Trident and the Lib Dems

During last week's debate, Lib Dem frontman Nick Clegg repeatedly brought up the question of replacing Trident. Jeffrey Lewis interviewed Paul Ingram on the potential implications of Lib Dem strength for the Trident program:

Last Thursday Britain had its first ever election leader TV debate, and it confounded the pundits, not only for being more interesting than anyone expected, not only because it turned out to be a genuinely three-horse contest (why should that be surprising when you put three horses in the track?), but also because little-known Lib Dem leader Nick Clegg (Nick who?) raised the cost of Britain’s Trident replacement plans not once, nor twice, nor thrice, but four times, before the other two were forced to respond. Tory leader David Cameron reluctantly responded with the usual response about defending the UK but committing: “I say we should always have the ultimate protection of our independent nuclear deterrent”, followed by Prime Minister Gordon Brown, who after describing the need for a united front against potential proliferators, said, “I don’t favour Nick’s proposal which would unilaterally abandon our nuclear deterrent when we know Iran and North Korea and other countries are trying to get…” Since the debate the universal media and public opinion is that Clegg scored a hit on the night (not necessarily on this issue) and the Lib Dems are soaring in the polls. So, is there something exciting going on around Britain’s nuclear deterrent? Could we see some sort of momentum behind a policy shift? What?s the background?

The Lib Dems could end up holding the balance of power, so their opinion is important. But don’t expect an FDP moment — where after last October’s elections Germany’s new Foreign Minister is pushing hard within NATO for the withdrawal of US B-61s from Germany — there is strong cross-party and public support for such a move in Germany where it does not yet exist in the UK. Even in their own party the Lib Dems are badly divided on the issue of what to do, and national representatives have been on all the UK media since the debate clarifying that they are not in favour of unilateral nuclear disarmament, simply looking for cheaper alternatives to buying UK nukes systems off the US shelf.

For my part, I'm glad that Trident replacement is being debated inter-party forums. I have long believed that the UK's nuclear deterrent is redundant, and that funds would be better spent on maintaining Royal Navy surface and expeditionary capability. The discussion probably won't get to the point of debating the merits of the Queen Elizabeth vs. a Trident replacement, but Clegg's presence at least pushes the strategic debate to the fore.

Joint UK-French SSBN Fleet?

This is an interesting notion that is unlikely to happen in anything but a very limited sense:

France has offered to create a joint UK-French nuclear deterrent by sharing submarine patrols, the Guardian has learned. Officials from both countries have discussed how a deterrence-sharing scheme might work but Britain has so far opposed the idea on the grounds that such pooling of sovereignty would be politically unacceptable.

In a speech this morning in London, Gordon Brown said he had agreed to further nuclear co-operation with France last week after talks with Nicolas Sarkozy. The prime minister did not comment explicitly about submarines, saying only that the UK and France would both retain "our independent nuclear deterrent".

"We have talked about the idea of sharing continuity at sea as part of a larger discussion about sharing defence burdens," a French official said.

A British official confirmed that the French government had raised the idea of shared "continuous at-sea deterrence", but added that any such scheme would cause "outrage" in the midst of an election campaign.

Today, Brown said of his talks with the French president: "We have agreed a degree of co-operation that is, I think, greater than we have had previously but we will retain, as will France, our independent nuclear deterrent....

Sarkozy hinted at the potential for shared deterrence in a speech at Cherbourg. "Together with the United Kingdom, we have taken a major decision: it is our assessment that there can be no situation in which the vital interests of either of our two nations could be threatened without the vital interests of the other also being threatened," he said.

Britain and France could synchronise nuclear deterrent patrols and co-operate in the deployment of surface fleet task forces, sources say. However, British officials played down the possibility of formal agreements on the nuclear deterrent - or on sharing each other's aircraft carriers.

The idea of a shared deterrent is certainly interesting; during the Cold War, the NATO alliance essentially "shared" the nuclear umbrellas provided by the US, the UK, and France. Italy and West Germany did not need to invest in their own nuclear weapon programs because it was impossible to imagine an attack that would not also involve one of the three nuclear states. The current situation for France and the United Kingdom is very similar. While it's obviously possible to imagine France or the UK going to war independent of one another, it's difficult to envision scenarios where the nuclear deterrent of either country would become militarily relevant in an independent conflict. If anyone flings a nuke at either London or Paris, the expectation would be that the other would become involved (not to mention the United States). Thus, the idea of a shared deterrent has some appeal, especially given the high cost that both countries face in replacing their SSBN fleets.

That said, nuclear weapons play other roles besides deterrence. Nukes remain a prestige weapon, and in some sense guarantee a seat at the big power table. Without nukes, it would be much harder to distinguish France or the UK from the bevy of second tier powers (Germany, Italy, Japan, Poland, Spain, Canada) that lack nuclear weapons but have otherwise similar defense profiles. Indeed, it becomes very hard to justify the two security council seats for France and the UK if they're sharing one of the key elements of their national power. Again, the idea of folding the two European permanent seats together (and replacing with, say, India or Japan or Brazil) makes some intuitive sense, but would be procedurally very difficult.

The command and control details of a shared deterrent would also be difficult to work out. There are a variety of different schemes, running from a CoG to CoG link (Brown calls Sarkozy from the ruins of London and asks him to shoot back at aggressor country X) to high level military contacts to the direct presence of French and British naval officers on each others submarines. Working out firing bureaucracy would be extremely complex, especially given that both countries seem to have somewhat idiosyncratic nuclear command procedures. Future procurement would also be a bit twitchy, as the RN SSBNs are scheduled for replacement prior to the French. However, the procurement issue might also be the firmest ground for collaboration; 4-5 boats to one design makes much more financial sense than 6-8 boats of two designs.

Cross-posted at LGM.

The Falklands Or Las Malvinas?

According to the BBC, Argentina has announced that all ships passing through its claimed territorial waters (so that includes the Falklands) must have a new permit.
The reason for this is British plans to drill for oil, an operation that is set to begin next week. The oil-field off the Falklands is said to have a capacity of 60 billion barrels.

