"The Worlds Symbol of Hope in Disaster"

ORNDOC BAY, Philippines (Nov. 16, 2013) Sailors from the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Mustin (DDG 89) and Philippine Army soldiers unload international aid from an MH-60S Sea Hawk helicopter from the Island Knights of Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 25 as an MH-60R Sea Hawk helicopter from the Warlords of Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron (HSM) 51 prepares to land. HSC-25, HSM-51 and Mustin are with the George Washington Carrier Strike Group, which is supporting the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade in assisting the Philippine government in ongoing relief efforts in response to the aftermath of Super Typhoon Haiyan. (U.S. Navy photo by Lt. j.g. Timothy Tran/Released))

Last week I was sitting on the couch with my 3rd grader. It was almost 9pm, well past her bedtime. She was finishing her homework late due to being out that evening shopping with mom, and I was enjoying a book as I tend to do in the evenings. We have a family rule that during homework time, the television is allowed to be on only as long as it is on the a Music Choice station - in most cases the Alternative music station.

My daughter finished her homework about 8:59, and I changed the channel over to CNN to see how Anderson Cooper was going to lead into his show. While I do not watch cable news very often, I had noted from Twitter that Anderson Cooper was in the Philippines, and I was very curious how CNN was reporting the response to the Typhoon.

As I was telling my daughter that her evening still isn't done, Thursday night being bath night, there was a silent pause in our conversation so we could have a staring contest between dad and daughter over this new 'bath time' information that was not being well received. In that silent moment, Anderson Cooper made a comment like "US Navy helicopters have become a global symbol of hope during crisis."

I got distracted when hearing that phrase, and repeated it out loud to myself. My daughter then asked me a question, "What does crisis mean?" My immediate thought was how fortunate I am that my eight year old child has never had to learn the meaning of that word crisis from experience. As I explained the definition, describing the term within the context of disaster, CNN flashes a picture of an MH-60 helicopter delivering humanitarian assistance to the people of the Philippines. My daughter, a right-brained thinker who has grown up heavily influenced by her much older left brained-sister, noted it is the same helicopter that I have a picture of on my office wall - a picture of the Bay Raiders of HSC-28 Det 2 from the Bataan's incredibly long 2011 deployment.

The voice of power interrupts our little conversation as mom sends my daughter up to the shower.

Fast forward to Wednesday night, where again the family is gathered to read and do homework listening to excellent music, as per our usual routine. That evening my youngest daughter asked me to check her paragraph. The classwork for the evening is for the students to write a paragraph based on an article written in this weeks Time For Kids magazine and other materials from school related to the Typhoon that hit the Philippines. I checked the TFK website, the article in the print version is not the same article they have online. On Thursday, exchanging emails with my daughters teacher, I was able to get the back story.

Every Monday the students discuss current events from the weekend. This weeks current event topic for class is the Typhoon. Several of the boys in the class had watched the news with their parents over the weekend and the centerpiece of the class discussion was the USS George Washington (CVN 73). The teacher, because she is freaking awesome, quickly pulled up a picture of the ship for the class to help the students fully appreciate how big an aircraft carrier is. My daughter, according to the teacher, contributed to this conversation by repeating her interpretation of what Anderson Cooper said - describing Navy helicopters as "the worlds symbol of hope in disaster."

For the art project this week, the students were asked to draw a picture related to the Typhoon, which are then placed around the classroom for the week. Due to my daughter leaving a form that needed to be filled out in her classroom, I walked into my daughters classroom with her to see the art the students had produced hanging on the walls of the classroom. There were pictures of aircraft carriers and helicopters, Marines and even a few dark pictures of broken homes and sad people, and in the center of the room my daughter showed me her picture - which was very similar to my picture of the Bay Raiders from HSC-28 in my office, except with gold glitter and glue she had written "The worlds symbol of hope in disaster."

Since the release of the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, the United States has not hesitated to commit major naval capabilities to humanitarian response and disaster recovery. While it isn't necessarily a new thing to commit aircraft carriers for HADR, the increased frequency of committing major naval capabilities like entire Carrier Strike Groups for that purpose can be specifically attributed to the elevated emphasis of humanitarian assistance and disaster response outlined in CS21. I do believe Anderson Cooper is on to something, and the US Navy helicopter has in fact become a symbol of hope in crisis around the world.

That symbolism is important, and represents a much stronger strategic communication than I have previously appreciated. Six years after the release of CS21 I note that it is primarily because of an active HADR policy by PACOM  - using aircraft carriers to respond to crisis in places like the Philippines and Japan, and building upon the 2005 Tsunami response by the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72); the forward deployed aircraft carrier in the Pacific is no longer simply a symbol of American military power communicating political influence to the governments of the region, but thanks to the consistent great work of the helicopter squadrons supporting humanitarian assistance and disaster response, the aircraft carrier has also become a symbol of American power representing hope during crisis to the people of the region during their times of legitimate need.

