Observations on CS-21R

It’s taken me a few weeks to find the time to finish reading CS-21R and write up my thoughts. Overall I believe the document does an excellent job articulating how the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard intend to ‘man, train, and equip’ in this era of uneasy international peace, increasingly revisionist and adversarial great powers, dramatic technological change, and American self-imposed fiscal paralysis. The signals CS-21R sends regarding the importance of being prepared both materially and intellectually for waging major maritime war are exemplary, especially in the sense that our prospects for preventing such a war depend greatly upon that exact preparation. Likewise, CS-21R’s discussions of how the cyber and electromagnetic domains are central to modern warfare—and what steps the sea services will take to ensure their readiness to fight in those domains—are simply outstanding.

Strengths

Here are the items I found particularly commendable:

• Continues 2007 CS-21’s emphasis on international maritime security cooperation. Restates importance of working with longstanding allies, building new partnerships with formally non-aligned states, and even cooperating with competitors where possible on enhancing the security of the global maritime commons. Recognizes allies would play essential roles in major maritime combat, and that further interoperability enhancements are therefore required.

• Cements ADM Greenert’s maxim of “Warfighting First.” Sends unambiguous message that fleet design, operating concept development, platform and system procurement, and force-wide training are to be focused on developing the capabilities needed for waging major maritime war.

• Strong emphasis on maintaining peacetime forward naval presence. Details specific forces that will be deployed (whether permanently or rotationally) in specific regions for certain peacetime missions.

• Addresses the global strategic changes since 2007 CS-21. Chinese and Russian behavior called out as major influences on CS-21R. Chinese and Russian maritime warfare capabilities are clear factors (to those versed in modern maritime warfare concepts, emerging defense technologies, competitors’ orders of battle, etc.) driving the required Navy capabilities and competencies outlined in the document.

• Clearly informed by the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) and Air-Sea Battle/Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC). Heavy attention to measures for establishing/restoring/maintaining access to theaters of interest whether during peacetime or war. Advances idea that holistic ‘All Domain Access’ is a core Navy function on par with deterrence, sea control, power projection, and maritime security. Whether one agrees with it being a Navy function or not, it unmistakably indicates that Navy leadership is prioritizing development of capabilities, competencies, and operating concepts that will help overcome access challenges.

• Underscores expectation that future combat (especially in the event of major war) will occur under conditions of intense cyber-electromagnetic opposition. Articulates roles of cyberspace operations, electronic warfare, and command and control warfare in obtaining operational access as well as in defeating adversary forces.

• Articulates the minimum overall fleet size as well as the minimum inventories of major power projection combatant types needed to execute the Maritime Strategy (and by implication national grand strategy) in peacetime and war. Note, though, that this force structure is—by definition—likely right up against the strategic “tipping point” as defined in CNA’s March 2010 study of the same name. James Holmes thoroughly dissects exactly this point in an excellent piece at Real Clear Defense this week.

• Strategic deterrence emphasized as a principal Navy mission.

• Recognizes that projection of power ashore can represent all forms of national power; it is not just physical strikes or amphibious assaults.

• Recognizes that sea control is a precondition for performing power projection tasks.

• Expands details regarding how Marine Corps and Coast Guard will be employed to execute the vision as compared to 2007 CS-21.

“Must” Statements

It is quite revealing to look at what CS-21R lists as imperatives. Unlike “Will” statements that pronounce intentions, a “Must” statement implies requirements imposed on the sea services. Of the five “Musts” in the document, three are directly related to cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare:

• “Naval forces must have the resilience to operate under the most hostile cyber and EM conditions.” (Pg. 8)

•  “…we must become more comprehensive in our offensive capability to defeat the system rather than countering individual weapons.” (refers to adversary long-range maritime strike systems, Pg. 21)

• “…the Navy and Marine Corps must maintain a fleet of more than 300 ships, including 11 aircraft carriers, 14 ballistic missile submarines (replaced by 12 Ohio Replacement Program SSBN(X)), and 33 amphibious ships, while the Coast Guard must maintain a fleet of 91 National Security, Offshore Patrol, and Fast Response Cutters.” (Pg. 27)

• “[Naval combatants] “must be complemented by reconfigurable platforms such as the Joint High Speed Vessel, National Security Cutter, and auxiliaries including Large, Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) ships, Dry Cargo/Ammunition (T-AKE) ships, Mobile Landing Platforms (MLP), and the Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB).” (Pg. 28)

• “The electromagnetic-cyber environment is now so fundamental to military operations and so critical to our national interests that we must treat it as a warfighting domain on par with sea, air, land, and space.” (Pg. 33)

Concerns

There are countless views on what CS-21R should or should not have contained, should or should not have said, and so forth. You can’t fully satisfy everyone all of the time, myself included.

In his comments on Bryan McGrath’s ID post on CS-21R, John McLain (formerly of OPNAV N51) talks about the numerous revisions that occurred while routing the draft document up the chain and across organizations for review. I’ve done my share of document development and routing, and I fully appreciate John’s point: consensus generally requires tradeoffs and compromises on content. He’s also quite correct that the process for developing a strategy, tracking its implementation, communicating its ideas, and adapting it over time as the strategic environment changes and lessons are learned is just as important as what the product document actually says.

In hopes of contributing to the next iteration of this process, I’ve listed my main critiques of CS-21R below:

• CS-21R seems to assume the reader already agrees with the assertion that forward naval presence is of vital importance to U.S. grand strategy. Though the document summarizes major benefits that flow from presence, it surprisingly does not go to the lengths previous publicly-released U.S. Maritime Strategies did to underscore the case. The 1986 publicly-released Maritime Strategy document was remarkably specific in explaining conventional deterrence’s dependence upon forward presence (examples: limited time available for mobilization, sheer distances to reach theaters of interest, immediate and short-term military balances in theater with emphasis on warfighting capabilities, and need for broad escalation management options). 2007 CS-21 did so as well, albeit to a lesser degree given the strategic environment of the time. The question of whether or not CS-21R should have been more detailed on this topic is not academic, as it is clear that many of America’s political leaders and opinion elites either do not appreciate what is at risk as forward naval presence (and domestic Coast Guard coverage) declines—or loudly refute these risks exist. I would argue that no good opportunity to increase the visibility of one’s case to those open to being convinced (especially by countering critics’ arguments) should ever be rejected. 

• Despite exceptional discussions of how forward presence will be achieved despite insufficient force structure to meet full Combatant Commander demands, there is limited discussion of how this presence will trade against the rest of the fleet’s surge readiness (even if the 2011 Budget Control Act ceilings are repealed). The Optimized Fleet Response Plan is explained, but the issues it mitigates are alluded to rather than spelled out. A non-navalist reader might come away with the incorrect impression that there were no serious trades between forward presence and fleet readiness/reset.

