Strategy and Airpower

Reading and listening to political scientists discuss policy for Libya, I was sure I had been exposed to everything stupid that could be stated in a strategic context regarding airpower.

I was wrong.

It turns out the fantasy land filled with political science majors touting decisive airpower tactics like No-Fly Zones in foreign civil wars is potentially more coherent than what is being printed these days in Air and Space Journal, Air University Press.

Strategy and Airpower (PDF)
Col John A. Warden III, USAF, Retired
Air University's Air and Space Power Journal
Spring 2011
Vol XXV, No. 1

Selected Excerpts:

"Airpower enables us to think about conflict from a future-back, end-game-first perspective as opposed to one based on the battle obsession of Clausewitz and his followers. It also opens another very exciting possibility: conflict with little or no unplanned destruction or shedding of blood."

"So here is a proposition: let us resolve to expunge the words fighting, battle, shape the battlefield, battlespace, and the war fighter from our vocabulary, to relegate the "means" of war to the last thing we think about, and to elevate the "end" to the pedestal of our consideration. In other words, let's bury thousands of years of bloody battle stories, as heroic as they were, and start looking at war-and eventually airpower-from its end point, which by definition means from a strategic perspective."

"Movement from the parallel domain to the serial domain causes the probability of success to begin to fall dramatically. Taking a very long time decreases the chances considerably. It isn't impossible to win a long war, but the odds are very low-and this applies to both sides, despite significant differences in their centers of gravity. Since good strategy depends heavily on understanding probabilities, deliberately embarking on a low-probability, long serial war does not make much sense."

"Very simply, whether in war or business, our normal approach to the time element is exactly backward: we ask ourselves how long something will take rather than decide how long it should take in order to create parallel effects and succeed at an acceptable cost."

"We should take a page from business, which long ago learned that selling a product had to involve much more than touting its technical goodness. Products sell because customers see them as filling a real need in their lives; airpower advocates have not done well in this regard. If airpower is something different, we must highlight its differences and show convincingly that it fills a vital need."

"Airpower exponents not only need to connect airpower directly to strategy and market their product well, but also need to start believing in it. Those who begin a discussion by noting that airpower "can't do everything" do themselves and their listeners a real disservice."

"Of course, espousing the unlimited concept of airpower exposes the advocate to charges of airpower zealotry, a lack of "jointness," or some other nasty label. But we need to become confident enough to shrug off these labels."

Everything I want to say about this article is negative, so I'll let readers lead the analysis here.

But I will make a side observation, particularly in light of that last paragraph which has been thrown at me lately in another discussion regarding the advocacy of seapower...

With professional articles like this, the United States Air Force continues to project themselves as unlearned Borg drones carpet bombing legitimate strategic thought with absurdity in the name of self relevance. Air Defense Press is struggling for legitimacy primarily because they have sacrificed everything to the alter of airpower advocacy.

Don't laugh Navy thinker, because if the Navy leadership ignores the Board of Directors at the US Naval Institute, this type of self-service incoherent bullshit sold to the alter of cash cow interests is exactly what people following USNI closely legitimately believe will begin happening to Proceedings starting this year. If you doubt what I am saying, you had better do your own research into the subject - indeed I encourage it.

The Navy cannot under any condition allow their strategic thought institutions, both inside and outside the Navy, become focused content shops shaping the message towards a specific point of view. To understand why, simply look at the Air Force.

Not the Stuff of Bud Light Lime

I've been reading the latest cover story of Rolling Stones by Michael Hastings titled Another Runaway General: Army Deploys Psy-Ops on U.S. Senators. This is a very well written article, so I encourage people to read it before reading further. Reading the article is quite necessary to understand what is actually happening here.

Read it? Good.

I have taken from the article all of the quotes from Lt. Colonel Michael Holmes that were used to frame the context of the story. Holmes is the leader of the information operations unit that works for Lt. Gen. William Caldwell. I have intentionally left out all the "context" Michael Hastings added to the story to frame the narrative.

The way the article is written, one would likely get the impression some shenanigans were going on in Caldwell's office. Perhaps, however, if we add our own context to the very same statements, a different picture emerges.

It starts with Lt. Colonel Michael Holmes describing in his words what his job as a social software internet messageboard warrior is in the Army.

My job in psy-ops is to play with people’s heads, to get the enemy to behave the way we want them to behave"

"I’m prohibited from doing that to our own people. When you ask me to try to use these skills on senators and congressman, you’re crossing a line."

Facebook friending a House Armed Service Committee member is bad. Got it. No Farmville with the Senator from North Dakota. Got it.

This is where it gets interesting, because this is where Lt. Gen. Caldwell assigns Lt. Colonel Holmes a job to do.

According to Holmes, who attended at least a dozen meetings with Caldwell to discuss the operation, the general wanted the IO unit to do the kind of seemingly innocuous work usually delegated to the two dozen members of his public affairs staff: compiling detailed profiles of the VIPs, including their voting records, their likes and dislikes, and their "hot-button issues." In one email to Holmes, Caldwell’s staff also wanted to know how to shape the general’s presentations to the visiting dignitaries, and how best to "refine our messaging."

According to Holmes, the general wanted the IO team to provide a "deeper analysis of pressure points we could use to leverage the delegation for more funds."

The team was also instructed to "prepare the context and develop the prep package for each visit."

"How do we get these guys to give us more people?" he demanded. "What do I have to plant inside their heads?"

In other words, Lt. Colonel Holmes and his IO team are being asked to take a break from their messageboard warrior time and Facebook friend time and being delegated to do staff nerd work, and their job is to prepare Lt. Gen. Caldwell for the dog and pony show of visiting VIPs. The ego of this Holmes guy is incredible, because he is making the suggestion through this Rolling Stones article that his skills with a keyboard are so l33t, the simple task of being assigned the role to prepare a General for a briefing with VIPs equates to an information operation against elected officials by deploying his Google searches and subsequent analysis as an influence weapon. The irony is, this kind of staff work is usually done by someone all the time, and the great offense here is that the IO Team, which is basically a social software debate club, is being assigned this work. The shame!

How did Holmes approach his responsibility as a staff nerd?

"We called it Operation Fourth Star," says Holmes. "Caldwell seemed far more focused on the Americans and the funding stream than he was on the Afghans. We were there to teach and train the Afghans. But for the first four months it was all about the U.S. Later he even started talking about targeting the NATO populations."

Under duress, Holmes and his team provided Caldwell with background assessments on the visiting senators, and helped prep the general for his high-profile encounters. But according to members of his unit, Holmes did his best to resist the orders.

In other words, being delegated to a mere research assistant was so offensive, that he lashes out at his boss for giving him the remedial task of providing "Caldwell with background assessments on the visiting senators" to help "prep the general for his high-profile encounters." Instead of doing the work assigned as ordered, because Holmes thinks his keyboard skills are lethal, he "did his best to resist the orders."

Are you kidding me? A disgruntled Lt. Col. who normally does information operations in the Facebook fan club of Caldwell's social software shop gets assigned staff work for VIP visits, and the article frames that assignment to Holmes - leveraging his opinion of being assigned what he considers work beneath his keyboard skill set - as a crime? Yep, and that context is reinforced by the author with this statement in the article.

In a statement to Rolling Stone, a spokesman for Caldwell "categorically denies the assertion that the command used an Information Operations Cell to influence Distinguished Visitors."

That statement is accurate, because for it to be inaccurate we would have to believe that the research skills of Lt. Col. Holmes are so incredible that his background research alone can "influence Distinguished Visitors." Does Michael Hastings realize the insult he is delivering regarding the intelligence of Congressmen and Senators for that assertion of his to be true?

Some are suggesting there needs to be an investigation. Based on what, the claim by Hastings that Holmes is so skilled at research that such research is influential to the point that it represents an information operation? Seriously, show me the allegation by Holmes that something illegal took place, because the article makes clear he was asked to do prep work for VIP visitors, and the implication being made here is that only because it was HOLMES who was asked to do that work is it somehow improper. Oh no, dude has to do work other than counter Jihad on the messageboards... oh the shame - the criminal shame!

Sorry folks, but I don't see this as the stuff of Bud Light Lime. The only allegation being made is that Caldwell dared to ask this Holmes and his internet nerds to research and plan for a visit by VIPs for the purposes of briefing and prepping Caldwell for the visit, and the intent was so that Caldwell would be prepared to communicate more effectively his needs for more money and more people. Those are the specific allegations made by Holmes in the story, everything else in the story was the narrative that implied illegal activity added by Michael Hastings.

All we have learned is that either Holmes of Hastings are excellent at PSY-OPs, because either Holmes pulled an excellent PSY-OP over Hastings to burn his former boss in Rolling Stones magazine, or Hastings pulled an excellent PSY-OP on Rolling Stones readers to suggest that Army staff work done for the purposes of preparing for VIP visits is criminal.

