Potential Chinese Anti-Ship Capabilities Between the First and Second Island Chains

Chinese Active Defense Layers (Office of Naval Intelligence graphic). Note that the range lines reflect where PLA aircraft and submarines might be expected to operate in wartime based on evidence to date. While PLA aircraft would be unlikely to fly further east from the second layer's line if U.S. and allied air coverage from bases along the Second Island Chain was strong, the same might not be true for PLAN SSNs. Also note that the maritime approaches to Luzon and the northern/central Ryukyus fall within the PLA's middle layer, and Taiwan and the southern Ryukyus within the inner layer.

There was a pretty lively debate in the comments to Chris Mclachlan’s post last month about the Combat Logistics Force. No one took issue with his observations that the CLF might be undersized for sustaining high-tempo forward U.S. Navy operations in the event of a major Sino-American war. Nor did anyone contest his argument that our replenishment ships lack the basic self-defense capabilities their Cold War-era predecessors carried. Instead, the debate focused on Chris’s assertion that CLF ships ought to be escorted during wartime by a small trans-oceanic surface combatant possessing medium-range anti-air and anti-submarine capabilities.

Needless to say, I agree with Chris’s view. Such an escort would be a necessary part of the overall combined arms solution set to protecting not only CLF assets but also the shipping that would surge reinforcements and materiel to embattled U.S. allies in East Asia, provide steady logistical sustainment to the U.S. and allied forces deployed to or based in those countries, and maintain the flow of vital maritime commerce to and from those countries. One rarely sees any of these four critical tasks acknowledged in discussions within the security studies community. I believe that represents a dangerous analytical oversight, as an American failure to adequately protect its own and its allies’ sea lines of communications in a war with China would be strategically disastrous. In today's post, I'm going to outline China's ability to threaten these lines in a notional major war. On Thursday, I'll outline how the U.S. and its allies might offset that threat.

Let’s first look at the strategic geography of the problem. The sea lanes in question pass through the waters between the First Island Chain and the line stretching from Hokkaido through the Bonins and Marianas to the Palaus (e.g,  the “Second Island Chain”). I’ve recently written about the PLAAF’s effective reach into the Western Pacific, and it’s been widely understood for years that late-generation PLAN submarines possess the technological capability to operate for several weeks in these waters before having to return to port. China would be hard-pressed to achieve localized sea control anywhere within this broad area; its own surface combatants and shipping would be just as vulnerable to attack. It wouldn’t need sea control, though, to achieve its probable campaign-level objectives of bogging down (or outright thwarting) an effective U.S. military response, or perhaps inflicting coercive economic pain upon one or more embattled American allies. The use of PLA submarines and strike aircraft to pressure U.S. and allied sea lines of communications would be entirely sufficient. And as Toshi Yoshihara and Martin Murphy point out in their article in the Summer ‘15 Naval War College Review, these kinds of PLA operations would be consistent with the Mao-derived maritime strategic theory of “sabotage warfare at sea,” albeit at a much greater distance from China’s shores than the theory originally conceived. Such operations have been widely discussed in Chinese strategic literature over the past two decades.[i]

It bears noting that our East Asian treaty allies like Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines would have inherent roles and responsibilities defending their sea lines of communication. Nevertheless, they probably would not be able to fulfill the mission entirely on their own given their maritime forces’ sizes and capabilities. There would probably need to be a geographical line of responsibility similar to what the U.S. and Great Britain worked out in the Atlantic during the Second World War; shipping protection west of the line would primarily be the ally’s responsibility, and the U.S. would be primarily responsible for shipping protection east of the line. Even so, the U.S. would probably still need to contribute escorts and supporting forces to assist the ally in protecting sea lanes that were within some threshold distance of the Chinese mainland. Shipping protection in the approaches to the Ryukyus, Taiwan, or western Luzon particularly come to mind.

While it is true that U.S. and allied forces could probably pressure the PLA’s ability to push submarines and aircraft through the Ryukyus’ various straits or the Luzon Strait in a war, they would probably not be able to fully seal those doors—at least not during the conflict’s early phases. The biggest reason for this would be the straits’ sheer proximity to the Chinese mainland: PLAAF/PLAN fighters would be readily able to escort their strike aircraft brethren out into the Western Pacific and back, not to mention threaten any U.S. or allied anti-submarine aircraft or surface combatants patrolling the straits. Granted, Chinese fighters would be exposed to any sea-based and mobile land-based area air defense systems covering the straits and their approaches. They might also be confronted by U.S. or allied fighters operating from austere island bases in the vicinity of the straits, or from aircraft carriers or land bases located at various distances “over the horizon” to the east. U.S. and allied defenders could additionally use any number of countertargeting tactics to reduce their susceptibility to attack.

