Keyhole

As we continue the movie theme this week, ironically the same week the movie Battleship hits theaters, I encourage folks to check out this presentation by Michael Jones, Chief Technology Advocate at Google Ventures. Now full disclosure, this is how Google rolls and I have seen a version of this speech several times, each time tailored to the audience. Basically Google guys like Mr. Jones walks in and scares the crap out of people.

If you are interested in the power of information, you are going to love this.

Monday Morning Naval Tech

At first it reminded me of Star Wars, because it the idea reminds a Sci-Fi fan of the role an Astrometric Droid like R2D2 might play on a star ship - damage control. Then you look at the picture and you realize this isn't Star Wars, rather this is Battlestar Galactica, and the Navy is building first generation Cylons for their next generation warships.

Is this transformational, evolutionary, or simply part of the 21st century future that is coming whether we are ready or not? Who cares... because it's very damn interesting because it addresses a legitimate need with what is apparently a legitimate 1st generation technology. Operational testing (which I presume means on a warship) is expected to begin late next year.

Firefighting Robot (SAFFiR), is being designed to move autonomously throughout the ship, interact with people, and fight fires, handling many of the dangerous firefighting tasks that are normally performed by humans. The humanoid robot should be able to maneuver well in the narrow passages and ladderways that are unique to a ship and challenging for most older, simpler robots to navigate.

The robot is designed with enhanced multi-modal sensor technology for advanced navigation and a sensor suite that includes a camera, gas sensor, and stereo IR camera to enable it to see through smoke. Its upper body will be capable of manipulating fire suppressors and throwing propelled extinguishing agent technology (PEAT) grenades. It is battery powered that holds enough energy for 30 minutes of firefighting. Like a sure-footed sailor, the robot will also be capable of walking in all directions, balancing in sea conditions, and traversing obstacles.

Another key element of the SAFFiR development is to allow damage control personnel and the robot to work cohesively as a team. Algorithms are being developed to allow autonomous mobility and decision making by the robot as a team member. To enable natural interaction with a human team leader, the robot will have multimodal interfaces that will enable the robot to track the focus of attention of the human team leader, as well as to allow the robot to understand and respond to gestures, such as pointing and hand signals. Where appropriate, natural language may also be incorporated, as well as other modes of communication and supervision.

Researchers from Virginia Tech and University of Pennsylvania are also working with NRL on the project. They plan to test the firefighting robot in a realistic firefighting environment onboard the ex-USS Shadwell in late September 2013.

The obvious shortfall of these prototype systems is their low power supply, but as is also true with the technologies of the Littoral Combat Ship modules - get the 1st generation stuff out there so demand will drive the innovation towards the limitations of these systems. The software, logistics, training, and support of these systems are going to be harder - from the Navy POV - than working around the limitations of power, after all the Navy can and will simply throw money in the direction of contractors at the power problem, while we all know the Navy ultimately will not throw enough money at the more legitimate Navy-centric challenges (software, logistics, training, and support) that will only be resolved with time and experience in the hands of sailors and officers.

Also noteworthy is this piece of technology that is apparently soon to roll out as well, which in my mind sounds a great deal like the hypothetical science of Warp Fields in Star Trek lore - except applied in the oceans.

Someone tell the U.S. Navy that rough waters might become a thing of the past. Scientists think they’ve figured out how to fool the stormy seas.

The breakthrough, courtesy of researchers at the University of California at Berkeley, is the latest in a series of developments in invisibility research — many of them Pentagon-funded. Too bad this one won’t actually address what’s arguably the military’s biggest on-the-water worry: Hiding ships from the watchful eyes of potentially dangerous foes. Instead, these scientists think they’ve figured out how to trick the water itself.

The goal is to make ships immune to the up-and-down motion of waves, an objective that could help the military avoid the kinds of delays or rerouting that, for now, are inevitable during bad weather.

If that sounds different than previous breakthroughs in invisibility, it most definitely is. Before this, scientists focused on shrouding objects from the human eye. They’ve tried harnessing the mirage effect to play tricks on vision, and tried using meta-materials that bend light, in the hope of rendering something impossible to see. But despite some pretty amazing progress (cloaking 3D objects or entire events, for example) invisibility is still largely relegated to the low-frequency realm — not the optical wavelengths visible to us.

This time, instead of cloaking an object from light, scientists are cloaking it from water.

The article goes into further depth with links that describe how the technology will generally work, but basically "as long as “the wave vector of the ripple [cloak] equal[s] the difference in the wave vectors of the interfacial and surface waves,” a rough wave approaching a vessel will suddenly disappear — and pass far below the vessel."

Just thinking out loud, but if this technology does work - and if we make the huge assumption that it works without creating massive environmental problems - it does have me wondering if it could potentially just plug into hull mounted directional sonar systems. In other words, this technology could simply be a sonar upgrade in the future.

The first, most obvious practical use of this technology would be for the Coast Guard - if during a high seas rescue they can simply drop a dipping sonar from a helicopter to calm the waves around a ship rolling around in high seas, that sure will make any rescue easier.

The American Made Corvette

As most of us know, the US does build naval corvettes, just not for the US Navy. The first of four intended for Egypt is in the news. Here is a bit from the VT Halter Marine, Inc. press release.

VT Halter Marine, Inc. (VT Halter Marine), a subsidiary of VT Systems, Inc. (VT Systems), held a dedication ceremony for the first of four Fast Missile Craft (FMC) built for the Egyptian Navy at its Pascagoula shipyard. The keel for this first FMC was authenticated on April 7, 2010.

Chris Cavas has more at Defense News.

Construction of the ship began in a newly built fabrication facility at VT Halter in November 2009 under a U.S. Navy Foreign Military Sales program managed by the U.S. Navy's Naval Sea Systems Command.

The original contract for the program was awarded to VT Halter in November 2005. Since then, the U.S. has awarded the shipbuilder more than $800 million for the ships.

The Ezzat is expected to leave Mississippi for Egypt during 2012.

Construction continues on the other three ships: F. Zekry, M. Fahmy and A. Gad. The last ship is contracted for delivery in December 2013.