What I see here is a disgruntled staff officer with an axe to grind against his boss, and a reporter willing to play along.

All Budgets Are Not Equal

I constantly pick on the Air Force, but because it is Friday and I have a three day weekend coming up - today I'm going to give them some rare attention by playing the role of an Air Force blogger.

The DEW Line has a nice little blog post on aviation, which is actually a live feed of reporting from the other day when the DoD budget was released. While they are covering aviation in all three services, I was mostly looking to see if there was anything interesting happening in Naval Aviation.

In his post, Stephen Trimble makes a comment I want to expand on a bit.

Top-line budget documents show how the DoD has requested $44 billion to spend on aircraft procurement next year. It's always amazing to me that the navy spends more money on aircraft than the air force!

Yep, every year the Navy spends more on aircraft than the Air Force, but it is important to note that the Air Force budget has long been like a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma. If you ever dig into the Air Force budget you will find there is a mini-budget that is about as transparent as the Peoples Liberation Army budget, and it has been like that for several years.

The Air Force FY12 baseline budget is $166.3 billion. For comparison, the Navy baseline FY12 budget is $161.4 billion. Wow, the Air Force gets more money, right? Not really. If you go to page 7 of this Air Force Budget rollout brief (PDF), you can get a good idea of what I'm talking about. There are basically three Air Force budgets; Blue, Non-Blue, and OCO. Just so everyone knows, OCO stands for Overseas Contingency Operations and every military service has an OCO budget, which for the Air Force is $16.4 billion in FY12.

The Blue budget is the vast majority of the actual Air Force budget, and in FY 2012 the Air Force has budgeted $119 billion in the blue budget. This budget include Military Personnel Costs, R&D, Procurement, Military Construction, Health Care, Housing, Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC), and Operations and Maintenance.

Lets think about something for a second.

The Navy budget is $161.4 billion.. Of that, the Navy is spending $18.775 billion on Navy and Marine Corps aviation, which comes to about 11.6% of the Navy budget being spent on aviation.

The Air Force budget is $166.3 billion. However, the Air Force also has a "Non-Blue" budget of $30.9 billion that must be subtracted, leaving the Air Force with a "Blue" budget of $135.4 billion. Of that, the Air Force is spending $17.897 billion on Air Force aviation, which comes to about 13.2% of the Air Force budget being spent on aviation.

By numbers alone the Navy does spend more money on aviation than the Air Force, but by percentage of budget the Air Force spends more money on aviation. By now you are probably wondering what the "Non Blue" budget is.

Well, I think we all would love to know. The "Non-Blue" budget in the FY 12 Air Force budget is $30.9 billion. Historically, about 15% of the "Non-Blue" budget is spend on Health programs and Special Operations. The other 85% is where the Office of the Secretary of Defense has traditionally put all their classified stuff in the DoD budget (most of which is intel, so it is said), and the funding directive for that money in the Air Force budget isn't actually the Air Force, rather historically OSD decides what to spend that money on.

So in FY 2012, based on historical patterns, there is a bit over $26 billion worth of classified goodies hidden in the Air Force "Non Blue" budget. It has been suggested this is how the Air Force pays for mystery space planes, but also why even though the Air Force baseline budget is higher than the Navy's baseline budget, the Navy has a higher top line to work from and can spend more money on aircraft than the Air Force every year.

In the Spirit of Lies and Secrecy

I've been thinking about this discussion on Wikileaks by Glenn Greenwald all day. I was unimpressed with the personal attacks and respectfully disagree with several points, but in general I think that article makes several compelling arguments regarding the abuse of power behind the veil of secrecy, and might be one of the best contributions in support of Wikileaks in the discussion I have seen yet.

I particularly enjoyed the part where Bill Keller is thoroughly mocked, shamed, and disgraced. That alone makes the article worth reading.

These things were on my mind when I read Bill Gertz tonight.

The Obama administration, despite public denials, held secret talks with Russia aimed at reaching a ballistic missile defense agreement that Moscow ultimately rejected in May, according to an internal State Department report.

Disclosure of the report to The Washington Times comes as Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on Tuesday pressed for a new anti-ballistic missile treaty, warning that a failure to reach an agreement would trigger a new strategic arms race.

The four-page document circulated on Capitol Hill stated that administration officials held four meetings with the Russians and last spring presented a draft Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation Agreement (BMDCA) to Russian negotiators.

The internal report contradicts congressional testimony by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates in June denying a missile defense deal was in the works.

So Hillary Clinton and Robert Gates lied under oath in testimony to Congress. This revelation carries almost no significance anymore though, because being dishonest under oath has become common place on Capital Hill and no one - ever - gets called out for it.

Whether you are the Secretary of Defense or a major league baseball player - committing perjury isn't enforced on Capital Hill. If the people who write laws do not enforce laws like perjury committed against them - then what exactly is the value of a nation that claims rule of law when the law is selectively enforced - and often excused - when the lawbreakers are the rich and powerful? Good thing US Navy Admirals never lie to Congress under oath.

Oh, wait, damn!

No problem, in the 21st century tradition of Navy accountability ashore - that particular Admiral was promoted.

Is the Missile Actually an Airplane Contrail?

There is some very good analysis here on whether this is a missile or the contrail of an aircraft.

Other good analysis over at the New Scientist is good enough for Jeffery Lewis to call it a contrail.

A jet contrail viewed from just the right angle looks a lot like a missile launch. There is an actual blog called Contrail Science (How awesome is that!) that is getting slammed with traffic. The overflow site, though, is still up and I think the author, who is an anonymous pilot, has this one dead to rights. And, of course, there is the Jonathan McDowell rule: When in doubt, just agree with Jonathan, who explains

“If it’s coming over the horizon, straight at you, then it rises quickly above the horizon,” he told New Scientist. “You can’t tell because it’s so far away that it’s getting closer to you - you’d think it was just going vertically up,” he says.

The fact that it occurred at twilight would have emphasised the contrail, he adds. “It’s critical that it’s at sunset - it’s a low sun angle. It really illuminates the contrail and makes it look very dense and bright.”

The short explanation is that we don’t see a lot of jet contrails head-on, especially from the vantage point of a helicopter. So, it looks like a missile to everyone else, including former Deputy Secretaries of Defense. But it probably isn’t.

That would explain why no one else in LA saw a missile launch other than the helicopter crew — or, rather, why everyone else from every other angle saw a typical jet contrail — and why DSP didn’t light up like a Christmas Tree.

It makes sense and I think it is the best explanation I have seen yet, but I'd like to know why NORTHCOM can't link it to a specific flight after 20 hours. If I am watching this video and the aircraft is flying towards and over the camera in the helicopter - rather than away from the camera - then the issue being dealt with here is irresponsible media reporting.

After all, the rest of the camera footage should eventually reveal an aircraft that would responsibly explain the contrail images.

Israeli Submarines - Maybe Not?

This AFP story is what started the list of news stories claiming Israel had accepted two new submarines.

Now I am hearing from a friend at Janes that "HDW confirmed to us that construction is still in progress and no deliveries have taken place."

I'll take the word of the folks at Janes over the word of AFP every time. I can't imagine Israel would complain about the news article though, this type of military disinformation propaganda is what they do to keep everyone else guessing.

Lind's Blinders...

Due to my current contract, I am not allowed to embrace the technical debate that would explain how William Lind apparently doesn't know anything about the Information Technology business, much less Cyber Security for the Department of Defense for the United States of America. He can chase black helicopters and conspiracy theories all day, but I'd bet at least 5 shots of Canadian Whiskey (I'm a Crown Royal fan until summer gets here) that the problem that triggered his rant doesn't originate in the DoD or any government entity, rather the private sector.

But I will say this. There are several legitimate reasons why websites, blogs, and other forms of social media sites on the web are blocked. If your website or blog is blocked, please understand you can do something about it besides whine.

Use Feedburner, or some other form of syndication software to distribute your content, including by email. Organizations including the military may block Blogger but typically they do not block syndication service sites because from an IT perspective, syndication services like Feedburner is a better way to manage bandwidth for larger enterprises. If an organization is blocking syndication sites too, then your organization has a very strict IT policy, BUT if your favorite websites are distributing content by email, problem solved.

For all you Pentagon folks, I have no idea what man made act of God has allowed this blog to survive the kill lists. All I know is that I owe someone, somewhere a drink. However, if it ever does get blocked, you know how to get around that problem. Also, the reason why you are restricted to so many places you believe you should have access to is because technology has not evolved as far as we would all like. The DoD, just like every other large enterprise, can only afford a single backbone for most internet access, and because private information tends to run on that same backbone, until the services can come up with the money, equipment, and manpower to deploy multiple backbones and separate internal and external access, you will be in the same boat as the vast majority of major companies in the United States...

and live with some form of website filtering restrictions.

