Russia Responds to Atlantic Resolve

Under Operation Atlantic Resolve, the U.S. has been rotationally deploying relatively small land-based force packages into Eastern Europe that are intended to signal American commitment to defending NATO’s boundary members against Russian aggression (while arguably also serving as deterrence tripwires). It's been pretty confusing trying to sort out what is being deployed where. Although last Thursday I noted the reported deployment of the 3^rd Infantry Division’s entire 1^st Armored Brigade Combat Team (BCT) to the Baltics, per the latest Atlantic Resolve fact sheet only a few hundred personnel and vehicles will actually be positioned in the Baltics. Furthermore, these vehicles will be consolidated with U.S. Army Europe’s prepositioned stocks in Germany at the end of the BCT’s deployment; they will not be left in the Baltics. According to LTG Ben Hodges, Commander of U.S. Army Europe, however, that does not preclude redistributing those vehicles to prepositioning sites in the Baltics or other Eastern European NATO members at a later date.

Russia’s response to all this is hardly surprising or unexpected. From Agence France-Presse via Defense News last Thursday:

Putin on Monday [3/16] ordered drills for more than 40,000 troops in regions spanning the country, from the Arctic to the far east to the volatile southern Caucasus, and ordered nuclear bomber jets to be deployed in Crimea a year after its annexation by Moscow.

Russia's chief of the general staff, Valery Gerasimov, said Thursday that the "number of troops taking part in the exercises has gone up to 80,000, and the number of aircraft has increased to 220," quoted by RIA Novosti state news agency.

Troops in the western and central regions and military aircraft were scrambled for exercises, Gerasimov said.

The drills are the latest in a succession of large-scale military maneuvers that Moscow has ordered as relations with the West have plunged to a post-Cold War low over the crisis in Ukraine.

One of LTG Hodges’s takeaways from the Russian exercises is particularly telling:

"I've been watching the Russian exercises...what I cared about is they can get 30,000 people and 1,000 tanks in a place really fast. Damn, that was impressive."

Conventional deterrence by denial rests heavily on creating a perception that a fait accompli isn’t possible, or that achieving one would be very costly and risky. This is why forward presence is so critical to deterrence credibility. The challenge becomes even harder when the adversary can mobilize and deploy an order of magnitude faster than the defender can.

Pavel Felgenhauer, a longstanding and often well-sourced Russian military analyst, notes at the Jamestown Foundation’s Eurasia Daily Monitor that:

This week (March 16-21), the Russian military began massive, “sudden” military exercises (“vnezapnaya proverka”). The authorities initially announced that the “sudden exercises” are intended to check out the battle readiness of Russia’s Northern Fleet and the possibility of reinforcing it with forces from other military districts. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, 38,000 soldiers, 3,360 military vehicles, 41 navy ships, 15 submarines and 110 aircraft are involved in the exercise. The mass deployment of air and naval forces in the Barents Sea practices ensuring the safety of Russian nuclear missile-armed submarines, which have to be defended at all costs before they launch their hundreds of nuclear warheads at the United States. The military plans to land marines and paratroopers on the shore of the Kola Peninsula close to the Norwegian border and on the polar archipelagos of Novaya Zemlya and Franz Josef Land.

According to a defense ministry source, the “sudden exercise” was intended to send a message to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that Russia is ready for war and can counter with force the deployment of limited US and other NATO forces to the Baltic, Romania, Poland and Bulgaria. Moscow, apparently, did not give Western nations any prior notification about the exercise (Vedomosti, March 17).

Neither side has had experience with brinksmanship on par with the darker moments of the Cold War in over a generation. That does not bode well for crisis stability, to put it mildly.

--Updated 3/24/15 7:38AM EDT to correct typo in 6th paragraph--

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.

Conventional Deterrence Developments in the Baltics

In mid-February, it was reported that the 1^st Armored Brigade Combat Team (BCT) from the 3rd Infantry Division was deploying ‘to Europe’ for three months. It was implied that the BCT would disaggregate to conduct training events with host nation forces in the Baltics, Bulgaria, Romania, Germany, and Poland.

It now seems that the BCT deployment will be concentrated in the Baltics. The Army is also stating that the BCT’s tanks and armored personnel carriers will remain prepositioned in the region.

I’m not certain, but the amount of armor to remain prepositioned appears to be an increase from what was being described back in December.

Unlike a parade of a handful of armored vehicles through the streets of Narva, the deployment of a BCT is a very serious move. I’ll leave detailed comparisons between this BCT and the Russian order of battle adjacent to the Baltics to experts on ground warfare, which I most assuredly am not. All the same, my gut instinct is that the deployment of a heavy BCT falls somewhere between delay/disruption and tripwire on Robert Rubel’s spectrum of forward presence. In the absence of evident tactical air support as well as air and missile defense support, I would think the needle still points towards tripwire, but the level of commitment that this deployment appears designed to signal is significant.