The Argentine government has already prevented one ship, the MV Thor Leader, to sail for the Falklands. The government said the vessel had supplies on board for oil drilling.
Currently the oil rig Ocean Guardion is on its way to the islands and should arrive tomorrow, the 19th. Some claim the rig has been shadowed by Argentine aircraft.

At this moment I wouldn't expect a 2nd Falklands War, because the risks for Argentina are too high.
When the Falklands War started there were about 80 military personnel at the islands, together with the patrol vessel HMS Endurance.
Currently there are just over 1,000 military personnel, 4 Eurofighters, a VC-10 refuelling plane, a Hercules and 2 Sea Kings. Naval assets currently at the Falklands are the type 42 destroyer HMS York and patrol vessel HMS Clyde. Underway are the fleet tanker RFA Wave Ruler and survey vessel HMS Scott.
I'd expect one or more submarines to emerge in the waters of the Falklands as well.

If it would come to a war expect the UK to go 'all in'. Yes, because of the oil reserves, but also because of the upcoming general elections in the UK. These must be hold before June 4 and the Labour Party of Prime Minister Gordon Brown could use a boost, since most recent polls indicate Labour is 9 percentage points behind the Conservative Party (the Tories).

So don't expect 'the Falklands War part II', but do expect tensions to be rising between the UK and Argentina.

When It Pays to Do Nothing

I was reading comments on piracy by British Foreign Secretary David Miliband in this Reuters article, and it has me thinking out loud.

In the Reuters article, Miliband states the British government will not commit extra resources to the piracy problem that has expanded to the Indian Ocean, and while he is on the subject of offering no extra assistance, he also tells commercial shipping companies that the British government discourages ransoms. I guess he would hate for the insurance companies to have to spend any money collected from... piracy insurance?

Insurance underwriters in London are clearing somewhere in the neighborhood of ~$500 million US in additional premiums annually thanks to Somali piracy, and collections will increase in 2010 with the recent announcement war-risk insurance will extend to every ship that travels within 1000 miles of the Somalia coast. Does anyone know how much of that ~$500 million is potentially collected as tax by the British government?

The Royal Navy currently has 9 warships at sea in that region, but none are currently conducting anti-piracy patrols. Why should they, the British government has become so cheap when it comes to the Royal Navy maybe the extra revenues from piracy related war-risk premiums will provide enough funding for a full years worth of Royal Navy fleet operations in 2010?

Well, I did say maybe.

It is a few months old, but a good CRS report on the costs of piracy can be found here (PDF).

Fleets in Being

Interesting post from UltimaRatioReg:

When built, Tirpitz was one of the most powerful units afloat. Slightly larger than her more famous sister, Bismarck, KMS Tirpitz displaced more than 43,000 tons. She was 824 feet long, armed with eight 38-cm (15”) guns, and had exceeded 31 knots on trials. The British had tried desperately to destroy her before she was even completed, and between the RAF and Royal Navy, many air, surface, and subsurface attacks had been only moderately successful, and had often paid a heavy cost for their efforts....

It has been estimated that the “fleet in being”, of which Tirpitz was the centerpiece and eventually the only significant unit, tied down ten times its own combat power in Royal Navy battleships, carriers, cruisers, and destroyers. Many of these powerful warships were desperately needed in other theaters of war, most notably in November/December of 1941 in the Pacific.

First a technical quibble; the idea that Tirpitz was one of the most powerful units afloat can't be allowed to sit uncontested. Debates on the relative capabilities of WWII battleships are about as helpful as arguing about the merits of Lennon vs. McCartney, but advocating for Tirpitz is about as sensible as defending the idea that Ringo was the most important Beatle. She was large, yes, but inferior to foreign contemporaries in many respects, including armor, main armament, and anti-aircraft protection. Had Tirpitz encountered a North Carolina or South Dakota class battleship, or even a King George V on equal terms, there's no question I'd rather be on the Allied vessel; recall that Prince of Wales, even crippled by teething problems in her main turrets, inflicted more damage on Bismarck than she received at the Battle of Denmark Strait.

As to the "fleet in being" as purely historical concept, the "10 times" figure seems pretty hyperbolic, especially in reference to fall 1941. First, the German Navy had several major units in addition to Tirpitz (Scharnhorst and Gneisenau both remained operational, as did two pocket battleships and three heavy cruisers) which in fact limited the number of warships the British could deploy to the Pacific, but by nothing approaching a factor of ten. The only fast battleships that the RN had, apart from Repulse and PoW, were King George V, Duke of York, and Renown. The slower R, Queen Elizabeth, and Nelson class ships were effective in the Med, and as convoy escorts, but were thought to be of limited utility in either the Pacific or in the role of commerce raider chaser. Thus, the RN didn't have a tremendous advantage over the forces available to Germany; indeed, to confirm advantage the USN deployed Washington and North Carolina to the Atlantic for the first six months of US participation. So while it's true that the Allies maintained heavy forces in the ETO because of the German units (and battleships, of course, aren't the entire story), it's important not to overstate the leverage that the Germans earned from their "fleet in being".

The other issue was the Italian Navy. We tend to remember the Italian Navy as a joke, but in 1941 it was a force to be reckoned with. Even post-Taranto, the Italians possessed three modern fast battleships, as well as a number of older units that had been effectively updated. The RN did not dominate the Med in 1941; if the German Navy hadn't existed, the forces thus freed up would more likely have been used against the Italians than in deterrence of the Japanese. The continued presence of several powerful French units, and the possibility that Vichy might join the Axis, also limited the Royal Navy's ability to deploy to the Pacific.

Thus, the idea that the German Navy represented a major drain on Allied resources isn't quite wrong, but there's a significant danger of overstating its impact. The Royal Navy seemed overstretched in 1941 because it was genuinely overstretched; it was utterly incapable of fighting the Germans, Italians, and Japanese all on its own. This matters, because the Tirpitz example leads URR to ask:

Could a burgeoning Chinese Navy become a “fleet in being”? What implications does that hold for the United States? In each historical example, a “fleet in being” that threatened vital interests was countered by one of two approaches. The first was the dedication of naval combat power in excess of that which such a “fleet in being” could bring to bear, ensuring a reasonable chance of victory. The second was an attack (pre-emptive in some notable cases) on that fleet from the air while the critical elements of that fleet were in harbor.

