LCS - A History Lesson in Failed Execution

(Lt. Jan Shultis / U.S. Navy)

The Naval War College has released a working paper titled The Littoral Combat Ship: How We Got Here, and Why, by Robert O. Work. I think it is a very interesting read and perhaps one of the most candid and insightful collections of history related to a Navy program that many of us have watched unfold in real time over the last decade. I have many thoughts, and have no intention of trying to capture all of them in a single post, so for the foreseeable future I intend to discuss this topic through several posts.

First, I note that John Lehman was the last political appointee to ever put anything this comprehensive together on paper as a professional contribution to the Navy community. Given the current political environment, this might also be the last time we see a political appointee make this kind of professional contribution for the next few decades.

I was originally given this paper in October to read for feedback when Bob Work submitted it to the NWC for publication. My opinion has not changed. I appreciate the effort and the detailed research poured into this article, and I understand what the Undersecretary is trying to do, but in my opinion I think the article does what everyone always does when discussing the Littoral Combat Ship - it focuses on the mistakes of the past. Because the history of the Littoral Combat Ship is a lesson in what not to do, I personally no longer find anything in the history of the Littoral Combat Ship of any value because I look towards the future of the program, not the past. In my opinion the history of the program, as laid out in detail by Bob Work's latest paper, offers no justification for the stated future of the LCS program at 55 ships.

If the Navy had any credibility left on the Littoral Combat Ship, and for the record I am not sure they do right now, it is my impression this paper erodes all remaining credibility of the Littoral Combat Ship into oblivion. While I know that is not what Bob Work was trying to do, I do believe the paper ultimately delivers the impression that the Navy has been lost at sea trying to execute the concept of this program from the beginning.

At the end of the paper on pages 45-46 (PDF pages 49-50) recent activities that have happened under the leadership of CNO Greenert are discussed. Those activities include the sustainment war game conducted in January of 2012 to assess the logistics, maintenance, and support plans to support the early deployment of USS Freedom (LCS 1) to Singapore, the "OPNAV Report" assembled and delivered by Rear Admiral Samuel Perez last spring, the review of LCS material condition by Rear Admiral Robert Wray, President of the Navy's Board of Inspection and Survey, in preparation for the upcoming deployment, and the second wargame early summer 2012 directed by Admiral John Harvey on LCS concepts of deployment and operations.

Those four activities were the major Littoral Combat Ship activities of 2012, and with the ship set to deploy in only a few weeks, perhaps it is time to review where the Navy is today as a result of all that history in the Work paper.

The first wargame on logistics, maintenance, and support plans was held in January 2012. Chris Cavas has an article about it here written in July of last year. The wargame was expected to help the Navy plan for the upcoming USS Freedom (LCS 1) deployment, and I am sure it will be very helpful in that regard, but the results of the wargame suggest the Littoral Combat Ship program is going to have serious problems as a forward operating vessel in ports where US Navy presence is limited, ports like the one USS Freedom (LCS 1) will be stationed at in Singapore.

The OPNAV Report put together by Rear Admiral Samuel Perez was completed early last year and is so brutally honest about the Littoral Combat Ship the Navy can't even release a declassified version for public consumption because it would, legitimately, be too embarrassing and likely damage the non-existent credibility of the LCS program. The OPNAV Report was exactly what the Navy asked for, an honest assessment of what is needed to fix the Littoral Combat Ship, and it turned out that honesty was also brutally ugly. God bless Rear Admiral Perez for doing a wonderful job that legitimately may actually save the Littoral Combat Ship program. Noteworthy, Rear Admiral Perez got promoted for his good work before he was sent off to the State Department where his career will likely end and no one will ever hear from him for the rest of his career. I'd love to be wrong on that last point, but historically when a Flag Officer gets sent to the State Department, it is like the Russians sending a General to command a remote barracks in Siberia.

Chris Cavas discusses the OPNAV Report here and here.

Rear Admiral Robert Wray is a really smart guy. USS Freedom (LCS 1) is something of a one-off version with lots of problems. None of the rest of Freedom class will be anything like LCS-1, in fact in that respect, the Navy really did get what they paid for when they purchased the ship with R&D money - although because the execution of the program was so bad the Navy paid too much for what amounts to the R&D lemon. I am inclined to believe that Rear Admiral Wray will have LCS-1 as ready as the ship could be for the deployment.

Finally, Fleet Forces command held the second wargame focused on LCS concepts of employment and operations in the early summer of last year. Bob Work mentions this on page 46 of his report, but what he doesn't mention is that the wargame ultimately found the LCS as is today to be a complete dumpster fire. It would be inaccurate to describe the second wargame as a waste of time, because the wargame revealed a great number of things the Littoral Combat Ship can't do. USS Freedom (LCS-1) is only a few weeks away from deployment, and yet in the January 2013 issue of Proceedings Rear Admiral Rowden discusses the LCS by noting:

We are also codifying the framework under which the LCS will be employed, known as the Concept of Employment (CONEMP). This document will evolve based on experience and will be a foundational reference, dictating how we will operate, man, train, maintain, modernize, and sustain these ships. The CONEMP will frame the critical program tenets and planning factors to build and refine the various mission-specific CONOPs and other implementation documents issued to support LCS Fleet introduction.

It goes on to say:

The Fleet’s forthcoming mission-specific CONOPs and refinements to the ship’s current warfighting and platform wholeness CONOPs will follow. LCS is a component of a balanced force, structured to defeat adversaries seeking to deny our access. The LCS CONEMP and various CONOPs will likely be very different documents from what we’re accustomed to, given the unique concepts of LCS and its emerging role in the Fleet.

In other words, the Navy is about to deploy the ship to the south Pacific for naval operations and they still don't have their concept for employment or concept of operations finalized because it will be informed through experience. Folks like Rear Admiral Rowden are basically running around saying something akin to 'the sailors will figure out this LCS thing for us!'

As a bit of snark, I'll just note the sailors have no choice but to figure it out now that Admirals have spent nearly a dozen years - as laid out in full detail by Bob Work no less - really screwing it up. In the context of the history of the Littoral Combat Ship, all signs both in word and deed suggest that Navy leaders are still improvising and making it up as they go with LCS, doing so with the hope the deployment is the completion of a Hail Mary pass. If it was as easy as a choice, I would bet on the sailors before I would bet on the Admirals, or Undersecretary - but we all know there is nothing simple about the task the crews of FREEDOM are facing.

The Navy has spent less than $12 billion on the LCS to date, which really isn't much when compared to the $50 billion the Navy has already spent on the vaporware of the Joint Strike Fighter. For perspective, building the 24th Littoral Combat Ship to completion will ultimately mean the Navy has invested just over 2% of their total budget over that time - from top to bottom - on training, maintenance, manpower, construction, everything LCS. All the criticism and anger and passion over LCS is really only about 2% of the budget. By comparison aircraft carriers are at least 13% that I can quickly account for in the budget, and just owning them has serious influence over a much greater percentage like type and number of escorts that are necessary.

At 24 ships I still believe the Navy can get the return on investment in lessons learned needed to develop a true battle network at sea mothership capability that advances US Navy seapower generations ahead of all competition. Yes, believe it or not, if the LCS worked as conceptualized it absolutely would advance US seapower generations ahead of the competition. To date, concept and execution have been far from equal, not even close actually.

At 55 ships, LCS can never return on the investment, indeed after the Bob Work paper anyone who suggests the Navy needs 55 Littoral Combat Ships needs to produce strong supporting data and make that case, because in my opinion the Naval War College just published strong supporting data that the data used to get to 55 ships never existed intellectually. Indeed 55 Littoral Combat Ships was, perhaps not even figuratively, just a dream.

More than anything else right now, what the Littoral Combat Ship needs is a public plan and vision of the future that inspires and is exciting with potential, because right now the future of LCS is a dark uncertain place that has sailors wondering if it is worth getting involved in. Bob Work's paper is the most informative paper on LCS published publicly in many years, and yet all it really does is reflect the past - just like virtually everyone else who talks about the LCS on the internet.


It shouldn't be this hard to execute a good concept. I still strongly believe the Littoral Combat Ship - warts and all - is one of the great things the Navy is doing today and legitimately - besides ballistic missile defense - the only sign of innovation in surface warfare taking place on the entire planet, but if the future is as poorly managed as the past has clearly been, the LCS will be noted in history as an expensive, wasted opportunity.

Two Stories in One

From Navy News Service.

Riverine Sailors Provide Realistic Training for Strike Group - 10/12/2024

Riverine Sailors Participate in Strike Group Exercise - 12/3/2024

Comment: Can a brother get a mothership?