Something caught my attention here. The previously reported cost of this ship is off by over 100%, as the vessels were originally expected to cost $100 million each but have suffered a great deal of cost overruns.

If you ever wanted to know what ~$220 million in FY05 dollars buys, which is what the Littoral Combat Ship was originally supposed to be, this is what you get: 500 tons, 8 days at sea, 2000nm range, and even 41 knots.

It's Armed, It's Fast, and It's Virtually Unstoppable!!! Or Something Like That...

The following press release was put out by Juliet Marine Systems, Inc. Keep in mind this is a press statement...

Juliet Marine Systems, Inc. (JMS) announced Aug. 10 that the US Navy/USPTO have removed Secrecy Orders previously applied to GHOST. For the first time, Juliet Marine is able to release photographs of GHOST, the first super-cavitating craft, to the public. GHOST was designed and built by US Citizens for the US Navy at no cost to the government to protect US sailors, servicemen and servicewomen.

Development of the first ever super-cavitating craft, in many ways, is as difficult as breaking the sound barrier. GHOST is a combination aircraft/boat that has been designed to fly through an artificial underwater gaseous environment that creates 900 times less hull friction than water. GHOST technology adapts to manned or unmanned, surface or submerged applications.

Any Navy possessing GHOST technology could operate in international waters undetected and would have an overwhelming advantage against conventional ships. GHOST is specifically designed for Fleet Force Protection at its present size. GHOST technology is scalable and JMS is currently discussing a plan to build a larger Corvette-sized vessel (150 feet) by partnering with a large international defense company. The US Navy could reduce its Naval footprint and financial exposure by deploying a squadron of GHOSTs from Bahrain, which would free up larger assets, such as destroyers and cruisers, saving costs in manpower and maintenance. GHOST is ideal for piracy patrols and could be sea-based to provide protection from pirate attacks that cost our government an estimated $1.5 billion each year. The world-wide shipping industry could be provided with substantial fuel savings using JMS hull friction reduction super-cavitation.

A squadron of GHOSTs would not be detectable to seeking enemy ship radar and sensors. GHOST can carry thousands of pounds of weapons, including Mark 48 torpedoes, and would be virtually unstoppable. The GHOST platform and technology could reduce the need for LCS completely with the capability to travel long distances and conduct the same missions. GHOST could make LCS a defensible platform for combat - LCS is not currently rated for combat. Today, Iran has the capabilities to stop the US Navy from operating in the Straits of Hormuz, a critical passage for most of the oil our country uses.

The Navy compares GHOST to an attack helicopter with regard to its capabilities for force protection. GHOST can deliver forces to any beach location quickly and quietly with enough weapons to conduct a hot extraction. GHOST is designed to provide military game changing advantages for the USA.

I've read this around 8 times today, and I still laugh out loud every time. The technology sounds interesting, but the press statement sounds like a TV infomercial.

GHOST can carry thousands of pounds of weapons, including Mark 48 torpedoes, and would be virtually unstoppable.

And it will shine the Admirals shoes and trim the CMCs hair and..!!!

What? Is this legitimate? I am so confused.

The Navy's Laser Show

News article here.

"One of the things that amazes me about this business is that the future is getting closer every day," [Rear Adm. Nevin] Carr said.

We need a new discussion when it comes to Navy ships. For years everyone has focused on the weapon system of the ship - example LCS. The conversation desperately needs to shift so the discussion is hull, mechanical, and engineering with a focus on power distribution. If the DDG-51 Flight III isn't ready to field the 3rd generation FEL model we are currently working on, DDG-51 Flight III is the wrong platform for the AMDR.

Congress must get their head around this, because spending $20 billion on ships that won't be able to field the technologies of war a decade after they are built would be an enormous waste of money. Ironic, the Navy doesn't want to build a new design because they don't want to make the case for nuclear power - and yet power is starting to look like the most desired aspect of a combat ship by 2030.

Something Isn't Quite Right With AMDR

If you haven't seen it, I encourage you to watch the video of the testimony given by Eric Labs and Ronald O'Rourke in front of the House Armed Services Committee Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee. There is an exchange in the middle of the hearing where the DDG-51 Flight IIIs and AMDR is discussed, and once again Ronald O'Rourke discusses the Cobra Judy program. This isn't the first time Ronald O'Rourke has brought up Cobra Judy in testimony, but it is important to note.

Below are the relevant discussion materials from the printed testimony. First Eric Labs of CBO to set the stage.

DDG-51 Flight III. The Navy’s strategy to meet combatant commanders’ demand for the increased capabilities of ballistic missile defense ships—as well as to replace Ticonderoga class cruisers when they retire in the 2020s—is to modify the DDG-51 destroyer substantially, creating a Flight III configuration. That configuration would incorporate the new Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR), now under development, which is larger and more powerful than the radars on earlier DDG-51s. Adding the AMDR would require increasing the amount of power and cooling available on a Flight III ship in order to operate the radar effectively.25 Those changes, and associated increases in the ship’s displacement, would make a DDG-51 Flight III at least $500 million, or about 30 percent, more expensive than a new Flight IIA, by CBO’s estimate.

However, there appears to be some question as to whether the hull of the DDG-51 will be able to accommodate the changes envisioned for Flight III. In particular, if the AMDR proved too large to fit inside the deckhouse (the main superstructure above the hull) of a DDG-51 without raising the ship’s center of gravity and destabilizing it, the Navy would need to lengthen the ship, further increasing its displacement and cost substantially. Overall, the Navy plans to buy 24 DDG-51 Flight III ships between 2016 and 2031. If the Navy does not need to lengthen the DDG-51’s hull, those Flight IIIs will cost an average of $2.4 billion, CBO estimates, compared with the Navy’s estimate of $2.0 billion.

Note, the $2.4 billion is for a DDG-51 Flight III destroyer where the hull is not increased to accommodate the AMDR. The Navy is estimating the cost at $2.0 billion, which I think is an optimistic figure even with a bulk purchase.

Below is the testimony by Ronald O'Rourke of CRS.

