West African Piracy

The Benin pirates are at it again. Since March, 12 tankers have been attacked in West African waters. Previous attacks by these pirates have been more violent than their East Coast brothers, such as those in May of this year and in the fall of 2009, which both killed crewmen. It is no surprise that piracy has escalated West Africa. Successful operations beget imitators.

Unfortunately the local countries involved shouldn't expect much assistance in fighting this growing problem, with the preponderance of Europe's navies heavily involved in countering the Somali pirates and stuck in a protracted maritime embargo against a north African dictator who knows better than to quit. Even for the USN, West Africa presents a challenging presence and logistics problem. We've been able to maintain a presence in the Indian Ocean mostly because the ships deploying for CP ops can be tasked for other CENTCOM and AFRICOM missions. However, other than APS, scheduled naval deployments to the other side of the continent are non-existent. Regrettably, West Africa presents a number of irregular challenges that cannot just be wished away: growing piracy; insurgent groups bent on disrupting the flow of oil; an increasingly militant Islamist movement in northern Nigeria (Boko Haram); and a burgeoning narcotics trade that in part, supports AQIM's broadening reach across North Africa. AFRICOM's naval requirements are growing, and US force structure is not. It's past time to buy ships we can afford in a quantity that can meet current and future demands for maritime security operations and security force assistance.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.

The STRATCOM Opportunity of Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame

No matter where I go or who I talk to in the US Navy, the one thing folks give me a hard time about is that it is suggested I often spend too much time focusing on piracy in Somalia and not enough time discussing Al Shabaab. That is fair, I guess, although I was the guy who suggested we buy the services of pirates to fight Al Shabaab, after all at least we know the motivation of pirates is money...

But on a more serious note, US officials have been talking up the threat posed by Al Shabaab and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula over the last few months. It turns out, they had a very credible intelligence source of information regarding the threat of those two organizations. A few details from Luis Martinez of ABC News.

After secretly holding and interrogating a Somali man captured off the coast of Africa for two months, the United States indicted him, claiming he was a liaison between terrorist groups.

The Somali man, Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame, believed to be in his mid-20s, is a top leader in the al Qaeda-linked al Shabaab terrorist group in Somalia who has been acting as a go-between with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the U.S. Justice Department alleged in an indictment Tuesday.

Many thoughts, not very well collected, come to mind as I observe this event.

First, Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame was captured at sea on April 19, 2024 and taken to USS Boxer (LHD 4) where he was interrogated and held before being transferred to New York. To capture the man while at sea obviously suggests an impressive intelligence operation took place behind the scenes, and while it shouldn't need to be said - the reason the US did capture him on what was almost certainly a short notice window to respond to intelligence is because the US Navy is globally deployed and always present. It is probably a bit of luck that some pirate event didn't have our ships out of position to respond to this intelligence, a detail that needs to be stated because it is important to note piracy is a distraction for maritime forces, not a maritime mission the US Navy is currently, actively dealing with directly.

Second, Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame was captured at sea. The sea is playing an important but rarely discussed role in Al-Qaeda's lines of communications. Around The Horn of Africa there is a lot of attention given to piracy as the major problem at sea, but piracy is a symptom of the bigger regional lack-of stability problem and by no definition is piracy a threat to the national interests of the United States. Task Force 151, the international task force against piracy, is symbolic of US military activities lately - it is a halfhearted military solution that can never solve the political problem that sources the piracy in the first place. I do not know why it is the policy of the United States to sail the fleet in circles off the Horn of Africa pretending to protect commerce from piracy threats, but at some point effective and efficient use of the fleet needs to focus on forwarding legitimate security solutions. In this instance, that claim can be made.

Third, I intend to leave the legalities of taking Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame to civilian court to the experts, and highly recommend the good folks at the Lawfare Blog. They have made available a copy of the full indictment of Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame at this link (PDF), and have already gone into the coverage of this very important development. Does it matter? Yes, how we deal with terrorists is a legal issue that rises to the level of a Presidential election issue. Will this trial get as much coverage as Casey Anthony? It would be a tragedy regarding the judgment and quality of American journalism that balances ratings in favor of national importance if it didn't, which also means it probably won't get anywhere near as much attention as Casey Anthony on the US cable news networks.

Fourth, the politics of this are also very important. George Bush left office with no way to deal with detained terrorists except to release them to the custody of other nations. Some people say the Guantanamo Bay solution works just fine, but it really doesn't. The bottom line on the Guantanamo Bay solution is that it has always been a temporary solution with no replacement, and both the Executive and Congress has been unable to come up with a better replacement for almost a decade now.

But more important than the detainment politics to me is the war narrative politics. For a couple of years now the US Army has cited only "hundreds" or less Al Qaeda operating in Afghanistan and Iraq, but Al Shabaab alone is well over 5,000, with access to tens of thousands more disenfranchised folks in Somalia alone. No one really knows how big Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is, but best verifiable numbers range over 500, and they have access to many thousands of disenfranchised folks in Yemen. While it is unlikely the Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame case will bring it up, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is on the rise and becoming the next big problem with thousands in their ranks.

The point is, Afghanistan gets all the attention but that isn't where Al Qaeda is. I've put together a little map to put my thoughts in context, and included a few pointers to where one might notice a few dumpster fires.

One Hot Mess

There are more Al Qaeda at the end of those arrows on this map than all other places not shown on this map combined, and you do not see major parts of Pakistan or Afghanistan on that map. The Obama administration knows this, hell everyone knows this, but the question is what is anyone going to do about it and what should the United States be doing about it?

The Obama administration is going to send Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame to civilian court, which means evidence will be presented publicly and a narrative will emerge from that evidence.

We are about to find out if the United States has any STRATCOM at all in the State Department, because this court case is without question the single most important STRATCOM moment of the next decade in the fight against terrorism - not just on the prosecution legal side but also on the operational side.

So lets all generically think about what is happening here. News reports are claiming Somalia is not only a failed state, but Somalia is a dead state with as many as 54,000 people fleeing the war stricken drought zone in June alone. Pirates are now organized enough to use the Yemen controlled island of Socotra as a fuel depot. News headlines tomorrow will discuss a pirate hijacking inside the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor, about 30 miles from Aden if my sources are correct. But none of this news items about Somalia actually matters, because none of these developments represent a threat to the national interest of the United States.

Those are other peoples problems and should be left for other people to deal with. It might be hard to swallow, but when one starts counting problems in Somalia, piracy looks more and more like the least of the problems folks are facing, at least it is unless piracy is part of the income model for Al Shabaab. No government has officially made that claim yet though.

