Deception and the Backfire Bomber, the Finale

For previous installments, see Parts I, II, III, and IV

Final Thoughts

It should be hoped that Tokarev’s article will be the first of many revelations in the coming years illustrating how the Soviet and U.S. navies actually used EW and tactical deception against each other to gain edges in their struggle for maritime scouting superiority. Enough time has passed such that many of the less-sensitive aspects of this late Cold War competition ought to be safely disclosable without harming existing tactics or capabilities. A deeper understanding of this competition’s rich history will be crucial to the U.S. Navy’s doctrinal and tactical development as new oceanic surveillance-reconnaissance-strike threats emerge in the coming years. We have thankfully not fought a great power-level war since 1945, and if we are to keep that track record going our current and future force must develop and then maintain the deception and counter-deception competencies central to modern maritime warfare—not to mention conventional deterrence.

Deception and the Backfire Bomber, Part IV

For previous installments, see Parts I, II, and III

Ingredients of Counter-Deception

How could a U.S. Navy battleforce then—or now—avoid defeats at the hands of a highly capable adversary's deceptions? The first necessary ingredient is distributing multi-phenomenology sensors in a defense’s outer layers. Continuing with the battleforce air defense example, many F-14s were equipped during the 1980s with the AN/AXX-1 Television Camera System (TCS), which enabled daytime visual classification of air contacts from a distance. The Navy’s F-14D inventory later received the AN/AAS-42 Infrared Search and Track system to provide a nighttime standoff-range classification capability that complemented AN/AXX-1. Cued by an AEW aircraft or an Aegis surface combatant, F-14s equipped with these sensors could silently examine bomber-sized radar contacts from 40-60 miles away as meteorologically possible. As it would be virtually impossible for a targeted aircraft to know it was being remotely observed unless it was supported by AEW of its own, and as the targeted aircraft’s only means for visually obscuring itself was to take advantage of weather phenomena as available, F-14s used in this outer layer visual identification role could help determine whether inbound radar contacts were decoys or actual aircraft. If the latter, the sensors could also help the F-14 crews determine whether the foe was carrying ordnance on external hardpoints. This information could then be used by a carrier group’s Air Warfare Commander to decide where and how to employ available CAP resources.

It follows that future U.S. Navy outer layer air defenses would benefit greatly from having aircraft equipped with these kinds of sensors distributed to cover likely threat axes at extended ranges from a battleforce’s warships. Such aircraft could report their findings to their tactical controllers using highly-directional line-of-sight communications pathways in order to prevent disclosure of the battleforce’s location and disposition. Given that the future air threat will not only include maritime bombers but also strike fighters and small unmanned aircraft, it would be enormously useful if each manned aircraft performing the outer layer visual identification role could also control multiple unmanned aircraft in order to extend their collective sensing reach as well as covered volume. This way, the outer layer would be able to investigate widely-dispersed aircraft approaching on multiple axes well before the latter’s sensors and weapons could be employed against the battleforce. The same physics that would allow the U.S. Navy to disrupt or exploit an adversary’s multi-phenomenology maritime surveillance and reconnaissance sensors could be wielded by the adversary against a U.S. Navy battleforce’s outer layer sensors, however, so the side that found a way to scout effectively first would likely be the one to attack effectively first.

A purely sensor-centric solution, though, is not enough. Recall Tokarev’s comment about making actual attack groups seem to be “easily recognizable decoys.” This could be implemented in many ways, one of which might be to launch readily-discriminated decoys towards a defended battleforce from one axis while vectoring a demonstration group to approach from another axis. Upon identifying the decoys, a defender might orient the bulk of his available fighters to confront the demonstration group. This would be a fatal mistake, though, if the main attack group was actually approaching on the first axis from some distance behind the decoys. If there was enough spatial and temporal separation between the two axes, and if fighter resources were firmly committed towards the demonstration group at the time it became apparent that the actual attack would come from the first axis, it might not be possible for the fighters to do much about it. An attacker might alternatively use advanced EW technologies to make the main attack group appear to be decoys, especially when meteorological conditions prevented the CAP’s effective use of electro-optical or infrared sensors.

This leads to the second necessary ingredient: conditioning crews psychologically and tactically for the possibility of deception. During peacetime, tactical competence is often viewed as a ‘checklist’ skillset in that crews are expected to quickly execute various immediate actions by rote when they encounter certain tactical stimuli. There’s something to be said for standardized immediate actions, as some simply must be performed instinctively if a unit or group is to avoid taking a hit. Examples of this include setting General Quarters, adjusting a combat system’s configuration and authorized automaticity, launching alert aircraft, making quick situation reports to other units or higher command echelons, and employing evasive maneuvers or certain EW countermeasures. Yet, some discretion may be necessary lest a unit salvo too many defensive missiles against decoys or be enticed to prematurely reveal its location to an attacker. The line separating a fatal delay to act from a delayed yet effective action varies from circumstance to circumstance. A human’s ability to avoid the former is an art built upon his or her deep foundational understanding of naval science and the conditioning effects of regular, intense training. Only through routine exposure to the chaos of combat through training, and only when that training includes the simulated adversary’s use of deception, can crews gradually mentally harden themselves against the disorienting ambiguity or shock that would result from an actual adversary’s use of deception. Likewise, only from experience gained through realistic training can these crews develop tactics that help them and other friendly forces reduce their likelihoods of succumbing to deception, or otherwise increase the possibilities that even if they initially are deceived they can quickly mitigate the effects.  

It follows that our third ingredient is possessing deep defensive ordnance inventories. A battleforce needs to have enough ordnance available—and properly positioned—so that it can fall for a deception and still have some chance at recovering. It is important to point out this ordnance does not just include guns and missiles, but also EW systems and techniques. During the Cold War, a battleforce’s defensive reserves consisted of alert fighters waiting on carrier decks to augment the CAP as well as surface combatants’ own interceptor missiles and EW systems. These might be augmented in the future by high-energy lasers used as warship point defense weapon systems, though it is too early to say whether their main ‘kill’ mechanism would be causing an inbound threat’s structural failure or neutralizing its terminal homing sensors. If effective, lasers would be particularly useful for defense against unmanned aircraft swarms or perhaps anti-ship missile types that trade away advanced capabilities for sheer numbers. Regardless of its available defensive ordnance reserves, a battleforce’s ability to receive defensive support from other battleforces or even land-based Joint or Combined forces can also be quite helpful. 

The final ingredients for countering an adversary’s deception efforts are embracing tactical flexibility and seizing the tactical initiative. Using Tokarev’s observations as an example, this can be as simple as constantly changing CAP and AEW cycle durations, refueling periods, station positions, and tactical behaviors. A would-be deceiver needs to understand his target’s doctrine and tactics in order to create a ‘story’ that meshes with the latter’s predispositions while exploiting available vulnerabilities. By increasing the prospective deceiver’s uncertainty regarding what kinds of story elements are necessary to achieve the desired effects, or where vulnerabilities lie that are likely to be available at the time of the planned tactical action, it becomes less likely that a deception attempt will be ‘complete’ enough to work as intended. A more aggressive defensive measure might be to use offensive counterair sweeps well ahead of a battleforce to locate and neutralize the adversary’s scouts and inbound raiders, much as what was envisioned by the U.S. Navy’s 1980s Outer Air Battle concept. The method offering the greatest potential payoff, and not coincidentally the hardest to orchestrate, would be to entice the adversary to waste precious ordnance against a decoy group or expose his raiders to ambush by friendly fighters. All of these concepts force the adversary to react, with the latter two stealing the tactical initiative—and the first effective blow in a battle—from the adversary.

Tomorrow, some concluding thoughts.