• On that note, there is no discussion of the steps or resources needed to reset the fleet from the maintenance/manning shortfalls of the past decade and the more recent optempo crisis. This is one of the highest priority issues articulated in Navy leadership’s Congressional testimony as well as public statements, but it is surprisingly not addressed in CS-21R.

• CS-21R acknowledges conventional deterrence has requirements, variables, and implications that are distinct from those concerning nuclear deterrence. But unlike the publicly-released 1986 document or 2007 CS-21, CS-21R doesn’t connect how everything else it articulates is informed by basic conventional deterrence principles or otherwise promotes deterrence credibility. The discussions of how naval combatants support conventional deterrence is implicitly power projection-centric; the wording creates an impression that conventional deterrence centers on strike capabilities (and land-attack at that). The importance of sea control to deterrence by denial (examples: war at sea operations, protection of vital sea lanes for allies economic sustenance as well as reinforcement of our and their forward defenses) is overlooked. Additionally, CS-21R does not explain how the forces allocated to each theater of interest will support deterrence beyond simply ‘showing the flag;’ their latent warfighting roles within a theater deterrent are left implicit.

• Beyond platforms supporting strategic deterrence (SSBNs) or heavy conventional power projection (e.g. carriers, amphibious warships), it is left unclear how the rest of the fleet’s platforms trade against each other. SSN and LCS-FF acquisitions are arguably the Navy’s highest priority non-capital combatant programs right now per Navy leadership talking point emphasis, but neither is mentioned explicitly in that context. Nor is there any allusion to what will be sacrificed or what risks will be accepted to make those procurements possible. These considerations will become increasingly important in preparing U.S. maritime strategy for the fiscal pressures that will emerge during the final years of this decade and stretch into the 2020s…regardless of whether the 2011 Budget Control Act ceilings are lifted.

• CS-21R’s discussion of sea control recognizes that the condition reflects local margin of superiority, but it does not note that this condition is generally temporary. It also does not note that sea control is not something sought in and of itself, but rather is sought for discrete operational purposes.

•  Strategic sealift is mentioned but its criticality is not underlined. America’s ability to wage war overseas depends on strategic sealift; this message should not be left implicit.

• Standing peacetime European maritime security and deterrence is clearly being left to European militaries, with contributions from the four BMD-capable DDGs in Rota and forces transiting through EUCOM en route to other theaters. This may be all that is possible given the U.S. Navy’s fleet size and the operational demands in East/Southeast/Southwest Asia. It is also likely consistent with current Defense Planning Guidance. It strikes me as odd, though, for this to be the case in the theater in which the risk of major war is presently highest and conventional deterrence credibility is accordingly most needed. In this light, it is even odder that the section defining how and why the Navy will achieve presence in the European theater does not mention the Russian threat at all (especially when Russian revanchism was mentioned in the global security environment section). Europe is primarily referred to as a bridge for projecting power into other theaters or as a locus for maritime security efforts; in other words a means to an end rather than a set of allies (and a representation of values) that we are committed to defend. Given the fact that European militaries (and especially navies) are struggling for funding and are already far less capable than the U.S. Navy, it is questionable whether this element of CS-21R will endure long if Russian coercion against NATO continues to increase. If this is the case, then there is a gap in CS-21R regarding how trades with presence/operational requirements in other theaters will be managed.

•  The 1986 publicly-released Maritime Strategy was a product of the pre-Goldwater/Nichols era, and so its discussion of how the Navy would move pieces around on the global chessboard in a general war does not carry over into the Combatant Commander-dominant era in which CS-21R resides. But the 1986 document also explained how the Navy’s basic operating concepts provided specific means for achieving strategic ends in a generic major war. It outlined how each element of the fleet would operate together (as well as with Joint and allied forces) within combined arms campaign constructs. That’s still germane today under ‘man-train-equip,’ and it can be argued that it’s a crucial missing piece for justifying the force structure articulated by CS-21R as well as explaining to non-experts (and especially some critics) how a modern combined arms maritime force works.

o   Example: strike is the single explicitly articulated mission for aircraft carriers in CS-21R, even though their roles supporting sea control are arguably just as important. The caption addressing the E-2D Hawkeye’s role in the Navy Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air concept (pg. 20) speaks indirectly to the carrier’s central sea control roles; it is surprising that this was not echoed in the document’s main body narrative.

o   Example: very limited discussion of how the sea services are supported by the Air Force (beyond aerial refueling and intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance) and the Army (beyond Integrated Air and Missile Defense), or how the Navy supports those services (beyond kinetic and non-kinetic fires, plus intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance). This could have been used to further connect how CS-21R connects with JOAC and JAM-GC.

My critiques should not be interpreted to detract from the exceptional work done by the CS-21R development team. They have powerfully communicated the message that readiness to deter—and if necessary wage—major war is once again America’s sea services’ paramount priority. They have heralded the idea that 21^st Century seapower will depend in great part on the ability to fight in the cyber and electromagnetic domains. They have upheld the notion that maritime security cooperation remains central to the functioning of the international system.

Job well done.

 

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.

PERSTEMPO - The Hollow Force's Canary in the Coal Mine‏

Along with other reporting and data, recent Personnel Tempo, or PERSTEMPO trends illuminate cracks in the Navy’s readiness. As previously noted in this blog, Bataan, Mesa Verde and Whidbey Island are on their way to setting records with 10.5 month deployments. For those not familiar with Navy deployment patterns who might try to view these data in the context of recent 12-15 month Army deployments, I’ll try to add a bit of context on why anecdotal evidence and other statistics are a harbinger for future problems.

Partly as a result of the post-Vietnam “hollow force” of the late 1970s, the Navy began tracking PERSTEMPO in 1985 and has kept detailed data on these trends ever since. Past Center for Naval Analysis PERSTEMPO studies demonstrated that six month deployment lengths and 2:1 turn around ratios (or dwell, as its now called in joint parlance) are optimal for balancing forward deployed presence, allowing ships enough time to receive depot-level maintenance, and sustaining retention and morale for Sailors who are generally assigned to 3-5 year periods of sea duty. Prior to 2007, deployments longer than six months required CNO approval. As with other standards in DOD, when they can’t be met regularly, they are often redefined. The attached graphic shows these trends up to 2004. One thing not illustrated in this slide is how ship numbers have declined in relation to PERSTEMPO increases. In 1991, during Desert Storm, the shipcount was 529 ships. In 2004 at the end of the graphic, it was 292. Today, it's only 284.