However, even if the PLA could not damage or destroy many of these forces per raid, it could still take actions that effectively suppressed the straits “guardians.” One tactic might be to salvo land-attack or anti-radar missiles to distract the defenders or induce them to keep their “heads down” shortly before or during a straits transit. Another might be to damage runways or austere airstrips as possible in order to constrain the defenders’ air operations; repairs could take precious hours. Electronic attacks and tactical deception could also be used to screen transiting PLA aircraft and submarines. Periodic PLA suppression raids would neither be small undertakings nor without risk to the forces performing them, but they might be sustainable on an as-needed operational tempo for several weeks or months at minimum.

The other factor that would make it impossible to hermetically seal the First Island Chain barrier would be the difficulty in maintaining persistent U.S. or allied submarine coverage in all of the requisite straits. The U.S. presently has thirty-one non-special-purpose SSNs stationed in the Pacific; three are homeported in Guam and twenty in Pearl Harbor. Only a small number would be deployed at sea within quick steaming of the straits, though, unless timely indications and warning of an impending crisis or conflict were received and then acted upon by U.S. leaders. The high-readiness Guam boats would be able to arrive on scene fairly rapidly once sortied, but it would take several more days for them to be reinforced by Pearl Harbor boats—not all of which might be immediately surgeable due to inter-deployment maintenance. Japan could surely contribute a number of its sixteen modern SSs in active service, but again not all of them might be surge-ready at any given time. And while the U.S. and Japanese fleets will be receiving additional boats over the coming decade, it will not be at a rate and scale that would dramatically change the straits coverage math. Hypothetical seabed-mounted sonar arrays in these straits or their approaches might help improve these odds by cueing available U.S. or allied submarines (or other anti-submarine forces) to a PLA submarine transit. The probability of a friendly submarine intercepting a PLA submarine detected this way, though, would depend upon the time between when the cue was broadcast and when it was received by the friendly sub, how the friendly sub's effective sonar ranges in those waters affected its ability to redetect the trespasser, and whether the friendly sub could cover the distance from its starting point to have a chance at redetection before the cueing data "aged out." More than one boat might be required to cover any particular strait with a certain margin of confidence; this would be especially true for the wider straits. Nor would anti-submarine patrols in the straits be the two sub fleets’ sole mission at the beginning of a major war: there would be equal if not greater demands for land-attack strikes, anti-submarine and anti-surface patrols inside the First Island Chain, anti-submarine patrols between the two island chain lines, special forces insertion/extraction, and far-forward intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance. U.S. and Japanese submarine coverage of the straits simply could not be absolute.

It would be excellent if U.S. and allied forces could attrite the PLA forces making or supporting straits transits by a few percent each time without suffering equivalent attrition; the cumulative effects on the PLA’s overall warmaking capacity would be significant. But it would take weeks if not months for those effects to really show. That’s why the ability to logistically sustain the land-based forces waging the protracted frontline fight would be so crucial to U.S. war strategy. If the PLA were to inflict enough pressure on these logistical flows, the barrier defense would eventually wither on the vine.

It’s also important to remember that this imperfect barrier would only function in an open war—not during a crisis. Any PLAN submarines sortied prior to the outbreak of open hostilities could in theory patrol between the two island chain lines for campaign-significant amounts of time before having to hazard a trip back through the First Island Chain gauntlet. Modern PLAN SSNs like the Type 093 and its Type 095 follow-on would have an obvious endurance advantage over Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP) boats like the Type 041, but even the latter could probably remain underway for a few weeks before requiring a return to port. During that time, the mere fact that PLAN submarines were unlocated in the Western Pacific would undoubtedly affect U.S. operations (and tempo) in theater. The Royal Navy’s experience coping with a single unlocated Argentine submarine during the Falklands War is instructive on that point.

