Admiral Greenert appears to be making some organizational changes within OPNAV. From Christopher Castelli at InsideDefense (subscription only).Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert plans to shake up the organization of his staff, reincarnating the role of a single baron overseeing warfighting programs, sources tell Inside the Pentagon.Almost every CNO makes organizational changes in OPNAV intended to provide savings in one way or the other. Rarely does that work as designed The article goes on to discuss how we got to where we are today.
The new plan would create a three-star leadership position for warfare integration, dubbed N9, to oversee the requirements shops that now report to the Navy's three-star chief for resources and requirements (NCool, industry and Navy sources said.
"Bottom line, N8 is so busy with budget drills and non-stop meetings, there is little time for oversight of warfighting wholeness," an industry source said. A Navy source echoed that sentiment.
Vice Adm. William Burke, a submariner in charge of the Navy's fleet readiness and logistics, is slated to move into the new N9 role, the sources said, noting the admiral is considered an honest broker for all warfighting capabilities.
In some ways, the plan marks a return to the sort of organization that former Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Vern Clark introduced. Under that approach, the Navy's long-term modernization needs were the domain of the deputy chief of naval operations for warfare requirements and assessments (N6/N7). In creating that post, initially dubbed N7, Clark took from N8 its longstanding role overseeing the directorates that develop requirements for submarines, ships, aircraft and other systems. That left N8 -- the deputy chief of naval operations for resources, requirements and assessments -- with the responsibility for near-term investment decisions.First, if you are going to pick an Admiral to play Pentagon czar, hard to pick someone better than Admiral Burke. At minimum this change reflects solid judgement on the CNOs part.
Clark sought a healthy tension between the two offices, but the arrangement did not sit well with his successor, Adm. Michael Mullen, a former N8 chief who ascended to the CNO's job in July 2005 -- and, years later, became the nation's top military officer.
Mullen rolled back Clark's organizational approach. In November 2005, the N6/N7 and N8 staffs of about 1,200 personnel, including contractors, were merged under N8 with an eye toward restoring the N6 post as a separate senior-level position.
A lot of this is musical chairs inside the box that doesn't really matter to anyone outside the Navy, but here is a short outsiders take. There is no guaranteed right way to organize OPNAV into a model of efficiency - although I'd love to be proven wrong about that. What we do know is that the Mullen model for OPNAV that has been in place has been ineffective at best, because N8 had become too ridiculously powerful making virtually everyone else a paper pushing nobody constantly seeking to impress N8. The results were that the shipbuilding budget, for example, was never the same from year to year and often could change more than once in a single fiscal year. For whatever reason, N8 has been unable to plan beyond a single budget cycle and everyone suffered - and that was before the problem was compounded by Congressional political games with the defense budget that has added even more instability.
So in my opinion, the CNOs reorganization is a net positive solely on the merit of changing the existing organization of OPNAV which has a record of being inefficient and ineffective. The way I see it, N8 has been too powerful, and the worst case scenario is that N9 becomes too powerful instead - which is also a nice way of noting it can't get any worse, only just as bad.
It does raise one question though - where does this leave N5?