I haven’t seen recent data on PERSTEMPO “busts” or CNO waivers, but we know that the new PERSTEMPO instruction extended the deployment length limit to seven months and shrunk dwell to 1.0:1 between deployments. And more than a few ships seem to be tripping those limits. Another interesting data point is the number of ships deployed at any given time. After running approximately 30% of the force deployed on any given day for decades, today 36% of the force is deployed away from home station, a figure previously seen only during wartime surge periods such as Desert Storm, immediately prior to Iraqi Freedom, etc. A detailed analysis of recent PERSTEMPO trends might make for an interesting NPS Thesis…

In the late 1990s, the realization occurred to the Navy that PERSTEMPO data demonstrates how frequently platforms and units are deployed, but doesn’t account for the amount of time individual Sailors are away from home. In response to Congressional concerns, an attempt to capture this data, and possibly even compensate Sailors for excessive time away, resulted in the creation of a system called “ITEMPO.” However after 9/11, this system was simply ignored as unworkable, because the limits set were frequently broken with war time requirements such as individual augmentee deployments. Therefore, it’s difficult to measure the actual strain of time away from home on each Sailor over the course of a career.

It should be noted that unlike the Army, the Navy (and Marine Corps) was heavily deployed prior to 2001 - albeit with more ships and aircraft - and will continue extended deployments for operational forces following the Afghan withdrawals scheduled for 2014. This pattern is the nature of what makes naval forces responsive and ready - continuous forward presence.

However now, the Combatant Commanders’ global demands for deployed naval forces are higher than current the ship count can sustain. Sooner or later, something will give, resulting in either a (more) precipitous decline in readiness due to maintenance problems, retention, or a combination of both. History demonstrates that what likely won’t give are these presence requirements, or the Navy’s obligation and inclination to fill them. So we seem to be left with two choices: a pending readiness disaster; or to simply build more ships. A force of less than 300 ships does not bode well for maintaining the US Navy’s status the world’s premier sea power. The exact force composition, high-low mix, etc. has been and should continue to be debated, but the fact that we can’t sustain maritime primacy without more ships and submarines should be clear to all by now.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Red Lines, Fair Shares, and Inflection Points

The headlines this morning try to tell a story. Spencer Ackerman at Danger Room goes with the headline that reads Top Brass Unloads on Austerity Plan. Not to be outdone, Hugh Lessig of the Daily Press has the headline Military brass warns against deep cuts. Phil Ewing at DodBuzz has a similar headline that reads Vice chiefs bemoan readiness in bid to save budgets. If we were to read these headlines alone we might get the impression the proposed cuts to the Department of Defense was the story that came from the hearing, but unfortunately we would not be very informed if we didn't dig deeper.

The story from Tuesday's House Armed Service Committee's Readiness hearing isn't that military leaders do not want budget cuts - no government agency leaders like budget cuts. The real story is that the Department of Defense leadership sent a clear signal to political leaders where the red lines are and what those red lines mean. Representative Forbes choose the number - $400 billion - and each service defined what that red line means to them. Lets start with the Marine Corps.

FORBES: General, you have heard the same statements that we have heard about potential cuts from different sources, $400 billion to $1 trillion.

Assuming that we divided those equally and the Marine Corps had to take as much as $200 billion of cuts over the next 10 years, could you absorb those? And what would the impact be on the readiness state of the Marine Corps if that were to come your way?

DUNFORD: Chairman, we have taken a look at the figure of $400 billion and we've taken a look at what our fair share would be, if it would come down to the Department of Navy and we would take a cut of those reductions inside the Department of the Navy.

I think, within $400 billion, we would have some challenges in taking those cuts. I think, if they would exceed $400 billion, we would start to have to make some fundamental changes in the capability of the Marine Corps.

Did anyone else catch the important point that the Marine Corps has 'taken a look at what their fair share' of the cuts would be? If the military services have already divided the pie regarding the budget cuts before the strategic review is completed, then the Obama administrations strategic review is little more than a bullshit popsicle. General Dunford ultimately does not disclose the figure that would form the red line for "their fair share" of cuts, but if the strategic review is real and not the bullshit popsicle it appears to be, crossing the magic "fair share" total means "fundamental changes in the capability of the Marine Corps." That is a red line.

Forbes asks the same of the Air Force next.

FORBES: I'm looking right now at the average age of some of your fleet. And it could be a few years either way, but as I look at it, your strategic bomber's about 34 years old; tanker aircraft, 47; your airlift aircraft, 19.

What impact would those cuts have on the readiness for the Air Force?

BREEDLOVE: We have also looked at the conversation which is happening about our fair share of $400 billion. And it would cause us quite some concern in the recapitalization of just what you talk about, Mr. Chairman.

We do have an attack air fleet and a bomber fleet that is in bad need of recapitalization. And our plans throughout this period would be challenged by -- by those cuts.

Similarly to General Dunford, what we have looked at is that, in a $400 billion cut, our capacity would have to come down. We have determined that we will not go hollow.

When I came into the flying business in the '70s, I looked at what hollow was on Air Force bases as I walked down the line and saw holes in aircraft where there were no engines, and we had maintained a certain amount of infrastructure and iron but it was unflyable.

And we can't afford to go there with the requirements of our COCOMs today. So a $400 billion cut would force us to constrict our force in order to maintain a ready and fit force to fight.

And we come to almost the same conclusion that General Dunford did. Beyond $400 billion, we would have to go into a fundamental restructure of what it is our nation expects from our Air Force.

There is that phrase "fair share" again - adding more credibility to skeptics of legitimacy of any DoD strategic review by the Obama administration. Can anyone explain how a legitimate "roles and missions" analysis based on strategic thought leads to "fair shares" of budget pies?

General Breedlove has a good answer overall though, because he not only defines the red line as "beyond $400 billion" but also describes what a hallow force is. It is very smart, because by outlining what a hollow force looks like, the US Air Force positions themselves to make cuts that they deem necessary rather than allowing others to dictate - and this testimony makes clear the Air Force will choose to contract itself rather than spread itself out too thin to be effective. These signals are important because smaller Air Force means fewer planes, and fewer planes means local job impacts to specific districts.

Just like the Marines, the US Air Force makes clear that beyond their "fair share" of cuts the Air Force will have to go into a "fundamental restructure of what it is our nation expects from our Air Force." That is a red line.

Forbes then moved on to the Army next.

FORBES: General Chiarelli, again, thank you for being here. No-surprise question to you -- you've heard the questions that I've asked to General Dunford and also to General Breedlove. I'd like to ask you the same thing.

In your best professional military judgment, given the demands of the Army currently, are you currently able to provide the combatant commanders, all of our combatant commanders, with the resources they need to meet the operational requirements of the missions that they currently face?

CHIARELLI: No, we cannot meet all the other COCOM commander's validated demands. Those are prioritized through the global force management process. We work hard to meet them. We are not able to meet them all, and we help them manage that risk.

We are looking very, very hard at a $400 billion cut. We don't totally understand the total impact that's going to have on the force, but when you double that to $800 billion or more, you're reaching an area there that I think would definitely we'd have to look very, very hard at our strategy, what we can and cannot do.

The Army budget is currently enormous - two wars will do that. Even if we take just the baseline DoD budget, excluding the war costs, the Army budget for the last decade has held a higher percentage of the overall DoD budget than it has at any time since WWII, around 26%. What is noteworthy here is the Army doesn't really understand what the $400 billion budget cut figure means, but the red line for the Army is apparently $800 billion.

