Picture of the Day

This is HMAS Sydney (FFG 03) firing a SM2 on June 18th test off Hawaii.


This weapon system appears to be perfectly capable today. The United States Navy still operates many frigates that could, yet cannot, use this weapon system. I believe we may have been right to retire the missile when we did, but we have also been lucky we have not needed it.

USS Halyburton (FFG 40) and now USS Carr (FFG 52) have been operating in the Mediterranean Sea near Libya, and Libya may indeed one day find a way to shoot ASMs at ships offshore if this war continues much longer. If they do, having a functional SM2 sure would be handy for protecting the ship...

Just saying.

Australian Defense Will Focus on China

Just as Australia’s strategic outlook has been dominated in past decades by American primacy in Asia, so in future will it be shaped more than anything else by what follows as American primacy fades and China grows. The biggest risk is not that China itself becomes a direct threat to Australia, but that the erosion of American power unleashes strategic competition among Asia’s strongest states, which in turn increases the risk that Australia could face a number of military threats to its interests or even its territorial security.

We can escape that risk if the US, China, Japan and eventually India can avoid escalating strategic competition by negotiating a new set of understandings to replace those that have kept Asia so peaceful for the past forty years. The essential basis of any new understanding would be a more equal sharing of power among these key states.

But is America really willing to treat China as an equal? Will China settle for anything less? And can either treat Japan as an equal? And will Japan — still a huge power — settle for less than China gets? Unless these questions can be resolved, it is hard to see how escalating strategic competition can be avoided in the longer term.

A FOCUSED FORCE: Australia’s Defence Priorities in the Asian Century, Lowy Institute Paper 26, April 2009, Hugh White, Executive Summary

Hugh White's report set the stage a few weeks ago for the upcoming release of the Australian Defense White paper, which in case you have not heard, is expected to reach conclusions in stark contrast to the United States. News reports in Australia have not been able to resist discussing the gap between the US and Australia regarding the future strategic environment of the Pacific. First it was reported that Australia's military planners asked the US to reconsider their dove-like assessment of China, and also rejected the broader "Gates View" that unconventional non-state conflicts being the primary strategic threat over the next 20-30 years. The rebuff was mutual, as 2 days later The Australian reported the CIA and Pentagon rejected the hawkish arguments made by Australia's Defense leaders about the threat poised by China.

It is noteworthy that Australia is calling China the "next cold war" and when they came to Washington earlier this month, the Australian military leaders has expectations to recruit the US towards this view. On the contrary, the US rejected this assessment, and agreed with opinions of Australia's Defense Intelligence Organization and the Office of National Assessments, also known as Australia's spy agencies, which suggest China's military build-up is defensive in nature and unlikely to pose a long-term threat to Australia's security.

Following that assessment, the Rudd Government appointed the head of the Lowry Institute, Allan Gyngall, as the new head of ONA. It is noteworthy that another former ONA chief, Geoff Miller, had recently stated the following regarding the strategic threat regarding China as reported on The Australian blog.

CAMERON Stewart and Patrick Walters ("Defence plan rejects US strategy”, 13/4) report that “a group of senior Defence officials and ... army, navy and air force chiefs” have successfully argued, in the context of the coming defence white paper, that “Australia’s future defence force should be structured primarily for involvement in conventional warfare”, with China as “the greatest strategic danger to Australia”. To meet this danger, Australia should have new frigates, destroyers and 12 new generation submarines.

This view of China as a strategic danger seems at odds with our existing national policies towards China, our second largest trading partner and source of thousands of students at our universities. The main points of current difference are over the non-war-like topics of the timing and content of a free trade agreement, and how much and what kinds of investment each should allow from the other.

Setting aside the question of the validity of the reported “China threat” analysis, it is surely the height of hubris to suppose that if China—a nuclear power and a country now frequently mentioned as a member, with the US, of a coming global “Group of Two”—decided, against all expectations, to threaten us militarily, we could deter it or defend against it by our own efforts. In such extreme circumstances we would have one recourse, and that is our alliance with the US.

We need to question the rationale for this proposed force build-up. Apparently a force including 12 “new generation” submarines is envisaged. How realistic is this when we can only muster crews for half of the six Collins-class submarines we presently have?

I have a serious question. Wouldn't a massive naval and air force buildup in Australia be in best interests of the US? If the United States is going to reorganize towards a balanced force, wouldn't a military buildup by Australia be a good thing right now? We know that absent a major change in global conditions, the Obama administration plan is to maintain static and potentially reduced defense budgets over the next few years. Under these conditions, and with both shipbuilding a mess and the retirement of the F-22 line, the US is making choices that reduce mid-term capabilities in major war in favor of dealing with the current wars the nation is in. Under those conditions, why wouldn't an offset in the Pacific in the form of Australia doing a major upgrade of naval and air force capabilities be a welcome thing for US strategy?

The way I see it, there are plenty of domestic debates that will come out of the defense white paper, most of which will be useful in informing the Australian public about the major military growth taking place in the Pacific. While I think the specifics regarding what kind of equipment is certainly a legitimate debate, particularly in regards to submarines because there have been severe crew shortages with the Collins class, the strategic direction expected in the Defense White Paper that focuses on China as the primary strategic challenge appears to me to be very much aligned with US interests.

It is important to note, the strategic direction of Australia does not necessarily need to match the strategic direction of the US, and the way I see it, a strategic direction that expands the capabilities of Australia in the Pacific at the high end is probably better for US strategic interests right now than creating a force optimized for small wars at this time. If Australia, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan become more hardened against the potential threat of China, this reduces the risk to the US as we shift towards a balanced force.