The obvious follow-on question is whether this BCT will turn over its armor directly to a relieving unit that will take over this presence mission, and if not, what the concept of operations would be to transport personnel forward to marry up with this equipment in a crisis.

Very interesting.

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.

The Notable Empty Seat at Sea

Last week Bryan highlighted a new article on NATO he has written for AEI. NATO at sea: Trends in allied naval power focuses on the trends in the force structures of European naval powers, noting the numerical decline and the quality improvements. As Bryan notes, these trends do not balance one another.

Below is the section Bryan notes on the Royal Navy.

United Kingdom

The Royal Navy has dramatically declined in size by a third since 2000, but retains the desire and plans to remain a “balanced force” capable of naval airpower projection, limited amphibious operations, strategic nuclear deterrence, and sea control (see figure 1). This goal remains even in view of the 2010 UK Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) 8 percent defense budget reduction.[16]

A key question, however, is whether a balanced force is ultimately in the strategic interests of the United Kingdom, or whether such a force should be abandoned in favor of a “cruising” navy requiring a greater number of frigates and destroyers and providing more naval presence in a greater number of places than the current fleet plan can accomplish. The costs associated with fielding two aircraft carriers and the air assets necessary to equip them, in addition to the costs of replacing the current fleet of ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) with four new boats, will strain resources required for building surface combatants and attack submarines.[17] Considering the United Kingdom’s global economic interests and its desire to remain closely aligned with the US Navy, a force of less than 20 combatants might not suffice.

Upgrades to the Royal Navy will include fielding two new aircraft carriers carrying the F-35 Lightning II and the ongoing operation of the new, technologically advanced Type 45 destroyers.[18] Other upgrades include the continuing introduction of the five nuclear-powered, Astute Class attack submarines and the construction of the Type 26 Global Combat Ships.[19] Here as else-where in major NATO navies, numbers are being traded for capability.

When assessed against the roles articulated in the NATO Alliance Maritime Strategy of 2011—which includes deterrence and defense, crisis management, cooperative security, and maritime security—the Royal Navy presents a mixed story.[20] Continuing to move forward with both an aircraft carrier development program and a ballistic missile submarine program demonstrates national resolve to contribute to collective conventional and nuclear deterrence. However, the resources necessary to achieve these goals are to some degree harvested from savings gained from a significantly smaller escort and combatant fleet.

And while the Type 45 destroyer is more capable than the Type 42s it replaces, there will be fewer of Type 45s, as there will be fewer Type 26 frigates to replace the Type 23s. This numerical decline creates presence deficits that impact the navy’s ability to perform crucial traditional naval missions such as antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and antisurface warfare (ASUW), which underpin both conventional deterrence and cooperative and maritime security. Adding to a decline in traditional sea-control capabilities was the 2010 SDSR decision to eliminate the Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft from the inventory.

In summary, the Royal Navy continues to maintain a balanced fleet, one that looks strikingly like the US Navy, except a fraction of its size. Its contributions on the high end of the naval warfare operational spectrum (strategic deterrence, attack submarines, and antiaircraft warfare (AAW) destroyers) are notable, while a declining number of surface combatants will bedevil its ability to remain globally postured and will contribute to naval missions of a more constabulary nature.


16. Nicholas Watt “Next Generation of Nimrod ‘Spy In the Sky’ Surveillance Planes To Be Scrapped,” The Guardian, October 17, 2010, www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/oct/17/next-generation-nimrod-scrapped.

17. In response to questions about the costs associated with the SSBN programs, British Defense Secretary Philip Hammond insists that “The government remains 100% committed to maintaining and renewing the Trident system.” See “U.S. Defense Chief Bashes Idea of Reducing SSBN Fleet,” Global Security Newswire, July 15, 2103, www.nationaljournal.com/global-security-newswire/u-k-defense-
chief-bashes-idea-of-reducing-ssbn-fleet-20130715.

18. The Type 45 is built primarily as an anti-air warfare (AAW) combatant capable of local and area fleet defense. Capable of controlling fighter aircraft, it can coordinate fleet AAW operations and should be considered roughly comparable to a US-guided missile destroyer. It is equipped with long-range weapon systems to intercept increasingly sophisticated and maneuverable missiles. The Type 45 destroyer will be able to operate an embarked helicopter.

19. Due to begin joining the fleet in 2021, the Type 26 frigates will completely replace the Type 23 frigates. The Type 26 is planned in three variants: an ASW variant, an AAW variant, and a general purpose variant.

20. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Alliance Maritime Strategy,” March 18, 2011, www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_75615.htm.

