The Navy’s Information Dissemination Crisis

No, I’m not talking about strategic communications. I’m referring to the exponentially growing requirements for rapidly processing, disseminating and analyzing vast quantities of networked information and intelligence. National Defense has an enlightening article on the coming Navy ship-wreck in bandwidth, linked sensors, and networks.

VADM Cebrowski may have been the conceptual father of network-centric warfare, but MG Flynn and GEN Stan McChrystal operationalized the theory on the battlefield. Maximizing the leverage of interagency capabilities and authorities, counter-terrorism has recently evolved into a highly refined art form. Frankly, very few naval folks working outside the special operations community understand the impact of this new war-fighting paradigm. The limitations of the current naval environment are quite evident when one considers that a couple of SOF guys can carry around more bandwidth in a suitcase in the middle of a desert than 200-something Sailors share on the newest DDG. Broadly speaking, the decentralized, adaptive, and highly-networked style of warfare pioneered by counter-terrorism forces in Iraq and Afghanistan will become the American military’s competitive edge over future adversaries. As networking technology and precision-guided weapons proliferate to both state and non-state actors, only the integration of these capabilities into coherent fighting architectures combined with US logistics, creativity, and freedom of thought will enable us maintain a combat advantage.

Viewed in a naval context, network-centric warfare is the difference between a singular combatant such as an LCS (or even much smaller vessels) being able to find, fix, and engage targets within a few miles of the ship and the same platform being a node in a widely-distributed strike force able to destroy targets identified by non-organic sensors and national intelligence systems while calling in fires from over the horizon on locally-identified targets.

As the NDIA article notes, the proliferation of sensors and bandwidth-hogging data such as full motion video (from both manned and unmanned platforms) is an unstoppable trend. The vulnerability of these networks to jamming and disruption is an issue, but redundancy and robust designs can overcome those challenges. Contrary to some of the opinions expressed in the article, multiple networks add resiliency and any consolidation should be approached thoughtfully. (If you’ve used NMCI the past several years, you know exactly what I mean). Processing and analyzing data is as critical moving this data over the network. Off-board analysis, reach-back support, and automation are good ways to handle this issue, but embarked analysts closer to the fight can increase the speed and quality of decisions. Despite advances in automation, onboard intelligence analysis and operational C2 afloat is manpower intensive. Consequently, trends in minimal manning and designing ships with inadequate surge berthing must stop.

The Navy prides itself among the services on the independence of commanders at sea, but the reality is that much of this independence disappeared with the advent of radio. Rather than fighting the trend, we need to embrace networked warfare and exploit it to our advantage. This doesn’t mean micromanaging commanders in the field, the air, or afloat; quite the opposite is true. Flattened C2 allows individual units to contribute to the fight at the operational level while increasing the speed and quality of decisions across organizations and from the tactical to the strategic level. Furthermore, agility and speed of decision making are two of the most important principles to fighting irregular enemies who are not handicapped by a large bureaucracies and cumbersome chains of command.

Getting this networking and bandwidth problem right over the next few years is just as important for the Navy as formulating and executing an achievable shipbuilding plan. Moreover, properly networking naval forces will enable lower end (read more numerous and affordable) ships and aircraft to realize operational synergies and combat power way beyond what individual units are capable of achieving.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Update on Moving Aircraft Carrier to Mayport

From the Government Accountability Office.

The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review called for the Navy to provide more warfighting assets more quickly to multiple locations. Subsequently, the Navy made a preliminary decision to homeport a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Naval Station Mayport, Florida, which was affirmed by the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. In House Report 111-491, accompanying a proposed bill for the Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5136), GAO was directed to develop an independent estimate of the total federal costs for the proposed homeporting. GAO's objectives were to (1) develop an independent estimate of the full life-cycle costs to homeport a nuclear aircraft carrier at Mayport and (2) determine to what extent the Navy's estimate meets the characteristics of a high-quality cost estimate. To do this, GAO worked with a firm experienced in preparing life-cycle cost estimates for major federal acquisitions and compared the Navy's cost estimating practices with the best practices in GAO's "Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide."

GAO's independent cost estimate suggests that the total one-time cost of homeporting a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Naval Station Mayport is expected to be between $258.7 million and $356.0 million, in base year 2010 dollars. The Navy's estimate of the one-time cost is $537.6 million--also in base year 2010 dollars--which is outside the upper range of GAO's estimate. Unlike GAO's estimate, the Navy did not conduct a risk and uncertainty analysis on its one-time costs; as a result, its estimate does not include a range. The largest difference between GAO's estimate of one-time costs and the Navy's estimate is the cost of constructing new facilities at Mayport. Based on the historical costs of constructing similar facilities, GAO estimates at the 65 percent confidence level that the cost for constructing the controlled industrial facility will be $70.5 million, and the cost for constructing the ship maintenance support facilities will be $45.6 million. The Navy estimates the construction costs to be much higher at $139.1 million and $157.2 million, respectively. Navy officials told GAO the difference is due to the increased cost involved in protecting the buildings from a potential storm surge associated with a Category 4 hurricane. GAO included a hurricane factor in its estimate to account for this increase, but GAO and the Navy used different estimating methods in developing the estimates for the construction costs. GAO used adjusted actual costs from similar construction projects, while the Navy used a detailed engineering estimate. For recurring costs, GAO's independent cost estimate suggests that the total is expected to be between $9.0 million and $17.6 million per year. The Navy's estimate of $15.3 million per year is within GAO's estimated range. The Navy's estimate did not fully meet any of the four characteristics-- comprehensive, accurate, well documented, and credible--for producing a high-quality cost estimate. Specifically, although the estimate included almost all of the life-cycle costs related to homeporting a nuclear aircraft carrier at Mayport, it partially met the criteria for being comprehensive because it does not fully describe the cost-influencing ground rules and assumptions. The estimate was only minimally accurate and well documented in that although many elements of the estimate are based on actual experiences from other comparable programs, it is difficult to say if the cost estimates are the most likely costs since the Navy did not conduct a risk and uncertainty analysis. Further, the estimate contains very little step-by-step description of how the estimate was developed so that a cost analyst unfamiliar with the program could independently replicate it. The Navy had to recreate several portions of the estimate in order to provide GAO with supporting documentation. Further, the Navy's estimate does not meet the GAO best practice for a credible estimate because it does not include a sensitivity analysis and was not compared by the Navy to an independent cost estimate conducted by a group outside the Navy. Without fully meeting the characteristics of a high-quality estimate, the Navy's ability to present a convincing argument of the estimate's affordability and credibly answer decision makers' and oversight groups' questions about the estimate is hampered. GAO recommends DOD take several actions to improve the quality of its Mayport cost estimate. DOD partially concurred with two recommendations and disagreed with one, generally stating that additional direction or change is not required. GAO believes the recommendations remain valid as discussed in the report.

Full report and associated materials available at this link.

Thinking about the report, the Navy might benefit from the GAOs recommendation to assign a single office with the task of assembling a comprehensive cost estimate. The same office could also estimate the costs of forward basing aircraft carriers and other vessels to other locations outside the United States. Like Australia. Just saying.