Until the intentions of China are more transparent and better understood, the increase of defense capabilities at the high end in the Pacific decreases the risk for both the US and Europe who can then increase the capabilities of their military at the lower end. In this way, I see the strategic direction of Australia to make China the central strategic threat to Australia to be very much aligned with the current US direction towards a balanced force.

The Pirate Fighting Fad

Fighting Somali piracy is beginning to remind me of grade school, it has almost become a fad that catches on and everyone wants to be part of it. Not a bad thing, but an interesting dynamic to it nonetheless. Next up: Australia.

"There is also the possibility of perhaps going further and getting involved in some of the important counter-piracy work that is coming on in the north Indian Ocean," he told sailors aboard the Anzac class frigate HMAS Parramatta last week.

"That is something we will be looking at quite carefully in the months ahead, developing a proposal for government's consideration."

Australian Strategic Policy Unit research director Anthony Bergin said yesterday there were strong arguments for joining the anti-piracy operations.

"I guess the point I would make is that at a political level its useful for Australia to be contributing to maritime security in the Indian ocean. It's obviously part of our strategic interest,'' he said.

The article is actually about the deployment of HMAS Warramunga (FFH 152) to the Gulf to participate in Combined Task Force (CTF) 152. For those who aren't familiar, CTF-152 patrols the central and southern Persian Gulf as part of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.

Australia has maintained a naval commitment in the Gulf region since 9/11, although if they were to join CTF-151 to fight piracy, it is more likely the ship usually on patrol in the Gulf would move to the patrol area off the Horn of Africa instead, rather than sending a second ship. I'm guessing, a second ship forward would be an interesting commitment, mostly because there is a cost increase to naval operations at a time the government appears to want to cut defense costs.

At the end of the article, the question is raised about rules of engagement, and the question goes unanswered.

5th Fleet Focus: IRGC Troublemaking with British, Australian Frigates

As we have mentioned many times on the blog in the past, events are taking place at sea in the Middle East that are often not reported in the media. The 5th Fleet in particular keeps information very close, and rarely does it see the light of day without a political motivation, and even then it is some source in Washington leaking information, not 5th Fleet. Other nations tend to follow a similar policy.

This particular incident is flying pretty low under the radar. The IRGC appears to be still playing its tricks in the Persian Gulf, but with tensions with Iran very high it is noteworthy this report went unreported until now. Note the timing, this was during the recent missile tests by Iran, which coincided with major Iranian Navy maneuvers* in the Strait of Hormuz. Guess these IRGC dudes got left behind, and had nothing better to do.

Iranian Revolutionary Guard speedboats menaced the Devonport-based warship HMS Chatham as weapons tests ordered by the Tehran regime to deter strikes on its nuclear weapons facilities raised tension in the Gulf, it can be revealed.

The encounter occurred as the Type-22 frigate patrolled the same waters where sister ship HMS Cornwall suffered the kidnapping and detention of 15 of her sailors and Marines in spring 2007.

Some 16 months on, Westcountry servicemen and women are still going eyeball-to-eyeball with the Revolutionary Guards on an almost daily basis. In last week's incident, Iranian speedboats came within a few hundred yards of the frigate as the latter patrolled on the edge of Iraqi territorial waters.

At the same time, the Australian frigate HMAS Stuart, which was heading north to relieve the Chatham, was also approached aggressively by Revolutionary Guard vessels.

It all appeared to be part of a co-ordinated effort at sabre-rattling by Tehran, which also allegedly tested new ship-killing torpedoes as well as land-based ballistic missiles.

Until today, the Chatham and Stuart incidents were unreported.

There are too many ignorant people in America who refuse to believe the Iranian IRGC is a menace in the Persian Gulf, intentionally intimidating commercial traffic, and sometimes causing some tense moments with coalition forces. These guys do not have a reputation of providing a service to the security of the Persian Gulf. It is important however to distinguish between the IRGC and the Iranian Navy, they are not one in the same. No one in the region confuses the two, no one discussing events of that region from our armchairs should ever confuse the two either.

This particular comment caught our attention, because in the future when all this nonsense settles down and books get written about this time period in the Persian Gulf, we expect this will be a common theme.

“There are misunderstandings between ourselves and, whenever they occur, we aim to communicate with the Revolutionary Guards to clarify the situation,” revealed one British naval officer in the northern Gulf. “Unfortunately nine times out of 10 they ignore us.”

When the Revolutionary Guard Corps do respond, it is often to tell coalition naval forces to “stick it”.

Coalition forces barely spend any time, or more accurately put, few coalition ships have any time to dedicate to the piracy issues off the Horn of Africa, and the US Navy in particular doesn't have any time to focus on piracy. There are many reasons, but we highlight without giving specific examples, that while piracy may be stealing the headlines of the regions maritime troubles, there are much bigger, more relevant issues happening behind the scenes, but almost always out of view from the media perspective. Just because it isn't reported in the news doesn't mean it isn't happening, rather it is a strategic decision by 5th Fleet, or perhaps CENTCOM, not to add to the political rhetoric when it serves no military purpose. This is not a new policy, it has been in place since Adm. Fallon took over CENTCOM, and continues to this day.

In a time of high tensions, just as the price of oil starts to drop, and particularly at a time when diplomacy is actually getting its day, media reports like this are counterproductive to the process. It might explain why almost no one in the media is reporting the incidents.

