Public-Private Partnerships at Sea - in Fact & Fiction

Though we generally try to distill naval operations down to their simplest binary terms - fleet versus fleet - maritime operations in both peacetime and in war are more complex endeavors. Today and throughout history, contractors, mercenaries, and other non-governmental entities have played more of a role in maritime security on the high seas than most navalists would like to admit.  Some of these arrangements are contractual and sanctioned by legitimate government entities, some of them are ad hoc, and some operate on legally murky waters.  Some are based mutual economic benefits, but many are designed to enhance security.

Public-private partnerships, as they are sometimes called, are making a difference at sea across the globe.  Especially in Africa, there are numerous recent examples encompassing both for profit and non-profit organizations. In South Africa, Operation Phakisa brings together teams from government, business, academia and other sectors to accelerate the economic benefit stemming from marine transport and manufacturing, offshore oil and gas exploration, and aquaculture, while protecting marine resources.

In the Gulf of Guinea, the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) and the Nigerian Navy recently entered into a Public Private Partnership with a company for the supply, maintenance and bunkering of vessels. The vessels will be manned by the personnel of the Nigerian Navy on a Supply, Operate and Transfer (SOT) basis for a 10 year period after which ownership of the vessels will revert to NIMASA.   Also in the Eastern Atlantic, last year, the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society supplied a ship, fuel, and crew to conduct law enforcement patrols under the direction of the Government of Senegal’s Ministry of Fisheries.  Operation Sunu Gaal, as it was called, focused on investigating and intercepting vessels involved in illegal shark, tuna, and sword-fishing.

In the Mediterranean, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has established a contact group with officials from Libya’s Coastguard, the Port Security Department, the Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration, the Red Crescent, the International Red Cross, the International Medical Corps, and the EU border management agency, to improve coordination and communication between the Libyans and international actors participating in maritime rescue.

On a related note, the success of the Migrant Offshore Aid Station’s rescue campaign in the Mediterranean has allowed the organization to secure the funds that it needs to become a global organization.  MOAS has rescued nearly 12,000 migrants at sea with its ship and state-of-the art unmanned air vehicles provided by a corporate donor and will expand into Southeast Asian waters. These pseudo-Coast Guards and Para-navies see themselves as filling a maritime security gap and that is exactly the way governments should view them.   

Claude Berube is one of the handful of experts who speaks from a position of knowledge on maritime non-state actors such as those discussed above.  Though he's written non-fiction works on how private security companies and emerging maritime activists are shaping today's maritime security arena, it's his novels, including the newly released Syren's Song, that give a glimpse of how future wars at sea might resurrect the chaotic 19th Century era of privateers and pirates.

Berube continues to perfect his craft in this novel, the second of his Connor Stark series.  The characters are deeper, and the settings more vivid than in The Aden Effect, but the non-stop action at sea continues. In the book, a resurgent off-shoot of the Tamil Tigers allies itself with a shadowy multinational corporation to threaten a motley assembly of U.S. Navy and private maritime security vessels.  The choice of antagonist is fitting, given that the Sea Tigers represent one of the most lethally effective insurgent naval branches in recent history.  

A critical plot enabler in the book is the letter of marque that the Sri Lankan government issues to Stark's security firm to investigate the Sea Tigers.  Though this arrangement may seem far-fetched or antiquated to some readers*, the reality is there are many contemporary examples of contractors performing similar roles for Western militaries.  Contractors fly manned and unmanned surveillance assets overland and at at sea, for several countries, including the United States. These arrangements are perfectly legitimate, but generally not well publicized and understood.

Syren's Song is an entertaining read for those who enjoy geopolitical thrillers.  The novel reinforces an important point: our adversaries exploit their own collaborative networks of commercial interests - both legal and illegal - to meet their objectives. Conversely, modern navies should recognize that public-private partnerships in their many forms are a tool that can augment and enhance their fleets while filling maritime security gaps in countries that have neither the will, nor capacity to police their own waters.

*Letters of Marque were generally outlawed in 1856 by the Declaration of Paris, but continued for some time, especially during the US. Civil War.

Piracy, Privateering, and Para-Navies

Puntland’s pirate gangs have run out of luck lately with practically no successful attacks on the now well-defended merchants plying the Indian Ocean.  So like many of their free-booting predecessors who evolved by necessity when the hunting dried up, Somali pirates have shifted to the protection racket.  This opportunistic tactic has been part and parcel of pirates for hundreds of years. In the early 18th Century, pirates off America’s Gulf coast such as the Laffite brothers rotated frequently between piracy, smuggling, spying for profit, and privateering, sometimes playing states against each other while working multiple angles simultaneously depending what enterprise was most lucrative. 


Pirates, Para-Navy, or Activists?