I think it would be useful if the Navy explored this from a perspective other than OPFOR. Can a RIVRON control port access, for example?

The articles are very similar, begging for questions like why Enterprise CSG needs to do COMPUTEX twice, for example. With that said, I think the articles also give those with just a bit of imagination and creativity something to think about.

Somalia: Motherships from Hell, Mercenary Military Power, and the new Terrorist Money Trail

The war in Somalia is at a pivot point. If you read the latest Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia to the United Nations Security Council (PDF), you will find things do appear to be getting worse, not better. There are no territorial advances by the TFG, while security and humanitarian problems appear to be deteriorating within Somalia. Civilian casualties are up as are the use of IEDs, but fewer AU troops are being killed. Noteworthy the report explicitly claims "Mortars also impacted regularly near the United Nations common compound and the UNICEF compound," which is a new development over the period of the report suggesting perhaps territory is indeed being conceded to al-Shabab. The gist of the report is simple - we are losing, which is why the report notes more troops are being sent.

But there are signs that more than just soldiers to boaster the TFG in Mogadishu are heading towards Somalia - indeed if you study events and trends unfolding it does appear that a new military force is emerging in Somalia.

Mercenaries on Land

Yesterday I briefly mentioned the 'mystery helicopter' attack in the southern Somali town of Merca. I have gone over every known warship in the region, and the only ship I could find that could have potentially carried out the operation was the Spanish amphibious vessel SPS Galicia (L51). Not likely.

The event as described in multiple news stories suggests a single unmarked helicopter either green or gray made a single pass firing unguided rockets that missed the target house. The US and all European nations have denied it was them, and AMISOM does not have any helicopters in Somalia. I know many defense reporters in the Pentagon, and if it was us we would know by now. The same is true in Europe - this kind of thing doesn't stay secret. It only leaves one possibility - the TFG is now using private security firms.

Bob Woodwards new book revealed that the CIA is operating a 3000 man secret army broken in to Counterterrorism Pursuit Teams, and when asked to respond to this the White House basically replied with an answer that suggested we - as Americans - should be proud of this development. For all the political rhetoric otherwise, the Obama administration has been remarkably aggressive in how they fight war - they support the use of CIA army's, they have expanded the use of drone strikes, and despite campaign rhetoric otherwise - the Obama folks love private mercenary firms.

We are moving past the point of "probable" that private mercenary firms are heading to Somalia - indeed we have pictures they are already there. CEOs of private security companies don't hang out with the TFG for free - it is a solid bet that a deal has already been made.

The African Union has been unable to field the 8,000 troops pledged - and more troops have to come from somewhere if the TFG is going to survive. To make things worse, the AMISOM is digging into defensive positions, meaning no one is actually out chasing al-Shabab around Somalia. The west isn't stupid, governments see the TFG is losing. The mercs are indeed coming (and have probably already arrived) - so expect a lot more 'mysterious' activities in Somalia beginning sooner rather than later.

Mercenaries at Sea

Private security firms aren't only going to Somalia on land - indeed they are getting boosts from just about everyone at sea. The biggest development is the announcement by Jardine Lloyd Thompson Group (JLT) that they intend to field private security forces to protect merchant ships against pirates. The article notes that insurance costs including damage and ransoms has now cost maritime insurance companies $300 million over the last 3 years. The article sensationalizes the development as a 'private naval force,' but I asked CDR James Kraska about it and he believes this is simply local security on ships with an extra capability of small boats to extend the defense ring around ships.

Also worth noting is the newly formed Somali Navy, which is claiming it will attempt to make an impact against piracy as well. From a strategic perspective, if I was the United Nations I would be encouraging the newly formed Somali Navy to concentrate on illegal fishing vessels around Somalia - because the strategic communication benefits of that activity enhances the credibility of the TFG. That strategic communications tactic is successful in Puntland, for example.

Mothership From Hell

Have you heard the story of the MV Legula? Pirates were able to board the ship on September 25th, but the crew was able to secure themselves in the ships citadel, which also happened to be the main engineering space. By not being captured and by preventing the ship from moving, the pirates eventually abandoned the vessel. Chalk up another for Force Recon, because clearly those pirates knew what happened to pirates on a foreign ship without hostages or control of the ship.

Interesting story - but so is the rest. Following the incident, multiple sources leaked that the pirates who attacked MV Legula used the South Korean supertanker SAMHO DREAM as the mothership for that operation. Today NATO appears to have validated those sources.

In the northeast there are several mother ships operating east of 55E, including the MV SAMHO DREAM which may be operating in company with two unidentified fishing dhows which may correlate with media reports concerning the pirating of two Iranian dhows near 60 degrees. There is also activity at 60 degrees east probably linked to the last known location of the FV TAI YUAN 227. Pirates frequently force these pirated vessels and crew to be mother ships, thereby extend their range and increase their endurance. The area south of 3 degrees south off the Tanzanian coast is also very active with 3 recent incidents noted and the MV ASPHALT VENTURE pirated in this area today. This area is likely to remain active for some time due to the prevailing weather conditions.

Masters should note that the Tai Yuan 227 is a white hulled fishing vessel, approximately 50 metres long, with the registration numbers BH3Z87 painted in large black letters on the hull.

VLCC SAMHO DREAM is probably being used by pirates as a mother ship in operations near the shipping lanes, approximately 190 nm SE of Socotra Island. The SAMHO DREAM is a 319,000 dwt, crude oil tanker, approximately 333 metres long, with an orange hull and white superstructure.

Pirates on these vessels represent an active threat to merchant shipping and any small boat observed in the open ocean more than 300Nm from the Somali coast should be considered to be a potential pirate vessel.

I'd be very curious how Admiral Roughead would characterize NATO's alert of a 319,000 dwt supertanker carrying an estimated $190 million worth of crude being used as a mothership for pirate operations 900nm from the coast of Somalia in the context of the role and responsibility of the United States Navy. I'm just saying - I think there is an interesting question the CNO should be asked regarding this development.

And while we are asking interesting questions to the CNO, I'd also like to hear his take of the latest hijacking.

A maritime security alert has been issued for the Indian Ocean following the reported hijacking of a Panama-flagged vessel with 15 crew members on board.

The 3,884 dwt MT Asphalt Venture is believed to have been traveling to Mombasa and is now en route to Xaradheere in northern Somalia, reports GAC Protective Solutions.

NATO Shipping Center reports that at "282000 UTC a merchant vessel was reported pirated in position 07 07S 041 02E." It says that position is in the close proximity of a pirate action group sighted and reported in an earlier NATO report.

Xarardheere? Interesting, because that is where the New York Times has reported that Al-Shabab has established their maritime organization. Apparently the al-Shabab navy just took their first prize on the high seas.

So we have reached the dreaded crossroad where piracy intersects with terrorism. Will the vessel be used for terrorism operations, or will they seek a ransom payment? If the ransom is paid, it will be done knowingly that the payment is directly supporting al-Shabab, an organization listed by the US State Department as a terrorist organization. In other words, the insurance company that pays the ransom must violate US law to free the ship and crew...

The hijacking of the MT Asphalt Venture is something new - something we haven't seen before (but suggested was coming only a few weeks ago). This hijacking represents the first time an organization listed by the State Department as a terrorist organization has participated in maritime piracy off Somalia.

I think there is another interesting question the CNO should be asked regarding that development. While we are at it, what does the SecDef have to say about these things? How about members of Congress on the campaign trail? How about the President himself? Seems to me now that al-Shabab is pirating ships off Somalia, that might be news.

The Navy's New Shipbuilding Program

InsideDefense (update your subscription already) is doing a great job reporting on issues surrounding the FY 2011 discussion. Indeed, this is very informative article, except the headline given is quite misleading. I get the impression the reporter didn't quite know exactly what he had, but what he had was very important.

Basically, we have a brand new shipbuilding program, replacing a shipbuilding program that never really got started... but new program will eventually assume the name of the old program?

Yep, something like that. Confused?

The headline Joint Logistics Vessel is what was the Mobile Landing Platform didn't add much clarity, but the details in the article are well reported and help quite a bit.

The gist of the article is that the original Sea Basing program is dead, but in an interview with Jim Strock, director of the Marine Corps seabasing division, he apparently told InsideDefense "the only capability the Navy still needs to make seabasing a reality is an at-sea transfer and surface connector ship, namely the Mobile Landing Platform." The thing that makes this confusing is that "at-sea transfer" system and acting as a "surface connector" are only a few capabilities of the old MLP concept, not what the MLP was in whole. Strock tells InsideDefense the MLP is included in the Navy’s draft long-term shipbuilding report under the name Joint Logistics Vessel (JLV). In my opinion, if Jim Strock actually said it like that, then he may have added to the confusion. The article gets good with the direct quotes though.