The Army also receives about $70 billion annually in war supplemental funding, so that might explain in part why $400 billion isn't too bad a hit to the service compared to the other services, but why closer $800 billion would be.

Finally, Rep Forbes brought up the issue with the Navy, but what is remarkable is the extraordinary detail that went into asking the question.

FORBES: Admiral, last question I'm going to ask is this. When Admiral Burke was here a little over a week ago, he said that the COCOM demand was for about 16 or 18 subs at any one time. He said we could only deliver about 10 subs at any one time, not because they didn't need them, but because that's all we could afford to deliver -- big difference.

I'm looking at the shipbuilding plan that has been submitted by the Navy in looking out. We had Admiral Willard testify before one of our subcommittees a little over a year ago that the Chinese now for the first time in our lifetime had more ships in their navy than we did in ours. And I know we can argue about capability, but at some point in time, numbers become capability.

The second thing we looked at is the Navy has said we needed a floor of 313 ships. Then they came back and somewhat tweaked that and said 328. You know, and we've chatted about this before, in the QDR independent panel that did an analysis on that number, they came up and felt we needed 346 ships.

Regardless of whether it's 313, 328 or 346, in CBO's review of the shipbuilding plan that has been brought forward, they asked the question how the numbers work out, because based on their numbers and the cost of the ships, they feel instead of going to 313, we could be going down to 270, 250, even 170, depending on the cost of the ships.

Here's the question I have for you. This year this committee put $14.9 billion in shipbuilding. The average over the last three decades, as you know, has been $15 billion that Congress has put in for shipbuilding. We know we can't supply enough subs right now for our combatant commanders' request.

We know, as you mentioned and also as CRS has come out and told us, if we were to delay a carrier, that carrier cost for either not building one or delaying them would increase not just our carrier cost, but the cost of our subs and the cost of doing the maintenance on our ships.

We also know that last year the Navy had a $367 million shortfall in their ship repair account. Admiral Burke, Admiral McCoy testified about a week or so ago that when we don't do the maintenance on the ships, we reduce the lifecycle for those ships, and we increase the cost of the maintenance.

The number differentiation on that shipbuilding plan is this. If we had the $15 billion, we can't reach even a 313-ship goal. You heard General Breedlove say when the Chinese say they're going to do something, they normally do it. And they're talking about building a lot of ships over the next few years.

My concern to you is if we are short already, and I think the numbers are between -- that we need $17 billion to $19 billion, so we could be short $2.5 billion to $19 billion, what in the world would the navy do on its shipbuilding plan, if you have to take further reductions coming down from some of these budget hits?

GREENERT: Well, Mr. Chairman, you really eloquently described the conundrum we're in, the balance.

FORBES: I try.

GREENERT: And it's really all about that balance.

If we have a reduction of a kind that was passed around here, $400 billion, $886 billion, without a comprehensive strategic review, a fundamental look at what we were asking our forces to do, without a change in activity, as I described, we won't be able to meet the global force management plan today. I'm pretty sure of that.

It will exacerbate our readiness trends, which you're familiar with. And if we have to go to force structure, reduction of force structure, which you mentioned, I'm concerned about the industrial base. You're familiar with it, and you know that it's a fragile item.

Later in testimony, this exchange also takes place.

FORBES: And, Admiral Greenert, the last question I have for you, going back to the numbers we were chatting about earlier on our shipbuilding plan, I think it would be fair to say that the Congress has been averaging about $15 billion over the last three decades.

This year, we put in $14.9 billion. As you know, CBO has come out with their report, suggesting that to follow your plan, you would need about $19 billion per year.

I think some of your earlier figures -- but I don't want to throw these at you -- show that we'd need about $17.3 billion. But let's just take the CBO figures.

How realistic do you think it is with the budgets that we're seeing and proposed cuts that we're going to have those kind of increases going into the shipbuilding plan over the next several years?

And if we can't come up with a realistic scenario of getting those dollars, does that mean our shipbuilding plan is not a realistic plan?

GREENERT: If I may, Mr. Chairman, I looked at the CBO report and as we know, in the -- in the -- the differences vary by year, a few are by tranche years (ph).

First 10 years, we're pretty close. It's about inflation indices, labor differences, cost differences, and really the foundation, if you will, or the assumptions put into the design of the ships. We vary slightly on what the future ship might look like.

But, nonetheless, to get to the -- to your question at hand, if we receive a reduction of the ilk we were talking about, $886 billion, and we have to reduce force structure, and we can't build ships to the level that we need to.

Then, you know, our shipbuilding plan, it gets back to strategy. I have to change the strategy. So we, as stated by all our leadership, we need a change in strategy.

Admiral Greenert had a great day on the Hill in my opinion, particularly considering he is in a somewhat difficult position with the CNO confirmation hearings looming. In his opening statement, ADM Greenert said this very interesting bit:

I can't tell you for sure, Mr. Chairman, if we're at an inflection point or a tipping point. But I can't -- but I don't see how we can sustain this pace of operations indefinitely and meet the readiness standards.

If we try to do so, I think it'll consume the expected service life of our force structure earlier than designed and planned, and we'll face a cascading increase in the cost to achieve the expected service life for those ships. And reaching that expected service life is a foundational element of our future ship inventory and, accordingly, our shipbuilding plan.

ADM Greenert nailed his testimony. The news folks can afford to be simplistic and frame headlines as a DoD vs the budget drama, but it is clearly more complicated than that. There are serious strategic and political issues on the table, and there is nothing simple about the challenges.

The approach Admiral Greenert consistently took was a strategic view calling for a strategic review. It's brilliant, because the Navy faces very difficult decisions and this approach results in burden sharing - specifically when the Navy takes the strategic road it shifts the burden of the political consequences onto elected leaders - and the consequences are enormous.

The shipbuilding industry in America is almost exclusively supported by the government sector, as it lacks the private sector alternative like the airline industry - for example. Loss in shipbuilding capacity by reduced government sector spending cannot be made up via other means, and neither Congress nor the Obama administration has a policy that could help the shipbuilding industry become more competitive globally in the private sector. When Admiral Greenert says he is "concerned about the industrial base," he is speaking directly to capacity now and into the future. Loss of that capacity will translate into regional impacts to economy likely to have election outcomes, and that is particularly true in states like Virginia and Florida.

The Navy needs the strategic review more than the other services do right now, and ADM Greenert has sent a clear message the Navy faces difficult choices, and only with a legitimate strategic review can the Navy make informed choices based on the budget cuts to the Navy. The decisions by the Navy must be guided by a political policy with a clear objective. In many ways, the US needs to decide whether we are Sparta or Athens, because in this economy the nation can no longer afford to be both.