With that said, if diplomacy breaks down and rhetoric of war picks up again, if the US Navy or coalition forces as a whole is asked to produce information regarding incidents with the IRGC in the Persian Gulf, expect a very long list of incidents no one has heard any details of. It really is amazing coalition naval forces haven't sank any IRGC boats in the Persian Gulf, because it isn't for a lack of reasons to take defensive action or opportunities to apply steel down range.


* That is an interesting read, it ran in an Iranian paper on July 12th and we had our Farsi guy confirm it is a good translation.

Photos of the Day: Juan Carlos I (BPE)

Things are busy, and posting is obviously light. I did want to take a few minutes to highlight some pretty nice photo's of the launching of Spain's Juan Carlos I a few weeks ago. According to Joe Katzman (also blogs here), Australia is paying about $1.5 billion US a piece for 2 built by Spain. Pretty good deal, but I would remind those wishing for some for the US that they would cost at least $2.3 billion to be built here. Why? Because someone in Congress will want them be nuclear powered. Even without nuclear power they will be more than $1.5 billion in the US though, they would not meet US Navy NVR.




Those ski jumps are not going to contribute much for Australia. People still talk like Australia is buying F-35Bs, but there is still no official plan at all to do so, and they have only expressed government interest to date on the F-35A models. The assumption is that will change. Maybe, but I think they will wait for a V-UCAS in the 2025 time frame.

Tons and tons more photos from the launch of the Juan Carlos I here.

Australian Leadership Looking to Slash and Burn Defense

Under the Howard government, Australia made a number of defense purchases to upgrade a military that has been in heavy use and in need of replacements. Of the projects that made a lot of sense to us included the Air Defense destroyers, the LHDs, and new Abrams tanks, all of which are important warfighter capabilities that fit very well within the trends of globalization and expeditionary forces. We were never very impressed with the Super Seasprite deal, the F/A-18 Hornet purchase, nor did we ever fully understand the thinking behind purchasing the F-35A, which would not be capable of utilization on the new LHDs.

The Rudd government has decided that some of this doesn't make sense, and it appears they aren't happy with the direction of defense, or defense spending, and some major changes are in the works for Australia's military. The news starts with a study.

Work will begin this week on the 2008 defence white paper, the biggest review of Australia's defence priorities since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US. It will reassess the Howard government's policy of spending $50billion to build a defence force that fits seamlessly into the US military machine.

In many ways this is smart, the Howard government was all over the map with its priorities, and did a very poor job of delivering a public intellectual basis for expensive programs. The purchase of the F/A-18s is an excellent example, Eric has blogged the history for awhile and the Howard approach consistently begged the question, where is the strategy?

We observe this report uses the phrase "white elephant" a lot. Apparently it escaped the Howard government that if you cannot match defense funding with purpose, your program can be said to be lacking of purpose.

THE Federal Government will launch a major cost cutting assault on multi-billion dollar defence projects established by the Howard government, with the controversial $6.6billion Super Hornet jet fighters first in its sights.

Other defence white elephants in the Government's target include the Abrams tank, three massively expensive air warfare destroyers, two huge amphibious carrier ships, dud Seasprite helicopters, unnecessary flying drones and $16billion worth of undeveloped F-35 joint strike fighters.

If I was a citizen of Australia, I'd be a little concerned when almost every major defense program is labeled a white elephant. We note that only the Collins class and Collins class replacement are not mentioned. Is every single program actually a white elephant, is that really the world we live in where a nation should in fact invest in no new defense programs? I'm not sure the phrase white elephant applies, but in a nation loaded with resources in a region of increasing competition for resources, I think the word "Ivory Tower" best describes the white elephant approach to defense. Rather than a military "that fits seamlessly into the US military machine" this article is painting an ever scarier picture, because it sounds a lot like a plan for Australia to be as dependent as possible upon the United States for defense in the future. There has to be a wise approach somewhere in the middle.

That isn't to suggest there shouldn't be a review, or cuts, in fact we believe both should be done. From our perspective, Air Defense destroyers are hardly white elephants for an island nation. Without the ability to defend shipping, you better be ready and willing to produce everything, without any imports, because only with the proposed Air Defense destroyers will Australia have the capability to defend its sea lanes. ANZACs and Adelaide frigates cannot fill that role in the Pacific, too many contenders.

The LHD is also very important, in fact we would suggest one of the most important military programs for Australia. One of the pillars of Australia's defense lies on its option for intervention in the South Pacific. Without that capability, Australia eliminates that pillar of regional defense, and is just begging for other powers to assume that role. The power most likely to assume that role in the region, in protection of its own interests, is China. I have a hard time believing the sacrifice of that pillar of defense to China is in the best interest of Australia, but that is the road being paved by the elimination of the LHDs. The Abrams tanks, which can be carried on the LHDs, is an important part of that defense strategy.

As for the aircraft purchases and frigate modernization, I believe this is something for the Rudd government to take a serious look at. The Super Seasprites are a disaster, Howard lacked the guts to call a spade a spade and do what is required. Rudd should take action there. If the modernized frigates can't deploy to forward theaters, they aren't of any use. The replacements for the F-111s also raises questions, and is tied directly to the F-35A purchase. The problem is two fold, first what is the strategic purpose of ground based aircraft, and two what considerations are required within the scope of the strategic purchase of future aircraft for expeditionary deployment. The Howard government never answered those questions, and it is unclear if the Rudd government is even asking those questions. Until strategic purpose is identified, it is premature to believe any platform is right for Australia, which is why the cross-hairs are on the aircraft purchases.