The threat comes from Al Shabaab, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) - all of whom are capable and have desires to strike at US interests both globally and domestically. Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame represents the link between Al Shabaab and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which makes him potentially the most important Al Qaeda member captured outside Pakistan or Afghanistan since 9/11. If similar links between these organizations and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) exist, we are in serious trouble... and those links probably exist.

Think about the map. Right now Libya is a dumpster fire with no local functioning security system, which means it represents a tremendous opportunity for organizations linked to Al Qaeda to move and operate freely around the current military contest for political control. Libya has all the makings of a prolonged, uncontrolled tribal war similar to Somalia where groups are likely to link up with elements of Al Qaeda like AQAP and AQIM for support towards taking political control once Gaddafi is removed.

Folks also better start paying attention to the news on the western side of Africa, because another front is starting to open up in Africa (see here, here, and here) - and I'm not talking about Independence day in Sudan this Saturday - which is where the UN is focused.

Right now we are fighting wars on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq, with the political objective hopefully to reduce the military presence in both nations over the next few years. Pakistan is going to remain a target in an extended air campaign for years. The only sure thing we know from the announced arrest of Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame is that the United States is about to really spin up air operations in Yemen and Somalia over the next days, weeks, and months.

Libya is a strategic catastrophe, or as it is more commonly being called privately - an Obama Boondoggle - and it will surely look like one that even the best political spin doctors can't hide as European nations begin to withdraw from combat operations next month. Libya is also emerging as the new nexus in North Africa for Al Qaeda, and anyone who says otherwise is ignoring how that fight against Al Qaeda is the fight everyone knows is coming after Gaddafi loses power. The easiest prediction one can make right now is that some form of covert US military operations against AQIM and their efforts in Nigeria are coming - sooner rather than later. Finally, the Obama administration has a "no massacre" policy, so if things get heated after South Sudan declares independence, expect US military activity there too.

Since AFRICOM stood up, the focus has been engaging African nations at their request in what is described as a "supportive role" towards security. That must change in the very near future.

At some point it is time to admit that strategically, the US military efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq to consolidate and contain Al Qaeda to those two states has failed miserably, and the US must adapt. I do not know what that adaptation looks like, but western, northern, and eastern Africa are dumpster fires where Al Qaeda presence is growing - and AFRICOM needs to grow up from its touchy, feely hands off approach and be a real Unified Combatant Command if they are going to productively deal with these emerging problems. The United States is facing Al Qaeda on three sides of a continent we have neglected as policy for decades, and our best friend on the continent - Egypt - is enduring some internal issues that remove the nation as a regional leader we can count on.

Which takes us back to Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame's day in court and the associated STRATCOM. What will the court files reveal about Al Qaeda? What will be the emerging narrative from a terrorist trial in the US at a time where the nation is suffering from war fatigue, and oh by the way, the future is darker than the present. How strong are our alliances and are they sufficient to address emerging challenges?

How can the US and China work together in solving the emerging Al Qaeda problem in Africa? We are engaged with China on this, right? If the answer isn't yes, we have much work to do. How long before Europe bails in dealing with problems on their own southern lawn? How much longer will US war hawks trumpet the cause in Afghanistan with other, much more serious problems emerging in Africa and the Middle East? How long can the US sustain "air campaigns" and claim that activity legitimately forwards a solution, as opposed to doing what air campaigns always do - prolong the problems?

The US Navy is heavily investing in force structure to fight the big war against China in the Pacific while the nation is engaged in 6 campaigns - none currently deployed from the sea - in 6 countries across the Middle East and Africa. The most important nation in Africa besides the United States is China. In other words, the Navy is organizing to fight the one nation that has the most shared interest with us towards an Africa that is connected to the global trade system - something Al Qaeda stands squarely against. Is this approach to national security interests our naval strategy, or our naval strategery?

What does the logistics of distributed regional naval support presence look like when low end counter terrorism problems are to be addressed in the maritime domain by the Littoral Combat Ship?

Tell me what WWIII might look like. Take your hand and rub it on a globe from Nigeria to Pakistan on land, and if we count piracy - go from the Gulf of Guinea up towards the Med, down the Red Sea and all the way over to the west Indian coast topped by the Persian Gulf all the way down to the southeastern coastline of Africa. Is that a sufficient amount of territorial mass to conduct military operations and potentially be big enough to be a world war? By 2012 that is almost certainly going to be the range of land and sea where the US is conducting air strikes and maritime security operations against legitimate Al Qaeda related terrorism threats. This is not a hollow prediction, the US has consistently fought Al Qaeda wherever they go, and right now that enormous swath of territory is the area Al Qaeda is attempting to influence politically. Think about it.

STRATCOM matters in ideological struggles, and right now the expansion of Al Qaeda across Africa represents a weakness in our ideological struggle against the legitimacy of Al Qaeda as a credible alternative to the global trade system. If the global trade system isn't effectively reaching the people of African nations, which in many cases it is not; Al Qaeda represents a legitimate alternative to an offering we can't make to disenfranchised people.

The STRATCOM from the Obama administration offers nothing productive to disenfranchised people in Africa, and unfortunately that is the one lesson everyone stands witness to with the Arab Spring. That also might explain why the Obama administration does not stand up for folks like Mubarak and Gaddafi, hoping the result will offer the US better access to disenfranchised people. Will we have compelling alternatives for the people once dictators are out of power? I don't think anyone really knows, primarily because we are still quite uncertain how it all turns out in Egypt.

Are we fighting the right fights with the right tools? Today the Obama administration claims air campaigns aren't war; they are simply an evolved variation of armed humanitarian intervention. If humanitarian air strikes isn't the STRATCOM for Libya, then what exactly is? What about Somalia? What about Pakistan? Yemen? Sudan? Nigeria? Are we shaping the information environment for political action, or simply shaping the battlefield for the next air campaign?

The United States is a strategic hot mess right now in our fight against Al Qaeda. We are engaged in two land wars and air campaigns in four countries, and we do not have a policy that can be articulated as an acceptable plan for successfully ending any of these military campaigns. Why is defense cuts the most highlighted spending issue by this administration when the Presidents policies continue to call for more and more open ended military activity across Africa and the Middle East? How does any of this end?

Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame is sure to be another political parade of some sort, but is the United States preparing to lead the parade by establishing a narrative that explains the use of global forces or are we simply going to operate as usual pretending 6 different simultaneous military campaigns are no big deal? I believe the event represents a real opportunity for the administration to take control of the counter terrorism narrative to forward a more reasonable realignment of counter terrorism policy.

