The Notable Empty Seat at Sea

Last week Bryan highlighted a new article on NATO he has written for AEI. NATO at sea: Trends in allied naval power focuses on the trends in the force structures of European naval powers, noting the numerical decline and the quality improvements. As Bryan notes, these trends do not balance one another.

Below is the section Bryan notes on the Royal Navy.

United Kingdom

The Royal Navy has dramatically declined in size by a third since 2000, but retains the desire and plans to remain a “balanced force” capable of naval airpower projection, limited amphibious operations, strategic nuclear deterrence, and sea control (see figure 1). This goal remains even in view of the 2010 UK Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) 8 percent defense budget reduction.[16]

A key question, however, is whether a balanced force is ultimately in the strategic interests of the United Kingdom, or whether such a force should be abandoned in favor of a “cruising” navy requiring a greater number of frigates and destroyers and providing more naval presence in a greater number of places than the current fleet plan can accomplish. The costs associated with fielding two aircraft carriers and the air assets necessary to equip them, in addition to the costs of replacing the current fleet of ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) with four new boats, will strain resources required for building surface combatants and attack submarines.[17] Considering the United Kingdom’s global economic interests and its desire to remain closely aligned with the US Navy, a force of less than 20 combatants might not suffice.

Upgrades to the Royal Navy will include fielding two new aircraft carriers carrying the F-35 Lightning II and the ongoing operation of the new, technologically advanced Type 45 destroyers.[18] Other upgrades include the continuing introduction of the five nuclear-powered, Astute Class attack submarines and the construction of the Type 26 Global Combat Ships.[19] Here as else-where in major NATO navies, numbers are being traded for capability.

When assessed against the roles articulated in the NATO Alliance Maritime Strategy of 2011—which includes deterrence and defense, crisis management, cooperative security, and maritime security—the Royal Navy presents a mixed story.[20] Continuing to move forward with both an aircraft carrier development program and a ballistic missile submarine program demonstrates national resolve to contribute to collective conventional and nuclear deterrence. However, the resources necessary to achieve these goals are to some degree harvested from savings gained from a significantly smaller escort and combatant fleet.

And while the Type 45 destroyer is more capable than the Type 42s it replaces, there will be fewer of Type 45s, as there will be fewer Type 26 frigates to replace the Type 23s. This numerical decline creates presence deficits that impact the navy’s ability to perform crucial traditional naval missions such as antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and antisurface warfare (ASUW), which underpin both conventional deterrence and cooperative and maritime security. Adding to a decline in traditional sea-control capabilities was the 2010 SDSR decision to eliminate the Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft from the inventory.

In summary, the Royal Navy continues to maintain a balanced fleet, one that looks strikingly like the US Navy, except a fraction of its size. Its contributions on the high end of the naval warfare operational spectrum (strategic deterrence, attack submarines, and antiaircraft warfare (AAW) destroyers) are notable, while a declining number of surface combatants will bedevil its ability to remain globally postured and will contribute to naval missions of a more constabulary nature.


16. Nicholas Watt “Next Generation of Nimrod ‘Spy In the Sky’ Surveillance Planes To Be Scrapped,” The Guardian, October 17, 2010, www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/oct/17/next-generation-nimrod-scrapped.

17. In response to questions about the costs associated with the SSBN programs, British Defense Secretary Philip Hammond insists that “The government remains 100% committed to maintaining and renewing the Trident system.” See “U.S. Defense Chief Bashes Idea of Reducing SSBN Fleet,” Global Security Newswire, July 15, 2103, www.nationaljournal.com/global-security-newswire/u-k-defense-
chief-bashes-idea-of-reducing-ssbn-fleet-20130715.

18. The Type 45 is built primarily as an anti-air warfare (AAW) combatant capable of local and area fleet defense. Capable of controlling fighter aircraft, it can coordinate fleet AAW operations and should be considered roughly comparable to a US-guided missile destroyer. It is equipped with long-range weapon systems to intercept increasingly sophisticated and maneuverable missiles. The Type 45 destroyer will be able to operate an embarked helicopter.

19. Due to begin joining the fleet in 2021, the Type 26 frigates will completely replace the Type 23 frigates. The Type 26 is planned in three variants: an ASW variant, an AAW variant, and a general purpose variant.

20. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Alliance Maritime Strategy,” March 18, 2011, www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_75615.htm.

There is no question the Type 45 is more capable of than the Type 42. The Type 26 looks promising, and should it ever be built I am sure it will be a great ship. But quantity only goes so far, and the reduction of sufficient quantity of surface combatants means a reduction in operations.

For example, the Royal Navy in 2013 does not have enough surface combatants to contribute to either of the Standing NATO Maritime Groups, and the quiet withdrawal by the Royal Navy from the Standing NATO Maritime Groups is a feature of the decisions, both military and political, regarding Royal Navy force structure that reduces surface combatants.

This comes on top of the decision in 2012 for the Royal Navy to stop contributing surface combatants to their Caribbean narcotics patrol.

If a nations Navy force structure design is completely focused on the carrier strike groups and amphibious groups, as the design of the Royal Navy of the future is, what can their naval forces do, and what do the nation give up in that process? Under such a model for naval operations, presence consists solely of the most expensive capabilities. The contingencies of both Libya and Syria have yet to demand the requirement for a US Navy aircraft carrier strike group, and yet under the future force structure of the Royal Navy, the carrier strike group is basically the minimum capability the Royal Navy can contribute to those type of naval response contingencies.

The present and future design of the Royal Navy is the ultimate test of competing theories of seapower. The prevailing theory today - even in the US Navy - is that high end capabilities are critical and therefore must be favored over lower end capabilities because warships of excess quality can meet lower end requirements. And yet, the expense of excess quality isn't simply in design and construction, but also in operations and maintenance. Will the UK choose to use the highly capable and very expensive naval vessels of the Royal Navy for naval missions that require far less capabilities, operations that can be successfully conducted at far lower cost with less capable warships the Royal Navy does not have? The Royal Navy isn't simply reducing global presence, but the high quality force design of the Royal Navy has raised the price of global presence. On one hand the future Royal Navy is built to fight in nearly any conventional war scenario, but is also designed to be excessively inefficient towards building partnerships and security cooperation in nearly all places in the world that struggle with challenges less than contested conventional war between military forces at sea.

Today there are no valid ways politically to measure the value of naval presence by a warship,and the absence of naval presence is not evaluated objectively because highlighting the absence of naval does little more than highlight the failure of politicians who ignored unmet requirements for presence.

For example, the tragedy that took place last year on 9/11/12 in Benghazi would have almost certainly unfolded differently if EUCOM had the amphibious ready group that has long been and remains today an unmet presence requirement in the Mediterranean Sea. A single amphibious ship could have potentially responded not only with helicopter gunships, but a Marine evacuation/reinforcement force, and as a warship present offshore the US would have been clued into events with the situational awareness that comes from forward deployed naval presence. The absence of that naval presence is rarely discussed in the context of Benghazi, so there has been no lesson learned, and the requirement for a Marine presence offshore goes unmet even to this day with a stop gap response force now based in Rota (a reactive contingency force vs a proactive contingency force).