This will be interesting to observe unfold. Will Australia go the way of Europe, basically rely on the US for its defense, and if so, what does that mean for the US? The lack of defense spending in Europe is creating a greater reliance on the US for defense, will we have to do the same for Australia in the future? This is why a rising India is so appealing to many in the US, it is a lot easier to partner with nations, specifically democracy's. that take their national defense and regional security responsibilities seriously.

5th Fleet Focus: The European Surge

Following the conflict fought in 2006 between Israel and Lebanon, the Europeans shifted their naval deployment strategy. With a UNIFIL commitment and a lot of attention being paid to troop movements into the UNIFIL areas, the European Navies moved to support the UN peacekeeping operation. Since the conclusion of that conflict, only Britain, Germany, and France have operated warships for any extended period of time south of the Suez canal.

During that same period, Pakistan had increased their presence in Task Force 150, while Australia and Singapore have continuously deployed their naval forces to support Task Force 158 in the Northern Persian Gulf. The US Navy filled the gaps with a number of surges to the region while the Europeans dealt with the situation in Lebanon.

When we began the blog in June of 2007, our first Order of Battle for the 5th Fleet AOR indicates there were 2 CVNs, 3 CGs, 7 DDGs, 1 FFG, 1 LHD, 1 LPD, 2 LSDs, and 4 MCMs bringing the total theater contribution to 21 US Navy ships. Allied contributions however highlighted a different story, the Royal Navy had 2 frigates and 2 minesweepers, while Germany, France, and Australia each had only one frigate deployed regionally. Of the US naval forces listed, 1 CVN, 1 CG, 2 DDGs, 1 FFG, and 1 LSD were surge deployments.

In 2008 the European Navies are returning to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. We have previously discussed both the Orion 08 deployment and the German Training Cruise Flotilla, but we can now add the Italian Medal 08 deployment. In all, the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Germany, and Italy are deploying an aircraft carrier, 8 warships, and 2 minesweepers to the AOR by late February, and none are replacing the 6 European warships and 2 minesweepers already in the region. That is just the Europeans; Canada, Australia, and Japan all either have forces in the region, or on their way.

Why is this noteworthy? Because unless the US has a hidden Strike Group somewhere, by this time next month there will be more allied naval forces in the 5th Fleet AOR than US naval forces since 2001. We list the forces by nation:

US Navy
USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75)
USS San Jacinto (CG 56) (*Black Sea)
USS Hue City (CG 66)
USS Carney (DDG 64)
USS Oscar Austin (DDG 79)
USS Winston S. Churchill (DDG 81)
USS Tarawa (LHA 1)
USS Cleveland (LPD 7)
USS Germantown (LSD 42)
USS Port Royal (CG 73)
USS Hopper (DDG 70)
USS Ingraham (FFG 61)
USS Cole (DDG 67)
USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)

(submarines and support ships not listed)

Royal Navy
HMS Illustrious (R06)
HMS Edinburgh (D97)
HMS Manchester (D95)
HMS Westminster (F237)
HMS Campbeltown (F86)
HMS Atherstone (M38)
HMS Chiddingfold (M37)
HMS Ramsay (M 110)
HMS Blyth (M 111)

(submarines and support ships not listed)

France
FS Jean Bart (D615)
FS Surcouf (F711)
FS Guepratte (F714)
FS Commandant Ducuing (F795)
FS Premier Maitre L'Her (F792)

(submarines and support ships not listed)

Germany
FGS Augsburg (F 213)
FGS Hamburg (F 220)
FGS Köln (F 211)

(support ships not listed)

Italy
Comandante Borsini (P 491)

(support ships not listed)

Spain
SPS Mendez Nunez (F104)

Canada
HMCS Charlottetown (FFH 339)

Australia
HMAS Arunta (FFH 151)

Japan
JDS Murasame (DD 101)

(support ships not listed)

By my count the US Navy has 18 if you include the USS San Jacinto (CG 56), while Europe has 19, and Japan, Canada, and Australia combine for 3. By the way, I've done the math on the various support and command ships as well, and it looks like without counting Japan the numbers are close to equal in that regard as well.

This may not be the top number for the Europeans either, the Mistral will be making its deployment to Asia in February, the Dutch and the Danes both have deployments to the region scheduled for 2008, and the US Navy Global Fleet Station off east Africa is expected to begin this spring.

We note that come February 2008, the US Navy will have reduced the number of ships by 3 since June 2007, but allied nations will have increased their naval presence from 7 ships to at least 20, with Japan operating one ship and one support ship during both time periods. I don't know what you would call a three fold increase of naval power by the Europeans to the Indian Ocean, but we call it a European Surge.

Indirect Effects For Collins Replacement

This isn't small news for the Australian Naval community, but most point of views I have seen so far are focused on the financial and industrial aspects of either Tenix or BAE, making a bit too much of it IMO. I thought something completely different when I heard about this. The Collins class submarine replacement folks will be happy.

BAE Systems Australia has bought Australia’s second-largest defense manufacturer, Sydney-based Tenix Defence Pty Ltd, for 775 million Australian dollars.

The news here isn't that Tenix sold to BAE, I think everyone agrees this is a good thing for Australia, at least I think they should. The good news is that a BAE bought Tenix, and neither General Dynamics or Northrop Grumman did. Why does that matter? Because it opens the door for one of them to buy ASC, which is what I believe most in the Collins replacement program are secretly hoping for. The article even hints at this.

However, it’s unclear whether or not Australia’s new defense giant will be allowed also to buy the government-owned submarine and warship builder ASC Pty Ltd, Port Adelaide, when this is put up for sale later this year.

McDowell told Defense News that the Australian government hasn’t said when ASC will be sold, nor how, nor how much of it.