The Super Sexy Pirate Fighting US Navy

Under the Bush administration, every time an aircraft carrier would deploy the news would report that it was being sent over to the Middle East specifically to threaten Iran. Well, as if that wasn't dumb enough, with the departure of the Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group over the weekend, Martin Sieff is reporting that the US Navy is deploying an aircraft carrier battle group to fight pirates.

Why am I laughing...

As was previously mentioned, the Eisenhower CSG will be replacing the Theodore Roosevelt CSG already operating in the region. The TR CSG deployed in September, meaning the 6 month deployment will end in March which is when the Eisenhower CSG will arrive. There is about 0% chance the Eisenhower is being sent to fight pirates at a time when troop numbers are being increased in Afghanistan and air stations are being threatened, but hey... anything for a headline right?

What really caught my attention over the last few days was a few pictures uploaded to Navy.mil showing a little photo action with CTF-150 and CTF-151. All of the photos were dated Feb 20th. Sure it is sexy to see the USS Vella Gulf (CG 72), USS Mahan (DDG 72), and HDMS Absalon (L 16) sailing together, and while I'm tempted to sit quietly and admire these impressive pictures I find myself embarrassed a bit for the Navy.

According to this photograph, USS Monterey (CG 61) has joined CTF-151, bringing the total number of US ships in the anti-piracy task force up to 4 (that we know about), when you count USNS Lewis & Clark (T-AKE 1). With Monterey and Vella Gulf now part of CTF-151, the US Navy has committed their two largest surface combatants to the pirate fight, and when you add up the manpower of both ships and throw in Mahan, I count over 1000 sailors taking on this challenge... on three ships.

If we could possibly be less efficient or more expensive way to fight pirates with our surface combatant forces, I'm not sure how. 1000 sailors on only three ships. How is it possible to pretend to justify this type of activity in a time of fiscal contraction? People tell me we cannot afford small ships for these low intensity challenges. Do the math, we can't afford not to field small ships for these challenges.

Another question I have is, why are we massing our ships for a photo opportunity off the coast of Somalia? I thought the coast of Somalia was something like 1880 miles long, which means if we are protecting out to 200 miles off the coast, the coalition naval forces are together patrolling somewhere around 376,000 square miles. That is roughly the size of New Mexico, Arizona, and Nevada PLUS West Virginia.

It is hardly a surprise that three days later pirates hijacked a Greek-owned coal carrier.

So what is really going on? If we have time for pictures, the answer is nothing. It seems to me the US Navy is waiting to see what they can do with the pirates they have already captured before moving forward again. Navy Times is observing the developments:

The pirates are supposed to stay aboard temporarily until the U.S. can arrange for them to go to a Kenya-based special pirate court. But as of Feb. 19, details for the transfer hadn’t been worked out.

In other words, we have a floating prison ship and no idea what to do with the pirate prisoners. In the meantime we don't do much to fight piracy because we don't have very many ships to do it, not to mention we don't want to end up with even more prisoners we can't drop off anywhere. Despite nearly 20 additional naval vessels from the worlds most powerful Naval powers, pirate hijackings in 2009 are already up four times what they were at this point last year, and the early part of the year is supposed to be the slow season.

Something else to think about:

"We provide them food; showers; good hygiene; we give them a climate-controlled environment; a very spacious area to live in — they’re probably living better here than they were on their ships.”

Their ships? It is probably better living on the USNS Lewis and Clark (T-AKE 1) than it is in Somalia. Imagine our definition of punishment. We take them out of the hell on earth that is Somalia, put them on a climate controlled ship, give them food, showers, and probably hand out some sort of comfortable clothing. Are we sure this is the most effective way to deter piracy?

On second thought, maybe it is a good thing the Navy is posting sexy photo's of cool looking warships, because when you start to think about what is happening behind the scenes, there really isn't much good news for the good guys.

For the record, the title is snark.

Observing Today's Coast Guard Acquisition Approach

RADM Gary T. Blore, Assistant Commandant for Acquisition and Chief Acquisition Officer (CAO), participated in a blogger Roundtable last week. Blogger Roundtables are hit and miss, sometimes they are really good, sometimes not so much, but credit Jack, Jennifer, and co because they do a great job. Anytime I feel engaged in a conversation where I learn something new, I enjoy it. I learned a lot in this discussion. Jim Dolbow's questions were quite informed and interesting, as one would expect, and he discussed his questions and RADM Blore's answers over at the USNI Blog.

If you remember last week, it was pretty busy with plenty of interesting commentary regarding Navy acquisition, in particular shipbuilding. When Navy shipbuilding is the topic, I end up in dozens of offline discussions in a day regarding various ideas, etc.. of ships, and one discussion was regarding the Sentinel class. The offline discussion I was engaged in was whether the Sentinel class was a viable platform for littoral warfare with the Navy. My answer to that is emphatically, no. But I do think the Sentinel class is brilliant for the Coast Guard, and I was one of the people who actually read the entire GAO summery regarding the protest.

In the spirit of that discussion I decided to throw RADM Blore a softball question (PDF Transcript) first so he could explain the Sentinel class acquisition process.

RAYMOND: Hi, Admiral. This is Raymond Pritchett from Information Dissemination.

I wanted to ask about the Sentinel class, which -- I noticed you put a little blurb up on the commandant's blog that highlighted the GAO summary. And I was one of the people who read through the whole summary, and it seems to me that this validates the Sentinel class development process as a bright star in terms of shipbuilding in the United States right now for our military services.

So can you kind of walk through -- you identify the requirement, you set the requirements for the ship, you -- I mean, the whole process up through the point where you -- this is how we envision it being utilized off the coast of the United States, because there were some interesting things about it. It's one of those programs where it looks like it's an evolution of an existing program. Can you kind of summarize that in a generic sense for me?

ADM. BLORE: Sure, and we have several openings in acquisition, because you sound pretty knowledgeable. So keep us in mind if you'd like a federal job.

Yeah, let me quickly review what we tried to incorporate in the Sentinel class patrol boat. That was a very important project to us. As may have been a little bit inferred in Raymond's question, we've gone through about two years of what we'd call acquisition reform. We had some acquisition projects in our past that did not run smoothly. We've learned a lot of lessons for those, and we've incorporated those lessons into a new reorganized acquisition organization.
And the Sentinel class really does represent a star for us, because it really started with the new acquisition organization going up through contract awards. So, you know, here is the types of things that are in place for the Sentinel.

In this particular case, it's a parent craft. And by parent craft, we mean we're modifying an existing proven design, and when the Coast Guard feel that can be a very successful acquisition strategy and help control costs, as long as the final version that you're going to build is fairly close to what the parent was.

The second thing is, we're having it classed by the American Bureau of Shipping. So we're going to have independent assess theirs -- assessors in the yard with Bollinger reviewing what they're doing, so that it can be classed. We've required in the contract that the designer, which is Damen, is physically there for any design changes and approves any design changes as part of the contract.
We have government personnel that we've established in a project resident office that will be onsite at Bollinger inspecting -- checking quality control, quality assurance; and overseeing the work. It's a fixed-price contract, which we prefer because that sets up good expectations between the manufacturer and us on what's expected. And those are -- that's kind of in a nutshell.
Those are the kinds of things that any new acquisition that we do -- other than the parent craft itself because that applies to some things; may not apply to the others -- but those elements of independent review, onsite government inspection -- I neglected to mention the role of the United States Navy, because we've partnered very closely with the United States Navy on this to help us with cost estimating, review of designs, that sort of thing. And of course, within the Coast Guard, what we refer to as our own technical authorities: our engineering community, our naval engineers and naval
architects, and our C4ISR engineers, and our human resources engineers, in essence, that look at training and the ergonomics for safety of design.

So all those folks are incorporated in this in, I think, a fairly efficient manner, if you look at the time line. But we believe all those elements that I just spoke about represent critical cornerstones of how you can do an acquisition project well.

RAYMOND: What maturity percentage would you mark the Sentinel class at? I mean, 50 percent, 75 percent? In terms of the design maturity.

ADM. BLORE: The design maturity is very mature. I'm not going to give you a number. We did rate it for technological maturity and production maturity.
The modifications we're making to it are not substantial. There's a stern ramp that's being installed which is based off a stern ramp that's already been done on a Damen smaller-class boat that the Coast Guard uses. The parent craft itself operates with stern ramps in other parts of the world, and the parent craft itself has been built by several other countries.

So as far as the production maturity, it's about as mature as you can get. We are making a stern ramp modification. I think our propulsion system is slightly different, although it's pretty much the standard MTU twin-diesel propulsion system. So I would say it's very production mature.

RAYMOND: And you're doing fixed pricing, so I assume you have a rough estimate on the average cost per unit?

ADM. BLORE: Right. We will. I'd rather wait a little bit, because we're doing that right now, as far as our integrated master schedule and cost analysis with the manufacturer. The first element of the contract that was awarded was $88 million, and that's for the first production. But of course, there's a lot of non-recurring costs with the first haul. And it's the government's option -- government option as to whether we want to go forward with the options in the contract.
I'm sure we will.

