Reading About Fast Ships

Several briefs were presented at a meeting of the International Hydrofoil Society earlier this year, and to put it as plain and blunt as possible.

There are several interesting things to read at this link, and in particular I recommend Kelly Cooper's T-Craft presentation (PDF) document which is about the best collection of T-Craft information in a single document I have seen yet.

US Navy Irregular Warfare

I find the information coming out of Defense Tech regarding "Imminent Fury", which appears to be a SEAL naval air support lease program (see here, here, and here) to be pretty fascinating. What really caught my attention though is the unclassified brief (PDF) from the Navy Irregular Warfare Office highlighting some of the efforts underway to support IW from the sea.

If I was being snarky, I would suggest the Navy put IW under N3/N5 to insure IW went underfunded and basically to die as a priority, but after looking around there are several places in the FY2010 budget line item where this stuff does appear funded, so maybe IW is starting to get some traction inside the Navy.

For example, this recent article in Special Operations Technology is excellent, and covers some of the developments with programs like Sea Stalker. For those who don't know, Sea Stalker is a large-diameter Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (38 inch instead of 21 inch) that can be launched from either a DDG or a SSGN via a drydeck shelter designed to lurk off a coast and collect intelligence and/or conduct surveillance.

I was pretty surprised reading that Special Operations Technology article, because this is not the kind of information we usually see discussed, much less printed.

He noted that this summer’s exercise Talisman Saber will include participation by two ScanEagles, providing alternating full motion video (day) and infrared (night) “eyes on” capabilities with the second vehicle shifting to the data relay mission.

In terms of smaller UAV activities, Kenny also pointed to recent Navy efforts involving the BUSTER small unmanned aerial system from prime contractor Mission Technologies Inc.

“We’ve deployed it on a number of naval vessels,” he said. “We’ve also done some very successful operations with allies, doing foreign internal defense, training them to operate this vehicle...

“We currently have got the system deployed on USS Florida and we’re looking at larger and more capable versions of that vehicle,” he said.

And people think blogs are a security problem? I am pretty sure there has never been a blog discuss what kinds of payloads SSGNs are loaded out with.

Very interesting though, because Buster only has about a 6nm radius. As a super cheap UAV, I doubt it is recovered once launched, rather just allowed to sink into the sea or crash out of the sky once out of fuel.

In reading through the slides of the IW brief I note plenty of efforts over the sea and under the sea, but nothing on the sea. I just wonder how long before we hear about the "DDG-51 for IW". Only a matter of time I'd guess. Oh wait, I guess that would be USS Bainbridge (DDG 96), where the destoyer acts as a SEAL sniper platform at sea.

Navy Developing New Anti-Ship Missile

Phil Ewing has a story on Navy Times regarding a new program to develop the next anti-ship missile, which sounds a bit like a smart ramjet missile.

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Office of Naval Research issued a $10 million contract to defense giant Lockheed Martin on June 30 to begin work on a “Long Range Anti-Ship Missile.” If the project moves forward, the Navy could begin buying an advanced, high-speed missile that would ride in cruisers’ and destroyers’ Mk 41 Vertical Launch System tubes.

In a statement, DARPA spokeswoman Jan Walker said the goal was to develop a weapon that can think and hunt without much help from its firing ship.

I particularly enjoyed, and agree completely, with the response by Norman Friedman.

U.S. commanders became wary of ship-launched anti-ship missiles in exercises in the 1980s, during which they missed or hit neutral ships about as often as they found their targets, naval weapons expert Norman Friedman said. The weapons suffered from the classic problem of needing good information about their targets.

Friedman said he was skeptical about the prospects for DARPA and ONR’s new missile. Although sensors have gotten better in the age of unmanned aerial vehicles and higher-tech satellites, the classic target-finding problem still remains, he said.

“There are constant efforts to make hypersonic missiles — you see claims about them — but they don’t seem to go anywhere.”

Scouting, Scouting, Scouting. My favorite paragraph in Wayne P. Hughes book Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat covers the problem perfectly.

It seems pedestrian to say that scouting has always been an important constant in war. Perhaps the way to put it is this: winners have outscouted the enemy in detection, in tracking, and in targeting. At sea better scouting - more important than maneuver, as much as weapon range, and oftentimes as much as anything else - has determined who would attack not merely effectively, but who would attack decisively first.

While I have no problems with the development of a new anti-ship weapon system, particularly considering this is a weapon system that doesn't seem to get much attention in the US Navy anymore; I still say the challenge for the US Navy is improving the capabilities in scouting. I could be wrong, but I don't see any evidence that delivering firepower is a problem for any service branch of the armed forces.

But developing effective maritime domain awareness of the battlefield... I see that as a major issue emerging in the 21st century, particularly with hybrid threats emerging that look and act exactly like the normal maritime traffic seen globally every day.

ONR's New Zamboni

The Office of Naval Research has built a Zamboni.

I like it, cleaning flight decks is not a small task, and getting all the slick nasty stuff off the deck is not an easy task. Even with no-skid it gets slick out there, and this looks like a smart, inexpensive way to address the issue.

Full Navy.mil article here.

HT: NOSI blog

The Technology in the Indian Ocean Hostage Crisis

It came to the surprise of many that the USS Bainbridge (DDG-96) is not carrying helicopters, but it should not be. First, I would remind that the USS Mahan (DDG 72) was reported to be using ScanEagles while she was on station before returning home. At that time, I got the impression the Arleigh Burke destroyer involved in the piracy fight would be where the Navy would put the ScanEagle detachment operating in that space.

There are 6 Arleigh Burke class destroyers that are specially configured for supporting unmanned technology, DDG-91 through DDG-96. While this was intended to be for operating the RMS mine warfare unmanned underwater vehicles, the same space could be used for supporting ScanEagles, indeed it would give more room for such a capability.

As I understand it, the UAV detachments and the helicopter detachments have both been moved around to various vessels depending upon their location and to test various operational concepts dealing with piracy. The Navy realizes they need UAVs like the ScanEagle, but it is unclear if the Navy has figured out the best way to deploy them. Are ScanEagles more useful than helicopters? Should be put helicopters on our destroyers that have hangers when our other destroyers without hangers can support ScanEagle? There are some legitimate questions, but as of right now I don't think the USS Halyburton (FFG 40) has the right equipment to support the ScanEagles, so the USS Bainbridge (DDG 96) is all we had in the area that could do it.

If you recall, we saw H-60s being collected for use on the USS San Antonio (LPD 17) when it was flagship. The result was taking H-60s from other vessels that were using ScanEagles. It is unclear if the shuffle of detachments continues, but it is probably determined by the mix of vessels in the region.

Now you might be asking why isn't the USS Stout (DDG 55) being used in this role? The other Arleigh Burke class destroyers in the region are the USS Stout (DDG 55) , USS Milius (DDG 69), and USS Paul Hamilton (DDG 60), which are all AEGIS BMD vessels, and the destroyer that would normally be operating with the USS Boxer (LHD 4), USS Chung-Hoon (DDG 93), was sent back to the Pacific to protect the USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS-23) following that incident. Ultimately, USS Bainbridge (DDG 96) is the only Arleigh Burke destroyer that was fighting pirates, and that has been the platform operating the ScanEagle detachment.

In the end, the primary technology assets utilized in this specific instance appears to be sniper rifles, RHIBs, and the ScanEagle UAV. While not exactly a technology, the influence ultimately came from the presence of the US Navy sailor, the most important component to any tactical operation dealing with bad guys in the asymmetric space at sea.