Claude Berube and I recently wrote about another sort of maritime non-state actor which I’ve discussed here extensively - the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society (SSCS).  SSCS’s “direct action” fleet has slowly increased in ships and tonnage each of the past several years, earning the title among its supporters of “Neptune’s Navy.”  Interestingly, a component of SSCS' environmental portfolio includes a fisheries enforcement "out-sourcing" function, which has proven a successful in Ecuador.  While maybe not as aggressive as SSCS, other maritime non-profits such as ShadowView (run by a former SSCS sailor) have begun to outsource their services.  Are these models much different than privateers or their more modern equivalents, maritime private security companies?  The discussion on our article among the online environmental activism and commercial shipping communities rather predictably aligns with the two polar reactions many seem to have towards SSCS: either savior of world’s cetaceans or scourge of the seas.  Perhaps a more useful perspective, at least from the naval point of view, is to study SSCS as a model that future more nefarious groups will likely emulate.

Claude and I contend that as navies around the world - including the United States Navy - shrink, these non-state maritime actors, or “para-navies” will expand to fill the vacuum at sea.  In some cases, such as Sea Shepherd, motives of non-state actors will appear noble, while other para-navies will be driven by rebellion, ideology, or simply greed.  All of them will challenge state navies and coast guards for the monopoly of violence on the water.  Much like their land-based terror and insurgent counter-parts, these entrepreneurial, adaptive organizations tend to confound traditional naval analysts who are more comfortable studying orders of battle and tactics similar to their own modern navies.  Accordingly, as we recommend in the Small Wars Journal article, organizations such as Sea Shepherd can provide a better lens through which emerging para-navies can be understood.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity.

Lawfare and NGO Maritime Actors

In this undated photo released by Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, its new Antarctic patrol ship SSS Sam Simon steams on the sea. (AP Photo/Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, Carolina A. Castro)

On the One Year Anniversary Special of Midrats 2 years ago, CDR Salamander opened his discussion with a question submitted by Admiral James Stavridis that asked what the panel believed would be the next big thing after next (over the horizon) for naval operations. In his answer, Claude Berube discussed the concept of emerging Maritime Shadow Zones which he defined as geographical maritime security gaps where naval power lacks the strength, authority, or interest to enforce maritime security in maritime regions globally. In his description of this potential emerging future, Claude mentioned that it is possible that both legitimate an non-legitimate non-governmental actors would be emerge to fill those voids.

While it wasn't the first time I had been exposed to that concept, his presentation of what a potential future role of the maritime NGO might look like inspired several ideas in my mind, and I admit I have thought about the topic in the way he presented it many times since. Due almost entirely to the his answer that night, I began paying closer attention to the activities of the Sea Sheperd Conservation Society, perhaps the most renowned of the modern legitimate NGOs currently filling the maritime shadow zone in the Southern Ocean.

Did that word bother you? The word I refer to is legitimate, which does require some definition and I am open to adopting a different word for the lexicon if you have any suggestions. Maritime piracy, maritime banditry, smuggling and trafficking, oil theft, and a host of other criminal activities at sea are conducted by non-legitimate non-governmental actors in various places in the world. While causes may be increased population density of coastlines, poor regional governance and failed states, or the absence of an effective regional maritime security enforcement agency, criminal activity on the seas - particularly in the littorals - is not going away anytime soon. As more commercial interests emerge offshore and as the commercial population on the seas increase in the maritime domain, it should be expected that criminal activity on the seas will increase, and as the recent history of Somalia shows us; well financed enterprises will emerge as well.

But it is the trend of legitimate NGOs that interests me most, and regardless of what you think about the organization or their politics, the Sea Sheperd Conservation Society is a legitimate non-profit non-governmental organization. Legitimacy means a lot of things, but first and foremost being a legitimate NGO means the organization can be held to the rule of law, when applicable.

To celebrate the upcoming sixth season of Whale Wars, the political struggle between the Sea Sheperd Conservation Society and Japan's Institute of Cetacean Research has moved beyond clashes at sea that somewhat resemble non-lethal irregular maritime warfare activities towards another type of political combat often found in war zones: Lawfare.

A U.S. appeals court ordered American anti-whaling activists to keep 500 yards away from Japanese whaling ships off Antarctica.

The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals issued an injunction against the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, which sends vessels every December to disrupt whale killings by Japan's Institute of Cetacean Research.

The whalers sued Sea Shepherd last year to prevent the protesters from interfering, but the judge refused to grant the request.

The 9th Circuit ordered Sea Shepherd not to approach any of the Japanese vessels until it can rule on the merits of the whalers' appeal.

Japan's whaling fleet kills up to 1,000 whales a year for research. Whale meat not used for study is sold as food in Japan, which critics say is the real reason for the hunts.

In response to this injunction, and just days into the Sea Sheperd Conservation Society's latest anti-whaling campaign Operation Zero Tolerance, Paul Watson has relieved himself from duty.