That second part has significantly greater positive ramifications in support of America's "Pivot to Asia" policy than the first part, because regional support of the United States at the population level defuses criticism of American forward based presence while simultaneously reinforcing the value of the United States as the regions primary security provider, and by using "hard power" assets in support of HADR a positive American "soft power" message is being communicated to a broader audience than just the political level of the regional governments.

From the PACOM Playbook to PACOM's Plan B(MD)

WATERS TO THE WEST OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA (March 17, 2024) The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS John S. McCain (DDG 56), front, the Republic of Korea Navy Aegis-class destroyer ROKS Seoae-Yu-Seong-Ryong (DDG 993), middle, and the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS McCampbell (DDG 85) move into formation during exercise Foal Eagle 2013. McCampbell and McCain are members of Destroyer Squadron 15, forward deployed to Yokosuka, Japan, and are underway to conduct exercise Foal Eagle 2013 with allied nation Republic of Korea in support of regional security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Declan Barnes/Released)

Every year as winter ends in March, North Korea holds an annual military exercises as part of their spring training period that usually concludes with a big meeting with all the leaders in early April. This years meeting appears to have occurred on April 1st with the announcement that North Korea will restart their dead reactor. Despite news reports, I am skeptical that reactor will be back online this calendar year.

This annual training period in North Korea typically coincides with South Korea and the United States holding their annual Foal Eagle and Key Resolve exercises. For the past few years the pattern has been fairly consistent with North Korea being extra threatening (and feeling extra threatened) and usually a war of words breaks out for about a month or so. Once the US/South Korean military exercises end, North Korea will call for negotiations and take credit for resolving the crisis they manufactured in the first place. Last year when this chess game was over, many in the US had a bad taste in their mouth unhappy with the result, and as a result a lot of thought and planning by PACOM went into this years Foal Eagle 2013 exercises.

Everyone who follows me on Twitter might have noticed about mid-February that I was gearing up for this years annual chess match on the North Korean peninsula. I will never be an Asia expert, but I admit to being fascinated by the North Korean government that has somehow remained completely resilient to any type of external influence for over a half century. In particular North Korea, not China, is a subject I like to raise when talking about geopolitical issues in the Pacific with Admirals and Generals, because with North Korea the biggest threat is the lack of good intelligence.

Earlier this year I was following up with various Admirals and Generals I had met over 2012. As part of those calls I had a long conversation with someone I have gotten to know at PACOM on AirSea Battle and specifically the Pacific region; and more specifically we often discuss North Korea, not China. I was informed that the 2013 Foal Eagle exercise would be something I, in particular, would appreciate because it truly leverages public affairs within the context of both strategic communications and operations; a topic I have frequently written about. I was given no hints as to what this meant, except I was told Secretary Panetta had set aside extra funding for the Air Force for Foal Eagle 2013, and most of the details were already worked out. This conversation took place 2 months ago.

The Playbook

Adam Entous and Julian Barnes at the Wall Street Journal have revealed the US script that has played out over the month of March. Described as the 'Playbook', they detail events in their latest Wall Street Journal article.

The U.S. is putting a pause to what several officials described as a step-by-step plan the Obama administration approved earlier this year, dubbed "the playbook," that laid out the sequence and publicity plans for U.S. shows of force during annual war games with South Korea. The playbook included well-publicized flights in recent weeks near North Korea by nuclear-capable B-52 and stealth B-2 bombers, as well as advanced F-22 warplanes.

The U.S. stepped back from the plans this week, as U.S. officials began to worry that the North, which has a small nuclear arsenal and an unpredictable new leader, may be more provoked than the U.S. had intended, the officials said.

"The concern was that we were heightening the prospect of misperceptions on the part of the North Koreans, and that that could lead to miscalculations," a senior administration official said.

The Wall Street Journal goes on to detail the Playbook, even describing Secretary Hagel as one of the playbook's chief backers, even though I know for fact the Playbook was actually written by PACOM on Secretary Panetta's watch and with his full support. The article then highlights the meat of the politics.

The public-relations effort was designed not only to send a message to North Korea, but also to assure a hawkish new government in South Korea that it had full U.S. backing and there was no need for it to respond militarily to the North's provocations.

U.S. intelligence agencies assessed the risks associated with the playbook and concluded there was a low probability of a North Korean military response because the regime's top priority has been self-preservation. U.S. officials believe the North understands that taking military action could prompt a devastating U.S. and South Korean counter-strike that could destabilize the regime.

"Everyone is concerned about miscalculation and the outbreak of war. But the sense across the U.S. government is that the North Koreans are not going to wage all-out war," a senior Obama administration official said. "They are interested first and foremost in regime survival."

The U.S. plan was discussed during several high-level White House meetings, according to participants. The effort was backed by Mr. Hagel in one of his first acts as defense secretary. John Kerry, the new secretary of State, supported the Pentagon, as did other top administration officials, according to meeting participants.