There is no question the Type 45 is more capable of than the Type 42. The Type 26 looks promising, and should it ever be built I am sure it will be a great ship. But quantity only goes so far, and the reduction of sufficient quantity of surface combatants means a reduction in operations.

For example, the Royal Navy in 2013 does not have enough surface combatants to contribute to either of the Standing NATO Maritime Groups, and the quiet withdrawal by the Royal Navy from the Standing NATO Maritime Groups is a feature of the decisions, both military and political, regarding Royal Navy force structure that reduces surface combatants.

This comes on top of the decision in 2012 for the Royal Navy to stop contributing surface combatants to their Caribbean narcotics patrol.

If a nations Navy force structure design is completely focused on the carrier strike groups and amphibious groups, as the design of the Royal Navy of the future is, what can their naval forces do, and what do the nation give up in that process? Under such a model for naval operations, presence consists solely of the most expensive capabilities. The contingencies of both Libya and Syria have yet to demand the requirement for a US Navy aircraft carrier strike group, and yet under the future force structure of the Royal Navy, the carrier strike group is basically the minimum capability the Royal Navy can contribute to those type of naval response contingencies.

The present and future design of the Royal Navy is the ultimate test of competing theories of seapower. The prevailing theory today - even in the US Navy - is that high end capabilities are critical and therefore must be favored over lower end capabilities because warships of excess quality can meet lower end requirements. And yet, the expense of excess quality isn't simply in design and construction, but also in operations and maintenance. Will the UK choose to use the highly capable and very expensive naval vessels of the Royal Navy for naval missions that require far less capabilities, operations that can be successfully conducted at far lower cost with less capable warships the Royal Navy does not have? The Royal Navy isn't simply reducing global presence, but the high quality force design of the Royal Navy has raised the price of global presence. On one hand the future Royal Navy is built to fight in nearly any conventional war scenario, but is also designed to be excessively inefficient towards building partnerships and security cooperation in nearly all places in the world that struggle with challenges less than contested conventional war between military forces at sea.

Today there are no valid ways politically to measure the value of naval presence by a warship,and the absence of naval presence is not evaluated objectively because highlighting the absence of naval does little more than highlight the failure of politicians who ignored unmet requirements for presence.

For example, the tragedy that took place last year on 9/11/12 in Benghazi would have almost certainly unfolded differently if EUCOM had the amphibious ready group that has long been and remains today an unmet presence requirement in the Mediterranean Sea. A single amphibious ship could have potentially responded not only with helicopter gunships, but a Marine evacuation/reinforcement force, and as a warship present offshore the US would have been clued into events with the situational awareness that comes from forward deployed naval presence. The absence of that naval presence is rarely discussed in the context of Benghazi, so there has been no lesson learned, and the requirement for a Marine presence offshore goes unmet even to this day with a stop gap response force now based in Rota (a reactive contingency force vs a proactive contingency force).

What is the political value of a Navy without the ability to sustain strategic presence to places globally of national interest? What is the strategic value of a Navy designed for high end conventional and nuclear war, and little else? These and other similar questions are important questions for the US, because sequestration will require the US Navy to make difficult force structure changes of our own. Is it in our nations strategic interest to reduce capabilities in conventional and nuclear war in favor of strategic presence and operations that support irregular warfare threats to our nations interest globally? The most recent maritime strategy claimed that preventing wars is as important as winning wars. How do naval forces prevent war in the 21st century through presence, or does the 21st century geopolitical environment demand that naval power function as primarily a reaction force, rather than proactive force?

Navy’s Continued Commitment to Europe

The following contribution comes from Rear Admiral Michael Smith. Rear Admiral Michael E. Smith is Director, Strategy and Policy Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

Last Tuesday, at the Sea-Air-Space Expo, I had the opportunity to sit on a well-attended panel with USMC Major General (sel) Rocco and USCG Rear Admiral Lee to discuss a range of issues for the three Sea Services relating to the Asia Pacific rebalance. In the exchange with audience members following our remarks, we fielded a number of very pointed questions that were really variations on the same concern: will the rebalance negatively impact our commitments to Europe?  

From my perspective, the answer to these questions is a resounding no - as long as we approach the future with a new way of thinking. NATO is without question the most powerful military alliance in the world and will continue to be a centerpiece of security in an unpredictable world, and the Navy's relationship with the maritime forces of our European allies and partners remains a cornerstone of cooperative activities across the globe as we confront numerous, collective challenges together. In fact, the Navy continues to pursue greater integrated and cooperative activities with our European counterparts. Examples of continued and enhanced U.S. commitments to Europe include the forward deployment of four of our most advanced Aegis ships to Rota, Spain, where they will support a broad range of missions in addition to their focus on NATO ballistic missile defense, and our ongoing feasibility study of deploying new Littoral Combat Ships and Joint High Speed Vessels to the region. Further, Navy’s contribution to Ballistic Missile Defense of Europe includes not only the maritime BMD piece but also Aegis ashore with the first site planned for Romania in 2015.