It would not take many PLAN submarines to generate such effects. For instance, let’s assume that the PLAN allocated its Type 041s, Type 093s, and Type 095s for war-opening operations between the two island chain lines while simultaneously holding its Type 035A/B/G, Type 039, and Kilo-class diesel-electric boats back for operations within the East and South China Seas. Let’s also assume China had its planned twenty Type 041s and five Type 093s in commission, plus perhaps five Type 095s as well, when a conflict erupted. Lastly, let’s assume that these boats’ material conditions of readiness were high enough to sortie two-thirds of them into the Western Pacific as the crisis phase peaked. Thirteen AIP boats and six SSNs might not seem like a lot within such a broad expanse. However, as Julian Corbett pointed out a century ago, the most “fertile” areas for hunting ships are “the terminals of departure and destination where trade tends to be crowded, and in a secondary degree the focal points where, owing to the conformation of the land, trade tends to converge.”[ii] If the PLAN followed Corbett’s logic, it might position its submarines in waters the U.S. and its allies would have to traverse to access (or break out of) selected major ports along the First Island Chain during the war’s first weeks. Or it might assign those duties to the Type 041s and deploy its SSNs in the waters just west of the Marianas that shipping from Guam, Hawaii, or the continental U.S. might seek to traverse. Or if the Chinese Ocean Surveillance System’s (COSS) coverage between the island chain lines remained adequate after the war started, China might try to steer its SSNs into mid-transit contact with U.S. or allied shipping.[iii] What’s more, the lingering effects of a PLA conventional first strike against major U.S. and Japanese bases in the Japanese home islands and Okinawa, subsequent PLA suppression operations against U.S. or allied straits-guarding forces along the Ryukyus-Luzon line, and in-theater U.S. and allied anti-submarine-capable forces’ sheer combat load prior to the arrival of reinforcements from the U.S. suggest that at least some PLAN submarines could complete at least one full cycle from their patrol areas to port for replenishment and then back into the Western Pacific before the “happy time” window began to close. This would especially be true for PLAN submarines patrolling the approaches to the Ryukyus, Taiwan, or Luzon.

Add the PLAAF/PLAN strike aircraft threat back into the mix and it should be apparent that U.S. and allied use of the Western Pacific’s surface between the two island chain lines would likely be opposed early in a notional war. The key variables driving China’s anti-shipping potential within these waters would be COSS’s ability to provide PLA aircraft and submarines with actionable targeting cues despite intense U.S. (and possibly allied) efforts to degrade and deceive this system-of-systems, the PLA’s ability to push those forces through contested First Island Chain straits when and where needed, and the operational range and endurance of those forces. 

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.

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[i] For instance, see Chapter 3 of Roger Cliff, et al. “Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States.” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007).

[ii] Julian Corbett. Principles of Maritime Strategy. (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2004), 263.

[iii] For more detail on COSS, see Section 2 of Jonathan F. Solomon. “Defending the Fleet from China’s Anti-ship Ballistic Missile: Naval Deception’s Roles in Sea-Based Missile Defense.” (Master’s Thesis, Georgetown University, 2011).

"The Worlds Symbol of Hope in Disaster"

ORNDOC BAY, Philippines (Nov. 16, 2013) Sailors from the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Mustin (DDG 89) and Philippine Army soldiers unload international aid from an MH-60S Sea Hawk helicopter from the Island Knights of Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 25 as an MH-60R Sea Hawk helicopter from the Warlords of Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron (HSM) 51 prepares to land. HSC-25, HSM-51 and Mustin are with the George Washington Carrier Strike Group, which is supporting the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade in assisting the Philippine government in ongoing relief efforts in response to the aftermath of Super Typhoon Haiyan. (U.S. Navy photo by Lt. j.g. Timothy Tran/Released))

Last week I was sitting on the couch with my 3rd grader. It was almost 9pm, well past her bedtime. She was finishing her homework late due to being out that evening shopping with mom, and I was enjoying a book as I tend to do in the evenings. We have a family rule that during homework time, the television is allowed to be on only as long as it is on the a Music Choice station - in most cases the Alternative music station.

My daughter finished her homework about 8:59, and I changed the channel over to CNN to see how Anderson Cooper was going to lead into his show. While I do not watch cable news very often, I had noted from Twitter that Anderson Cooper was in the Philippines, and I was very curious how CNN was reporting the response to the Typhoon.

As I was telling my daughter that her evening still isn't done, Thursday night being bath night, there was a silent pause in our conversation so we could have a staring contest between dad and daughter over this new 'bath time' information that was not being well received. In that silent moment, Anderson Cooper made a comment like "US Navy helicopters have become a global symbol of hope during crisis."