"The term JLV was just a flash in the pan," Strock told ITN last week. He said that at this point plans call for the ship to simply be called the Mobile Landing Platform.

"There was a Mobile Landing Platform in design," he said at the conference. "This is a slightly different creature. This is going to be effectively a ship design similar to the heavy lift ships that we have out there today."

"It’s a more basic form of the original Mobile Landing Platform design, but it retains very essential seabasing qualities," he added.

The middle paragraph is the key. This is a brand new shipbuilding program, not the MLP, even though it will carry the name Mobile Landing Platform. Think for a moment about the characteristics used describing this new platform.

The article describes a large heavy lift ship that interfaces with other sealift AND smaller platforms as an at-sea transfer and surface connector for purposes of moving cargo and equipment. As a platform no longer intended to reconfigure Marine forces before sending them ashore, even as it retains that capability on a limited basis, the new ship is better explained as an intermediate transfer station from logistics and lift ships to smaller platforms.

By making the platform less specific to Marine Corps requirements, and using what sounds like a Flo/Flo model with modifications to connect larger and smaller vessels, the Navy may have stumbled right into what sounds like a mothership. It isn't a mothership for smaller unmanned systems like the LCS, rather a mothership to support platforms like HSVs and manned systems like LCACs and LCUs, although there is no reason why it couldn't support manned platforms like Littoral Combat Ships, foreign corvettes, or PCs, or even smaller systems like SOF systems and RHIBs. It will be particularly interesting to find out if one of the requirements is to swap out a LCS module at sea.

When you take all the interior design modifications out and leave a large open platform to work with, the transition from specific to generic actually enables Joint capabilities. It will be very interesting if in the design process this ship gets a few modifications on its large open deck that allow the large platform to provide limited support of ISO sized modules, not unlike some of the engineering connections built into the LCS module bays. There really is a great deal of flexibility in a ship like this, not only as an intermediate transfer station between sealift and ship-to-shore connectors, but with large spaces come an opportunity for the Navy to use this type of vessel as a forward sea station for littoral vessel operations, a giant floating blue water airfield for ScanEagle UAVs, or a forward operating base at sea for Marine Corps/Army/Air Force operations ranging from over the horizon assault or support to humanitarian operations.

Reconfigurable space can be used in many ways you know, particularly when the ship is designed to provide power to stuff on the platform. In theory, this ship could pull into port and set up a giant floating hospital on its deck with ISO containers if the power distribution system is designed properly.

The JLV looks like a 75% solution with a lot of potential use from a creative Combatant Commander, and I think this could turn out to be a more interesting design than the original MLP.

All we know for certain is this will be the first Navy ship designed since the DDG-1000 and LCS, and even though it is not a warship, it will be interesting to watch.

Another Mothership Possibility

Check out this picture of Ocean Force unloading the USS Avenger (MCM 1) in Sasebo. Nice picture of USS New Orleans (LPD 18) in the background as well.


Ocean Force has a hold deck 85m long, 15m wide, and goes around 7.85m deep. I think it is important to think about that, because Ocean Force is a Flo/Flo that displaces ~6700 tons. I am not certain, but I believe she is very similar (maybe slightly larger) to Condock V, another MSC charter often seen hauling MCMs around the world as well.

No question chartering Flo/Flo's is a good deal, but there are only 20 in the world. I also wonder how much it would cost to build a US Navy Flo/Flo with a hold deck 134m long and 20m wide, which is slightly wider than the size of a Whidbey Island class well deck.

Why the extra beam? Because with a 20m hold deck, that Flo/Flo could carry 4 PCs the size of the Cyclone class at a time. Something like that would make a great PC tender, and would have the space to double as a LCS tender for module swaps.

All Ahead Slow on LCS

The Littoral Combat Ships is a new type of high-speed surface combatant with interchangeable warfighting mission modules optimized for littoral or coastal missions. The ship is designed to defeat asymmetric anti-access threats including mines, quiet diesel submarines and fast surface craft.

LCS consists of a seaframe that is outfitted with reconfigurable payloads, called Mission Packages that can be changed out quickly. Mission Packages are supported by special detachments that operate and maintain manned and unmanned vehicles and sensors to counter mine, undersea, and surface threats. There are currently three types of focused Mission Packages that provide potent combat capability in specific warfare areas: Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), Mine Warfare (MIW) and Surface Warfare (SUW). The ship will operate one package loaded at a time, but can swap to a new package in 1-4 days.

The first two ships, USS Freedom (LCS 1) and the future USS Independence (LCS 2), have very different and distinct designs. The Lockheed Martin design (LCS 1) is a high-speed semi-planing steel and aluminum monohull. The General Dynamics design (LCS 2) is an all-aluminum trimaran with a slender, stabilized monohull.

LCS is a warhship, designed to conduct combat operations. It is capable of sustaining combat damage and still perform its mission. To accomplish this, LCS was designed and constructed to American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) Naval Vessel Rules (NVR). LCS was the first application of NVR to a surface combatant. NVR essentially replaces military general specifications used in past surface combatants.

As a surface combatant, LCS will be crewed by U.S. Navy sailors and officers. LCS is a leap forward in automation and reduced manning. The core ship (seaframe) has a crew complement of 40. The Mission Package brings a maximum of 35 personnel, including up to 20 personnel in the aviation detachment. Total berthing aboard LCS is 75.

Team Ships FAQ - accessed 5/21/09

That typo in the second to last paragraph, fourth word, is an ironic example of exactly how much of a mess the Littoral Combat Ship program has become for the Navy. The LCS is a far cry from a warship in the historical context, so it is appropriate the word warship gets misspelled in the Navy's own description. I personally think that this description for the Littoral Combat Ship does more damage to the platform than it helps, indeed I find the entire narrative of the US Navy regarding the LCS program to be intellectually dishonest. This narrative, if it still exists in five years, will be why the Littoral Combat Ship is the Navy's greatest shipbuilding failure since the 120 gun 34 gun USS Pennsylvania.

Converted from the collier USS Jupiter (AC-3) beginning in 1920, USS Langley (CV-1) was commissioned in March 20, 1922. The Navy had already flown aircraft off the deck of a ship, but on October 17m 1922 Lieutenant Virgil C. Griffin piloted a Vought VE-7 from her decks. This is a momentous occasion in US Naval history, the age of the aircraft carrier for the US Navy was born. Nine days later Lieutenant Commander Godfrey de Courcelles Chevalier made the first landing on the USS Langley (CV-1) in an Aeromarine 39B.

In January the following year, USS Langley (CV-1) conducted flight operations and tests in the Caribbean Sea for carrier landings. Five months later the ship steamed up to Washington DC to give a demonstration at a flying exhibition before civil and military dignitaries. In 1924 the nations first aircraft carrier participated in several maneuvers with other ships and did several other demonstrations for dignitaries before departing for the Pacific at the end of 1924.

For the next twelve years the USS Langley (CV-1) operated in the Pacific training with other fleet units, conducting experimentation, and developing a pilot training program at sea. Operational models, doctrine, and tactics were developed as the aircraft carrier was prepared as a platform to screen the battle line. The USS Langley (CV-1) served as an aircraft carrier until October 25, 2024 when the ship was converted into a seaplane tender.

Despite the long innovative development of the aircraft carrier, five years and two months after the USS Langley (CV-1) was retired as an aircraft carrier, the Japanese Navy demonstrated the utility of the aircraft carrier to the United States at Pearl Harbor on December 6, 1941. In other words, despite conceptual development, conversion, evaluation and experimentation of this very innovative, but complicated technology the US Navy never developed an effective concept of operations for aircraft carriers prior to WWII. The US Navy struggled to understand where the aircraft carrier fit in the fleet, and ultimately the Japanese showed us. With that said, what the US Navy did do is stick with aircraft carriers as a technology, and had not only built but had mastered the construction of the very complicated technologies of aircraft carriers allowing us to build several modern aircraft carriers during WWII.

I believe USS Freedom (LCS 1) and USS Independence (LCS 2) represent the USS Langley (CV-1) of the 21st century. I believe that in the 21st century, motherships for manned and unmanned underwater, surface, and aviation systems will be as important as aircraft carriers were in the 20th century. I believe these distributed, sometimes expansive offboard system empowered networks will influence the littoral battlefield and determine who controls the seas.