Deception and the Backfire Bomber, Part III

For previous installments, see Parts I and II

The Great Equalizer: Backfire Raiders’ Own Use of Deception

The key to improving a Soviet maritime bomber raid’s odds of success appears to have been its own use of EW and tactical deception. Tokarev observes that SNAF doctrine developers closely monitored U.S. Navy carriers’ Combat Air Patrol (CAP) tactics and operational patterns, with particular interest on patrol cycle durations and aerial refueling periods, to identify possible windows of vulnerability that could be exploited in a large-scale attack (Tokarev, Pg. 69). He further observes that SNAF doctrine developers concluded U.S. Navy CAP crews were “quite dependent” upon direction by tactical controllers embarked in area air defense-capable surface combatants or E-2 Hawkeye Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft. This meant

“…the task of the attackers could be boiled down to finding a way to fool those officers—either to overload their sensors or, to some degree, relax their sense of danger by posing what were to their minds easily recognizable decoys, which were in reality full, combat-ready strikes. By doing so the planners expected to slow the reactions of the whole air-defense system, directly producing the “golden time” needed to launch the missiles.” (Tokarev, Pg 75)

In practice, this entailed extensive use of chaff to clutter and confuse the E-2s’ and surface combatants’ radar pictures, not to mention to create ‘corridors’ for shielding inbound raiders from radar detection. This probably also involved using elements of the sacrificial reconnaissance-attack group mentioned earlier to draw attention away from the other penetrating pathfinders. Most interestingly, Tokarev mentions that the raid’s main attack group included a “demonstration group.” When combined with his statement that only seventy to eighty of the bombers in an air division-strength raid would be carrying missiles, this suggests some of the bombers might have been specifically intended to attract their opponent’s attention and then withdraw from contact—the very definition of a deceptive demonstration (Tokarev, Pg 73, 77). As a Backfire raid would be conducted from perhaps two or three attack axes, a demonstration group could hypothetically cause a significant portion of available CAP resources—not to mention the carrier group’s overall tactical attention—to be focused towards one sector while the main attack would actually come from other sectors. Any missiles launched by the CAP against the demonstration group (or the reconnaissance-attack group for that matter) would obviously no longer be available when the main attack group arrived on scene. In this way, enough of the main group might survive long enough to actually launch their missiles, and maybe longer still to escape homeward.

The reconnaissance-attack and demonstration groups might also have been used to induce the carrier group to break out of restrictive EMCON and thereby help clarify the situational picture for the rest of the bombers. Enticing warships to light off their air search radars—and for the pre-Aegis combatants, missile-directing radars—would have provided some high confidence indications of which contacts were surface combatants and which were not. A similar effect might result if the Soviet tactics resulted in U.S. and NATO warships ceasing radio-silence as the carrier group oriented itself to defend against the perceived inbound threat. Still, as the carrier and any carrier-simulating decoy ships present might refrain from radiating telltale radars or engaging in telltale radio communications even under these conditions, the raid’s deceptions would not necessarily help pinpoint the carrier. They would, though, reduce the number of contacts requiring direct visual identification by pathfinders—perhaps dramatically. They would also likely help the raid’s air defense suppression group designate targets for jamming or anti-radar missile attack.

None of this should be surprising to those who have read Tom Clancy’s Red Storm Rising. The novel’s famous first battle at sea begins with a Badger group lobbing target drones towards a NATO carrier task force from far outside the latter’s AEW radar coverage. Equipped with ‘radar blip enhancers’ that allow them to simulate bombers, the drones present themselves using a formation and flight profile that easily convinces the task force’s air defenses they are facing an actual raid. The resultant ruse fools the task force’s F-14 fighters into wasting their AIM-54 Phoenix long-range air-to-air missiles against these decoys, essentially denuding the task force of its outer defensive layer. This is readily exploited by a Backfire group approaching from a different axis, with disastrous consequences for the task force’s warships.

Nor should any of this be surprising to students of the first Gulf War. While U.S. Air Force F-117’s were rightly heralded as having penetrated all the way to Baghdad with impunity on Operation Desert Storm’s opening night, their ease in doing so was paved by a joint U.S. Air Force and Navy deception titled SCATHE MEAN. In this little-known mission that closely emulated Clancy’s fictional scenario, the two services launched BQM-74 target drones and ADM-141 Tactical Air Launched Decoys to distract Iraqi Very High Frequency surveillance radar operators from detecting the inbound F-117s, seduce the Iraqis into expending precious Surface to Air Missiles against the bait, and induce these SAM sites into exposing their search and fire control radars to U.S. anti-radar missile attacks.

Tomorrow, the ingredients for countering such deceptions.

Deception and the Backfire Bomber, Part II

Part I available here

Was U.S. Navy Tactical Deception Effective?

Since Backfire needed pathfinder support, the U.S. Navy’s key to disrupting if not decapitating a raid by the former was to defeat the latter. As part of my thesis research, I came across much circumstantial evidence that the U.S. Navy’s combination of strict Emission Control (EMCON) discipline, decentralized command and control doctrine, occasional use of lower campaign-value warships to simulate high campaign-value warships, and perhaps even occasional use of electronic jamming gave SOSS controllers and Soviet reconnaissance assets fits during real-world operations. Still, I did not come across any authoritative Russian perspectives on whether or how these U.S. Navy countertargeting efforts affected Soviet doctrine, tactics, or confidence. That’s what makes the following comment from Tokarev so interesting:

“Moreover, knowing the position of the carrier task force is not the same as knowing the position of the carrier itself. There were at least two cases when in the center of the formation there was, instead of the carrier, a large fleet oiler or replenishment vessel with an enhanced radar signature (making it look as large on the Backfires’ radar screens as a carrier) and a radiating tactical air navigation system. The carrier itself, contrary to routine procedures, was steaming completely alone, not even trailing the formation. To know for sure the carrier’s position, it was desirable to observe it visually.”(Tokarev, Pg. 77)

He goes on to describe a special reconnaissance-attack group of sacrificial bombers that might be detached from an inbound raid to penetrate a naval formation and visually identify the primary targets. Only with positive target designations from these pathfinders, or perhaps from TU-95RT Bear-D reconnaissance aircraft preceding the raid, could Backfire crews have any confidence the single missile they each carried was aimed at a valid and valuable target (Tokarev, Pg. 72, 77). Even then, he observes that “Contrary to widespread opinion, no considerable belief was placed in the ability of launched missiles to resist ECM efforts” (Tokarev, Pg. 75), indicating recognition that the countertargeting battle hardly ended with missile launch.

The one exception to the above contact classification and identification problems would have been a war-opening first salvo attack, in which targeting-quality cues could have been provided to Backfires or other anti-ship missile-carrying assets by any tattletale ships following a carrier closely. While noting the tattletale tactic’s high potential efficacy, Tokarev makes clear it could only be used in peacetime and would never again be possible following hostilities’ outbreak:

“Despite the existence of air reconnaissance systems such as Uspekh, satellite systems like Legenda, and other forms of intelligence and observation, the most reliable source of targeting of carriers at sea was the direct-tracking ship. Indeed, if you see a carrier in plain sight, the only problem to solve is how to radio reliably the reports and targeting data against the U.S. electronic countermeasures. Ironically, since the time lag of Soviet military communication systems compared to the NATO ones is quite clear, the old Morse wireless telegraph used by the Soviet ships was the long-established way to solve that problem. With properly trained operators, Morse keying is the only method able to resist active jamming in the HF band… But the direct tracker was definitely no more than another kind of kamikaze. It was extremely clear that if a war started, these ships would be sent to the bottom immediately. Given that, the commanding officer of each had orders to behave like a rat caught in a corner: at the moment of war declaration or when specifically ordered, after sending the carrier’s position by radio, he would shell the carrier’s flight deck with gunfire, just to break up the takeoff of prepared strikes, fresh CAP patrols, or anything else.” (Tokarev, Pg. 80)

Preventing a tattletale from maintaining track on a carrier accordingly reduced the chances for successfully striking that carrier. Additionally, since not all carriers would be operating forward at the time of the first salvo, those withheld in areas tattletales could not readily access would be more or less immune from large-scale attacks. This would leave the Backfires overwhelmingly dependent upon pathfinders in any later raid attempt.

It should be obvious that EW (and its contemporary cousin, cyberwarfare) or tactical deception capabilities on their own are not going to deter an adversary from embarking upon some form of conventional aggression. The adversary’s decision to seek war will always be politically-driven, and the possibility of aggression out of desperation vice opportunism cannot be discounted. To the extent that political and military leaders’ latent psychological perceptions of their forces’ strengths and weaknesses influence their warmaking calculus, though, efforts to erode an opponent’s confidence in his most doctrinally important military capabilities can induce him to raise his political threshold for resorting to war. Tokarev’s observations therefore imply that Soviet commanders understood the likely cost in their crews’ lives that would be necessary just to provide a raid a chance at success, and that complicating variables such as the U.S. Navy’s demonstrated countertargeting competencies only made the whole endeavor seem more uncertain and costly. The impact upon general deterrence, while unmeasurable in any real sense, obviously was not insignificant.

Tomorrow, an examination of the deception tactics that might have been employed by Backfire raids.

