Some Thoughts on the Coastal Riverine Force

Even the smallest economy-of-force programs aren’t immune to Navy budget cuts and accordingly, numerous reductions to NECC force structure were submitted for POM 13. The Navy’s Riverine and Maritime Expeditionary Security Force (MESF) units make up a significant and important part of this community, and comprise the majority of the Navy’s combatant craft outside of Naval Special Warfare. Following the decommissioning of six MSRONs over the next few years, the resulting force structure will consolidate to seven combined Coastal/Riverine Squadrons (CRF) Squadrons for a total of about 4,400 active and reserve Sailors. “The primary mission of CRF is to conduct maritime security operations across all phases of military operations by defending high value assets, critical maritime infrastructure, ports and harbors both inland and on coastal waterways against enemies and when commanded conduct offensive combat operations.” As these changes are enacted, it’s worthwhile to look at where this leaner expeditionary force has come from and where it might go in the future.

A Bit of History

Fighting in inland and coastal waters has been a regular occurrence throughout the U.S. Navy’s history, with notable campaigns in North America, China, and of course, Vietnam. Following the Vietnam War, the navy’s riverine force was largely disestablished and by the 1990s, the sole capability remained in one NSW unit.  The 21st Century riverine force, assembled a few years after the Navy Staff realized that Operation Iraqi Freedom wasn’t just a ground war, now consists of three squadrons of highly trained Sailors with boats and kit sufficient to conduct their missions globally. During OIF, the RIVRONs protected the Haditha Dam and performed hundreds of combat patrols in support of ground forces along Iraqi rivers. The RIVRONs also were equipped with the RCB, a very capable troop carrying boat based on the Swedish CB-90. These boats have been recently used for coastal missions, but are not optimized for extended operations in heavier seas.



 RPBs and RCB in USS Oak Hill (LSD 51) U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication
Specialist 2nd Class Michael R. Hinchcliffe

The arguably less well known Maritime Expeditionary Security Force originated out of the Inshore Undersea Warfare units that defended harbors and other inshore areas against Viet Cong sappers. In the 1970s, the IUW community reverted to the reserve force, added new equipment and missions such as electronic and acoustic surveillance. MIUWs and IBUs performed landward and seaward security roles for amphibious and JLOTs operations, with some units mobilized for Operation Desert Storm. Following the October 2000 attack on USS COLE, the then-called Naval Coastal Warfare community gradually shifted to a boat-centric force, added active force structure, and changed its name to MESF, to reflect the increased emphasis on anti-terrorism/force protection. Throughout the last decade,  thousands of MSRON Sailors have deployed globally to austere locations and successfully deterred new terrorist attacks on critical maritime infrastructure. They have escorted thousands of naval and civilian ships, defended dozens of different ports, and lived for months at a time on Iraq’s rusty OPLATS - all thankless, but vitally important missions.  Interestingly, the new CRF is not the first time that the Navy has combined coastal and riverine units.

On boats

The MK VI will be the newest addition to NECC’s fleet (see Chuck Hill’s post here) and provide a much needed augmentation to the smaller MESF and RIVRON craft. There is room to debate whether the MK VI will be the right vessel for coastal NECC missions. Certainly, the ability to embark a boarding team and better sea-keeping and endurance will make the MK VI a tremendously more capable platform than the MESF’s current 34’ PBs. But one the thing to keep in mind is that combatant craft are small, inexpensive relative to every other surface (and air) platform, and designed to have a short life span. Therefore, if the initial buy of six vessels doesn’t prove ideal for CRF, then OPNAV shouldn’t dwell on what amounts to rounding errors in the larger acquisition budget and move quickly to another design.

That said, it should be understood that the MK VI does not meet the requirement for a green water Cyclone PC replacement which would be more properly classified as an offshore patrol vessel or offshore support craft. The MK VI just doesn’t have the legs and payload for that mission set and requires either a near-by land base or sea-basing as seen in the above photo of well deck testing last year. Ostensibly, LCS was going to take on the offshore patrol role, along with the missions for apparently every other ship class smaller than a DDG. Time will tell how that idea works out.