But if you ask the same question in about six, seven weeks I can give you a lot better figure. By then we'll be further along in the design.

RAYMOND: All right. Thank you.

I really have nothing to add to that. Observe for a moment the state of Coast Guard acquisition.

Everything is transparent. RADM Blore wasted no time telling everyone that there was cost growth in the Bertholf program, indeed he also called a press conference the same day to discuss the issues in detail. It isn't a unique situation, anytime there is an acquisition problem the first thing we see is the Coast Guard call a press conference, and RADM Blore attends every one of them. It isn't just RADM Blore though, I've noticed that the Commandant even attends some of these bad news press conferences. But here is the key, and why I think many CG acquisition critics simply don't get it...

The Coast Guard answers every single acquisition question and follows up to every single request for information, and if the information requested isn't sensitive, they give details. The Coast Guard is a small organization that maximizes funding through "parent" design evolutions with a focus on acquiring mature technologies. What is there not to like? Well, the biggest complaint I hear about Coast Guard acquisition is in regards to TEMPEST.

So I started looking into TEMPEST, and I couldn't believe what I found.

TEMPEST is the most overrated problem in modern defense spending history, and it isn't close... and the facts prove it. Find me someone who thinks TEMPEST problems are a really big deal worthy of bitching at the Coast Guard, and whether they are elected or not, I'll show you a certified, card carrying dumbass. Without question, Michael Dekort is one of the most overrated defense whistleblowers in my life time. The guy sacrificed his career to call out a problem with TEMPEST that SPAWAR had not yet been given a chance to evaluate in full. Are you telling me the smoking gun here is a revelation of a problem at a time before SPAWAR had completed its full evaluation? For his sake Mr. DeKort turned out to be a useful propaganda tool for politicians and Coast Guard critics. Some legacy...

When you think about how much midnight oil has been burned over TEMPEST with congressional hearings, news stories, etc... did anyone ever think to ask how much all of this "TEMPEST" stuff actually costs? Do you know how much money we have wasted over all these years of "TEMPEST problems" in the Coast Guard?

The total cost growth for TEMPEST on the Bertholf is $4 million, and that ship costs $700 million. That is not even 1%. The total cost growth related to TEMPEST for all programs is less than $10 million. When I read folks pointing to TEMPEST as the red flag for problems in Coast Guard acquisition, and these several years later we are talking about a defense problem that has grown in cost less than $10 million... I think the whole conversation is really intellectually stupid. TEMPEST is only a $10 million problem in all programs combined, and SPAWAR is part of the certification process to give recommendations. Like I said, TEMPEST is the most overrated problem in defense acquisition, and it ain't close.

I'll bet a pint of local brew the Coast Guard has spent more explaining TEMPEST issues over the last three years due to bad PR by Mr. DeKort than they have spent actually fixing TEMPEST issues on their ships, meaning the only real effect Mr. DeKort can be credited for is compounding the cost to taxpayers of TEMPEST. I'd love to see that analysis in a CRS report for Rep. Sanchez and Rep. Carney, because to be real honest, I think their time is more valuable than Mr. DeKort's ten million dollar temper tantrum.

Moving on...

After throwing a softball to RADM Blore with the first question, I decided to throw him a curve ball for the second question.

RAYMOND: Admiral, this is Raymond Pritchett. I have a question. You've talked a little bit about the offshore patrol cutter. Have you guys set up any sort of requirements for that vessel yet, or is that still over the horizon and just in development phase? I mean, I'm just thinking, have you thought about what size and some sort of ship requirements? I haven't seen anything. I was just wondering if there was anything that's been discussed.

ADM. BLORE: Yes. (silence)

ALL: (Laughs)

RAYMOND: Good answer, I guess. So there's nothing public, though?

ADM. BLORE: Actually, some of it's public, sir. And what we're doing is, we had an earlier question about the Sentinel patrol boat and how we did that acquisition. And we're actually following that pattern right now with the offshore patrol cutter.

So last year, I think it was in the September-October time frame, we published a request for information. That's in the public domain. And that basically asked for worldwide designs and vessels that were already in service that kind of met the general requirements of an offshore patrol cutter class -- you know, between like, you know, 250 and 400 feet, and with, you know, rough capabilities that we were looking for.

And we got a bunch of responses in on that. We hired an independent third party, just like we did with the Sentinel class patrol boat, to review the input we got and make sure that -- you know, because it's everything from 80-page detailed reports to three- page marketing glossies on a particular manufacturer. So we had the independent kind of do some analysis to make sure that the data we had was accurate. At the same time, we've engaged our engineering forces under our technical authority to start doing some preliminary point designs and to also start doing trade-off analysis, which we also have a research and development center under my jurisdiction working on. So for example, you know, if you have an offshore patrol cutter of a certain size, and it does 25 knots, and you want to drive it 3 knots faster, what kind of trade-offs are going to take place?

How is that going to affect length? How is that going to affect shaft horsepower? How is that going to affect cost?

So all that analysis is being pulled together now. We're starting to do the briefings within the Coast Guard. Our hope was that by the end of March we'd have a much better feeling for what's available worldwide, and then we're matching that against a parallel effort which is also taking place where we've designed what we call our preliminary operational requirements document. And that's a fairly broad-based document, but it starts narrowing the focus down on what are the types of capabilities that would be attractive to us in an off-shore patrol cutter.

And as you do this analysis, as you kind of look at what the world has available versus what the Coast Guard needs, then you have to make some hard choices based on -- again, using cost as an independent variable of what, you know, the nation can afford for the Coast Guard to operate.
So that's where we are. I think you'll probably see something more in the public domain after April, May, hopefully coming out with a request for proposal this summer. And that request for proposal, of course, would have all the details of the requirements that we're looking for.

RAYMOND: And has there been any influence to look at the littoral combat ship platforms?

ADM. BLORE: Absolutely, yeah. We're looking at both parent craft concepts like we're doing with the patrol boat and original design, like we did with the National Security Cutter, and there's pros and cons of both, as you may be aware of. And we're balancing those pros and cons.
And certainly, the littoral combat ship could be looked at as a parent craft and whether it would be, you know, wise for us to use that platform would really depend on how many modifications would need to be made to meet our requirements.

RAYMOND: Thank you, Admiral.

This is what I see. When Gene Taylor suggests the NSC can replace the LCS, he is wrong. The LCS is meeting a requirement for forward deploying unmanned systems technology, and while we can disagree how the Navy should be meeting this requirement, there is no question the NSC does not meet that requirement.

The same applies to the suggestion the LCS should be the Offshore Patrol Cutter. I heard a good analogy on this topic today, and I'm stealing it. The Coast Guard is looking for a Mercedes to fill a requirement, but a bunch of folks see the LCS and are trying to tell the Coast Guard "hey, just take this bus instead of your Mercedes" simply because it is available.

I have a better idea. Why not design a joint CG/Navy littoral/offshore warship from scratch and lets start talking about the National Fleet, starting small instead of big, bring in the Marines for input, and with a ground up approach see what we can come up with.

Was Mumbai a Navy problem or a Coast Guard problem? I can't wait to read the RAND report on the lessons of Mumbai (PDF) and see if they even addressed that question. What about piracy off Somalia, is it a Navy problem or a Coast Guard problem? These questions are not simple, not when the Navy is being asked to make arrests of pirates so they can stand trial, and the Coast Guard may be asked to shoot up terrorists storming Miami beach. I'm looking forward to Bob Works Navy report next week, because if my instincts are right, I bet he'll have a few things to say about a National Fleet approach to a future fleet.

And in my opinion, the Offshore Patrol Cutter looks like a great place to start the National Fleet discussion for addressing the low intensity level of war at sea, the human terrain in the littorals, and the low intensity challenges both the Coast Guard and Navy are being asked to address at home and abroad.

Thanks to RADM Blore (and Laura) for answering my questions, both in the roundtable and offline.

A Defense Program With Its Own PAC?

Is it possible for a specific defense program to have its own Political Action Committee? Or something similar...

Just Might be!

It is actually a smart idea. Keep in mind this platform may have touch to as many as half a million American jobs, is the only Navy shipbuilding program on cost and schedule, and is much more advanced than what we intend to replace it with. It might even end up the same cost as the lesser capable replacement, we just don't know...

There is much disinformation about this program. DDG-1000 is such a strange concept for a ship anyway, and because no one has been able to establish any credible authority the rest of us don't really know who to believe.

Media Disinformation on Navy Sonar Case

Who got it wrong? Try the AP, ABC, LA Times, New York Times, AFP, Wired, The Wall Street Journal, Reuters, CNN, MSNBC, and Foxnews. Most of those news services didn't even get the decision right, and honestly I doubt any of them care.