In the deliberations, supporters said it was better for the U.S. to control the escalating steps, to ensure the situation didn't spin out of control. In part, according to these officials, the plan was an effort to ensure that South Korea's new government wouldn't feel compelled to respond to North Korean threats, which often emerge at the time of the exercises, as the North conducts its own annual legislative meeting.

But within the administration, some officials voiced concern about unintended consequences of provoking North Korea. Some of these officials questioned the faith the White House and Pentagon placed in the intelligence agencies, which have a mixed record of predicting North Korean behavior.

The intelligence gaps are particularly acute when it comes to reading new North Korean leader Kim Jong Eun, who remains an obscure figure and someone who intelligence agencies themselves have described as potentially more unpredictable than his father.

However, few objections were raised at the highest levels during the meetings, according to participants—unlike in other Obama administration deliberations about using military force abroad, including Libya, Northwest Africa and Syria, that have been marked by protracted debates. President Barack Obama gave the green light to proceed with the playbook, these people said.

The First Quarter: March

The Playbook was intended to function as escalation control by the Obama administration. As someone who jumps online every night at 8pm EST to read the morning news in North Korea, allow me to suggest the Playbook worked better than expected. When North Korea abandoned the Armistice back on March 10, it was clear to observers that North Korea was operating from a script. As I discussed at that time, escalation control was the key to managing the tensions, and I do think the US still maintains escalation control over the situation today, with or without the old Playbook.

As I have observed the US airpower show of force that has visited South Korea over the past month, I found myself in huge admiration for how well the US was playing the game with North Korea in 2013. What headlines that bluster the presence of US military power failed to mention is that every single aircraft that has been flown over South Korea over the past month had been planned many months ago as part of the planning process for the Foal Eagle 2013 exercise. This was never a secret btw, I exchanged emails with a public affairs officer who confirmed this for me right after B-52s made their appearance on March 19. The B-52s, the B-2s, the F-22s, etc... all those flights and activities were planned to appear in Foal Eagle long ago, and there was nothing new or reactionary by the United States taking place as events unfolded throughout March. While bombers and advanced fighters have been involved in previous Foal Eagle exercises, the key distinction this year was the announced use of those platforms.

Unlike previous years, this year the US publicized the presence of B-2s and F-22s through defense public affairs, because otherwise North Korea (or you and I) would never know they were involved in the exercises, even though the actual flights by those aircraft were planned and paid for months ago. So what is new this year? The public affairs piece that mentions their presence and activity, and the PA professionals who were able to mingle those activities into the context of the North Korean rhetoric - so reporters could go write plenty of news stories - is the only thing that is actually different from the US/SK perspective relative to previous years. Talk is cheap, which may explain why our defense public affairs folks are actually pretty good at it when given the green light.

Throughout the entire month of March as North Korea has stepped through their well orchestrated script for escalating tensions in the region, the US has been following a script of their own; a script written long ago for the Foal Eagle exercises and supported fully by the White House. In my opinion, everything North Korea is doing - even through today - is part of their script, and everything we have been doing has been part of our script. The intelligence officials in the WSJ report are right, there is no evidence that North Korea is off script. We do not know what their script is, but there does appear to be broad agreement that North Korea didn't write a script that ends with them being wiped out in a war. Neither script was written in a way that predicted the others actions, and public affairs and the use of media by both North Korea and the US is solely responsible for connecting the activities of the other side.

It would appear that in the end, the actions contained in the North Korean script forced us to abandon our script.

April Fools Day

If the US and North Korea have been playing a game of chicken as each side executed their scripted events in the public sphere, it is now clear that beginning on April Fools Day North Korea won that game of chicken, and the US was the first to flinch.

Every military activity related to the Korean peninsula discussed in the public was part of the script until on Tuesday - for the first time - the narrative being produced by US media was no longer fully incorporated into the Playbook. The retasking of USS Decatur (DDG 73) to head towards North Korea was a new event, and everyone who follows naval power closely knew it. The problem was, PACOM was one ballistic missile defense destroyer short of what was needed to meet demand signal coming from North Korean activities.

While most of the media made a big deal about the USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) being close to the Korean peninsula, the fact is the US Navy has a BMD capable destroyer on that patrol every single day of the year. Without going into too much detail, USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) is on a regular patrol that gives the United States an early warning detection capability should someone in Asia launch a ballistic missile at us. There is an AEGIS warship there 24/7/365 and on leap year day too. As soon as the media started talking about USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) and USS Decatur (DDG 73), neither of which has any attachment to Foal Eagle 2013 or the Playbook, apparently that is when the Obama administration got nervous and pulled back on the Playbook.

But here is the issue: PACOM needed USS Decatur (DDG 73) because there wasn't another BMD ship available. Attention Congress, there is a capacity issue in 7th Fleet for BMD capable destroyers in the Obama administrations 'pivot to Asia' plan, because the Navy fell short one forward deployed BMD capable warship when PACOM came calling in regards to a North Korean crisis.