What is the political value of a Navy without the ability to sustain strategic presence to places globally of national interest? What is the strategic value of a Navy designed for high end conventional and nuclear war, and little else? These and other similar questions are important questions for the US, because sequestration will require the US Navy to make difficult force structure changes of our own. Is it in our nations strategic interest to reduce capabilities in conventional and nuclear war in favor of strategic presence and operations that support irregular warfare threats to our nations interest globally? The most recent maritime strategy claimed that preventing wars is as important as winning wars. How do naval forces prevent war in the 21st century through presence, or does the 21st century geopolitical environment demand that naval power function as primarily a reaction force, rather than proactive force?

Sean Stackley - Bullish on Aircraft Carriers

Sean Stackley, former LPD-17 program manager with a highly questionable track record, and current Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition with a much better track record, has become very bullish on aircraft carriers - in the United Kingdom.

A recent Telegraph article tells the story.

Converting HMS Prince of Wales so that it can be used by the Joint Strike Fighter will require significantly less than the £2 billion quoted by officials, the assistant secretary of the US Navy, Sean J Stackley, insisted.

In a letter seen by The Daily Telegraph, he told Peter Luff, the defence procurement minister, that the necessary equipment would cost £458 million before installation. Defence experts estimate the installation cost at £400 million.

For the most part, I think Sean Stackley is exactly right on this. The article cites the reason for the letter being that the US wants "to ensure that the information the British Government is working from is accurate because currently that quite clearly is not the case." I think there is a lot of truth to that as well.

Lets get to the core part of the article then discuss...

Two British carriers are being built, but one will be mothballed following the SDSR. Reverting to jump jets for both of them would not help American military planners, who want to be able to base a squadron of their own jets on a British carrier.

Separate accommodation is being built on board HMS Prince of Wales with communications facilities that would be for “US Eyes Only”.

There are also said to be technological concerns over the jump jet version of the fighter and the Americans might be positioning themselves to ditch it altogether.

“This letter could be a warning shot saying if you Brits go back to jump jet carriers then there might be no planes to fly off it,” said a defence source.

Richard Scott, of Jane’s Defence Weekly, said: “The trouble the Government has is in getting reliable cost data but at least the costs the Americans are giving are quite reassuring.”

An MoD spokesman said: “Work is ongoing to finalise the 2012-13 budget and balance the equipment plan. This means reviewing all programmes, including elements of the carrier strike programme.”

I try to avoid Royal Navy discussions like the plague, because I am an unapologetic biased lover of all things related to the history of the Royal Navy, and think the British government as a collective group today might be the largest collection of strategic fools in any capital city on the planet except Pyongyang. Churchill, bless his soul, is long gone and there is no one in political leadership today that inspires confidence in even the possibility that strategic thinking is applied to defense issues discussed in London these days.

So here are my thoughts, and I suspect they will have nothing in common with whatever Mr. Cameron comes up with.

If the MoD is in fact going to build aircraft carriers, then the Royal Navy would be very smart to build both CVFs and put the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) on both CVFs, but at this point in time the MoD shouldn't commit to either version of the Joint Strike Fighter until that entire program is more mature. The decision to go with a conventional launching system on the CVF should be obvious - it is the only way the CVF will be relevant in the future should armed unmanned aviation platforms start operating off aircraft carriers anytime in the next 3 decades - which is very likely to occur.

But it is important to highlight that the strategic reasons for building the CVFs are the same strategic reasons to insure it has a conventional launch system like EMALS - in the 21st century the places the Royal Navy is most likely to fight are places where there will be very limited parking for land based aviation support for naval forces. From a purely strategic perspective, that suggests to me that all of the tactical and operational capabilities the Royal Navy fleet will need in order to fight effectively will have to come from the CVFs.

Those capabilities aren't going to be provided by the Joint Strike Fighter, rather will come from other types of aircraft that will absolutely require a conventional launch system like EMALS. A CVF task force with ~30 F-35Cs and helicopters is going to be eaten alive by a CVF task force with a mix of 30 F/A-18E/F/Gs + E-2s + helicopters every day of the week, and lets stop pretending now that ~30 F-35Bs will be supported by some AEW version of the MV-22, because there is a snowballs chance in hell that the Royal Navy would be able to afford both the F-35B and a completely new version of the MV-22 for AEW that doesn't exist today.

I know I am in a minority, but I am still very skeptical the US Navy will ever field the F-35C - so I obviously do not believe the Royal Navy should be committed to the platform. The damage the costs of the F-35C program is doing to naval aviation is bigger than anyone in Washington wishes to admit publicly - YET, but when the US Navy starts planning the early retirement of multiple aircraft carriers (potentially as soon as the FY14 budget cycle) I think people are going to wake up pretty quickly to how much damage F-35C is doing to naval aviation, and what the cost of a single strike fighter has been to naval aviation as a whole.

That goes double if a debate ever breaks out regarding the lack of relevance the future CVW has to the 21st century threat environment at sea - because anyone who thinks the CVN is better off with today's CVW with JSFs instead of F-18s is fooling themselves - ignoring the capabilities that aren't being fielded because the cost of the F-35C sucked all the $$ out of the naval aviation community. When considering this is the decade that naval aviation should be innovating the most due to the US Navy enjoying a substantial lead on competitors, I am convinced naval aviators will look back at 2011-2020 as the lost decade of their community.

And for the record, during the next US Presidential term (2013-2016) the safest bet any navalist can make is that the world will observe 2 brand new aircraft carriers being built in China, and I'm not counting Varyag. If you don't expect 5 aircraft carriers in use by China by 2025, then you are the 1936 IJN Admiral who casually dismissed Isoruku Yamamoto's concerns of American industrial capacity.

My point is simple - things are going to change a lot well before the first CVF is doing anything in sea water. The UK needs to either commit to 2 first class CVFs with conventional launch and recovery capabilities, or commit to zero and build a bigger fleet of surface combatants and submarines - but spending massive amounts of national treasure on two half assed aircraft carriers would be an epic strategic fail greater than the Maginot Line, and the equivalent of a self inflicted Pearl Harbor.

The UK should commit to strategic flexibility for naval forces of the future, which for the CVF would absolutely mean EMALS but doesn't necessarily mean the F-35C.

Royal Marines Stand Ready

It is still unclear if anything will come of it, but the BBC is reporting the Royal Marines are standing ready to conduct an evacuation of British citizens from Yemen if necessary.

Some 80 Royal Marines are on standby off the coast of Yemen to assist with the possible evacuation of British civilians, the BBC has learned.

The marines are thought to be aboard a naval support ship, RFA Fort Victoria, near Yemen, according to naval sources.

The Ministry of Defence said British military assets were in the region but it would not comment on their exact operational task.

Yemen has been affected by weeks of political instability and violence.

This represents an interesting use of an axillary ship. It is entirely possible that in the future we could see this kind of operation done by the United States using ships of the Maritime Sealift Command.

When a fleet shrinks, you use what you have as opposed to what you need.

"If We Had a Carrier..."

This is a great article on Libya in the Guardian. Also check out the graphic. The article bring with it the quote of the day.