Deception and the Backfire Bomber: Reexamining the Late Cold War Struggle Between Soviet Maritime Reconnaissance and U.S. Navy Countertargeting

Last winter's Naval War College Review contained a must-read article on the Soviet Navy’s doctrine from the 1980s for employing its TU-22M Backfire series of bombers against U.S. Navy carrier groups. In “Kamikazes: the Soviet Legacy,” former Soviet Navy officer Maksim Y. Tokarev reveals many details regarding Backfire capabilities and tactics that, to my knowledge at least, have not been previously disclosed within English-language open sources.

As part of my 2011 master’s thesis, I conducted a case study examination of how the U.S. Navy used Electronic Warfare (EW) and tactical deception to counter Soviet long-range maritime strike capabilities such as Backfire during the Cold War. I found that while a considerable amount of information is now publicly (though not necessarily widely) known about the two sides’ tactics, technologies, and real-world operational experiences from the late 1950s through mid-1970s, relatively few details regarding the competition’s late-1970s through early-1990s peak have been declassified by the U.S. or Russian governments. Tokarev’s article sheds a remarkable amount of light on the latter period from the Russian perspective. In doing so, he also underlines timeless maritime targeting challenges that technology can partially ameliorate but never fully eliminate. He additionally paints an intriguing picture of how an advanced attacker might use tactical deception in an attempt to score a lopsided win in a battle at sea. In my posts this week, I will point out the most fascinating of the new details provided by Tokarev and then examine their historical significance as well as contemporary implications.

What Kind of Reconnaissance Support did Backfire Need?

One of the key historical questions regarding Backfire involves the reconnaissance support the bombers’ crews needed to effectively employ their missiles. The earlier TU-16 Badger series of Soviet maritime bombers depended upon targeting cues provided by scout aircraft. These so-called ‘pathfinders’ penetrated an enemy’s battleforce ahead of a raid in order to locate and positively identify aircraft carriers or other high-priority target ships. This was necessary because a standoff bomber like Badger simply could not tell whether a large contact held by its onboard radar was an aircraft carrier, a surface combatant or other ship configured to simulate a carrier, an artificial decoy, or a large and perhaps neutral-flagged merchant vessel. Even if a surface contact of interest made ‘telltale’ radiofrequency emissions, the vessel’s type could not be determined with high confidence because of the possibility that the emissions were deceptive. Visual-range verification of contacts’ types (if not identities) was consequently a prerequisite for the Badgers to be able to aim their missiles with confidence. Yet, because the Soviet pathfinder aircraft necessarily had to expose themselves to the entirety of a battleforce’s layered defenses in order to do their jobs, they represented single-points-of-failure that could easily doom a raid if neutralized before they located, classified, and identified desired targets.

In the mid-1970s, the Soviets began launching Radar Ocean Reconnaissance and Electronic intelligence Ocean Reconnaissance Satellites (RORSAT and EORSAT) into low earth orbit. RORSAT and EORSAT were primarily intended to expand the maritime areas covered by the Soviet Ocean Surveillance System (SOSS), a networked ‘system of systems’ that fused data from a wide variety of remote sensors to locate, identify, track, and target U.S. Navy forces at sea. In theory, Soviet standoff bombers might not have needed the support of pathfinder scouts if SOSS operators were able to provide a raid with high confidence, targeting-quality tactical pictures derived from RORSAT, EORSAT, and perhaps other remote sensor sources.

Backfire made its Soviet Naval Air Force (SNAF) debut in 1976. Unlike the subsonic Badger, Backfire could make its final approach to its firing position—and then its subsequent escape attempt—at supersonic speed. The SNAF’s Backfire-C variant, which reached Initial Operational Capability in 1981, carried enough fuel to make an indirect approach against a targeted naval force operating well beyond 2000 nautical miles from the Soviet coast. Defending against a Backfire raid was therefore an order of magnitude more complicated than defending against a Badger raid. The tactical dilemma facing a U.S. Navy battleforce would have been further exacerbated—potentially decisively—if a Backfire raid received its targeting data directly from SOSS instead of from pathfinders. Some later Backfire-Cs were even equipped with a communication system that allowed them to download RORSATs’ and EORSATs’ tactical pictures as those satellites passed overhead.

From a purely technical perspective, though, it seemed quite unlikely Backfire could completely do away with reliance upon pathfinders or other visual-range scouts. As I detailed in my thesis, RORSAT suffered from the same contact classification challenges that inherently plague any radar. In fact, RORSAT’s shortcomings were even worse: its sensitivity was apparently so poor that it could only detect large ships, and even then not reliably when the area it was searching contained inclement weather. EORSAT was completely dependent upon ships complacently radiating telltale radiofrequency emissions, and as a result could not compensate for RORSAT. Lastly, as neither RORSAT nor EORSAT could report their data in ‘real time,’ their contact pictures generally suffered from tactically-significant lateness. Nevertheless, other than anecdotes from U.S. Navy veterans of the 1980s who directly observed SNAF operations when their carrier groups steamed into the “Bear’s Den,” and beyond some open source scholarly interpretations of Soviet doctrine dating to the early 1990s, until Tokarev there has been virtually no authoritatively-sourced evidence available to the public confirming or refuting Backfire’s dependence upon pathfinders.

On that note, Tokarev first relates that SNAF bomber forces

“…always tried to use reconnaissance and targeting data provided by air assets, which was also most desired by their own command structure. Targeting data on the current position of the carrier sent by surface ships performing “direct tracking” (a ship, typically a destroyer or frigate, sailing within sight of the carrier formation to send targeting data to attack assets—what the Americans called a “tattletale”), were a secondary and less preferable source. No great trust was placed in reports from other sources (naval radio reconnaissance, satellites, etc.). Lieutenant General Sokerin, once an operational officer on the Northern Fleet NAF staff, always asked the fleet staff’s admirals just to assign him a target, not to define the time of the attack force’s departure; that could depend on many factors, such as the reliability of targeting data or the weather, that generate little attention in nonaviation naval staff work.”(Tokarev, Pg. 73)

He later amplifies this, noting that Backfire crews

“…had the targeting data that had been available at the moment of takeoff and kept the receivers of the targeting apparatus ready to get detailed targeting, either from the air reconnaissance by voice radio or from surface ships or submarines. The latter targeting came by high-frequency (HF) radio, a channel known as KTS Chayka (the Seagull short-message targeting communication system) that was usually filled with targeting data from the MRSC Uspekh (the Success maritime reconnaissance targeting system), built around the efforts of Tu-95RC reconnaissance planes. The Legenda (Legend) satellite targeting system receiver was turned on also, though not all planes had this device.” (Tokarev, Pg. 74)

These statements tell us two things. First, while Backfires could use direct satellite-based cueing, they relied heavily upon—and in fact placed greater trust in—targeting provided by scout aircraft. Second, a Backfire (or any Soviet maritime bomber) sortie depended upon raid planners being told approximately where a U.S. or NATO naval group was operating. If SOSS or any other surveillance or reconnaissance capabilities supporting this general cueing was disrupted or deceived, a raid might be dispatched to the wrong location, might be wasted against a decoy group, might be exposed to an ambush, might be held back until too late, or might never be launched at all.

We must keep in mind that launching a SNAF raid was no small undertaking. Per Tokarev, an entire air division—up to a hundred bombers—might be hurled against a single carrier’s battle group. Furthermore, doctrine called for the Soviet Northern and Pacific Fleets to be equipped with three air divisions each in order to counter multi-carrier battle groups. Tokarev also mentions that the bomber attrition rate for a single raid was expected to be as high as 50% regardless of whether or not the objective U.S. or NATO warships were successfully struck (Tokarev, Pg. 73, 78). With a finite number of bombers, missiles, and trained crews, it is reasonable to think Soviet commanders would have been somewhat hesitant to dispatch such irreplaceable forces into battle unless they had some degree of confidence in their situational picture’s accuracy; the operational-strategic penalties that would be incurred if they ‘got it wrong’ simply seem too high for this not to have been the case. Accordingly, it will be extremely interesting to someday learn the criteria that had to be satisfied for SNAF commanders to order a raid.   

Tomorrow, just how effective was U.S. Navy countertargeting?

