I am in full agreement naval gunfire support is needed off Libya, but the British press would be wiser to report such activities for their Navy after it happened, not before.
BRITISH destroyer HMS Liverpool was last night preparing to shell targets in Libya and quicken the downfall of tyrant Colonel Gaddafi.
Defence chiefs have ordered the Type-42 Destroyer to start pounding command and control centres and boost the ill-equipped rebels.
Until now Britain has only used RAF Tornado and Typhoon warplanes and a nuclear submarine.
But sources close to the mission told The Sun a major Navy assault will begin this week. The source said: "Final details are being hammered out now but they are looking to strike over the next few days. When they do, Gaddafi won't know what's hit him."
The Liverpool is a batch 2 Type 42 destroyer with the standard British 4.5 inch Mark 8 gun. There are some new rounds called the High Explosive Extended Range round which give the gun a range of about 27km, while a traditional round offers about 22km.
Either way, the NATO Navies find themselves in a major fight for Misrata, and the absence of fire from the sea has been problematic. Many of the aid ships have been chased out of Misrata's port, and the mines that have been laid in the harbor continue to be a problem.
While it is always dangerous to send ships closer to shore for combat operations, it is good to see the Royal Navy stepping up. Leveraging the type of sustained, persistent fires that offshore fire support brings to the fight, NATO can augment aircraft and remain continuously engaged with fires as needed in Misrata making it very problematic for the Libyan government to move their heavy equipment into offensive position.
I still don't understand why NATO hasn't captured the airport at Misrata. In any other humanitarian operation in the world the very first thing NATO countries would do is send force to the airport in the middle of the disaster zone. I see this as one more reason the political micromanagement of Libyan military operations through the UN directed tactical advisory of no troops on land is far closer to stupid than wisdom, and is why I won't be surprised if the best NATO can do is sustain a stalemate while Libyans continue to die.
I have been thinking about this picture a lot. This is a slide found on page 13 of this Powerpoint, and in it the USS Tortuga (LSD 46) apparently loaded 16 CB-90s during an exercise back on February 27, 2002. I have a very high opinion of the CB-90, and note the US Navy is using the CB-90 on a limited basis with our Riverine Squadrons.
I've also been thinking about Libya. In a Congressional Research Report dated March 28, 2024 done by Jeremiah Gertler titled Operation Odyssey Dawn (Libya): Background and Issues for Congress (R41725), there are some interesting charts on costs. For example, the 3 B-2 bombers that flew from Missouri to Libya cost $2.3 million in flight hours, $800K in refueling costs, and if we assume each aircraft dropped 15 JDAMs (45 total), they delivered roughly $1.575 million in payload. That means those three B-2 strikes cost an estimated $4,675,000. If we assume the US Navy has fired 210 Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles to date, and each TLAM costs $1.4 million, that is roughly $294 million in war costs.
It was recently reported that one of the submarines moved away from Libya, scaling down US Navy presence. That news was received with a big yawn. I'm not really sure why, but I think it might in part be due to the reality the US Navy lacks capabilities for taking the fight to land below that of the $1.4 million Tomahawk. It seems to me the US Navy is missing a few critical pieces if seapower is to take a leading role in influencing the enemy from an offshore position in situations where military action on the land side of the littorals is required.
As I see it the US Navy is missing two important pieces. First, the US Navy needs an accurate weapon system for deploying fires up to a range of about 10km from a position offshore of about 2km. This needs to be a low tech, low cost rapid fires capability that can be supported and maintained from existing platforms at sea. Second, the US Navy needs an accurate weapon system for deploying fires up to a range of about 50km from a position offshore of around 25km. Again, this needs to be a low tech and low cost, selective fires capability that can be leveraged from existing platforms at sea.
It appears the Navy believes that long term, the Griffin missile will be capable of filling the role of the second weapon system. Obviously there will be a development process towards that conclusion to increase the capability of the Griffin, but since NLOS was going to be that short range offshore precision fires capability and the Griffin is intended to replace that weapon system long term, at minimum we can acknowledge the Navy is investing in a solution.