Data shows the US initially dominated the military campaign before taking a back seat and handing over control to Nato on 31 March. France also took a leading role, deploying its aircraft carrier, Charles de Gaulle. Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, the head of the British navy, told MPs: "If we had a carrier, it would be there."

If the UK had an aircraft carrier, the Guardian wouldn't be reporting how Norway and Denmark have both dropped far more bombs - nearly 700 between them - than the UK in Libya.

The latest news suggests Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope might be on to something, as there are now reports that HMS Ocean is being sent to Libya to support 12 Apaches. The latest Guardian article discusses the politics of that possibility, and raises some interesting questions.

Aren't helicopter carriers the same as modern light aircraft carriers (rhetorical question, or not)?

If not, too bad, because I tend to think if it was possible to build a low cost LPH, the platform would be a very useful addition in the modern maritime domain where the irregular threats are usually met first and foremost by unmanned vehicles and manned helicopters.

Enablers and Disablers

In recent discussions regarding swarm boat attacks, every solution discussed in defeating the swarm included maritime surveillance aircraft of some time.

In that context, is this effective cooperative security strategy or an example of a dependency that exposes a strategic vulnerability? The question is rhetorical, and the answer isn't zero sum.

HMS Liverpool, mine hunter HMS Brocklesby and nuclear submarine HMS Triumph have been watched by a US Navy P-3 Orion which has made regular sweeps of the Libyan coastline looking for potential threats.

The Ministry of Defence said that Nato assets and aircraft are shared as a matter of course.

A spokesman said: “The Americans do have a lot of kit and that’s why we are in alliance with them. We don’t have airborne maritime surveillance but the Americans don’t have mine sweepers. It’s not just the Americans that pool their assets - it is the whole Nato alliance.”

The Nimrods were scrapped in the Strategic Defence and Security Review which took place last October. The aircraft are used to spot underwater threats.

The Workhorse of the Misrata Port

NATO still has a rather large armada of ships in the Mediterranean Sea supporting operations for Libya. This includes aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates, amphibious ships, submarines, and all varieties of support craft.

Interesting who is making the big difference at the pointy end of the spear.

Aid ships have begun to enter Misrata after NATO ships cleared mines laid by forces loyal to Colonel Gaddafi.

Humanitarian relief ship Red Start One has made it in to Misrata port according to The International Organisation for Migration and they are going to start evacuating 1000 civilians.

Aid ships had been prevented from entering the port after Gaddafi’s forces laid mines.

Royal Navy Minehunter HMS Brocklesby played a "key role" in clearing them.

Ah yes, Mine Warfare, the red headed step child of every Navy that no one actually cares about come budget time until the guy in the field can't do his job without the little minesweepers. The first vessel to standout as a critical enabler of operations off Libya was USS Florida (SSGN 728). The second vessel to standout as a critical enabler of operations off Libya in my book is HMS Brocklesby (M33).

Check out the photo gallery for the ship to get a sense of the technology being used. In addition to traditional MCM capabilities, it looks like HMS Brocklesby (M33) also deploys the Recce UUV, which is very similar to the REMUS 600 autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV).

Nobody in the United States wants to hear this, but observing several of the littoral activities we have seen from NATO off Libya, from Royal Navy MCM to Italian Navy humanitarian escort, I keep thinking to myself that the Littoral Combat Ship can do all of these missions, and more, very well.

With that said, it is important to note that Libyan anti-access operations focused on sea lines of communication have been very limited to date. How much more aggressive would Gadhafi need to be to scare NATO out to 25nm? I find it interesting that Hezbollah has proven to have more anti-Navy access denial capability from shore than Libya apparently does.

Royal Navy Preparing for Naval Ship Fire Support in Libya

I am in full agreement naval gunfire support is needed off Libya, but the British press would be wiser to report such activities for their Navy after it happened, not before.

BRITISH destroyer HMS Liverpool was last night preparing to shell targets in Libya and quicken the downfall of tyrant Colonel Gaddafi.

Defence chiefs have ordered the Type-42 Destroyer to start pounding command and control centres and boost the ill-equipped rebels.

Until now Britain has only used RAF Tornado and Typhoon warplanes and a nuclear submarine.

But sources close to the mission told The Sun a major Navy assault will begin this week. The source said: "Final details are being hammered out now but they are looking to strike over the next few days. When they do, Gaddafi won't know what's hit him."

The Liverpool is a batch 2 Type 42 destroyer with the standard British 4.5 inch Mark 8 gun. There are some new rounds called the High Explosive Extended Range round which give the gun a range of about 27km, while a traditional round offers about 22km.

Either way, the NATO Navies find themselves in a major fight for Misrata, and the absence of fire from the sea has been problematic. Many of the aid ships have been chased out of Misrata's port, and the mines that have been laid in the harbor continue to be a problem.

While it is always dangerous to send ships closer to shore for combat operations, it is good to see the Royal Navy stepping up. Leveraging the type of sustained, persistent fires that offshore fire support brings to the fight, NATO can augment aircraft and remain continuously engaged with fires as needed in Misrata making it very problematic for the Libyan government to move their heavy equipment into offensive position.

I still don't understand why NATO hasn't captured the airport at Misrata. In any other humanitarian operation in the world the very first thing NATO countries would do is send force to the airport in the middle of the disaster zone. I see this as one more reason the political micromanagement of Libyan military operations through the UN directed tactical advisory of no troops on land is far closer to stupid than wisdom, and is why I won't be surprised if the best NATO can do is sustain a stalemate while Libyans continue to die.

Future of UK Maritime Aviation

British participation in the Libya operation makes comments like this even more on point:

Amongst the most desperately short-sighted decisions of the SDSR was the frankly inexplicable decision to jettison the country’s maritime air capabilities in favour of retaining RAF Tornados. I welcome the letter published in the Daily Telegraph today ‘Military experts warning over defence spending review‘ from a group of distinguished officers and academics, including my colleague Professor Andrew Lambert, urging the Minister to reconsider the decision and suggesting a more strategically sound and cost-effective alternative

It’s not just the Harriers and HMS Ark Royal. The loss of the Nimrod R1 patrol aircraft and the cancellation of the Nimrod MRA4 maritime patrol aircraft will make British participation in operations like the Libya NFZ much more difficult. That wouldn’t be such a problem were it not clear that the UK was very interested in participating in such operations.

On Spooks and Subs

Very rarely do people talk about all the interesting things submarines do, except maybe this article.

Revelations by prominent British journalist and author Gordon Thomas in his latest book, Inside British Intelligence: 100 Years of MI5 and MI6 , published last year, show Britain's foreign secret intelligence service mounted an operation to thwart the Chinese arms delivery to Zimbabwe in April 2008.

"Britain's intelligence services have increased surveillance of China over the years because of China's activities in Africa. In April 2008, MI6 asked for one of the Royal Navy's nuclear Trident-class submarines to track a floating arsenal of weapons and bombs dispatched by the Beijing regime in China on board a rust-stained freighter, the An Yue Jiang, to President Robert Mugabe's pariah state of Zimbabwe," Thomas says.