If the President can't establish a narrative that explains the constantly expanding use of military force globally as his primary political tool in the war against terrorism, then he needs to be replaced for getting the United States involved in (and also failing to lead during) what is by any definition the largest hot battlefield globally the nation has fought on since World War II. It is quite concerning that US political leaders are not being held accountable for that remarkable fact.

Africa Marine Commando on the Rise

The Gulf of Guinea's pirates continue to emulate their East Coast brothers with a recent rash of kidnappings against local officials and Chinese fishermen, but also have engaged in attacks from the sea. Last fall, AMC targeted Cameroon's 200 million barrel oil reserves by attacking offshore oil platforms. This time, they seem to be raising funds with maritime crime, including a major bank robbery using a get-away boat.

Unlike in Somalia, however, Cameroon's security forces have dealt with the pirates ruthlessly, killing 18 of the bank robbers during a high speed boat chase.

AMC is the maritime spin-off of freedom fighters from the Bakassi peninsula, essentially a mangrove swamp full of fish and oil. The area, which was formerly disputed between Nigeria and Cameroon, is yet another example of the arbitrary decisions by Victorian-era British diplomats and cartographers which still impact the world's economy and security.

The USN has conducted episodic engagements in the region with Africa Partnership Stations, but this economically vital and volatile area currently plays second fiddle for naval force allocation compared to other parts of Africa.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Gulf of Guinea Open Source Insurgency Update

I’m back… And so is MEND, with new systems disruption attacks against Nigeria’s oil infrastructure. These attacks are taking a toll on petroleum production and distribution in the Delta.

Like any innovative organization, insurgent groups and terrorists constantly adapt and emulate success of partners and competitors. The Niger Delta Liberation Force recently blew up pipelines similar to earlier MEND attacks. A splinter pirate group of Cameroon’s Bakassi Freedom Fighters, the Africa Marine Commandos, has blended the tactics of MEND and the Somali pirates, but stepped up the level violence.

If oil prices continue to climb and these attacks grow in scope and effect, it will be interesting to see if the US chooses to facilitate action against these networks. One can only hope any steps taken to mitigate the threat will be more effective than the lackluster counter-piracy campaign on the other side of Africa (successful attacks and the value of ransoms are higher than in previous years despite significant coalition presence). The unabated expansion of criminal-insurgent-terrorist groups who exploit the sea for their ends should not surprise to anyone who has watched Somali pirates run circles around dozens of first world navies with impunity the past couple years.

A recent article by Dr. Donna Nincic of the California Maritime Academy discusses this specific threat to energy security.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Hunter-Killer Ops in the Littorals‏

The US is unlikely to have further appetite for more large scale, ground based COIN operations such as those ongoing in Iraq and Afghanistan in the foreseeable future. But the threat posed by non-state actors to US interests around the world is unlikely to dissipate any time soon, either. As noted here before, some of these groups, such as the Tamil Tigers and Nigeria’s MEND have become adept at using the sea, littoral, or inshore areas to facilitate their operations. MEND guerillas have employed hit and run tactics against oil infrastructure and security forces, then retreated to the refuge of the Nigerian Delta’s expansive creeks and mangrove swamps. So it would be wise for naval planners to consider offensive counter-guerrilla operations in their portfolio of options in the event these insurgent groups rise to a level that invites a discrete US intervention in support of a host nation’s counter-insurgency efforts.

Could hunter-killer operations as described by Joseph Celeski (COL, USA, SF, Ret.) in Hunter-Killer Teams: Attacking Enemy Safe Havens be adapted for a maritime environment?

Hunter-killer operations are prolonged operations conducted in irregular warfare by a unique and specifically organized force, in conjunction with an indigenous
force, against irregular warfare adversaries by operating behind the lines or in
hostile, safe haven, or semipermissive environments, employing unorthodox
tactics, for the sole purpose of achieving attrition and punitive actions
predominantly against the personnel, leadership, and resources of the enemy.

Maritime hunter-killer operations (HKO) should work in conjunction with other offensive counter-guerrilla operations such as naval raids, interdiction of the insurgents’ supply lines, and man hunting of insurgent leadership (based from the sea). HKO are one component of a strategy of exhaustion, where the prolonged operations wear down and attrite enemy insurgents to the point of defeat. As Celeski notes, “Hunter-killer operational utility derives from employing an effective economy-of-force option, achieving persistence by operating in the same space and conditions of the enemy, while achieving a military and psychological impact out of proportion to its size (operational or strategic performance is achieved).”

A historical example of maritime HKO-like role were SEALs and their UDT predecessors who advised indigenous maritime units operating in areas such as the Rung Sat Special Zone, Laos, and Cambodia during the Vietnam War.

The Naval Special Warfare community remains the obvious choice to conduct Maritime HKO today. NSW is skilled in the tools of HKO, including working with indigenous forces and using mobility platforms (boats) to access enemy held terrain. Alternatively, as Celeski suggests, teams from MARSOC could be trained in the HKO mission. MARSOC MSOTs are performing well in Western Afghanistan, but as they eventually return to their maritime roots, HKO might be a desired niche capability for selected teams.

Future maritime HKO would be supported by intelligence, over-watch, and resupply from sea-launched UAVs and other distributed fire precision fires. However, in order to achieve success, the elements of SOF tasked to prepare for maritime HKO would need to train to tactics different from those used in the generally short duration direct action missions common today. Capabilities required for HKO include longer duration patrols in insurgent held littoral environments, enhanced de-confliction measures with other naval units operating in the battle space, incorporation of influence operations, and a smaller footprint for logistical sustainment. Hunter-killer ops should be considered as a viable component of an overall COIN strategy against a maritime-centric insurgency.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.

Nigeria's Ten Year Naval Expansion Plan

The Nigerian Navy is seeking the Federal Government's approval to upgrade and expand the Navy considerably, including adding 49 warships and 42 helicopters. The goal of the naval expansion would be to improve maritime security of national interests in Nigerian waters and the Gulf of Guinea.

This is in response to estimated oil revenue losses exceeding 38N billion due to recent attacks by MEND, which breaks down 19 billion was used for the repair of oil facilities destroyed by the militants while the balance of N18 billion was the value of the crude stolen by the militants.

The plan is not insignificant, and is broken down into short, medium, and long range plans.

He [Vice Admiral Ibrahim] stated that the immediate plan which will span for two years, the Federal Government should add to the inventory of the Navy two light frigates, two 85 metre OPVs, six 17 metre Manta Class IPCs, six Shaldag MK 11 Patrol Craft, two 38 metre FPBs, two combat Augusta A138 helicopters, one Landing Platform Dock, and two Logistics Ships.