“The process isn’t clear,” he said, declining to comment on the issue.

Is it really not that clear? It looks pretty clear to me that ASC is going to be for sale, and to keep BAE from turning the Australian defense industry into a monopoly, ASC will sell to a certain US company. I know which one everyone is thinking, but I tend to think its the other one.

Give Us More Submarines!

Apparently someone believes it is a good idea to expand the number of submarines. No, not the US Navy, rather some are calling for up to a dozen new submarines to follow the Collins class for the Royal Australian Navy.

AUSTRALIA may need to double the size of its submarine fleet tocounter the growing and deadly threat posed by rival submarines in the region, former defence minister Kim Beazley said yesterday.

His comments come after The Australian this week revealed that Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon had ordered planning to begin on the next generation of submarines to replace the six Collins-class boats when they are retired in 2025.

Mr Beazley also called on the Rudd Government to urgently tackle what he said was a "glaring weakness" in Australia's anti-submarine warfare capabilities.

"This weakness comes at a time when (the navy) will soon be producing the best submarine targets in the region with the new air warfare destroyers and amphibious landing ships," Mr Beazley told The Weekend Australian.

That last observation is noteworthy. A few things need to be considered. The US Navy and Royal Australian Navy are joined at the hip, anyone who thinks otherwise isn't paying attention. The military satellite systems in the Pacific have become joint ventures, and several of the communication networks both countries use have become the same. The intention of this is obvious, it is to insure that should China engage one or the other in a war, China will have to fight both.

Additionally, if there is a weakness on the F-100, it is certainly ASW. The obvious alternative though is that Australia is not buying VSTOL Joint Strike Fighters, so there will be plenty of room for ASW helicopters on their new LHDs which could make them excellent ASW platforms, apparently a detail lost on Mr. Beazley (or more likely he wants to see the VSTOL JSF). However, if given the choice between using a LHD as an ASW platform or having more submarines, I'll take more submarines every time.

With that said, the regional players who are buying submarines is nothing to shake a stick at. China will soon have the largest submarine fleet in the world, and India is soon to have the third largest behind only the US and China. Indonesia and Malaysia are also upgrading their submarine fleets, and that doesn't include Pakistan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan who either have or are working on new modern submarine fleets of their own. It is too early to estimate how many submarines will ultimately be in operation throughout the Pacific and Indian Oceans, but you can be sure of one thing, that number will be very high.

We have already heard Australia is planning to spend around $20 billion US for new Collins class replacement submarines. Now we are hearing the number 12 tossed around. What does it all mean?

It means Australia sees the Collins replacement to be more expensive than the Collins. This also implies the design doesn't exist today, and the commitment to building the submarines domestically, where it will be more expensive, is legitimate. As far as the design not existing today, we are hearing that from virtually every direction. It also means the number 12 is a target, not the plan. It should be pointed out the original plan was for 8 Collins class, not 6.

As far as the design specifics, ME is probably closer to the mark with his Darwin Class suggestion than we were with our S-80 option, but in the end it is hard to guess what the final product will be. The one aspect of the new submarine we continue to hear discussed is the design effort that will focus on a USV launch. If that is truly the case, with 20 billion dollars Australia has a number of choices.

In observing the various time frames, it seems to me there are a lot of options here. If the US Navy was really on their game they would work with the RAN on this project. Just doing the math, it looks to me like the Ohio class SSGNs are going to need to be replaced around the same time as the Collins class submarines. Maybe I'm off here, but it seems to me that if both countries are looking for a next generation underwater mothership around the same time frame, there is something to be said about a joint venture on the project. There is certainly something in it for the US Navy, for example, a joint submarine program could potentially lead to that submarine base in Australia the US Navy wants so badly.

New Year Brings New Australian Defense Debacle to Discuss

With the Collins class submarines working better than originally planned, and the Super Seasprite not quite shiny enough to make a big headline, the latest Royal Australian Navy spending debacle has the early makings of something the Australian press can sink their teeth into. What is interesting about this story to me is that it has all the elements needed to create mass disinformation, from politics to foreign influence.

AFTER a $1.4 billion "upgrade" the navy's front-line fighting ships cannot defend themselves and are unable to be sent into battle.

A navy whistleblower says sending the 4000-tonne Adelaide Class Guided Missile Frigates to war would be like sending a VK Commodore to race at Bathurst.

Senior officials admit the 1997 FFG upgrade project was a "debacle" created by the Howard government's decision to maximise the sale price of the Sydney-based contractor Australian Defence Industries when it was sold to the French firm Thales.

The Adelaide Class frigates will eventually be replaced by the Hobart class Air Warfare Destroyer ordered last year. While delivery schedules are preliminary, the Adelaide class is expected to serve in the fleet for about five more years.

Apparently, this problem has had an effect on morale. If the whistle blower is in fact telling the truth, the problems for the Adelaide class are total. Virtually every aspect of systems integration has failed. In several ways, this is difficult to believe, and reminds us of similar issues we have seen with the Super SeaSprite program. How is it that so many proven technologies can produce so many software problems? Australia is unique in regards to this problem as well, as other nations have not experienced similar problems with similar platforms, Egypt and their SH-2Gs comes to mind as an example. Other nations have not had trouble integrating ESSM with other naval air defense systems as another example.

We are unsure where the problem lies exactly, and it will likely not easily be identified, but it raises questions regarding the quality of software engineering in the Australian Defense Industry at a time when the Defense Industry is starting a number of major projects. Whether it is new Amphibious Ships, new Air Defense Destroyers, new fighter aircraft, or other defense priorities this raises serious questions whether Australia will in fact be able to achieve their desired goals for future platforms.