"On board were 1000 rocket-propelled grenades, 2000 mortar rounds, and three million rounds of ammunition. MI6 agents in South Africa believed the arsenal was intended to further cow Zimbabwe's starving population (after the disputed elections)."

Thomas says Britain, using its MI6 operatives and the Royal Navy's nuclear Trident-class submarine, tracked the Chinese ship - nicknamed "Freighter of Death" - along the coast to ensure it did not offload the cargo, while London and Washington ratcheted up diplomatic pressure to prevent any country in the region from allowing the delivery of the arms to Mugabe.

"Denied landing rights by dockers in South Africa's Durban port, the freighter began to wander around the South Atlantic while Chinese officials in the home port of Ningbo sought other ports in Africa where the cargo could be unloaded and sent by road to Zimbabwe," Thomas says.

"Intelligence sources in London confirmed that secret approaches had been made to Equatorial Guinea, Benin and Ivory Coast. None, however, allowed the ship to dock and off-load its weapons."

Thomas says his sources had told him Mugabe could even approach Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez to repackage the arms and ship them to Zimbabwe under disguise.

"The Trident - one of the four in the fleet which is based in Faslane on Scotland's Clyde - continued to track the freighter until it suddenly hurried to its home port late in May 2008," Thomas says.

"The black-hulled Trident submarine covered with sonar-absorbing anechoic tiles tracked the Chinese freighter, sending short-burst communications to the Admiralty in London."

The Chinese ship eventually sailed back home after all countries in the region refused to allow it to offload the weapons.

A 'spill the beans' spy book written by an Englishman. Sounds like something I need to read.

This is the side of China that Hu should have been asked about by reporters during his visit. If he was asked - send me a link.

I wonder how many ships with arms are at sea right now with destinations of Tunisia, Sudan, and Algeria? Also, does anyone else see the irony of a "nuclear Trident-class submarine" tracking "a floating arsenal of weapons and bombs."

Invincible For Sale

Anybody want to pool some change and put together a bid?

Invincible is being sold by the the Disposal Services Authority, which says it has secured receipts of more than £900m for the MoD in the past 16 years.

The Barrow-built light aircraft carrier, which has an estimated metal weight of 10,000 tonnes, will "almost certainly" be sold for scrap, said naval expert Jon Rosamond.

Saying Goodbye to Ark Royal

Ark Royal moves on:

The aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal has sailed into Scotland for the last time, as part of a farewell tour. The fleet flagship of the Royal Navy, which is being decommissioned after 25 years service, sailed down the Firth of Clyde.

It is due to dock at Glen Mallan Jetty on Loch Long to unload its ammunition. The ship will stay in Loch Long for five days before sailing around the north of Scotland and on to Newcastle, close to where she was built.

The Ark Royal left its Portsmouth base for a farewell tour of the UK on Tuesday. The aircraft carrier is being retired three years early as part of cost-cutting measures announced by the UK government.

Some of my academic work has to do with the politics of military equipment and national prestige. There's a tendency to have clinical, or potentially even cynical, view towards the emotional attachments that develop between people and the material instruments of foreign policy. The sorrow that accompanies the retirement of a warship like Ark Royal, not to mention the enduring popularity of national naval memorials in the United States and elsewhere, serves to temper this tendency. It's genuinely sad to see a great warship retire before her time. The Queen's inspection makes it particularly poignant; one of her earliest major foreign tours was aboard HMS Vanguard in 1947, and her reign has witnessed the profound decay of the Royal Navy as a global force.

Observing Comments in the Old Kingdom

A letter by Ian King is getting some play across the pond, because as it turns out in the end everyone on all sides ultimately agreed with his argument. The Telegraph has the long story, but here is the short version.

George Osborne, the Chancellor, released Mr King’s letter, saying the carrier contract was “probably the greatest problem” the Coalition inherited from Labour.

Mr King told Mr Cameron that if both carriers were completed the cost would be £5.25 billion. If the second carrier was cancelled the “direct cost” of the programme would be £4.8 billion.

He added: “However, in these circumstances, and under Treasury rules and the agreements I have outlined, there will be consequential costs, including those related to rationalisation, which we estimate would amount to £690 million.”

Mr King added that cancelling a carrier would force him to close three shipyards by early 2013, “with the loss of more than 5,000 jobs in BAE Systems and many more across the UK in hundreds of companies in the supply chain”.

He said: “In practice, that means the end of the UK's capability in complex warships and would bring the sector to a halt.”

Mr King concluded: “I have no doubt that there may be skepticism about some of this analysis. But I fully stand behind it.”

Imagine that, in a strategic debate it turns out that 'costs' other than financial costs in the future appears to have actually been a winning argument. Let my sarcasm drip off the page.

The other interesting article from across the great pond comes as a tip from a reader - quite humorous really - where the an Irishman (yes, those Irish) are mocking the Royal Navy.

The two countries should have accepted the permanent geopolitical reality of the power-shift: instead, they clearly still hanker to have their flags fluttering over distant seas -- hence the tragi-comedy of the aircraft carriers. The sad and sorry Charles de Gaulle is permanently in dry-dock, and a British carrier, if it ever finally goes to sea (don't worry, it won't) will run out of puff after 10,000 miles. Unlike US carriers, the proposed UK carriers are not nuclear.

You might have read of French aircraft one day landing on British carriers. Forget it. They'll be cancelled as the cost of each exceeds the value of Scotland. And that's before the most expensive lawsuit in aeronautical history virtually bankrupts the British state.

For 18 months ago, the British signed a contract with Lockheed-Martin of the US to co-develop the F35B, a crazy vertical take-off, supersonic, stealth-aircraft which, at British insistence, also functions as a lawnmower. Now the British say they don't want it, and tears of covetous joy trickle down the cheeks of Lockheed-Martin's attorneys.

Moreover, such is British amnesia that no one seems aware that in 1942, the last time the Royal Navy simultaneously had two vessels called Prince of Wales and Queen Elizabeth, they were lost within a week of one another, the latter being the only enemy-battleship the Italians have EVER sunk.

But even if the carriers are ever launched, they'll simply join the Charles de Gaulle in a seagoing citrus-grove of EU lemons with flight-decks. This will enable Europe to project global-reach in much the same way that Zaire's ballistic-missile programme keeps Mongolian children awake at night. However, the Chinese have already perfected a ballistic missile that is somewhat more impressive than Zaire's. Its sole purpose? To destroy an aircraft-carrier, anywhere in the world, and at any time. Zut alors, as they say in Peking.

It is a very clever and entertaining editorial - almost Jon Stewart worthy. Before you get too worked up about it, keep in mind the Irish have been waiting centuries for the chance to stab back at the Royal Navy. Well done Kevin Myers, very funny Friday stuff.

The Evolution of Expeditionary

My latest column at World Politics Review is on British expeditionary capability:

The idea that wars should be fought at a distance has informed British military policy for centuries. To this end, the United Kingdom has historically structured its military forces with expeditionary capability in mind, even if other missions -- the British Army's commitment to the defense of West Germany, for example -- have at times competed for money and interest. That would seem to apply even more today, when for the United Kingdom, virtually every conceivable military conflict is an expeditionary war.