Some Future Opportunities

Along with continuing to conduct NECC’s mainstay riverine, force protection, and security force assistance missions, the CRF has the opportunity to expand into new mission sets. As the combined CRF stands up next week, it’s heartening to hear one of the MESG Commodores recognize the offensive potential of these units. “Although Coastal Riverine Force will predominantly perform force protection type missions, when required it will be capable of conducting offensive operations which will enhance mission effectiveness throughout the force.”  These operations will require new equipment, training, and tactics.

Although the MK VI is not heavily armed or armored, it does appear to have a remotely operated MK 38 Mod 2 (25mm) on the bow. The Israelis have similar mounts on their fast attack craft that include coaxial Spike ER laser guided missiles (8 km range). One hopes that NAVSEA CCD is planning on installing at least an equivalent capability on the MK VI to add to CRF’s offensive punch. I recently was aboard a similar sized vessel capable of carrying 16 griffin missiles in a VLS-type launcher, so this sort of firepower not out of the question for 20-30 meter fast attack craft. Furthermore, by becoming targeting nodes in a distributed naval fires network, these small vessels could fight above their weight class.


MIUWU 114 Mobile Operations Center on Khawr Abd Allah River
Iraq, April 2003 (author’s photo)

 Similarly, the MESF’s land-based sensor detachments have the potential to improve targeting in the littorals. A primarily defensive force since COLE, MESF’s 90s-era equipment is in need of a radical facelift, with the addition of lighter and more numerous fixed, mobile, and disposable sensors. In the IUW era, the MIUWUs routinely deployed and listened to sonobuoys in support of coastal ASW.  Today, a myriad of air and sea droppable sensor packages with various combinations of EO, signals, acoustic, and METOC collection capabilities are readily available. These smaller, smarter, and cheaper sensors can rapidly disseminate their data globally via a number of means, and along with small tactical UAVs, should become a staple of the CRF.

The Navy must sustain traditional brown and green water MSO missions, but new technology will also make it possible for NECC units to become an integral component of distributed maritime operations in higher intensity warfare.

******
Thanks to Lee Wahler, a frequent commenter on ID, and other hard core boat guys for helping with ideas and research on this article.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Finding Stability with Somalia's Nascent Navy

Here's a good article from the Somalia Report on the TFG's underfunded, underequipped Navy. The littorals play no small part in Somalia's instability. Piracy from Somalia's shores continues to threaten the Indian Ocean, despite a dropping success rate due to a greater acceptance of embarked armed security teams. Al Shabaab has begun to exercise its own crude maritime force, skirmishing with the Kenyans at sea in November and December. Al Shabaab also receives funding, weapons, and fighters from the sea. Finally, some combination of Somali pirates/criminals/al Shabaabers continues attempts to kidnap tourists from Kenyan coastal areas.

Building indigenous naval capacity is one of the ways that the international community can help stabilize Somalia. As we know from recent experience trying to stand up Iraq's Navy, building a nascent navy is not easy, inexpensive, or fast. US legislation on security force assistance doesn't facilitate multiyear funding mechanisms optimal for these sorts of efforts, and Navy culture and force structure (outside of MCAST) are not conducive to working with smaller navies. However, there may be a role for US and allied support to the African Union in training, equipping, and deploying an AMISOM maritime capability. The US State Department's ACOTA program has supported training Ugandan Defense Forces which are the bulwark of the AMISOM mission. A program to deploy willing West African navies to Somalia under the auspices of the AU, train and equip them with patrol boats that they might retain following mission completion, might be enough to bolster the tiny Somali Navy and reduce the impact of maritime crime, insurgency, and terrorists who ply the coast of Somalia. In turn, these navies would redeploy more capable, interoperable, and experienced to defend their own shores.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Picture of the Day

I love this picture.


Here is the Navy article. Good stuff. I smell some Bold Alligator '12 planning behind the scenes here.