Especially in light of fiscal challenges felt across the NATO alliance, we should approach this era of fiscal austerity with significantly greater focus on the potential we all can gain from a more advanced approach to cooperation and engagement between allies and partners - this issue was the focus of an article I recently wrote for Proceedings, Strategic Cooperation: Everybody Wins.

In short, if we take an approach that more fully leverages allied and partner contributions then not only will we maintain our commitments in Europe; we will more efficiently manage resources globally. Now is the time to grasp this opportunity and approach allied and partner contributions in a new light. While the Asia Pacific rebalance is a current area of focus, our commitments to Europe and the Mediterranean are not wavering and can in fact be strengthened if we are willing to challenge our previous planning assumptions and embrace the full capabilities our partners can bring.

The Dutch To Fight Pirates On Shore

On March 23 the European Union decided to extend operation EU NAVFOR until December 2014. At the same time the AOR has also been extended to include Somali coastal territory and internal waters. 

On April 3 their operation plan has been adjusted accordingly.Soon after that, the Dutch government has decided that they will act according to the new operational plan. The Dutch have wanted this extention for quite some time now.

And to be effective against pirates, the Dutch had also agreed last year to put helicopters on every ship they would send to the Horn of Africa.

Because the NH90 has been delayed and the Westland Lynx' are end-of-life, instead of the frigate HNLMS Tromp, the Dutch will now send HNLMS Rotterdam, a LPD. In 2010 they also sent a LPD and used LCU's and LCVP's to block the Somali coast. But HNLMS Johan de Witt didn't have a helicopter on board. This time the Dutch will be sending 2 Cougars (that have been training for this during excersice Cold Response 2012), along with a Scan Eagle.

And they will send in another submarine. And some extra marines. 

So from September-December the Dutch presence is substantial.

But the kicker.....from September-December the Dutch will be leading a Standing NATO Maritime Group for Operation Ocean shield from their LPD, and the sub is also in the area after a NATO request.

So will the Dutch do what they did when freeing the MV Taipan, and temporarily put their ship under national command (or EU command), so they can tackle those pirates ashore?

Another Dutch Sub To Horn Of Africa

In 2010 the Dutch deployed a submarine to the Horn Of Africa after a request from NATO. And while most newspapers focused on the lack of Dutch surface vessels around the Horn of Africa, after HNLMS Zuiderkruis left for retirement (the next surface vessel to go is HNLMS Van Amstel),  there is a Dutch vessel in the area: HNLMS Dolfijn, join operation Ocean Shield.

In 2010 the Dutch sub was 4 months away from her homeport, this time the sub will stay for 8 months. After 4 months the Dutch will rotate crews.

This means the Dutch should have 3 vessels in the area in May: HNLMS Dolfijn, HNLMS Van Amstel and HNLMS Tromp.

And while the sub will gather important information, it is general a very boring operation for the crew. Lying a couple of miles from the Somali cost, watching through a periscope, for days on is more like a police stake out and not as exciting as trying to sneak past enemy warships.

Highlight for the crew the last time a Dutch sub was off the Somali coast was seeing a vessel leave for the sea, after which HMS Montrose sent a Lynx to stop the suspected pirates.

And the information gathered is important in two ways: for operation Ocean Shield and EU Navfor on one side, and for the Dutch on the other.
It is important for the Dutch, because they can trade their intelligence with others who have intelligence they want. In 2010 they did an intellegence exchange with the USA. The USA got intelligence on Somalia, we got intelligence on Afghanistan.

And only recently the Dutch and Germans formed a Joint Investigation Team to tackle the problem of piracy in the HoA.

The old saying is still true: there is no such thing as a free lunch.

On Syria and Turkey

The Arab League is starting to look west as they struggle to influence Assad in Syria, which means the world appears to be moving in the direction of escalation. I do not see military intervention in Syria in the short term, but do not dismiss it as a long term possibility.

One aspect of the Arab uprisings of 2011 that has caught my attention is the genuine interest by nations in the Arab world to attempt to take some responsibility for political problems within that region by leveraging the frameworks of established international institutions like the Arab League, United Nations, and in the case of Libya - NATO. I don't want to overstate that as an important event, even if it is important; because it is a relatively new development for a region that last century largely conducted foreign policy with leaders standing at a podium shouting threats and waving a gun.

Even a nuanced political change is change.