But that still leaves the gap at the very low tech, low cost, short range level... and when facing adversaries that are using low tech capabilities to drive our costs up, it is important that we too seek low tech solutions for those environments where we can keep our costs of conducting the business of war down. The cost difference between MRAP and IED demonstrates how long term, the US loses the cost equation in warfare if we too aren't looking for low cost solutions.
Again, that is why I have been thinking about the CB-90, and in particular the AMOS or Advanced Mortar System, a 120 mm automatic twin barreled, breech loaded mortar turret. If the USS Ponce (LPD 15) had 6 or so of these CB-90s with 120mm mortars, and was configured to fire the GPS Roll-Controlled Guided Mortar shell, your talking about a CB-90 being able to put up to 26 GPS guided 5 lb shells on top of several targets in a single minute out to 7-9 km and at a cost of $7,000 a shell. The nice thing about this capability is that it would fit in nice working with UAVs from LCS, and the low yield of the shell would make this capability useful in urban areas where civilian casualties are a critical concern.
High end missions like Ballistic Missile Defense are requiring resources to be concentrated towards capabilities that simply don't translate into the dirty work of littoral warfare. The LCS is coming, and with the LCS comes a significant number of ISR capabilities that will create opportunities for the US Navy to take the fight to the enemy. Part of that fight needs to be sustainable firepower capabilities that can move in and out of the littorals from 50 miles offshore, be moved forward quickly and maintained in the field. In times of tight budget resources, sometimes those capabilities will be poor man solutions.
The CB-90 with a 120mm mortar firing GPS rounds is an example of a poor mans solution to short ranged fire support, but I would point out that operating at night off the Libyan coast right now they would be a lethal, low cost uniquely naval capability that allows the US to use the sea as a maneuver space and sustain coverage over land areas with a much greater capacity for fires than UAVs will now, or in the future when LCS and other UAV platforms are fielded.
Reader Robert Buss most helpfully pointed out to me an article in Jane's IDR from 1995. The title of the article is "US Navy weighs missile alternatives" and it talks about various experiments in navalized rocketry. In the abstract, handily enough, which is available here, there is a most interesting quote describing Navy TACMS:
The US Navy also tested one such round at White Sands, followed by an at-sea launch from the amphibious assault ship USS Mount Vernon in February1995.The vessel, steaming at 10kt, fired the missile from a standard M270 tracked launcher chained to its helicopter deck (emphasis mine)... An operational variant of Navy TACMS could use either the Mk41 Vertical Launch System (for which United Defense has designed a suitable canister) or fixed deck launchers.The round's six-channel GPS receiver provided 13 position updates,using a total of eight Navstar satellites, during its 75nmi flight to the target area on San Clemente Island off the coast of California. The missile then dispensed some 800 inert grenades, achieving an accuracy of 71% of the weapon's nominal circular error probable.
In other words, there doesn't appear to be any problem firing from an M270 vehicle on board a moving ship so long as you have a guided round. - the launcher doesn't need stable-platform modification, and the fire control system appears to be up to it already.
I harp on this because although various folks have gone on about the pluses and minuses of mounting these launchers on ships, my point has a different emphasis. The fire support problem is one that has been hanging around for a while, and hasn't been solved (at least partially) due to the cost of new platforms. I am proposing a 'use what you have' solution to gain some capability for little additional RDT&E.; The bonus of using full-up launcher sets is, of course, that you can then use them at the far end - and take them off the ship easily when you don't need them. Plus, we already own a whole bunch of them.
There would obviously be issues with navalizing the launchers (or covering them) well enough to withstand deployment, but since they would only need to be available on station, covers would work and be easier to design/fabricate than modifying the launchers themselves for higher salt/water resistance. Heck, if you're using a platform with a hangar, park a couple in there. Or, if it's a big-deck ship, park more than a couple.
If, as Galrahn keeps harping on about, the Navy builds a 1000-ton littoral PC in reasonable numbers, they'll need weapons. Unlike all-up amphib ships and their supporting craft, this is a mission for guns. VLS systems are just too space-intensive for a 1000-ton, 250-foot ship. If the ship is intended to self-deploy and remain on station for reasonable periods of time, it won't be able to head back to port to reload a VLS system. The target set for this sort of combatant is quite different as well - it will consist of small to medium sized boats, aircraft, and targets on the shoreline whether vessels, vehicles or structures. It's not efficient to use VLS for that. This is where the gun will thrive again.