Defending Iraq’s OPLATs - End of an Era

The final British patrol has departed Iraq’s Khawr Al Amaya and Al Basrah Oil Terminals (KAAOT and ABOT) in the North Arabian Gulf. American Sailors are still engaged but will join the Brits later this year as the Iraq withdrawal progresses. From the time of their initial capture by NSW operators in March 2003, to the rapid hand off of security to USMC FAST, USCG Port Security Units, and the establishment of a long term presence by (then) Naval Coastal Warfare and MESF forces, thousands of active and reserve American and British Sailors, Marines, and Coasties have played a key role in defending the lifeblood of the Iraqi economy. A few even gave their lives.

Some observations on this mission:

- MSO is an enduring sort of mission - once started, it’s hard to stop. Aside from the oplats, a significant portion of the NECC’s security forces have been tied down since 911 protecting SPODs and friendly shipping in CENTCOM. Even as some of these missions draw-down, these capabilities should remain intact, as they are versatile and difficult to reconstitute in the event of a crisis. MESF is an economy of force capability, and with a little imagination, the squadrons bring utility outside of force protection such as support to HADR operations and FID.

- A related lesson is that cutting the umbilical and turning over operations (completely) to a foreign partner can be challenging. The complete withdrawal from the OPLAT has been delayed several times. It's time for the Iraqis to sink or swim.

- Although numerous CRUDES and Gators supported the defense of the OPLATs and the Sailors on them, the work horses of this mission were the USN PCs and USCG WPBs. The OPLATs are situated amidst a complex environment of shoal water, heavy small boat traffic, and international sea boundaries. Some missions were made for smaller, more nimble, shallow draft vessels, and putting a multi-billion dollar capital vessel at risk is a misuse of assets at best. The PCs have been rode hard and put away wet, and are beyond the end of their service lives. A replacement is nowhere to be found in USN acquisition plans.

- ISR over-watch is a critical component of MSO. For a variety of reasons, UAVs were chosen for this mission in the NAG. However, other systems should be considered to maintain persistent surveillance over ports and offshore platforms, including fixed aerostats, like those made by this company or this one. These tactical aerostats (unlike those currently in use for base protection in Afghanistan) are affordable for smaller navies.

- At the strategic level - putting all of one’s eggs in the same critical infrastructure basket is a recipe for disaster. The Iraqis (and consequently the US) were very lucky that there was only one viable attack attempted on the platforms over the past 8 years. Systems disruption attacks, especially against oil infrastructure, have become widely understood by insurgents and terrorists globally as a low risk/high return tactic. Given growing global offshore oil infrastructure, it’s likely the US Navy will find itself involved in MSO again sometime in the future, whether in a lead or supporting (train/equip/advise) role.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

NSW in the PI

Here's a nice video featuring SEALs in the Philippines. Also see JSOTF-P's blog here.

I agree the nearly decade old operation has gone well and been cost effective. But frankly, comparisons to the scope and cost of JSOTF-P's COIN (really FID) efforts to COIN/CT efforts in Iraq or Afghanistan are apples and rocks. The nature of the insurgencies are fundamentally different as unlike the primary AQ affiliates, the Mindanao insurgents are of limited importance to al Qaeda's overall strategy and lack external support and an influx of foreign jihadists fighters.

Criticism aside though, the NSW (SEAL and SWCC), NECC forces (primarily maritime civil affairs), and various USN/USNS ships have done a tremendous job in supporting the PI military in combating Islamic insurgents since 2002. (And yes, there are non-Navy SOF and GPF involved also, but this has been a maritime-centric operation). Aside from the obvious COIN lessons learned, some take-aways from a naval IW perspective include the experience gained operating and sustaining distributed SOF in an archipeligo, use of small tactical UAS in a maritime environment, and long duration afloat staging of SOF.

Update: try this link at SWJ. For some reason (probably my technical ineptitude), the above video link isn't working.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Sorting out Small Craft SFA

Building partner capacity is a key line of operation in our maritime strategy and the campaign to defeat terrorism globally. In addition to participating in numerous multi-lateral blue water exercises each year, the US Navy and other government agencies routinely support the development of partner naval, coast guard, and police forces to operate in the littorals. Combatant craft conduct a wide variety of irregular warfare operations including maritime security, special operations insert/extract, ISR, VBSS, riverine and coastal patrol. The US government’s capabilities to support the growing demand for small craft security force assistance is scattered throughout DOD and other agencies.