The Navy's Secret Aircraft Carrier Problem

After all the heat and smoke last year, conventional wisdom would suggest that the CG(X), or DDG-1000, or LCS, or LHA(R), or even the Sea Base will be the hot shipbuilding topic of FY2010. Well, conventional wisdom is not correct, the shipbuilding topic for FY 2010 will be the CVN-21 program. Not only are we going to get an announcement from the Navy about the reduction of aircraft carriers from the Navy in FY 2010, there is also a secret problem with EMALS that the Navy has not explained. That EMALS problem raises questions regarding contracts like this:

Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, Inc., Newport News, Va., is being awarded a $42,994,547 undefinitized modification to previously awarded contract (N00024-08-C-2110) for the procurement of long lead time material to support production of the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launching System (EMALS) for CVN 78 (Gerald R. Ford) construction. Under this modification the contractor will procure material for Energy Storage Subsystem (ESS) Induction Motor Stator Assemblies, ESS Induction Motor Rotor Assemblies, ESS Exciter Stator Assemblies, ESS Exciter Rotor Assembly, ESS Rectifier Assemblies, ESS Main Rotor Assemblies and Power Conversion Subsystem Rectifier material components to support the production of EMALS. Work will be performed in North Mankato, Minn., (74 percent); Mt. Pleasant, Pa., (17 percent); and San Diego, Calif., (9 percent), and is expected to be completed by Nov. 2012. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington Navy Yard, D.C., is the contracting activity.

Peter Frost knows there is a problem with EMALS too, and my guess is he is having trouble finding good details. Still, he steals the show with this article though.

But shipyard and Navy officials — as well as a cadre of industry observers — have questioned whether the unproven system will be ready for implementation on the first ship of its class, which is due to be delivered to the Navy in September 2015.

The Navy confirmed Monday that it is conducting a formal review of the program to determine if it will proceed with its plans to build the system into the Ford.

Then Peter gets LCDR Chen to give a ringing endorsement of EMALS.

"We're still conducting a review to assess and mitigate risks in the program cost, schedule and performance of EMALS," said Lt. Cmdr. Victor Chen, a Navy spokesman. "At this point, EMALS is still the launching system of record for (the Ford)."

"Still" is an interesting word, and I interpret the comment suggesting the Navy has not figured out what to do about the EMALS problem that is under "review." Peter goes one better getting a ringing endorsement from Northrop Grumman.

Shipyard officials have said if the new system isn't ready for the Ford, it will be implemented on following ships.

Signaling the shipyard's concern about the launch system, the GAO wrote that Northrop "anticipates changes to (the Ford's) design based on the results of EMALS testing."

Northrop maintains that EMALS is still government furnished.

Note how Northrop is saying "this is a Navy problem." Peter Frost's article is a good read in full, be sure to read and understand the first paragraph because Peter clearly knows, like I do, there is a problem with EMALS that has not been laid out in detail yet. The rumors are everywhere, but the details remain nowhere.

No one wanted to comment on the GAO report, which can be found here (PDF), so I will. The GAO report suggests the following, and this is before the problems with EMALS I am talking about.

Problems during EMALS development have already resulted in cost growth and schedule delays. In order to meet CVN 78’s delivery date, the Navy adopted a strategy that will test, produce, and ultimately install EMALS with a high degree of concurrency. In September 2008, the contractor completed the first round of high- cycle testing, gaining confidence in the performance of the generator—a source of past problems. Contractor-led integrated land-based system testing will not be complete until the end of fiscal year 2011—2-years later than estimated in December 2007. Assuming no further delays, EMALS will not demonstrate full performance of a shipboard ready system until at least 7 months after installation on CVN 78 has begun.

The report goes on to say:

The program has faced challenges in maintaining its design schedule due to delays in the receipt of technical information on EMALS and the advanced arresting gear; however, the Navy believes this issue has been largely resolved. The shipbuilder anticipates changes to CVN 78’s design based on the results of EMALS testing.

Then goes on to say more:

A February 2008 program assessment recommended a number of changes to the EMALS program to improve performance. The Navy re-planned the test program and changed the management approach. The CVN 21 program office is now responsible for overseeing EMALS production and ship integration, rather than the Naval Air Systems Command. In addition, EMALS will no longer be provided as government-purchased equipment. Instead, the shipbuilder will purchase EMALS, giving it a more direct role in managing the integration on CVN 78. The cost impact of this change has not been finalized.

Bottom line, the Navy doesn't want to talk about the problem until they have decided officially what to do. Here is some of what I do know. The larger opinion is that General Atomics may know how to make UAVs, but they have no idea how to make ships systems. The first Ford class carrier is going to suffer a delay and a pretty significant cost hit, somewhere in the neighborhood of $600 million is the number I am hearing thrown about. Shit happens, and on $11 billion aircraft carriers, when shit happens it is usually dinasour sized piles of it.

Some have suggested the first Ford may end up being redesigned for steam. I've also heard everywhere from a 1 year to 3 year delay as a result, with more informed people saying at least 1 year.

As the GAO report notes, steel has been cut on the new aircraft carrier, and if the decision is made to go with steam, a significant redesign will be required. Steam will add weight to the new ship as well as more crew, and will make the first Ford class a unique design, as EMALS will not be canceled thus making the EMALS version of the Ford, CVN-79, another first in class ship.

The other option could get even more costly, and would be to wait for EMALS to get fixed for the first Ford class ship and take an even larger cost hit if the problem doesn't get fixed quickly. As the GAO report notes, the schedule has already been pushed back as far as possible.

The question is, why is the Navy not talking about the EMALS problem? Simple. In a budget year where the budget axes are being sharpened, the last thing the Navy wants to talk about is an enormous soon to be costly delay for its most expensive platform, the new aircraft carrier. For as long as possible, the Navy is going to not talk about this problem, because only by getting as much money into the program as possible first can the Navy insure it doesn't take a budget hit. In other words, the Navy appears content to say nothing until the budget hearings, and even then I question whether they will bring it up, or be forced by Congress to answer the rumors that are now just about everywhere.

What the Navy should be doing instead is explaining the problem. Hell, run it by me, I'll explain the freaking problem in a way anyone who wants to know can understand, that is what blogs do.

Be honest, talk about the problems with the press and explain them in detail. Aircraft carriers are national capabilities, and no matter what weapons China is producing to attack them, there is still no evidence that missile technology nor the submarine threat has rendered the aircraft carrier obsolete. The aircraft carrier is a platform of national interest, paid for with an enormous investment in national treasure, and a unique capability that has, every single day since the very first day the United States entered WWII with Pearl Harbor been the most powerful warfighting capability at sea.

The biggest mistake the Navy can make is to be intentionally deceptive or dishonest regarding the most expensive single platform acquired by the Department of Defense. The House or the Senate, particularly a representitive from Virginia or perhaps Jim Webb, might want to get to the bottom of this issue under oath. After the last few trips to the Hill, does Barry really need that headache? Can someone give that guy a break for a change, instead of making him the mule for everyones problem...

Before that happens and the Navy makes negative headlines for itself during a budget hearing, the Navy might want to get out in front of this issue. They might find the American people finally give a shit about something related to the Navy. After all, to the Navy's detriment, the aircraft carrier, not any single person, is the symbol of the sea service today. Yes, it is sad but true that a picture of a piece of technology and not an individual represents the Navy of the 21st century.

Enterprise IT and the Big Mac

For several months I have been using Twitter at work, and solely in the form of RSS delivery of information. There are about 60 Twitter accounts I follow on my work account, all of which do nothing but run headlines. This includes several trade magazines, drudge, and a few IT centric Twitter accounts of folks who do a good job tracking information around the technology blogosphere. It wasn't until about a month ago I decided to give Twitter a try as an actual social media tool and incorporate it into the function of the blog.

It is useful? Sure, I certainly appreciate the folks who post links to useful information. As a social media tool, Twitter is useful for connecting with people I don't know. In particular I find myself following the people who are involved in Government 2.0, what essentially represents an umbrella project for the incorporation of Web 2.0 technologies into government to assist with transparency. One of the more active elements of the Government 2.0 network is the informal but well connected Government 2.0 Club. The two are not directly associated, but I'm finding more and more that the informal network works better than the formal one does, something that should surprise nobody with any experience in government.

There are a number of thought leaders and evangelists in social media that are part of the evolution towards the incorporation of Web 2.0 tools. While I admit I have not been exposed to all of them, I am finding there are two categories to describe these thought leaders:

• Academics
• IT Specialists

My impression is these are very smart people with big ideas and a broad depth and understanding of the utility of social media and Web 2.0 for information exchange. My impression is that most of these people have very little practical experience in large IT enterprises or large project implementations of software in either the public or private sector.

Dr. Mark Drapeau recently wrote an article on ReadWriteWeb titled Government 2.0: The Midlife Crisis. Ignore the flashy title, its distracting to the larger point.