However, the defense cuts outlined in the Strategic Defense and Security Review (.pdf) threaten to undermine Britain's ability to undertake expeditionary operations. For the first time in centuries, the United Kingdom will effectively lose the ability to conduct unilateral expeditionary war.

Strategic Defense and Security Review Highlights

I think Bill Sweetman and Robert Wall know more than they are letting on regarding the Strategic Defense and Security Review details, but if they don't - I can fill in the blanks on what the SDSR decisions are on a few issues.

Key naval announcements are:

• 1st Queen Elizabeth Class to be LPH, 2nd to have CV variant.
• Immediate decommissioning of HMS ARK ROYAL.
• Joint Force Harrier to go by 2011.
• Loss of 4 frigates (Type 22) by 2011.
• Decommission of either HMS OCEAN or HMS ILLUSTRIOUS following a short review to determine which platform is better suited to LPH operations.
• Decommission an LSD(A).
• Rotate ALBION and BULWARK at extended readiness.
• Sea King to go by 2016.
• Nimrod MRA4 not to enter service.

2 high-level objectives:

• To ensure a secure and resilient UK by protecting our people, economy, infrastructure, territory and ways of life from all major risks that can effect us directly; and
• To shape a stable world, by acting to reduce the likelihood of risks affecting the UK or British interests overseas, and applying our instruments of power and influence to shape the global environment.

The following Tier 1 risks are judged to be our highest priorities for UK national security:

• Terrorism
• Cyber attack
• Major natural hazards and accidents
• International Military Crisis
• Afghanistan will remain our top priority while British troops are deployed there.

Size and Shape - Future Force 2020 to comprise CASD ; 7 SSN ; 2 CVF, with one at extended readiness ; 2 of LPD, one at (alternated) extended readiness; 19 FF/DD ; 14 MCMVs.

Warfare:

• Wildcat to mirror 19 FF/DD numbers.
• Merlin Mk 2 CSP to remain - numbers to mirror FF/DD capability.

Air:

• Joint Strike Fighter Carrier Variant to be bought, Joint Force Harrier to be gone by Apr 11 and Carrier Strike capability gapped until 2020.
• QE class with “cats and traps” lends to UCAVs / COD/ AEW capabilities, as well as French and American interoperability.
• Numbers of JSF buy uncertain.
• CH47F buy now 12 rather 22.
• Wildcat ALM - safe but numbers unclear.

Log/RFA & N1:

• Overall 5,000 RN redundancies (600 RM), possibly compulsory.
• Loss of 1 AO and 1 AOR, but the commitment to a new tanker remains.
• Defense Training Review not to happen (no move of SULTAN to St Athan), but the Naval Estate to be reviewed.
• RN to work closer with the French logistically and operationally.

Technology & Equipment Programs:

• Investment will focus on developing capabilities and countering threats in key areas: autonomous systems, sensors, cyber, space and new materials including nano technology.
• Maintain close cooperation with US and others on Ballistic Missile defenses.
• Defense industrial and technology Green paper by the end of the year.

It is my observation that the Royal Navy is in transition from a military force to more of a constabulary force, with an aircraft carrier they know they need instead of the frigates strategy demands they need instead. I honestly don't think it will matter, primarily because I think the assumptions made will be proven wrong long before we reach 2020 - meaning this plan won't last the test of time.

HMS Astute Runs Aground Off Scotland

According to the Telegraph, HMS Astute has run aground by the stern while it was conducting a crew swap in shallow water.

“Astute ran aground by her very stern earlier this morning as she was transferring people ashore,” a Navy spokesman said. “There’s no nuclear issue or no environmental issue that we are aware of and no one has been hurt.”

The submarine, which carries a crew of 98, will now wait until later today for tug boats to pull her off when the tide comes in.

Thomas Harding is covering the incident for the Telegraph and has offered more details in this article. According to his report, the tide should come in around 6:00pm this evening and tugs will try to lodge the submarine off the shoals.

This news strikes many obvious thoughts. Yes, yesterday was Trafalgar Day but that doesn't mean anything anymore to the British, and the Royal Navy is so far removed from the days of Nelson the comparison could be used as more of a national insult from Americans like me than an observation. It is also true this comes after the results of the 'strategery' review conducted by the best and brightest in the UK. I wonder if that 'strategery' review built in the cost of business, which includes attrition due to a variety of factors. Unlikely.

After learning this news a few hours ago this morning, I decided to conduct a little experiment. I set up several feeds on my laptop and phone to monitor a few Twitter hash tags like #astute, #submarine, and #RoyalNavy. Bottom line, the Royal Navy is a punchline, and is getting killed by comedy (some of which is very funny). Unfortunately, it highlights how the Royal Navy has no control over the information space. However, what escapes me is how that somehow translates into their apparently belief that they have very little to contribute to the perception of the event. The Royal Navy has a nuclear submarine aground within view of the shore, and more specifically a major bridge, where thousands of people are going to see this in person - and likely care.

It will start as an infinite source of comedy, the irony of the "Astute" running aground. The individuals involved will be made infamous for their mistake, and the accident will be turned into a mockery in future news. This stuff will happen - but there could be more done.

How many people in the UK know that Astute submarines are a double hulled submarine? Are the details of a shore transfer from a submarine to shore top secret? If not, why isn't the process being explained - and put into the context of frequency. Is this the first time a submarine has gone aground in this area despite 100 previous shore transfers? a 1,000? 10,000? Even when bad things happen - or particularly when bad things happen - isn't that the time to broaden the knowledge of an interested audience? What MoD PAO is down at the BBC studios available to jump on live TV or radio to provide up to date information? What about CNNI or other news outlets? I've been streaming the news feed online for at least the last hour, and I haven't seen anyone in either studio.

Think about it though. If a US nuclear submarine was to run aground off the east coast, how would the US Navy react? Would they promote Twitter hash tags to coordinate the humiliating comedy - with the intent of adding knowledge to the stream? Would the US Navy flood the internet with photography of the submarine, knowing full well that images matter? Not just far views where the media is - but up close and personal photos that give the viewer the impression - "I am 7,800 tons of silent steel, and this the only time you will ever see me, if you're lucky."

Would a PAO be dispatched from the New York office to CNN, Fox News, and MSNBC to be in studio, ready for live TV, ready with new information at real time? Considering the number of PAOs in New York City - unlikely.

But Ray - its a digital world, you don't have to be in studio...

Wrong. CNN, Fox News, and MSNBC measure responses to content in real time - TV news has trended towards a 2 way conversation with real time feedback, and if the PAO is at a remote site then there will be no feedback on content contributed by the television medium - only by being in studio does one get to measure responses and react appropriately with speed.

In the UK today, the Royal Navy will suffer another black eye, and the problem is compounded because they do not have the leadership or planning in place as an organization to immediately apply the eye cream - and contribute towards the purpose of giving understanding of Astute class submarines (or the Royal Navy as an organization) to the currently interested population. The moment will pass, no one will care - but the question is will folks learn something in the process? In the UK today, probably not. What about next time?