I got distracted when hearing that phrase, and repeated it out loud to myself. My daughter then asked me a question, "What does crisis mean?" My immediate thought was how fortunate I am that my eight year old child has never had to learn the meaning of that word crisis from experience. As I explained the definition, describing the term within the context of disaster, CNN flashes a picture of an MH-60 helicopter delivering humanitarian assistance to the people of the Philippines. My daughter, a right-brained thinker who has grown up heavily influenced by her much older left brained-sister, noted it is the same helicopter that I have a picture of on my office wall - a picture of the Bay Raiders of HSC-28 Det 2 from the Bataan's incredibly long 2011 deployment.

The voice of power interrupts our little conversation as mom sends my daughter up to the shower.

Fast forward to Wednesday night, where again the family is gathered to read and do homework listening to excellent music, as per our usual routine. That evening my youngest daughter asked me to check her paragraph. The classwork for the evening is for the students to write a paragraph based on an article written in this weeks Time For Kids magazine and other materials from school related to the Typhoon that hit the Philippines. I checked the TFK website, the article in the print version is not the same article they have online. On Thursday, exchanging emails with my daughters teacher, I was able to get the back story.

Every Monday the students discuss current events from the weekend. This weeks current event topic for class is the Typhoon. Several of the boys in the class had watched the news with their parents over the weekend and the centerpiece of the class discussion was the USS George Washington (CVN 73). The teacher, because she is freaking awesome, quickly pulled up a picture of the ship for the class to help the students fully appreciate how big an aircraft carrier is. My daughter, according to the teacher, contributed to this conversation by repeating her interpretation of what Anderson Cooper said - describing Navy helicopters as "the worlds symbol of hope in disaster."

For the art project this week, the students were asked to draw a picture related to the Typhoon, which are then placed around the classroom for the week. Due to my daughter leaving a form that needed to be filled out in her classroom, I walked into my daughters classroom with her to see the art the students had produced hanging on the walls of the classroom. There were pictures of aircraft carriers and helicopters, Marines and even a few dark pictures of broken homes and sad people, and in the center of the room my daughter showed me her picture - which was very similar to my picture of the Bay Raiders from HSC-28 in my office, except with gold glitter and glue she had written "The worlds symbol of hope in disaster."

Since the release of the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, the United States has not hesitated to commit major naval capabilities to humanitarian response and disaster recovery. While it isn't necessarily a new thing to commit aircraft carriers for HADR, the increased frequency of committing major naval capabilities like entire Carrier Strike Groups for that purpose can be specifically attributed to the elevated emphasis of humanitarian assistance and disaster response outlined in CS21. I do believe Anderson Cooper is on to something, and the US Navy helicopter has in fact become a symbol of hope in crisis around the world.

That symbolism is important, and represents a much stronger strategic communication than I have previously appreciated. Six years after the release of CS21 I note that it is primarily because of an active HADR policy by PACOM  - using aircraft carriers to respond to crisis in places like the Philippines and Japan, and building upon the 2005 Tsunami response by the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72); the forward deployed aircraft carrier in the Pacific is no longer simply a symbol of American military power communicating political influence to the governments of the region, but thanks to the consistent great work of the helicopter squadrons supporting humanitarian assistance and disaster response, the aircraft carrier has also become a symbol of American power representing hope during crisis to the people of the region during their times of legitimate need.

That second part has significantly greater positive ramifications in support of America's "Pivot to Asia" policy than the first part, because regional support of the United States at the population level defuses criticism of American forward based presence while simultaneously reinforcing the value of the United States as the regions primary security provider, and by using "hard power" assets in support of HADR a positive American "soft power" message is being communicated to a broader audience than just the political level of the regional governments.

Chine Sends Hospital Ship Peace Ark to Philippines

While under blistering public criticism both internationally and domestically, China has changed course and is sending the hospital ship Peace Ark to the Philippines. This was how it was reported by media in China.

The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy's hospital ship the Peace Ark will depart on a typhoon relief mission to the Philippines on Thursday, a Foreign Ministry spokesman said on Wednesday.

With full-load displacement of 14,300 tons, the hospital ship has 300 beds, 20 ICUs, eight operating theaters, and can accommodate 40 major procedures a day.

"We hope its mission will help ease the lack of medical services in the disaster areas in the Philippines, as a token of Chinese people's friendship to the Philippine people," Hong Lei said at a daily press briefing.

The death toll from Typhoon Haiyan (local name Yolanda) stands at 4,011, the Philippine disaster agency said Wednesday. The number of those injured has risen to 18,557, while 1,602 people remained missing.