"The Worlds Symbol of Hope in Disaster"

ORNDOC BAY, Philippines (Nov. 16, 2013) Sailors from the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Mustin (DDG 89) and Philippine Army soldiers unload international aid from an MH-60S Sea Hawk helicopter from the Island Knights of Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 25 as an MH-60R Sea Hawk helicopter from the Warlords of Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron (HSM) 51 prepares to land. HSC-25, HSM-51 and Mustin are with the George Washington Carrier Strike Group, which is supporting the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade in assisting the Philippine government in ongoing relief efforts in response to the aftermath of Super Typhoon Haiyan. (U.S. Navy photo by Lt. j.g. Timothy Tran/Released))

Last week I was sitting on the couch with my 3rd grader. It was almost 9pm, well past her bedtime. She was finishing her homework late due to being out that evening shopping with mom, and I was enjoying a book as I tend to do in the evenings. We have a family rule that during homework time, the television is allowed to be on only as long as it is on the a Music Choice station - in most cases the Alternative music station.

My daughter finished her homework about 8:59, and I changed the channel over to CNN to see how Anderson Cooper was going to lead into his show. While I do not watch cable news very often, I had noted from Twitter that Anderson Cooper was in the Philippines, and I was very curious how CNN was reporting the response to the Typhoon.

As I was telling my daughter that her evening still isn't done, Thursday night being bath night, there was a silent pause in our conversation so we could have a staring contest between dad and daughter over this new 'bath time' information that was not being well received. In that silent moment, Anderson Cooper made a comment like "US Navy helicopters have become a global symbol of hope during crisis."

I got distracted when hearing that phrase, and repeated it out loud to myself. My daughter then asked me a question, "What does crisis mean?" My immediate thought was how fortunate I am that my eight year old child has never had to learn the meaning of that word crisis from experience. As I explained the definition, describing the term within the context of disaster, CNN flashes a picture of an MH-60 helicopter delivering humanitarian assistance to the people of the Philippines. My daughter, a right-brained thinker who has grown up heavily influenced by her much older left brained-sister, noted it is the same helicopter that I have a picture of on my office wall - a picture of the Bay Raiders of HSC-28 Det 2 from the Bataan's incredibly long 2011 deployment.

The voice of power interrupts our little conversation as mom sends my daughter up to the shower.

Fast forward to Wednesday night, where again the family is gathered to read and do homework listening to excellent music, as per our usual routine. That evening my youngest daughter asked me to check her paragraph. The classwork for the evening is for the students to write a paragraph based on an article written in this weeks Time For Kids magazine and other materials from school related to the Typhoon that hit the Philippines. I checked the TFK website, the article in the print version is not the same article they have online. On Thursday, exchanging emails with my daughters teacher, I was able to get the back story.

Every Monday the students discuss current events from the weekend. This weeks current event topic for class is the Typhoon. Several of the boys in the class had watched the news with their parents over the weekend and the centerpiece of the class discussion was the USS George Washington (CVN 73). The teacher, because she is freaking awesome, quickly pulled up a picture of the ship for the class to help the students fully appreciate how big an aircraft carrier is. My daughter, according to the teacher, contributed to this conversation by repeating her interpretation of what Anderson Cooper said - describing Navy helicopters as "the worlds symbol of hope in disaster."

For the art project this week, the students were asked to draw a picture related to the Typhoon, which are then placed around the classroom for the week. Due to my daughter leaving a form that needed to be filled out in her classroom, I walked into my daughters classroom with her to see the art the students had produced hanging on the walls of the classroom. There were pictures of aircraft carriers and helicopters, Marines and even a few dark pictures of broken homes and sad people, and in the center of the room my daughter showed me her picture - which was very similar to my picture of the Bay Raiders from HSC-28 in my office, except with gold glitter and glue she had written "The worlds symbol of hope in disaster."

Since the release of the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, the United States has not hesitated to commit major naval capabilities to humanitarian response and disaster recovery. While it isn't necessarily a new thing to commit aircraft carriers for HADR, the increased frequency of committing major naval capabilities like entire Carrier Strike Groups for that purpose can be specifically attributed to the elevated emphasis of humanitarian assistance and disaster response outlined in CS21. I do believe Anderson Cooper is on to something, and the US Navy helicopter has in fact become a symbol of hope in crisis around the world.

That symbolism is important, and represents a much stronger strategic communication than I have previously appreciated. Six years after the release of CS21 I note that it is primarily because of an active HADR policy by PACOM  - using aircraft carriers to respond to crisis in places like the Philippines and Japan, and building upon the 2005 Tsunami response by the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72); the forward deployed aircraft carrier in the Pacific is no longer simply a symbol of American military power communicating political influence to the governments of the region, but thanks to the consistent great work of the helicopter squadrons supporting humanitarian assistance and disaster response, the aircraft carrier has also become a symbol of American power representing hope during crisis to the people of the region during their times of legitimate need.

That second part has significantly greater positive ramifications in support of America's "Pivot to Asia" policy than the first part, because regional support of the United States at the population level defuses criticism of American forward based presence while simultaneously reinforcing the value of the United States as the regions primary security provider, and by using "hard power" assets in support of HADR a positive American "soft power" message is being communicated to a broader audience than just the political level of the regional governments.

We Live in Interesting Times

A year ago the world watched as the Chinese landed an piloted aircraft on an aircraft carrier, a capability few in the world possess even in the early 21st century. On Wednesday the United States landed an unmanned vehicle moving at 145 knots autonomously piloted by software on a ship moving at over 20 knots. It is the most impressive thing an unmanned aviation vehicle has ever done.

The success of the X-47B delivers many choices to the Navy. Unmanned aviation is bigger than the evolution from propeller to jet engines, or the evolution from guns to missiles - both of which were natural technological evolutions for naval aviation. UCLASS brings disruptive change to naval aviation unlike anything else the community has seen in 100 years.

The decisions of the very near future will define the community for the next half century. We live in interesting times.

Learning from the Doolittle Raiders

The following contribution is written by Congressman J. Randy Forbes from Virginia's fourth district, Congressman Forbes is chairman of the House Armed Services Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee and founder and co-chairman of the Congressional China Caucus.

71 years ago today, 16 U.S. Army Air Force B-25 Mitchell bombers took off from the aircraft carrier USS Hornet on the way to bomb Tokyo. Coming only months after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Doolittle Raid (named for the mission’s commander, Lt. Col. Jimmy Doolittle) constituted the first American offensive operation of World War II and helped shatter the illusion of our adversary’s invincibility.

Despite occurring over seven decades ago, the Doolittle Raid offers lessons intensely relevant for our time. The personal heroism of the Doolittle Raiders, seven of whom died during the raid or in captivity, is a timeless tribute to the bravery and sacrifice of our men and women in uniform. The operation’s brazenness - placing bulky bombers on an aircraft carrier in the Pacific Ocean in order to reach and hit the very heart of the Japanese Empire - reminds us that effective military operations require leaders of vision and daring to achieve our national security objectives. And the Raid’s effective use of Army Air Force personnel and aircraft, launched from a Navy carrier and defended by Navy surface vessels and submarines, illustrates how the demands of modern warfare refuse to neatly delineate between services- cooperation between our Navy, Marines and Air Force is an enduring necessity.

Most importantly, the Doolittle Raid reminds us that the ability to project military power from the sea in times of crisis is the essential mission and defining feature of the U.S. Navy. As in 1942, the aircraft carrier remains the most effective instrument of projecting American power onto hostile shores, deterring potential adversaries and, if necessary, delivering overwhelming force to defeat the enemy. No other platform possesses the striking power of the carrier. This power is packaged into a system that has both global reach and almost unimpeded growth potential. The carrier can sail through the world’s oceans, free from the political complexities associated with overseas bases. At the same time, this floating airfield can also be “modernized” with new naval aircraft that can bring a mix of capabilities demanded to operate in future security environments.

Today’s Navy carriers have advanced beyond anything the sailors onboard the Hornet could have imagined; a modern Ford-class carrier is roughly 80,000 tons larger than the Yorktown-class ship which launched the Doolittle Raiders and can house over 75 advanced aircraft. Despite the technological advances of the last seven decades, the aircraft carrier’s status as the fulcrum of the Navy’s Fleet remains unchallenged.