ADM Greenert specifically used the phrase "inflection point," which I think is brilliant in describing exactly where the Navy - if not the nation - is today. Whatever the strategic review decides, what is clear is that Congress will want to have a copy of it for evaluation, because ADM Greenert made it pretty clear that while the Navy can adapt to the review decisions, the political consequences of the choices that will need to be made will be very real.

Did we learn anything? I think we learned a lot. We learned the Navy is standing on the red line. We learned that the 313-ship plan is almost certainly dead. We learned that ADM Greenert is going to present the Navy to Congress as guided by his strategy, and he has signaled that will probably be a new strategy for the Navy. We learned the demand for naval forces is around 400 ships, so the Navy is well below and unlikely ever to be sized to meet COCOM demands.

Most importantly, we learned that right now the Navy is at an inflection point, and the Navy has given clear indications the Tipping Point exists, potentially at $400 billion in budget cuts and absolutely at higher numbers.

Ms. Bordallo Asked the Right Questions

From the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness hearing last week.

FORBES: Ms. Bordallo, I recognize you for whatever time you require.

BORDALLO: Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. There are a few miscellaneous questions for the admiral. Admiral Burke, it is my understanding that the DOD rates for fuel increased on June 1st from $126 a barrel to $165 a barrel. Can you please explain the total cost and the impact to the ship operations and flying hour program accounts? And if the fuel rates remain high in fiscal year 2012, how will you pay for that deficit?

BURKE: Ma'am, you're absolutely right. It's roughly $39 a barrel. In the last four months of 2011, if that price holds, it will cost us an additional $140 million in the ship operating account, an additional $204 million in the flying hour account, for a total of $344 million through the rest of the fiscal year. The likely source of payment for that will be supplemental funding.

$165 a barrel? Yep, and while I am not certain, I believe $344 million is just the Navy/Marine Corps budget shortfall to meet the higher price. I could be mistaken, but I thought I read somewhere the total DoD shortfall due to rising prices of fuel is $517 million. Regardless, the $165 a barrel number is important. Tell me folks, which direction is energy heading in the future... up or down?

From Navy Nuclear-Powered Surface Ships: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress by Ronald O'Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs dated January 18, 2011.

2006 Navy Alternative Propulsion Study

The more comprehensive and detailed 2006 Navy alternative propulsion study was conducted in response to Section 130 of the FY2006 defense authorization act (H.R. 1815, P.L. 109-163 of January 6, 2024), which called for such a study (see “Prior-Year Legislative Activity”). The study reached a number of conclusions, including the following:

In constant FY2007 dollars, building a Navy surface combatant or amphibious ship with nuclear power rather than conventional power would add roughly $600 million to $800 million to its procurement cost.

For a small surface combatant, the procurement-cost increase was about $600 million.
For a medium-size combatant (defined as a ship with a displacement between 21,000 metric tons and 26,000 metric tons), the increase was about $600 million to about $700 million.
For an amphibious ship, the increase was about $800 million.

Although nuclear-powered ships have higher procurement costs than conventionally powered ships, they have lower operating and support costs when fuel costs are taken into account.

A ship’s operational tempo and resulting level of energy use significantly influences the life-cycle cost break-even analysis. The higher the operational tempo and resulting level of energy use assumed for the ship, lower the cost of crude oil needed to break even on a life-cycle cost basis, and the more competitive nuclear power becomes in terms of total life-cycle cost.

The newly calculated life-cycle cost break-even cost-ranges, which supercede the break-even cost figures from the 2005 NR quick look analysis, are as follows:

Although nuclear-powered ships have higher procurement costs than conventionally powered ships, they have lower operating and support costs when fuel costs are taken into account.

A ship’s operational tempo and resulting level of energy use significantly influences the life-cycle cost break-even analysis. The higher the operational tempo and resulting level of energy use assumed for the ship, lower the cost of crude oil needed to break even on a life-cycle cost basis, and the more competitive nuclear power becomes in terms of total life-cycle cost.

The newly calculated life-cycle cost break-even cost-ranges, which supercede the break-even cost figures from the 2005 NR quick look analysis, are as follows:

• $210 per barrel to $670 per barrel for a small surface combatant;
• $70 per barrel to $225 per barrel for a medium-size surface combatant; and
• $210 per barrel to $290 per barrel for an amphibious ship. In each case, the
• lower dollar figure is for a high ship operating tempo, and the higher dollar figure
• is for a low ship operating tempo.

The life-cycle cost break-even analysis indicates that nuclear-power should be
considered for near-term applications for medium-size surface combatants, and
that life-cycle cost will not drive the selection of nuclear power for small surface
combatants or amphibious ships. A nuclear-powered medium-size surface
combatant is the most likely of the three ship types studied to prove economical,
depending on the operating tempo that the ship actually experiences over its
lifetime.

Compared to conventionally powered ships, nuclear-powered ships have
advantages in terms of both time needed to surge to a distant theater of operation
for a contingency, and operational presence (time on station) in the theater of
operation.

CRS sourced that information to the written statement by The Honorable Dr. Delores M. Etter, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition), et al., Before the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on Integrated Nuclear Power Systems for Future Naval Surface Combatants, March 1, 2007, pp. 4-5.

I think this is very interesting, because in 2011 - roughly a dozen years away from commissioning the first DDG-51 Flight III in a time everyone is talking about shrinking budgets and high operational tempos, all of a sudden the price of DoD fuel is now around 75% of the breakeven point for nuclear powered surface combatants with a high operational tempo. By the way, when you add nuclear power to surface combatants, it raises the price of those ships meaning Congress is likely to buy fewer ships - and at a high price already the Navy is going to have fewer ships anyway which also means it is very likely the operational tempo would remain very high.

The Navy has a serious energy problem, and it isn't just fuel. The question that everyone needs to be asking is "what should we be doing now?" It depends. If the Navy is serious about total cost of ownership when it comes to their new construction vessels, then the law that requires nuclear power must be part of the discussion. Alternatives to nuclear power should also be important parts of the discussion, after all there is something to say about not putting a nuclear reactor on a platform the enemy will be shooting at - although given we already have nuclear aircraft carriers, perhaps that ship has sailed.

No matter how one looks at it, any discussion of the DDG-51 Flight III must include an explanation why the price of oil will not go up only 25% more than the price of oil today, which by itself is an unbelievable proposition because any war requiring the United States to use the capabilities of the DDG-51 Flight III is almost certainly going to raise the price of oil by 25%! The issue I'm trying to highlight is that the rising cost of fuel must factor into the DDG-51 Flight III discussion, because we appear to be well past the red line for a legitimate nuclear power discussion for any platform that won't be fielded 10 years from today.