DDG-51 Program

Other risks for the DDG-51 program include cost and schedule risks associated with restarting Flight IIA DDG-51 production, technical risks associated with developing the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) and other elements of the combat system for the Flight III DDG-51, and the previously mentioned risk of construction cost growth on Flight III DDG-51s. Some observers are concerned about the Navy’s ability to develop the AMDR on the schedule needed to begin procuring the first Flight III DDG-51 in FY2016 as currently planned. The Navy could manage this risk by deferring the procurement of the first Flight III ship to FY2017 or later, if necessary, and instead continue procuring Flight IIA ships.

An additional question relates to the fleet’s future air and missile defense capability. The version of the AMDR to be carried by the Flight III DDG-51 is to be considerably more capable than the SPY-1 radar carried by the Flight IIA DDG-51, but considerably less capable than the larger version of the AMDR that was to have been carried by the CG(X) cruiser. The Navy canceled the CG(X) program in favor of developing and procuring Flight III DDG-51s reportedly in part on the grounds that the Flight III destroyer would use data from off-board sensors to augment data collected by its AMDR. If those off-board sensors turn out to be less capable than the Navy assumed when it decided to cancel the CG(X) in favor of the Flight II DDG-51, the Navy may need to seek other means for augmenting the data collected by the Flight III DDG-51’s AMDR. One option for doing this would be to build a small number of adjunct radar ships equipped with a very powerful radar. Such a ship could be broadly similar to the Cobra Judy replacement ship. CRS presented the option of building an adjunct radar ship in testimony to this subcommittee in July 2008.

The Navy in FY2012 intends to conduct preliminary design work for the Flight III DDG-51. Since the Navy intends to procure Flight III DDG-51s through FY2031, a potential oversight issue is whether the Navy is designing the Flight III DDG-51 to accommodate an electromagnetic rail gun (particularly in light of that weapon’s newly identified potential for being an air and missile defense weapon) and/or a higher-power (i.e., 200 kW to 300 kW) solid state laser.

It is interesting to me that both Eric Labs and Ronald O'Rourke are expressing concerns regarding the AMDR even while the radar is in the very early stages of program development. Something else is interesting... when the Navy discusses the AMDR, I've noticed the radar is always discussed as part of a sensor system in the context of a network. Now, for the second year in a row, Ronald O'Rourke has raised the issue of Cobra Judy to Congress.

Something isn't quite right here.

As I understand it, the AMDR is still in the requirements development process, so why is there so much concern while the requirements are being developed? I think Eric Labs and Ronald O'Rourke know something the rest of us don't.

When Ronald O'Rourke talks about Cobra Judy, I think it is because he is sending a big warning to Congress that they need to be paying attention. If I was guessing, I think it means he knows that in order for the Navy to fit the AMDR into an unmodified DDG-51 Flight III, the specification that will be stated in the upcoming requirement for the AMDR will be reduced, and because of that there is a capability gap that needs a solution like Cobra Judy.

Go back and listen to any testimony, speech, or public discussion of a Navy official discussing the AMDR and you'll find it is always discussed in the context of a networked platform with the E-2D and other offboard sensors. Navy leaders pick their words carefully, so I think what the Navy is trying to do is settle on a radar that is good, but can only really do the job when it is networked with everything else.

Why? I think the Navy has done a study and realized the DDG-51 can't support the bigger radar needed to do the job without a plug, and based on Eric Labs estimates provided by the Navy - no plug is planned. The DDG-51 without a plug doesn't have the size and it doesn't have the power for the AMDR capability that would be able to independently meet all the requirements alone. I believe Ronald O'Rourke has somehow realized this along the way, and is suggesting to Congress to give serious thought to building a bunch of Cobra Judy type platforms because without those big sea radars (or DDG-1000s that have enough power and space to carry the better radar), the future fleet has a blind spot. Even with the Cobra Judy option though, the reliance on data networking in the future Navy is an obvious single point of failure that our enemies must be salivating at.

Ronald O'Rourke is one of the smartest guys I've ever met when it comes to naval affairs. I refuse to believe that his discussion related to the suggestion for Congress to think about the Cobra Judy is rooted in a parochial issue - rather it is a warning about some legitimate unspoken issue with the AMDR the Navy is thinking about under current plans.

I think this goes back to the decision to truncate the DDG-1000, because the DDG-1000 has both the size and power to take on a bigger AMDR than an unmodified Burke which has very little room for growth left. The Navy must force the AMDR into the Burke hull in order to justify that decision by Admiral Roughead, so a lot of sacrifices will be made along the way to avoid second guessing the truncate decision.

The House and Senate need to pay attention, because rail guns and solid state lasers are coming faster than people think. A Flight III Burke without significant engineering modifications that includes significantly more power or integrated power is going to be a lemon class of capital ships built unable to field the latest technology at the time they are being fielded - much less 20 years later, half way through their expected life.

FY2010 Director, Operational Test and Evaluation Annual Report

It's over 9mb, but if like me you track defense technology and budgets, grab it while you can. Defense News is publishing a link here (PDF). Archives from previous years can be found here.

Navy programs listed in the report:

Acoustic Rapid Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) Insertion (A-RCI) for Sonar AN/BQQ-10 (V)
Aegis Modernization Program
AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM) Program
AIM-9X Air-to-Air Missile Upgrade
AN/BYG-1 Combat Control System
Common Aviation Command and Control System (CAC2S)
Common Submarine Radio Room (CSRR) (includes Submarine Exterior Communications System (SubECS))
CVN 78 Gerald R. Ford Class Nuclear Aircraft Carrier
Department of the Navy Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (DoN LAIRCM)
Distributed Common Ground System - Navy (DCGS-N)
E-2D Advanced Hawkeye
EA-6B Upgrades/Improved Capability (ICAP) III
EA-18G Growler (Electronic Attack Variant of F/A-18)
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV)
Global Combat Support System - Marine Corps (GCSS-MC)
Global Command and Control System - Maritime (GCCS-M)
H-1 Upgrades - U.S. Marine Corps Upgrade to AH-1W Attack Helicopter and
UH-1N Utility Helicopter
Improved (Chemical Agent) Point Detection System - Lifecycle Replacement (IPDS-LR)
Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures (IDECM)
Joint Mission Planning System - Maritime (JMPS-M)
KC-130J Aircraft
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
Low Cost Conformal Array
LPD-17 San Antonio Class Amphibious Transport Dock
MH-60R Multi-Mission Helicopter
MH-60S Multi-Mission Combat Support Helicopter
Mobile User Objective System (MUOS)
MV-22 Osprey
Navy Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) Program
Navy Multiband Terminal (NMT)
P-8A Poseidon
Ship Self-Defense
SSN 774 Virginia Class Submarine
STANDARD Missile 6 (SM-6)
TB-34 Towed Array
Tomahawk Missile and Weapon System

Why is DDG-1000 not in the report? Since we are paying for new DDG-51s, why aren't they in the report either? Does anyone else think it is very odd that the major surface combatants are not included in the FY2010 report, even though those programs have consumed the most money outside of aircraft carriers from the shipbuilding budget over the last few years?