The challenge PACOM faces is that PACOM believes North Korea is going to be launching a ballistic missile soon, but the difference between this ballistic missile and previous North Korean ballistic missile launches is that this missile has a mobile launching platform. That makes the launch time of the next ballistic missile an unknown, and just as important the launch point for the next ballistic missile an unknown. This combination of unknown time and unknown launch location requires PACOM to cover every threat axis from North Korea in this threat environment, just in case, to insure regional security.

What you have been reading in the press is only partially correct, because there are actually nine US Navy ballistic missile defense capable warships operating throughout the 7th Fleet today, not two or three as has been reported. As we navalists know, AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense is an integrated network approach to developing a very large regional shield where each ship is both a radar and a shooter, and by integrating other assets in the region, the Navy can track a ballistic missile at launch and potentially develop a firing solution within only a handful of seconds. The more sensors and the better the quality of data, the faster a threat assessment can be made by AEGIS thereby enabling options for response quickly. This process is one that the Navy is well trained for, and in complicated exercises has practiced successfully in actual intercept events that last no longer than 20-30 seconds in practice windows that have spanned days.

While Foal Eagle and the "Playbook" was essentially a strategic communications exercise with North Korea in this environment of higher tension, when PACOM faced a situation where the potential for an actual missile launch in this environment became a legitimate possibility, PACOM has reacted by establishing a regional ballistic missile shield around our partners and bases. This regional ballistic missile defense shield layers around the Japanese ballistic missile defense capabilities, which can be integrated with the US Navy capability through AEGIS.

The US already has an X-Band radar in Japan that can track launches, additional radars in South Korea that can be utilized for launch detection, and nine BMD capable warships that can help track and develop firing solutions for intercepting any ballistic missile threat. Because the area that requires defense from the particular missile North Korea intends to launch is fairly vast, the US Navy ultimately was one ship short to meet the ballistic missile shield demand PACOM needed for full protection. When USS Decatur (DDG 73) was retasked, as a public asset outside the Playbook, political leaders got the impression they had lost escalation control with the Playbook and apparently gave it up. It is somewhat disappointing the Playbook was so rigid it couldn't adapt when inserting a new asset into it's strategic messaging.

Seapower as Strategic Deterrent

Throughout the duration of the cold war, mutually assured destruction is often credited for deterring nuclear war. While the debate over mutually assured destruction still exists today regarding the wisdom of the policy; the bottom line is MAD worked. Ballistic missile defense, in theory, adds a new strategic option for the United States in dealing with nuclear powers like North Korea that have limited capabilities. For the first time in human history, the United States is fielding a fully mature and developed ballistic missile defense shield to protect US allies and territories from an announced threat of nuclear attack.

One of the key strategic differences between ballistic missile defense as a deterrent and mutually assured destruction as a deterrent is that the United States is basically saying the enemy can shoot first, and if the attack is a nuclear attack but is also successfully defended against, then the United States reserves the option of responding without using nuclear weapons. This is a critical point critics of ballistic missile defense apparently don't believe is important, because a successful nuclear attack against US allies or territories requires a nuclear response. The option of not having to respond to a nuclear attack with nuclear weapons is the value of successful ballistic missile defense, and why smart investment and stewardship of ballistic missile defense is in the best interests of the United States.

It has been reported that the deployment of land based interceptors to Alaska is going to cost one billion dollars. That suggests the latest announcement that THAAD interceptors will be deployed to Guam will probably also cost one billion dollars. THAAD interceptors are expensive, and about half the time they even work. Those two land based ballistic missile defense deployments cost as much as a single new AEGIS ballistic missile defense destroyer, and while the AEGIS system is only capable of intercepting ballistic missiles in the very early and final stages of a ballistic missiles flight, the AEGIS BMD system has a much more reliable track record and has been tested under much more realistic conditions, including multiple targets and decoys, unlike the THAAD system. An AEGIS ballistic missile defense destroyer is also mobile, which is why the US Navy will be protecting Guam with an AEGIS ballistic missile defense warship for the next several weeks until the THAAD system can be deployed to Guam.

In theory THAAD is more capable than the AEGIS system because it can intercept at a higher altitude. The problem is THAAD is less reliable than AEGIS, less mature than AEGIS, and more expensive than AEGIS; but for now it is all the US has.

There is another reason why I believe Seapower is important right now as a strategic deterrent. I believe North Korea's creativity is interesting primarily because they are limited by means and are simplistic in method, and sometimes North Korean methods are so simple they appear absurd at first glance. North Korea publicized today that they have "smaller, lighter and diversified" nuclear weapons, which in theory makes some sense because they have only a limited supply of material to make nuclear weapons with. I know it has been something of a running joke for years, but if things go hot I would not be surprised if North Korea tried to deliver a nuclear weapon via a sea mine rather than by missile. North Korea is very skilled in developing sea mines, but not so much when it comes to rocket technologies. The ability to keep North Korea's naval forces from causing any problems is going to be important over the next month in preventing a war. An incident like the sinking of the Cheonan 3 years ago right now could spark a chain of events that leads to Korean War II, but an even worst case scenario is if North Korea was to find a way to sink a US or Japanese warship, because that puts South Korea in the middle of a crossfire.