If total cost of ownership matters the way the Navy says it does, then it is time to start thinking about designing a future surface combatant that factors in total cost of ownership. The law today states new design ships the size of modern US surface combatants must be nuclear powered. I cannot say I have always agreed with that law, but in light of new information I think there was quite a bit of wisdom in the law and the Navy can no longer ignore nuclear issue when it comes to the next surface combatant. Besides, the necessity for Integrated Power in future surface combatants is an issue that makes the current plan for Burke Flight IIIs completely unrealistic anyway. Indeed, Congress should never fund a future surface combatant program that lacks integrated power, to do so would be a criminal act in the form of wasting taxpayer investments in seapower.

With all of that said, Congress cannot ignore that by buying nuclear surface combatants, they are budgeting cost of ownership for fuel up front in procurement - an upfront investment that suggests a transition period requiring higher investment up front for lower operational costs later. This is very important, because while it is unclear if the Navy has the foresight to make choices based on long term total cost of ownership investments - that concern regarding lack of foresight goes double for political leaders.

BORDALLO: Another question is, given the issues with the current computer-based training raised by GAO, the naval inspector general and the Balisle report, how has the Navy improved off-ship training for Navy personnel to ensure that sailors arrive at the ship with the necessary skills?

BURKE: Ma'am, we probably went a little too far on computer based training a few years ago. We have since shifted the pendulum back some, so we have a mix of computer-based training and as well as instructor-based training. And we have a very good instructor-to- student ratio in that instructor-based training. And we see benefits in both kinds of training, because there are some people that learn better one way than the other and there are some things that are better taught one way than the other. But the key point is it's much better to take apart a valve and put it back together in something, you know, where you actually put your hands on a physical valve and physically work on something. So we shifted too far. We've come back. And we think we've got the mix about right now. But we've heard from the sailors and heard from the Congress on this one and we've moved.

Shortly after the commissioning of USS New York (LPD 21), the ship was returning to Norfolk when all of a sudden there was this loud tapping sound coming from the main propulsion diesel engine. It turned out, nobody knew what to do. This scenario was apparently not covered in the virtual training program the crew had used to operate those big diesel engines in the LPD-17 class. The crew was supposed to turn off the engine having the problem, but that's easier said in hindsight.

The Navy has spent a fortune retraining sailors because of poor training given in the name of virtual instruction. Time will tell if the Navy has found the right balance between hands-on training and simulated training, but there is no question the Navy has taken a lot of strides to fix what was an enormous mistake in reliance on computer based simulation.

Of all the mistakes the Navy has made recently regarding their attempt to find efficiency in technology, the virtual training mistakes might be one I'm OK with as long as the lesson is legitimately learned. For a generation or two at least, my sense is that the Navy heaped upon itself a healthy dose of skepticism regarding the false promises of technology as a replacement for fundamental skills sailors require. It's an expensive lesson to learn, but one we are unlikely to see repeated. Large private organizations make these kinds of mistakes too, so the Navy is not unique when making mistakes attempting to incorporate new technological concepts into their organization.

As mistakes go, this was a big one, but in the case of too much reliance on virtual training - it is a problem that has been relatively easy to identify and has a known and easily applied solution. The Navy deserves all criticism for this mistake, but for me - I'm far more concerned with organizational problems that are hard to identify or don't have a known solution yet, for example, new surface force maintenance shore based support concepts. For me, integrating new support regimes for new ship types is a much bigger challenge than a virtual training software program that never lived up to expectations.

BORDALLO: Good. My last question, Mr. Chairman, is, based on the findings of the Balisle report, the Navy plans to take a number of actions in many interrelated areas such as training, maintenance, command and control, manning, etc. What's not clear, however, is who will be responsible for making sure that the actions are coordinated and implemented to avoid the problems of the past where the Navy wasn't looking at things holistically to see whether the changes it was making were compatible and did not have unintended consequences. The Navy will need to make accountability clear and have some kind of integration mechanism across the areas, whether it be one senior-level official who is the focal point supported by an interdisciplinary group or another approach. So how does the Navy intend to proceed from here in taking corrective actions, including establishing leadership and organizational accountability?

BURKE: Last summer, last July, I think it was, in front of this committee, Admiral McCoy and I were here in between us was Admiral Harvey. And Admiral Harvey was and is the commander at Fleet Forces down in Norfolk. Admiral Harvey said he was the responsible person to do exactly what you talked about. Now, he can't do that without Admiral McCoy and Admiral Architzel and me doing our jobs to support him. So in military parlance we see him as the supported commander and we are the supporting commanders. And as long as we do our jobs to give him the resources to do it, he will -- he will deliver.

BORDALLO: So he is the focal point.

BURKE: Yes, ma'am.

MCCOY: And if I could chime in, I'm on a regular every 60 to 90 day drum beat with Admiral Harvey. I also report to Admiral Walsh, the Pacific Fleet commander. I'm responsible to deliver the engineering and maintenance associated with the actions in the Balisle report. I can also tell you that the two surface type commanders are also held accountable by the fleet, Admiral Harvey and Admiral Walsh, for their pieces of manning, training and standards and things like that that were in the Balisle report. So we are on a regular drum beat. And so I think that's moving and being well cared for.

BORDALLO: Thank you very much. And I thank you both for service to our country. I yield back.

FORBES: Thank you, Madeleine.

Who is accountable? HE IS! Wouldn't it be nice if a ships CO could pass the responsibility on to the squadron commodore? I get it that there is a chain of command, but at some point every one in the chain has to take personal responsibility for what they are doing. McCoy and Burke were thrown slow fastballs over the center of the plate, and passed up the opportunity to swing.

I think it says a lot when the question of accountability is raised and leaders quickly point fingers in the direction of others. VADM McCoy's answer is slightly better, but still, I think the questions of accountability and the perception regarding what it means in the Navy only gets more murky when the shore based leadership is ready to fill the accountability void with the names of others under oath. Ms. Bordallo is right to ask about organizational accountability, because the problem is bigger than one person, even if both Vice Admirals are suggesting otherwise by pointing to one person.

Don't get me wrong, I agree ADM Harvey is the senior-level official responsible for coordinating everyone else, but "everyone else" includes both of these Vice Admirals they should have stepped up, but didn't.

I was impressed when Admiral Harvey took personal responsibility on under oath last year, but what I don't understand is how VADM McCoy can suggest that the accountability for this falls to one person - the Commander of Fleet Forces Command - when in fact Admiral Greenert was the Commander at Fleet Forces Command before ADM Harvey. Admiral Greenert's record is that he ran around apparently oblivious to readiness problems including the funding shortfalls for surface combatants claiming "we have plenty of money." How is it possible Fleet Forces Command is accountable today when Fleet Forces Command is not being held accountable for past activities when a promotion to CNO for Admiral Greenert is the reward for not getting on top of this issue a few years ago?

Ms. Bordallo, allow me to humbly suggest the answer to your question is exactly as the Navy testified - accountability only exists if your name is Admiral Harvey who, on his own, was willing to take responsibility for the problems himself.