The Supreme Court decision today was 6-3, not 5-4 as most of those reports claim. Justices Alito, Scalia, Thomas and Kennedy joined an opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts. Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Stevens joined as to the concurrence. Ginsburg and Souter dissented outright. You can read the decision yourself here (PDF).

How did the media get it wrong? Well, mostly because nobody but the Navy and a few environmental groups actually cares about this stuff, and the media was ready and willing to immediately hear what the National Resource Defense Council was saying and buy into their dishonest characterization immediately. This was not a case of Navy vs the Whale, this was a case where the Navy wanted the application of science, and the environmental groups wanted to apply restrictions absent the application of science.

Despite what you may have heard, the Navy will still take great care in preventing harm to ocean mammals. Here are some things you probably don't know.

The research that discovers the deep dive patterns of beaked whales was funded, and discovered by the US Navy. The Navy didn't know, the environmentalists didn't know, nobody knew just 4 years ago why or if beaked whales were being damaged by sonar. The Navy funded a study, which is not uncommon since the US Navy funds more research on oceanic mammals than the rest of the world combined, and found that beaked whales could hold their breath for up to an hour, usually around 45 minues, and would dive very deep where no one was looking. Because they would only surface about 30 times a day, no one knew how many of beaked whales there were.

Upon discovery of the beaked whale population, the Navy found that high intensity mid-frequency sonar could effect beaked whales that were hundreds of feet underwater. The whales would surface rapidly as a result of the sound, and this was contributing to their deaths, often resulting in the whales being washed up on shore. The Navy took action implimenting the famous 29 rules to protect marine mammals, rules that will still exist after this court ruling.

All of the ranges determined in the 29 rules were determined by research funded by the Navy. Is the research tainted? Nope, the Navy funded these groups to conduct the research, to insure independence. The National Resource Defense Council blew smoke up the ass of the mainstream media today, didn't mention any of that, and nobody in the media cared to fact check.

What are the 29 measures? Well, you can't find them online anywhere, trust me I've looked. Then I asked for them, and it turns out very few had ever asked for them before. Clearly, the Navy has taken the issue seriously, because this is how it is even after the decision.

Mid-Frequency Active Sonar Mitigation Measures during Major Training Exercises or within Established DoD Maritime Ranges and Established Operating Areas

I. General Maritime Protective Measures: Personnel Training:

1. All lookouts onboard platforms involved in ASW training events will review the NMFS approved Marine Species Awareness Training (MSAT) material prior to use of mid-frequency active sonar (MFA).

2. All Commanding Officers, Executive Officers, and officers standing watch on the bridge will have reviewed the MSAT material prior to a training event employing the use of MFA.

3. Navy lookouts will undertake extensive training in order to qualify as a watchstander in accordance with the Lookout Training Handbook (NAVEDTRA 12968-B).

4. Lookout training will include on-the-job instruction under the supervision of a qualified, experienced watch stander. Following successful completion of this supervised training period, lookouts will complete the Personal Qualification Standard program, certifying that they have demonstrated the necessary skills (such as detection and reporting of partially submerged objects). This does not preclude personnel being trained as lookouts fiom being counted as those listed in previous measures so long as supervisors monitor their progress and performance.

5. Lookouts will be trained in the most effective means to ensure quick and effective communication within the command stnrcture in order to facilitate implementation of protective measures if marine species are spotted.

II. General Maritime Protective Measures: Lookout and Watchstander Responsibilities:

6. On the bridge of surface ships, there will always be at least three people on watch whose duties include observing the water surface around the vessel.

7. In addition to the three personnel on watch noted previously, all surface ships participating in ASW exercises will, have at all times during the exercise at least two additional personnel on watch as lookouts.

8. Personnel on lookout and officers on watch on the bridge will have at least one set of binoculars available for each person to aid in the detection of marine mammals.

9. On surface vessels equipped with MFA, pedestal-mounted "Big Eye" (20x1 10) binoculars will be present and in good working order to assist in the detection of marine mammals in the vicinity of the vessel.

10. Personnel on lookout will employ visual search procedures employing a scanning methodology in accordance with the Lookout Training Handbook (NAVEDTRA 12968-B).

11. After sunset and prior to sunrise, lookouts will employ Night Lookout Techniques in accordance with the Lookout Training Handbook.

12. Personnel on lookout will be responsible for reporting all objects of anomalies sighted in the water (regardless of the distance from the vessel) to the Officer of the Deck, since any object or disturbance (e.g. trash, periscope, surface disturbance, discoloration) in the water may be indicative of a threat to the vessel and its crew or indicative of a marine species that may need to be avoided as warrented.

III. Operating Procedures

13. A Letter of Instruction, Mitigation Measures Message, or Environmental Annex to the Operational Order will be issued prior to the exercise to disseminate further the personel training requirement and general marine mammal protective measures.

14. Commanding Officers will make use of marine species detection cues and information to limit interaction with marine species to the maximum extent possible consistent with safety of the ship.

15. All personnel engaged in passive acoustic sonar operation (including aircraft, surface ships, or submarines) will monitor for marine mammel vocalizations and report the detection of any marine mammal to the appropriate watch station for dissemination and appropriate action.

16. During MFA operations, personnel will utilize all available sensor and optical systems (such as Night Vision Goggles) to aid in the detection of marine mammals.

17. Navy aircraft participating in exercises at sea will conduct and maintain, when operationally feasible and safe, surveillance for marine species of concern as long as it does not violate safety constraints or interfere with the accomplishment of primary operational duties.

18. Aircraft with deployed sonobouys will use only the passive capability of sonobouys when marine mammals are detected within 200 yards of the sonobouy.

19. Marine mammal detections will be immediately reported to the assigned Aircraft Control Unit for further dissemination to ships in teh vicinity of the marine species as appropriate when it is reasonable to conclude that the course of the ship will likely result in a closing of the distance to the detected marine mammal.

20. Safety Zones - When marine mammals are detected by any means (aircraft, shipboard lookout, or acoustically) within 1,000 yards of the sonar dome (the bow), the ship or submarine will limit active transmission levels to at least 6 dB below normal operating levels.

(i) Ships and submarines will continue to limit maximum transmission levels by this 6 dB factor until the animal has been seen to leave the area, has not been detected for 30 minutes, or the vessel has transited more than 2,000 yards beyond the location of the last detection.

(ii) Should a marine mammal be detected within or closing to inside 500 yards of the sonar dome, active sonar transmissions will be limited to at least 10 dB below the equipment's normal operating level. Ships and submarines will continue to limit the maximum ping levels by this 10 dB factor until the animal has been seen to leave the area, has not been detected for 30 minutes, or the vessel has transited more than 2,000 yards beyond the location of the last detection.

(iii) Should the marine mammal be detected within or closing to inside 200 yards of the sonar dome, active sonar transmissions will cease. Sonar will not resume until the animal has been seen to leave the area, has not been detected for 30 minutes, or the vessel has transited more than 2,000 yards beyond the location of the last detection.

(iv) Special conditions applicable for dolphins and porpoises only: If, after conducting an initial maneuver to avoid close quarters with dolphins or porpoises, the Officer of the Deck concludes that dolphins or porpoises are deliberately closing to ride the vessel's bow wave, no further mitigation actions are necessary while the dolphins or porpoises continue to exhibit bow wave riding behavior.

(v) If the need for power-down should arise as detailed in "Safety Zones" above, the ship or submarine shall follow the requirements as though they were operating at 235 dB - the normal operating level (i.e., the first power-down will be to 229 dB, regardless of at what level above 235 sonar was being operated).

21. Prior to start-up or restart of active sonar, operators will check that the Safety Zone radius around the sound source is clear of marine mammals.

22. Sonar levels (generally) - The ship or submarine will operate sonar at the lowest practicable level, not to exceed 235 dB, except as required to meet tactical training objectives.

23. Helicopters shall observelswey the vicinity of an ASW exercise for 10 minutes before the first deployment of active (dipping) sonar in the water.

24. Helicopters shall not dip their sonar within 200 yards of a marine mammal and shall cease pinging if a marine mammal closes within 200 yards after pinging has begun.

25. Submarine sonar operators will review detection indicators of close-aboard marine mammals prior to the commencement of ASW operations involving active mid-fiequency sonar.

26. Increased vigilance during major ASW training exercises with tactical active sonar when critical conditions are present:

Based on lessons learned from strandings in the Bahamas (2000), the Madeiras(2000), the Canaries (2002) and Spain (2006), beached whales are of particular concern since they have been associated with MFA operations. Navy should avoid planning major ASW training exercises with MFA in areas where they will encounter conditions that, in their aggregate, may contribute to a marine mammal stranding event.