"Silent Service" indeed. At a time when the Royal Navy budget is suffering because they lack any connection between themselves and the population, an event occurs that puts the Royal Navy on the front page and the Royal Navy does nothing to take advantage of it. Yes, the event itself is not a good thing - but Royal Navy is failing as an organization because they willingly waste an opportunity to communicate themselves to an interested audience.

Handicapping the Queen Elizabeth Race

I have considerable doubt as to whether the British will really sell HMS Queen Elizabeth in 2020. If they do, however, they’ll need a buyer:

• Russia: The Russians are interested in another aircraft carrier, and it’s unlikely that the Russian shipbuilding industry will have produced a vessel of comparable size and capability by 2020. Even if they do, Admiral Kuznetzov will be close to thirty years old; not too long in the tooth for a CV, but of worrisome age given concern about Russia maintenance capacity. The Russians could probably afford Queen Elizabeth, and could undertake any modifications necessary to fly their own carrier aircraft. On the downside, such a purchase would be an express vote of no-confidence in a Russian shipbuilding industry already made nervous by the Mistral acquisition. Moreover, unless Russia-NATO relations warm appreciably in the next ten years, both the British defense establishment and Britain’s NATO allies would freak out over the prospect of a Russia purchase. Odds on Imperatritsa Ekaterina Velikaya: 50-1
• China: Like the Russians, the Chinese will probably be able to afford Queen Elizabeth, and there’s good reason to believe that they’d be interested in acquiring a CV. However, by 2020 indigenous construction may have proceeded to the point that the Chinese won’t believe that they need to bother with foreign acquisition. Integrating Queen Elizabeth into the PLAN would be a pain. The biggest obstacle would be on the other side, however; the USN would go absolutely ape if the British tried to sell QE to the Chinese, and I doubt that the British defense establishment would be terribly enthusiastic, either. Odds on Empress Dowager Cixi: 99-1
• France: France could certainly use a second carrier; recent events have demonstrated the problems associated with even a reliable single carrier fleet. However, I would be deeply surprised if the French government chose not to take advantage of the opportunity to build such a vessel in French yards. Even though QE might fit the bill, I suspect that the French will either go with a French built ship or no second carrier for the foreseeable future. Odds on Carla Bruni (R92): 20-1
• Brazil: In 2020, Sao Paulo will be fifty-seven years old. Refurbishment notwithstanding, that’s really old, and it’s unclear where Brazil intends to acquire a replacement vessel. Brazil has CATOBAR experience, and will presumably at some point decide on a modern carrier-borne fighter/strike aircraft. Brazil also appears to have an interest in expanding its navy. Queen Elizabeth would seem to fit Brazil’s needs perfectly. While it’s possible to envision competition between Brazil and the United Kingdom over South Atlantic sea access, the scenario is somewhat far-fetched. I don’t see why the British defense and foreign policy establishment would object overmuch, or why the United States would try to veto the deal. Odds on Empress Isabel: 3-1
• South Korea: South Korea has a large, modern, and growing navy, and is gaining experience with large flat deck amphibs. Queen Elizabeth would be a substantial step up, but not necessarily an insurmountable one. Of course, if the South Koreans want a carrier they can always build one themselves, but Queen Elizabeth could provide an extremely useful bridge to a domestically built CV force. South Korea could equip QE with F-35s. Much depends, of course, on changes in South Korea’s strategic situation; by 2020 that situation may have changed radically. I can’t imagine why such a sale would be a problem for either the US or the UK. Odds on Empress Myeongsong: 4-1
• India: India represents another obvious potential customer. Queen Elizabeth is going to be a considerably more powerful platform than the refurbished Admiral Gorshkov. However, India is also expects to have two domestically built carriers in service by 2020. Four carriers would be a major commitment for India, so I’m not sure I see them as a potential customer for Queen Elizabeth. On the upside, India and the UK have maintained a procurement relationship that could facilitate the deal. Odds on INS India Gandhi: 15-1
• Japan: In ten years, Japan might well be interested in stepping up to a genuine fleet carrier. It’s gaining experience with large flat deck warships with the Hyuga class. Japan will also probably buy the F-35, giving it a CATOBAR capable aircraft. However, as with France I suspect that the Japanese would rather build a carrier themselves than purchase one from the British. The Japanese constitution would present some difficulty, but objections from either the UK or the US would not likely be a problem. Odds on Empress Michiko: 7-1
• Australia: Australia has increased its naval profile over the past several decades, and appears to continue to believe that the RAN has an important role to play in maintaining order in Oceania/Southeast Asia. The RAN tried to buy HMS Invincible in 1982, a deal that would have been remarkably similar to the proposed Queen Elizabeth sale. However, Queen Elizabeth would be a substantial step forward for the RAN, although it will gain experience with large flat decked warships with the Canberra class. Australia operates the F-18, and is expected to be a customer for the F-35, and so will have the aircraft necessary to operate a (presumably CATOBAR capable) fleet carrier. Finally, Australia obviously has a strong, positive relationship with the United Kingdom. Odds on HMAS Queen Elizabeth: 9-2
• Canada: Canada hasn’t operated a carrier since 1970, and won’t have Australia’s experience with large flat deck amphibs. However, Canada enjoys some of the same advantages as Australia, including operation of the F-18 and the F-35. Canada can probably afford the QE if it wants it, and has a large and growing maritime backyard to worry about. Indeed, Canada might even eschew the catapult upgrade and operate QE as a helicopter carrier, although either Ark Royal or Invincible would probably be a better fit for such a mission. As with Australia, Canada maintains a strong, positive relationship with the UK. Odds on HMCS Queen Elizabeth: 15-1

Observing Al Qaeda Threat to France

I don't really know what to make of the threat to France by Al Qaeda, but it has been suggested that even though the information regarding the threat comes from someone attempting to cross the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, the threat itself is supposedly originating from Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Details:

French Interior Minister Brice Hortefeux, told a European television network that Saudi Arabian-supplied intelligence has described a new terror threat from al Qaeda, prompting France to placed its security and intelligence agencies on high alert.

Hortefeux confirmed that “in the last few hours,” France received a warning that a potential attack was forthcoming, but did not give any specific details. Hortefeux went on record as stating that the "threat is real" adding that, "We must not underestimate or over estimate the threat. We are directly concerned."

Three thoughts come to mind.

First, noteworthy France is currently deploying the Charles De Gaulle to the region, despite the ships minor detour. As the situation develops it will be interesting to see if the French carrier projects power towards the Arabian Peninsula. Unlikely, but it is worth noting it is a potential option for France.

Second, AQAP knows the French aircraft carrier is coming their way, and given how 2010 started with AQAP threats of attacks at sea against naval targets... it raises the question whether AQAP would attempt an attack against the French aircraft carrier. Given that France will be prepared for such activity, I see this as unlikely, but some one probably said the same thing about ramming the twin towers with commercial airlines.

Finally, contrast the situation France is in with that of the UK. Here we have France, with their aircraft carrier battle group deploying at a time the nation has a specific threat to deal with essentially projecting military power to the region as a strategic option to support the defense of France at home with disruptive attacks where the enemy is should that option become necessary.