Government 2.0 has reached its midlife crisis. Despite some leadership from influential individuals on using social software in government, there is still in many cases a disconnect between authorities issuing directives and ground troops carrying them out. In some corridors of Washington, this impervious middle section of government is jokingly referred to as "the clay layer," the layer through which no light shall pass. Resistant to change and adhering strictly to doctrine even when nonsensical, people in the clay layer can halt progress. Despite their intentions and being in a strategic position, they often stop the progress being called for.

This midlife crisis was pointed out by one of Government 2.0's most outspoken evangelists, Chris Rasmussen, of the U.S. intelligence community, at a well-attended event held recently in the Washington area. As covered in a widely read trade press article, Rasmussen lamented the impossibly high standards that social tools are held to, even within government firewalls. Furthermore, many tools, such as Intellipedia, are used as supplements to (rather than substitutes for) legacy systems. As Clay Shirky once quipped, this is like putting an engine on a rowboat to make the oars go faster.

At this crossroads, "creative destruction" will require hard decisions about shutting down certain systems and processes and focusing employees on new ones. Employees at the grassroots level need to be given true executive empowerment, rather than dictatorial directives. But how to achieve this?

I'm 33 years old, and after reading about the work both of these gentleman have done, I'm going to take a WAG that Dr. Drapeau is a few years older than I am, and Chris Rasmussen is around my age. I would guess both have considerably more education than I do (easy one with Dr. Drapeau) since I never went to college. I'm also going to guess that my nearly 19 years of IT experience, with 14 years in large enterprises, trumps both of their resumes in Enterprise IT experience. When I read Dr. Drapeau's article, I honestly felt really good about the direction of Web 2.0 and government, because while I have no idea what is happening behind the scenes if the descriptions in this article are accurate, it looks very familiar.

Dr. Drapeau describes what he calls the "the clay layer" which he describes as part of the crisis. I believe Dr. Drapeau is misreading the situation; this isn't a crisis, this is what progress looks like. The analogy goes like this:

Dr. Drapeau has lifted the bun off the top of the Big Mac and has discovered the special sauce in all large IT organizations, private and public sector. The special sauce has turned out to be an ugly orange goo, chunky and not very appealing. When he shakes his Big Mac, the orange goo wiggles like a gross jelly, and as he attempts to pour the special sauce off his Big Mac he discovers with horror that it doesn't slide, but it oozes until it flops off his burger in a chunk. Even if he was to use a napkin to remove the special sauce, he would discover it only makes a bigger mess and he never really gets it off his Big Mac. The special sauce has already soaked up into the bun, and it has embedded itself into the cheese. If Government 2.0 is going to enjoy their Big Mac, they are unfortunately going to have to eat the special sauce. In the process, they will likely learn why it is called special.

As you probably realize by now, the special sauce is the bureaucracy one finds in large technology projects in all large enterprise environments, and government has plenty of special sauce. These layers come in the form of people resistant to change, programs that lack the flexibility to utilize additional technologies without adding more ugly layers, and restrictions that are inherent to the large organizations as a function of business.

One example might be a career officer who has been doing it the same way for many years, and it is the most efficient way there is; just ask him/her. Another example might be a work flow process for government projects where the addition of Web 2.0 has limited if any benefit. A third example will be any social media or public Web 2.0 activity that lacks a network other than the existing secure backbone to operate from. Quite frankly, public transparency with social media and the security standards of the DoD are incompatible, and alternatives will take time and money to implement.

I understand the frustration that comes with the perspective of Chris Rasmussen regarding the slow adoption of Intellipedia as a standard, and favoritism towards legacy systems. The evidence suggests that Chris Rasmussen is a real evangelist, thought leader, and pioneer when it comes to using Web 2.0 to connect information horizontally. However, his comments suggest a bit of inexperience in large enterprise IT project implementations.

For years most hospitals required paper trails with their electronic medical records, or what IT folks call "doing everything twice" as part of EMR implementations. Some Government health agencies still require paper trails today. Even Wal-Mart required their store fronts to maintain paper trails on inventory, sales, and payroll data for years despite efficient utilization of databases and modern technology. What these thought leaders are seeing are not new IT problems, they simply lack the experience to realize it. The problem isn't the ideas and implementations specifically, it is the ideas and implementations in context of the existing environment. In the end, Intellipedia may not win over the legacy crowd until the legacy software ends up going away due to factors not related to Intellipedia. In dozens of government agencies, Windows NT and 2000 are still in use (despite lack of vender support) supporting legacy Visual Basic applications, and what makes these legacy applications eventually go away isn't the presence of better software that was implemented years ago, rather that the hardware is finally giving way and the legacy software doesn't work on the latest versions of Windows OS.

As bitter a pill it may be, that is what the special sauce can taste like in large Enterprise IT environments.

The purpose of Dr. Drapeau's article is to suggest the crossroads for government and Web 2.0 is on the horizon, and it is time to plan for the road ahead. For the Navy and Coast Guard, I have some suggestions.

Both the Navy and the Coast Guard have moved beyond the point where they need convincing Web 2.0 technologies have something to offer, and both services are leveraging public Web 2.0 efforts with top down leadership models that easily fit into the chain of command rigid models of the military services. By definition social media technologies are multi-dimensional networking tools, but military services are hierarchical organizations with a rigid command structure. This environmental condition will create challenges in adopting Web 2.0 technologies.

I get the impression through news reports covering Web 2.0 in the Navy and Coast Guard that the process is currently working on development of business strategy models, understanding value in and out, addressing data security concerns, and evaluating training costs. It is important to note that the private sector is not demonstrating significant or widespread adoption of Web 2.0 technologies, so the slow adoption of Web 2.0 is not unique to Government or the military services. Large public and private IT enterprises both have the special sauce, and both sectors appear to be at around the same point of evolution with these new technologies.

Any change of software is hard, and those changes always require training. In the case of the Navy and Coast Guard, network infrastructure limitations today prevent to a large extent any sort of public connectivity with Web 2.0, so internal collaboration technologies are obviously the best place to start to overcome IT infrastructure and security concerns (and save costs in implementation). The necessity to get ROI is also important, so utilization of these technologies should be along a broad but consistent sector of the organization. As I work through the business processes of the Navy and the Coast Guard and evaluate Web 2.0 technologies, it seems to me the way ahead would be to utilize Wiki technology for collaboration, and allow the social media aspect of Web 2.0 develop at the pace of IT infrastructure upgrades.

So applying Wiki technology specifically to the Navy, if it was me, I would look at it like this:

The Littoral Combat Ship maintenance model is something I admit being more than a little nervous about. This shore based maintenance reliance means more ships than crews, and as crews rotate lessons could be lost. It seems to me that a fleet maintenance Wiki for the Littoral Combat Ship would be a very useful and appropriate way to utilize collaboration technologies, particularly as the Littoral Combat Ship ends up distributed to forward ports globally. The LCS comes with a lot of moving parts, it isn't just the hulls but the modules as well, and because the fleet maintenance implementation is going to be both new and unique anyway, it seems to me that utilizing Web 2.0 technologies from the beginning will increase the likelihood of successful utilization. By beginning new programs with Web 2.0 tools as opposed to evolving traditional/existing/legacy tiered applications to use 2.0 tools, the potential for success increases greatly because the tools become part of the process.

The Coast Guard has fleet maintenance too, and Web 2.0 collaboration technologies may be useful for maintenance plans for the Deepwater platforms coming online.

In my experience implementing Web 2.0 tools into large organizations, I have found efforts to replace existing tiered applications with Web 2.0 software in large departments to mostly be a non-starter, at least initially. Web 2.0 technologies are better fits in new projects, where training costs are budgeted and expected anyway, and the expectations from the users perspective is that change will occur anyway as the users move to new software. When security is a primary consideration, connectivity is inside-in, not inside-out or outside-in.

Both the Navy and the Coast Guard are large IT shops, and even in places where Web 2.0 technologies make a lot of sense, resistance to change will exist. When the Web 2.0 technology revolution runs into "the clay layer" or special sauce as I call it; don't panic. This challenge is not a crisis, these are the challenges every major IT implementation has fought in the information age since at least 1993. We sometimes forget it was W2K that shifted the IT industry away from mainframes. Windows and Unix may have been better, lower cost long term alternative, but many IT shops had no intention to change until the W2K issue forced them to.