Halftime Adjustments

While I can understand why PACOM called in the US Navy to build a regional ballistic missile defense shield when it became clear North Korea might launch a ballistic missile from a mobile launcher, I don't understand why the Obama administration threw out the Playbook and then ran off to tell the Wall Street Journal about it. Regardless, someone clearly needs to clue Hagel in on a little secret: Seapower is the winning playbook if the objective is to prevent war.

The ballistic missile defense shield PACOM is setting up is a defensive capability. It is also a very limited piece of the US Navy's capability - indeed it's only a small piece of the surface combatants being used for the ballistic missile defense shield. There are no carriers projecting power into the Yellow Sea, there are no submarines launching missiles, and there are no amphibious ships preparing to send Marines ashore in South Korea.

If North Korea does continue to escalate further, and I believe they will, the Stennis Carrier Strike Group is deployed and is currently in port in Singapore, and the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group is deployed currently off the US west coast heading east. Those two carriers represent 100+ aircraft that can project power as needed in any contingency, and can do so right into downtown Pyonyang if necessary.

And if tensions result in a hot war, those submarines nobody in North Korea can detect will be the first strike that knocks out the Command and Control capabilities of North Korea in the first minutes of hot war.

And if for some reason the US needs to reinforce the South Korean Army, US Marines will be delivered into theater from amphibious ships.

And if, God forbid, a nuclear device goes off in South Korea, the nearby SSBN that no nation on the planet can find today will make sure Pyonyang is melted off the face of the planet.

American Seapower is inherently designed to be an escalation control mechanism for political leaders during a crisis. Seapower is a stabilizing presence capable of preserving peace through projecting strength or providing defensive, and an enabling capability when it is time to deliver the US Army to win a war.

No matter what the Playbook was last week, the winning Playbook for the US going forward dealing with North Korea is Seapower. Military strategists have spent most of the 21st century convincing political leaders in Washington that US military power is best exercised with land power - in Asia of all places, but hopefully with a splash of cold water called the threat of nuclear war, political leaders are waking up to the historical reality that Seapower is how Superpowers manage enduring peace without being intrusive on the sovereignty of partners. Seapower enables nations to enjoy enduring prosperity through maintenance of stability, lines of communication for trade, and security. Seapower is also going to be how PACOM will be managing peace in the Pacific crisis of the present and future, so I hope those involved with Hagel's strategic review are paying attention.

It's only April 4th, Foal Eagle still has 25+ more days. It is going to be a long month with plenty more threatening rhetoric and behavior ahead. Is a ballistic missile launch how this ends? Maybe, but I still believe North Korea desires a limited skirmish of some sort as part of their script, although it could be that the Playbook has actively deterred that potential outcome.

There is a lot of good analysis of the situation in North Korea out there. I highly recommend two sites in particular that may not be part of your regular web readings. The Interpreter Blog at the Australian Lowy Institute is always a great source for analysis of events in the Pacific, and in particular North Korea right now; and just about everything written by Jeffery Lewis these days covers every angle of North Korean nukes and missiles.

CSIS Asia Pacific Posture Assessment

PACIFIC OCEAN (July 27, 2024) The aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN 68) and the amphibious assault ship USS Essex (LHD 2) are underway in close formation during the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2012 exercise. Twenty-two nations, more than 40 ships and submarines, more than 200 aircraft and 25,000 personnel are participating in the biennial RIMPAC exercise from June 29 to Aug. 3, in and around the Hawaiian Islands. The world's largest international maritime exercise, RIMPAC provides a unique training opportunity that helps participants foster and sustain the cooperative relationships that are critical to ensuring the safety of sea lanes and security on the world's oceans. RIMPAC 2012 is the 23rd exercise in the series that began in 1971. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Raul Moreno Jr./Released) 

 

 

Section 346 of the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act directed the Defense Department to commission an independent assessment of U.S. force posture in Asia. This task was assigned to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, who has delivered a very excellent report that will be discussed in the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness at 2:00pm on Wednesday, August 1, 2024.

I had never heard of David Berteau before this report, he just never popped up on my radar, but he's in my A+ list because this guy is a serious professional, and the report reflects exactly that. In my opinion, the U.S. Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region: An Independent Assessment by CSIS is exactly the kind of high bar quality we should expect from the Defense Think Tank community. CSIS has delivered quality taxpayer funded work, and should be proud of their effort.

So enjoy the report, and see also this unclassified response from Secretary Panetta regarding the report. I do believe many in this audience will appreciate the high quality work delivered in this report on a very relevant topic.

Below are only a few (of the many) thoughts inspired by my reading of this report. I encourage the community to contribute your own analysis and commentary in the comments.