The conditions to be considered during exercise planning include:

1. Areas of at least 1,000 m depth near a shoreline where there is a rapid change in bathmetry on the order of 1,000-6,000 meters occurring across a relatively short horizontal distance (e.g., 5 nm).
2. Cases for which multivle shi~osr submarines [2 3)-operating MFA in the same area over extended periods of time [> 6 hours) in close proximity (I 10 nm apart).
3. An area surrounded by land masses, smarated bv less than 35 nm and at least 10 nm in length or an embayment, wherein operations involving multiple ships/subs (> or = 3) employing MFA near land may produce sound directed toward the channel or embayment that may cut off the lines of egress for marine mammals.
4. Although not as dominant a condition as bathyrnetric features, the historical presence of a simificant surface duct (i.e., a mixed layer of constant water temperature extending fiom the sea surface to 100 or more feet).

If the major exercise must occur in an area where the above conditions exist in their aggregate, these conditions must be fully analyzed in environmental planning documentation. Navy will increase vigilance by undertaking the following additional protective measure:

A dedicated aircraft (Navy asset or contracted aircraft) will undertake reconnaissance of the embayment or channel ahead of the exercise participants to detect marine mammals that may be in the area exposed to active sonar. Where practical, advance survey should occur within about two hours prior to MFA use, and periodic surveillance should continue for the duration of the exercise. Any unusual conditions (e.g., presence of sensitive species, groups of species milling out of habitat, any stranded animals) shall be reported to the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC), who should give consideration to delaying, suspending or altering the exercise.

All Safety Zone requirements described in Measure 20 apply.

The post-exercise report must include specific reference to any event conducted in areas where the above conditions exist, with exact location and timelduration of the event, and noting results of surveys conducted.

IV. Coordination and Reporting

27. Navy will coordinate with the local NMFS Stranding Coordinator regarding any unusual marine mammal behavior and any stranding, beached liveldead, or floating marine mammals that may occur at any time during or within 24 hours after completion of mid-frequency active sonar use associated with ASW training activities.

28. Navy will submit a report to the Office of Protected Resources, NMFS, within 120 days of the completion of a Major Exercise. This report must contain a discussion of the nature of the effects, if observed, based on both modeled results of real-time events and sightings of marine mammals.

29. If a stranding occurs during an ASW exercise, NMFS and Navy will coordinate to determine if MFA should be temporarily discontinued while the facts surrounding the stranding are collected.

Fact is, the Navy is a good steward of the environment, the National Resources Defense Council was never acting in good faith, and the media let them slide with their nonsense about how the Navy will now run around killing mammals and destroying the environment.

The heart of the case had nothing to do with whether the Navy "could use sonar" rather was specifically about "when and how it could use sonar." The matter in dispute was specific in regards to what ranges certain actions should be taken to mitigate damage to marine mammals. The best oceanic scientists in the country determined the ranges used in the Navy measures, judges came up distances during appeals absent any applied scientific research. The winner in the Supreme Court may have been the Navy, but ultimately the reason the decision was 6-3, particularly given how little the judges appeared to look at the science in the decision, was because the Navy had a scientific case and the National Research Defense Council and the 9th Circuit didn't.

It is really ignorant that so much science media ignores this aspect of the case, but it does show how little science is actually applied in the media these days once an issue becomes political.

We Can Now Kill the "Mystery Ship" Rumor

The MV Iran Deyanat might be the most popular commercial vessel in the world. Hijacked earlier this year off the coast of Somalia, the ship became the subject of wild speculation and conspiracy theory when a Somalian government minister claimed to Reuters that 16 pirates died attempting to open the cargo hold. A few more strange stories began popping up, including blisters, boils, and hair falling out of those exposed to the cargo of the ship.

At that point, the conspiracy theories became legand. Whether it was a dirty bomb to be used against Israel, nuclear cargo to be offloaded in Africa for Al Qaeda, or a simple case of illegal dumping of toxic materials by China off the coast of Somalia, something about the MV Iran Deyanat became perfect fodder. When the company that owned the Iran Deyanat got listed under sanctions due to ownership by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard 2 days before the rumors broke into the mainstream news, a legand was born.

When the MV Iran Deyanat was released in early October, the expectation was the ship could be boarded to inspect the cargo and explain some of the mysterious rumors that came about in the mainstream media. If there was such an inspection, it never made the news. The crew that was hijacked was replaced, and the ship continued on towards Rotterdam, its original destination.

Well, the MV Iran Deyanat popped up in the news again today, this time making port in Rotterdam. Not only was the ship deemed unsuspecting of any problems, but it underwent a normal inspection without issue and according to this news report, is tied up to bouy 29 without the necessity of extra security as the ship waits to unload cargo.

Hopefully this will allow the never ending conspiracy theory surrounding the ship die. Was there anything that made this ship unusual? Hell ya! Pirates turned down a $2 million dollar ransom at one point, the ship had an unusually long official transit log, Reuters reported on dead people and other health related problems of those exposed to the ship, and official government folks in Somalia threw plenty of gas on the fire. In the end, it amounted to nothing, adding just one more legend to the piracy off the Somalian coast.

Clearing the Air for Ballistic Missile Defense

If a major corporation in the defense industry makes their case for their product, we are interested. I don't want to see my tax money spent on a company that won't stand up for their product. Say what you want about Lockheed Martin, but we give them huge props here for one reason, Fred Moosally and several others from Lockheed Martin put themselves out there and sell their product to the American people. Whether I agree with them or not, at least they believe in their product, and are willing to engage the debate why it is superior.

Geoff Fein did an interview with Dan Smith (PDF), Raytheon president for Integrated Defense Systems division, and if Dan puts himself out there, we'll talk about it. In particular we want to talk about this great article by Geoff Fein, who we love on this blog. Well done by Dan Smith, facts from the July 31st hearing need to be told, and can only be explained if you guys get your ass out there more often. You allowed the Navy to put out disinformation on the SM-2 thing, and they certainly had me fooled. I don't like repeating disinformation, my readers deserve better. That issue still needs clarity, so do a follow up interview. You guys can hit your audience here if you want, we do a Guest Author Series you know...

For the first time since the July 31st hearing, Dan Smith rightfully points out that the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers are not built BMD capable. From Defense Daily (subscription only).

"There isn't a DDG-51 today that comes off of the production ways with BMD capability, for example. That's an upgrade to existing DDG-51s," he said. "When they get through the next phase of that...I think the Navy plan is to have like 15 destroyers which have what you would call rudimentary BMD, but those are upgrades, as opposed to a standard package coming off the production way. So there is some knowledge there that needs to be looked at with a little bit finer tooth comb."

And to do BMD a ship is going to need sensors, Smith added. "There really is no comparisons in capability between a DBR and a SPY-1D, either from a concurrency perspective...in other words how many phases can be in operation and how many modes at one time...or in just the capability to command the missile which is in the other end of the spectrum in the SM-3 (Standard Missile) mode."

Even if the Navy's proposal is approved and they go back to building DDG-51s, there is still opportunity for Raytheon, Smith added. "There is nothing that says you couldn't make the non-recurring investment to put much of Zumwalt into a new construction DDG-51 hull, that's what it was designed to do."

OK so lets detail exactly what Dan Smith of Raytheon is talking about. When Chairman Gene Taylor called a meeting of the House Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee on July 31st to discuss the DDG-1000, Gene Taylor's stated intent was to have "a hearing that would clear the air of rumor and lay out all the facts without championing any ‘side’ in the debate." One problem though, Vice Admiral Barry McCullough didn't clear the air at all, instead of simply saying "hey we screwed up, this thing is expensive as hell and we can't afford it" the Navy took a position that made claims about the DDG-1000 out of context, then made claims about the DDG-51 also without context. In the question and answer part of the hearing, Rep. Jim Langevin (D-RI) asked Vice Admiral Barry McCullough to detail the technology of the new DDG-51s the Navy wanted to buy to replace the DDG-1000s. Vice Admiral Barry McCullough answered:

Sir, the capability set I described for a DDG 51 that would restart as DDG 113 is based on the modernization program that we currently have funded in the DDG modernization program.

And that includes the COTS-based computer hardware, the open-architected computer program, the multi-mission signal processor with inherent ballistic missile defense capability, and the extended range anti-air warfare capability with SM-6.

Here is the problem. Any new DDG-51s the Navy buys today does not have "inherent ballistic missile defense capability" as McCullough suggested. Dan Smith talked about 15 destroyers, we have names of fourteen of them: USS John Paul Jones (DDG 53), USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG 54), USS John S. McCain (DDG 56), USS Russell (DDG 59), USS Paul Hamilton (DDG 60), USS Ramage (DDG 61), USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62), USS Stethem (DDG 63), USS Benfold (DDG 65), USS Milius (DDG 69), USS Hopper (DDG 70), USS Decatur (DDG 73), USS Higgins (DDG 76), and USS O’Kane (DDG 77).