Welcome Web 2.0 technologies to the ugly process of progress.

A New Vision Described for Naval Unmanned Combat Vehicles

Check this out. A very interesting evolution of the UCAS concept for naval operations.

U.S. Navy plans to fly the Reaper unmanned aircraft system from forward locations mark a "huge change" in the way the vehicle is used, a top service official said Feb. 5 at AUVSI's Unmanned Systems Program Review 2009.

Rear Adm. Mark W. Kenny says flying the Reaper closer to forward ships and sailors--and even controlling its weapons and payloads from sea--will ease up on bandwidth restrictions and will get critical data to his warfighters sooner.

"We can get a higher bandwidth for an aircraft that's flying overhead," he says.

The forward operation of Reapers by the Navy is a program known as Saber Focus, which is mostly classified. According to the United States Fleet Forces' 2009 Annual Plan, it's a one-year combat demonstration to assess the military usefulness to the Navy. Kenny says forward-based ground control stations will handle the flying, instead of operators at Nellis Air Force Base, Nev., but sensor packages and weapons will be "controlled from sea.

This article is just loaded with good stuff though. We are unlikely to hear much about what is going on in full detail, but even small details like this give us plenty to talk about.

To that end, the Navy plans to procure unmanned systems with relatively simple launch mechanisms, deploying autonomous vehicles from the surface rather than beneath the water. Kenny said unmanned systems would help the Navy to watch costs and would also alleviate some of the stress on SEAL teams, given the heavy requirements made of them by commanders and politicians.

"We need to get the man out of the loop," he said.

Kenny also said he is focusing on large-diameter unmanned underwater vehicles. Instead of using them for broad sweeps of the water, such as for anti-mine work, he'd like to stuff them with sensitive instruments and sneak them close to shore where they could overhear and relay signals intelligence, he says.

"Ideally we could have a series of them to cover ports or hotbeds of activity and they collate that [data from the UUVs] on the ship," he says. Pennsylvania State University has the lead on that work, he says, but like Saber Focus, it "gets classified real fast. What we're doing is responding to needs from the front."

I read that as... the Navy believes they can replace submarines with large UUVs with links to a ship for roles of off coast intelligence gathering. I've heard about something similar before.

If you recall, at the Euronaval 2004 exhibition DCN revealed they were working on modular capable alternatives to their new "three-in-one" base model. For those not familiar, the SMX "three-in-one" design combined three submarines into one underwater vessel with somewhere around a 3700 ton displacement. The primary vehicle was a command unit nicknamed NCW, and would consist of two operational units called OPS. The NCW unit acts as the Command and Control node for tactical data and forward deploy the OPS vehicles into the operational theater. The primary vehicles would also provide the energy production for the deployable vehicles.

The concept was for the NWC to act as an underwater sea base for the pair of OPS unit crews. Each OPS submarine would displace somewhere around 500 tons and were fitted with a mission-specific modular payload prior to deployment. The OPS unit was invisioned as an AIP driven system that would give it a few days of operation before needing to return to the mothership for recharging battery power and let the crew refresh.

This sortof sounds like something similar, except instead of using a submarine as a host vessel, it sounds to me like a surface vessel is being considered as the host vehicle, and the ~500 ton vessels would be unmanned instead. This would essentially be the next evolution of modularity to include large unmanned vehicles that can be detached as opposed to launched. Maybe I am reading this wrong, but with few details we are unlikely to know for certain.

If you hit the link, there is an article on the LCS just below this one as well that is worth a read.

Evolution, One Revolution at a Time

Sometimes a story stands out because someone says something very smart. This is a good example.

The U.S. Navy flight-tested Raytheon Company's Standard Missile-2 target detecting device. The SM-2 Block IIIB flight marks the lowest-altitude intercept to date using the new device, which enhances the SM-2's ability to detect and destroy threats.

The missile was fired from USS STERETT (DDG-104) during combined combat system ship qualification trials. The test flights included additional SM-2 Block IIIA, SM-2 Block IIIB, and SM-2 Block III missiles. The missiles engaged multiple targets under stressing conditions representing a variety of threat scenarios.

"These tests demonstrate the reliability and accuracy of SM-2 as it continues to evolve," says Ron Shields, Raytheon Missile Systems Standard Missile program director. "The SM-2's ability to employ this new target-detecting device against challenging targets enhances the missile's usefulness to the warfighter."

zen.

Good job to the Navy for getting a good photo, love it. Would have been more interesting had they told us how low the altitude was for the intercept. Probably best they didn't.

The Navy news article on this story is really good.

"I am extremely satisfied with the gun's performance," said Sterett's Commanding Officer, Cmdr. Brian Eckerle. "It has really performed exceptionally under the taxing demand of firing 582 rounds."

In addition to direct engagement systems, Sterett's Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities were tried, as were chaff countermeasures and the SPY-1D(V) air search radar. However, the centerpiece of the CSSQT was the live firing of 7 SM-2 missiles against air and ground launched drone targets.

Test objectives for the events, in addition to certifying Baseline 7.1R for tactical use in the fleet, included operability tests of the SM-2 Block IIIB Missile, which contains an infrared (IR) seeker head assembly in the guidance section. The missile has the ability for dual mode terminal homing and can start homing on RF energy, switching to IR homing if necessary for a successful intercept.

In a true testament to the warfighting ability of Aegis Baseline 7.1R, Sterett simultaneously directed four SM-2 engagements to prosecution, and the test was an enormous success. CSSQT was highly anticipated as a critical milestone toward the development and testing of future weapons capability for the next generation of surface combatants.

This represents further evolution of existing systems, good stuff here. I am particularly pleased to read an article like this and note the use of live ammunition in training, including ASW training if you can believe it. To me, this is another example of how the Navy outside of Washington is doing really good things. If we could only fix the issues that seem centric to Washington.

Lockheed Martin's New COBRA

From Geoff Fein of Defense Daily today (subscription only).

Lockheed Martin [LMT] yesterday showcased a small tactical craft (STC) that it is proposing as both a manned boat for Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and as an unmanned surface vessel for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).

The Common Off Board Reconfigurable Asset (COBRA) is a 39-foot catamaran with a two-and-a-half foot draft built by Lockheed Martin using internal research and development (IRAD) funds, Ronald Harris, director, requirements and customs solutions, told reporters at a briefing in Crystal City.

COBRA is designed to carry either a mission module package up to 5000 pounds or a passenger module for 13 Marines. Lockheed intends to compete COBRA in the upcoming competition for the SOCOM Combat Craft Medium (CCM), but the article notes COBRA will have to be adjusted to meet those requirements.

CCM requirements include being able to be transported by C-130, which for COBRA means a few dimension changes. COBRA is currently a semi-swath hull, all-aluminum craft, although the article suggests an all-composite version will be built.

As the article notes, Lockheed had a bigger vision in mind.

But Harris noted that an unmanned COBRA variant would also be ideal for the anti submarine warfare (ASW) or counter mine warfare mission packages planned for LCS.

Harris pointed out that COBRA is the same size as the current ASW unmanned surface vehicle (USV) planned for LCS.

He also acknowledged that the LCS rear ramp would need to be modified to get COBRA in and out of LCS.

Nothing personal to Lockheed Martin, but I'll be impressed if the Navy doesn't require them to change that rear door on the LCS anyway. Maybe it is OK, but something just didn't look right to me. Very clever and creative stuff, and I always like it when attention is being paid MIW, because an all-composite version sounds like a useful MIW platform.

Technology As A Disabler In Warfare

Col. H. R. McMaster argues an interesting position that should provide food for thought as the Navy relentlessly pursues the "gee whiz" factor in its acquisitions strategy: that technology has been an impediment to effective strategic planning for the last half century.

As did McNamara’s whiz kids, advocates of the Revolution in Military Affairs applied business analogies to war and borrowed heavily from the disciplines of economics and systems analysis. Both Graduated Pressure and Rapid Decisive Operations promised efficiency in war; planners could determine precisely the amount of force necessary to achieve desired “effects.” Graduated Pressure would apply just enough force to effect the adversary’s “calculation of interests.” According to the terms of Rapid Decisive Operations, U.S. forces, based on a “comprehensive system-of-systems understanding of the enemy and the environment,” would attack nodes in the enemy system with a carefully calculated amount of force to generate “cumulative and cascading effects.”