For this parallel to make sense, we would have to posit additional naval powers that would stretch the USN beyond its breaking point. The German Navy was ineffective in the face of British superiority in the absence of the Japanese and Italian navies; the "stretching" of British forces was strategically useful only in that it left the Royal Navy unable to fight effectively in other theaters. The Royal Navy was also demonstrably inferior in naval capabilities to the coalition of Japan, Italy, and Germany. There is no comparable modern counter-coalition to the USN, unless you imagine simultaneous hot wars against China, Russia, Japan, and the EU. Thus, until the United States faces the potential of such a coalition, I doubt that it's helpful to think in terms of pre-emption; overwhelming superiority will do.

1 CV, No Planes?

This is... bizarre.

With consummate ill-timing U.S. policy makers efforts to sustain a second-engine for the F-35 are met with claims that London is ready to ditch equipping its planned second carrier with the aircraft.

Britain’s “Sunday Times” claims the Royal Navy has “agreed to sacrifice” one of its two 65,000 ton aircraft carriers, instead saying the navy would use the ship only as a helicopter carrier. For good measure the story speculates only about 50 of the F-35 will be bought, to save on cost.

Given budgetary pressures cutting the initial number to 50 appears credible - it would provide enough aircraft to equip the first carrier with a strike wing, and also for training needs.

The notion of having the second 65,000-ton carrier and using it only for helicopters seems far less so.

So... some questions:

1. This seems to suggest that one CV would be permanently configured for F-35s, and the other for helicopters. Wouldn't it make more sense to give both ships a flexible configuration, given the inevitable downtime that carriers need? The Times article suggests that Prince of Wales will be the helicopter/commando carrier, which would "save" the RN the 600 million it would otherwise require to replace HMS Ocean.

2. Can the RN possibly justify the construction of Prince of Wales as a glorified amphibious assault ship?

3. What does this mean for the rest of the Royal Navy's procurement plans? Does it get anything back for giving up an airwing?


UPDATE: Correspondents (as well as commenters) are indicating that the answer to question #1 is "No." The Times article is wrong, by this account, to suggest that Prince of Wales will be permanently configured around commando and helicopter operations. Rather, the two ships are likely to trade off the F-35 air group. This makes much more sense, and does suggest that the revision is more modest than the initial reports implied.

Jutland 1916

Film studies won't become a regular ID feature, but in doing some research on "Battleship", I came across this:

A film about one of the Royal Navy’s most controversial battles is due to be shot next year.

Oscar-winning actor Sir Ben Kingsley is to play the British commander, Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, in the most expensive British-made film about the First World War.

Jutland 1916 will tell the story of the epic clash that took place while the outcome of the war still hung in the balance.

The £40million movie, which will be shot in Britain, will draw on diaries and first-person accounts featured in the book Jutland 1916: Death In the Grey Wastes by Peter Hart and Nigel Steel.

The film is provisionally titled "Jutland 1916," although it might be worth paying Robert Massie for the rights to the name "Castles of Steel", or even Andrew Gordon for "Rules of the Game." I haven't read the Hart and Steel volume, but I've long thought that Gordon's Rules of the Game could plausibly serve as the foundation for a film script; the first chapters (about the "Run to the South" between Beatty and Hippers' battlecruisers) just crackle. I also think that the best dramatic choice for any Jutland film would be trying to understand the battle in terms of the tension between Beatty and Jellicoe. Trying to reduce any battle to competition between two men is invariably an injury to history, but the relevant question with regard to historical epics isn't whether history is injured, but rather how badly. Kingsley as Jellicoe would be fine; perhaps Clive Owen as Beatty?

The film may never be made, but what gives me just a touch of hope is the cinematic nature of the Battle of Jutland. I have no doubt whatsoever that modern special effects can do justice to the destruction of HMS Queen Mary, and to the rest of the battle. Moreover, there are some remarkably dramatic moments within the battle, particularly when the entire Grand Fleet, arrayed in three columns, emerges from the mist ahead of the German van, or when Major Francis Harvey, legs blown off by a German shell, saves HMS Lion by ordering the flooding of the Q-turret magazine.

Book Review: Flotilla

I recently finished Donald Shomette's Flotilla: The Patuxent Naval Campaign in the War of 1812. The United States initiated the War of 1812 in response to the activity of the Royal Navy, including the impressment of US sailors and the restriction of US freedom of trade. Territorial aggrandizement was also a goal; although opinions differ on how serious the US was about the annexation of Canada, the elimination of British influence along the frontier was understood as necessary to further US settlement and expansion. In spite of US growth since the Revolution, Great Britain remained militarily dominant by any metric. It was hoped, however, that the British would be too distracted by the war against Napoleon to devote their full attention to North America. Unfortunately for the Americans, the Royal Navy had largely eliminated the French Navy as a major threat, and was able to devote serious attention to the United States from the beginning of the war. The US coastline was virtually unprotected, leaving American vulnerable to trade blockade and to raids. The Royal Navy decided to concentrate its activity in the Chesapeake Bay area, home of the new US capitol and of the major port of Baltimore.

In response to the overwhelming dominance of the Royal Navy, Revolutionary War veteran Joshua Barney proposed to the Secretary of War a new set of tactics. In order to carry out their raiding operations, large, deep draft Royal Navy vessels had to accept some vulnerability, and had to employ launches in order to deliver and recover troops. Barney reasoned that a flotilla of shallow draft barges could sufficiently harass Royal Navy raiding parties to make the operations too costly and dangerous to carry out. Barney received approval from Washington to build a flotilla and recruit a corps of sailors necessary to carry out this effort; for his pains, he was made Commodore of the flotilla. The organization was distinct from the USN, and was viewed with some hostility by military professionals. Nevertheless, it represented the only chance to break the hold of the Royal Navy over the Chesapeake, a hold that was becoming increasingly intolerable as escaped slaves began to flock to the British flag.