Engage the Army
Did you read the Army prepositioning article in the New York Times I linked to Monday. What I did not mention in that topic is that the article actually describes a change from the existing APS Strategy 2015, although surprisingly nobody in the comments apparently picked that up, and Army folks simply argued as if APS Strategy 2015 was still the plan. APS Strategy 2015 called for 9 prepositioning ships, but the Army didn't fund 9 ships, and while not fully funding all 9 ships the Army also decided to use that afloat space as the storage facility for MRAPS rather than as a traditional prepositioning squadron.

From what I am seeing, all appearances are the US Army is simply checking boxes specific to MRAP storage and prepositioning rather than taking the prepositioning of Army assets forward in the Pacific seriously. I don't think many caught on to the changes that have been made to APS Strategy 2015, and I think folks believed this prepositioning squadron reported in the New York Times was exactly the same as traditional Army prepositioning squadrons, even though it is clearly something different. This approach to Army prepositioning, using it as afloat MRAP storage and reducing the size of prepositioning altogether in the Pacific appears to be counter to the recommendations on page 91 of the CSIS report.

Indeed I found it noteworthy that most of the recommendations on page 91 that are recommendations intended to better align the engagement strategy of PACOM with the DOD are specific to what the US Army needs to be doing. I'm a simple Navy nerd, but if I was an Army nerd, I would note that all data points suggest there is a huge vacuum of critically thinking about how the US Army has capabilities specifically relevant to the Pacific theater just waiting for some smart guy to start talking about with new ideas. If you think you're that guy, perhaps you need to be writing those ideas here on ID, because we welcome new ideas and unconventional thinking specific to the Pacific theater from smart Army folks. Dumb Army folks can go apply at Blackfive (just kidding!).

On Growing the High End
In option three, which is the option that increases the force posture in the Pacific, the report suggests a CSG in Perth and an ARG in Hawaii. Why did the authors not recommend a CSG in Hawaii and an ARG in Perth? The authors made clear in the report that basing a nuclear powered aircraft carrier in Australia was a huge political hurdle, and they also noted the enormous associated costs. So why the recommendation if it's almost certainly a no-go politically? From a political and financial perspective the CSG in Hawaii and ARG in Perth would appear to be the more politically viable approach, and if the ARG was centered around an America class LHA, would that not work as a nice middle ground approach? I find the 4 MAGTF argument in the report a very compelling discussion for forward basing a second ARG in the region, although with the neverending DoD pivot towards the Middle East rather than Asia, Perth makes more sense for that ARG to me than Hawaii does.

On Decreasing Posture
One of the things I try to do is question assumptions, and sometimes I do it even when I don't necessarily believe the assumptions are wrong. I found it curious that according to the CSIS report there is nothing whatsoever to be gained except affordability in the decreased posture option 4. I'm not sure I believe that a decrease in force posture in the Pacific can have only negative impacts to everything but cost, and decrease in force posture is inherently negative to US policy.

It seems to me that what option 4 reveals is that the report is written with an opening assumption that decreasing force posture in the Pacific is inherently a bad thing for US policy. That assumption bothers me because it presumes a lack of resiliency and trust in the capabilities of our allies without us there to hold their hand. I'm sorry, but I've had the pleasure to get to know and understand the capabilities of folks from Australia, South Korea, and Japan - three of the primary places in the Pacific US forces are being forward based under the current Pacific posture policy; and in my opinion CSIS has overvalued our handholding and undervalued the abilities of our allies. I am curious, upon reflection and feedback, if the authors have reconsidered their conclusions in option 4, even if only in parts, and considered the possibility of any (at all) benefits whatsoever in decreases in force posture, even if they are selective and specific about what those decreases are.

In my opinion, CSIS did not give the same intellectual rigor to option 4 that they appeared to give the rest of the study, because I find it very hard to believe the US could not reduce the military footprint in the Pacific in any way without only having negative impacts.

Ballistic Missile Defense Takes Center Stage in the Pacific

News broke yesterday that North Korea has been stepping up Air Force training and has begun fueling their rocket scheduled for launch next month. South Korea has already claimed they will shoot the rocket down if it crosses into their territory, and now Japan is saying the same thing.

Japan will shoot down any part of the long-range rocket that North Korea plans to launch next month that enters its territory, the Japanese defense minister, Naoki Tanaka, said Friday.

Speaking at a news conference, Tanaka said he had issued the official order after instructing the Japanese military earlier in the week to prepare the country's missile defense shield against the planned rocket launch.

North Korea announced earlier this month that it would launch a rocket carrying a satellite between April 12 and 16 to mark the 100th anniversary of the birth of Kim Il Sung, the founder of the Communist state.

I have no idea how South Korea could shoot the missile down. Patriot 2 missiles and SM-2 missiles simply don't have the range except under the most optimistic circumstances to shoot down the missile, but Japan fields better technology and has more capabilities like SM-3 to shoot it down.