But the U.S. experience in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq demonstrated that it was impossible to calibrate precisely the amount of force necessary to prosecute a war. The human and psychological dimensions of war, along with the friction and uncertainty generated when opposing forces meet, invariably frustrates even the most elaborate and well-considered attempts to predict the effects of discrete military actions. Enemy countermeasures such as dispersion, concealment, deception, and intermingling with the civilian population limit the reach of surveillance and precision strike capabilities. Other factors, such as cultural, tribal, and political identities enhance complexity and influence the course of events. Emphasis in planning and directing operations, therefore, ought to be on effectiveness rather than efficiency. The requirement to adapt quickly to unforeseen conditions means that commanders will need additional forces and resources that can be committed with little notice. For efficiency in all forms of warfare, including counterinsurgency, means barely winning. And in war, barely winning can be an ugly proposition.

While Col. McMaster's conclusion seem reasonable for a land conflict that can devolve into insurgency, the application of his thinking to naval warfare seems more challenging. Perhaps in our planning for potential conflicts with ideologically or religiously motivated regional powers it would do us well to plan for a surge in Sea Tiger-style operations following the destruction of any conventional naval forces.

Possible ASW/Surveillance Direction

I was privileged to spend a train ride chatting with Stuart Platt, RAdm (ret.) who co-founded HarborWing Technologies. There was a brief flurry of interest about this technology a few months back, just after my train ride. I offer it here as a part of a proposed direction for the shortfalls in ASW/ASuW surveillance that have been under discussion for the past few posts. A wingsail-equipped AUSV has made a multi-day unmanned voyage around a defined course, generating its own on-board power using solar and wind, with telemetry and remote guidance. It shouldn't be too much of a stretch to get this sort of thing working with several basic sensor packages onboard - hydrophones, perhaps ELINT receivers. This would be an ideal open-ocean or littoral surveillance system. It would present a minimal electronic signature, minimal acoustic signature, and a very very small radar return In addition, it would be difficult to damage with shoulder arms unless you could close quite near to it - and even so, it should be cheap enough that we shouldn't care if we lose some in the course of duty. It should be possible to make these of a size deployable by the LCS, although (as Galrahn noted) it probably wouldn't be able to do major repairs. But the lack of engines should make its maintenance requirements commensurately lower, and electronics can be made modular enough for field replacement. I would imagine that the tools and materials required to perform minor repairs on the running gear, hull and wing would easily fit in the LCS mission spaces. Perhaps they might even be modified to dispense sonobuoys, for better coverage of an area.

Although these would not replace powered AUSVs or AUVs, nor perform attacks, they have the wonderful advantage of having nearly infinite endurance - always attractive for a surveillance asset.

Image of the first wingsail autonomous surface vehicle (AUSV) sea trial from Harbor Wing Technologies. Nope, I have no connection with or financial interest in the company.

GAO Rejects Raytheon Protest

I did not see this coming, for some reason I kept thinking the GAO would ask the Navy to compete the contracts in order to keep more than one contractor capable of supporting these systems. The GAO says otherwise, and whether I am naive or not, I believe the GAO always gets these things right.

Essentially, Raytheon didn't produce a good case, and lost because of it. The GAO treats each case individually, so did not account for the big picture here nor should they, so faulting the GAO for making a decision that is only one small part of a larger picture that puts Lockheed Martin ahead of Raytheon in every Navy decision for combat systems work would be unfair and counter productive. Reuters has the report.

The Government Accountability Office has denied three protests filed by Raytheon Co after the U.S. Navy decided to pursue a sole source contract for Aegis combat systems with Lockheed Martin Corp.

The GAO, the nonpartisan congressional agency that rules on federal contract disputes, did not issue a statement explaining its decision. The GAO typically issues a redacted version of its decisions several weeks after they are announced.

Raytheon in September protested the award of contracts to Lockheed for modernization of the Aegis combat system, a system Lockheed built, saying the decision was flawed and violated the most basic U.S. competition laws.

The Navy rejected Raytheon's arguments, saying Raytheon did not demonstrate that it could meet the Navy's requirements, and relied instead on a "speculative promise" to team up with Lockheed. Lockheed said at the time that Raytheon had not approached it about any teaming agreement.

Raytheon has said the Navy repeatedly assured industry that it would open the Aegis modernization work to competition, but then suddenly decided to let Lockheed remain the sole source contractor.

The Navy did repeatedly assure the industry that it would open the AEGIS modernization work to competition, that is not untrue. Doesn't matter though.

The problem here is perception, and the perception is not good for the Navy. Every decision, every single one, gives the wrong perception. The Navy truncates the DDG-1000, with the unstated but widely assumed reason of cost, even though the program is hitting cost targets within 1%... then puts out a replacement plan that costs more than the DDG-1000 plan in favor of DDG-51.

In other words, the perception is the Navy has canceled the Raytheon system that is better in every single way than the Lockheed Martin AEGIS system, including being less expensive, and picked the more expensive but less capable AEGIS system. Then instead of putting billions of AEGIS modernization work out to competition, the Navy sole sources to Lockheed Martin. Lockheed Martin could make up to eight billion over the next 6 years in AEGIS work, just to make AEGIS as good as a product Raytheon could upgrade for a little more than half a billion.

And in the end, I still can't find any independent technical folks who will certify that AEGIS will ever be truly OA, which the Raytheon system is. Oh sure, we can get some PAO or Admiral to suggest it, but they know they will not be held accountable for their claims. No one with a technical reputation who doesn't work for Lockheed Martin will say AEGIS will be OA, which tells me a lot. Where from here?

No idea. I just hope nothing improper is taking place, because anyone with even a shred of evidence who suggests corruption is going to give the Navy a nightmare. There is absolutely none, ZERO, public information evidence that counters the perception of favoritism or corruption, and that is a serious perception problem. When the Navy picks the more expensive, less capable system option specific to Lockheed Martin in every decision and prohibits competition at the same time, the perception works against the Navy. The Navy should have held competitions where it could and let people win or lose on the merits, and with AEGIS Lockheed Martin would have already had every advantage to win on those merits, but at least that counters the perception issue. Lockheed Martin doesn't need the perception problem either, they do good work and can win fair competitions, let them.

Five to ten years down the road if AEGIS is the only game in town, if Lockheed Martin has a monopoly and the price of AEGIS is sky high the Navy will have no one to blame for a lack of competition except themselves. I just hope the system being produced at that time is world beater, because it will need to be as weapon systems continue to get more capable with longer range.

Maritime Open Source Intelligence Cyber Tool

SteelJawScribe has my attention, this is easily one of the most interesting internet tools I have seen in awhile. A Live Ship Map built on GoogleEarth technology that allows you to track maritime commerce in certain regions in real time. The map to the right (click to expand) was a live shot from 12:00am EST of the west side of the Strait of Hormuz. Sorry folks, you won't be able to track US Navy ships with this tool.

That big island is Forur I., you can see the west bound traffic moves in the deep shipping lane to the north, while the east bound traffic moves in the deep shipping lane to the south. Those deep water shipping lanes for the big maritime traffic is only 2 nautical miles wide in some places, so you can get a feel for why a big fight between Iran and anyone is a real bad thing for maritime traffic, they simply have no maneuver space and they have to pass within launch range of even small anti-ship missiles. It is a powerful strategic position, and no matter what anyone ever claims, in a war against Iran it would require Marines on that island to secure those shipping lanes.

That is also why China is building its blue water capacity, they know that when, not if, the US moves to alternative energy sources it will be China who has to keep those lines of communication at sea open. All of these things are interconnected, and often abused as fodder in militaristic rhetoric.

The Live Ship Map FAQ defines the purpose as thus:

This web site is created as an academic, open project. It is dedicated in providing free real-time information to the public, about ship movements and ports and our main objective is to expand it to other research applications. The project is currently hosted by the Department of Product and Systems Design Enginnering, University of the Aegean, Greece. The initial data collection is based on the Automatic Identification System (AIS). We are constantly looking for partners wishing to install an AIS receiver and share the data of their area with us, in order to cover more areas and ports around the world.