And that is the problem sure to be ignored by the Senate come the CNO hearings, meaning Congress should expect the same low standards of accountability from the Navy because it is the standard they set with their low standards of accountability when it comes to oversight via the promotion system. Ironically, as COs get fired with increased frequency the Navy is rightfully being praised for holding commanding officers to high standards of accountability, but when someone like me questions the job performance of any Admiral, folks get real defensive fast and generally start naming the non-Admirals to shift blame.

Exercising the Cannibalisation Option

During the Navy Readiness hearing last week, at one point Representative Forbes raised the issue of cannibalisation as a major challenge facing the US Navy. However, details regarding the extent of the issue were never provided during the hearing.

Sam Lagrone at Janes wrote about the cannibalisation issue on Tuesday. This is what the ugly byproduct of 'efficiency measures' and 'enterprise' management solutions like "Just in Time Logistics" looks like:

The US Navy (USN) is relying heavily on a maintenance option the service considers "a drastic measure to only be utilised as a last resort" to allow its ships to pass their basic inspections and maintain the operational effectiveness of its fleet, according to previously unreleased data provided to the US Congress and obtained by Jane's .

In four consecutive quarters in 2010 the USN reported a rate of so-called "cannibalisation" of components between ships of on average twice the current allowable maximum allowed limit (MAL) of about one instance per four ships (.28), according to the data.

"It's not a cost efficiency when we look at our cannibalisation rates," Vice Admiral Kevin McCoy, Commander of Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), told a US congressional committee on 12 July. "That means we're taking parts off one ship to put on another ship so we can meet the inspections."

Across the fleet in 2010, the USN saw an average rate of cannibalisation of .48, or about one instance per two ships across the entire year. Across the nine ship classes identified in the data, five ship classes exceeded the MAL.

The US submarine force had by far the highest instances of cannibalisation, according to the data. In the first three months of 2010 US nuclear attack boats (SSNs) and Ohio-class nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) saw a collective cannibalisation rate of 1.4, or about one-and-a-half instances per ship.

At the end of the report the article has a brilliant chart that breaks down the cannibalisation rates by type of US Navy vessel.

Cannibalisation incidents per ship per quarter

	Jan-Mar 2010	Apr-June 2010	July-Sep 2010	Oct-Dec. 2010	2010 Totals
Carriers	0.45	0.64	0.36	0.09	0.385
Sub Tenders	0.5	0	0	0	0.125
SSBN	1.43	1.07	1.29	0.86	1.1625
SSGN	1	0.25	0.5	0.75	0.625
SSN	1.4	1.26	1.19	0.93	1.195
Amphibs.	0.37	0.23	0.09	0.11	0.2
Combatants	0.27	0.41	0.31	0.31	0.325
Auxiliaries	0	0	0	0	0
Minesweepers	0.33	0.06	0.28	0.43	0.275
Average Across Classes	0.64	0.44	0.45	0.39	0.48

While the nation is at war, this is the behind the scenes ugly of what is keeping a peacetime Navy under current operational tempo, and to make matters worse this is before the budget cuts.

The chart is too generic to draw too many conclusions, but it certainly raises several questions.

I'd be very interested in reasons why the Amphibious Ships and Minesweepers have a lower rate of cannibalisation than other types of surface vessels. In particular, how is it possible the amphibious ships are suffering from low cannibalisation when in fact the average age of the amphibious ship force was much higher over this time period than the average age of the surface combatant force? I'd also be very curious to see if cannibalisation is more common in certain ports than it is others, for example, is it frequent in Norfolk but infrequent in San Diego, for example?

Because nuclear powered carriers, nuclear powered submarines, and surface combatants generally have more advanced electronics than other types of vessels, is it possible these numbers suggest the cannibalisation problem is more related to electronic technologies rather than engineering issues? If it is true the problem is more related to electronics than engineering, it begs the question what the aircraft numbers look like, but also how the Navy intends to get on top of this problem as the Navy starts to incorporate unmanned technologies into the fleet when by design unmanned technologies generally have more electronics than the manned systems they are replacing.

One more question... anyone notice there is apparently no cannibalisation taking place on ships operated by the Maritime Sealift Command? Those ships are operating at least as much as any other ship in the fleet - and probably more - so what is the MSC doing right that the Navy can learn?

The entire cannibalisation issue tells us a story... it is a story about COs who are held to ultimate responsibility and accountability for their ship, and who are doing everything they can to get their ship ready.

This is also a story about some Flag Officer somewhere (or more likely - several Flag Officers) playing with the system as if it is made up of monopoly money, and not being held accountable for their poor decisions made in the name of efficiency. With that said, the lines towards accountability go like this... until Congress and specifically the Senate holds military leaders accountable during promotion hearings, the blame needs to be properly assigned almost entirely on elected leaders unwilling to enforce accountability as a function of their oversight responsibilities. Until the Senate starts holding leaders accountable during promotions, the Senate reflects and enables a culture of leadership absent accountability in the Navy.

Congress Goes Powerpoint on Navy Readiness

In the hearing yesterday, there was a moment where Congressman Randy Forbes of Virginia went Powerpoint on the Navy. During the opening testimonies, the Navy went Powerpoint on Congress when explaining the Fleet Response Plan. These were the very interesting slides Rep. Randy Forbes used in his response. Click the images to read. From here.

In the last four years inspection failures for Navy ships have nearly tripled. Currently, 1 in 5 ships inspected is either unsatisfactory or unfit for combat. Since 2007 inspection failure rates have risen from roughly 8% to 24%. Yet, this year alone, the Navy faces a $367 million funding shortfall for ship maintenance.

On average, Navy deployed ships are forced to spend nearly 40% of their time with at least one major equipment or systems failure. Essential equipment or systems on Navy ships could include anti-air defenses, radar, satellite communications, or engines. Almost 40% of the time, deployed ships have at least one essential piece of equipment that has failed and prevents them from meeting a primary mission.

Over one-half of our currently deployed aircraft are not combat ready. Fifty-five percent of deployed Navy and Marine Corps aircraft are not fully mission capable. For every two aircraft sent on deployment, one of them cannot perform a critical mission for which it was deployed . Despite this, the Navy faces a nearly $100 million funding shortfall for aviation maintenance and logistics this year alone.

It was remarkable to me that Rep. Forbes kept apologizing to the two Vice Admirals for beating them over the head with the facts regarding Navy readiness. In my opinion, I think it would have been more appropriate for Navy leaders to apologize to Congress and the American people for being consistently below the stated readiness requirement.

When Congress asked the panel who in the Navy is responsible for Readiness, both VADMs were quick to point to ADM Harvey. Remember, Commander Fleet Forces Command is responsible for fixing these problems, while former Commanders at Fleet Forces Command who were simply voting present during the deteriorating surface ship standards are somehow not responsible.

For evidence, just look to the next CNO.

Something Clearly Went Wrong With USS Philippine Sea

U.S Code Title X, 7304 requires a Board of Naval Officers to conduct a Material Inspection of all naval ships at least once every three years, if practicable.