Barney was able to put together his flotilla, but he was unable to stop Royal Navy depredation. The British took the flotilla seriously, and treated it as the major threat in the Chesapeake. They responded by bottling the flotilla up and blockading it on the Patuxent River. This utilized some Royal Navy resources, and the Americans were able to score some minor victories, but no major British vessels were lost, and British raiding activity continued. Local militia had no interest in fighting the British, and typically fled at the first shot. Because of the large number of pro-British slaves (male slaves of age were trained to fight, while the rest were freed and sent either to Canada or British Caribbean possessions), the Royal Marines typically had excellent intelligence as to American capabilities and dispositions.

The Chesapeake campaign resulted in an almost complete victory for the Royal Navy. Atlhough the British were unable to secure and burn the city of Baltimore, they managed to burn and loot much of the rest of the region, including the city of Washington. The British looted an enormous quantity of tobacco, ground regional commerce to a halt, and freed a substantial number of American slaves. Barney's flotilla was scuttled to prevent capture, although his men served heroically at the Battle of Bladensburg and at Fort McHenry. British victory depended not only on vast material superiority, but also on exceptional skill on sea and on land. American militia and regular Army were simply inadequate to the task of fighting the battle-hardened British on anything approaching equal circumstances. It didn't help that the very best American forces were deployed to the Canadian border. Moreover, the outcome of the Chesapeake campaign should have been essentially foreseeable to American policymakers. While Americans lacked the capacity to challenge the Royal Navy in anything but single-ship battles, it was obvious that the British would use their superiority at sea to devastate American coastal areas. The presence of the French and Spanish navies had limited the damage during the Revolution, but neither were a factor in the War of 1812. I think it can be plausibly argued that the War of 1812 represents the biggest "mistake war" in American history; regardless of whether sufficient cassus belli existed, the United States was simply not up to the task of launching and winning a war against Great Britain.

The American strategy in the Chesapeake campaign represents the same kind of asymmetric, small boat strategy that gave the USN fits in the first half of this decade. To be sure, the Americans also employed other asymmetric strategies, most notably a commerce raiding campaign that depended both on USN frigates and on privateers. Nevertheless, as the points of comparison between the Royal Navy of 1814 and the USN of 2009 are obvious, it's not surprising that opponents adopt broadly similar methods. The small boat strategy is not, apparently, dependent upon a particular constellation of technologies. Small boats can always provide some threat to large ships in littoral areas, although I think it could be argued that the development of the torpedo increased small boat lethality. German torpedo boats significantly reduced Allied freedom of action off the French coast in World War II, for example. Indeed, there's nothing new about the idea of blowing up a small boat next to a big ship, although the suicide element is reasonably novel. Of course, small boats can and have also been utilized as part of a larger symmetrical strategy of warfare; the USN PT-Boat campaign of World War II caused the Japanese no end of difficulty.

The experience of Barney's flotilla also brings up some interesting issues regarding the behavior of military organizations. Barney was forced to essentially invent the flotilla, without significant support (and indeed against opposition) from the United States Navy. Barney did his own recruiting, designed his own ships, and procured his own artillery, provisions, and ordnance. To be sure, he didn't do this from his own funds; both the US government and the State of Maryland gave him some support. Also, even a regular naval commander of the Napoleonic Era had to play the role of independent contractor on many occasions, as readers of Patrick 'Brian will be well aware. Nevertheless, the organizational environment that he created is quite distinct from that which exists in any modern military organization. I suspect that it would be nearly impossible to create such an organization today in a modern state; the institutional and legal barriers would be insurmountable. The exception that proves the rule might be Iran's Revolutionary Guard, which has managed to create naval forces independent of the main naval organizations of the Islamic Republic. The Revolutionary Guard, however, enjoys a level of political and organizational independence that is extremely rare in a modern state, and that depends on the peculiar institutions of modern Iran.

Barney's task was undoubtedly made easier by the fact that he could draw upon a population that was familiar with the sea and with boats. This substantially increased the recruiting pool, the interest level (people who depended on the sea were particularly vulnerable to the British), and the skill level of the recruits. I found this interesting in that it supported Mahan's contention that one of the pillars of naval power is a population that is familiar with and interested in maritime life. I have always had some doubt that this is the case in the industrial era; I don't, for example, believe that a serving officer born and raised in Nebraska is any less capable than an officer raised in Maryland or Massachusetts. This is because the tasks of modern naval life are sufficiently distant from the tasks of civilian maritime experience to make any initial differences disappear beneath professional military training. I have no doubt, however, that a population oriented around maritime activities was critical to naval power in the Age of Sail and before. I'm also inclined now to think that the success of irregular naval forces (of which Barney's flotilla is an example) is much more sensitive to the maritime capabilities of a given population than is that of a professional naval organization.

It's odd that the small boat strategy always seems somewhat surprising to established navies, especially given the recurrence of such strategies over the years. One reason might be that navies are organizationally inclined to think about threats that are symmetrical. A Mahanian naval stance requires modern shipbuilding capabilities and a long organizational tail. A commerce raiding or cruiser strategy requires much the same thing, if on a different scale. A small boat strategy, however, can be conducted by organizations utterly unlike a modern Navy. In its relatively ad hoc approach to construction, procurement, and recruitment, Barney's flotillas shares some characteristics with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, the pre-independence Israeli naval forces, the Tamil Tigers, and even Al Qaeda. In combination with the above observation regarding the importance of "people of the sea" to irregular naval forces, there's undoubtedly some interesting work to be done regarding the prospects for Al Qaeda penetration into various maritime-oriented tribal networks in SE Asia. I suspect that there are also some interesting observations to be made regarding population, professionalism, and the effectiveness of small boat strategies.

In any case, Flotilla is valuable both to those interested in naval history, and to those focusing on small boat and irregular warfare strategies. I highly recommend it.

Nuclear Deterrence, Except on Weekends

Gordon Brown is using logic on nuclear weapons that I do not understand. Maybe one of you can explain to me how this makes the world safer under any 21st century geopolitical nuclear theory.

The prime minister was to outline plans to cut the number of submarines from four to three at a special session of the U.N Security Council on September 24, his office confirmed.

But Brown added: "We are making no proposals at the moment about warheads."

"If we are serious about the ambition of a nuclear-free world we will need statesmanship, not brinkmanship," Brown was to tell the U.N. General Assembly in his speech, according to comments released by his office.