More on the Automatic Identification System (AIS) can be found here, but this is the overview.

Picture a shipboard radar display, with overlaid electronic chart data, that includes a mark for every significant ship within radio range, each as desired with a velocity vector (indicating speed and heading). Each ship "mark" could reflect the actual size of the ship, with position to GPS or differential GPS accuracy. By "clicking" on a ship mark, you could learn the ship name, course and speed, classification, call sign, registration number, MMSI, and other information. Maneuvering information, closest point of approach (CPA), time to closest point of approach (TCPA) and other navigation information, more accurate and more timely than information available from an automatic radar plotting aid, could also be available. Display information previously available only to modern Vessel Traffic Service operations centers could now be available to every AIS-equipped ship.

With this information, you could call any ship over VHF radiotelephone by name, rather than by "ship off my port bow" or some other imprecise means. Or you could dial it up directly using GMDSS equipment. Or you could send to the ship, or receive from it, short safety-related email messages.

The AIS is a shipboard broadcast system that acts like a transponder, operating in the VHF maritime band, that is capable of handling well over 4,500 reports per minute and updates as often as every two seconds. It uses Self-Organizing Time Division Multiple Access (SOTDMA) technology to meet this high broadcast rate and ensure reliable ship-to-ship operation.

It is noteworthy that we track every airplane in the world, but we only track a small fraction of global commerce at sea, and yet 90% of global commerce moves at sea. Very cool tool, and a step towards Maritime Domain Awareness (PDF).

What's In Your Trash?

This sounds clever. Described as a flying periscope, the article does not cite the cost of this one shot toy.

America has gone one better than Germany in the race to develop the world's most powerful submarine-launched robot aircraft. US arms giant Raytheon has announced a model which can be deployed at depth without modification to the submarine.

The new U-UAV is dubbed SOTHOC, for Submarine Over the Horizon Organic Capabilities. The launch system works by deploying a sealed can through the sub's waste disposal lock. The can then sinks away safely to get clear of the boat. On reaching a preset depth it dumps weight to become positively buoyant and ascends to the surface. Once stable at the surface, it aligns itself into wind and launches a one-shot, disposable UAV.

It is certainly a clever weapon system, but how do we counter it when the enemy does this to us? Lets assume you can detect this at 10 miles and it is watching your ship under good visibility. Now lets say you are a destroyer, how do you shoot it down at that range? Electronic attack?

These small UAV systems don't have to be submarine launched, the real danger comes when everyone is actively using these small UAVs to recon naval forces. Depending upon cost and capability, the counter could be something as simple as a smoke machine, or something as complicated as a remote control bullet.

A EW option could be best, if we can use it without revealing a precise position to a larger degree than a UAV operating at 10 miles already is.

Jamming the Future - Prowlers, Growlers and Boeing

One of my bugbears when writing about defense issues a decade ago was the state of aerial jamming capabilities fielded by the U.S. Military. This was around the time that the EF-111 Ravens were being retired, and (at the time) I was fond of telling colleagues that the surest proof there was a problem was that that Air Force had decided officially to rely on a Navy platform (the EA-6B) for its jamming capabilities until the EA18-G Growler was online. The EA-18G is now termed an escort jammer, as the first deliveries of that aircraft start to trickle into NAS Whidbey Island. While this is partially due to limitations on the reach of its systems imposed by both available onboard space and power, it also has to do with the limited amount of loiter time available to the aircraft.

As the Navy and industry are proud of telling us, it is a smart choice because it has an approximately 90% commonality with the base F/A-18F Super Hornet. However, one problem with this is that it also shares the Hornet's notoriously short legs. While this isn't a problem if the mission you're undertaking involves escorting Hornets themselves, it has other implications. For example, it means that it is impractical to 'blind' air defense systems on a large scale using the Growler. It is impractical to undertake loiter-time missions more than a couple of hundred NM from the Growler's base. And while there are no strikes in the air escorted by the Growler, you will be short the capability to deny your adversary the use of electronic scanning to watch your movements and determine when their own airspace is 'clear.'

It is of course possible to mitigate these problems by ensuring that air defense systems have high priority in initial strikes of a large-scale operation. However, in situations where either an all-out air attack is not an option or where those strikes are found to be not fully effective (if the enemy has the sense to 'reserve' sensors for later rounds) then the problem resurfaces.

As it stands, the Navy (and Air Force) rely on the EA-6B to perform both escort and limited standoff jamming. As the aging Prowlers are retired, there will be a gap in US standoff jamming capabilities which the Prowlers will be unable to fill due to their legs. While the Navy may not have much of an issue with this, operating in a purely strike mode, the Air Force's need for and mission to acquire total airspace dominance means a standoff jamming capability is a requirement.

It seems that this problem has indeed piqued the AF's attention, as in 2006 they began funneling money to Boeing with the intent of evaluating the possibility of placing standoff jamming capabilities on the B-52H platform as an 'additional capability' rather than a full rebuild. Designated the CCJ or Core Component Jammer, this program is still in 'technology maturation' mode; however, the advantages of a larger platform with lots of available space and power (and crew) seems to be accepted.

This is noteworthy mostly because it might (possibly) indicate a path to future standoff jamming for the Navy. The P-8 Poseidon is being designed and built with both high-power electronics and avionics/weapons hardpoints. Perhaps it will be possible to produce a system which will fit both Boeing products, or to adapt systems produced for the B-52H. Whether the Navy needs standoff jamming of its own is another question, one which seems to have been answered in the negative by the retiring of the Prowlers; but at the least, there should be a possibility of adding the capability to a patrol asset.

Observing The M-80 Stiletto OPEVAL

So what did SOUTHCOM do with its Skyship 600 leased from Airship Management Services of Greenwich, Conn.? According to a recent article in Defense Daily (subscription) by Geoff Fein, the airship has been part of a six-week test mission between Florida's southern coast and Cuba as part of the OPEVAL of the M-80 Stiletto to deter and disrupt illicit trafficking in the JIATF South area of operations.

The craft, built by San Diego-based M Ship Co., underwent OPEVAL this past summer. U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) conducted the OPEVAL, and it included participation from the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South, U.S. Coast Guard, the Army and U.S. Army South (USARSO), the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and a representative from Colombia.

In September, SAIC [SAI] prepared a 72-page after action report outlining the findings of the OPEVAL, test objectives, operational issues and recommendations.

The 80-foot long Stiletto, with its unique double M-hull configuration, was developed as a test bed for new systems and technologies, ranging from unmanned surface and aerial systems as well as Augmented Reality Visualization of the Common Operational Picture (ARVCOP), built by Maine-based Technology Systems Inc.

This article is brilliantly written for those like me interested in new technologies like the M-80. The article reads like the story of a platform earning its reputation.

"During operations in the Florida Straits, Stiletto was responsible for the interdiction and apprehension of a suspicious vessel that was identified by the [Coast Guard] as a target of interest," the report said.

Stiletto's speed and ability to keep up with a go-fast boat, even pursuing it into shallow waters, proved critical for mission success, according to the SAIC report.

There is a lot of interesting material here. Essentially the airship ends up being the aviation surveillance piece directing the fast M-80 as a maritime interceptor going after "targets of interest." The article goes on to note "Stiletto's OPEVAL was successful" but "many of the participants, according to the report, believed that ship's impact could have been much more significant if several limiting factors had been mitigated."

"These factors included the fact that Stiletto was restricted to operate in international waters where the weather and sea state conditions were unfavorable; limitations of Stiletto's communications and surveillance systems, including lack of secure chat and data access, problems with voice satellite communications (SATCOMs) when Stiletto was port side, and a commercial-grade radar that was ill-equipped to identify targets of interest; and maintenance problems with Stiletto and its rigid hull inflatable boat (RHIB) among others.," the report stated.

Put another way, the high sea state and weather conditions issue makes the case that these platforms need a mothership for support, either in the form of a well deck or a smart dock. The advantage of this would allow the M-80 to remain sustained in forward theaters, manage weather and sea variables encountered in forward operating environments, and otherwise better sustain crew support, platform repair capacity, and extend operations beyond a land base while putting the ship in the operation zone for a longer duration. In other words, this ship needs a sea base, highlighting once again that sea basing is a strategic concept beyond the tactical capability to land Marines on a beach.