On the Naval Special Warfare side, NAVSCIATTS provides courses and Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) to international combatant craft professionals. The command recently took delivery of four Safeboat 25’ Defender Security Force Assistance Combat Craft (Small). These craft will support NAVSCIATTS’ new Patrol Craft Officer Coastal Course, which is designed “to provide the student with specialized training in the employment and operation of a Patrol Craft in littoral/coastal environments.” In addition to NAVSCIATTS, NSW Special Boat Team detachments routinely deploy for Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCETs) on combatant craft operations. Notionally, NSW SFA efforts are designed to train their maritime SOF counterparts on NSW-combatant craft specific missions, but some of the partner forces NAVSCIATTS trains with clearly don’t meet that threshold.

In NECC, MCAST SFA det delivers “maritime expeditionary core capability training and instruction in the areas of small boat operations, maritime interception, weapons, maritime expeditionary security, maintenance, professional development, and skill sets external to NECC.” While deployed on Iraq’s rivers and lakes, the RIVRONs supported the training of Iraq’s riverine forces, and as they withdraw from this mission, there are additional opportunities to support riverine FID in other areas. Additionally, MESF dets have played a role in maritime security training.

The US Coast Guard deploys MTTs globally, both ashore and embarked on naval platforms to support host nation maritime law enforcement training.

Finally, the Justice Department’s ICITAP supports international marine police unit training.

At first blush, the multitude of small craft training teams and courses may appear to be redundant or wasteful. Low-end capabilities like these may seem like low hanging fruit to budget cutters. However, when looking at the overall demand globally for small craft training - especially in Africa, the nation’s small craft SFA capacity seems about right. Yet there is clearly room for improvement and efficiencies in how these capacity building efforts are allocated and deployed across the COCOMs. Better coordination must occur across the Navy (especially between SOF and non-SOF staffs), interagency and with other partner nations who have similar SFA functions. This coordination responsibility falls on the shoulders of security cooperation planners in the geographic combatant commands, and their naval and special operations components.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Two Stories in One

From Navy News Service.

Riverine Sailors Provide Realistic Training for Strike Group - 10/12/2024

Riverine Sailors Participate in Strike Group Exercise - 12/3/2024

Comment: Can a brother get a mothership?

I think it would be useful if the Navy explored this from a perspective other than OPFOR. Can a RIVRON control port access, for example?

The articles are very similar, begging for questions like why Enterprise CSG needs to do COMPUTEX twice, for example. With that said, I think the articles also give those with just a bit of imagination and creativity something to think about.

NECC Focus: MCAST

Last post here for a while as I'm deploying shortly...

This article demonstratives the power and initiative of small, cohesive teams of forward-deployed Sailors. Over the past few years, Maritime Civil Affairs Teams (MCATs) have done some great work in shaping and stability operations, primarily in support of CJSOTF-P and CJTF-HOA. I was a bit surprised by last year's consolidation of two units with somewhat different roles: NECC's MCAG and ETG. Civil Affairs is primarily a population-centric mission, while ETG's focus was on developing partner navies (SFA/FID). I'm sure there was some measure of cost savings and efficiencies factored into the decision. But there are also some overlaps in training and complementary skill sets for these missions including the ability to operate on the ground independently and language, regional, and cultural expertise. Unfortunately, it is still difficult for these trained and experienced Sailors to re-tour with NECC.

It will be interesting watch how the Navy and NECC integrate MCAST capabilities into combatant commanders' theater engagement strategies over the next few years. MCAST units have an additional bit of flexibility over similar joint capabilities -- they can deploy rapidly by air (as in Haiti), deploy persistently (CJTF HOA), but unlike their Army brethren, they also embark on afloat partnership stations. Hopefully, MCAST is here to stay. But unfortunately, history shows that non-standard (meaning not ships, aircraft, or subs) units tend to be the first to face the Navy's budget knife.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.