For the 35 years since I founded the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society I have strived to act non-violently and within the boundaries of the law.

Sea Shepherd has never been a protest organization nor have we engaged in civil disobedience. We are an anti-poaching organization established to uphold international conservation law. We operate within the guidelines of the United Nations World Charter for Nature that allows for intervention by non-profit non-governmental organizations and individuals to uphold international conservation law.

During Sea Shepherd’s long history we have never caused a single injury to any person. Although we have broken some bureaucratic regulations like Canada’s so called Seal Protection Act, we did so to challenge the validity of these regulations, which were in contradiction to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In all other respects we have always operated within the boundaries of the law, both international and national.

In 1998 Sea Shepherd USA complied with the order by the United States Coast Guard to not approach within a thousand yards of the Makah whaling operation in Washington State.

I myself have never been convicted of a felony crime.

And for this reason, the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society in the United States and myself as a U.S. citizen must comply with the order by the 9th Circuit court of the United States.

Because I have been personally named in the injunction I have resigned as the President of the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society in the United States and as President of the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society Australia. I have also resigned my position of Executive Director of Sea Shepherd Conservation Society USA and I will hold no paid position with Sea Shepherd anywhere Sea Shepherd is registered and operates as a non-profit organization in any nation.

I have also stepped down as campaign leader for Operation Zero Tolerance. Former Greens Party leader and former Australian Senator, Bob Brown of Tasmania will now hold this position.

I have also stepped down as Captain of the Steve Irwin. Captain Siddharth Chakravarty of India is now in command of the Steve Irwin. The other three Captains are citizens of Sweden, France and Australia.

As a United States citizen, I will respect and comply with the ruling of the United States 9th District Court and will not violate the temporary injunction granted to the Institute for Cetacean Research.  I will participate as an observer within the boundaries established by the 9th Circuit Court of the United States.

Some people pick sides in the struggle between Japan's Institute of Cetacean Research and the Sea Sheperd Conservation Society. Don't be that guy, because the actual politics of either side of their issues have absolutely nothing to do with our interest in their disputes here at ID.

I have no idea how much money Japan's Institute of Cetacean Research is spending on their legal battle against the Sea Sheperd organization in the 9th Circuit court, but it is probably a lot. What have they accomplished? They basically turned Paul Watson into a living martyr, able to freely roam around the planet fundraising for more activities against Japanese whalers, but they haven't accomplished anything else.

And that is the key point here - Lawfare is going to be a fact of life for legitimate maritime NGOs that conduct any engaging activity at sea. However, I also expect that legitimate non-governmental organizations are going to be able shuffle resources around multiple countries under any number of Flags until they find a legal system supportive of their organizational goals - and by doing so avoid legal consequences solely by avoiding legal jurisdictions.

Until now Sea Sheperd has been the largest legitimate maritime NGO operating in the maritime shadow zones, but an even larger organization is about to step up and unlike the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, these guys will be packing heat!

A private navy founded by businessmen, former marines, retired captains and soldiers will protect its first group of oil tankers and bulk carriers from pirates in the Indian Ocean in late March or April, according to Bloomberg Businessweek.

Typhon, a venture formed by a group of U.K. businessmen led by Glencore International’s Chairman Simon Murray, will recruit 240 former marines and sailors for its navy...

Typhon, the company behind the venture, is chaired by Simon Murray, a millionaire businessman who joined the French Foreign Legion as a teenager and walked unsupported to the South Pole aged 63.

Typhon has been set up because the Royal Navy, NATO and the European Union Naval Force lack the vessels to patrol an area of ocean that is as large as North America, said Anthony Sharp, chief executive. "They can't do the job because they haven't got the budget and deploying a billion-pound warship against six guys (pirates) with $500 of kit is not a very good use of the asset," he said.

Typhon said its aim is to deter pirates from attacking its convoys, rather than engaging in firefights.

The pirates will face former marines in armoured patrol boats capable of 40 knots and able to withstand incoming Kalashnikov fire. They will be armed with close-quarter battle weapons, such as the M4 carbine, and sniper rifles with a range of 2km.

Also worth noting this particular NGO is bringing it's own brand of political celebrity.

Other Typhon directors include Admiral Henry Ulrich, former commander of US Naval Forces Europe, General Sir Jack Deverell, former commander in chief Allied Forces Northern Europe, and Lord Dannatt, former chief of the general staff.

The last major commercial vessel hijacked off Somalia was MT Royal Grace, a Panama-flagged oil tanker owned by a UAE-based company that was hijacked on March 2, 2012.... 10 months ago! The last pirate attack on a commercial vessel came Saturday when a merchant vessel was able to repel an attack when USS Halyburton (FFG 40) responded and all pirates were rounded up by the French Frigate FS Surcouf (F 711).