In the medium term which will span between two to five years, the CNS said the Nigerian Navy would need, ten OPVs, 20 helicopters, one hydrographic ship, two training ships, two logistics ships, and two mine counter measure vessels (MCMVs).

While the long term plan which he put at between five and ten years, he requested the Federal Government to procure, three Conventional Submarines, two corvettes, two LPDs, 20 long rang maritime patrol helicopters, two training ships and two MCMVs.

It looks like the Nigerian government is being encouraged to have the multi-national oil companies that operate in Nigeria pay for the naval expansion. The article goes on to note that part of the expansion includes human capital. A few bullets:

• Nigerian Navy should embark on training and retraining of personnel and acquisition of vessels in partnership with local industries.
• Nigerian Navy should ensure the inter agency linkage for placement of skilled ex-Service personnel in pursuant of our nation building.
• On regional maritime security collaboration, it was resolved that the Nigerian Navy should spearhead international maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea on the basis of the Gulf of Guinea Commission and should in liaison with relevant government agencies, convene a conference of contracting states and other stakeholder for a common maritime security policy in the region as soon as possible.
• Pursuant to international maritime security collaboration, the Ministry of foreign Affairs should be contacted to begin confidence-building measures among member countries in the Gulf of Guinea Region to assure them that such collaborative efforts are in their common and collective interest.
• Coastal nations in the sub-region should aim at interoperability in naval platforms, joint exchange training programmes for personnel increased investments in coastal radars and the establishment of Automated identification Systems (AIS) to facilitate regional cooperation in maritime safety and security.

Finding and purchasing all the equipment isn't the hard part of this plan, the hard part will be the human aspect of the plan.

Nigeria is trying hard to break into the worlds top 20 economies, and there is considerable Chinese investment in Nigeria helping to bring up the infrastructure. Obviously this is a very ambitious plan, but not because of the equipment but because of the human investments necessary to make the equipment useful. I want to note something though...

Something that has been on my mind lately as I observe several nations across South America, South Asia, and Africa expand their Naval forces. Compare the way Nigeria is building up a maritime security fleet with the way Brazil is building submarines first in that nations Naval expansion. Nigeria is positioning themselves to be a regional partner with their Navy in the Gulf of Guinea, where Brazil is building its Navy to be a regional power in the South Atlantic. Both nations are expanding naval forces for the purposes of securing their offshore energy resources, but the approaches are very different.

It is an interesting comparison long term to think about, because ~49 warships over 10 years would be an average of almost 5 new ships per year for Nigeria, while Brazil may spend twice as much money and may not end up with an average of 3 new ships per year. It also raises the question which approach builds confidence with international business partners, the nation protecting resources with nuclear submarines or the nation expanding the size of their maritime police force and presence on the sea surface?

Open ended question intended to get you thinking; each situation is clearly unique.

MEND Attacks Oil Infrastructure, Promises More Attacks to Come

While the international naval presence off the east African coast gets most of the attention, the problems in the Gulf of Guinea remain a serious problem that can spill over into a problem impacting your wallet.

On Monday the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) disabled pipelines used by US owned Chevron over the weekend. On Tuesday a Nigerian navy patrol foiled an attempted attack on an offshore oil facility operated French owned Total on Tuesday.

"Men in speedboats tried to attack our Amenam offshore field and they were driven away by a (navy) patrol team," Total spokesman Fred Ohwawa said.

Amenam lies about 30 kilometres (20 miles) offshore from Rivers State in the Niger Delta.

A spokesman for the Joint Task Force (JTF) protecting oil firms and facilities in the restive region confirmed the incident.

"There was an attempt to attack a Total's offshore facility, but the criminals were driven away," Colonel Rabe Abubakar told AFP.

20 miles offshore is in international waters. The US Navy has been increasing presence in the region with the African Partnership Station, but it does raise the question whether a larger presence is necessary. MEND has a history of attempting to attack these large offshore oil platforms, and the pattern suggests these attacks will continue.

All it takes is one successful attack, or even one attack that goes badly, and we have a potential huge global economic impact on energy or even a regional environmental problem that could trigger a chain reaction of events throughout that region.

It isn't an accident that last year when oil prices at the pump were so high, it was during the height of conflict between MEND and the Nigerian government. Oil production at that time was down to below 1 million barrels per day. After the loss of 100,000 barrels per day due to pipeline damage of the Chevron facility, Nigeria is pumping 1.76 million barrels per day. That compares to 2.6 million barrels per day back in January 2006.

Study after study suggests the western oil companies do a better job than the Nigerian government insuring the local population gets an economic boost in the local economy from the oil production. The Obama administration must do more to encourage the Nigerian government to pump revenues from oil back into the local economy as part of improving security. It is one of many necessary steps needed to fight the MEND insurgency.

Crude oil imports to the United States from Nigeria are down almost half from last year, and it looks like increased crude oil imports from the African nations of Angola and Algeria are making up the difference. Reasons for the decline include the global economic depression, the MEND insurgency, and diversification of supply. The real question is what happens when global demand increases with an economic rebound, and if the Nigerian government starts pulling in huge sums of cash as a result of increased oil demand... how will MEND react?

Russia Finds a Logistics Port for Somalian Operations

One of the questions we have raised regarding the deployment of the Russian frigate RFS Neustrashimy (FF 712) to Somalia was where the logistics would come from. While certainly not a game stopper, as the United States Navy and NATO would welcome Russia's assistance in the area and help with logistics, part of the purpose of the deployment from the Russian perspective is to be able to conduct long range deployments without the assistance of the US or NATO.

It would appear the Russians have worked their diplomatic magic and developed the forward logistics agreements necessary to sustain the RFS Neustrashimy (FF 712).

A Russian delegation chaired by President of the Russian Senate Sergie Mironov left Sana’a last Thursday after a 22-hour visit during which it met with President Ali Abdullah Saleh, Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Mujawar, Shoura Council Chairman Abdulaziz Abdulghani and other Yemeni government officials.

Speaking about military and strategic cooperation between Russia and Yemen, Mironov affirmed during a news conference in Sana'a that “Yemen agreed to allow Russian ships to use its ports for reaching strategic objectives, not as a station for them.” This information was confirmed by Russian official Novocity News Agency.