The US Navy put the X-Band Radar Platform to sea last week, and from everything I hear - the West Sea is getting crowded with naval forces.

The launch is expected in two weeks. The US is rightfully leading from behind on this issue, supporting Japan and South Korea side by side but staying out of the spotlight. With USS Enterprise (CVN 65) soon to be heading towards the 5th Fleet AOR, I expect the USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) to rotate back to the Pacific, and sometime over the next 2 weeks I suspect we will see the USS George Washington (CVN 73) get underway.

The Commercial Argument

ADM Willard has his own set of talking points in the context of budget cuts, and they appear to make other arguments seem feeble in comparison.

“We feel strongly that the decisions that we make should be strategy-driven, so how do you think of our global commitments - strategically - and where the priorities ought to be placed?” said Willard, in an interview Monday at the Scripps Institute of Oceanography in San Diego during a short visit to the region. “I think Secretary Panetta is like-minded in this. He is reviewing this within the Washington environment. We are going to have those discussions.

“And in that debate, I think the Asia-Pacific region does very well, because of the economic importance that is obvious throughout the Asia-Pacific. The U.S. interest in the region very strong,” he said.

“I can’t imagine...the Asia-Pacific region wouldn’t hold high marks in terms of any global strategic view of where U.S. interests reside,” he added.

Some $5.3 trillion of commerce transits the waters of the South China region alone, and “1.2 (trillion) of that is U.S. annual trade,” Willard said. “This is the center of gravity for the global economy right now, and PACOM is there to protect it.”

The defense budget debate is ultimately about fixing our governments finances to get the economy moving. Nice to see a military leader talking apples and apples in this discussion.

U.S. Navy Officer's Death in Philippines Ruled a Homicide

In Manila last December, U.S. Navy Lieutenant Scintar Mejia died in what had been reported as a suicide. But as discussed in an earlier post, the conflicting reports left more questions than answers.

Not surprisingly, a joint investigation has revealed that Mejia's death was a homicide.

Today, it was announced that the Pasay city police chief recommended charges against 11 aviation policemen, five of whom will face homicide charges.

Navy Supply Corps Officer Dies in Custody in Manila

There are many, many questions that deserve answers in this tragic story.

According to news reports, Navy Lieutenant Scintar Mejia of Los Angeles, CA died Monday as a result of injuries suffered after reportedly jumping to his his death while in custody for alleged possession of cocaine. Mejia was a Filipino-American Navy Supply Corps officer selected for promotion to Lieutenant Commander.

A day earlier, Mejia was arrested at Ninoy Aquino International Airport as he passed through Terminal 2 security when security officials reportedly discovered a small packet containing .03 grams of a white powdery substance, initially reported as cocaine. Mejia allegedly became unruly, denied that he was carrying drugs, threw the packet at authorities, and accused them of setting him up for a crime. It was later determined that the substance was not cocaine.

Held overnight at the Police Center for Aviation Security at Terminal 1 at the airport, Mejia asked aviation police for permission to use the restroom. Reportedly, the restroom was in use and Mejia asked permission urinate outside. As he was escorted outside, Mejia reportedly dashed toward the stairs and dove toward the ground landing on the cement below.

The U.S. Naval Criminal Investigation Service (NCIS) is conducting an investigation in parallel with Pasay City police authorities.

There are many questions and contradicting information surrounding the circumstances of Mejia's arrest and death. The more recent reports from the Philippines are subsequent to the announcement that NCIS would participate in the investigation. These reports also seemingly attempt to paint Mejia as a drug trafficker, although there is little or nothing to back that up in the earlier reports.

Some of the relevant questions:

1. When did Mejia arrive in the Philippines? Earlier reports said he arrived sometime last week. More recent reports said he arrived on Christmas Day, just a day earlier.
2. How was the substance discovered? In the Philippine Star report, airport security Superintendent Manuel Pintado stated he was informed that Mejia himself removed the packet from his carry-on bag after it passed through the X-Ray machine. The AP reported that security officials discovered the packet.
3. How could Mejia have thrown the packet at security? If it was discovered by security, it was likely never in Mejia's hands. If Mejia pulled it from his bag, why would he have thrown it at security?
4. How much money did he have in his possession? Earlier reports made no mention of carrying a large amount of money. More recent reports state that he had over $30,000 in his possession.
5. What actually happened to Mejia while he was in custody?

Beyond the many inconsistencies in the reporting, there are a thousand questions that could be asked surrounding his time in custody and the exact circumstances surrounding the fatal fall. The one overarching question in this case is whether this whole tragedy is the result of a hudilap.

We may never find out.

韬光养晦

The literal translation is "hide brightness, nourish obscurity," but it is more commonly known as Deng Xiaoping's policy of "tao guang yang hui" toward international relations - which describes a policy of patiently keeping a low profile when forced into an unfavorable position and nourish your position until opportunity to act presents itself. Many scholars believe this has been the core philosophy driving policy in China for almost the past 3 decades, but I am starting to wonder if this policy is shifting right before our eyes in 2010.