Navy Laser Testing

I thought this press release by the Naval Research Laboratory is interesting. Basically they are field testing a photo-ionization laser acoustic source.

The driving laser pulse has the ability to travel through both air and water, so that a compact laser on either an underwater or airborne platform can be used for remote acoustic generation. A properly tailored laser pulse has the ability to travel many hundreds of meters through air, remaining relatively unchanged, then quickly compress upon entry into the water. Atmospheric laser propagation is useful for applications where airborne lasers produce underwater acoustic signals without any required hardware in the water, a highly useful and efficient tool for undersea communications from aircraft.

Additional potential applications benefitting from extended underwater acoustic propagation include rapid sonar search and detection of underwater mines and vessels, and navigation using remotely generated laser acoustic beacons.

A lot more details in the press release.

What to Watch For on Friday

I'll be looking for more news regarding this:

Senior Navy leaders will be on hand Dec. 10 at Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) for a record-setting test of the Office of Naval Research's (ONR) experimental Electromagnetic Railgun, the service's effort to evolve surface ship weapons.

With the latest demonstration, the Navy will fire a 32-megajoule muzzle energy shot, and attempt to set a new world record for the Railgun program. A megajoule is a measurement of energy associated with a mass traveling at a certain velocity. For example, a one-ton vehicle moving at 100 mph equals a megajoule of energy.

The test will also show the tactical relevance of the technology.

"The importance of the 32-megajoule demonstration is the feasibility of the system at an energy level that has military significance," said Roger Ellis, ONR Electromagnetic Railgun program manager.

In terms of capability, a future tactical Electromagnetic Railgun will hit targets at ranges almost 20 times farther than conventional surface ship combat systems. A 32-megajoule shot, for example, could reach ranges of more than 100 nautical miles with Mach 5 velocity, said Dr. Elizabeth D'Andrea, ONR Electromagnetic Railgun program strategic director.

Additionally, the two industry competitors, BAE Systems and General Atomics, will showcase their advanced composite prototype Railgun launcher systems at NSWCDD, a tenant command to Naval Support Facility.

The goal of the Electromagnetic Railgun program is to develop a new surface ship weapon that will use a projectile driven by kinetic energy. This new munition will eliminate the need for a high-energy explosive warhead and traditional gun propellants, ONR officials said. Removing explosives and chemicals will improve safety for Sailors and Marines and reduce the munitions logistics chain.

The Railgun is being developed for use on a wide range of ships, whether the vessel has an integrated power system, such as DDG 1000, or a non-integrated power system, such as a DDG 51, ONR officials said.

The system would be capable of a rate of fire of six to 12 rounds per minute and guided to targets with a high degree of precision. Improved accuracy should result in minimizing collateral damage, ONR officials added.

No matter what happens, the Navy needs to talk and talk and talk and talk about this event. The phrase "Electromagnetic Railgun technology" is the stuff nerds, also known as Americans, are interested in. There are a number of people who have given considerable thought to how this technology can translate towards commercial applications - it doesn't have to be a gun you know...

Contract For Modern Long Range Anti-Ship Missile

About time. As has been mentioned many times on the blog, the US Navy has a lot of shooters under, on, and over the sea; but the real problem is the Navy doesn't have enough bullets. I think this is positive news.

Lockheed Martin Corp is to develop within 2 1/2 years a new long-range anti-ship missile, the Defense Department said on Wednesday.

The work falls under a $157.7 million contract from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, or DARPA, which has been responsible for some of the Pentagon's biggest technology breakthroughs, including the Internet's precursor.

The goal is to develop rapidly and demonstrate a ship-launched weapon that can knock out other ships "at significant stand-off ranges," an item in the Pentagon's daily contract digest said, without elaborating.

The work is expected to be completed by April 2013 in a joint effort between DARPA and the Office of Naval Research, the announcement said.

This isn't the first step, rather the phase of the development process where they actually build a missile. The design phase for the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) began last July.

That is still very rapid development though. Is the DoD procurement system even capable of effectively producing a guided weapon system in only a few years without the pressures of a war going on? Why is it always the Navy that is rushing procurement in exceedingly fast time frames?

These are rhetorical questions, but feel free to comment anyway.

About Those Fixed Wing Aircraft on Bonnie Dick

Wow. Scoopdeck had part of the story when they spotted the photos, but when I asked what was going on the other day I was told to wait for the rest of the story.

I am not disappointed.

The amphibious assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6), en route to participate in Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2010, is carrying unique cargo for training evolutions during the international maritime exercise. Bonhomme Richard left San Diego June 14 with two Czechoslovakian-built 1964 and 1965 Aero-Vodochody airplanes, modified with U.S. standard small turbojet J60 engines. These planes will simulate air to surface missile attacks for training purposes, during RIMPAC.

Traveling aboard with the embarked aircraft is retired U.S. Navy Cmdr. Gerry Gallop, who is Chief Operating Officer for Tactical Air Support Inc. The company, that owns and operates the aircraft, provides consulting services, tactics development and test and evaluation services to U.S. THIRD Fleet.

“Our company’s main goal is to increase readiness through quality training with affordable platforms,” Gallop explained. “It adds realism and training value, because we can do a pretty-good job simulating a profile a missile would fly.”

Gallop said that he and three other retired military pilots will fly the Aero Vodochody airplanes during the RIMPAC exercise.

“We all happened to retire from the military, but we weren’t done contributing,” reflected Gallop. ”So we came together and found a way to continue doing what we are passionate about and continue to contribute to training and readiness of the U.S. military.”