The ship also appears to need better technology for better communications integration, and a new RHIB to for its boarding parties.

Information Dissemination was able to obtain a copy of the 72-page after action report that Geoff Fein discussed in his article. The report is labeled Unclassified / FOUO. I've given some thought about this, and I have decided to post on it while being selective regarding the content. Some will say I shouldn't post any of it, and others would say I should post the whole thing. Here is my contribution to that discussion.

The blogosphere is where ideas are disseminated and shared after being born elsewhere, and I believe this blog is a public place for responsible debate and discussion about maritime issues. I believe the content below contributes to the public knowledge in a number of ways to the industry, academic, strategic, tactical, and political folks who read this blog, and serve a benefit for understanding to the public at large in understanding the challenges of small ships in an emerging 4GW environment. I don't see the content posted below as any more of an information loss than what is found here. Tonight, for the 19th time, someone asked for this PPT presentation for use in a training evolution, serving as a reminder the blog continues to serve a serious purpose for our uniformed men and women of the Navy beyond the simplistic function of your entertainment and my education. I believe the content added below contributes to the discussion without risk. With that said...

The report cites "themes" that emerged in the development of the OPEVAL report.

• The importance of using Stiletto in a more appropriate (littoral) environment
• Deploying on Stiletto was a good experience and most interviewees stated that they would deploy on Stiletto again
• The RHIB requires extensive modifications or replacement
• The deployment in itself was a major success

There is a comment early in the conclusions that I think it worth mentioning, because this is something that comes off very obvious whenever we begin talking about the quality of work observed coming from SOUTHCOM. While this might be specific to the OPEVAL of the Stiletto specifically, I think it reflects something right taking place down in SOUTHCOM bigger than a single OPEVAL, at least in the opinion of this observer.

• Most participants commented on the fact that the OPEVAL was organized, planned and successfully executed in a very short period of time. The following quotation is representative of the feedback received regarding the OPEVAL, “commands were able to throw together three teams from different pots and deploy them in a short time; and everyone got down there, joined together and made one team. This was the success. No one got hurt, and nobody got in trouble.”

When evaluating new platforms, this blog author evaluates from the position of people, ideas, then platform. As such we focus in on the issues regarding people first, the ideas that went into operation, then finally the platform itself.

Based on the reports findings, there were problems with the training process, some of which appear due to equipment failure. The lists below are partial.

• At the start of the deployment, there was only one person with more than two weeks of training with Stiletto (Stiletto civilian technician).
• Typically when training commences, the vessel(s) are prepared; however Stiletto and her RHIB were not ready / available for training when the time came.
• The crew was given three weeks to train prior to the deployment, which included time for team integration training. However Stiletto and RHIB maintenance issues, and heightened sea state, consumed most of the allotted training time.
• The crew did not receive proper or adequate training, and integration training did not occur until they had arrived in Colombia. The 1st official training was toward the end of the deployment to prepare for the DVs visit.
  

The report also gives a lot of credit to the Army personnel by Fort Eustis, noting the "Army has a long history of training high-speed craft crews." Indeed, this was an interesting note in the details. I'll let John or Brad carry this football.

• The Army typically employs small crews, though the Navy might have 20 guys in a crew. In the Army, there are typically only two rates: deck-side rate or engineer; the Navy uses many other rates. On an Army vessel, anything that needs to be done deckside, the deck personnel do it; same for engine side. Army personnel subsequently have a broader spectrum of training, and they are used to working in small crews. There are not as many problems of a crew with six or so; can still get the job done.

This was also an interesting detail, an issue we need to get right as we move ships with small crews into the littoral. Any desk jockey whose experience is sailing the deep blue that gives a LCS CO shit for the handling of a ship in 10 meters of water needs an asskicking. I get the feeling the future desk jockey I'm talking about was somewhere in this process.

• There were multiple reports of uncertainty with regards to whom the team should provide feedback to, and who to turn to for support. As one example it was reported that “there were times we wanted to make tactical recommendations” for Stiletto missions. The team would email one agency and then later learn that the agency was not informing others with OPCON and TACON authority. Additionally others reported that some within a particular agency were not receptive to the feedback the crews were providing.

If this wasn't so common in just about everything new, I'd probably make a deal of it. Truth is, this happens every time you do something for the first time. This is the kind of thing that gets sorted out with ownership of a program. Like I said above, the focus stays on the people.

• During the beginning of the deployment, the sea state was too rough for the quick transit that Stiletto had expected. Another person explained why the rough sea state impacted the crew: “in that environment [Stiletto] can’t go fast without wearing on combat effectiveness.”
• Crew sustainability, due to the rough sea state, was limited. One person explained that, “when Stiletto is at high speed (40+ kts), it is not cutting through the water, it is hitting the water very hard. This is tough on the crew and fatigue was a real killer.” Another person explained the impact constant vibration had on the crew: “vibration and movement of the ship was very rough on the crew. After constant battery, the body gets tired. And once a person gets tired or exhausted, you begin to break into and cut down on endurance - and then it is a down-ward spiral.”
• The crew had an “abnormally high rate” of sea sickness. While some sea sickness is to be expected, the crew members were all maritime veterans and most of them experienced sea sickness during this deployment. One person suggested that employing a simulated horizon device in the galleys may be effective at combating sea sickness in those passengers riding below the bridge.
• The crew reported that they had a contract technician on the boat, who “did everything in the world to keep up with the boat.” Another person explained that the technician did not ride onboard Stiletto during missions, but that he could be reached via cell phone to assist. Additionally once Stiletto docked, the technician provided any “on-the-spot repair services” that were needed. Another individual said that the technician provided guidance on fixing issues, but not actual support.
• Several individuals explained that there must be more discussion about the role of the technician, who acted as an advisor. It was suggested that one area that could be reviewed is how engaged mariners should be in Stiletto maintenance. While there were never any problems during the deployment, there were conflicting viewpoints at certain times.
  

The report goes on to note some injuries occurred during operations of the ship, mostly contributed to rough seas and the RHIB that nobody was happy with.

Just as important are the ideas behind using the Stiletto.

• All explained that while Stiletto was not able to participate in any interdiction opportunities in the Colombian area, if Stiletto was employed in an area with littoral waters - that would be the prime location to be most effective. This was evidenced by Stiletto’s involvement in an interdiction in the Florida Straits. As one individual stated, “two days in the right area is better than 45 days in the wrong environment.” Many individuals suggested new locations to include the Bahamas, Florida Straits, and areas surrounding Cuba, northern Antilles and Puerto Rico. Each of these areas offers a lower sea state, and provides a prime environment for targeting suspected drug traffickers.
• All interviewees explained that Stiletto should not be used as a patrolling vessel; rather Stiletto should be used for response and intelligence queuing only. One person explained that Stiletto should “be used like a sniper rifle or missile” i.e., aimed at a specific target rather than patrolling.
• Several interviewees explained that it would be good to add additional port stops or ports to a future Stiletto deployment. Adding additional stops would require extra logistics support, but many agreed it would be worth it for several reasons including ability to replace/exchange crew members, provide multiple opportunities for crew rest, potential opportunity to work with new partners etc.
• Several interviewees explained that for Stiletto be an effective vessel, she must have ballistic protection and an organic weapons and/or defense capability, or at the very least her current on-board weapons and sensor systems must be expanded. Though these factors have drawbacks such as additional weight and issue of who has authorization to control weapons, it was agreed this is imperative.
• Multiple interviewees agreed that Stiletto must be able to deploy for several days at a time, rather than just for eight hours at a time. In order to be self-sufficient for several days, this would require additional changes such as: berthing, a mess facility, and the ability to refuel at sea which could be facilitated by moving the refueling location from the starboard side to a more accessible location on the vessel.
• All agreed Stiletto’s communication suite must be upgraded to include, at a minimum, more secure SATCOMs, a secure fax, and ideally secure chat. It was imperative to many that Stiletto must have a SIPR terminal if she is to be an effective node in the counter-narcotics environment.
• Many recommended that the radar onboard Stiletto be updated to a “better” radar package; Stiletto must have military grade radar on board, and not one used by commercial fisherman. One person suggested the best method of finding the most appropriate radar is to “take a look at the operational environment and pick the radar that works best in that particular environment.”
• Many agreed that Stiletto should be more light-weight, and a common recommendation was to purchase a new more lightweight RHIB. An additional recommendation was to utilize, in the future, a multi-task crew or for the crew to hold multiple roles in order to reduce the forward footprint

The report cites a recommendation to add a UAV in addition to the radar system, and improve the platform for night operations with a number of recommendations. Since Stiletto was only able to operate in 8 hour intervals, it could be argued the night-ops upgrades were not necessary for this operational test.