However, he was also to reaffirm Britain's commitment to maintaining an independent nuclear deterrent.

Unfortunately, our President shares in Gordon Brown's delusion by wasting time and resources discussing this supposed nuclear free world. I think I may disagree with Gordon Brown regarding what statesmanship and brinkmanship is in this situation though, because negotiations with an end of stopping nuclear weapons development by either North Korea or Iran is neither statesmanship or brinkmanship, because neither country is willing to give up the capability.

North Korea has the bomb, and Iran will have the bomb. If Gordon Brown and Barack Obama want to know what is required to stop Iran from getting the bomb, all they need to do is look at how George Bush dealt with Iraq on WMD. Nothing short of that type of effort stops Iran, so if another Gulf War isn't an appealing option, learn to accept the idea of an Iranian bomb. All this political happy talk of "tough/smart/strong/cunning" negotiations is about as intellectually convincing as the militant threat of air attack by Israel. Neither will be successful, unless Israel nukes the Persians.

But here is what I just do not understand. Isn't the entire point of a SSBN to insure that a country cannot be destroyed by nuclear weapons, because the SSBN hidden in the middle of the ocean somewhere can retaliate? If you can't maintain a persistent nuclear deterrent at sea all the time, then what exactly is the point? Does Gordon Brown believe that wars start with a phone call from the other guy saying "here we come?" Has any country that is not a democracy ever told another country they intend to attack?

Only Gordon Brown has the strategic vision to believe the nine-to-five working schedule applies to nuclear deterrence. The only way a SSBN is a successful capability is if it is always deployed, and never used. If a country can't meet those two criteria, then you don't have an actual strategy for SSBNs. I've read this argument, and I'm missing the compelling logic that explains how Britain can reduce the number of SSBNs and that will prompt others to follow their lead in reducing nuclear weapons globally.

If the Royal Navy can't build 4 SSBNs, they should build none. The Royal Navy needs a strategy where they can point to something and say "we do that great." Right now the Royal Navy points to their force and says "Can barely do everything but can do nothing well." Time for a new strategic plan if you ask me.

Just thinking out loud here, but the Royal Navy should look at all the low intensity 10% budget solutions the US Navy has been looking at. There are all of these amazing ideas, creative ideas on a low budget for expanding fleet numbers and building robust networks of green water naval forces that the US Navy rejects in favor of risk reduction.

The Royal Navy on the other hand is at the point where even the smallest stuff carries a huge risk, so why not take a risk on something intentionally? I note that taking risks with unconventional, unpredictable approaches is what China is doing, while the US Navy makes conventional, predictable decisions every time.

Future Surface Combatant at DSEi 2009

The Royal Navy is beginning to discuss their Future Surface Combatant. Janes covered the emerging ideas at DSEi 2009. The model in the picture is the BVT, described by Janes here.

A model unveiled at the show by BVT Surface Fleet has provided an initial indication of the key characteristics of the C1 variant of the Future Surface Combatant (FSC), intended to begin replacing the RN’s current Type 22 Batch 3 and Type 23 frigates from around 2020. And while officials caution that the model represents only an “early visualisation” of the C1 design concept, it nevertheless highlights some of the key attributes of flexibility, modularity and open architecture desired by the FSC programme.

Initial concept design work for the C1 variant of FSC has been completed by the Naval Design Partnership (NDP), a ‘rainbow’ team of naval architects and engineering specialists bringing together Ministry of Defence personnel and industry resource drawn from BVT Surface Fleet, Babcock Marine, BAE Systems, QinetiQ and Thales. The result is a baseline monohull platform, displacing in the region of 6,000 tonnes, equipped for anti-submarine warfare, naval fires, special forces support and possibly precision land attack.

Then Janes discusses this.

One novel characteristic of the model displayed at DSEi is the stern ramp and aft payload bay area. This concept of a mission bay is intended to afford the ship the flexibility to embark different payloads, such as a towed array sonar, torpedo countermeasures, special forces boats or unmanned vehicles.

There are obviously differences in what the Royal Navy needs and the US Navy needs, but it is worth noting the trend here. The Littoral Combat Ship is essentially an all out effort to maximize flexibility for various deployable payloads, where the Royal Navy needs a Type 23 replacement, a warship capable of independent operations to be the fleets workhorse. For the US Navy, the DDG-51 handles this role, but emerging European designs including FREMM and now the FSC for the Royal Navy are attempting to add partial capability for deployable payloads.

This is why when I look at the LCS, I believe the US Navy has the concept exactly right. Every Navy in the world wants the capability of unmanned vehicles for their fleet forces, but no other Navy can afford to do it in the quantity the US Navy is attempting to do. With that said, it is yet to be determined if either LCS design will be sufficient to effectively bring unmanned technologies for integration with fleet forces. The logistics issue specifically comes to mind, although there are several question regarding the US Navy approach towards unmanned system deployment.

The Royal Navy is already hinting the next round of defense reviews will likely result in even more cuts, which suggests the fleet will potentially fall below 20 surface combatants. This hybrid design example by BVT is about the best the Royal Navy can hope for in efforts moving towards unmanned technology at sea while sustaining a surface combatant force of 20 ships. We will see, this ship is suggested to cost £400 = US$660m, but Royal Navy cost estimates are about as reliable as US Navy cost estimates. I have huge doubts a 150 meter, 6000 ton steel ship will cost less than $1 billion, and I see 0% chance of the US Navy ever building a 6000 ton ship without wanting AEGIS (in other words, only as a competitor to existing DDG-51s).

More on FSC here (PDF).

Future Royal Navy Boomer in Trouble

This is interesting:

The Ministry of Defence has also ruled out cancelling the replacement for the Trident nuclear weapons system, although there have been suggestions it could be scaled back from four submarines to three, he adds.

The campaign group Greenpeace has said in a report scrapping Trident would save £34bn - the government estimates that replacing the submarines and warheads would cost £15bn - £20bn.

I'm wondering whether this backhanded vote of confidence in the Trident replacement program doesn't sound the death knell of the UK's sea based deterrent. I suppose it's possible to run a full deterrent patrol with only three boomers, but it wouldn't be easy, and would lead to enormous wear on both crew and equipment. I wouldn't be surprised if the replacement program goes down something like this: An official determination is made that the Royal Navy can get by on three SSBNs, followed in a couple years by a determination that three boats can't do the job, followed by the termination of the program.