As the Navy prepares for the challenges of the coming decade, the question will not be whether our carriers remain vital; rather, the key determination will be the appropriate mix of aircraft comprising the Carrier Air Wing (CVW). It is this flexibility that is the true utility of a carrier. In an anti-access/area-denial environment (A2/AD), where nations from Iran to China are investing in missile technology designed to restrict our carrier operations, it is imperative that the Navy’s CVWs contain aircraft with the right mix of of range, persistence, stealth, payload, and electronic attack to successfully execute its missions. The Navy’s investments in shorter range aircraft have left it dependent on the carrier’s ability to get relatively close to hostile shores. As the Doolittle Raid proved, there is great strategic and military advantage in maintaining a long-range strike capability. As I have written here before, the UCLASS, if done right, is poised to offer the CVW an option for long-range ISR and strike that will help anchor the carrier’s power projection mission for decades to come.

The world we face in 2013 is very different from the one the Doolittle Raiders knew as their B-25s hurtled down the Hornet’s flight deck in April 1942. But while the technologies and competitors may have changed, the utility of the aircraft carrier to American defense policy remains constant. We honor the legacy of the Doolittle Raiders today while being mindful that the success they achieved in projecting American power far from home against a determined and resilient enemy is an achievement we must jealously protect in our own time. It is incumbent upon all of us to never stop working, and to never stop asking the difficult questions, to ensure that those who follow in the footsteps of the Doolittle Raiders have the tools they need to deter, prevent and, if absolutely necessary, win America’s wars.

Five Things on Friday Morning

Where is the one-stop shop for all things tactical in the United States Navy? That's a good question being asked at CIMSEC today. Really interesting post, but as I am not in the Navy, what I really enjoyed was reading several of the links.

I've been waiting to read David Axe's article discussing the CNAS paper by Captain Hendrix. David always takes a unique perspective on things, and that's one of the things I appreciate most about his writing. In his article he's offering up three big flattop alternatives: America class smaller carriers, MLP commercial style carriers, and a radical shift towards underwater long range strike. It did get me thinking about something, if the Navy took long range precision strike out of naval aviation, what kind of platform would you build to field naval aviation at sea that focuses on fleet support? This is a fictional "what if" not a "what I would do" question.

Ray Mabus is a complicated guy, and even after 4 years I can't decide if I like him or not. He is stubborn as hell though, and I admit I do admire that about him. I keep hearing that Ray Mabus was repeatedly told that if he backed away from biofuels, he was going to be offered more opportunities in the Obama administration. From what I hear, he basically told the President "thanks, but no thanks" and has stuck to his belief that alternative energy really is an important issue and something the Navy needs to continue working on as a function of long term reserve planning. Today it is somewhat hard to believe the investment is worth it, but in 20 years we may all look back through the sands of history and describe him as the guy in the room who was legitimately thinking ahead. Either way, the Senate is allowing the Navy’s ‘green fleet’ to sail on. While this topic gets a lot of attention, even his Republican opponents know that the amount of money involved in the more riskier investments really isn't enough to get too worked up over. True, money is tight, but there is some evidence indicating that some of his alternative energy investments in things like solar and advanced batteries does become, at worst, cost neutral over time.

Freedom is having problems. The ship has already lost a Fincantieri Isotta-Fraschini ship service diesel generators (SSDG), and a seventeen degree roll (which really isn't a big roll in my opinion) to port knocked out power the other day. According to Aviation Week the ship has now lost power three times since departing Pearl Harbor. I am standing by what I have always said, the Navy will not build more than 12 of each of either ship without significant design changes.

Today is Bob Work's last day as Under Secretary.

Each a Half Century of History

USS Midway

This is the first in a series of posts inspired by the recently released paper at the Center for New American Security titled At What Cost a Carrier by Captain Henry J. Hendrix, USN (Ph.D). Full disclosure, I consider Jerry Hendrix a good friend, although to be honest we talk about the sports our daughters are involved in about as often as we talk about the topics we both enjoy writing about.

Ordered in 1942 and laid down in October 1943, USS Midway was launched in March of 1945 and commissioned later that year on September 10, 1945. Originally a straight deck carrier, USS Midway served with distinction all over the world before receiving an enclosed hurricane bow, an aft deck-edge elevator, an angled flight deck, and a steam catapult beginning in June of 1955. After extensive modernization the carrier returned to service just over two years later in September of 1957.

Upon returning to service in 1957, USS Midway operated in the Pacific and conducted military operations in South Vietnam in 1965.

Following that deployment, USS Midway went back into drydock in 1966 for another massive modernization that expanded the flight deck from 2.8 acres to 4 acres and adjusted the angle of the flight deck out to 13.5 degrees. The elevators were upgraded to support larger aircraft, and everything from catapults to air conditioners were replaced. The planned $88 million modernization suffered a massive cost overrun, with the final cost coming in at $202 million. Upon returning to sea in 1970, it was discovered that the modernizations had created problems with the seakeeping of the big carrier, and the ship had to go back into dry dock for further modifications.

Once back to sea USS Midway conducted operations in Vietnam in 1971 and 1972, and in 1973 became the first US aircraft carrier forward-deployed to Japan. USS Midway returned to Vietnam conducting military operations in 1975.

From 1975 until 1990 USS Midway spent time at sea patroling the Western Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Persian Gulf regions where, in August of 1990 USS Midway found herself in the Persian Gulf after Iraq invaded Kuwait. USS Midway stayed on station and served in Gulf War I throughout the air and ground campaign before departing the region in March of 1991.

At 74,000 tons USS Midway was decommissioned on April 11, 2024 having served the nation for just over 46 years.

On the evening of February 3, 2024 I attended a banquet for members of the United States Naval Institute hosted on the USS Midway Museum in San Diego. After arriving to the party, CDR Salamander and I met up with UltimaRatioReg to form our own band of bloggers with beer for a stroll along the flight deck. Upon arriving on the flight deck, our band of brothers was joined by Norman Friedman, and the four of us spent the next hour double-fisting the prizes of our drink tickets as we strolled USS Midway discussing the history of the aircraft on the deck of the USS Midway Museum.

Our little band of brothers took our time as we enjoyed the comfortable mid 50s winter evening San Diego style and inspected the restoration of each aircraft. The aircraft we inspected both above and below deck included the EKA-3 Skywarrior, the A-4 Skyhawk, the H-34 Seabat, the H-46 Sea Knight, the T-2 Buckeye, the F9F Panther, the SBD Dauntless, the F9F-8P Cougar, the F/A-18 Hornet, the F-8 Crusader, the C-1 Trader, the E-2 Hawkeye, SNJ Texan, the A-6 Intruder, the A-1 Skyraider, the A-7 Corsair II, the S-3 Viking, the SH-2 Seasprite, the SH-3 Seaking, the F-4 Phantom II, the RA-5 Vigilante, the Huey Gunship, the F-14 Tomcat, and the TBM Avenger.

At the end of our top side tour, Norman Friedman broke ranks from our group and the three of us stood at the bow of the flight deck enjoying our perfect evening, CDR Salamander noted that every single type of aircraft we had just visited on the ship had, at one point or another, landed and taken off from USS Midway in the service of our nation.

That was when it hit me. USS Midway isn't simply a Museum, rather it is a time capsule that accurately reflects the essence of what every modern aircraft carrier in the US Navy is - a strategic investment for a half century of service to the nation. Over a period of over 46 years, USS Midway flew over two dozen aircraft off her deck, conducted operations all over the globe, fought wars in Vietnam and Iraq, served in function as a humanitarian, a diplomat, and a symbol of American power and influence during times of peace or crisis in the service of the nation.

Commissioned in late 1945 USS Midway began service at a time when aircraft carriers were unquestionably the most important seapower capability in the world. USS Midway is the only military asset of the United States that served as a relevant capability for the entirety of the Cold War, with the Iowa class Battleships being the only other platform to serve intermediately from the beginning to the end of the Cold War in a relevant function. If we suggest military anti-access and area denial capabilities that target carriers began development in the late 1990s, then we can say with a high degree of certainty that the service life of the USS Midway represents the period by which aircraft carriers were the dominant military capability at sea.

Today aircraft carriers have become extremely expensive to build, operate, and maintain. Today aircraft carrier air wings have become extremely expensive to build, operate, and maintain. Today the high end surface force and by assignment at least part of the attack submarine force serves the fleet today to protect the US nuclear powered aircraft carrier. The title of Captain Hendrix's paper asks At What Cost a Carrier, but the substance of Captain Hendrix's paper asks "What is the carriers value?"