The question would be 'which gun?' I'm not talking about self-defense against Zodiacs, because I think that's best handled using the Marines you're carrying to man Ma Deuce mounts. A PC of the size we're talking would have the room for one or perhaps two main gun systems depending on the type. Unfortunately, it looks like the venerable and flexible Mark 45 5"/54 and its ilk may be too large; the smallest vessel I can find sporting one of those is the Blohm & Voss MEKO. Greece's Hydra-class versions are 117.5 meters long and displace 2,710 tons - too big for our notional ship.
The real questions would be whether this is a direct-fire only gun or a true naval rifle; and if it is a standard mount or some new technology. I would posit that given Gal's $100MM cap, an existing mount is the way to go, and it's not like the world is short of medium gun systems. Otobreda makes a nice 76mm gun system with a 20km maximum range that Israel mounts on its 250-ton patrol boats, just for one example of many. This would give you a nice option against small boats (it can depress -15 degrees) and soft-to-medium shore targets while retaining emergency AAW and cruise missile defense capability.
On a more daring note, it might also be possible to use these craft and the module space on the LCS for a more dispersed NSFS capability - which, if they're carrying Marines, would (I'm sure) be appreciated. I need to get off my tuchus and run some quick Lanchester numbers for the survivability of big ablative vessels with many NSFS assets (foamed tankers, etc.) vs. lots of smaller vessels with single or double mounts.
Another project I keep doodling over but haven't really run numbers for: given the number of helo decks available in the fleet, it might be possible to make a dedicated MLRS or HIMARS 'mounting plate' for a standard helo deck - essentially a flat metal lockdown plate designed to securely hold an MLRS or HIMARS vehicle in firing position. I'd want to know if there are standardized lockdown options on USN helo decks; if so, even if they're different across platforms, perhaps the mount could be a universal adapter. Next number to crunch: will a HIMARS/MLRS and a loading vehicle fit on a helo deck? Is there a sneaky way to load them? Realistically, even, you could put just a HIMARS launcher on the mount - save yourself the truck, unless you had plans to use them at the other end of the trip ashore. There should be more than enough space. While of course the LCS mission module space is a better candidate, helo decks are in goodly supply - and maybe a quickly-assembled force of bombardment ships is something we could keep 'on the shelf' this way.
Hm. Helo decks seem to run around 12m in width by 20-25m in length. If we're lucky, LAMPS RAST hardware could be adapted for the mount to provide power and lockdown. Anyone have a reference for an online copy of NAEC-ENG-7576 I could leaf through? (That is, if it's open - I don't know if it's restricted at all).
These are the things I ponder when I should be working.
Update: There is nothing new under the sun. Field Artillery Magazine has mention of a 'navalized MLRS' way back in 1987 - although that was built onto the ships in question. My proposal above involves utilizing existing launcher sets on an as-needed basis. Of course, what I'd love to know is if the USN actually looked at the feasibility of firing these things from a ship, and if it required stabilization - a commenter says the Germans tried it and it didn't work even with guided rockets. Hm.
Image of the Otobreda 76mm - handily, with small boats in frame - courtesy of Wikipedia
We see this as a great sign for naval fire support.
BAE Systems and Lockheed Martin are teaming to develop long-range guided munitions for the U.S. Navy. The new 5-inch, precision-guided Extended Range Munition (ERM) will address the current void in affordable and reliable long-range naval surface fire support.
The 5-inch ERM builds on BAE Systems/Lockheed Martin’s success with the Navy’s 155-mm Long-Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP) program. The LRLAP has the capability to precisely engage targets at ranges in excess of 72 nautical miles, delivering lethal force in support of military operations ashore with minimal collateral damage. Much of the proven technology used with the LRLAP program is being applied to the 5-inch ERM program.
If you recall, earlier this year the Navy dropped the ERGM Raytheon was developing, mostly because it was too expensive and it didn't work. The only current competitor in the market we are aware of is Alliant Techsystems, which is developing a ballistic trajectory extended-range munition (BTERM). The BTERM has had some problems though.