While I'll agree we are observing very weak data points, collective political action by regional partners through established institutions like the Arab League (and even African Union in Somalia to some extent) does suggest that international institutions are showing signs of gaining some strength in addressing some types of international political problems, even if the process is still incredibly ugly to watch and the success of action through those institutions is still yet to be determined.

The latest news regarding the Syrian uprising is that the Arab League is reaching out the UK and France for some guidance and leadership on ways to move forward effectively. What caught my attention was a Reuters report that some folks associated with Syrian politics believe that a Turkish military intervention would be received well in Syria. Part of me thinks this comes from the Middle Eastern School of Dick Chaney Diplomacy or perhaps even a Middle Eastern version of Sun Tzu that looks to others to do the dirty work, but I don't have the expertise and understanding regarding the internal politics of Syria to know if this is legitimate or not. Either way, it is worth consideration... here is the Reuters report:

A leader of Syria's outlawed Muslim Brotherhood said on Thursday the Syrian people would accept military intervention by Turkey, rather than Western countries, to protect them from President Bashar al-Assad's security forces.

Mohammad Riad Shaqfa, who lives in exile in Saudi Arabia, told a news conference in Istanbul the international community should isolate Assad's government to encourage people in their struggle to end more than four decades of Assad family rule.

Hundreds of people have been killed this month, one of the bloodiest periods in the revolt that began in March. The United Nations says more than 3,500 people have died in the unrest.

If Assad's government refused to halt its repression, Shaqfa said Turkish intervention would be acceptable.

I understand a lot of folks get immediately skeptical when they read "Muslim Brotherhood," but it is a fact of life that the Muslim Brotherhood is a political entity in the Middle East and North Africa that will have to be dealt with by the US directly on a diplomatic and political level for years to come - and all indications are that will be especially true for Egypt. While there are obviously differences, the Muslim Brotherhood of 2011 reminds me of the Ba'ath Party rise in the 60s. I have a feeling the US will take a similar political approach with the Muslim Brotherhood as we did with the Ba'ath Party - we don't like them, we don't trust them, and we'll find a way to work with them anyway.

Commentators and opinionators in the US seem to believe the US has full control over whether military action takes place against Syria. This New York Times Op-Ed, for example, contemplates military action against Syria and encourages the US to avoid military intervention. It is an interesting Op-Ed, but it reads like a political narrative from the first decade of the 21st century, not a narrative compatible with the adjustments guiding use of military power in the second decade of the 21st century. When discussing Syria and military intervention, there is only one key player who will decide when military intervention is necessary in Syria, and it isn't the United States, UK, or France - military action related to Syria begins and ends in Ankara.

For all the talk that trouble might break out between Turkey and Israel or Turkey and Greece or Turkey and Cyprus; for example, how flotilla's from Turkey might create an international political incident with Israel or how energy competition between Turkey and Cyprus could spark a conflict; all that heat has led to exactly zero smoke. Today, Turkey remains a strong ally of the US and one of our most important partners in the region. The news the US intends to set up BMD capabilities in Turkey suggests the political relationship between the US and Turkey is still being looked at in the context of long term commitments, not in the context of short term adjustments.

Because the relationship between the US and Turkey is and will remain strong long term, one question we should be asking is what happens when Turkey reaches a red line with Syria and Assad? It is still very possible that Turkey will approach NATO and say - this emerging Syrian civil war issue is a legitimate threat and we want NATO to help us intervene. Events in Syria could easily unfold in ways very similar to how events unfolded in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and if you recall, Bosnia and Herzegovina evolved from a UN political intervention into a NATO military intervention. With the Arab League and Turkey, it isn't impossible to see a similar scenario unfold regarding Syria.

As both France and the UK get more involved behind the scenes in helping the Syrian opposition movement, and as Turkey becomes more frustrated with the current Syrian government, a lot is yet to happen. While first steps in Syria do not appear to be military in nature, the militarization of policy can unfold over time, and events can unfold in predictable and unpredictable ways that can expedite the militarization of policy. One possible scenario that could emerge from the political fog is a limited Turkish led NATO military mission to deal with Syria, and that potential scenario alone suggests the US cannot rule out supporting military activities related to unfolding events in Syria. Calling for US military restraint is wise, but recognizing the potential for legitimate US support for military intervention in Syria is also wise.

I do not necessarily see Syria unfolding towards military intervention, but I also do not believe we have seen the last domino fall as it relates to the political uprisings that began earlier this year in the Middle East and North Africa. I also do not believe we have seen the last military intervention as a result of the ongoing unrest in the region.

The uprisings in Syria are starting to get more attention politically, and that uprising isn't going away anytime soon. Sanctions and other international pressures will only increase the stakes for the Assad government, which suggests to me the situation is approaching a policy change moment for the United States who in the words of some will assert power through the "lead" from behind model. Whether it's lead from behind or lead as part of a front, US leadership on the issue appears to be inevitable - but the US will "lead" only after Turkey asks us to.