If you can screw up the upgrades for known technologies, how do they expect to get it right for brand new technologies? That isn't a rhetorical question, it should be of major concern otherwise Australians will find themselves with more cost overruns than they can afford, or fewer pieces of equipment than originally intended.

The Future of Submarines Is Down Under

The Collins class submarine replacement is getting a lot of attention. In case you are curious why the topic has suddenly came up in the media, it has little to do with any new movement and everything to do with politicians talking about it. These are the only details that matter on the subject to date.

New Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon has ordered planning to begin on the next generation of submarines to replace the Royal Australian Navy's Collins-class fleet with the aim of gaining "first pass" approval for the design phase from cabinet's National Security Committee in 2011.

The 17-year project will be the largest, longest and most expensive defence acquisition since Federation, potentially costing up to $25 billion.

Everything else is speculation, mostly regarding what the new platform will be, hell we've done a bit of our own. In reality though, if you are looking towards an existing design as a contender for the Collins replacement, you are probably looking in the wrong place.

The Collins class had a tough start, was given a bad reputation, and to this day is one of the least understood weapons of war taxpayers in Australia probably do recognize by name. Perception drives the reality of the media, and in general the media misses the mark today when it talks about the Collins class submarines.

The truth is, the Collins class submarine is one of the best submarines in the world, anywhere. Only Japan and the United States are realistically contenders in a match game debate, it really is that good. Any American submariner who has served on a Seawolf or Virginia class submarine would feel comfortable in a Collins, the same tech exists. In fact, the same strike packages exist, the same mission profiles exist, and in many ways they handle the same roles for their respective services. The only real difference is the propulsion system and the size.

The Collins class may not be nuclear, but it is a fleet submarine. We have recently learned thanks to released documents that if they were allowed, Australian submariners could tell more than a few stories of cold war operations deep into Russian waters in the Pacific, and it is a good bet if they did it with older submarine platforms, they will conduct the same mission profiles with the Collin class, and the Collins class replacement.

There is a lot of speculation regarding what the requirements of the Collins class replacement will be. From my discussions with people who do know, this is all we actually know..., it will not be like anything on the market today outside the US, and when 2011 comes, we will only hear the generic details. We can only count on three specific requirements leading the design focus: Fuel cell technology, high energy requirements, and it will operate as an underwater mothership for both manned and unmanned deployable systems. There is currently nothing in the market that meets those requirements outside of the US, and sense it is unlikely Australia will go nuclear with its submarines, it means there is nothing in the market designed today likely to be the Collins submarine replacement.

Australia will introduce something new, likely to only be influenced by Japanese and American concepts and technologies. Of all the underwater programs under development today, if you are looking for the next 'game changer' in underwater warfare, the Collins class submarine replacement program is the program to keep your eye on.

A Navantia Design To Contend As a Collins Replacement

Navantia released a press statement last week that they had begun work on both S-81 and S-82, the first two submarines of the S-80 class. Both submarines are being built for the Spanish Navy.

Spanish Navy Admiral Sanjurjo Jul, Director of Naval Constructions, and Juan Pedro Gómez Jaén, CEO of Navantia, have presided on 13th. December, the ceremony of the cut of the first steel for the second S-80 submarine (S-82), and afterwards, the ceremony of the keel laying of the first unit (S-81).

The S-80 submarine, 100% Navantia design, is in these moments the most technologically advanced conventional submarine in the world. Navantia becomes, thanks to this programme, a pioneer company in submarines construction and system integration, as it happened before in the surface ships.

These submarines, equipped with an AIP system, will be delivered to the Spanish Navy in 2013, 2014 and 2015.

It also listed the expected "official" statistics.

Main particulars:
- Length overall: 71.05 m.
- Hull length: 51.76 m.
- Hull diameter: 7.30 m.
- Displacement Submerged: 2,426 t.
- Displacement Surface: 2,198 t
- Floatability: 9.5%
- Power (MEP): 3,500 Kw
- Number of Battery Elements: 360
- Generators Power: 3,600 Kw
- Crew: 32 p (+8)
- Speed: 20 knots
- Endurance: 50 days

I haven't been paying as close attention as I should to the S-80, because I didn't realize how big it is. At 2,426 tons submerged displacement the S-80 class is the largest AIP submarine in the world. What is also interesting about the S-80 class is these are not coastal submarines like what we are seeing exported from Germany, these are fleet submarines like what we are seeing exported from Russia.

Consider a few things. It has been reported in the media lately that discussions on the Collins class submarine replacement have begun in Australia. The Collins class is a fleet submarine, and it's replacement will have to be a fleet submarine as well. Australia recently picked Navantia to build amphibious ships and surface combatants. Australia is almost certainly not going to work with the Swedes again on the Collins replacement, and will look for a new partner. Whatever submarine they build will need to be compatible with American submarine systems, from the Combat center to just about every other piece of equipment that might be deployed on a submarine. Most importantly, it is almost a certainty the new Collins class replacement will leverage fuel cell technology.

Given the shipyards in Spain are working at peak capacity for the next several years, and this is before additional export orders, it seems very likely that Navantia would agree to licensing terms to allow a modified S-80 be built in Australia. While it is not very likely that Australia has approached Navantia at this early stage, I wouldn't be surprised if they have mentioned it in passing, or implied the possibility. Of all the submarines on the market, while not as large as the Collins class, the S-80 represents the most likely design to be used as a basis for the Collins replacement to date, and as the Collins submarine replacement discussions get started it will be interesting to see if Navantia is mentioned as a partner in the discussion.