If the new ERM is like the canceled ERGM, it will only be available for the 5" 62 caliber gun fielded on DDG 81 and forward. Something to keep an eye on for the DDG-51 modernization. BAE has a solid reputation with the LRLAP. Hopefully BAE and Lockheed Martin will be able to capitalize on that success for the ERM.
It looks like the proposed German F125, initially criticized for not being desirable on the export market, may indeed have an interested customer. In a September 4th article in Mer et Marine, the Netherlands is mentioned as interested in the F125. This may or may not be accurate, but there are reasons why it probably is.
The Mer et Marine article isn't really about Dutch interest though, the article claims that the German Court of Auditors (the accountants) aren't happy about the F125 price, claiming the new ship could cost as much as 3 billion Euros. For only 4 ships, that would represent a substantial naval investment by Germany. The accountants don't seem to like anything about the contract, which they claim is designed poorly and only to the favor of the defense industry. That is their job though, sort of like how the CBO hates all procurement costs for any military program, apparently accountants are the same everywhere.
The Dutch and Germans are partners and have experience in joint programs, so this really isn't anything new about a potential partnership in a shipbuilding program. The F125 contract already has foreign expenditure in the program, and that almost certainly includes Thales NL.
When the announcement came that the 127mm lightweight Otobreda naval gun was chosen over the MONARC, it reminded me that the Netherlands and Italy had already begun working on long range projectiles for the 127mm Otobreda. Given the ground attack role of the F125, and the apparent substantial cost of the F125, it is possible the desire to cut cost in developing the new gun led to the final 127mm choice, and the existing interest by the Dutch to field such a gun in the future was as much as a factor in the final F125 design as the purchase of U212s by Italy. You never know with the webs weaved in the European defense community.
In the end though, the F125 itself is impressive. Designed as a stealth ship, which might be just a vogue way of saying 'new' in maritime circles these days, the F125 does have a considerable amount of redundancy, and is built to a higher combat standard than is typically seen in European warships, which tend to cut costs by using a modified upscale commercial standard (not to be confused with a lower cost civilian standard or a higher cost military standard common in the US Navy). At 6800 tons and designed for 2 year deployments, it is an interesting deviation from how other countries are trying to incorporate land attack on the cheap if at all, and a much broader approach than what other European Navies are considering with FREMM.
Old-School? Stars and Stripes may think so, but it is also new school with the DD(X) on the horizon. While labels are actually just a distraction, it is both interesting and noteworthy the US Navy is engaged in the GWOT with weapons other than cruise missiles, and has been off Somalia for years.
The Navy went old-school on Somali militants Friday, using naval gunfire against bad guys for the first time in the region since the Gulf War.
It was first reported over the weekend that a U.S. destroyer had shelled Islamic militants in Somalia, where Ethiopian and Islamic government forces are fighting insurgents from the Islamic Courts Union, which the U.S. government has accused of sheltering al-Qaida terrorists.
A senior Defense official confirmed Tuesday that the USS Chafee, based out of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, fired more than a dozen rounds from its 5-inch gun during the strike.
“The USS Carter Hall fired flares and several shots across the bow as well as several disabling shots at the three skiffs in tow,” he said. “They shot at the skiffs and they caught on fire.”
Sailors used the ship’s .50-caliber machine guns, 7.62 mm miniguns and 25 mm Bushmaster cannons in the encounter, Gay said.
“As long as they’re in international waters, they can engage,” he said.
But the hijacked Danica White made it into Somali waters and the Carter Hall had to back off and watch.
“We’re observing them at this point,” Gay said. “It’s ongoing.”
The Navy mission rotation of L class ships without Marines embarked is discussion for another time, but the fact the US has had two engagements this week involving guns raises several questions. Will the 57mm planned for the LCS be enough? Did the Navy make a mistake not putting a larger gun on the LPD-17? Did the USS Chafee make the best case yet for the DD(X) Zumwalt class ship so far in 2007?
I am in full agreement naval gunfire support is needed off Libya, but the British press would be wiser to report such activities for their Navy after it happened, not before.