I see unmanned systems as the dominate warfighting approach towards controlling the maritime battlefield in the 21st century, just as I see manned systems as the dominate peacemaking approach on the maritime battlefield in the 21st century. Motherships, with the ability to deploy both manned and unmanned systems, represent the emerging capability of our time on the maritime battlefield. I believe sea control in 21st century warfighting will require dominance above and under the sea, but 21 century sea control for peacemaking will require a sailor present at the point of contact with the population on the sea.

The Littoral Combat Ship is an innovative, complicated, small modular mothership that introduces the Navy to the technical, logistical, operational, tactical, and doctrinal challenges of the 21st century mothership concept. Just as the USS Langley (CV-1) was a far from perfect aircraft carrier, both LCS designs are far from perfect motherships.

Cost

One of the most cited items of complaint for the Littoral Combat Ship is the cost. For months I have been searching for answers to a few questions: Where did the number $220 million for the hull come from, and where did the number $180 million for the modules come from. The Navy is so wildly wrong on the estimates for both hull and module that I never believed these figures were produced from a technical evaluation of cost. In my search for the truth, it turns out the answer is as I suspected, both figures were a wild ass guess.

Several sources have confirmed to me the way the Littoral Combat Ship estimate of $220 million was reached was that during a visit to Odense Steel Shipyard, ADM Vern Clark asked the shipbuilders how much HDMS Absalon (L16) cost. The answer was $440 million. When the Littoral Combat Ship was developed as a ship about half the size of the Absalon class, Clark used the number $220 million as the estimate for the platform. Half the size meant half the cost, and the number was apparently never questioned. Unfortunately, HDMS Absalon (L16) costs a hell of a lot more than $440 million, because $440 million was the estimate at the time of the contract with Odense Steel Shipyard, and basically included only the hull. $440 million was the estimate for a hollow shell, but became the driving number for $220 million which was supposed to include all of the systems and the hull of the LCS.

Today the LCS cost is still largely unknown. While Congress has established a $460 million cost cap, there is no guarantee this cost cap can be achieved for the hull regardless of how many are built. The mission modules are also very immature, and as such have enormous potential for long term problems. The Navy intends to spend the next five years testing USS Freedom (LCS 1) and USS Independence (LCS 2), and the odds that the mission modules of today will look the same in five years is very slim.

The LCS Is Counter Culture

The Littoral Combat Ship is more complicated than people give it credit for, as several aspects of the Littoral Combat Ship represent the antithesis of naval ship development. The engineering for modularity is both new and complicated. The Littoral Combat Ship is a test case for a lot of automation intended to reduce the crew size of ships. The Littoral Combat Ship is a test case for high speed on small crew conventional warships, and has an overly complicated CODAG engineering plant highly dependent on automation as a result. The engineering challenges of the hull are only part of the problem, almost none of the pieces intended to make up the mission modules includes a mature technology. The crew scheme, the doctrine for operating the ship, the concept of operations for the ship type, and the logistics of the mission functions and the hull types are all challenges yet to be fully developed.

The US Navy is a blue water Navy, and the US Navy has not developed a littoral strategy that includes ships intended to operate in the littoral since WWII. During both Korea and Vietnam, the US Navy leveraged vessels either designed or evolved from WWII era ship designs, with small ships like the Asheville class, Pegasus class, and Cyclone class being the rare exceptions. Among the exceptions, only USS Typhoon (PC-5) has served in the Navy consecutively for more than 15 years.

I am often struck by how critics misunderstand how the Littoral Combat Ship represents something so unique in US Navy culture that we haven't seen anything like it in over 5 decades. This is a relatively small ship being developed specifically for the littorals intended to serve longer than just 2 decades. It seems to me that critics too easily dismiss or fail to recognize just how foreign it is that the US Navy would operate a small vessel for any meaningful period of time. I'm not saying that corvettes won't happen, but the suggestion the US Navy will build small platforms for the littoral simply because someone else does is crazy talk, it is completely against the US Navy culture and will require a major mindset adjustment.

Where is LCS Going?

Critics of the LCS suggest the US Navy should be building safe, proven hulls instead of the wild combination of capabilities represented in the Littoral Combat Ship. I only disagree with one aspect of that line of thought, the whole idea of "instead." The rest of the world is building nice, safe ~3000 ton hulls with designs that are decades old and barely innovative. FREMM is nowhere close to as flexible as the Littoral Combat Ship in terms of modularity, and comparing the Absalon to the LCS in terms of systems support demonstrates pure ignorance. Absalon has space, but it takes a lot more than space to support unammned systems. No question FREMM and Absalon are excellent ship designs, but there is nothing truly innovative about them, and they cannot support flexible, interchangeable modular payloads.

Innovation is the bane of contracting, indeed contracting by nature is a risk averse exercise that draws criticism at a rate consistent with the level of risk involved. The LCS is a combination of several innovations including modularity, unmanned systems, smaller crew size, automation, and speed. I personally don't think all of these combination's add up to a 'littoral combat ship' nor even a ship with well designed requirements, but I appreciate the fact the Navy needs to get all of these innovations into the future fleet (thus to sea). The only way that happens is to build a few Littoral Combat Ships and see what they can do.

Other than the LCS, right now the US Navy has nothing on the chalkboard smaller than the DDG-51s, and nothing on the chalkboard that can act as a mothership smaller than the LPD-17. If the LCS was canceled today, what would the US Navy build? MSC ships like T-AKE or JHSVs? I'll take more Littoral Combat Ships instead. The QDR is going to hopefully change what goes on the chalkboard, but even that will take a few years. For now, the Littoral Combat Ship is an excellent way to move ahead with mothership development in my opinion.

Change the Narrative!

The Navy needs to change the narrative for the LCS. There are at least 5 very difficult years ahead of the Littoral Combat Ship where testing and evaluation will be conducted. It is intellectually dishonest every time a flag officer claims to know what the LCS is, or what it can do. The fact is, nobody knows what the LCS will be or what it will do well, or do poorly. Anyone suggesting the Littoral Combat Ship is going to be excellent at some specific task in 2009 is basically the fool suggesting what the aircraft carrier is going to mean to the 20th century back in 1923. Nobody in 1923 knew how the aircraft carrier was going to influence naval warfare, the predictions were much more generic. Nobody in 2009 knows for sure how motherships are going to influence naval warfare, we can only make generic predictions.

The Littoral Combat Ship program is likely to be the most innovative and influential development for surface warfare in the first half of the 21st century, a unique opportunity for today's surface warfare community to be the pioneers in how surface warfare will operate in the 21st century. The layers of awareness in the maritime domain that motherships will enable, the networked capabilities motherships will empower for the both the warfighter and peacemaker, and the development of the concept of operations for motherships will all combine to influence the way surface warfare will command the sea in the 21st century.

The Littoral Combat Ship itself is almost certainly going to be looked back on through the prism of history in the same context we now look at the USS Langley (CV-1) and see a poorly designed aircraft carrier. But that isn't how we look at the USS Langley (CV-1) today, is it?

I hope the Navy continues with the LCS despite the critics. I also hope the Navy slows down with the LCS and develops a new narrative central to innovating towards a conclusion without attempting to fit a square peg in a round hole. The LCS is not a solution to anything other than challenging assumptions, innovating motherships and associated technologies, and developing a new concept of operations for surface warfare.

A Mothership Idea for Partnership

How would I develop a proof of concept for leveraging a mothership as a partnership integrator? I'd think like a SEAL, an enterprising entrepreneur, like that guy.

Ellsworth Marine has contracted with Yacht Escort Ships (YES), for the construction of the M/V Pacific Provider. Under the management and direction of YES owner Captain Stan Antrim, the M/V Pacific Provider will be renovated to ABS class with all systems and engineering brought up date during the major refit. “Stan and his team basically invented the concept of the yacht escort ship or “shadow boat” conversion having re-fit numerous OSV’s from 130’ to over 200’,” said Ellsworth. “He understands what it takes to produce this kind of product, and we couldn’t be more pleased with his level of professionalism and enthusiastic approach.”

A former Navy Seal, Antrim holds a degree in Naval Engineering from the U.S Naval Academy. When making the transition to the private sector, Stan has managed, operated and built some of the world’s largest yachts, his first new-build project being Oceanco’s 210 foot “Lady Lola,” which was awarded Showboat’s 2002 Yacht of the Year. Work on the conversion of the F/V Shelikof is slated to start in January with the completion in early Summer of 2007.

I see an inexpensive, innovative way to fighting drug smugglers and pirates that gives a coast guard small ships someplace to rest during the down periods while distributing them over a broad area at sea for operations during the most likely times of activity. Yes, drug runners and pirates have patterns based on time of day, so something like this works.