More details on the difference between the Greenpeace estimate and the government cost estimate can be found here. You may be inclined not to trust Greenpeace on this point, but you should also be very reluctant to accept the numbers set forth by Her Majesty's government, which has a strong incentive to deceive...

Royal Navy's New SOF Speedboat

The Telegraph is discussing the XSR, a new small boat for Royal Navy SOF.

The British-designed vessel travels at almost 100mph, carries a retractable heavy machine gun and would not look out of place in a 007 film.

With a maximum speed of 85 knots (97mph) and carrying a .50 calibre machine gun hidden under the deck, the boat will be able to overhaul “go-fast” drug smuggling boats in the Caribbean and pirate ships off the coast of Somalia.

The vessel is part of a raft of new equipment being shown for the first time at the Defence and Security Exhibition in London.

Hailed as the world’s “most advanced performance and pursuit” vessel the XSR will allow navies to deploy special forces on enemy shores, anti-piracy and smuggling patrols, protecting oil platforms and to intercept unidentified vessels in potential terror attacks.

When the XSR comes within range of an enemy ship the machine gun emerges from the forward hull and is trained on the target using a remote controlled system from the cockpit.

The article goes on to note the cost of around $2.5 million, or £1.5 million. It also notes a larger version that comes with "four bunks, can carry up to 12 additional passengers and has a range of 1,000 nautical miles." That would be impressive.

It is somewhat frustrating to be honest. The US Navy is going to stand up a new Riverine squadron and reuse armored RHIBs, and here we have the British building very impressive small boats that do things like go 100 mph and have endurance up to 1000nm.

I say this because 100mph could be useful in brown water, but something if that fast hits the wrong wave in green water, it will do more than make a splash.

Post-Victory Posturing

Jerry Jones has a very interesting article in the Spring 2009 NWCR on the course of post-World War I naval negotiations between the United Kingdom and the United States. The RN and the USN emerged, with the internment of the German High Seas Fleet, as the two most powerful navies in the world. Dreadnoughts remained the most important currency of naval power, although the submarine had announced its presence with authority in the latter half of the war. The sticking points of the negotiations were the balance of power between the USN and the RN, and the disposition of the German High Seas Fleet. Wilson was initially in favor of returning some portion of the High Seas Fleet to Germany, in order to provide a counter to the Royal Navy. The British wanted the High Seas Fleet destroyed, while the French and others were in favor of distributing the German fleet (and the Austrian) among the Allied belligerents. These positions were essentially consistent with the war aims of the US and the UK; the United States favored the quick rehabilitation of a democratic Germany, while the UK (and France) favored the semi-permanent hobbling of German military power. The scuttling of the German fleet at Scapa Flow rendered the question largely moot, although a few German battleships survived.

Jones focuses on the posturing between the US and the UK over naval construction during the early part of negotiation. Having just fought and won a war against Germany in order to prevent naval parity, the British were unhappy to simply give it up to the United States. The United States remained displeased by the UK's wartime embargo against Germany, a wished in the future to have the capacity to force such a blockade. In spite of his idealistic vision of post-war international politics, Wilson was not immune to balance of power considerations. Although the United Kingdom's violation of US freedom of the seas wasn't as violent or egregious as the German, it still remained a difficult pill for the US to swallow. The notion of war, or even vigorous armed competition, between the US and the UK was not as absurd as it appears through hindsight; this was well before belief in the relevance of the Democratic Peace had taken hold. Both Britain and the US understood war to be a possibility, if not in the sense that it was immediately likely.

In my own research, I discovered several instances of USN admirals expressing concern over the idea of dispatching battleships to assist the Grand Fleet following US entry into WWI. At least one admiral argued that the Royal Navy would attempt to contrive some sort of confrontation between the USN and the High Seas Fleet, leaving the former in a weakened post-war state. It turned out, of course, that the battleships of the USN were largely irrelevant to the outcome of WWI, but that its destroyers would make a significant contribution to the First Battle of the Atlantic. The USN would eventually deploy a squadron of older coal-firing dreadnoughts to the Grand Fleet, as concerns about a lack of fuel oil prevented the dispatch of the USN's most modern units. I'm forced to wonder, however, whether anyone in the USN believed that USS Delaware was expendable, while USS Pennsylvania was not...

In any case, Jones draws several lessons from the episode, the most interesting of which is that diplomacy, naval power, and collective security are tightly tied together. Reaching a mutually agreeable settlement regarding the eventual balance between the United States and the United Kingdom was critical to efforts to create and maintain a viable post-war balance; uncontrolled competition between the two (and Japan) would, in all likelihood, have led to a much quicker degeneration of the post-war status quo, and might have created serious difficulties down the road for US-UK collaboration. As it was, the RN and the USN resented each other bitterly into the late 1930s, to the extent that political authorities had to pull teeth in order to create officer exchange and liaison programs. These difficulties slowed the development of ASW expertise in the USN. The situation might have been much worse if the RN and the USN had continued to take War Plan Red seriously. While the US almost certainly could have "won" a naval race with the UK in the 1920s, our overall security would have suffered, just as Germany was, on balance, weakened by its pre-war efforts to match the RN. In terms of modern naval construction, I think that the lesson would be that procurement cannot be conceived of separately from grand political strategy, alliances, and strategic doctrine. A robust conception of national security is required in order to provide a logic for naval procurement; the former should precede the latter, although in practice strategy is often forces to accomodate itself to force structure, rather than the other way around.

Another CVF Change of Plan Rumor

As if the CVF wasn't controversial enough due to cost, it looks like a major design decision is being made regarding the CVF almost certain to raise the cost considerably more, not to mention substantially influence the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program. While the US is looking to scrap the F-22 and move up the schedule for the F-35B for the Marines, the Royal Navy may be moving from the F-35 VSTOL version of the Joint Strike Fighter to the catapult variant known as the F-35C.

In a significant about turn the MoD has indicated that it will ditch the jump-jet version of Joint Strike Fighter in favour of the conventional model, as the planes for its two new aircraft carriers.