While USS Midway may represent one of the most important national military capabilities of the second half of the 20th century, as budgets get tighter I believe it is important for the Navy to question long standing assumptions like whether aircraft carriers remain one of the most important national military capabilities for the United States heading into the 21st century. When we study aircraft carriers, either in the past, present, or future; the "value" of carriers must be thoroughly examined and explored because that "value" is bigger than budget, bigger than function, and is not easily measured through a price tag or statistical analysis. USS Midway served 46 years, but even if we use the broadest definition for sorties, USS Midway flew on average less than 40 sorties per year in wartime over the entire life of the great carrier. Statistics can tell the truth and can tell a lie, so over the next few weeks I intend to dig deeper into the questions regarding the value of aircraft carriers, and question assumptions that for too long haven't faced enough objective consideration in public.

Navy Stuck Between the Rock and Hard Place on Joint Strike Fighter

F-35C Art

National Defense Magazine blog has what appears to me to be the most insightful tidbits of information to date on the Navy perspective of the F-35C. At the March 12 Credit Suisse/McAleese defense programs conference in Washington, D.C. Air Force LT. General Christopher C. Bogdan, program executive officer of the Joint Strike Fighter, and Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, both made comments that in my opinion, gives the current view of the F-35C program from DoD perspective. The implications of these comments are worth consideration.

Throughout his presentation, Bogdan repeatedly hammered the point that the F-35’s eight international partners — the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Italy, Turkey, Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands — are losing patience and becoming increasingly alarmed by the trends in the program.

“The cost is up by tens of billions,” Bogdan said. “Our partners are starting to put really big dollars into this program.” By the time F-35 reaches lot 8 low-rate production, more than half of the aircraft will be for non-U.S. customers. “They need to know where their money is going,” he said.

Adding insult to injury, the JSF program office classified all documents as “U.S. only,” which upset partner nations. Even if they are all buying the same aircraft, each country has its own air-worthiness qualification processes and other administrative procedures that require they have access to the aircraft’s technical data. JSF officials are working to re-classify the documentation, Bogdan said. “These airplanes are important to them [our partners], politically.”

Pressure to keep allies happy might be one reason why the U.S. Navy will not be allowed to dump the F-35C. It has been known for years that some Navy leaders would prefer to continue to buy the F/A-18 Super Hornet, and not have to bother with the expense and trouble of having to bring a new type of aircraft into the inventory.

Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert insisted that the Navy is fully on board.

“We need the F-35C,” he said at the Credit Suisse conference. “It has to be integrated into the air wing.” He said the Navy has not yet decided how many it will buy, however. And he recognized that the Navy ultimately has no choice but to buy the F-35C. “If we bought no C's, it would be very detrimental to the overall program” and to international partners, he said.

As most of you know, the F-35A is the Air Force version of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), the F-35B is the Marine Corps version of the Joint Strike Fighter, and the F-35C is the Navy carrier launched version of the Joint Strike Fighter. Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor, and in order for all three versions of the Joint Strike Fighter to reduce costs per unit, the schedule for all three must improve. Scheduling delays and design flaws have turned the JSF program into the biggest runaway train wreck in modern DoD acquisition, if not of all time. The only version of the F-35 that everyone appears to agree is truly needed is F-35B, the vertical takeoff and landing version. The F-35A is the single most important of the three versions because current plans call for building thousands of these aircraft, and alliance interest is primarily for this version of the aircraft. The US Navy is the only purchasing client in the world for the F-35C, and my sense for the last year is that the US Navy would bail out of the program if they could.

In public statements, it has become very common to hear Admirals say the Navy 'needs the F-35C,' but it has become uncommon to hear any Admiral praise the aircraft. Why the Navy needs the F-35C is never addressed in context, primarily because the well documented problems of the F-35C make it clear that the Navy needs are not yet met by the F-35C at this time, and it is unclear if some of those problems can ever be truly fixed. Anyone who has read the latest annual report released by the Pentagon’s director of test and evaluation, J. Michael Gilmore, - not to mention the latest GAO report on the Joint Strike Fighter, knows that the Joint Strike Fighter program still has very serious problems. The GAO report in particular is the kindest report to date for the Joint Strike Fighter program, but after reading that report my primary takeaway is that the Joint Strike Fighter is at least as technologically and electronically complicated as even our most sophisticated Unmanned Aviation platform concepts. Quite honestly I find it hard to believe that any aircraft with so many technological moving parts will ever be reliable on any modern battlefield. The Joint Strike Fighter is a logistical nightmare, and is literally a helmet malfunction away from being a mission kill during wartime - with hundreds of proverbial helmets built into the aircraft.

LT. General Christopher C. Bogdan is emphasizing the multinational partnership of the program for a good reason, and the reason is specific to bringing down the cost of the F-35A. Stable funding across all 3 models of the Joint Strike Fighter is required if the F-35A price is going to have any chance to drop to $90M per aircraft. That means the Navy must stay completely invested in the R&D of F-35C, and must - at least initially - buy F-35C aircraft at the scheduled rate to maintain stability in the production schedule. When  Adm. Jonathan Greenert mentions the Navy still hasn't determined how many F-35Cs the Navy will purchase, the implication is the CNO is looking for the bare minimum threshold the Navy must spend to stay invested in the program.

What is important about the comments of both LT. General Christopher C. Bogdan and Admiral Jonathan Greenert is that when it comes to the F-35C, the F-35C is now being purchased by the Navy primarily for reasons of National Security Policy and not for any reason related to maritime policy or strategy. The Navy is now required to continue to pay for the F-35C for purposes of cost consideration of the entire program - all variants, and that consideration is primarily being driven by the multinational character of the program. It is now fair to say that Navy budget spending for the Joint Strike Fighter is now more important to the Department of the Air Force and the Department of State than it is for the Department of the Navy, because it is more important for the National Security Policy of the United States for the F-35A to be affordable to multinational partners than it is for the F-35C to fly off US Navy aircraft carriers.

While it is extremely frustrating that the Navy is essentially being forced to spend huge sums of money on an aircraft the Navy no longer appears to want, it is also valid that the Navy be forced to continue investment in the Joint Strike Fighter for National Security Policy purposes - even when that purpose is primarily for insuring the cost of the platform is affordable to allies. It is completely legitimate that the Navy buying the F-35C is the right thing for the National Security interests of the country even while buying the F-35C itself is not good for advancing naval aviation. This is not a zero sum game.

It would be a mistake to interpret validity and legitimacy as good or bad, because the context matters. National Security Policy trumps maritime strategy, even if I would like to see maritime strategy have more influence in the crafting of National Security Policy. In my opinion if (and this is a BIG "if") the cost of the F-35A comes down to $90 million per aircraft because the Navy spends money on the F-35C, and if international partners ultimately buy a bunch of F-35As at that price, then the Navy's investment in F-35C is simultaneously a poor investment for the Navy and a good investment for the country. What makes all of this really frustrating though is that a poor investment for the Navy and a good investment for the country is the best case outcome of the Joint Strike Fighter as things are today, and it should be noted there is no evidence to date that this represents the most likely outcome. At this point, all it takes is one country to bail out and the whole plan falls apart.

Talking to Robots on the Flight Deck

You might ask yourself, "Who in the world is that yellow shirt signaling?" It is an unmanned system afterall, right? What is the point if the operator is that green shirted guy (not that kind of green shirt) right next to the yellow shirt. That was exactly the question on my mind last week when i first noted all the pictures and video put out by the US Navy as the X-47B was driving all over the flight deck of the USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75).

Well, it turns out all that work is part of teaching the UCAS-D to read and understand the hand signals of the Yellow Shirt. Yes, that guy in the green on video is the human engaged pilot, but there is a learning process underway by which the unmanned aircraft is learning how to taxi around an aircraft carrier autonomously based on the hand signals of the yellow shirt.

Ready to watch the video again? Pretty cool IMO.

Watch very closely in this video (and check out others for more examples) and you will see how very deliberate the yellow shirt is with his signals, indeed he stays very steady and is being very deliberate with every motion. This is an example of yet one more in a long list of very interesting, intricate processes being developed as the Navy moves toward flying advanced computers without pilots strapped to jet engines off aircraft carriers.

As one pilot noted to me today, what this video is actually showing is a two way conversation on the flight deck.

CNO Hints Towards the (New?) Future of Carrier Launched Naval Aviation

Contrary to a recent suggestion regarding the decline of influence by the US Naval Institute and the organizations flagship product Proceedings magainze, Chief of Naval Operations Jonathan Greenert has penned an article in Proceedings magazine this month that is already getting a lot of attention. Payloads over Platforms: Charting a New Course is a really important article, indeed there are several aspects of the article that jumped off the page the first, second, and every other time I've read the article.