The idea would be to match with 2 M-80 Stiletto type vessels and some Maritime Expeditionary Security Squadron (MSRON) 34-foot Sea Ark patrol boats, plus fix the flight deck to be NAVAIR rated, and cover some area with physical presence of a small but useful mothership that can or does not have to be armed, and acts primarily as a C2 communications and logistics node at sea. Find a Navy 0-5 with leadership and language skills, a Navy E-5 with a wicked creative streak, a Marine SGT who knows how to run a mini-boot camp, a few Coast Guard trainers with a tremendous amount of patience, and this is serious partnership in action.

The intent of such a program, if done right in my opinion, would be to train foreign coast guard personnel from regional countries as part of a partnership/investment model for maritime security. Said another way, part of your boarding party (manpower) is local who are undergoing on the job training to develop regional Coast Guards. As the local countries get comfortable with the equipment and develop skills and experience, just give the equipment away to build up regional security capabilities after a time frame, probably something like 10 years.

I'm sorry, but the cost of a few M-80s, a handful of 34-foot Sea Ark patrol boats, and a 160’ ~700 ton mothership might run somewhere around $100 million brand new for everything. If we were to operate this type of arrangement for 10 years developing a local Coast Guard capability, it is essentially a $10 million annual investment in equipment, and we give away stuff that not only integrates with ours, but is only 10 years old.

No question someone will want to get fancy with the gear and that would add to the cost, but all the gadgets and bonuses like UAVs and super kit still make this a $150 million program over 10 years. What do we need for something like this to work?

Partnership and leadership. I see this as one alternative evolution of Global Fleet Stations.

The key design study for the program would be logistics. It may be that a 160' mothership can't support M-80s, which makes it a no go IMO. At that point the necessity to increase size of the mothership could make the cost double, making the system less likely to be given away which is a key point to the entire concept.

H/T gCaptain

A Question From the Department of Dissent

I believe in the theories I opine through the blog. They do not focus on major power war and high intensity conflict in the maritime domain; rather they focus entirely on littoral warfare and low intensity challenges emerging in the maritime domain. I contend that the line between war and peace at sea is becoming blurred, and the approaches to dealing with both are evolving two very different directions, although with some convergence.

I believe it takes fewer people to kill more people in the 21st century due primarily to the advances in technology; we are simply more lethal than we have ever been in the past. I believe naval forces require more ships for peacemaking than they will for warfighting, and that the costs of warfighting with fewer ships will still be extraordinarily higher than the costs of fielding more ships for peacemaking. I believe that when the Navy takes risk in the development of fleet constitution, the Navy should take risks for peacemaking roles, not warfighting roles, but at no time can the Navy ignore the necessity to field low cost platforms for peacemaking.

I believe unmanned technology will continue to improve our lethality for warfighting, but peacemaking at sea begins with the fundamental requirement of manpower. I believe the platform that will make the largest difference in peacemaking in the 21st century is the mothership for both manned and unmanned systems, but while the mothership may be optimized for peacemaking the platform must be big enough to escalate violence as needed in its operational environment, which for me means the mothership will consist of both manned and unmanned systems.

As I observe the unfolding events off the coast of Somalia, I'm very pleased to find that virtually every one of the theories for peacemaking opined on the blog over the last 20 months are proving true. It is mothership operations with small boats and manned aircraft that is making the most significant impact in the fight against pirates, or said another way; the USS Vella Gulf (CG 72) is being used as a mothership.

I have been given a bit of smack from folks for calling the USS Freedom (LCS 1) a mothership. It is, it is a small mothership and designed specifically for operating unmanned platforms. With that specific design parameter, I believe the LCS is limited, because as a platform not really built for war but designed specifically for unmanned systems, it is intended for war. I have called out a number of folks for suggesting this is a peacemaker platform. It isn't, it can enable that environment with its unmanned systems and conflicting combination of speed and space, but I disagree with every single person who believes the LCS can do what the USS Vella Gulf (CG 73) is doing, and I can now prove it.

So as a vocal and visible member of the Department of Dissent, I'd like to ask a question to those advocating the 21st Century frigate can do everything, and this particularly applies double for the leftover Bush administration civilians who got their honorary PHDs on 'techno-centric naval requirements and solutions' from the University of Rumsfeld. Can you explain to me how the LCS can do what the USS Vella Gulf (CG 72) is doing, because I think based on just a few photographs it has become pretty obvious we see some fairly obvious flaws in the suggestion the LCS is the everything solution people have suggested.

Observe in photography. Keep in mind these photos appear to be taken from a helicopter, specifically from Mass Communications Specialist 2nd Class Jason R. Zalasky who is on the USS Vella Gulf (CG 72). He would be the 5th person on any helicopter giving us all the photography, which I believe is an important part of this actually. In the top picture of the first incident I see 2 RHIBs with an 8 person team and 2 helicopters each with 4 person crews. In the bottom picture of the second incident I see 2 RHIBs with 12 person teams and 2 helicopters with 4 person crews. Add one more if you want photo drama. Click the images; use high resolution to count heads yourself if needed.

This means 25 naval personnel were involved in the first picture, and 29 naval personnel were involved in the second incident. The LCS has a maximum crew size of 75 by design, and there just isn't berthing space for more.

Will someone please explain how the LCS does this job? The Freedom (and I bet Independence) can carry 2 H-60s and 3 Fire Scouts in the hanger, although the current configuration calls for only 1 H-60 with the modules. Trust me, there is plenty of room for two on Freedom, I measured it myself. There is also plenty of space in the module bays for multiple RHIBs, indeed the LCS could deploy 2 manned RHIBS and 2 armed unmanned RHIBS with room to spare. It does appear the LCS can carry the equipment for this role, but there is a problem, where do the people come from? There is even room in the mission bay for the makeshift prison like what the Navy has done on the USNS Lewis and Clark (T-AKE 1).

A core crew of 40, a crew of 15 mission module, and a crew of 20 for aviation takes the total up to 75. Does anyone else think there might be a problem with the whole platform peacemaking model when your 3000 tons ship has to use 1/3 of its total personnel to round up a little dingy full of bad guys?

Think about the crew breakdown a minute. 40 core crew. I would assume we would want an 8 man Coast Guard LEDET team, which leaves 27 spots for the aviation crews to run potentially two H-60s and 3 Fire Scouts. For just 1 H-60 and 3 Fire Scouts, the current requirement is 20 people, so the extra H-60 would only give you 7 more people, 4 which would be the crew. That gives you three spare berths on the ship to fill, which I'd bet is not enough to help out the second H-60, so the question is whether those 7 would be enough to operate 2 armed USVs when the normal module requirement is more than double (15).

Anyone else seeing the problem here? The LCS is not built for joint operations with the Coast Guard, which is exactly what peacemaking is. The LCS is built for countering small boat threats... BUT PIRACY IS A SMALL BOAT THREAT... and the LCS can't even do 2 manned RHIBs and 2 H-60s while including a LEGIT detachment from the DOG. This is why the techno-centric requirement set is such a load of crap, in Rumsfeld's world we blow the living shit out of everything and ask questions later. In what world will our political leadership be allowing that kind of RoE short of major power war?

With all due respect to the advocates of the '21st century frigate' as a way to deal with peacemaking requirements at sea, do the math by counting heads, you are short on manpower! It takes people to fly Helicopters and conduct the work on RHIBS, but it also takes people to control Fire Scouts and operate USVs. When you are short on people, you have to make sacrifices. The 75 crew maximum on the LCS, which is our half a billion dollar littoral do everything platform, prohibits the LCS from actually doing just what we are seeing now. The LCS does not have enough berthing just to do this very simple 2 helicopter and 2 RHIB operation of rounding up a handful of pirates, and we think we need to build 53 more?

This platform is an abortion of requirements planning. The LCS does not have enough crew to do peacemaking. The LCS is built to deploy unmanned technologies, a warfighting capability, but is built to the lowest warfighting survivability standard allowed for Navy ships. The LCS is optimized for speed and space, despite the obvious problem of adding stuff in the space creating weight that slows down the speed. Why is it asking too much to build a littoral ship with characteristics that compliment rather than compete with one another?

This ship is proving my USS Langley analogy correct every day, because it can do what it was built to do, it just can't do it very well. We didn't convert towards 55 Langley class aircraft carriers; we learned our lessons and moved on. With so many obvious problems with the LCS, starting with the fact the ship is great right up until contact with the enemy (which is what 2 RHIBs and 2 H-60s is!), clearly this ship needs partners to utilize all that information gathering capability the ship actually can do.

Peacemaking at sea requires manpower. This is a solid example of how manpower intensive even a simple peacemaking operation like rounding up a handful of pirates off a tiny vessel at sea can be. This is also a solid example how the LCS cannot do what everyone wants it to do, not without the other platforms able to contribute the manpower needed for low intensity operations.