Stay on Message

An observation from one of the many remarkably folks I follow on Twitter.

It's 'game over' for Gadhafi: NATO Forces, rebels fight at Misrata airport Agence France-Presse; Reuters - May 9, 2024

NATO: 'Game over' for Gadhafi amid rebel advances, increasing losses by Slobodan Lekic, The Associated Press - June 7, 2024

Qaddafi’s Bid to Retake Libya by Force Has ‘Fallen Apart,’ NATO Chief Says By Patrick Donahue - Jul 6, 2024

Any day now...

NATO and Means-End Reasoning

My thoughts on Gates’ NATO speech:

It is worth noting, however, that protection of Libyan civilians through airstrikes sits so far outside NATO’s founding purpose that the framers of the 1949 treaty that brought the alliance into existence would hardly recognize the mission. NATO is a tool that has been effectively repurposed since the end of the Cold War, but tools are not infinitely malleable. So while the alliance may not be the ideal tool for managing military intervention in Europe’s “near abroad,” that does not mean that the organization is — or risks becoming — useless. Instead of disparaging allies, it would make more sense for critics to consider what NATO can and cannot do, and adapt their expectations accordingly

.

Vessel Sunk Off Somalia by Missile

This report is claiming NATO blew up a ship off Somalia last night.

Somali pirates and a foreign warship clashed off the coast of the town of Hobyo in central Somalia, killing at least three of pirates and wounding four others, witnesses said Saturday.

Hassan Ilka-asse, a a fisherman in the coastal town of Hobyo told AHN by phone that the firefight erupted after one of the foreign warships approached the pirates’ boat.

“Heavy gun fire and shoulder launched missiles could be heard throughout the coastal area nearby. I think the ship was among [the] NATO Navy patrolling off Somalia coast” Ilka-asse explained, citing that he saw a NATO flag upon the top of ship.

He also said the ship completely destroyed the boat with a "big missile".

Something is wrong though, because it does not appear the ship was sunk by NATO as the article claims.

The Somalia Report is guessing it was EUNAVFOR. I'm hearing that isn't correct either.

Some folks in the private intelligence community are telling me the ship sunk was the FV PRANTALAY 12, which is really weird because earlier this week was claimed to be close to release. FV PRANTALAY 12 was reportedly en route from Ceel Dhanaane towards the Hobyo area. All 24 hostages were thought to be on the ship. This is also yet to be confirmed, but is one of the stories.

Now there are Somali sources saying India blew up a dhow, and that hostages of a pirate mothership are thought to have died in the attack. The missile is said to have rapidly consumed the ship in fire and only a few people who were on the ship, and were blown off the ship, survived the attack. Again, this is yet to be confirmed.

All we know for certain is that a ship was sunk killing 3-5 Somali's, and 4-6 Somali's survived the attack. Most people are describing the action as a missile attack.

I guess we will have to wait and see.

Update: Hard to figure how people are claiming to get information from pirates in a hospital in Somalia when all the injured are being treated on the ship, but I think this is the incident in question? Either way, the pirates learned an important (and what should be an obvious) lesson - do not attack Danish warships with machine guns.

Royal Navy Preparing for Naval Ship Fire Support in Libya

I am in full agreement naval gunfire support is needed off Libya, but the British press would be wiser to report such activities for their Navy after it happened, not before.

BRITISH destroyer HMS Liverpool was last night preparing to shell targets in Libya and quicken the downfall of tyrant Colonel Gaddafi.

Defence chiefs have ordered the Type-42 Destroyer to start pounding command and control centres and boost the ill-equipped rebels.

Until now Britain has only used RAF Tornado and Typhoon warplanes and a nuclear submarine.

But sources close to the mission told The Sun a major Navy assault will begin this week. The source said: "Final details are being hammered out now but they are looking to strike over the next few days. When they do, Gaddafi won't know what's hit him."

The Liverpool is a batch 2 Type 42 destroyer with the standard British 4.5 inch Mark 8 gun. There are some new rounds called the High Explosive Extended Range round which give the gun a range of about 27km, while a traditional round offers about 22km.

Either way, the NATO Navies find themselves in a major fight for Misrata, and the absence of fire from the sea has been problematic. Many of the aid ships have been chased out of Misrata's port, and the mines that have been laid in the harbor continue to be a problem.

While it is always dangerous to send ships closer to shore for combat operations, it is good to see the Royal Navy stepping up. Leveraging the type of sustained, persistent fires that offshore fire support brings to the fight, NATO can augment aircraft and remain continuously engaged with fires as needed in Misrata making it very problematic for the Libyan government to move their heavy equipment into offensive position.