Notice a pattern? Every DDG-51 configured for AEGIS ballistic missile defense is either a Flight I or a Flight II version of the Arleigh Burke class destroyer. Most people don't realize this, but the reason why is because as Dan Smith suggests, AEGIS BMD is an upgrade. It is actually more specific than that. Current ballistic missile defense only runs on ships with AEGIS version 5.3.x, and it is specific to hardware/software. You cannot put current AEGIS BMD on the new baseline ships, it simply won't work, the hardware/software doesn't exist on those ships, and for the record, the hardware that supports todays AEGIS BMD isn't even made anymore.

In the future this is all supposed to come together with AEGIS open architecture (OA), but until then there is no such thing as a new Arliegh Burke destroyer "with inherent ballistic missile defense capability" as was implied in the July 31st hearing.

As a side note, AEGIS ballistic missile defense will never work for the seven “Baseline 2” cruisers, essentially CG-52 through CG-58, because they have the old SPY-1A which utilizes very old computers known as UYK-7s and UYK-20s. It is incredibly expensive to upgrade these ships to use the SPY-1D(V), which will prevent them from ever performing the AEGIS BMD role. Such information begs the question, is that where the number "7" came from in determining the number of DDG-1000s to build? Did the Navy originally intend to retire seven more ships early with the construction of seven DDG-1000s?

As we have already highlighted, the suggestion the DDG-1000 can't use SM-2s is a comment out of context. As is highlighted in that link, the 2009 budget asks Congress to fund SM-2 Block III integration for the DDG-1000, integration that will be completed in time for the DDG-1000 class to support SM-2s. Gene Taylor called the July 31st hearing to clear the air, but the Navy blew so much smoke in that hearing how could anyone see a clear picture in case the Navy made. Think about it, the Navy is telling Congress the DDG-1000 cannot support Standard missiles because that capability hasn't been developed yet, but the Navy is also telling Congress the DDG-51s can support ballistic missile defense, even though that capability hasn't been developed yet either.

We think it is frustrating that even in a Congressional hearing we can't get straight talk from the Navy. Dan Smith is right to get out there, do interviews, talk to the press, and stand up for Raytheon's product. If there is a case to be made for Dual Band Radar instead of SPY, then make it with clarity. Lockheed Martin is kicking the crap out of General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon in their public approach. This is the information age, it stuns me how so many companies in the defense industry allow their competition to dominate the information flow, which ultimately can lead to misrepresentation of the information. It seems to me whenever we are talking about taxpayer money, accuracy is important, and trusting in a reporter, or a blogger, to always get the facts right is asking too much, particularly when information can be disclosed out of context inside the House chamber during a public hearing.

All information in this article is public information collected from media sources and public congressional testimony.

Debka Makes Us Dumber Again

Debka is good at disinformation, but they are getting dumber and dumber by the day. This is classic Debka.

DEBKAfile’s military sources disclose that a powerful Russian naval contingent, led by the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov , left Murmansk on the Barents Sea Aug. 18 to dock at the Syrian Mediterranean port of Tartus Saturday, Aug. 23. It includes the Russian Navy’s biggest missile cruiser Moskva and at least four nuclear missile submarines.

That would be amazing! According to Debka, the Admiral Kuznetsov and the rest of its powerful Russian navy contingent is heading to Syria, traveling the 4,903 nautical miles at sea from Murmansk to Tartus in 6 days! Wow! Too bad they failed math, because according to Debka the Russian naval group is going to average 34 knots for every nautical mile. Jeez, and people believe this stuff?

When I read something like this, I've always wondered if Debka is one of those secret message websites where specific readers have a secret decoder ring that enables them to obtain super secret messages hiding in plain sight, because this is just so stupid in its implication it is hard to believe they could be that dumb.

Anytime Debka talks about Navy stuff, go the other way. The Admiral Kuznetsov has been reported to be planning a deployment to Syria, but there is no evidence it has deployed. The source for that information was Russian news, and today the Northern fleet news is all about maintaining ships in the Med, but no word about a deployment yet.

Beware of Debka, they only write disinformation. For example, this is pure fantasy, That was a rumor started by Timothy Alexander (see google cache here, as original was deleted). In case you are curious, the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) is in Norfolk.

Fabius Maximus has been tracking that last rumor, and has every angle of the disinformation covered.

Big Carriers and Fighting Submarines

Our favorite person to disagree with, Mike Burleson, has written an editorial this week that highlights the conflict between the conventional wisdom and operational reality the US Navy faces when communicating with the public at large. Mike, indeed millions of other Americans, actually believes this stuff.

Unable then to adapt to changing conditions of warfare, stuck in a untransformative rut, unable to reduce its size and hence its great cost, non-stealthy and increasingly unaffordable, we can only conclude that the days of the flattop aircraft carrier are numbered.

Thanks then to unmanned aerial vehicles and cruise missiles, already tested and deployed on submarines and surface ship, every warship has become an aircraft carrier, just in time to take hold of the new warfare.

Mike may or may not be aware, but there is a school of thought in Surface Warfare that truly believes the massively armed surface combatant can replace the aircraft carrier. That school of thought is absolutely inaccurate. Mike's article is a comprehensive look at aircraft carriers, told from the perspective of the Air Force, suggesting that just about every possible alternative has replaced the necessity for large aircraft carriers, and the future is in fact small aircraft carriers.

Here is the problem though, we are willing to bet Mike, and others who believe precision guided cruise missiles are ready to replace aircraft carriers, have never actually participated in a real war game where these theories are tested. In these war games a single truth is learned about the US Navy's surface combatants, all those precision cruise missiles are usually gone by day 2 of the war, meaning the Navy would be left with this massive fleet that has to turn around for port to reload if it wants to stay on offense. Logistics, logistics, logistics... nothing can sustain itself at sea like the aircraft carrier, and the technology to reload a cruise missile in a MK41 while underway in blue water does not exist.

The days of the large deck aviation ship are far from numbered, indeed with the USS George H. W. Bush (CVN 77) and the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), both paid for and neither in the fleet yet, means large deck aircraft carriers will serve in the Navy until at least 2060. Mike mentions, then apparently ignores that study after study continues to highlight the large deck aircraft carrier is the most "efficient way to deploy naval aircraft by sea."

We also completely disagree with the suggestion that it would somehow be cheaper to build many small aircraft carriers as opposed to fewer large aircraft carriers. Section 122 of the FY2007 defense authorization act [H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364 of October 17, 2024]) establishes a cost cap for the Ford class CVNs to be $8.1 billion in FY2006 dollars. The cap is actually higher than the expected cost of CVN-79, which last we heard is still estimated at $7.4 billion in FY06 dollars.

The aircraft carrier is not simply the symbol of naval power from the cold war era, it is the foundation of forward deployed national military power in the 21st century, and represents a national investment towards the strategic interest of the United States. We reject the suggestion that there is a way to put precision weapons in a position to be used in war more cost effectively than the large deck aircraft carrier. We believe it would require some creative arithmetic to suggest some number of smaller aviation ships would be capable of bringing that much capability to the fight for the same cost. The Ford class, which will have 2000 fewer sailors over a 50 year lifetime and does not require a mid-life overhaul to its nuclear power plant, even with a higher up front cost is ultimately a less expensive national investment than the current Nimitz class CVN. In other words, big deck aviation is getting less expensive than in the past, not "increasingly unaffordable" as is suggested.

Mike is no ones fool, particularly in regards to naval power under the sea, and he does make an important point that we want to discuss.

At the same time the nuclear attack submarine and new AIP (air-independent propulsion) boats have become awesome weapons of war. Invulnerable as they are to most of the new precision arms, they are the ultimate stealth platforms.

Nothing is Invulnerable. In those same war games revealing surface combatants end up shooting off all available cruise missiles in the first few days of war, should escalation to nuclear war occur, everything on the surface is destroyed in those scenarios, and nothing is left but submarines.

The AIP submarine is not a trivial threat, submarines dominate the maritime domain like no other platform built for war. The anti-access/area denial capability of conventional submarines is the single most difficult conventional weapon challenge facing the US Navy in the 21st century. While guided ballistic missiles and super sonic cruise missiles get a lot of attention in the media, in conventional war, enemy submarines rank higher than anything in the air or on the surface. Submariners like to remind anyone who will listen, there are only 2 types of ships: submarines and targets.

But the Navy is well aware of the problem.

Iran and China operate lethally quiet diesel-electric submarines, carrier cripplers and the scourge of the surface fleet. Thankfully, so do navies from such South American nations as Brazil, Peru, Colombia and Chile. And under a seven-year-old agreement with the U.S. Navy, their diesel-electric subs regularly train in fleet exercises as opposing forces...

The Arica will be the 17th sub from South America to take part in fleet exercises under the DESI program.

Scourge of the surface fleet? Absolutely, however our favorite phrase describing submarines is one Mike has previously used: Submarines are The Insurgent at Sea.