On the flip side we have the UK, busy executing political strategery in support of a jobs program to produce aircraft carriers without combat aircraft, and moving to retire the only aircraft carrier in the nations inventory capable of projecting air power. I have no idea what the budget obligations and priorities of the British government is, but whatever it is - the results of the defense budget suggest national defense is driven by a domestic agenda and was given the priority of a national afterthought.

A Strategic Review With Political / Industrial Limitations

The ongoing Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR) currently taking place in London is perhaps one of the most interesting public defense debates since the cold war. Undertaken while the British government is at war in Afghanistan, the British government is attempting to make policy for the next decade without a clear understanding of current activities may mean for next year. Every decision carries an enormous political ramification, whether domestic or foreign, and as a public debate without a single statesman advocating compelling intellectual strategic arguments an observer might be left wondering what exactly the objective of British strategy actually is. Policy will ultimately be crafted by October 19, 2010, so the papers say - but what that policy is intended to do for the British people is the first question one might ask - and the last question one might find a good answer to.

The Nuclear Question

The public side of the debate began, legitimately, with the nuclear question. All indications are the SDSR looked at the nuclear question and has already decided that ballistic missile submarines are will be fielded to support the British government requirements for nuclear deterrence. I find alternatives hard to argue - the ballistic missile submarine is the most secure and the most survivable of the various choices, and provides any nation with such a capability unquestioned protection of nuclear retaliation to any state that may attempt a direct nuclear attack. As we live in an era where the number of states seeking nuclear weapons in increasing, protecting a nations future with underwater nuclear deterrence seems to be the appropriate choice for any nation. It explains why such a capability is currently a visible piece of the military development of China, Russia, and India - and that ignores the recently upgraded capability of the French and the ongoing planning to upgrade by the United States. With every other sitting member of the UN security council currently at some level of modernization for this capability, the British really have no choice in the matter if they wish to remain relevant on the nuclear deterrence issue.

Chicken or Egg

Once one gets past the nuclear question in the SDSR, one might begin to wonder what is driving the strategic discussion. The carrier debate is an excellent example, because one might ask what is the priority? Is this a domestic jobs issue? Is this a strategic capability issue? Is this an industrial issue? Are the British making a classic mistake with the carrier issue by allowing force structure to drive strategy and policy?

This is not as straight forward as one might believe, at least not if you examine the issues closely. The domestic jobs issue is one of politics. It does not matter what the political reason cited for support on any strategic issue, because even in the 21st century the decisions of geopolitics made within any local body of government still reflect the reality that all politics are local. There are no impressive political statesmen, unless one is to claim such a role of Liam Fox (which I will not). If one is searching for the modern Nelson, Wellington, or Churchill - too bad, one will not find a modern visionary within the current crop of British leadership. Agenda's are plainly evident, and among those in the SDSR debate no ones agenda begins with a discussion of British power, rather focus is specific to military power and capabilities.

The Royal Navy does not have a statesman. There is no vision offered from which one derives the necessity of aircraft carriers, nor any other specific capability. Capability leads the discussion first, and what the capability provides follows in discussion. This reality is a reflection of two things:

First, no one in British politics is willing to point to the purpose of military power in the 21st century, including a rational argument for current British involvement in Afghanistan. If Afghanistan was so important to the national security of Great Britain, then why has it already decided when the British are leaving? Will the Strategic Defense and Security Review offer the strategic rational for the current contribution of 9,500 troops to Afghanistan, or what the role of a large active duty Army (compared to reserves) might be in the strategy of the United Kingdom? Unless the Strategic Defense and Security Review defines the security challenge facing the United Kingdom today, then it doesn't matter what the size of the British military is - lack of definition can rationally be followed by greater lack of definition.

Second, for what reasons will British military power be used in the 21st century? Who will the British be attacking? Who will the British be defending? What are the British interests both domestically and globally that require military power for security? Even today the British are being accused of nineteenth century colonialism for their occupation of the Falklands by the President of Argentina. Are the Falklands a strategic priority to Great Britain today? I have no idea, but I do know that Argentina will be conducting a 21st century information war on the British because Argentina sees the enormous economic importance of the islands. Is defending the Falkland Islands on the short list of where military power might be necessary to protect the interests of the United Kingdom? The answers to those type of questions would, in classic strategic development, drive force structure.

But instead the British debate force structure first; ie..

The Carrier Question

I will skip my rant on how the British Army's role in future British military operations is implied and accepted rather than clearly articulated. It doesn't really matter though, because the SDSR debate is not really a debate on military structure and British strategic interests, rather a question of economics and political priorities. The intent of the SDSR is to find the magic formula that offers a perception of British autonomy in geopolitical affairs to a domestic audience while seeking the minimal economic investment in national strategic power possible. The British government's policy appears intent on leveraging as much reliance as possible on the United States in an effort to maximize budgets towards domestic political interests while attempting to maintain that autonomous perception for domestic audiences.

This is the behavior of all states that have neither the strategic vision nor the visionaries necessary to domestically articulate a nations self interest on the global stage. Call it concession to a superpower ally if you wish, but the degree to which Britain will retain autonomy in future strategic challenges will be limited based primarily on the decision to 'go cheap at home while leaning heavy on the US.' While legitimately labeled a strategy with limited political options, it is not necessarily a bad strategy.

But it might explain why the Royal Navy would be willing to sacrifice heavily for carriers. For those who are not familiar, the Astute class submarine ran into serious problems a few years ago. As it turned out, the industrial base of the UK nearly failed to produce the submarine, and when they ran into serious technical problems a United States contractor had to go overseas to straighten out the problems, and put the Astute class back on track. The inconsistent construction schedule over decades of building nuclear submarines in Great Britain led to the loss of critical skills, and had it not been for the United States the British not only would not have the highly capable Astute class, but wouldn't have the option of a highly capable future ballistic missile submarine replacement.

It is an important issue, because the industrial question also becomes a strategic question in that context. Aircraft carriers, just like submarines, are enormous investments of state. If the British decide for whatever reason not to build the CVF, they will eventually lose not only what they have in inventory, but the ability to build aircraft carriers in the future. That is a fairly significant strategic choice, because whether the British needs an aircraft carrier in 2010, or even 2020, is perhaps a legitimate question - whether the British will need an aircraft carrier in the 21st century is a very tough question to answer. Sure you can start from scratch with your industry if you lose that capability, but at what cost? For examples, see the Russians and Indians (and I predict the Chinese very soon), because the costs of starting an aircraft carrier program without industrial experience is enormous. Look at Russia - have you truly studied the political costs to Russia for seeking the Mistral class from France? Given the recent decision by Russia to quit selling military equipment to Iran, the cost could already be nearly $10 billion US in military sales over the next few years alone.

Are aircraft carriers aligned with the strategic interests of the UK? I have no idea, without clear articulation of the strategic interests of the UK how can anyone say for sure? I do know this, it is entirely possible that it is the United States encouraging the UK to make the choice it is regarding aircraft carriers, and because the UK's strategic review is a minimalist budget approach to defense with heavy reliance on the United States to fill gaps - US encouragement can act as a determining factor in those type of strategic choices.