The first step of coarse is to get the S-80 on time and on budget, and for that we will have to wait and see.

Saving Submariners Down Under

The Australian has a pretty decent article on Pacific Reach, a submarine rescue exercise last week that appears to have involved several dozen nations.

This submarine rescue exercise, codenamed Pacific Reach, off the coast of Western Australia captures the paradox of the submarine. Able to strike a fatal blow while remaining unseen, the submarine is a weapon nations covet, resulting in what analysts call a Pacific arms race to build more.

While deadly effective, it can also be deadly to those on board. The history of submarine development is punctuated with accidents that have claimed many men who died, cold and alone on the sea floor.

The whole article is an excellent read, and the article includes some excellent stories for those unfamiliar with the depth issue of the Collins or the "Remora" incident. What caught my eye though is something I've been developing some information on, specifically that the RAN is starting to talk about Collins class replacements.

The Collins-class subs face the end of their operational life from 2025 and, in August, the then Labor Opposition committed to building a new fleet to replace them as one of its first acts in government. Senior navy briefings in the past few weeks have already discussed the possible timeline of this project.

"It's very much on the horizon," says Scott. "I think the area there you would improve would be speed, perhaps more flexibility in payloads. There's a lot of research going into underwater vehicles for surveillance."

As I understand it the talks have begun. There are no details yet, but there is a focus I intend to get to once I have more information. For everyone who thinks the US Navy needs to build conventional submarines powered by fuel cells, keep your eye on the Collins replacement, because given the relationship between the US Navy and the RAN, the Collins replacement will have every major submarine system on the Virginia except the nuclear reactor. One thing we also know for sure, the Collins replacement will be a fleet submarine which means there are going to be very few excuses for the US Navy not to examine or perhaps participate in the design.

I'll have more on the Collins replacement at a later time.

Australia Signs Amphibious Ship Contract

Marine Log has the story.

Australian Prime Minister John Howard today announced the signing of a contract with Tenix, worth about A$3.1 billion (US$2.78 billion) over eight years, two build two large amphibious ships fo the Royal Australian Navy.

The first ship, HMAS Canberra, will be delivered in 2013 and the second, HMAS Adelaide, in 2015.

The ships are based on a LHD design from Spain's Navantia and their hulls will be built in Spain.

Prime Minister Howard said the "27,000-tonne ships will greatly enhance Australia's ability to deploy forces when necessary in our region or beyond, and to provide assistance in time of natural disaster. Using their integrated helicopters and watercraft, each vessel will be able to land approximately 1,000 personnel, along with their vehicles, the new Abrams tanks, artillery and supplies. They will also be equipped with medical facilities, including two operating theatres and a hospital ward, and will be capable across the full spectrum of maritime operations, including aid to the civil community in times of natural disaster at home or abroad."

This is timely. The stack of stuff I want to blog on is piled with topics specific to expeditionary warfare and how platforms with large aviation facilities and a well deck, in any number of roles, are ideal for meeting naval requirements in the 21st century. I see this purchase as brilliant for the RAN, and a major event in the steady increase of naval power taking place among a number of nations in the Pacific.

If you are looking for more information, check out the media kit.

7th Fleet Focus: Malabar 07-02 Order of Battle

Malabar 07-02 Order of Battle

USS Nimitz (CVN 68)
USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63)
USS Princeton (CG 59)
USS Cowpens (CG 63)
USS Higgins (DDG 76)
USS Chafee (DDG 90)
USS Pinckney (DDG 91)
USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG 54)
USS Mustin (DDG 89)
USS John Paul Jones (DDG 53)
USNS John Ericsson (T-AO 194)
USNS Rainer (T-AOE 7)
USS Chicago (SSN 721)

INS Viraat (R22)
INS Ranvijay (D55)
INS Ranjit (D53)
INS Karmukh (P64)
INS Kuthar (P46)
INS Aditya (A59)

Unidentified Brahmaputra class frigate
Unidentified Shishumar class submarine

HMAS Adelaide (FFG 01)
HMAS Sirius (OR 266)
RSS Formidable (F68)
JDS Oonami (DD 111)
JDS Yudachi (DD 103)

7th Fleet Focus: The Royal Australian Navy Carrier Strike Squadron?

My friend Eric has covered every up and down, left and right, for and against point and counterpoint in the Australian 'stop-gap' F/A-18 Super Hornet purchase. His reaction this morning to this article in The Australian was my first reaction, but the more I have thought about this, the more I think this might be a good idea.

A select handful of Royal Australian Air Force instructors will be chosen for lessons on how to land on US aircraft carriers flying the new F/A-18F Super Hornet fighter.

The plan, which could eventually lead to participation in US carrier-based operations, marks the first time Australian pilots have flown off aircraft carriers since the retirement of the navy's flagship carrier HMAS Melbourne in 1982.

The carrier training underscores the rapidly evolving military partnership between the US and Australian military.

Senior US navy sources said the relationship was likely to involve an increasing convergence in training and tactics between the RAAF's fast jets and their US equivalent.

RAAF Flight Lieutenant John Haly will become the first Australian air force pilot to become carrier-qualified when he attempts his toughest flying skills test later this year.

Asked to clarify RAAF Super Hornet training, Defence Minister Brendan Nelson said yesterday: "There is no plan for RAAF pilots to undertake training in aircraft carrier landings."

The official government line contradicts briefings provided to The Australian by senior US military officials at Lemoore Naval Air Station in California that other RAAF "Top Gun" instructor pilots are expected to follow Flight Lieutenant Haly and be provided with carrier training.