The report concentrates on three areas where I've decided not to quote much information. The first is the specific electronics and technology issues the Stiletto faced during its operational test. This is cited throughout the report as a major limitation, particularly during the ships deployment to Columbia. The second aspect is the RHIB. The report has a laundry list of reasons that sums up the RHIB as a "piece of shit that floats" and it was an ongoing problem from the beginning. The third aspect of the report discussed in detail, enough detail I'm hesitant to publish details..., regarding the operations in Columbia. While there is probably some great discussions there, the Navy is still uncomfortable with blogs so I'm going to refrain from posting those details, for now.

Finally, some platform observations:

• The crew covered 6,000 nm while underway on Stiletto.
• When the seas were calm, Stiletto could transit very quickly; they were able to “get somewhere very fast.”
• The range of operations was shorter than expected because Stiletto’s top speed was less than they originally anticipated. A mission typically requires eight hours. However onboard Stiletto in this deployment, it “took two hours to transit out and two hours to RTB, leaving four hours to patrol.” Crew members suggested that four hours to patrol is not enough time on-station to have success.
• Most of the deployment time was spent patrolling with Stiletto 12 miles offshore in an area with 4 ft seas, which reduced Stiletto’s speed advantage.
• Stiletto became a “responsive” asset, due in part to lack of secure data which limited mission planning at sea.
• The Stiletto team reported that they had “RHIB launch/recovery down to a science.” The crew reported that RHIB recoveries always present risk, and they were able to successfully launch and recover the RHIB.
• The team conducted the RHIB launching in 6-8 ft seas, and another in occasional 8-ft seas. They reported that while it is typically too risky to conduct RHIB launch / recoveries in sea states this high, it could be done onboard Stiletto in “life or death” situations.
• There was one particular mission where the Stiletto had a go-fast target; Stiletto was in port and launched. After transiting out and seeing the rough sea state, the Chief made a decision that the water was too rough and to turn back - a decision that the LEDET team supported. At the same time, other COL support and military vessels, including a Midnight Express, turned back as well.
• In regards to the Florida Straits mission: USCG Sector Key West (KW) “got Stiletto for two days to conduct patrols.” During that time, the Army mariners work with four USCG groups, two from D7 TACLET and two from Sector KW. On the second day, another two came from the USCG operations center. In the morning of Day One Stiletto participated in a demo with the evaluation team and other DVs, and in the afternoon it patrolled the area. The morning served as integration training for the mariner crew and USCG members. On Day 2 Stiletto went northwest toward Williams Island, capitalizing on its shallow draft capability; during that time, Stiletto used D7 for law enforcement, not Sector KW. Stiletto was approximately five miles offshore Andros Island when the crew visually spotted a target; they then found it on FLIR (never saw the target using the radar). They chased this vessel in the shallow waters for approximately 15-20 minutes. When the suspect could not lose Stiletto, he then turned north toward Marathon in the open waters. However the waters proved to be too rough for the go-fast. The sea state was approximately 2-3 feet, and Stiletto was moving at 42.4 kts. At this rate and in these conditions, Stiletto was able to apprehend go-fast within two hours. Also involved in the apprehension was Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) aircraft; the aircraft had been flying overhead when it saw the Stiletto chase. After contacting Stiletto and learned it was not training they were watching, CBP assisted with the interdiction. Additional assistance came from Sector KW, OPVAC (USARSO Counter-Drug program) and three USGC members. There was also another go-fast on scene that other USCG officials apprehended. Once concluded, DEA officials said that the individuals apprehended were actually TOIs that had been identified earlier.

Finally we conclude with this.

• Several reasons for the lack of interdiction and counter-drug activities in the Colombian area were given by interviewees. Some suggested that Colombian police and Navy vessels were in the region at the same time, either warding away potential suspects or apprehending them without Stiletto’s assistance. Others suggested that people in Colombia knew Stiletto was in the area because of information leaks. As an example, the crew stated that one could “Google Stiletto and find updated data, pictures etc. The Saturday evening before Stiletto deployed [we] painted the roof a white color; by that Monday, pictures of Stiletto with a white roof were on the internet.” When the crew researched Stiletto, they found deployment dates and port stops listed online. Additionally others suggested that the lack of interdictions may be due to the stealth-like appearance of Stiletto because it attracts a lot of attention. “It was impossible for Cartagena citizens to not know about Stiletto. To pull into port there, you have to pull by all the high rises. We deployed at all hours, day and night; it was too cool looking for people not to know we were there.”

Welcome to 4GW at sea. This last part was one aspect I nearly didn't post, except to add context to the discussion. This is a good example why these platforms would be better suited for operations from a sea base. Stiletto is a stealth ship, but by the testimony of the ships own crew the stealth advantage was impaired in part by the MK 0 eyeball, the bane of stealth for any surface ship at sea.

From the Inbox...

I got this from a reader yesterday.

A while back I constructed a model of the USS Bainbridge (1842) researching what I believed to be the best information available and being as accurate as I could within the constraints of the scale. It took me three years, not an hour of which I didn't enjoy. When I was done, I had model that I felt recreated as accurately as possible a ship that hadn't been seen since her sinking in 1863.

Today I toured the USS Pinkney DDG 91. My prevailing thought was "Thank heaven I don't have to model it." Because, in contrast to the 1842 Bainbridge, the 2004 Pinckney has possibly 30 times is many gizmos consisting of ammunition lockers, CPS airlocks, valves and whatnots. Moreover, whereas every officer and crewman on the Bainbridge would know the function and importance of the line belayed by the first pin on the starboard, I doubt weather a tenth of the crew of the Pinkney would have any idea of the functionality of the first gizmo on its starboard

I hope this doesn't appear as critical as I fear it might. The problems and response of the US Navy today are complex and well met. But it appears to me as a student of naval history, that one can not too often ask "are we making things as simple as we can respecting the fact our lives and our Country are dependent upon the decisions of sailors in times of crisis.

It is an interesting thought, the complexities of modern systems and the desire for simplicity to insure widespread proficiency is a delicate balance. Among some the desire for specific capabilities "gold plates" our platforms, creating unnecessary complexity while also increasing the cost. It is noteworthy the only modern commissioned class that where the description of "vanilla" would apply is the Cyclone-class Patrol Coastal Ships. In the near future, these older platforms will need a replacement, and I have often wondered how complex the replacements will be, and whether simplicity would be the best approach. I am reminded of something my uncle, who served among these fine sailors, used to talk about. The KISS method works best when doing the dirty work in the suck, so keep it simple sailor.

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USS Bainbridge - The first Bainbridge, a 12-gun 259-ton brig, was launched 26 April 2024 by Boston Navy Yard and commissioned 16 December 1842, Commander Z. F. Johnston in command. She operated with the Home Squadron until mid-1844 and then alternated in service with the Brazil and African Squadrons until 1860. Sailing from Boston 26 January 1843, Bainbridge served with the home Squadron until returning to New York 3 May 1844. During 26 June 1844-10 October 1847 she served with the Brazil Squadron. She laid up for most of the next year and then spent 10 April 2024 July 1850 with the African Squadron. She departed New York 2 November 2024 and until September 1856 cruised with both the African and Brazil Squadrons. She returned to Norfolk 10 September 1856. 1859-60 Bainbridge participated in the punitive expedition against Paraguay. On 21 August 2024 while proceeding to her station with the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron she capsized off Cape Hatteras with the loss of all but one of her crew. (Brig: T. 259, 1. 100'; b. 25', dr. 14'; s. 11.5 k., cpl. 100; a. 12 32- pdr. car., cl. Bainbridge)