If I'm wrong, please explain how. 75 - 40 crew - 20 aviation crew = 15 people left to be divided among Coast Guard LEDET, another helicopter, and unmanned systems supporting operations. This is one of many problems the Navy faces by intentionally making reduced crew size a priority, as opposed to letting the actual requirements in the field determine how many sailors you need.

Correct the Mistake of Seapower 21

Is there a group think idea in the blogosphere? I think so, I've seen it in other places too, so it isn't unique to the blogosphere, but what bothers me is that the idea doesn't really make a lot of sense when given serious consideration... at least for me.

It is often suggested the Littoral Combat Ship is a ship in search of a purpose. I think that statement is false, the Littoral Combat Ship is an imperfect mothership design for delivering unmanned vehicles to forward theaters to support MIW, ASW, and ASuW. Regardless of anything else that has been said about the Littoral Combat Ship, that mission requirement exists, and the necessity to provide unmanned platforms supporting MIW and ASW littoral challenges is very important to the future Navy. The LCS can do that job.

That is why I don't believe the LCS is in search of a purpose. I think people have adopted that position, but I see it like this. The Navy has mission profiles in search of a ship to meet the requirements in the field, and the Navy is assigning the Littoral Combat Ship to address those requirements even though the LCS is a bad fit. That is a different problem than suggesting the LCS is in search of a purpose.

I continue to wonder if the Navy has any intention of doing a final cleanup of Seapower 21 now that they have begun the process of truncating the DDG-1000. While Seapower 21 has been criticized as a failure of strategic thinking, in hindsight I think they got the strategy aspect more accurate than has been given credit, and ultimately failed to get the details right. Seapower 21 said we need an arsenal ship, which we got with the SSGN. Seapower 21 said we needed a cruiser replacement, which will be CG(X). Seapower 21 said we needed a new surface combatant to address 21st century challenges. Seapower 21 said we needed motherships for delivering unmanned systems to forward theaters.

Had Seapower 21 said big motherships and small surface combatants, instead of the big DDG-1000 surface combatant design and the small LCS mothership design, I think most people would agree the Navy would be in good shape even if we were seeing cost overruns on the small combatants.

I still believe that is the way ahead. The Navy should build 26 Littoral Combat Ships to replace the minesweepers, spending money on MIW is a good thing in the emerging 21st century maritime environment. After that, I think the Navy needs to refocus its unmanned systems strategy by building bigger ships to accommodate the likely increase in weight and size we will see in future unmanned systems. I also do not see how the aluminum LCS, with a bridge surrounded by glass, unable to support larger weapon systems, and too expensive to field in reasonable numbers can be a serious solution for the littoral warfare challenges sure to be faced over the next 3 decades. Assigning that requirement to the LCS is not the answer, building a combatant for the 21st century, a true armed and survivable combatant that can sustain presence off foreign shores, is the way ahead for matching the force structure of tomorrow to the maritime strategy for the 21st century as outlined by the Navy today.

Lee's Mothership

Frequent contributor leesea, always thinking commercial, found a mothership design he likes. From MarineLog.

Eidesvik Offshore ASA has, through its associate Eidesvik OCV KS, today taken delivery of the X-bowed construction vessel M/V Viking Poseidon from Ulstein Verft.

Viking Poseidon left Ulsteinvik to be fitted out with a 250-tonne offshore crane just before Christmas.

"We took her around Stadt, a very rough sea area along the Norwegian coast, and the wind reached hurricane strength," says Ulstein Verft sea trial captain and manager for the aftermarket department Frank Strandebø.

The hurricane force winds generated waves of around 12 m and the vessel showed great seakeeping qualities.

"We hardly noticed the rough sea. We really got to confirm that the Ulstein X-Bow functions according to its intentions," says Strandebø.

She needs a paint job, but otherwise a very interesting vessel. With a 250 ton crane you have all kinds of options here. Always fun to look at these types of commercial construction vessels, because there is so much utility in these platforms it makes you wonder why there weren't alternative suggestions for the MPF(F).

Specs:

It has an overall length of 130 m, breadth of 25 m and a large cargo deck area of 1,700 sq.m. Up to 105 persons can be accommodated and the vessel is equipped with two moonpools, a 250 tons active heave compensated offshore crane, ROV-hangar, diesel-electric machinery and helicopter deck.

Someone check my math, am I understanding the article right that the vessel was built for 608 million NOK? That's around $85.5 million US right? Interesting.

Smaller Ships Could Mean More Guns

If, as Galrahn keeps harping on about, the Navy builds a 1000-ton littoral PC in reasonable numbers, they'll need weapons. Unlike all-up amphib ships and their supporting craft, this is a mission for guns. VLS systems are just too space-intensive for a 1000-ton, 250-foot ship. If the ship is intended to self-deploy and remain on station for reasonable periods of time, it won't be able to head back to port to reload a VLS system. The target set for this sort of combatant is quite different as well - it will consist of small to medium sized boats, aircraft, and targets on the shoreline whether vessels, vehicles or structures. It's not efficient to use VLS for that. This is where the gun will thrive again.

The question would be 'which gun?' I'm not talking about self-defense against Zodiacs, because I think that's best handled using the Marines you're carrying to man Ma Deuce mounts. A PC of the size we're talking would have the room for one or perhaps two main gun systems depending on the type. Unfortunately, it looks like the venerable and flexible Mark 45 5"/54 and its ilk may be too large; the smallest vessel I can find sporting one of those is the Blohm & Voss MEKO. Greece's Hydra-class versions are 117.5 meters long and displace 2,710 tons - too big for our notional ship.

The real questions would be whether this is a direct-fire only gun or a true naval rifle; and if it is a standard mount or some new technology. I would posit that given Gal's $100MM cap, an existing mount is the way to go, and it's not like the world is short of medium gun systems. Otobreda makes a nice 76mm gun system with a 20km maximum range that Israel mounts on its 250-ton patrol boats, just for one example of many. This would give you a nice option against small boats (it can depress -15 degrees) and soft-to-medium shore targets while retaining emergency AAW and cruise missile defense capability.

On a more daring note, it might also be possible to use these craft and the module space on the LCS for a more dispersed NSFS capability - which, if they're carrying Marines, would (I'm sure) be appreciated. I need to get off my tuchus and run some quick Lanchester numbers for the survivability of big ablative vessels with many NSFS assets (foamed tankers, etc.) vs. lots of smaller vessels with single or double mounts.

Another project I keep doodling over but haven't really run numbers for: given the number of helo decks available in the fleet, it might be possible to make a dedicated MLRS or HIMARS 'mounting plate' for a standard helo deck - essentially a flat metal lockdown plate designed to securely hold an MLRS or HIMARS vehicle in firing position. I'd want to know if there are standardized lockdown options on USN helo decks; if so, even if they're different across platforms, perhaps the mount could be a universal adapter. Next number to crunch: will a HIMARS/MLRS and a loading vehicle fit on a helo deck? Is there a sneaky way to load them? Realistically, even, you could put just a HIMARS launcher on the mount - save yourself the truck, unless you had plans to use them at the other end of the trip ashore. There should be more than enough space. While of course the LCS mission module space is a better candidate, helo decks are in goodly supply - and maybe a quickly-assembled force of bombardment ships is something we could keep 'on the shelf' this way.

Hm. Helo decks seem to run around 12m in width by 20-25m in length. If we're lucky, LAMPS RAST hardware could be adapted for the mount to provide power and lockdown. Anyone have a reference for an online copy of NAEC-ENG-7576 I could leaf through? (That is, if it's open - I don't know if it's restricted at all).

These are the things I ponder when I should be working.

Update: There is nothing new under the sun. Field Artillery Magazine has mention of a 'navalized MLRS' way back in 1987 - although that was built onto the ships in question. My proposal above involves utilizing existing launcher sets on an as-needed basis. Of course, what I'd love to know is if the USN actually looked at the feasibility of firing these things from a ship, and if it required stabilization - a commenter says the Germans tried it and it didn't work even with guided rockets. Hm.

Image of the Otobreda 76mm - handily, with small boats in frame - courtesy of Wikipedia

The Littoral Strike Group: An Alternative to More Battleships

As I noted the other day on the USNI blog, Frank Hoffman's new CNAS report (PDF) is calling for a 1000 ton PC, while Dakota Wood's CSBA report (PDF) is calling for Marine attachments on the LCS. A new article in National Defense Magazine notes the Marines are now in serious discussions that there is "definitely some momentum building" for either a PC vessel or a 100 foot vessel for irregular warfare operations.