China is keeping a close eye on the disaster and wants to help heal the wounded by sending manpower and humanitarian assistance, Hong said.

We will probably never know why China didn't react to events in the Philippines sooner, nor why China chose to act now.

What I do know is the hospital ship Peace Ark is a modern hospital ship with world class medical facilities, and the Chinese have the potential to do a lot of good if they embrace this opportunity. China is sending the ship for domestic political purposes, but just because a ship gets sent doesn't mean it actually does anything. The US Navy has sent ships for disaster response to unfamiliar places in the past where those ships ended up doing very little, and there can be legitimate reasons for that. The question will be whether China and the Philippines can work through that and help people.

It is going to be interesting to see how this turns out, and what if any impact it may have on the relationship between the two nations.

Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda

 The following is an incomplete list of assets various governments are sending or have already sent to support humanitarian assistance in response to Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda.

United States
USS George Washington (CVN 73)
USS Antietam (CG 54)
USS Cowpens (CG 63)
USS Mustin (DDG 89)
USS Lassen (DDG 82)
USS McCampbell (DDG 85)
USS Ashland (LSD 48)
USS Germantown (LSD 42)
USS Denver (LPD 9)
USS Emory S. Land (AS 39)
USNS Yukon (T-AO-202)
USNS Walter S. Diehl (T-AO 193)
USNS Bowditch (T-AGS 62)
USNS Richard E. Byrd (T-AKE-4)
USNS Charles Drew (T-AKE 10)
USNS Mercy (T-AH 19)
Military airlift

Great Britain
HMS Illustrious (R06)
HMS Daring (D32)
Military airlift

Norway
Kapitan Felix Oca (NSA 16)

Japan
JDS Ise (DDH 182)
JDS Osumi (LSD 4001)
JDS Towada (AOE-422)
Military airlift (C-130s)

Australia
HMAS Tobruk (L 50)
Military airlift (C-130s)

India
Military airlift (C-130)

Indonesia
Military airlift (C-130)

Malaysia
Military airlift (C-130)

New Zealand
Military airlift (C-130)

Singapore
Military airlift (C-130)

South Korea
Military airlift (C-130s)

Sweden
Military airlift (C-130)

Taiwan
Military airlift (C-130)

Thailand
Military airlift (C-130)

Belgium
Military airlift

Canada
Military airlift (C-17, C-130s)

France
Military airlift

Germany
Military airlift

Italy
Military airlift

Netherlands
Military airlift

Spain
Military airlift

The response of the United States led by PACOM is remarkable. There are 20 US Navy helicopters  that have been providing support since Thursday, and 14 MV-22s as well. Those 34 US vertical lift aircraft outnumber the 31 helicopters the government of the Philippines had available when the disaster took place.

与人方便，自己方便

USS Guardian Grounding

Jan. 20, 2013 released by the Armed Forces of the Philippines Western Command (AFP-WESCOM) taken on Jan. 19.

We are kind of late to the discussion, but it is slowly trending towards the nightmare scenario. The latest report is still valid, as today the Navy said the situation has not changed. From the Navy Times.

“Multiple spaces” are flooded aboard the minesweeper Guardian, still stranded on a reef in the Philippines since Jan. 17.

While the ship’s condition remains stable, a U.S. destroyer has arrived on the scene in the Sulu Sea and a salvage team headed by a rear admiral is being established as more ships and assets head to the area.

Weather conditions remain rough, and the ship, once pointed straight into the reef with her bow hard aground, has swung broadside on, where most of the starboard hull is in contact with the coral.

As of Saturday night Eastern Standard Time, the ship experienced a “slight increase to a port list,” according to the Navy. But as of Sunday night Philippine time, there was no evidence the ship was taking on more water. Concerns persist, however, that the ship will sustain further damage.

No injuries have been reported, and the entire crew of 79 sailors was taken off the ship Jan. 17. No one has been back on board the Guardian, the Navy confirmed.

The destroyer is USS Mustin (DDG 89) where Rear Admiral Thomas Carney has taken over as the on-site commander.

I'm not going to speculate cause and will wait for the investigation to run its course.

I hear nothing but great things about the CO. I do not know if it is still true, but it used to be that the navigator of the Minesweepers was the XO, but that was several years ago and the minesweeper I visited was using paper, not digital maps. This was also back when the mine ships were still homeported in Texas - much has changed with our nations mine ships since then, starting with the fact that nearly all of our Avenger class ships are now homeported overseas and the coastal minesweepers are long retired.