In general I have been less than impressed with the analysis of the Proceedings article to date, indeed I think most people who have publicly commented either missed the point, or failed to connect the dots. The whole article is important, not just the pieces that made headlines, and I believe it really informs us on modern ideas being circulated inside the Navy - many of which are very smart.

Please, if you have not done so, go read the entire article before reading any further. Once you have read the article, come back and read what I'm saying, then go back and read the article to see if I have this right. I'm not certain I am reading it correctly, but I think I am.

Ready? OK...

First, I have to address something. This kind of industry shrilling by think tank people who I thought were credible analysts needs to stop. The suggestion through fear by Mackenzie Eaglen that the end of manned military aviation will occur if any aspect of the Joint Strike Fighter program is changed by the Navy is either the definition of jumping the shark, or perhaps more appropriately the act of 'credibility hara-kiri.' If the defense analyst community continues to promote political fear in lockstep support of industry and policy failures instead of legitimate ideas for the DoD to deal with programs and policies that have gotten way out of control (too big to fail, a meme that applies to both the JSF and Afghanistan), then the defense analyst community is damaging their credentials beyond the ability of those folks to ever effectively lead the defense establishment in the future, and a new source of expertise needs to be sought after.

The fine line between think tank analyst and defense industry lobbyist is being blurred today by a lot of folks who were once thought of as highly credible, and I absolutely include folks at CNAS in the same category as Heritage Foundation and AEI. There is a lot of self-licking Ice Cream cone BS coming out of DC today, and that article in AOL Defense pissed me off with it's new extreme in hyperbole.

Second, Phil Ewing got it right, TWICE, but failed to connect the dots. Did the CNO just take a big swipe at the F-35? You bet the CNO did. The CNO absolutely made clear that the cost of stealth and exactly what the capability advantage of stealth is has forced the Navy to evaluate with clear eyes how to use stealth in naval aviation in the future, but the stealth issue is bigger than just the F-35C - it also must be applied to unmanned carrier aviation as well.

The CNO starts out by stating clearly that the Navy needs "to move from ‘luxury-car’ platforms—with their built-in capabilities—toward dependable ‘trucks’ that can handle a changing payload selection." Because the use of the word "truck" has historically only been applied to ships in the context of modularity or swapping out equipment on ships, it is assumed he is speaking only about ships when he mentions trucks. That would be a bad assumption, because I think he is talking about naval aviation as well.

If you recall, Bob Work sent out a memo on July 7, 2024 to Navy acquisition chief Sean Stackley, Vice Chief Of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert and assistant Marine Commandant Gen. Joseph Dunford to form a team to develop three alternative tactical aviation force structures, respectively representing cost savings of $5 billion, $7.5 billion and $10 billion across the future years defense plan. Ultimately, Work expects to determine “the best-value alternative, factoring in both cost and capability. The purpose of the study was to determine whether the Navy and Marines could operate fewer than the 40 squadrons of JSFs currently planned and to look at the possibility of accelerating development of unmanned alternative systems."

Everybody knows the costs of the Joint Strike Fighter has grown too high for the Navy to afford the future carrier air wing, indeed there is no future for unmanned carrier aviation unless the Navy reorganizes current plans of the Joint Strike Fighter, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, and existing Unmanned Carrier Launched Systems programs in an effort to find more money. That memo last year was the study of plans to determine what the options are. We have never seen the results of that memo, although my impression is the CNO just hinted what they might be.

What I believe the CNO is basically saying is that the F-18E/F works effectively as a manned truck, if new weapons are brought online to support the aircraft's ability to strike at long range - which is the cover story that Captain Hernandez ran out to Phil Ewing after his original post. Like I said, Phil Ewing got it right, twice!

What the CNO is also saying is that the stealthy UCAS-D is too expensive, and that unmanned carrier launched aviation doesn't need to be stealthy, rather it needs to be capable of endurance/range and high payloads. This has been coming awhile, because one of the worst kept secrets is how many problems there are with UCAS-D. UCAS-D weighs way too much, costs too much, has less than desired endurance, and has a limited payload capacity in favor of its stealth profile. My bet is the Navy isn't going down that road long term, although the Navy will use UCAS-D as a technology demonstrator.

But the CNO emphasized stealth was important? You bet he did, and how he discusses the importance of stealth in that Proceedings article reminded me of a concept I heard discussed with regards to the future of unmanned naval aviation at a recent USNI conference where the Joint Strike Fighter will still play an important role in future naval aviation that includes unmanned systems.

Basically, the Navy would field carrier launched aviation platform "trucks" that carried a variety of long range missiles forward, and escorting these large flying trucks - trucks which would include F-18E/F manned fighters and unmanned carrier launched medium payload delivery vehicles - would be stealthy F-35Cs that basically functioned as forward observers that helped targeting for the payload trucks that could operate at stand off distances. By taking that approach, fewer F-35Cs would be needed, because the internal strike payload of the F-35C is no longer as important relative to the payload capacity of the overall strike package - which would be offloaded to manned F-18E/Fs and medium capacity carrier launched UAVs.

So that is basically where I think this is going. The Navy is going to address the very real concerns about the future carrier air wing in FY14, and they will restructure the various programs. The F-35C program will likely be restructured in the same way it was last time, by reducing the number of squadrons fielded per carrier. Last time the F-35C was reduced to 2 squadrons per carrier, this time it will likely be reduced to 1 squadron per carrier. With F-35C IOC currently scheduled for FY14, but expected to be delayed, the purchase of fewer F-35Cs and the delayed IOC will mean more F-18E/Fs will need to be purchased. This comes just in time too, because the production line for F-18E/F only goes through FY14, so more F-18E/Fs will keep that production line open longer.

The rest of the savings, which will be either $5 billion, $7.5 billion and $10 billion across the FYDP will decide the details of the F-35C and F-18E/F program changes, and also determine to what degree unmanned carrier aviation will play in the future Carrier Air Wing by 2020 and beyond. I believe it is a very good bet that unmanned carrier launched aviation will find funding, that the F-35C purchase will be reduced, and that the F-18E/F production line will stay open beyond FY14 - but the details of what unmanned carrier launched aviation will look like by 2020 is still very much unclear.

It is also important to recognize that under the CNO's emerging vision of payloads instead of platforms, platforms like the F-35C still have a primary role, but that role is changing. In part, the F-35C is still a very necessary stealth capability that will perform the always important intercept function - although the payloads for intercept will be carried at stand-off range. F-35C will also function in the forward observer role - again in support of weapons held at safer, stand-off distances. These roles for the F-35C would be vital to the tactical and operational level execution of air superiority and combat air support by carrier aviation well into future decades, which means that while the total number of F-35Cs might be fewer in the future Carrier Air Wing, it's existence in the future Carrier Air Wing becomes even more vital than it is today - particularly if the unmanned "truck" options materialize as legitimate. In many ways, I could see these changes seen as a mixed result for Lockheed Martin, on one side the F-35C is purchased in lower quantity but on the other side the platform becomes the most critical piece of the puzzle, something the platform is not under current plans.

In the end, all I believe can be said with any certainty is that based on the CNO's Proceedings article and the fiscal reality of naval aviation heading into the next two very, very tight budget years, the UCAS-D is the least likely full production approach for the future of unmanned carrier aviation.

Sean Stackley - Bullish on Aircraft Carriers

Sean Stackley, former LPD-17 program manager with a highly questionable track record, and current Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition with a much better track record, has become very bullish on aircraft carriers - in the United Kingdom.

A recent Telegraph article tells the story.

Converting HMS Prince of Wales so that it can be used by the Joint Strike Fighter will require significantly less than the £2 billion quoted by officials, the assistant secretary of the US Navy, Sean J Stackley, insisted.

In a letter seen by The Daily Telegraph, he told Peter Luff, the defence procurement minister, that the necessary equipment would cost £458 million before installation. Defence experts estimate the installation cost at £400 million.

For the most part, I think Sean Stackley is exactly right on this. The article cites the reason for the letter being that the US wants "to ensure that the information the British Government is working from is accurate because currently that quite clearly is not the case." I think there is a lot of truth to that as well.

Lets get to the core part of the article then discuss...

Two British carriers are being built, but one will be mothballed following the SDSR. Reverting to jump jets for both of them would not help American military planners, who want to be able to base a squadron of their own jets on a British carrier.

Separate accommodation is being built on board HMS Prince of Wales with communications facilities that would be for “US Eyes Only”.