When I had a chance to sit down with Commandant Conway back in September, he emphasized several aspects of getting the Marines back to sea, but two comments he made stood out. First, the Marines are getting too heavy, and need to find a way to get lighter. That point was also made by Colonel David Coffman, Commanding officer, 13th MEU when I spoke with him last month.

Commandant Conway's second point was also interesting, he believes the Marines need to find ways to maintain organizational integrity when broken into smaller units at sea. That last part of the discussion was in response to a question about Marines returning to warships. I think you can link both issues, because the way I think the Navy and Marines can approach the organizational integrity issue while getting lighter is by building Navy platforms and LCS modules intended to support the existing organization of the Marine Corps, keep the vehicles close but separate, and start building with the squad and build up to the Company level.

The Navy has a long history of deploying squadrons of small ships in the littorals to deal with irregular warfare challenges, indeed the comments of this post and this post have plenty of links that recount the historical record. I think as we look at ideas being circulated, review our own Navy and Marine Corps history, and look at the current challenges one option for the way ahead with PC class vessels becomes apparent.

Right now our ESGs are designed to deploy a battalion of Marines. We are looking to build a Sea Base to support a brigade of Marines, and that requirement is actually being driven by a 2 brigade standard. As we look to smaller ships, perhaps we should approach it as part of the solution to deploying a Company of Marines, or perhaps a Platoon of Marines, or as Dakota Woods suggests, perhaps down to the squad level. A 100 foot armed vessel usually runs between 200-450 tons, while a 1000 ton PC usually represents something like a 250 foot vessel. I would suggest maybe we are looking for something between both of those metrics.

Building upon the historical view of deploying small combatant squadrons in the littoral, I think we should look at building squadrons that include 4 PC type vessels, each designed to deploy a squad of 12 Marines, but also designed to include a detachment of Coast Guard for law enforcement while operating the ship with a small Navy crew. I think we should also seek a few requirements for this PC including a $100 million price cap, minimum 10 days endurance, a 2000 nautical mile range at 15 knots, and I would include a small medical space on the PC and insure each PC has 2 corpsman. I don't care what the top speed is and I don't care what the weapon payload is, those can be an argument for someone else, because what I think is important is that we expect this PC to be the physical contact platform with other surface vessels and we let that reality drive requirements. In other words, the PC is sending the boarding party and will be the eyeball that determines friend and foe in confusing maritime environments. The PC becomes a manned engagement node in the deployable Maritime Domain Awareness network.

A 4 ship PC squadron where each PC supports a squad of Marines and a detachment of Coast Guard sailors opens up all kinds of littoral capabilities, but by itself falls just short of completing a Marine Corps Rifle Platoon while also introducing several C4ISR challenges. This is where the LCS becomes the C4ISR enabler, the support ship for the squadron, and where a Marine Corps module fills the gap and completes a Marine Rifle Platoon with everything but vehicles. Essentially, the LCS becomes the Sea Based HQ for the operations of all three services supporting the squadron requirements. With payloads of aviation unmanned vehicles for ISR, replacement RHIBs for the squadron, extra fuel and food for sustaining the squadron, not to mention other options that might include an air traffic controller and several other specialists that can be deployed with the platoon for ground operations. The LCS may even be required to act as a sea based temperary jailing facility during maritime security operations and Coast Guard interdiction operations. A full squadron would be 5 ships.

A Littoral Strike Group would include 4 squadrons, 4 LCS and 16 PCs, plus 1 HSV which carries the vehicles for the full Marine Corps Company that is built into the squadron. Pair this force with 1 LPD-17 with another rifle company of Marines plus detachments, 1 T-AKE mod mothership for the 4 Littoral Combat Ships, 1 T-AKE mod mothership for the 16 PCs, and 1 DDG-51 escort and you have a regional force that could be distributed along a very long coast line with Command nodes on the LPD-17 and all 4 LCS supporting the activities of 16 PCs. With the additional Marine Corps vehicles on the HSV, you could surge a LHA(R), some major surface combatants, and a submarine into this force and come very close to having a light and agile LSG MEU to compliment a traditional ESG MEU carrying the heavier, organic ship to shore deployable Marine Corps vehicles.

When I look at a force like this, I see 2 T-AKE motherships that focus on the Navy's squadron platforms and crews, I see a LPD-17 mothership model for supporting the Marine and Coast Guard detachment crews, I see a HSV for regional partnership with a Marine Corps company of vehicles to support that activity (and plenty of space for all kinds of NECC capabilities), and the LCS's themselves act as motherships for the unmanned systems to support operations on both sea and land. Depending upon the future development of the MIW and ASW modules, particularly if they end up using the same deployable underwater and surface vehicles, it may be possible to build rapid response capability with the tender to meet those challenges with this force.

Sound expensive? Not with the $100 million cost cap requirement. Do the math, a squadron of 16 PCs runs $1.6 billion, $600 million less than the $2.2 billion of a new Burke and if the ship is manned with between 14-18 sailors each, you end up with fewer total sailors in a squadron than a new DDG-51.

There are additional costs though. The LPD-17 and 2 T-AKE mods would cost about $1.8 billion and probably around 2 x $500 million respectively, which added together comes to $2.8 billion + the $1.6 billion, or roughly $4.4 billion total. Wait, that is how much the 2 DDG-51s per year the Navy will ask for starting in FY10!

Operational costs will be higher than 2 Burkes though, fuel consumption will be much higher, and there will be additional Navy (perhaps civilian on the T-AKE) crew costs associated with the LPD-17 and 2 T-AKEs, not to mention potential additional costs for both the Marines and Coast Guard for forward deployment operations. Unfortunately, this is the price of more, faster ships that puts additional manpower at the point of contact in forward deployed theaters, what I have mentioned many times that I believe will be a requirement for the Navy in following through in its effort to "preventing war" as outlined in the Maritime Strategy.

If we think of $100 million PCs in the context of aircraft like the MV-22, which at around the same investment also carries a squad of Marines into harms way, and apply that approach to the sea, the joint maritime services can create persistent sea surface networks better aligned for dealing in the irregular warfare space, the maritime security space, the self generated Maritime Domain Awareness space, and the regional partnership engagement space that better aligns the US Navy to the requirements of the ungoverned and contested spaces in the maritime environment today. This force isn't what we would want for major war, but it fills out peacetime requirements quite well and frees up major surface combatant forces for the responsibilities they are better suited to manage against major competitors.

To borrow another historical look at small combatants, given the cost and size of the force, it would not be inaccurate to call the development of 4 Littoral Strike Groups the 21st century Economy B force discussed only a decade ago, and all 4 LSGs that includes 76 new ships (4 LPD-17s, 8 T-AKEs, and 64 PCs) could be developed with the same SCN funds intended to fund just the 8 more Burkes the Navy intends to build over the next 5 years.

EagleOne's Mothership

Whenever EagleOne starts talking about an inexpensive shore fleet the critics come out and suggest logistics is a problem. I'm going to beat this argument up very soon, but for now, I'd like to give a suggestion of perhaps one idea we should look at for both Coast Guard and Navy inshore fleet network support, or what I call motherships. If we build a few, I vote we call this the EagleOne class mothership.


If you can't see a military use for that ship in fighting piracy, I'd suggest you seriously lack imagination. I'd take that ship, anything from the Mk V and up in terms of deployable vessels, 2 Coast Guard detactments, a Marine heavy weapons platoon, and a 0-5 with a poliical mandate please.

As I always say, manpower if you want to preserve the peace, unmanned systems if you want to destroy your opponent in war.

Tracking Bloggers On USS Freedom

Phillip Ewing, a Navy Times reporter who we read regularly, is currently taking a trip across the Great Lakes in the Navy's newest warship USS Freedom (LCS 1). Phillip is blogging his trip from the warship which you can follow here.

This might interest some folks...

In the meantime, if there are any curious surface warriors, airedales, bubbleheads or just enthusiasts who have questions about the Freedom they haven’t gotten answered, please send me them in an e-mail at [email protected] or leave them in the comments. I’ll do my best to find the right sailor, chief or officer while we’re on board and get the details you’re looking for.

I only have one question Phil, is the Navy providing Charmin or the cheap stuff? Just trying to get a feel for what I might need to pack.

I'll be taking a ride on USS Freedom in the near future, and uh, I don't want to be the guy who comes back to blog about the rash I got hanging out with sailors.