Full-scale Super Hornet training for RAAF air crew starts in the US in 2009.

I have a feeling the only thing we have learned here is that what Defence Minister Brendan Nelson says isn't always to be taken at face value, oh wait we already knew that. The question here is whether or not the Australian Super Hornets will have a tailhook. If they do, I'd say an Australian Carrier Air Squadron is probable, without a tailhook I'd say unlikely.

Integrating strike fighter squadrons from other countries onto US Carriers isn't a bad idea, its just the number of nations where it would, could. or should be tried is somewhat small. Many people have assumed strike squadron integration could become common in the future with the Joint Strike Fighter, but I don't think so.

Australia isn't buying the VSTOL Joint Strike Fighter (or hasn't officially expressed interest to), they are buying the land based conventional version so it isn't like operations off US Carriers is a capability option in the future (unless something changes). While it is possible it could 'potentially' happen in the future with the VSTOL JSF, the US Navy may choose not to allow integration of VSTOL JSFs on its big deck carriers, logistically it may not be an option if the US is supporting the Navy JSF version, and the Marines simply may not have extra space for non US VSTOL JSFs on its smaller aviation ships.

Personally, I hope Defence Minister Brendan Nelson is wrong, and Australia is preparing its pilots for Carrier operations. I think this capability would make up in some part for the gap between the F/A-18E/Fs and the F-111s, because strategic mobility gained might balance out strategic payload and range lost. It would also, most importantly, show some strategic depth in planning between the US and Australia. The US is best when it is playing the role of logistical enabler. Australia on the other hand, plays an active role in regional stability in the South Pacific.

In the future, Australia may deploy its two soon to be built LHDs on a stability mission in the region and the F/A-18Fs could fly off a US Carrier to provide close air support to those operations. May sound simplistic, but it is hard to say the US is doing anything other than simply providing 4 acres of sovereign property in the middle of some large body of water for Australian air operations, which is no more than another country would be doing if they were allowing Australia to utilize their airfield.

5th Fleet Focus: Stories of the Seas

A very interesting story about a confrontation between the Royal Australian Navy and the Iranian Navy, specifically involving Iranian gunboats and an Australian boarding party doing Maritime Security Operations in the Northern Persian Gulf has come to light. If this sounds a lot like the March 23rd incident where Royal Navy sailors were captured by Iranian gunboats, it should, as the article on the incident points out, there are a number of similarities in everything but how it ended.

The incident, which came to light yesterday, has similarities with the capture of British sailors in the Gulf earlier this year by Iranian forces.

But, unlike the Britons, the Australians refused to surrender.

A BBC journalist who broke the story said: ``The point of this story is not that the Aussies were fantastically brave and the Brits were a bunch of cowards, although I'm sure some people will interpret it that way.''

In the previously undisclosed encounter, 14 Royal Australian Navy sailors were evacuated by helicopter after being surrounded by five Iranian gunboats in December, 2004.

I recommend reading the entire thing. My favorite part:

The BBC reporter who broke the story, Frank Gardner, citing various military sources, said the Australians had pointed their guns at the Iranians and used 'colourful language' to defuse the incident.

It was made very clear the Australians would not surrender or even yield to the Iranians. The blunt language used towards the Iranians was along the lines of 'f... off'.

Commodore Gilmore said: "As Australians, I think we all know our capacity to engage, to defuse by discussion and they indeed did that."

Hmm, that almost sounds like a very American approach to me. If a US Navy sailor is ever in the position where he might "defuse" a situation by pointing his weapon at an Iranian and shouting "colourful language" I for one hope the American sailors takes the Aussie approach over the British approach.

Royal Australian Navy Chooses F-100 and BPE

The Australian Government picked Navantia for both of its two major Naval projects.

Spain's Navantia is the big winner in an Australian $ 11 billion (US$9.3 billion), five ship expansion of the Royal Australian Navy.

The Australian Government has selected the F100 design by Navantia for three next generation Air Warfare Destroyers (AWD) for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN).

And a version of Navantia's 27,000 tonne strategic projection ship has also been chosen for two amphibious ships, beating out a design from France's Armaris based on its Mistral Class LHD.

Specific details were not released with the initial major media reports, however there are some details regarding the offer itself.

For the Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD) the offer was what Armada Española call the "Victor" baseline of the F-100, specifically the baseline used in the fifth F-100 (F-105) purchased last year. Those modifications to the baseline F-100 included the "Victor" standard (SPY-1D(V)) and upgrades the AEGIS Combat System to Baseline 7 Phase II. It also includes new AEGIS integrations of ESSM, AEGIS integration for a Cruise Missile weapon system (presumably Tomahawk), integration for Harpoons, and integration systems like the interface calibration with the US-Navy (I presume this is CEC?), plus modifications in crew reduction. Because my Spanish is decent, not excellent, some of this is lost in translation, except to say that "integration" basically means a commitment to COTS systems and software.

Presumably, given Australia's special defense status with the US Navy, Raytheon will be authorized to provide the very latest mods to AEGIS and COTS integration, which means the AWD will likely be in the league of the DDG-1000 in terms of upgrade potential with its SPY-1D(V) AEGIS system. There are no reports of any redesign regarding an additional helo or more VLS cells.

Click the picture above for a detailed tour of the BPE.

For the BPE design, Tenix went all out putting out the capability worksheets. The LHD media kit has just about any general information you would want to know about the offer to Australia, and is a good place to start to get a feel for what the RAN is getting.