We have previously discussed the Diesel Electric Submarine Initiative (DESI). The US leased HMS Gotland for two years to practice against conventional submarines, but gave up that lease because the Navy is getting world class training against conventional submarines in various multinational exercises and with the DESI program. Why lease cooperation when you can build it?

It is worth noting that right now, in both the Pacific and the Atlantic, there are a half dozen foreign submarines involved in multinational exercises with the US Navy. The Navy is building proficiency against world class submariners from foreign Navies, who themselves are constantly in exercises with Navies around the world in real world training exercises. In the Pacific, JDS Narushio (SS 595), HMAS Waller (SSG 75), and ROKS Lee Sunsin (SS 068) are participating in RIMPAC 2008, while off the East Coast BAP Arica (SS 36), ITS Todaro (S 526), and the nuclear powered FS Amethyste (S 605) are participating in "Operation Brimstone."

The US Navy is not taking the submarine threat lightly. We are on the verge of seeing the US Navy deploy the ASW module for the LCS, and while the LCS itself may have flaws, the payload package of the ASW module is an entirely new tool set for the ASW fight. Mike and I both agree on one thing, unmanned systems are the future of war at sea in the 21st Century, and we see the ASW module as a second step towards that future in dealing with conventional submarines. The unmanned payloads for ASW developed for the SSGN represent the first step.

The Navy is working hard, despite the legal issues involving sonar, to insure sailors are well trained, well tooled, and very much prepared to meet the challenges of conventional submarines in the 21st century. While it is common to see editorials highlight the increasing number of conventional submarines entering service around the world and cry threat, it is less common to see equal time given to discussing the mitigation strategies at work in the Navy to address the challenges of underwater warfare in the 21st century.

And we haven't even mentioned the US Navy's own nuclear attack submarine force... on purpose.

The Navy and NASCAR

Today there was a blogger roundtable I missed due to travel, the topic, Recruiting. The Navy is leveraging NASCAR for recruitment, specifically the Navy car driven by Dale Earnhardt Jr. (#88) to recruit. Enter one of my favorite bloggers, Boston Maggie, who we'll refer to as the goddess of the naval blogger strike group keeping us all honest. Maggie kicked ass today at the roundtable, giving us something to talk about with this issue, which I was not sure was actually possible. Even better, she did it with one good question.

Well, recently the CNO spoke about diversity. And I believe the quote was, when the nation looks at the Navy, it should see itself reflected back.

How are you incorporating that motive into this campaign?

Great question, because like you the first thing that pops into everyone's mind when I hear recruiting and NASCAR is diversity! Maggie is quoting the CNO from reporting like this from just the other day.

Capt. Jack Hanzlik has an interesting answer though, I'll post in parts. I have completely ignored the "diversity" discussions in the Navy because I'm not in the Navy, but because this is a blogger roundtable, because I'm at least aware of NASCAR being a sports fan, and because this is a Navy blog I'm opening the floor.

Well, I think NASCAR has had the reputation of being more of a male-dominant, white-attracted or Caucasian-attracted type of sport if you will. We're finding that that demographic has changed substantially.

There's at least equally a large number of female folks who are interested in NASCAR. And so that's one element. We're heavily focused on attracting women to the Navy these days. So we do reach that demographic in that audience.

There are fewer minorities in the service, I'm sorry, in NASCAR, than you'll find in other areas, other sports for example. But it seems to be growing. And I don't have any measure to give you at what rate it's growing. But you'll see it in the drivers. We certainly see it in the teams too. I mean, the team is as diverse as they come.

And what we try to show when we bring our sailors there is that we are a diverse service, from those folks that are involved with the recruiting activities. We have both men and women and usually each of the different race and ethnic backgrounds represented there too, so that as young men and women approach us to talk to us about the service, they see that we are a diverse organization.

I don't get the daily bombardment of diversity love letters that sailors get, so I have no idea what the policy is nor what it is like in the Navy. I do know what its like in business though, and diversity means very little outside of government and politics. Government in general has become too sensitive and too politically correct for my taste. In the workplace, at least in all the workplaces I travel to, people don't want to have their race highlighted for positive spin, they want to have their work highlighted for positive spin, which is why so many people work so damn hard. It isn't about what they are, it is about what they are doing.

I get that it might be useful to "have both men and women and usually each of the different race and ethnic backgrounds represented" but as far as the rest of the answer, it sounds fake because it is bullshit. Is the Dale Earnhardt Jr. recruiting campaign really about recruiting women and minorities? If it is, next time hire Brad Pitt and Tyra Banks.

Here is what Capt. Jack Hanzlik should have said, "We recruit white people too." That isn't racist to say, and it is the truth, and there is nothing wrong with saying it. Am I suggesting minorities don't go to NASCAR or don't like NASCAR? Nope, but trying to tie diversity in recruitment on the topic of NASCAR is a bit dishonest, and is spin. How clear was it that he was spinning? Capt. Hanzlik got so dizzy he somehow took the topic of diversity and NASCAR to its logical destination... Ballistic Missile Defense.

We also carry that one step further in that we have a program called the Fleet Honoree Program. And that's part of our morale focus, where we bring young men and women who are sailors out in the fleet, doing great work, and it's kind of a reward where we choose one of our commands to be honored at each race. And a lot of times it may tie to something unique that has happened in the real world also.

For example, down at Talladega, we brought the folks off of the USS Lake Erie. Lake Erie, if you remember, a little more than a month and a half ago, was the cruiser that shot down the spy satellite. And we thought that there might be some real interest for media to have the opportunity to interview the young kids -- I say kids, but -- the young men and women that were involved in that incredible event.

And so we try to bring down sailors that have recently done something that is noteworthy, that media might be interested in talking to them about. It's a nice reward for them to come down and experience -- that's kind of a unique thing. And then we bring them right down to the pits, and they spend the day in the garage, at the pit, with the team throughout the day, and they get a chance to meet those folks that are really running the programs for the drivers.

And they get a chance to sort of share their respective experiences and see men and women like themselves that are doing different jobs.

And you know, it puts our best foot forward. And I think that everybody that's had a chance to meet the young men and women that come down and participate as a fleet honoree, they've always been very impressed with them.

For recruiting at a NASCAR event, I have a suggestion. Set up a booth with 100 pictures and video of the Sea Fighter, Austal LCS, HSV Swift, and Super Hornets supersonic. Find a few former enlisted and officers who have served on those platforms, and tell them to share stories. People don't go to a NASCAR event because they love left turns, they go because they like to drink, but also because they enjoy speed. Considering how much speed is costing the nation in shipbuilding, we might as well start getting some return on investment somewhere!

The program Capt. Hanzlik describes sounds like an awesome program, and a very smart way to capitalize on events like the Satellite shoot down. Here is my question though, if you are rewarding an entire section for their work during an event, does it take work to create diversity? I'd wager not, because the numbers are what they are. From the same article linked above.

Across all branches of the U.S. military, the numbers are (enlisted and officer ranks):

White - 66%; Black - 20%; Hispanic - 7.5 %, Asian/Pacific Island - 3.5%, American Indian - .9%;

For whatever reason, and I honestly don't care what those reasons are because they do not matter at all, the percentages listed are not balanced against the total population of the United States. According to the US Census Bureau the racial demographics from 2006 break down as follows:

White - 73.9%; Black - 12.2%; Hispanic - 14.8%, Asian/Pacific Island - 4.5%, American Indian - .8%;

You can see it however you want, but I see it like this. The comparison tells me the military doesn't have a diversity problem, they are clearly reaching minorities and if there was one area that could use improvement, it would appear based on these statistics they should perhaps look for creative ways to reach out to the Hispanic community.

The Navy can suggest NASCAR recruiting fits into all this diversity talk and even suggest a NASCAR recruiting campaign is intended to target women, but at the end of the day, Capt. Hanzlik's answer is spin, driven by fear of the diversity brigades more than anything. It isn't doing the Navy any good if the PAOs are walking on eggshells, and are forced to spin themselves dizzy because a blogger asked a good question.

Since Capt. Hanzlik can't say it, I will. The NASCAR recruiting program is doing what any smart recruiter program would do, is is targeting a base of potential candidates that are more likely to sign up. As I've mentioned many times, part of my role as a business owner is to hire qualified people who will do a job and do it well. When I need specialized folks for high level IT jobs, I don't advertise using the local newspaper. I use technical lists and websites specific to my requirements where I know I am more likely to find someone experienced and knowledgeable with the skill set I desire for the position.

The Navy deserves credit for this program. They are going to places where they are more likely to find patriotic young people willing to join the Navy. Sounds like a smart use of money for recruiting to me. It is a shame that the Navy PAO for the program can't tell it like it is, and it takes a good question from Maggie and some analysis here to offer honesty to the program and its objectives. For the record, I don't blame Capt. Hanzlik, sounds to me like he does a good job, its the stupid screwed up system he is operating within that creates the problem, and that should be clear as day to his superiors.