All kidding aside, I am pretty sure I know what people here want to know, and I hope to get those answers. After reading the commentary from the commissioning, I still believe I can make a better strategic case for this warship than the Navy, or at least than the Navy has so far, but maybe the USS Freedom CO or XO will have a good case to make themselves? It is somewhat telling that after four years, SECNAV was hyping the recent news about the Marine module and calling LCS a "mini-gator" during the commissioning, which is a brand new description for the LCS, instead of sticking to what it has supposed to be for the last several years.

Oh well, last week I heard the LCS referred to as the "think tank, sink tank" which was a less than flattering description. As I've said for over a year now, USS Freedom isn't a warship, it is a mini-mothership, and a reminder that the USS Langley wasn't the perfect aircraft carrier either.

5th Fleet Focus: Singapore Deploys Again to the Gulf

Singapore continues to be a solid friend to the Iraqi people as they deploy a LST yet again to the Persian Gulf in support of defending the Iraqi oil Terminals.

A Singapore Navy Landing Ship Tank (LST) left the country's Changi naval base early Saturday for the Gulf region to support the multi-national reconstruction efforts in Iraq.

According to the statement issued by the Defense Ministry on Saturday, RSS Resolution and its crew of about 175 personnel will undertake tasks such as protecting the waters around key oil terminals, conducting patrols and boarding operations, as well as providing logistics support for coalition vessels and helicopters during the three-month deployment.

To review the history here, RSS Endurance (L 207) operated in the Persian Gulf from October 2003 until December 2003. RSS Resolution (L 208) operated in the Persian Gulf from November 2004 until January 2005. RSS Endeavour (L 210) operated in the Persian Gulf from February 2006 until April 2006. RSS Persistence (L 209) deployed last September to contribute to Task Force 58.

Once again, we see an amphibious ship used in a role other than for amphibious assault, more evidence of the flexibility of the platform. In this case, Singapore uses their LSTs as motherships in protection of fixed resources at sea.

As the picture above highlights, in the past Singapore has deployed Protector USVs from their LSTs for patrols. In other words, big motherships, not small, is the trend everywhere but the US Navy.

In the past, people in the comments think we are out on a limb with our mothership concepts, but we again highlight the concepts promoted on the blog are tested, it is the US Navy spending taxpayer money on untested ideas... namely replacing rated frigates with unrated small motherships and expecting the same results.

We see RSS Resolution (L 208) replacing the USS Oak Hill (LSD 51) which will be returning home soon. The US Navy amphibious force has been on a very rapid deployment schedule, and we don't believe the US Navy will be deploying an amphibious ship to replace the USS Oak Hill (LSD 51) due to the high operational tempo. This deployment would seem to alleviate the necessity for a replacement.

SECNAV: "We Don't Understand" Motherships

Zachary Peterson has written a gem of an article for InsideDefense (subscription only). The article is titled Winter Impressed With LCS-1, Says a Mix of Hulls Likely in Future, so the title sums up pretty much what the Navy is thinking there. Essentially, the Navy wants to buy both LCS designs. The article goes on to note both Winter and John Young see a mix of LCS hulls in the Navy's future, and 25-25 or 30-20 are purchasing scenarios discussed.

BUT that was not why we liked this article. There are three quotes worth discussing. We start with this quote where Winter is discussing LCS-1.

“We have a nice ship at the end here,” Winter said of the Lockheed-built Freedom. “It is a warship. No one should be disabused of that -- it is not a fast ferry and it’s going to be a very capable addition to the fleet.”

If the good Secretary insists we call it a warship, then we will call it an unrated warship and everyone is happy. If it was a fast ferry, we would probably like it more, but instead the Navy has built LEVEL I survivability into their new unrated warship and expect to operate it in the most dangerous areas of sea. By the Navy's own definition of Level 1 survivability, these ships are not expected to fight hurt. One may be able to call the Littoral Combat Ship a warship, but lets not not insult Corbett and wrongfully call it a cruiser in the modern era.

Winter believes he has found an operational environment for the LCS to excel.

“When I think back to some of my visits to the North Arabian Gulf, where we have a lot of dependency on frigates and [patrol coastal boats] and things like that, it would be really nice to have a few LCS’s out there right now,” Winter argued. “Not only because you can reduce the crew size. It’s much better matched to that mission and to some of the challenges of operating there than the ships that we have in the region right now. They’re not bad ships, but they really weren’t designed for that type of environment. The speed provides you a lot of flexibility, [as does] the shallow draft and you’ve got a very nice weapons suite.”

So frigates and patrol coastal boats are not well suited for the Persian Gulf? That sounds odd to us, considering almost all naval vessels not a US Cruiser or Destroyer operating in the Persian Gulf are either frigates or patrol coast boats. Under that theory, every local Navy and basically all of Europe is operating the wrong type of vessel in the Persian Gulf. We would have to disagree with the Secretary's analysis here.

Some might argue what he really means is the AEGIS battleships don't belong in the Gulf. That might make a lot of sense, if one can explain how one would provide air defense of the strategic oil resources in the Persian Gulf. We think Winter is talking about frigates and PCs, and is simply wrong. Will the LCS help there? Yep, as a minesweeper during times of war, for that all indications are it will be a great replacement for the Avengers based in Bahrain. However, the LCS is an expensive minesweeper.

Finally, Winter admits what we already know, the Navy knows they are to something, they just haven't really figured it out yet. This is important.

“A lot of it will depend on how we intend to use and leverage these capabilities,” he explained. “I have this nagging sense that we don’t understand all but a small part of the possibilities that this type of platform is going to open up. And that’s good and we’ve just got to let it happen and see what happens.”

Read incorrectly, the title of this post could give the wrong impression. We think highly of the SECNAV, we just disagree with him on some things. In this case, we think he has it absolutely right.

When he says "we don’t understand all but a small part of the possibilities that this type of platform" he is being honest, and he is being correct. The Navy doesn't understand the concept of a mothership, yet. They have all these metrics and requirements, but they lack a clear picture of how to use and make use of the resulting technology and capability in war AND peace. Freedom gets to play the role of the Langley, where concept meets operational reality.

We have a core belief the Navy is on the right track, but hasn't put it together yet. We also believe the LCS will prove us correct, and the transformationalist wrong. The Navy recently discussed emerging strategic threats, but where is the associated emerging capabilities? For the 21st century, unmanned platforms represents emerging capabilities for the Navy in war, but manpower is and always will be the most important factor for managing peace. No way on earth Georgia gets invaded if the Marines are there holding the line, Ivan might by crazy, but he ain't stupid.

The same theories of strategy apply at sea, so apply them. Lets pretend the LCS is in the Persian Gulf; what does it do? If your intention is to observe the movement of the maritime domain, you have achieved that, because other than scouting for war the only thing unmanned technology can do in the field is give the operator a play-by-play of events. If the LCS is operating 6 RHIBs and has the associated manpower, now we are getting somewhere, but the LCS concept is absent said manpower. So when we field a Spartan USV or Protector USV instead, what do we get? A glorified pair of binoculars.

We are encouraged that Winter has a "nagging sense that we don’t understand all but a small part of the possibilities that this type of platform" because it highlights what we have been saying, the Navy isn't thinking strategic about its mothership strategy. The Navy wants MDA, wants peacetime presence, wants irregular warfare capabilities, and wants forward deployed forces to have organic tools on demand for the warfighter. During all times absent great power war this century against a near peer at sea, the mothership will be in the 12st century what the aircraft carrier was in the 20th century. We already see it today, as the amphibious ship plays the role of a mothership, in recent cases delivering manpower capabilities in peacetime. Note how the same platform could deliver tremendous unmanned capabilities in wartime.

So why then in an increasingly dangerous environment where the threat is blue water submarines, anti-ship missiles, and ballistic missiles is the Navy building a whole bunch of Littoral Combat Ships with minimum air defense capabilities and virtually no blue water submarine capability? If scouting is so critical to the fleet in an increasingly dangerous maritime domain, why does the Navy intend to store its 21st century scouting capabilities on its weakest platform intended to operate alone in the littoral, the region that historically speaking is where ships are most vulnerable.

Where is the cruiser? In No Case Can We Exercise Control by Battleships Alone. Maritime Strategy isn't just a slogan you know...

Motherships should be big. Motherships should be thought of as carriers, not gunboats, but instead of aircraft they carry your unmanned weapon and sensor platforms that enable information dominance at sea in the information age. Building a small mothership and pretending it is a frigate ultimately leaves the Navy without a real mothership and without a real frigate.

For the record, we completely agree with Winter when he says "let it happen and see what happens." We are consistent when we suggest of the LCS build a few, see what they can do. However, we do this in the belief the Navy will make sound judgments, because we believe once the Navy gets to sea and develops its operational concept for unmanned technology, particularly in a rapidly changing technology environment, the advantages and disadvantages will be obvious.