The Daily Telegraph has learnt from senior defence officials that an announcement will be made this autumn.

The move, welcomed by many defence analysts and the Royal Navy, will mean that the MoD has wasted £500 million of taxpayers' money paid to Rolls Royce to develop the highly complex engine to allow vertical take-off similar to the Harrier jump jet.

Ahh we get to the heart of global politics of defense alliances in a nutshell. Every year for several years President Bush unsuccessfully tried to cancel the second engine, the Rolls Royce alternative, for the F-35. Every year Congress came through and funded the engine. President Obama is on the verge of potentially finally not funding the alternative Rolls Royce engine, and because of this, the MoD has no intention at all to pay for the alternative engine itself, thus has more flexibility to make decisions regarding the CVF.

But if the Queen Elizabeth class is going to use catapults, what does that mean? Well, it sounds like EMALS may be an option.

The decision also comes with some risk as the Navy will be reliant on the Americans developing a new electro-magnetic catapult to launch the fighters off the carrier.

"This is a real risk because the new catapult design is a major undertaking. It is not just a widget," said a defence aviation source. "If it breaks then the planes can't fly and the carrier is useless.

"Also the UK has no serving experts in this area of carrier flying so it's a real step in the dark."

In an official statement the MoD said: “To maximise the flexibility that the carriers will offer over their service life, they are being built to an adaptable design that can operate both Short Take Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) and Carrier Variant (CV) type aircraft.”

It added that the STOVL or “B” variant of the JSF remains “our prefered solution”.

It is very difficult to tell what is happening with the MoD in this decision, because other than assuming the MoD will choose the least expensive option (cost vs capability, MoD chooses less money every time), I am not sure which option is the least expensive option.

As things stand right now, the British are looking to buy 150 F-35Bs, but just changing those into F-35Cs would produce a savings of over $3.7 billion US based on estimates of the F-35B costing £105 million and the F-35C costing £90 million. Then there is the suggestion that if the CVF has F-35Cs the greater range and payload will allow the British to buy fewer than 150 Joint Strike Fighters, further increasing the savings. Clearly some of the money would then be spent adding EMALS to the CVF design, but this plan still produces a clear savings when viewed only from a hardware perspective.

In the end though, I don't think this is going to save any money at all, in fact I would suggest this ends up costing the British a lot more money than they anticipate. First, the British haven't built an aircraft carrier able to catapult aircraft off the deck in 50 years, when HMS Hermes (now known as INS Viraat) was completed. Second, EMALS is hardly a foregone conclusion, that program has a huge cloud of unanswered questions right now. Third, the human factor of training and experience is not insignificant, indeed building up the training and skill sets needed for conventional air operations off an aircraft carriers for two aircraft carriers is a lot easier said than done. Finally, it is never a good idea to change the designs once construction already begins.

I do not think it is difficult to see why the MoD might be making this decision though. In virtually every discussion one of the primary factors driving aircraft carriers as power projection platforms is the ability to operate aircraft at very long range, and that ultimately leads down the road towards long range unmanned combat aircraft systems, all of which will almost certainly be conventionally launched from aircraft carriers throughout the lifetime of the CVF.

This is an important point, and may be what is driving the MoD decision process here. The CVF will almost be obsolete by the time it is launched in the middle of next decade in its expected role as a power projection platform against a peer competitor unless it has conventional launch capabilities. I am a huge fan of amphibious ships like the LHA and LHD, but VSTOL has shorter range and without catapults will not be able to launch the much needed long range unmanned aircraft systems that is needed to allow aircraft carriers to stay well off shore for operations.

In other words, in the 21st century defensive trends suggest Short Take-Off Vertical Landing (STOVL) is an expeditionary capability while Catapult Assisted Take-Off But Arrested Recovery (CATOBAR) is a power projection capability, and it is determined this way primarily due to the range and payload capacity of the aircraft that are launched via those methods. I think someone in the MoD has finally realized that the enormous investment the CVF represents simply makes no sense whatsoever without a Catapult Assisted Take-Off But Arrested Recovery (CATOBAR), because investing that much money into just two aircraft carriers that cannot be power projection capable vessels against potential peers is a terrible idea.

As this is a rumor, albeit a well reported rumor, it will be something to keep an eye on. In the end, probably a smart decision, although the smartest decision would probably be for the MoD to buy 0 CVFs and build a surface combatant and nuclear submarine fleet big enough to protect the interests of Great Britain. That is probably asking too much though.

Coulda - Shoulda - Woulda - Didn't

A Type 45 article worth reading in full. Love the ending...

Future Surface Combatants: A Royal Navy View

A new article was released by the Royal United Services Institute on Thursday titled FUTURE SURFACE COMBATANTS: A Military and Industrial Challenge By Commodore Steve Brunton.

I found it an interesting read on the Royal Navy struggling with challenges that sound very familiar. This is the forward:

Appointed as Director Equipment Capability (Above Water Effect) (DEC AWE) in July 2007, Steve Brunton is the UK MoD’s Director responsible for complex warships and their associated systems. At the RUSI Maritime Conference in June 2008, he set out the future challenge of delivering and sustaining the Future Surface Combatants for the Royal Navy. This article brings his presentation up-to-date and sets out the challenges for the UK MoD, Royal Navy and industry in delivering this essential capability.

Read the article from the link provided here.

News Analysis of the SSBN Collision

This article has been recommended by several experts as the best English analysis to date regarding the SSBN collision. Some key points in the article:

They avoid using active or ' pinging ' sonar to find other objects, as it would give away their own position. The sophisticated passive sonar systems - listening for sounds from another vessel - would be switched on. But as both subs move astonishingly quietly, they were able to blunder into each other without either spotting the other.

and

U.S. vessels are just as quiet as Britain ' s but the countries exchange information on where their submarines are patrolling.

There is no information-sharing deal with France , it is understood.

and

He said while Nato countries let each other know what general area of the Atlantic they are operating in, neither submarine would have had a precise position for the other. Saunders said submarines don ' t always turn on their radar systems or make their presence obvious to other shipping. '

The whole point is to go and hide in a big chunk of ocean and not be found. They tend to go around very slowly and not make much noise, ' he said.

and

In submarine warfare hiding means being quiet - too quiet for an enemy sonar system to hear and pinpoint you.