During the cold war, this announcement would not be received warmly by the United States, and it is a sign the cold war is over that the US media has outright ignored this announcement. In the future, when regional powers deploy naval forces forward, as Russia is in the case of Somalia, it will be a necessity for those powers to establish agreements in foreign ports where logistics services can be obtained. While the use of a Yemen port for a single Russian frigate will go ignored in the United States this time, we should use this example to look ahead into the future.

Because while it might be Russia today, it will probably be China tomorrow, and when a nation in the Middle East establishes an agreement for PLAN warships to resupply in the course of exercising Chinese strategic objectives in the Middle East or African seas, one can already predict the chorus of responses likely from both the media and political class.

In this case, RFS Neustrashimy (FF 712) will be participating as part of an international effort to curb piracy, an effort that shares objectives with the international community at large who have also deployed naval forces for the same purpose. Because in this case the purpose of the Russian ship deployment is in line with the interests of both the international community and the regional community, it is unlikely we will hear any negative rhetoric regarding this development.

But it sure will be interesting when we see something like this take place when it is not part of an international effort towards a shared purpose. One could easily see a scenario in the future where China establishes some sort of logistics agreement with a nation like Nigeria, as a way of adding security to China's economic investments widespread in the Gulf of Guinea. While such a move would be logical from the perspective of Chinese interests, I assure you the China hawks will be hyperventilating the threat the PLAN poses to the region (and the world no doubt) to everyone who will listen. Those same China hawks won't want to hear the counter claim that it is for exactly the same reasons we currently have a naval base in Bahrain.

As other nations, many whom may be competitors, step up and assume security roles in the maritime domain, to many it will have the look and feel of threat. It is never too early to start discussing this emerging reality of maritime security in emerging markets within the globalization economic model.

Nigeria River Delta Finds a New Investment Partner

Few people realize how many Chinese citizens are living and working in Africa. The details, indeed everything you ever wanted to know about Chinese involvement in Africa can be read in the excellent series by Richard Behar called China in Africa. On page two this tidbit jumps off the page.

There are already more Chinese living in Nigeria than there were Britons during the height of the empire. From state-owned and state-linked corporations to small entrepreneurs, the Chinese are cutting a swath across the continent. As many as 1 million Chinese citizens are circulating here. Each megaproject announced by China's government creates collateral economies and population monuments, like the ripples of a stone skimmed across a lake.

We were not surprised today when we read about China's latest megaproject, this time in an area very important to you and me, as it is the specific region in Nigeria that caused our gas prices to go up last week:

One of China's top engineering firms has signed a $1 billion deal to build a road around the volatile Nigerian city of Port Harcourt, the hub of Africa's biggest oil industry, the AFC development bank said on Sunday.

The deal makes Beijing a key development partner in the Niger Delta, home to Nigeria's 2.1 million barrels per day (bpd) oil industry, where poor infrastructure and a lack of investment have fuelled a campaign of violence by militant groups.

China Harbour Engineering Co. (CHEC) signed a memorandum of understanding with the African Finance Corporation (AFC) for the six-lane ring road during a visit to China by Nigerian local government and AFC officials last week.

On Friday the price of oil went almost to $150 because MEND announced it would be ending its cease fire. It will be interesting to see if China has success in this region. There are plenty of reasons to be optimistic for the short term, but if you read the entire Special Report by Richard Behar one can also come to the conclusion of long term consequences. Unlike the west who is concentrated mostly offshore, China's interest is on land, and they come with cash as the solution to all problems. From the second part of the seven part series, we find this nugget.

China's closed books make it impossible to see where the money actually goes, opening the door to all manner of inducements to local and national officials. These cash-heavy "no strings attached" offers make China's projects very hard to imitate for public companies from the West -- and all but irresistible to the cliques sitting atop most sub-Saharan countries.

For the outside world, Beijing markets its efforts with flowery rhetoric -- reminiscent of Mao Zedong's in Africa in the 1960s -- touting China as a "selfless friend" intent on fostering a "harmonious" relationship. But China doesn't hesitate to create more lasting symbols of its benevolence: parliament buildings in Uganda and Congo, a presidential palace in Sudan, the Supreme Court in Namibia, an entirely new administrative capitol rising in Equatorial Guinea -- and lavish soccer stadiums everywhere. These monuments not only distract restive local populations but are also, as one of the continent's best-known businessmen sees it, part of a subtler "psychological strategy: When the people are recreating, they will automatically revere the Chinese. And when the parliament is sitting, they will automatically revere the Chinese."

One wonders with a new billion dollar highway project how long we will see MEND, who will likely soon find themselves bribed with cash to leave the Chinese alone, sitting around the river road in reverence to the Chinese.

You may not agree with it, but China has a serious strategy in regards to Africa. What are we doing? We think the Navy is doing a decent job, indeed they have employed some clever ideas in how to engage Africa during peacetime. We keep thinking something more is required though, because we don't want to pay $4.50 or even $5.00 a gallon of gas, and had Bonga gone up in smoke a few weeks ago, that is exactly what we all would be doing today.

Here is something to think about. The price of oil hit a new record above $147 a barrel on Friday primarily for two problems, both of which are directly related to Maritime Security. The first problem is the return of tensions to Nigeria with the MEND cease fire ending, a cease fire which began right after the Bonga attack. The other factor is the Iran situation, with speculators concerned that a war with Iran will happen, and when it does Iran is going to shut down the Strait of Hormuz.

The United States Navy is the greatest Navy in the history of all mankind, and yet the perception that the US Navy is powerless to prevent disruption to the oil market by a band of river bandits in Nigeria or to a club of Iranian speed boat drivers wielding AK-47s is sending our economy into recession.

How can the most powerful naval force in the history of mankind not blunt the common perception of some of the most experienced money makers in the world, the speculators for oil? There are good reasons by the way. One wonders what speculators concerned about Nigeria think when naval forces in Europe do not respond to the Bonga attack, and return home instead. One wonders what speculators might think about the Iranian speedboat threat today had the US Navy blown the blue speedboats out of the water back in January.

What you don't like that comment? This whole post is discussing the price of peace, war isn't the only thing that has costs.

Observing the Offshore "Bonga" Attack

On June 19th, MEND released the following official statement.

"On Thursday, June 19, 2008, at 0045 Hrs, gallant fighters from the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) overran the supposedly fortified Bonga offshore oil fields operated by the Shell Petroleum Development Company.

"The main computerised control room responsible for coordinating the entire crude oil export operations from the fields was our main target. Our detonation engineers could not gain access to blow it up but decided against smoking out the occupants by burning down the facility to avoid loss of life.

"However, our next visit will be different as the facility will not be spared. We, therefore, ask all workers in the Bonga fields to evacuate for their safety as the military cannot protect them.