Some are calling this a private Navy, but there is very little difference in modern international law between Typhon's private Navy and the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society. One organization is arming themselves with weapons like rancid butter and the other is using bullet proof fast boats armed with ex-Marines fielding M4s and sniper rifles.

But there is a big difference between Somali pirates and Japanese whalers, right? A more legitimate question is how different are Somali pirates and Somali fisherman?

There are a lot of people making a lot of money on the Japanese whaling industry. There are also a lot of people making a lot of money on the Somali piracy industry.

The Typhon private Navy is not something radical, although it also doesn't really have a lot in common with the 19th century articles of marque either, despite the appearance of similarities. Typhon represents the next evolution of a maritime NGO setting up shop in the worlds most popular ungoverned maritime shadow zone. Over the next few years and in response to increased resource competitions offshore in greater frequency and intensity, organizations like the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society that are engaged in political activism and organizations like Typhon that are engaged in armed maritime security are going to become more common as global naval power trends towards more expensive, less numerous high end capability combat platforms that will almost certainly leave huge gaps in global maritime naval coverage necessary for good governance at sea.

With no unified ruleset governing the laws of the maritime domain, we should only expect these early examples to be carried forward as precedents. What does an armed fishery protection NGO in the South China Sea look like five years from now, and could such an entity be the catalyst for a proxy war in the South China Sea? If I am the Japanese government and I'm looking for a way of disrupting Chinese fishing vessels operating in my EEZ, I'm not sure why I wouldn't be looking at exactly this type of low cost, unofficial solution. When naval power lacks the strength, authority, or interest to enforce maritime security, alternatives will and are emerging, and I do wonder if the ruleset we are allowing to be set forth by others is actually in our long term national interest. The maritime NGO was an issue easy to ignore when it was the Sea Sheperd hippies, but now we are seeing a well funded, armed maritime NGO with significant political ties to major maritime nations.

I have no idea how maritime NGOs will continue to evolve, but one thing I am sure of... I won't be surprised the day Henry Ulrich is specifically named in some lawsuit in a US court in the future related to the murder of an AK-47 wielding Somali fisherman off the coast of Somalia, because when it comes to legitimate maritime NGOs, Lawfare is one of many expected consequences.


Additional Notes:

Midrats will be having a three year anniversary special this Sunday. I look forward to it.
The legal troubles for Paul Watson are bigger than simply the 9th circuit ruling. If that topic interests you, this link probably will too (PDF).
More on the Sea Sheperd here and here.

Insurance Company Funded Private Navy Preparing for Pirate Wars

Private Navy's to fight pirates are coming, and we are starting to see more details.

A private navy costing US$70 million (Dh257m) is being set up to escort merchant ships through the pirate-infested Gulf of Aden.

It will comprise a fleet of 18 ships, based in Djibouti, and will offer to convoy merchant vessels along the Internationally Recognised Transit Corridor (IRTC).

This is the world's most dangerous shipping lane, between the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea. The fleet will be operated by the Convoy Escort Programme (CEP), a British company launched by the international shipping insurers Jardine Lloyd Thompson (JLT) and the Lloyds of London underwriters Ascot.

Full funding will be in place by the end of next month, and the CEP hopes the fleet will be operational by December.

"The shipping industry needs to stand up and be counted," said Angus Campbell, the CEP's chief executive and a former director of Overseas Shipholding Group, the world's second-biggest listed oil tanker company. "The time is now, not in four or five years' time."

Piracy in the region is costing the global economy an estimated US$7 billion a year. For the ship owners alone, every vessel sailing through the waters off Somalia is charged additional insurance premiums of between $50,000 and $80,000.

Ships opting to carry their own armed guards can be charged an additional $18,000 and $60,000 per voyage by security companies.

Although the European Union is spending more than €8m (Dh37.94m) a year to maintain a naval force in the waters - EU NavFor - its warships still cannot provide close support to all merchant vessels.

The CEP, however, offers substantial savings to owners as well as protection from pirate attack. The CEP will buy insurance and use that to cover the ships in its convoys, so owners will no longer need to pay premiums, or hire security.

Instead, they will just pay a flat $30,000 to $40,000 per ship in the convoy.

Read the rest here.

Note the ships of this private Navy will be conducting their mission Internationally Recognized Transit Corridor (IRTC). The thing is, very few pirate attacks and maybe as few as 2 total hijackings have taken place in the corridor over the past few years, so in some ways this is smoke and mirrors from the insurance industry, and a way for them to sustain the money grab but protect product at the same time.

This sets an interesting precedent in the 21st century. It is past time to start thinking about what the role of private Navy's will be during the next war at sea - because as this demonstrates, the need for private Navy's will always exist and during war time it's a safe bet they absolutely will exist.