Speaking of digital maps, I look forward to the investigation explaining how the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) misplaced the Tabbataha Reef? This is just a mistake right, and not some very clever cyber sabotage? In cyber, the threat is not that someone will delete your data or steal your data - that kind of sabotage and espionage can be repaired and is in fact the kind of cyber capabilities the system is set up to protect itself against. No, the real cyber threat that keeps people up at night is when someone changes data in a way no one notices until it is too late. Stuxnet, often described as the first nasty cyber payload, didn't delete or steal information - Stuxnet changed the information in a covert way. That's the key distinction between the vast majority of cyber graffiti payloads and a legit cyber smart bomb. Hopefully the map issue at NGA is simply a mistake.

Another place for good pictures of USS Guardian (MCM 5) stuck on the reef can be found here.

The Philippines has fined the US Navy for destroying natural resources, which is clearly a political overreaction since we have no idea how much damage has actually been done, and it is hard to believe the fine is going to actually pay for any damages. For the record, the fine amounts to around $7,300 US for violation of at least five laws including unauthorized entry, non-payment of conservation fees, obstruction of law enforcement (we haven't allowed their park ranger on the ship), damage to the reef and destruction of resources. The fine is little more than a domestic political circus, and if it makes them feel better then I think they can go ahead and have their circus, because it certainly could be and still might get much worse....

because the ship isn't leaking oil or fuel, yet.

The good news is that no one was hurt. The bad news is the ship is in a very tough spot and may not survive this incident, and given the weather conditions any attempt to save the ship is almost certainly going to be dangerous. Keep everyone in your prayers as this plays out because mother ocean can be a bitch on a good day, and these aren't the good days in the history of USS Guardian (MCM 5).

Chinese Frigate Runs Aground

This is the latest news from the South China Sea.

A Philippine military aircraft confirmed Saturday that a Chinese naval frigate remains stranded in disputed waters of the South China Sea, a military spokesman said.

The Chinese frigate and smaller craft were sighted by a Philippine Islander plane, said regional military spokesman Colonel Neil Anthony Estrella.

"During the aerial reconnaissance mission, they were able to confirm, based on photographs, that there is indeed a ship with bow number 560 aground at Half Moon Shoal," he told AFP.

He said five more vessels and a number of smaller boats were assisting the grounded ship.

A navy ship and a coast guard vessel had been dispatched to the area to monitor the Chinese operations, he added.

He stressed that the shoal was just 60 nautical miles from the western Philippine island of Palawan, well within the country's 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone, as recognised by international law.

That would make the ship that ran aground the frigate Dongguan (560), a Jianghu-V class frigate. Welcome to the South China Sea littorals.

While the Half Moon Shoal is within the Philippine EEZ, the Chinese frigate has every right to be within the waters of the EEZ; although not necessarily on the shoal itself. With that said, this wasn't intended to be an amphibious assault.

What is noteworthy here is that the Philippines are well within their right to confiscate the warship. has few options here. The shoal is not habitable, and not within 5 miles of a habitable island. Funny thing about being the weaker power in this kind of power struggle though, the Philippines really can't do anything except what the Chinese allow them to do even though this is within the EEZ of the Philippines mainland, and in the end all we'll do is nothing but watch (which is probably the right move politically).

Another Hawk in the Party Calls for PLA Military Action in South China Sea

Today we see another Chinese hawk advocating military action, this time against the Philippines and Vietnam. I encourage everyone to read the entire editorial. Be careful to neither casually dismiss nor overstate the importance of this editorial, because this is a sanctioned editorial by the Party's mouthpiece Global Times, but it also only one of many opinions among Chinese Party leadership regarding how to manage the South China Sea tensions over energy resources. The author is identified as the strategic analyst of China Energy Fund Committee.

It’s very amusing to see some of the countries vow to threaten or even confront China with force just because the US announced that it has “returned to Asia.”

The tension of war is escalating second by second but the initiative is not in our hand. China should take part in the exploitation of oil and gas in South China Sea.

For those who infringe upon our sovereignty to steal the oil, we need to warn them politely, and then take action if they don’t respond.

We shouldn’t waste the opportunity to launch some tiny-scale battles that could deter provocateurs from going further.