"In order that the Nigerian military does not pass off this humiliating breach as another 'accident', an American, Captain Jack Stone, from an oil services company, Tidex, has been captured.

"This man was supposed to only be released in exchange for all Niger Delta hostages being held in northern Nigeria by the Nigerian government. Because the criminals in the government and state security want to use this opportunity to make money from ransom, we have decided he will be released in the coming hours.

"The location for today's attack was deliberately chosen to remove any notion that off-shore oil exploration is far from our reach. The oil companies and their collaborators do not have any place to hide in conducting their nefarious activities."

We have been gathering details regarding the attack, and so far this is what we have been able to piece together from the events of June 19th. Most of it comes from a hearing in the Nigerian House of Representatives on June 23rd.

The Navy Patrol Boats stationed in the area had withdrawn from the area the day before to participate in Exercise Sentry, an exercise conducted by the Eastern Naval Command of the Nigerian Navy, The withdrawal of the Navy ships left Shell’s $3.6 billion “Bonga” Floating Production, Storage, and Offloading vessel (FPSO), stationed 120km from shore in 1000 meters of deep water, and responsible for 10% of Nigeria’s Crude Export without security protection. The facility does not have a radar, rather the facility is limited to a CCTV surveillance system.

Moving out after sundown on June 18th, MEND militants aboard three boats made the 120km trip out to Bongo and attacked just before 1:00am. Initially boarding one of the support vessels, the militants were prevented via lockdown procedures from gaining access to the Bonga facility. The attack lasted four hours, and while there was a lot of gunfire, Shell's official statement suggests only 3 workers were injured, suffered by being roughed up by the militants, No deaths or other injuries have been reported. After leaving the FPSO at 5:00am, the militants came across a ship chartered by Chevron on the return trip home, and kidnapped the vessels captain. Captain Jack Stone was released unharmed a few hours later.

MEND has become the focus of security and military efforts of Nigeria, and represents an enormous challenge not only to the Nigerian government, but indeed the impact is global. Due almost entirely to government attention and resources being focused on dealing with MEND, splinter groups are able to operate on the fringes and do their own damage, which can be highlighted by the destruction of the Chevron pipeline on June 20th by what is described as disgruntled youth. As UPI reports, those disgruntled youth just cost you money.

Though Chevron would not say just how much production was lost due to the attack, Nigerian energy officials estimated the losses at over 100,000 barrels per day, a blow that prompted the company to declare force majeure, relieving them of their contractual obligations until the assaulted pipeline can be repaired and secured.

It is no wonder that just a few days later, Saudi Arabia pledged to increase oil production by 200,000 bpd. While reported as a rushed reaction, the move is intended to make up for the loss of the attacks against the Bonga facility and the Nigerian pipeline. The Bonga facility was brought back up this week, but the downtime accounts for an estimated 1,500,000 barrels not drilled to market during the downtime, meaning the surge of oil from Saudi Arabia is really a wash for the first 15 days simply insuring OPEC production is sustained at current levels. In other words, net losses from last weeks incidents in Nigeria alone won't be made up for until at least 15 days after Saudi Arabia increases production. No wonder oil shot up to $140 per barrel today.

As we observe this incident, we can't help but think this is one of the most important military actions at sea since the USS Cole attack in Yemen. Ships are targets of opportunity for pirates and terrorists, but an offshore production facility is a fixed military target representing global political impact for terrorists. MEND is not a classic terrorism organization, rather represents an insurgency and different kind of maritime challenge. Based on eye witness accounts reported through the media, MEND apparently had the firepower necessary to destroy the facility, and yet decided not to in order to avoid the consequences of an international incident.

That last point is key. We are observing what appears to be an interesting 4GW Industry strategy engaged in Nigeria. MEND is executing a very sophisticated political strategy against the Nigerian government using the oil industry as leverage. MEND appears to see the industry as a neutral party, and the signs tend to indicate MEND would like the oil industry to maintain its neutral status. By demonstrating the ability to influence the offshore oil industry, MEND has achieved its political goals of demonstrating the capacity to disrupt oil supply, but has done this leveraging threat alone.

The oil industry strategy on the other hand appears to also desire its neutral status, and to insure both its value to the Nigerian government and maintain a neutral status with MEND, the oil industry is calling for greater community ownership of oil assets, which we read as an invested interest in the oil industry at the community level. In this way we observe the characteristics of a 4GW industry driven strategy in an insurgency environment, but we don't fully understand the distinct nature of this specific insurgency and the oil industry's strategy to fully analyze it. If anyone is aware of such analysis we are very interested.

While we do not see MEND as a problem requiring an international military solution, as we examine the situation from a strategic perspective we observe the Navy is not very well resourced to deal with MEND even if a military solution was called for. To put it into perspective, on Tuesday right before the current cease fire was put into effect, the Nigerian Navy massed 8 riverine boats near a MEND camp in what MEND claims was preparations for an assault. The MEND statement of the incident claimed 'Our fighters headed towards the army position and fired warning shots (for them) to leave or be confronted. As our fighters approached the enemy in over fifty war boats, the eight gun boats turned and fled from the area, thereby averting a clash and maintaining the on-going ceasefire.'' If the claim of over fifty boats is true, and there is no reason why it wouldn't be, for perspective consider if you combined all three US Navy Riverine squadrons that amounts to around 700 sailors and only 36 boats! For even greater perspective, several MEND attack boats have stabilized gun mounts, the US Navy boats do not.

This incident highlights the intelligence capabilities and tactical proficiency of MEND in the region, and the potential for widespread destruction both in the river delta and well offshore is clearly well within their capabilities. If we can observe the naval capabilities developed by MEND to influence and attack at sea, it is a good bet terror organizations are studying the same information and learning from it. While MEND may not have created an international incident due to their own political interests, that is a bad bet in the future, not only in this region but other maritime regions as well.

We already know Al Qaeda is building naval terror cells, you can bet they are looking at the Tamil Tigers and MEND as models to build on. There is absolutely no evidence at all the shipbuilding budget or greater resource budget is even mildly prepared to posture forces against this type of threat. That is a very bad sign, probably one aspect of the global energy calculations being considered by the energy speculators. This was both the wake up call and the learning experience for everyone, next time will not go as well.

6th Fleet Focus: Building Silent Partnerships

The submarine force is undergoing its rotations, and because this is all part of regular rotations we don't usually post about it, but the last paragraph of this story regarding the deployment of the USS Boise (SSN 764) caught our attention.