I still don't understand why NATO hasn't captured the airport at Misrata. In any other humanitarian operation in the world the very first thing NATO countries would do is send force to the airport in the middle of the disaster zone. I see this as one more reason the political micromanagement of Libyan military operations through the UN directed tactical advisory of no troops on land is far closer to stupid than wisdom, and is why I won't be surprised if the best NATO can do is sustain a stalemate while Libyans continue to die.

Observing Modern MSO Squadron Operations

This is an interesting update on the anti-piracy activities of Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2). I see this as representing the other side of what Chris was discussing last night. I'm posting the news release in full (PDF).

NATO Operation Delivers Severe Blow Against Armed Pirates

Earlier this month, NATO counter-piracy forces delivered a severe blow against armed pirates off the coast of Somalia by arresting 34 suspected pirates. The suspected pirates had previously been observed loading up their mother ships and skiffs with fuel and weapons in order to attack merchant ships further out to sea. In a well-planned operation, NATO warships conducted a night-time strike on the known pirate lairs at sea, close to the coast. As well as detaining the 34 suspected pirates, 34 innocent hostages, who had been held by the pirates, were freed unharmed by the NATO forces.

Recent months have seen an increase in pirate attacks, particularly in the northern Arabian Sea, and with the monsoon season coming to an end, and the weather improving, it was seen as crucial for counter-piracy forces to strike to help prevent pirates getting out to sea to prey on merchant shipping transiting the area.

Over an extended period NATO warships HNLMS Tromp, HDMS Esbern Snare and USS Halyburton, observed the known pirate camps, supported by Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircrafts from the EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) and various other counter piracy forces.

On Friday, as part of the focussed operation, crew from NATO warship HDMS Esbern Snare boarded a suspicious whaler and found it to be packed with fuel, AK47 machine guns, a ladder and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and 3 suspected pirates. The whaler and weaponry were seized by the warship, and after being questioned, the suspected pirates were taken to a nearby beach.

On Saturday HDMS Esbern Snare then approached a dhow that was suspected to be involved in pirate activity. As the Danish boarding team investigated, the pirates started firing at them, who then fired back in self defence. In the fire-fight several pirates were wounded and as a result, a medical team from NATO flag ship HNLMS Tromp was quickly sent to the scene to render medical assistance.

Shortly afterwards HNLMS Tromp spotted another suspect dhow heading for a known pirate camp and as she closed in to investigate, her boarding team was also fired upon. Gunners on board Tromp and the boarding team returned fire, setting fire to the dhow. Ten pirates tried to escape in a skiff, but were quickly captured. When a team from HNLMS Tromp went to the dhow to assist the innocent crew, they found 2 fatally wounded pirates on board. At the same time, a previously pirated merchant vessel - MV Albedo, lifted anchor and headed straight for the NATO flagship.

After some well-aimed warning shots across her bow, Albedo returned to her anchorage. HNLMS Tromp then escorted the freed dhow and crew to safer waters.

On several occasions during the operation, the NATO warships surveyed the anchorages and the pirate beaches. They will continue to do so for the next few months.

Speaking after the operation, Rear Admiral Hank Ort, Chief of Staff at NATO’s Maritime HQ in Northwood said, “This operation has shown the pirates that we mean business and will not tolerate their criminal activities. By conducting this operation close to the shore we have been able to deprive some pirates of a safe passage back to their anchorages and deprive others of the opportunity to go out and attack innocent merchant ships. We are pleased with the success of this operation but we are not complacent as we know there is still much work to be done.”

As per the release:

NATO Forces currently in Operation Ocean Shield:

HNLMS TROMP (Flagship) - Netherlands
HDMS ESBERN SNARE - Denmark
USS BAINBRIDGE - United States of America
USS HALYBURTON - Unites States of America
TCG GIRESUN - Turkey

As a press release, we aren't really getting some of the key operational details, but it does sound to me that NATO has been conducting some form of shore blockade on a specific pirate group.

When I think about the three ships involved in this activity, HNLMS Tromp (F803), HDMS Esbern Snare (L17), USS Halyburton (FFG 40); I see the future of how the Littoral Combat Ship could be used operationally when fielded in numbers. Basically one large ship supports two (or more) motherships that are conducting MSO and harassment operations against the bad guys in the littorals.

This type of operational scenario extends beyond just piracy to potentially include scenarios like current operations off Libya, offshore infrastructure protection, narcotics and anti-smuggling operations, and counter terrorism operations in the South Pacific. It is also very possible in the future we will see NGO operations at sea that require operations not unlike what Israel faces with protest flotilla's. Just about anywhere maritime forces will be utilized for some form of blockade or maritime defense operation, the organization of a single large ship supporting several Littoral Combat Ships focused on sea control in an ungoverned area will be very useful.