I believe the attack by North Korea that sank the Cheonan may have become the catalyst for a policy shift by China away from Deng's "tao guang yang hui", and the United States is party to the events driving the policy shift. As the US and South Korea accumulated indisputable evidence regarding responsibility, China was repeatedly encouraged by the United States to join the international community in condemning the actions of North Korea. Ultimately, every diplomatic effort to achieve Chinese cooperation regarding the incident with small steps like condemnation over the incident ultimately failed - and the UN eventually lacked the political strength to name North Korea as the attacker in the UN statement on the incident.

At roughly the same time as the UN vote, the Chinese government issued a statement that they consider the South China Sea part of its "core interests" that concern China's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Previously, China had only regarded Taiwan and the Tibetan and Xinjiang Uygur autonomous regions as core interests vital to its territorial integrity. The significance of this new policy by China cannot be understated nor underestimated.

By the end of the first week of July, China had essentially blocked the United States in addressing the North Korean attack, claimed territorial rights over the South China Sea, and rejected all cooperation with constant condemnation of US activities in the region - specifically naval drills in the Yellow Sea and negotiations for military sales with Taiwan.

By mid July the Obama administration made a few adjustments to US policy with China. Note the developments:

First, at the ASEAN regional forum in Vietnam, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the United States intends to play a prominent role in a new regional effort to create a framework for resolving territorial disputes in the South China Sea. One side note about that speech that I don't think has been mentioned enough - Secretary of Defense Gates was in the room.

Second, the US will be sending an aircraft carrier into the Yellow Sea to exercise with South Korea, an action that has Chinese hawks very upset.

Third, the naval activities with Vietnam is just the latest sign that the US intends to remain present in the region, and specifically the South China Sea in support of the new US policy. It needs to be noted not every South China Sea nation is pleased with the new US position regarding South China Sea territorial rights.

Fourth, the US is about to sell more military equipment, including warships, to Taiwan knowing full well China will see this as another slap in the face.

This represents a full court press against China sending a clear signal that the United States is very frustrated with China given how the Cheonan incident played out. All four actions are diplomatic in nature, although much of the diplomacy at work here includes military-to-military cooperation and foreign military sales. Said another way, the US is speaking diplomatically with a naval power projection approach to the regions related to the issues. Our President is currently engaged in Roosevelt diplomacy with China - and just like Roosevelt - naval power is the leverage by which escalation is being managed.

As US naval forces populate the South China Sea and the Yellow Sea with an intended signal directed at China over the next few months, the question becomes whether China counters with a policy of patiently keeping a low profile when forced into an unfavorable position, and whether China will simply nourish their position patiently during these activities until the next opportunity to act presents itself? Or... does China do something different? I ask the question because right now our escalation controls of the friction between the US and China are based primarily on assumptions and expectations of our understanding regarding the Deng policy - an understanding built upon historic behavior.

But what happens if the Deng driven "tao guang yang hui" policy cycle is ending? How prepared are we for the impact of a different policy on our escalation control expectations? Is the Obama administration walking right into a potential incident with China? Worse, is the US walking into a proxy incident done by North Korea with Chinese top cover?

I'm not suggesting the US can concede at any level the sovereignty and territorial claims by China over the South China Sea, rather what I am saying is that other than blunting Chinese territorial claims to disputed territories in the South China Sea, it remains unclear to me what our other objectives are in this managed escalation of tensions between the United States and China. Are the actions we are undertaking consistent with an approach that encourages China into a familiar "tao guang yang hui" political mindset for dealing with US encroachment to areas near the Chinese coast, or are we pushing sufficiently to force China to change policies?

The Cheonan incident came and went, and the outcome was conceded by South Korea and the United States to consensus when the both nations decided a multilateral approach was more appropriate than a unilateral approach. Good folks can disagree on the merits of multilateral vs unilateral approaches to international problems or incidents (and I don't necessarily believe the multinational approach was wrong), but I tend to think that attacks by one nation on another nation represents a national sovereignty issue.

National sovereignty issues cannot be managed or controlled by a single party when an international consensus becomes the process. China has had a great deal of success influencing US policy towards North Korea and Iran by leveraging the quagmires that often result from seeking multinational consensus solutions to US policy initiatives towards those nations. That is why the new position by China regarding the South China Sea has been very effectively countered by the policy the US Secretary of State announced in Vietnam. Now that our opinion is a regional option for these territorial and sovereignty disputes, we have positioned ourselves to diplomatically disrupt Chinese policy interests with a consensus quagmire of our own.

But other than enabling this diplomatic option for South China Sea territorial disputes, what other objectives of national interest are we seeking with further escalation of tensions between the US and China? Given that our regional diplomacy efforts regarding China are being leveraged in large part with military power projection, I think PACOM needs to have a clear understanding of the objective desired before the US sends an aircraft carrier to exercise in the Yellow Sea.