Gallop said the modified Aero-Vodochody airplanes reach top speeds of approximately 420 knots or approximately 500 miles per hour. Tomahawk cruise missiles move at speeds of approximately 550 miles per hour. The ability to use the contracted aircraft in training simulations provides a more realistic and time-sensitive approach to the detection and countermeasures used to combat an inbound threat.

“They (Aero-Vodochody) are a particularly reliable, simpler airplane, which we have modified extensively to give us more power and performance,” explained Gallop. “We’re not as fast as an actual missile, but we’re pretty close.”

Big time well done to Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Katherine Barkley for the article, and indeed, the PAOs who are putting out information on RIMPAC 2010 appear to be doing a great job.

I guess I only have one question. Will they be offloaded by crane and flown from Pearl during the exercises, or will they take off and land on the USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6)? I know, I know... Just saying, it can't be too hard to trap a L-29, and I don't think launching would be the issue.

What I'm really trying to say is it will be a very good day when we get some fixed wing aircraft back on our big deck amphibious ships - and I'm not talking about Harriers and Joint Strike Fighters either. I might be a big fan of big carriers, but I am not oblivious to the advantages and utility smaller carriers and the benefits these type of simplistic fixed wing aircraft can provide the fleet. We don't always need a fighter jet and there are still significant advantages to having people in the loop as a compliment to unmanned systems.

I certainly believe expanding the options of available aircraft types that could fly from the big deck amphibious ships would reduce overall Naval operational costs in specific conditions and circumstances (HE/DR, IW at sea, etc), because we get the option of having more aviation globally postured forward without necessarily having to send a big deck.

Seriously, something similar to the L-29 would be very useful in today's Navy for a number of things - potentially including fixed wing ASW support btw. I wonder if you could fold the wings in a way it could be deployed forward via C-17...

Network Challenges

In Galrahn's article over at the USNI blog, he wrote one thing that especially caught my attention.

I caught Bob Work again right before he had to catch his plane, and he noted that VADM Dorsett is the guy who gets to figure out all the big network challenges to make the Navy work.

And in Opening Arguments: a FY 2011 Budget he identifies the battle network challenge as the fourth biggest issue.

These made me think of a Letter to Parliament in the Netherlands I just read. The letter is about the final evaluation of the deployment of HNLMS De Zeven Provinciën to Somalia (in Dutch) from March 26-June 28 under operation Allied Protector in 2009.

It was published January 12 and when I read it there was one sentence that stood out for me:

De Zeven Provinciën was the only ship [of all the Task Forces] that connection wise could communicate with TF465 (operation Atalanta), TF151 (Combined Task Force 151) and the own combined fleet (operation Allied Protector, TF410).

At that time it meant vessels from the US, Spain, Portugal, Canada, Turkey, Singapore, South-Korea, Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Sweden and the Netherlands.
These are all allies and they can't communicate with each other?

The QDR places a great amount of emphasis on Partnerships, at least according to Lt. Gen. Frank Kearney.
So I'd say VADM Dorsett has a lot of work to do. Not only the internal challenge for the US navy, but also the external challenge of connecting allied nations into this network, which is especially useful in a time of fewer and fewer vessels and a bigger and bigger need for real-time information.

A New DARPA ASW Robot

Now this (PDF) is very interesting.

Sea Base Tech

There is plenty of sea base tech in Haiti to observe. Task Force 48 is currently using amphibious ships to move materials back and forth from Guantanamo Bay to Port-au-Prince, but expects High Speed Vessels (the old Hawaii ferry's) and shallow draft barges to take over in the near future.

Lots of sea to shore activity, over and on the sea.

Haiti is what can be done by a nation that is a maritime power.

But even with all of that Sea Basing activity, I can't help but think about how down in the Gulf of Mexico, an important technology is being tested.

Click the image above for better resolution. More about the tech here and here. Next month they will move out to sea for trials.

Very Timely Unmanned Systems Seminar

A Live Web Seminar that will address "Unmanned Weapons and Challenges to International Humanitarian Law." Talk about the perfect day for it.

Begins at 9:30am EST, only a few minutes from now.

Great panel too.

Sea Fighter (FSF-1) Turns Ugly

Many were asking for a new picture of Sea Fighter (FSF-1), and the community delivers.


Wow that thing needs a paint job. I think she has gone from the idea of cool to the visualization of ugly. Effectiveness is what matters though.

Seafighter (FSF-1) Back at Sea

Seafighter has been hiding for a long time getting repairs and upgrades, but I got a tip from a Ham radio operator today that FSF-1 was at sea today chatting with the Coast Guard on VHF 16.

I for one look forward to seeing what the Navy has done to the little ship. If it was up to me, I say we send it with the next Strike Group that deploys straight to the Seychelles with some UAVs, a make shift prison cell, some heavily armed Marines, and a non-restrictive RoE.

Maritime Domain Awareness With Rear Adm. M. Stewart O’Bryan

Last Thursday I participated in a bloggers roundtable with the Director of the U.S. Navy’s maritime domain awareness program, U.S. Navy Rear Adm. M. Stewart O’Bryan.

It turned out, not a lot of interest in this subject besides me. It is still early in the process for developing MDA, but I thought I would post all the questions I was able to ask (a bunch of them), and you can see the answers for yourself. From the transcript (PDF).

Galrahn: Q Hi, this is Raymond Pritchett from Information Dissemination. Thanks for putting this roundtable together.

I have a few questions, but the big one, I think, that I see pop up when people are talking about Maritime Domain Awareness is, what is the expectations and what is the level of buy-in that you're seeing from the commercial sector, not just in the United States, but globally, and among those naval partners that you guys are developing? I mean, is there some expectation for AIS systems?

Or what is -- how do you approach the commercial sector with this, as Maritime Domain Awareness is certainly in part monitoring their activities as well and identifying what is not among the normal activities at sea?

ADM. O'BRYAN: Right.

I mean, the commercial entities and flagging nations have a keen interest in it, because they operate on these seas. And illicit activities and bad actors have found ways to work into the systems and hide themselves, amongst legal entities that are doing work.