By the way, I think it’s necessary to figure out who is really afraid of being involved in military activities. There are more than 1,000 oil and gas wells plus four airports and numerous other facilities in the area but none of them is built by China.

Everything will be burned to the ground should a military conflict break out. Who’ll suffer most when Western oil giants withdraw?

But out there could just be an ideal place to punish them. Such punishment should be restricted only to the Philippines and Vietnam, who have been acting extremely aggressive these days.

The impacts of nationalism will only create more tension between the cautious and hawkish elements of the Party moving forward. The other issue is that there are as many reasons to be concerned with the leadership changes next year as there are to be heartened.

It is a time of change in China. A time when outsiders should be both excited for the future of China while remaining cautious of that future as well. Predicting the results of the rapid growth in China with any accuracy is very difficult. Beware of all who aren't very cautious of China's intentions, because even Chinese leaders can't predict the future as they focus on the consolidation of their own power while balancing their intentional nationalism against the tensions that result from greater demands of a rapidly growing society.

It does concern me that we see ranking members of the Party in the Energy sector aligned with the hawks of the PLA, because it fits easily into the discussions and analysis regarding why China would take a more militarily hawkish policy towards other nations, including their regional neighbors.

Rules of Engagement in the South China Sea

Over the past 2 weeks I have been closely following the activities taking place in the South China Sea. It is worth noting that the tensions between China and the Philippines have advanced far enough that political leadership in the Philippines wants clarification regarding rules of engagement.

Lawmakers on Thursday urged the House of Representatives leadership to summon officials of the Department of National Defense (DND) so that they can brief Congress on the ongoing security situation in the West Philippine Sea.

The House also wants to find out the specific mission orders and rules of engagement issued to BRP Rajah Humabon and other maritime assets which are conducting sovereignty patrols in the disputed Spratly Group of Islands.

Davao City Rep. Karlo Alexei Nograles said the Chamber headed by Speaker Feliciano Belmonte Jr. can ask the DND and representatives of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), particularly the Philippine Navy (PN), to brief the House on the parameters of the country's assertion of its sovereignty over its territories in the West Philippine Sea.

This is very important, Nograles said, because while the Philippines is committed to protecting its sovereignty and its right to defend itself from foreign intrusion, "Congress needs to be apprised on what to expect under different possible scenarios."

"We should know how we are going to respond, especially in a worst case scenario because while it is true that although we have to protect our territories even if we are a small nation with a very ill-equipped Armed Forces, this act of sending BRP Rajah Humabon to conduct sovereignty patrols could be viewed as an act of brinkmanship," he said.

"A single act of hostility from either side could spark a shooting war and we definitely do not want that to happen," he added.

This comes after the topic of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and Philippines was raised earlier this week when Hillary Clinton promised the United States stands with the Philippines, although I do believe there are still some questions as to what exactly that means.

The US is also looking to arm up the Philippines, which is obviously necessary given the near absence of any legitimate naval capability by the Philippines. China responded to Hillary Clinton's remarks unfavorably, as one would expect.

China has recently completed 2 naval exercises in the South China Sea - one large exercise involving forces of the South Sea Fleet and a smaller naval exercise with Vietnam. Tensions between China and Vietnam are just as strained as they are between China and the Philippines due to similar incursions in the South China Sea. Vietnam has a stronger military and coastal security force than the Philippines does though, so the dynamic between those nations is very different.

As schedules would have it, it is time for our annual naval exercise with Vietnam while CARAT moves to the Philippines. The presence of the US Navy in the region is likely to add more political rhetoric to the tensions. The US is always forward deployed in the Pacific though, so there really isn't anything new here to note. For those who are curious, the Essex and George Washington will be at sea more over the next few months, but again that isn't new either - the calendar just changed to summer meaning it is time for the summer patrols.

It is hard to imagine an all out shooting war breaking out in the context of all this tension, indeed there is no public evidence anyone involved wants to see that happen based on political comments. With that said, there is also no evidence anyone is ready to back down, and we are at the stage where rules of engagement for the possibility of a military engagement is being discussed at the highest levels of government. That suggests to me some kind of incident may be looming large over the horizon.

As I have watched this unfold, my guess is this is intentionally leading to an incident. As unlikely as it may sound to some, the United States is in a terrible political position with these events and our credibility in the Pacific may be heading for a serious challenge. China is dead serious about these territories. As I have been watching all of this unfold, I am starting to think China may be looking to test the strength of our mutual defense treaty with the Philippines by inciting a major, but isolated incident. China knows a one time incident will not be responded to in any meaningful way by the United States, and also knows they can leverage our inaction in support of the Philippines as part of their political influence throughout the rest of the region.