SECNAVINST 5040.3, Department of The Navy Inspection Program (DONIP) and OPNAVINST 4730.5(series) Trials and Material Inspections of Ships provides additional directions and responsibilities to the President, Board of Inspection and Survey (PRESINSURV).

Instructions and procedures established by PRESINSURV for conducting inspections, surveys and trials are found in the following instructions; a)INSURVINST 4730.1, Material Inspections of Surface Ships, b) INSURVINST 4730.2, Material Inspections of Submarines, c) INSURVINST 4730.3, Trials of Surface Ships.

Lets talk about this news report.

Two East Coast-based ships — a cruiser and a frigate — registered unsatisfactory grades following early-December material readiness assessments by the Navy Board of Inspection and Survey, Fleet Forces Command has confirmed.

The grades were the worst of 41 ships assessed by the INSURV so far in 2010.

The Mayport, Fla.-based cruiser Philippine Sea “demonstrated challenges” in the areas of main propulsion, environmental protection, electrical, weapons, ventilation and aviation, according to Lt. Cmdr. Mike Kafka, a Fleet Forces Command spokesman. The Norfolk-based frigate Nicholas, he said, was similarly “challenged” in the areas of main propulsion, environmental protection, combat systems and aviation.

The first instinct lately with INSURVs has been to focus in on the ships leadership and crew, but I'll let the Navy handle that aspect. What I want to look at is some history.

USS Nicholas (FFG 47)

I do not know when the last INSURV was for USS Nicholas (FFG 47), but I am going to assume that it was sometime between August 18th, 2008 when the ship returned from a six month patrol in the 6th Fleet and December 2009 when the ship deployed to participate in Africa Partnership Station (APS) in support of U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM). The ship was commissioned on March 10, 2024 and is now 26.8 years old. The public record suggests the ship hasn't been doing much since returning from that deployment on June 3, 2010.

I see a very old ship that never underwent modernization among a class of ships that was stripped of weapons long ago that has undergone a lifetime of command and crew changes that just spent 6 months in one of the few places on the planet parts are virtually impossible to come by and the result doesn't surprise me any. In all likelihood the CO saw this coming months ago, alerted the Navy, and the crew has done what it could with what little it had - while probably also being looted for IA and any number of other training or assignment tasks - and ultimately the ship didn't pass INSURV. Even without knowing the details, there is very little about this case that I find out of the ordinary or unexpected - indeed it would have been heroic had the ship passed INSURV based on what public information is available.

USS Philippine Sea (CG 58)

The USS Philippine Sea (CG 58) has a much different history than USS Nicholas (FFG 47), and if we examine the results of a bad INSURV in the context of public information - someone needs to be asking questions. On September 29, 2024 USS Philippine Sea (CG 58) participated in an Expeditionary Strike Group Integration exercise (ESGINT), with the USS Nassau (LHA 4) ESG, in preparation for a deployment in 2008. On December 15, 2024 USS Philippine Sea (CG 58) successfully completed a 17-day Composite Unit Training Exercise (COMPTUEX).

USS Philippine Sea (CG 58) returned from a five month deployment on July 10, 2008, and wasn't heard from in the news again until USS Philippine Sea (CG 58) became the school ship for Surface Warfare Officers School (SWOS) in January 31, 2009.

On March 10, 2024 USS Philippine Sea (CG 58), along with USS Anzio (CG 68) and USS Porter (DDG 78), was conducting Fleet Irregular Warfare Training in the vicinity of the Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center (AUTEC) and in the Jacksonville Operating Areas according to news reports. On April 23, 2024 the Philippine Sea performed an airborne medical evacuation of a 70-year old passenger aboard the cruise ship Motor Vessel Braemar, while underway in the Atlantic Ocean. The guided-missile cruiser was en route to Plymouth, United Kingdom, to participate in a multinational NATO exercise Joint Warrior at the time. USS Philippine Sea (CG 58) spent all of May at sea in Europe returning to Virginia by June 1. Then this happened.

PSE arrived at Naval Weapons Station Yorktown, VA on June 1st and commenced a weapons offload. On the 2nd, ATG inspectors arrived, inbriefed the 3M Certification, and began the inspection the very next day. After completing the certification with Mayport Basin record-breaking scores, Phil Sea returned to homeport and entered her 10-month availability on the 8th. This availability encompassed what is known as Cruiser Modernization fleet-wide. USS Philippine Sea would soon become the 2nd cruiser in the fleet to complete Cruiser Modernization, the 1st on the east coast. The month was filled with crew move ashore, defueling, planning and coordination meetings, and finally entering Atlantic Marine Drydock on the 24th.

Captain Herbert M. Hadley took over command of the ship on November 19, 2024 according to the ships own history. Cruiser Modernization completed in February 17, 2024 when the ship returned to sea. In May 2010 the ship participated in New York City Fleet Week and as recently as October 22, 2024 the ship was reportedly conducting training operations with the George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) Carrier Strike Group in preparation of a deployment next year.

Something Clearly Went Wrong

Someone explain to me what just happened. USS Philippine Sea (CG 58) is 21.9 years old and just underwent cruiser modernization, which includes "smartship" and all electric modifications to the ship. The ship was in the yard from June 1st, 2009 until getting back to sea on February 17, 2024 and by December - 10 months after cruiser modernization - the ship fails INSURV? How can a ship be 10 months out of cruiser modernization and INSURV reports the ship “demonstrated challenges” in the areas of main propulsion, environmental protection, electrical, weapons, ventilation and aviation? Doesn't "smartship" reduce the crew size, extra hands that would have been nice during maintenance prior to INSURV?

From 1868-2009 INSURV reports were unclassified information. It is unclear why INSURV reports are classified, because the only thing one can learn from an INSURV report is that a ship isn't in good condition at some point in time. Clearly the enemy is unaware that ships can potentially wear down.

Because INSURVs are classified, we have no idea what went wrong with USS Philippine Sea (CG 58), but something clearly did. When a ship is only 10 months out of the yard following the ships single most important, and expensive modernization availability period and fails an INSURV, something is clearly not right. Inspections of Navy ships are required by law, and here is a great example where an INSURV report being classified conceals the material condition of USS Philippine Sea (CG 58), among the three CGs to be modernized, from Congress.

Did the Navy just flush millions in taxpayer money down the toilet with the modernization of USS Philippine Sea (CG 58)? How can we spend multiple millions on upgrades but fail to spend the multiple thousands necessary for upkeep? Sorry Congressman, unless you ask the question yourself while the Navy is under oath, you may never get the answer.

Here is another question the new Congress should think about - did the delay in the FY2011 defense budget impact maintenance funding for these ships? As a taxpayer and a voter, I think Americans should know that answer because warships are incredibly expensive, and shouldn't be allowed to fall into poor condition because money isn't available (when it could be made available in a CR) during a maintenance period due to political obstacles in passing a budget on time.