One of the things is that our efforts will eventually reduce potential delays, streamlining port operations and increasing port safety and security, which I think is a benefit to the commercial entities that are in this business of shipping goods. Ninety percent of the commerce and the cargo trans across the oceans and seas, in the effort to move commerce and cargo.

You had mentioned AIS. AIS is an automatic information system which shares databases about vessels and has been mandated by the International Maritime Organization for 300 gross tons and above.

And it provides various data about a ship -- its location, its course and things of that nature -- which helps start as a baseline for having an understanding of the ships and vessels that are in operation off of anybody's coast.

Galrahn: Because early discussions of MDA revolved around the examination of, say, the airline industry where you know where every plane is for the most part. They follow a standard protocol, whereas the sea has been ungoverned by these protocols for millenniums.

And I'm just trying to figure out, where does -- where does the connection go for what the Navy's efforts are, in terms of developing international buy-in?

What is -- what is the response that you're seeing from the industry side, for private-sector buy-in?

ADM. O'BRYAN: Yeah, the model that you're referring to is like the FAA model. And so industry, navies and nations are in agreement that we need to have this understanding, not only for just security reasons but also for safety, to avoid collisions at sea and to facilitate legitimate practice and shares of goods. So there is an agreed upon and a common appreciation for this awareness in the maritime domain. As a good example, piracy levels have decreased in the Straits of Malacca, because of this kind of sharing of information and security.

It provides the ship safe and free navigation across chokepoints and things, as is -- it has -- we've recently seen some improvement in the Gulf of Aden.

So I think industry and the whole government agencies are starting to come together and start to discuss these common threats and common desire to have this understanding and work together.

Galrahn: Ladies, I can ask questions all day. If you guys want to ask others --

LT. CRAGG: Raymond, go ahead and then --

Beth: Definitely go ahead. (Laughter.)

Galrahn: Well, I have another question about -- what is the intent of maritime domain awareness? Are you monitoring the environment, or are you monitoring the threat?

ADM. O'BRYAN: It's -- it is effective understanding of anything associated with maritime domain. That can impact the safety, the security, the economy or the environment of the -- you know, in the United States, and that understanding is widely recognized, I think, by most nations and navies, that that's -- it's just not limited to security. It's also environmental.

Galrahn: So say the United States government, through the -- I'm assuming it's multi-agency from our perspective --

ADM. O'BRYAN: Yes.

Galrahn: -- is monitoring the coast of Florida, and you're watching all of the fishermen out there, are you worried about running into any sort of privacy rights as you're watching 20,000 fishing boats?

ADM. O'BRYAN: Well, it's not that we have detailed information on each one of those fishing vessels. It's just that -- the awareness that there are fishing vessels out there.

And what you look for is not who or an individual or things of that nature; you look for anomalies. If you know that the common fisheries are in a certain body of water and you start detecting vessels in another area that's not common, that in itself is an anomaly, and the Coast Guard or the Navy or Customs or some other entity may want to go out and either query the vessels in that area or send someone out to look at it.

Galrahn: So it's almost you're monitoring patterns for behavior. It's like a behavioral science type project.

ADM. O'BRYAN: Yeah, it -- that's one approach. It's not the only approach. It's very -- it's a layered building of an understanding of this area. As you said, it was ungoverned. I'd say that it's not necessarily ungoverned, but it's very free and open, and because of that, illegal activities find value in exploiting that openness.

Galrahn: When you're talking about maritime domain awareness in development, does the -- how do you determine intent?

ADM. O'BRYAN: Well, that's a difficult question, even in -- can you elaborate a little bit more on that? What do you mean?
Galrahn: Well, does this capability will allow you to determine the intent? Is there any sort of -- I don't know, I mean, maritime domain awareness is huge. It's got this -- it's enormous, and it's global. And thankfully, there's a lot of people who are interested in it. But when you're looking for patterns, behavioral patterns that are -- anonamal (sic) -- I'm not even sure of the word you're using, but basically an anonymy (sic) -- anol -- I can't say it -- (laughs).

ADM. O'BRYAN: Anolamy (sic) -- anolamy -- it's anolamous (sic) -- you've got me doing it. (Laughs, laughter.)

LT. CRAGG: Anomaly?

Galrahn: Okay.

ADM. O'BRYAN: Yes. Very good. Thank you.

Galrahn: Thank you. Yeah, when you have these situations where they're unique, it's different, looks a little strange, how do you determine the intent? I mean, is that when you dispatch a ship, a plane?

ADM. O'BRYAN: Well, I mean --

Galrahn: I mean, what are we looking to gain here, other than a behavior pattern recognition process?

ADM. O'BRYAN: Well, that in itself is -- it's vital to understand what behavior is normal, in order to identify behavior that is inconsistent, or maybe intent. So by acknowledging the behavior that's outside of the norm, the Navy is better -- the Navy and the Coast Guard, for that fact, are better able to identify a threat before it is, you know, able to cause harm.

And so I guess in a way that's kind of intent. But as you go out to explore a vessel that is acting abnormally, you can then ascertain more information and maybe be able to better understand whether the intent is to do harm or not. I mean, that's a tough one, you know.

Galrahn: Sure. Is maritime domain awareness seen as a technological-enabled capability, or is there a human element to developing this information?

ADM. O'BRYAN: I think at the onset there is a lot of human interaction and -- and equity that is -- has been required. But the goal is to try to find -- when you start trying to gather huge amounts of information, you're basically upon an information explosion, and you probably could not have enough human interaction to go through this.

So technology we see as the answer to be able to sort through the disparate types of information and try to build linkages and point us to those anomalies or things that would be of interest. So they'll still require some human assessment or evaluation, but technology should be able to help us do this at a more rapid pace.

Galrahn: Yeah, I was going to ask about data-sharing. I assume that nobody's going to own the data, everybody's going to own the data, it's for a common picture. How are you looking at the data-sharing side -- (audio break) -- accountability perspective when integrating all of these regional coast guards and naval forces?