Both the British and French missile submarines are extraordinarily quiet, while their own sonar systems are designed to ' hear ' the slightest sound from an enemy ship.

and finally...

Both were listening hard for any other ships or objects to avoid, but each submarine was so quiet that the other was unable to hear it.

Only Britain , France and America are thought to operate such sophisticated and silent vessels. Russian boats are noisy by comparison.

But whereas British and American submariners routinely inform each other of roughly where their missile submarines are patrolling, to prevent just this kind of freak accident, it is understood there is no similar arrangement with the French.

As the French Navy generally has only one missile submarine on patrol at any one time, the British submarine had the remarkable misfortune to collide with the only vessel in the world which it is unable to detect, and knew nothing about.

Emphasis mine. That last sentence is based on the assumption that Russian and Chinese submarines are louder, but in the future as their underwater technology improves and matures, this will not always be the case. At some point it is going to become a priority to develop a technology other than sonar to increase the capabilities of detecting very quiet submarines underwater.

Expect the conversations regarding strategic patrols between the US, UK, and France to increase as a result of this accident.

Also, check out Peter Hitchens blog entry regarding the incident.

Ballistic Missile Submarines In Deep Underwater Collision - Updated/Bumped

It is hard to calculate the odds of a deep underwater collision between two nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines, but on the night of Feb. 3rd or 4th the unthinkable occurred. On Monday, as I noted on Twitter the French SSBN Le Triomphant (S 616) was returning home in the mid-Atlantic from a deployment when she reportedly hit an 'object, which was most likely a container' resulting in severe damage to the sonar dome of the submarine. Today we are learning that object was actually a container for the strategic nuclear deterrent of Great Britain, also known as HMS Vanguard (S28). From the Daily Mail.

French Navy sources confirm that Le Triomphant, one of four strategic nuclear submarines of the ‘Force de Frappe’ (Strike Force), was returning from a 70-day tour of duty when it collided with HMS Vanguard.

During heavy seas in the middle of the night between February 3 and 4, French sailors heard a loud ‘bang’ that all but destroyed the submarine's sonar dome.

This part of the boat should have detected the Vanguard in the first place, but Le Triomphant’s crew of 101 neither saw or heard anything before the collision.

According to reporting of both The Sun and Daily Mirror, both submarines had to be towed to port and both had visible damage from the collision. Both are lead ships of their respective countries ballistic missile submarine class. It is hard to calculate the odds of two submarines running silent at the same depth in the same part of the Atlantic Ocean and neither submarine detecting the other prior to collision. It is also particularly disturbing that the French Le Triomphant (S 616) was hit on the sonar dome and had no warning prior to collision.

Western nations have spent a fortune to upkeep strategic nuclear deterrence underwater for decades, and part of that investment has to make ballistic missile submarines very difficult to detect by passive sonar. Apparently, mission accomplished. HMS Vanguard (S28) displaces over 15,680 tons and Le Triomphant (S 616) displaces around 14,335 tons; these are gigantic submarines making any collision deep underwater very dangerous.

It is a real credit to how much attention to detail goes into the safety and survivability of nuclear submarines that all of the damage reported from both nations appears to be specific to the hull and external systems. There are no reports of damage to the ballistic missiles on either submarines, nor any leak from either nuclear reactor that powers either submarine.

Updated: I expect the details of the first reports to be inaccurate, for example, the French are not confirming anything happened, but are confirming a frigate escorted (not towed) the submarine back to port, while the Royal Navy is also claiming the submarine was not towed.

For the truth regarding the details of the accident, we will have to wait, and may not ever get the whole story. Given how odd the story was Monday regarding the Le Triomphant (S 616) crashing into an underwater container in the middle of the Atlantic, and that we are hearing official word about damage to HMS Vanguard (S28), I do believe the collision did occur. There has to be a story regarding how the Le Triomphant (S 616) hit the other submarine with its sonar and never detected it. That is very odd.

HMS Daring Live Blogging

The News in Portsmouth is live blogging HMS Daring including some commentary, videos, and imagery. Pretty interesting stuff.

Something else caught my eye regarding the Royal Navy. Check out the TAURUS 2009 deployment. The Royal Navy has assembled an international expeditionary strike group.

HMS Bulwark (L15)
HMS Ocean (L12)
HMS Argyll (F231)
HMS Somerset (F82)
USS Mitscher (DDG 57)
FS Dupleix (D 641)
RFA Mounts Bay (L3008)
RFA Lyme Bay (L3007)
RFA Wave Ruler (A390)
RFA Fort Austin (A386)

There will also be 2 unnamed Trafalgar Class submarines part of the group. The deployment will begin in February and end in August with the strike group traveling all the way to Singapore before turning around.

New Royal Marines Offshore Raiding Craft

Defense Professionals a story today about the Royal Navy's armored RHIB. It goes back to the discussions we have had lately about protection vs speed. I think the Royal Navy understands that low intensity peacemaking activities like fighting pirates and inspecting tankers in the Northern Persian Gulf requires more armor, protection, and survivability than the weapons used to sink someone elses Navy. I agree with this approach.

Royal Marines from 539 Assault Squadron put on a display of their latest up-armoured and up-gunned Offshore Raiding Craft in the choppy waters of Plymouth Sound yesterday, Thursday 22 January 2009.

The Marines, whose traditional role has always been to maintain law and order on the high seas, put the new mid-console variant of their Raiding Craft, known as the 'racing car' of the amphibious fleet, through its paces at speeds of more than 20 knots.

The Royal Navy has a large amphibious fleet and the Raiding Craft represent the smallest and most manoeuvrable elements of this fleet. Their role is to allow Royal Marines from the fleet to close with the enemy either at sea or on land. With the latest upsurge in piracy this role could not be more pertinent.

But protection is just as important to maritime equipment as it is to equipment used in the land environment, especially when undertaking dangerous engagements such as intercepting potential pirates. And the new craft have been designed following experiences in southern Iraq, when Marines came under attack from local insurgents, with improved armour and more firepower added.

The story goes on and covers just about every angle. Interesting approach.