An LCS Model Adds Logistics Requirements

Potentially more so for Esbern Snare (L17) and perhaps similar to the way USS Halyburton (FFG 40) is functioning today, there are a lot of moving parts in the mission modules of the Littoral Combat Ship. Stuff breaks, and when (not if) they break, where is the service depot for repairing the equipment?

The Navy is currently building 24 Littoral Combat Ships. As I have said many times, I do not support building more than these 24 Littoral Combat Ships until the concept behind the LCS is rigorously tested and experimented with in operational conditions. The problem is, after 2015, existing Navy plans suggests they simply continue to evolve the LCS and build more. It strikes me this plan has several flaws and is not an optimal use of money, particularly because the Navy will begin the second block of ships before the first block has been thoroughly tested.

I'd like to see the Navy take a different approach towards the years FY16-FY18, and consider slowing the LCS down to 2 ships per year (one of each instead of 2 of each) for that three year period and think about how to build support platforms that enhance the operational capability of the LCS.

One idea would be to build 1 T-AKE type ship per year as a LCS mothership capable of fueling and repairing the Littoral Combat Ship and her modules. For the same cost of two Littoral Combat Ships, the Navy can add that LCS support element that helps keep the hard driving LCS with its rotational crew and forward deployed posture supported effectively forward - adding more time on station instead of in transit to and from port.

Another approach might be to build 2 extra JHSVs per year for three years to serve as an support platform for module repairs and module augmentation in a forward theater. JHSVs may not be able to deploy modules like the LCS, but they can act as additional storage capacity and be designed as a mobile module repair ship for these new unmanned systems that are being distributed to virtually every level in the fleet. While this approach would not add to supporting the extra fuel requirements that can be expected with the LCS, it would add depth to the forward maintenance capability that extends beyond the LCS to the cruisers, destroyers, and submarines - all of which are and will in the future deploy unmanned systems.

The Right Large Ship

Another question that comes to my mind when examining the NATO organization scenario above in a LCS context is what ship would you want to play the role of HNLMS Tromp (F803)? HNLMS Tromp (F803) is an air defense warship with command and control capabilities - a fantastic warship for exactly this role in a NATO MSO operation. But the question I have is whether the DDG-51 would be the optimal ship for scenarios where the LCS would be used, or if the US Navy requires more flexibility due to the range of capabilities that the United States has in a relative comparison to the Dutch.

Lets face it, in war scenarios the AEGIS ships will be there anyway and there will be value added to any task group organization detaching a destroyer to support LCS operations if the LCS operations are what is required. The dirty secret upon close examination is that the AEGIS ship is not always needed, but combat power in the form of different capabilities is indeed needed.

The way military capabilities are used today is remarkable. Last month the United States basically blew through the entire fixed air defense infrastructure of Libya with the vast majority of combat power being provided by a single submarine: USS Florida (SSGN 728). If someone would have suggested to Ronald Reagan in 1986 that instead of a carrier air strike, "we'll defeat the vast majority of the Libyan defense infrastructure with a submarine," that person would have been laughed out of the room and called a clown. And yet, that was only 25 years ago.

So tell me what MSO looks like in 25 years when a Littoral Combat ship squadron is running around conducting maritime interdiction operations, or defending offshore infrastructure. There will be an enormous number of moving parts in sustained operations, and that is going to keep the crews of the LCS very busy. In many ways, MSO is about killing flies, not shooting birds, so having combat power in the context of the sharpest sword is much less useful than having combat power in the context of a mallet.

When augmenting an LCS force in these operations, the capabilities desired the most for these operations will involve manpower. They will be in the form of Blue-Green cooperation like Enhanced Company Operations, brown water capabilities like Riverine, Naval Expeditionary Security, Special Warfare capabilities, EOD, and even Seabees. These are capabilities that suggest a ship will be needed with capabilities very different than the way we think about traditional surface combatants which today come with combat power almost exclusively focused on air defense.

Just as there was the SSGN represents a hybrid between the SSN and the large missile carrying cruiser, I believe in the future we are going to need a surface ship that is a hybrid between today's modern warships and an amphibious ship - and that hybrid will be a large mothership for manned capabilities.

The LCS enables tremendous opportunity for flexible action in the littorals, but sustained operations on the LCS with the small crew suggests the necessity for augmentation, and when discussing any small ship there are always be several areas where augmentation is required. The Navy and Marines are looking to replace 12 LSDs with 11 LSD(X). Whether the Navy reuses the existing LSDs (like the Navy did with SSGN reusing retiring SSBNs) or simply thinks differently about the design of the LSD(X), there is a lot of room for innovation in the configuration of the future large surface combatant towards increasing combat power in areas other than air defense - where the US Navy fleet today is already strongest.