ADM. O'BRYAN: Well, there are some existing networks that are out there, and they have got inside them already approved and signed agreements. So we have to work with those regions on how we share and get information assurances. One of the discussion topics here was the possibility of federating these regions and how we would go about it. And some of the discussion revolved around developing a model, developing a technical standard and some of those things here. So the discussions will need to continue on how we start to continue to share, and where that baseline is, and how many layers of information is it that we'll be able to share, depending on the members of the various regional networks and global networks.

Galrahn: So we're looking at a pretty massive and global application development here. I mean, this is -- you're -- this sounds like you're looking for technology, presumably Web-based, for a public network that's secured. I would -- I'm just assuming.

ADM. O'BRYAN: Well, it would have -- it would be accessed (in RAN/and ran ?) and managed by the various regionals. But it's more federating the regions because of their common interests and needs vice a global -- but eventually the effect you achieve is awareness of things around the globe, as it applies to your region.

A global single network is something that's -- could be envisioned way out in the future, but not at this point, as far as I'm aware of.

Comment: I didn't ask all of the questions in the roundtable, you can read the transcript to see the other questions asked, but I do enjoy it when I get to ask a bunch of questions like that specific roundtable.

OK, I'll ask the question that wasn't asked, where is MDA going?

It looks to me like the Navy has settled on what might be a technologically driven human behavior at sea monitoring system. Apparently there is an expectation that they will be able to see everything moving at sea, and the data will reveal patterns that can be capitalized on. Maybe, but I don't think anyone knows for sure.

MDA will apparently be a real-time operational picture capability, in other words a tool for monitoring the environment. This will be useful, although I am not convinced MDA is the significant leap forward in capability it was once promised to be, and I think it will ultimately be very expensive. I also did not get the impression there is much complexity in concept or depth to what MDA could be. It sounded to me like a very operational level capability, and not much more.

I can imagine a lot of contractors will want to compete for this project though.

Battle Networks for a UCAS Future

Back on August 18th, Loren Thompson took on the issue of unmanned aircraft. While I agree with Loren Thompson's conclusion, I don't think he made a very compelling argument.

Which brings me, oddly enough, to the subject of unmanned aircraft. Unmanned aircraft like Predator have become emblematic of the way we are fighting wars today. They provide an unblinking eye over hot spots that would be hard to monitor continuously from manned aircraft or satellites, and they have proven remarkably useful in killing terrorists in Pakistan's tribal areas. The bigger unmanned systems like Global Hawk provide extraordinary richness and reach in reconnaissance, while their smaller tactical cousins give combat commanders new ways of understanding local conditions.

However, what many experts fail to grasp is that the value of unmanned systems results largely from the weakness of current adversaries. Because the Taliban and Al Qaeda lack their own air forces, or radars, or surface-to-air missiles, they cannot counter unmanned aircraft effectively. That would not be the case with state-based adversaries such as China and Iran -- or even Serbia -- because unmanned aircraft are intrinsically fragile and largely defenseless. Indeed, they may be the first military planes in history that can be defeated by adversaries flying in unarmed trainers.

He followed up this article, which doesn't make a compelling argument in my opinion, with two blog entries that both make very important points to the unmanned systems debate. The first is that unmanned systems will require air superiority to be successful.

Despite their endurance and versatility, unmanned aircraft are fragile systems that will seldom survive contact with a real enemy. So spending scads of money on them just because the Taliban can't shoot them down probably doesn't help us to prepare for more serious challenges.

...But unmanned aircraft won't survive unless the U.S. has control of the air space in which they operate, so we better stop killing manned aircraft programs before we lose the air dominance that makes other missions possible.

The second point gets to the real issue of turning towards reliance of unmanned systems. This should have been the point of his article, and is the point of this article.

Here is an additional wrinkle on that argument, provided by a retired admiral who is a longtime friend of Lexington.

He points out that command and control for our most capable unmanned aerial systems depends almost exclusively on satellite links subject to interruption in wartime. That's especially true of unmanned systems equipped with munitions such as Reaper, but it is necessarily true for any unmanned aircraft operating beyond the reach of ground or air-based communications. It's great that airmen can operate unmanned surveillance drones over Southwest Asia from secure stateside bases, but what happens if the communication links are jammed or the satellites are destroyed in a war? There doesn't seem to be a backup plan.

The backup plan needs to be the primary, because reliance on satellite networks in major power war for the Navy is the fastest way to failure. I think Loren Thompson is nailing the issue when noting that reliance on unmanned systems is fools gold against a peer competitor right now. There is no way unmanned systems can be expected to work as currently described because the reliance on satellite links in a fight against a capable competitor is not realistic. The challenge for the UCAS isn't going to be landing on an aircraft carrier, it is going to be building a battle network that extends the ranges necessary to keep unmanned systems performing missions when communication is degraded, and satellite links are not available.

Major powers can not only physically take out satellite systems, but cyber warfare is going to make available bandwidth of global satellite networks virtually unavailable in fights against major powers. If unmanned systems is the direction of naval aviation, then not only must the mediums be secured, and C4 must be assured for unmanned combat forces.

Against Al Qaeda, the US controls all the mediums: space, sea, and cyberspace. How much control of the mediums will the US have in a fight against a major power? Control? No way, all three mediums will be in contention. We may be able to deny the enemy control, but securing control for ourselves will not be easily done. Naval forces, and in particularly unmanned combat systems, must be capable of meeting mission obligations when the mediums are being contested.

I noted an article in Defense Daily a few weeks ago noting the tests conducted at Empire Challenge 09. The power of the E-2D and JOINT STARS in the unmanned battle network of the future is only part of the story though, because as ranges are extended the Navy is going to need repeaters on the network to insure communication links in jammed and degraded environments, particularly when satellite links are unavailable. I was thinking of repeaters when I read last weeks subscription article in Navy Times by Andrew Tighman titled Carrier-Based Predator Floated.

A carrier-based predator equipped with advanced sensors could give the Navy an occasional alternative to using the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance aircraft, the large unmanned patrol aircraft slated to join the fleet in 2015, Cassidy said.

In addition, an armed Avenger could provide capabilities similar to a strike fighter or the Navy's Unmanned Combat Air System, the stealthy fighter jet in the early phases of development, Cassidy said.

General Atomics is hoping to sell the Predator to the Navy to supplement those other programs.

