Late
last month, the CIMSEC NextWar blog carried an excellent post by LT Michael
Glynn, a Naval Aviator from the Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance community,
on the potential
utility of introducing a long-range anti-ship missile capability in the new P-8
Poseidon. LT Glynn observes that though the P-8 is armed with the legacy
Harpoon Block IC anti-ship cruise missile and slated to receive the Harpoon
Block II, both weapons lack the range to provide the aircraft with much
standoff distance from its prey. This standoff deficit is problematic, as a P-8
tasked with performing a Harpoon engagement would be placed at undue risk if it
faced adversary ships that either carried long-range Surface to Air Missiles
(SAM) or were operating under the defensive coverage provided by land-based
SAMs or fighters.
LT
Glynn also points out that the Navy already plans to use the P-8 to provide
over-the-horizon targeting support to other anti-ship missile-armed platforms.
This is logical, as the P-8’s onboard radar is capable of classifying a surface
contact’s type from some distance away using its Inverse
Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR) imaging mode.
LT
Glynn therefore argues the Poseidon would serve as a superb platform for the
Navy’s planned Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM). He notes that the P-8’s
combat radius and endurance, speed, and potential ability to confound an
adversary’s anti-airbase targeting apparatus by engaging in dispersed flight
operations from developed auxiliary airbases would make it a formidable
anti-ship asset if armed with the >200nm
LRASM.
I
have no personal position on whether any particular future anti-ship missile should be
integrated with P-8; I'll leave the operational and technical analyses on that to the professionals. He is
absolutely correct, though, that the P-8 could provide significant additional
offensive airborne anti-surface capability to a theater commander. This would be especially true during
periods in which the available aircraft carriers in theater (or long-range land-based bombers for that matter) are tasked with higher-priority missions. Of course, this assumes the U.S. could secure air superiority in P-8 operating areas.
I
also want to point out that the P-8’s electro-optical sensors might be just as
valuable as its radar for providing over-the-horizon targeting support to other
platforms. I’ve long argued
that visual classification of contacts will be necessary to have high
confidence that scarce long-range guided weapons are not being wasted against
decoys. Even
ISAR can, in theory, be susceptible to electronic countermeasures. Consequently, the greater the
range at which a P-8 can visually classify a contact under supportive
environmental conditions, the higher the potential value of its targeting
picture. This range would likely not be great enough for a P-8 to perform
visual classification at a safe standoff range from a well-defended ship, however. As a result, the Poseidon would only be able to independently perform the task at low risk if
the adversary’s defenses were either relatively short-ranged or could be readily suppressed.
This
highlights the need for visual-range targeting support by a fairly survivable
(or expendable) scout further forward, especially in locations where the adversary possesses air superiority. Indeed, even a P-8 armed with an
extended range anti-ship weapon would benefit from the tactical picture relayed
by such a scout.
The views expressed herein are solely those of the
author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the
official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s
knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of
Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.