USS Boise will complete some final systems testing in conjunction with the start of her overseas transit because she left a little sooner than planned, the Navy said.

We have seen it suggested in a few places the deployment is in response to this activity, but we don't think so. Israel might be getting the bulk of the headlines, but this is the theater to keep your eye on.

This may seem like a small thing, but this is one of many reasons we expect to hear about some fighting soon in that region. We don't expect foreign involvement on the ground, but the intelligence assets appear to be on the move... and we are not talking about just the Boise.

Submarine activity in that region is hiding in plain sight off and on, but we believe it is about to become a permanent station for a US submarine, and be part of the silent partnership to insure better intelligence regionally for forces to deal with emerging problems.

Pirates Attack 6 Ships in Nigeria

On Sunday we highlighted some disturbing developments coming out of Nigeria. The news today is another warning things are deteriorating quickly.

Unknown gunmen attacked six oil industry ships on the channel leading to Nigeria's largest oil and gas export complex on Bonny Island on Wednesday, oil company security sources said.

Two people were injured, one of them seriously, but none of the vessels was boarded, the sources said. Bonny Island is the export point for about 400,000 barrels per day of crude oil and 18 million tonnes per year of liquefied natural gas.

"Six vessels were attacked within the space of about 20 minutes," one of the sources said, asking not to be named.

There are a number of different aspects to the situation in Nigeria, it is difficult to tell if MEND is involved in this incident, or if this is a criminal element. Reading the article further reveals the Nigerians believe the attackers were most likely pirates, but the article makes the point they actually have no idea who is responsible.

In their annual piracy report, IMB notes an increase in piracy in Nigeria for 2007. The US Navy supposedly has an evolving, slowly emerging strategy for that region with its African Partnership Initiative program, but we are yet to see evidence that program does more than provide local security forces training. In the case of Nigeria, the local security forces are either overwhelmed or overtly corrupt, and the military is engaged against the MEND insurgency, so while the training helps, it won't be enough.

AFRICOM is meeting a great deal of skepticism in Nigeria, if not outright rejection. Given the American track record in that region, that is hardly surprising. With the security problems deteriorating though, it is possible the US will get an opening to contribute to the security situation, and if that call comes I hope both our political leaders and the DoD is ready to respond effectively. They will probably get a shot to make a first impression, although probably at a small, limited level. It will be important to make the right impression when the opening comes.

As for the status of the API, the USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43) arrived in Libreville, Gabon this week. It is still unclear how effective the API is. That might be good news though, there is some speculation that the API can be evaluated as more successful the less we hear about it in the press. Considering how very little we have heard about the pilot Global Fleet Station in the Caribbean Sea in its last 2+ months of its deployment, despite all the early attention that GFS got, it must of been an extraordinary success. Or not.

Don't Blink When It Comes to Nigeria

Sid posted this article in the comments the other day. I've look around, few are talking about it, but we should be. Iran was able to raise the price of oil from around $55 to over $100 a barrel in less than a year by shooting off their mouth with empty rhetoric. In this case, Nigeria is one of the top 4 exporters of oil into the United States, and this isn't empty rhetoric.

The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) yesterday vowed to cripple oil exports from the Niger Delta region by providing arms including anti-aircraft gunships to the leader of the Niger Delta Vigilante Movement, Mr Ateke Tom in what it said was a renewed bid to counter any possible offensive by Federal Government's Joint-military Task Force against it.

Specifically, the support, MEND said, would be in form of providing him their fighters and making available heavy duty war machines including anti-aircraft to ensure that they present a formidable front to counter Federal troops.

They, therefore warned that "Civilians inside capital cities in the Niger Delta states of Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers are advised to avoid milling around army check points and armoured personnel carriers as they have become targets for attacks by explosive devices".

Make no mistake, this is by definition a political insurgency. The US has no military presence in Nigeria, nor are we likely to anytime soon, and even during the best of times the relationship between Nigeria and the US is strained at best. MEND has established a specific objective, and if they succeed you will almost certainly feel it in your wallet.

MEND commended their men within the armed forces ofthe country for their infiltration of the intelligence channel which enabled the leakage of the document prepared on how to annihilate them. "We salute our agents inside the Armed Forces for ajob well done! The leakage of classified information meant to annihilate us during a fraudulent peace initiative has prepared us for the bloody fightin 2008. Our goal remains to paralyse 100 percent of Nigeria's oil export in one swoop" they boasted.

The fighting has been bloody, very bloody. A few months ago reporters in Nigeria attempted to get an exact figures of casualties by Nigerian government troops fighting MEND, and the number was well into the hundreds, with the actual number never confirmed. The Nigerian government has been resolved in the past to handle this situation themselves.

We will not see a public US politician discuss this issue, or I'd expect we wouldn't, but it is a very important issue nonetheless. Every political candidate who debated on Saturday night talked about helping middle class this and fighting terrorism that, big plans for this and that etc etc..

If MEND is successful, it will impact the average Americans wallet more than any campaign issue discussed by the candidate gaggle. From home heating oil to driving to work, events in Nigeria matter more to the average American than the vast majority of crap coming from candidates for US President, and if MEND is successful in cutting off Nigeria's oil output you'll hear all about it, after it is too late.

Makes one wonder what actually got loaded on HSV Swift before it deployed. I think it would be a shame if it wasn't something in response to this recent announcement.

6th Fleet Focus: Nigerian River Delta

It remains to be seen what role the USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43) will play in the Nigerian River Delta when it deploys for its Global Fleet Station deployment later this year. The Nigerian River Delta problems are a mix of terrorism, internal insurgency, and maritime crime but because the issues are mostly political, not idealogical, it becomes politically complicated for external involvement, and it is questionable whether the US would assist Nigeria even if asked for assistance.

A new report is out that is calculating the cost of energy troubles in Nigeria. $14 billion dollars a year, or 600,000 barrels a day.

Nigeria loses $14 billion a year to oil theft, according to Stephen Hayes, the president of the Corporate Council on Africa.

The supposed monetary losses incurred by the oil-rich West African country were calculated based on the estimated number of barrels of lost production due to corruption and crime, said Hayes.

"If you are losing 600,000 barrels a day on oil at $70 a barrel, you are losing $12 million a day on oil theft," Hayes told Nigerian newspaper This Day.

Before stepped-up hostilities by militant and other armed groups in the Niger Delta beginning in late 2005, Nigeria claimed to be producing about 2.5 million bpd. Since then, production has reportedly decreased by at least 20 percent, perhaps even by one-third, warn some analysts.