Corbett, Nelson, Cochrane, and Smith

There is legitimately some concern regarding what the choice to purchase two carriers in the UK will have on the Royal Navy. It is hard to predict, but I would offer the suggestion that perhaps what we are seeing is the General's view of Julian Corbett.

One cannot observe the SDSR debate in the UK without noting how many Afghanistan and Iraq veteran Generals are out advocating for policy in public. I find it very interesting, because it demonstrates the degree to which the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy have virtually no leaders capable of making a public argument with credibility - primarily because the British have so few Royal Air Force Generals or Royal Navy Admirals who have a name people recognize as credible in the debate.

I have often asked myself to what degree will the 21st century COIN approach on land impact naval forces, and in a way I think we see a microcosm of that today in the UK. The reason why veteran war Generals are generally supportive of aircraft carriers is because aircraft carriers provide the possibility for air power support for ground forces. More noteworthy, a Royal Navy that consists of a force structure concentrated around strike groups means the Royal Navy will consist of a force of concentrated sea control - a modern variation of Corbett. In a carrier strike group deployment model, the Royal Navy offers the capability to be dynamically mobile, locally concentrated sea control force that can be directed selectively globally. Seen from the perspective of a veteran in Afghanistan or Iraq, it looks very similar to ink spot strategies used by ground forces for influencing local populations.

But it is counter to how naval forces have typically operated. I see remarkable irony that Admiral Nelson, perhaps the greatest Admiral in world history in deploying and using high value ships of war, is famously quoted many times for desiring more cruisers (modern day frigates) for distributing presence sustaining operations across entire theaters. There is little question that is Admiral Nelson were alive today, he would question the wisdom of all of the MoD to even contemplate capital ships at the expense of a larger cruiser fleet - for power is derived from the influence achieved from constant presence, not from the ability to temporary arrive with force. This is the most important lesson being relearned on the ground in the 21st century wars conducted by the west.

It is unclear what comes when western leaders decide to wind down major military activities in Afghanistan. The Obama administration and the British government have already set timelines for the reduction in ground forces in Afghanistan. It is unclear whether these time lines will be kept, but we should know more after the next review of the Afghanistan war likely to be released after the next US election.

What is coming is a major strategic discussion in the US on military power, a US version of the Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR). We have already seen the US DoD push back decisions, likely waiting for the reduction in ground troops in Afghanistan before undertaking such a serious debate. The rise of China and the shift of economic power from west to east will likely drive discussions and decisions, and because that debate continues to be pushed out by the US it is almost certain that some form of pushing out major reorganization decisions will rise up in the British SDSR.

I am a strong believer that the structure of the US Army must change. I believe that ultimately, the United States needs to have a larger Army with between 75-100 brigades, but must find a way to have between only 1/4 and 1/3 of that force active duty - the rest reserve. The US can never, ever be allowed to fight a land war half way across the world again without the support and without significant impact to the American population, and I believe the way to do that is to insure any future war requires a mostly reserve force that has significant impact to local communities, thus doesn't allow for political decisions to be made without careful understanding of the political calculation and impact to the whole of the population. A smaller active duty force and larger total Army force is a huge change in the structure of the US Army, because one must account for the necessity to have a healthy officer Corps, among dozens of other critical factors, in both decreasing the size of the active duty Army while increasing the size of the overall US Army. That debate won't happen until operations in Afghanistan wind down.

But if you move that direction, and remove the potential for politically casual use of land military forces to achieve strategic objectives, you must then have a plan for how to influence limited strategic objectives over core national interests without major military presence on the ground. Ultimately, that is the same challenge facing the UK today, albeit within a very different context. I would argue the way to do this is found in British military history.

I strongly believe that naval power must assume a central role in the national security policy of any nation wanting to compete in the 21st century primarily because we are moving towards a global system where security is achieved by which regional major powers balance each other, and find compelling positive sum gains through cooperation and collaboration rather than zero sum gains and losses through competition. I also believe the politics that manages zero sum gains and losses that will occur in competition will be complex, and will be primarily decided with the presence of military power.

With that said, there will also be complex geopolitical challenges with the lessor powers, and how those problems are managed will be increasingly important to the balancing of major states. War is an enormous strain to the limited resources of states, so modern methods of preventing war is just as important as the use of military power to win wars. For both the US and the UK, I believe one way to prevent war is to adopt modern policies and strategies of those who successfully addressed complex military challenges with limited resources, and there are examples in British history.

This blog is guilty of often quoting Julian Corbett and Horatio Nelson. In reality when I think of how naval forces should operate and organize in the 21st century to manage the daily stresses of non-state actors, I attempt to conceptualize how to implement modern versions of the activities of Sir Sidney Smith in helping the Turks stop the French after they landed in Egypt, and the activities of Thomas Cochrane in harassing the French in support of the Spanish. Both men offer historical guidance on how to leverage sea power and limited ground combat power effectively in support of indigenous forces for the purposes of defeating common enemies. Unofficially they both represented part diplomat, part politician, part army officer, and part naval officer in executing operations in complex political climates where indigenous interests always prevailed, but they were successful in also insuring British interests were forwarded within the context of a clear understanding of strategic objectives.

I believe it is in that context nations like the UK, as well as the future US, should make choices within the context of a Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR). By clearly stating objectives, what needs to be done in providing for the national interest drives the conversation how something should be done in achieving the national interest objective. Only once a nation determined what the ends are and the ways which ends will be achieved can a nation effectively determined the means necessary to meet the objectives. The British SDSR has this backward, and starts with means to determine what ways are on the table as an option, and only then can that square peg be shoved into the round hole of what the political ends of strategy/policy are. It is in that way the political and industrial limitations of the SDSR limit the strategic context of the SDSR itself.

The SDSR skipped the important discussions of developing strategy, mostly because it isn't about strategy at all - it is about a minimalist budget first and foremost. Something tells me the cost of such a 'strategic' approach will financially be much higher than anticipated, because all those other discussions of policy really do matter a lot. I only pray that when it comes time for a similar debate in the US, the US debate has more substance on the ends and ways of strategy than the debate in the UK has.

The Brits Want 2 Carriers

Lewis Page is talking Royal Navy today. He basically lays down the law on any two carrier plan as:

1. Keep current design for F-35B
2. Redesign for EMALS
3. Make CVF = amphibious vessels

Since Monday is a US federal holiday, I figure Monday is a good day to talk Royal Navy, if something better doesn't come up.

See here and here for some background on the big 'strategic' debate across the pond.

The US and the Future of the British Nuclear Deterrent

At World Politics Review, I argue that replacement of the British SSBN force is not in the interests of the United States:

Just as important, however, is the money that would be saved from foregoing Trident replacement, which could be spent in other areas. The United States has depended on the United Kingdom as a military partner for the last 60 years. During that time, robust British naval and expeditionary warfare capabilities have supported and substituted for U.S. capabilities in key areas. Simply put, nuclear missile submarines are deployed to hide and wait. As a result, they can't address the highest-priority threats to global security today, such as countering terrorists, deterring pirates, and conducting disaster relief, most of which require a visible presence. A hollow, gutted British military, albeit one in possession of a formidable nuclear deterrent, is of little use to the United States.