There are also said to be technological concerns over the jump jet version of the fighter and the Americans might be positioning themselves to ditch it altogether.

“This letter could be a warning shot saying if you Brits go back to jump jet carriers then there might be no planes to fly off it,” said a defence source.

Richard Scott, of Jane’s Defence Weekly, said: “The trouble the Government has is in getting reliable cost data but at least the costs the Americans are giving are quite reassuring.”

An MoD spokesman said: “Work is ongoing to finalise the 2012-13 budget and balance the equipment plan. This means reviewing all programmes, including elements of the carrier strike programme.”

I try to avoid Royal Navy discussions like the plague, because I am an unapologetic biased lover of all things related to the history of the Royal Navy, and think the British government as a collective group today might be the largest collection of strategic fools in any capital city on the planet except Pyongyang. Churchill, bless his soul, is long gone and there is no one in political leadership today that inspires confidence in even the possibility that strategic thinking is applied to defense issues discussed in London these days.

So here are my thoughts, and I suspect they will have nothing in common with whatever Mr. Cameron comes up with.

If the MoD is in fact going to build aircraft carriers, then the Royal Navy would be very smart to build both CVFs and put the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) on both CVFs, but at this point in time the MoD shouldn't commit to either version of the Joint Strike Fighter until that entire program is more mature. The decision to go with a conventional launching system on the CVF should be obvious - it is the only way the CVF will be relevant in the future should armed unmanned aviation platforms start operating off aircraft carriers anytime in the next 3 decades - which is very likely to occur.

But it is important to highlight that the strategic reasons for building the CVFs are the same strategic reasons to insure it has a conventional launch system like EMALS - in the 21st century the places the Royal Navy is most likely to fight are places where there will be very limited parking for land based aviation support for naval forces. From a purely strategic perspective, that suggests to me that all of the tactical and operational capabilities the Royal Navy fleet will need in order to fight effectively will have to come from the CVFs.

Those capabilities aren't going to be provided by the Joint Strike Fighter, rather will come from other types of aircraft that will absolutely require a conventional launch system like EMALS. A CVF task force with ~30 F-35Cs and helicopters is going to be eaten alive by a CVF task force with a mix of 30 F/A-18E/F/Gs + E-2s + helicopters every day of the week, and lets stop pretending now that ~30 F-35Bs will be supported by some AEW version of the MV-22, because there is a snowballs chance in hell that the Royal Navy would be able to afford both the F-35B and a completely new version of the MV-22 for AEW that doesn't exist today.

I know I am in a minority, but I am still very skeptical the US Navy will ever field the F-35C - so I obviously do not believe the Royal Navy should be committed to the platform. The damage the costs of the F-35C program is doing to naval aviation is bigger than anyone in Washington wishes to admit publicly - YET, but when the US Navy starts planning the early retirement of multiple aircraft carriers (potentially as soon as the FY14 budget cycle) I think people are going to wake up pretty quickly to how much damage F-35C is doing to naval aviation, and what the cost of a single strike fighter has been to naval aviation as a whole.

That goes double if a debate ever breaks out regarding the lack of relevance the future CVW has to the 21st century threat environment at sea - because anyone who thinks the CVN is better off with today's CVW with JSFs instead of F-18s is fooling themselves - ignoring the capabilities that aren't being fielded because the cost of the F-35C sucked all the $$ out of the naval aviation community. When considering this is the decade that naval aviation should be innovating the most due to the US Navy enjoying a substantial lead on competitors, I am convinced naval aviators will look back at 2011-2020 as the lost decade of their community.

And for the record, during the next US Presidential term (2013-2016) the safest bet any navalist can make is that the world will observe 2 brand new aircraft carriers being built in China, and I'm not counting Varyag. If you don't expect 5 aircraft carriers in use by China by 2025, then you are the 1936 IJN Admiral who casually dismissed Isoruku Yamamoto's concerns of American industrial capacity.

My point is simple - things are going to change a lot well before the first CVF is doing anything in sea water. The UK needs to either commit to 2 first class CVFs with conventional launch and recovery capabilities, or commit to zero and build a bigger fleet of surface combatants and submarines - but spending massive amounts of national treasure on two half assed aircraft carriers would be an epic strategic fail greater than the Maginot Line, and the equivalent of a self inflicted Pearl Harbor.

The UK should commit to strategic flexibility for naval forces of the future, which for the CVF would absolutely mean EMALS but doesn't necessarily mean the F-35C.

Comparisons You Don't Want to Hear

The 4 cruisers being retired this year carry 520 VLS cells between them all. If each was loaded with half Tomahawks and half Standard missiles, and all 260 Tomahawks were fired at targets 750 nautical miles away from the ships and all 260 Standard missiles were fired against enemy aircraft 100 nautical miles away from the ships...

How many DAYS would it take for a single CVN with a modern CVW of 44 Super Hornets or Joint Strike Fighters to fire 260 AA missiles at targets 100 nautical miles away from the aircraft carrier and deliver 260 1000 lb bombs 750 nautical miles away from the aircraft carrier?

There actually is a right answer, with some margin of error in estimation. Don't forget logistics, reload times, and buddy tanking. The sortie rate for a CVW at range is a joke, because one has to pull in USAF tanking to make the numbers look even less uncompetitive.

I had to break out my little Harpoon 3.7 ANW simulator to do the math, keeping in mind CVNs only fly 14 hours a day - which is why the US Navy actually requires 2 CVNs for continuous 24 hour operations... for no more than 72 hours under optimal conditions. It is amazing how little people actually know about modern carrier operations, unless you have served on a carrier. Why SWOs concede the carrier as a dominant naval platform in the 21st century based on what I see today is a mystery to me, aircraft carriers aren't just expensive, they are on a steady flank speed course to irrelevance thanks primarily to the naval aviation community that has made land attack their primary capability - despite the fact it cannot even be done at long range by a carrier without land based tanker support.

People may look at the retirement of 4 CGs and think the worst possible case scenario is that the US Navy is retiring old battleships before Japan attacks Pearl Harbor, but if you do the math and compare value in terms of cost and capability, given the way war has changed at sea in the 21st century - there is a good argument for an analogy that the retirement of the 4 CGs in 2012 is akin to retiring Enterprise, Ranger, Yorktown, and Saratoga on December 8th, 1941.

Luckily we are holding tight to the Nimitz class - the proverbial Oklahoma, Arizona, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee of 1941.

If it was even possible there is truth that CGs are a more critical, relevant asset to the 21st century fleet today than the big deck aircraft carrier, would you even admit it was true?

Is anyone able to accept that aircraft carriers in 2012 might be a wasted asset for the cost? Aircraft carriers come with a proven track record since WWII against major naval powers like North Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, Iran, Iraq twice, Afghanistan, Argentina, and hot spots like Somalia - the historical record clearly articulates the infallibility of the modern aircraft carrier.

I dunno about you, but unless I am fighting small time military power with limited capabilities and training like Syria or Iran, I would rather have the cruisers than the aircraft carrier. It isn't the platform so much as it is the CVW we somehow pretend can field a magical mass of aircraft quickly - thus utilize the size and space of a big deck aircraft carrier when we need it. Where is the evidence that is possible? Where is even a single data point the procurement system could do it? MRAP is the biggest success in modern procurement history - and we think that kind of model can quickly populate carrier decks?

Until I see a US Navy CVW with a fixed wing ASW platform or a legitimate carrier based tanker capability tested and fielded, I am going to find it very difficult to take the naval aviation community seriously when all threat analysis from every corner of the globe highlights submarines as the fastest growing threat to the maritime domain, and the tyranny of range as the greatest threat to naval forces in the Pacific. The Navy is spending about $50 million more on the JSF than the F-18 to get less range with a moderate increase in stealth. And the CVW will still be left with no fixed wing ASW and no organic tanking.

And btw, you'll still need the 4 major surface combatants to protect the carrier, just so the Navy can hit targets at greater cost and at a slower pace. Some people say that because the Navy has a tighter budget the aircraft carrier needs to be cut. I don't think that's a valid reason at all, what I would rather see is a better debate between communities of the Navy why the aircraft carrier is a better investment than other aspects of the fleet - or a better investment than similar capabilities provided by other services. Show me that debate, and I'll show you an organization that is thinking. Until then, pass the hippy pipe so I can keep smoking the wacky tabacky that argues the infallibility of the modern big deck aircraft carrier in modern naval warfare.