If you are looking for a quick review of events unfolding in the South China Sea, I recommend this recap by Sen. James Inhofe (R-Okla.) over at The Hill. The map above can be used to reference where most of these activities are taking place relative to the Philippines. As you can see, these islands are nowhere near China, all of them 400-500+ miles away from China while being within the Philippines EEZ.

Tensions Rise in the South China Sea

From the International Institute for Security Studies (Shangri-La Dialogue) as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Shangri-La Hotel, Singapore, Saturday, June 04, 2011. Full transcript here, but this section caught my attention.

Maritime security remains an issue of particular importance for the region, with questions about territorial claims and the appropriate use of the maritime domain presenting on-going challenges to regional stability and prosperity. The U.S. position on maritime security remains clear: we have a national interest in freedom of navigation; in unimpeded economic development and commerce; and in respect for international law. We also believe that customary international law, as reflected in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, provides clear guidance on the appropriate use of the maritime domain, and rights of access to it. By working together in appropriate regional and multilateral fora, and adhering to principles that we believe are of benefit to all in the region, we can ensure that all share equal and open access to international waterways.

Experience consistently shows that pursuing our common interests together increases our common security. As I have stated before, providing for security and upholding the principles I mentioned earlier is not the task of any one nation alone, but the shared responsibility of all nations. This is the one reason we have placed a premium on building the partner capacity of friends in the region and enhancing the role of multilateral cooperation and organizations in Asia-Pacific security affairs.

Even so, we recognize that the American defense engagement - from our forward deployed forces to exercises with regional partners - will continue to play an indispensable role in the stability of the region. Although much of the press in both the United States and the region has been focused in recent years on our efforts to modernize our basing arrangements with traditional allies in Northeast Asia - and our commitment to those efforts is absolute - we’ve taken a number of steps towards establishing a defense posture across the Asia Pacific that is more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. A posture that maintains our presence in Northeast Asia while enhancing our presence in Southeast Asia and into the Indian Ocean.

For example, this past November, the U.S. and Australia established a force posture working group tasked with expanding opportunities for our two militaries to train and operate together - to include alliance arrangements that would allow for more combined defense activities and shared use of facilities.

Together, we are evaluating a range of options, including:

• Increasing our combined naval presence and capabilities to respond more readily to humanitarian disasters;
• Improving Indian Ocean facilities - a region of growing international importance; and
• Expanding training exercises for amphibious and land operations, activities that could involve other partners in the region.

In Singapore, we are strengthening our bi-lateral defense relationship within the context of the Strategic Framework Agreement and pursuing more operational engagement - most notably, by deploying U.S. Littoral Combat Ships to Singapore. We are examining other ways to increase opportunities for our two militaries to train and operate together, to include:

• Prepositioning supplies to improve disaster response;
• Improving command and control capabilities; and
• Expanding training opportunities to help prepare our forces for the challenges both militaries face operating in the Pacific.

Although we will continue to maintain and enhance our traditional presence in the Asia-Pacific region through efforts such as these, we believe that U.S. presence, and the associated impact and influences should not solely be measured in terms of conventional metrics, or “boots on the ground.” In the coming years, the U.S. military is going to be increasing its port calls, naval engagements, and multilateral training efforts with multiple countries throughout the region. These types of activities not only broaden and deepen our relationships with friends and allies, they help build partner capacity to address regional challenges.

Taken together, all of these developments demonstrate the commitment of the United States to sustaining a robust military presence in Asia - one that underwrites stability by supporting and reassuring allies while deterring, and if necessary defeating, potential adversaries.

There are few details regarding the deploying of Littoral Combat Ships to Singapore. Does that mean forward basing of ships, or just basing of modules? It is still unclear.

The region is certainly getting a lot of attention lately though. Folks may not be following it, but tensions are rising in the South China Sea. A few weeks ago it was reported that China has set up military garrisons and outposts on six islands within Philippine-claimed territory in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. This morning news from the Philippines is that the US Navy is sending the USS Chung-Hoon (DDG 93) to the region amid the escalating tensions.

There are also details out this week of recent events that involved the Chinese Navy shooting at Vietnamese and Philippine fisherman. Both articles are very detailed accounts of the actions, and are expected to be included in diplomatic protests filed with the UN this week by both nations.