These types of security problems are becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. Not only does the energy represent a loss to the larger global economic system, but the black market created from the theft tends to destabilize regional nations as well, leading to further regional insecurity and an increase in regional black market activity.

With this in mind, the SNMG1 African cruise appears to be focused on gathering information about the regional security issues. It is unclear what the information will be used for, but understanding the problem is a critical first step to acting on a solution.

6th Fleet Focus: 1000 Ship Navy, From Rhetoric to Response

Standing NATO Maritime Group ONE (SNMG 1) has deployed for its circumnavigation of Africa. Consisting of the Flagship USS Normandy (CG 60) the group also includes, HNLMS Evertsen (F805), HMCS Toronto (FFH 333), NRP Alvares Cabral (F331), HDMS Olfert Fischer (F355), and FGS Spessart (A1442). This is going to be an interesting deployment to watch, not only for its efforts later next month in Somalia, but also in its efforts over the coming weeks in the Gulf of Guinea.

This blog has covered the various US Navy activities in the Gulf of Guinea region, starting with the donation of the Automatic Identification System to Sao Tome and Principe ($18 million maritime radar system) to the SeaBee construction for the Sao Tome and Principe Coast Guard to the excellent work frigates like the USS Kaufman (FFG 59) and USS Doyle (FFG 39) as they prepare the way for the USS Fort McHenry Global Fleet Stations deployment.

Back on June 25th Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the current president of Liberia, wrote an OP-ED that ran on the popular allafrica.com news site titled Africa: Africom Can Help Governments Willing to Help Themselves. In the OP-ED, she makes the case for US engagement to Africa.

Since the announcement of the creation of Africom, a new unified American combatant command responsible for Africa, there has been much skepticism over its intent and what it will be able to achieve on the continent. Africom should be seen for what it is: recognition of the growing importance of Africa to U.S. national security interests, as well as recognition that long-term African security lies in empowering African partners to develop a healthy security environment through embracing good governance, building security capacity, and developing good civil-military relations.

The Africom charter specifies that the new command will focus on conflict prevention, rather than intervention. It will work with African states and regional organizations, such as the African Union and Ecowas, in coordination with other donor countries, to improve security capabilities and promote military professionalization and accountable governance.

In July the Congressional Research Office updated its report on "Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa" where it outlines how the United States got to the point of creating AFRICOM. One of the most interesting aspects of AFRICOM most people are not aware of is where the political support comes from. As it turns out, the key politician that has been pushing for the creation of AFRICOM is Senator Russ Feingold. On January 10th, 2007 he used his time on the Senate Floor to outline his expectations for AFRICOM, which turns out, is very much in line with what the Global Fleet Station and the other deployments listed above are.

We have to be strategic and forward-thinking as we create this ne diverse and complex. We have a number of security-related concerns there, ranging from terrorist organizations and safe havens to large-scale corruption, regional conflicts, and the disruption of global energy markets. Continuing to establishing firm and productive military-to-military relations with a number of African nations is also critical.w organization, though. Because we are making such a profound change to our posture on the continent, we need to ensure that the new organization will contribute to, not define, the U.S. Government's overall strategy and objectives for the continent. We also need to make sure that the U.S. military's activities and involvement on the continent do not overshadow, skew, or otherwise hinder our Government's other key objectives.

It is clear that challenges in Africa are

But we have learned that the way to address the underlying causes of the security challenges throughout the continent is not generally through military power. In fact, the best way to address the full range of security-related concerns in Africa is to focus on the underlying conditions that plague governments and societies throughout the continent. Security threats and instability stem from corruption, absence of human rights, poverty, disease, lagging economies, and joblessness. Weak governments are incapable of addressing the dynamics that often contribute to lawlessness or violence, and are often left without any capacity to help defeat trans-national threats.

Bi-partisanship in Washington DC is mostly dead, but through a military effort in a mission other than war there is a chance for bipartisan support to AFRICOM if the DOD is successful early in its "missions other than war" focus. That won't be easy, piracy is an enormous problem in Africa, and local forces simply do not have the capabilities to deal with the problem. Engaging with local maritime forces will be a big part of improving the security situation.

It is still unclear if Nigeria will be exercising with SNMG1 as it approaches the Gulf of Guinea, but the Nigerian Navy deployed NNS Aradu (F89) and NNS Nwamba (???) for the time period SNMG 1 will be in the area. The Nigerian Navy deployment appears to include stops in Monrovia, Liberia and Dakar, Senegal before proceeding to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil for its bicentennial of Joaquin Marques Lisbon, the Marquis of Tamandaré on September 8th.

The NNS Aradu (F89) is a Meko 360 class warship that is returning to sea after a long absence. What does it say for the security of the Gulf of Guinea that the most powerful warship of all the regional nations is returning to sea for the first time in over 12 years? The NNS Nwamba on the other hand has been active since it was acquired. It is the former USCGC Firebush (WLB393), one of four coast guard cutters turned over to Nigeria in 2003 and commissioned into the Nigerian Navy in June of 2004. In 2005, the vessel proved it still has it, despite being 59 years old at the time when it traveled to the 200th anniversary of the Battle of Trafalgar.

For those who are interested, the other three Cat class ships the US gave Nigeria are the NSS Ologbo, NSS Obula and NSS Kyama. If you have read this far, your probably wondering "why all the detail, what's your point? My point is this.

In 2005 the US Navy sent a single ship to the 200th anniversary of the Battle of Trafalgar, the USS Saipan (LHA 2), a major diplomatic blunder in my opinion. Personally, I thought it nothing short of embarrassing. This type of blunder can't be made again, and an opportunity is approaching to insure this type of nonsense doesn't happen again. On the east coast of Africa, a natural regional partner in maritime security is emerging with India, and the US appears fully engaged.

The same is also true of the wast coast of Africa, where another natural regional maritime partner is emerging. Just like on the eest coast, the west coast partner is not an African nation, rather South American, and the US can ill afford not to be fully engaged with an emerging Brazil. As blogger Gallant of the Brazil Naval blog (English Link) points out, the SNMG 1 deployment to east Africa should be commonplace for the Brazilian Navy, but it isn't yet for a number of complicated reasons. That doesn't mean Brazil won't be engaged in the Gulf of Guinea region in the future, and the US needs to be ready when Brazil is ready by bringing Brazil into its 1000 Ship Navy model for the region sooner rather than later.

Pulling into Rio de Janeiro to celebrate Brazil's bicentennial in early September with a large Task Force would be a good place to start, hopefully the Bush administration isn't sleeping on South America and will realize such a deployment is anything but a bad investment for an east coast Strike Group at sea on training.