I don't think the Predator C would be a supplement, rather the Predator C has the endurance and range to be the repeater to the total battle network. Think about how naval aviation operations would work with the UCAS-N.

Say a flight of 4 UCAS-Ns are attacking a target 1000nm from the aircraft carrier. Say satellite communications are unavailable. How would the Navy conduct the strike? First of all the Navy is going to need a manned fighter to provide escort for intercepting enemy aircraft, not to mention EW support. Obviously the E-2D does not have the range nor would the Navy want to put the aircraft too close to the enemy, so something has to bridge the network distance between the E-2D and the UCAS. That is where the Predator comes in. It may be sexy to think of the Predator as a strike platform because the Reaper is successful in Afghanistan, but the Navy will need the Predator for C4ISR roles, in particular as a piece of the battle network able to successfully sustain communications over long distances to insure the E-2D and the decision makers on the carrier can communicate with aircraft 1000nm away even without satellite communications.

Battle networks of the future will be serviced by platforms that act as local network providers and repeaters, and if the Navy doesn't have the capability to organically support that network from aircraft carriers then the UCAS-N model is flawed. I don't think that network will be cheap, in fact I think costs potentially saved by replacing manned strike platforms with unmanned strike platforms will simply shift to become the costs of the supporting network. While cost neutral, there are still advantages of unmanned aircraft like range and endurance.

The Navy is going to gain significant improvements in quantity of information that can help develop the battlespace with unmanned systems in the air, on the sea, and under the sea. These systems are going to compound bandwidth challenges the Navy is already facing, and require not only local network providers to thin out the bandwidth requirements for collection, but will require significantly more data analysis in the forward theater to insure quantity of information results in quality of information. There are rumors the QDR may result in cutting the Command Ships from the US Navy fleet. I think that would be an enormous mistake, because the requirements for C4 in the future battle network are going to be significantly higher - not lower - and Command Ships appear to be the ideal platform for managing the future increased quantity of data on the network and turning it into useful quality information.

A Significant Step for Unmanned Aviation

This is another gem of an article from Defense Daily (subscription only). Reporting from Empire Challenge 09 (EC09) exercise, the article discusses software developed by Northrop Grumman that allows a modified E-2 to communicate with unmanned systems, as the system to system level, for actionable control and command sequencing.

Think through what this means in terms of evolutions in unmanned aviation towards its logical conclusions...

"The ability to collect and share real-time ISR at the theater and the tactical level quickly and accurately is crucial to ensuring battle commanders have the enhanced situational awareness required for successful mission completion," Tom Vice, vice president of Battle Management and Engagement Systems division for Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems sector said. "During Empire Challenge, we successfully demonstrated how manned command and control aircraft can direct and manage unmanned aircraft to enhance image collection and target identification. We will take what we've learned through this collaborative exercise to continue to mature our ISR capabilities to ensure our warfighters have the mission critical information they need when they need it."

One key element to the success of this interoperability was an E-2 Hawkeye developmental test bed. The test bed is based on the robust capability of the U.S. Navy's E-2 Hawkeye mission computing system which enabled it to successfully operate the Electrical Optical (EO) sensor onboard both manned and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in response to requests from ground commanders. Using machine-to-machine command interfaces, the E-2 test bed was able to cue each UAV simulator to provide imagery of both static and dynamic ground tracks for target identification. The image request messages were transmitted via machine-to-machine interfaces, replacing the need for voice and manual chat resulting in an increased response time, Northrop Grumman said.

This really is interesting technology with incredible potential when you think about it, because not only is it increasing the efficiency of the unmanned constellations in the airspace in areas where access is assured, but the system to system architecture contributes significant infrastructure for evolution towards robust capabilities necessary to operate unmanned systems in airspace where active denial is taking place.

The virtual Joint STARS integrated the Battle Management Command and Control (BMC2) architecture providing constellation management along with UAV control and multi-level security capability sets which enabled the platform to demonstrate an expansion of its current ISR role to include automated UAV image collection and development of target quality solutions to support strike engagements, the company added.

Sensor imagery received from the UAVs via Joint STARS was provided to an image analyst who examined each image and determined which should be included in the image product library (IPL). Images in the IPL were used to populate the Global Command and Control System (GCCS). Once threats were identified, the E-2 test bed managed airborne attack assets, including F-18s and EA-6Bs, to conduct precision strike missions against those threats, based on Joint STARS ground tracks and correlated imagery supporting threat identification. The net effect of this ISR sensor tasking and command and control network was a reduction in both the 'kill-chain,' the time it takes to find, identify, and engage a target, and the operator workload required to accomplish the task, according to Northrop Grumman.

Empire Challenge 09 included unmanned systems like the RQ-4 Global Hawk, MQ-8B Fire Scout, and the MQ-5B Hunter. In the article, Northrop Grumman attempts to buzzword the solution for irregular warfare, but once we get to the point of reliable interaction between manned aviation systems and unmanned aviation systems, it is only a few short steps before we see integrated manned and unmanned platforms as strike packages for high intensity conflict.

In theory, a future naval strike package might include a EA-18, 4 F-35Cs, and an E-2D supported by USAF JSTARS controlling multiple assets including Global Hawks, Reapers, and a squadron of UCAS. In such a package against a peer competitor, under conditions where satellite communications may be jammed or otherwise unavailable, the JSTARS and E-2D rapidly pull data from the recon assets and distribute targeting commands to UCAS assets, under the air protection of the JSFs and supported by the Growler. You can pull up any number of fictional strike packages as an example, but the point is the opportunity to exploit the peer-to-peer network nature of operating at the tactical level within a confined sky battlespace extends operational options, and greatly increases the potential to utilize unmanned aircraft even when active denial of communication networks exists. In theory, leveraging this software and existing LOS network technology, this positions the Navy towards ForceNET at altitude with unmanned technology, and even if the sky is an electron soup commands could be issued efficiently to an unmanned aviation vehicle.

This is a step from the irregular warfare space that currently dominates UAV thinking, a battle space where active denial of communications and airspace doesn't exist; towards the use of unmanned aviation assets in high intensity conflict scenarios where active denial does exist. We may not be there yet, but I see this technology by Northrop as a huge step forward for unmanned aviation.