Expanding A2/AD: Is it Time to Start Worrying about the Eastern Mediterranean?

Note from Jon Solomon: My Systems Planning and Analysis colleague Jonathan Altman has long been interested in the Mahanian aspects of Russia’s foreign policy initiatives in the Eastern Mediterranean. Overshadowed by the ongoing Russian ground intervention in Ukraine or the headline-grabbing bomber sorties into the North Atlantic and Arctic, Russia’s cultivation of “places” and potential bases for its forces in that region over the past few years simply has not received much public attention from the security studies community. This needs to change, as the Mediterranean not only remains central to U.S. and European defense strategies, but is also a vital market as well as thoroughfare for Western economies. Jonathan has generously taken the time to outline his thoughts below on this overlooked topic.

Much has been written about the challenges posed by the Chinese adoption of what the U.S. military calls “A2/AD” (anti access area denial) in the Western Pacific. Accordingly, the Pacific remains a key focus area for both the U.S. Navy and Air Force, with the Navy promising to put 60% of its forces in that theater as part of the so-called “Pacific pivot.” Yet as focus remains on PACOM, the rest of the world is not standing still. This is exemplified in the Eastern Mediterranean, as the Russians have already begun laying the seeds to create an A2/AD zone in the region against the U.S. and its allies. If fully realized, an A2/AD envelope could put Western access to the Suez Canal, the Black Sea and the resource-rich Eastern Mediterranean at the mercy of Vladimir Putin.

There are three interrelated elements that make the development of an A2/AD zone in the Eastern Mediterranean possible for the Russians. The first of these is the prospect of a credible military presence, which in this case would most likely be provided by forward deployments from the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Armed with three (six by 2016) new enhanced Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines, 11,000 marines and a surface flotilla of 42 ships[1] as of last year, the Russian Black Sea Fleet is probably the most capable maritime force in the region. By contrast, the U.S. Sixth Fleet has a single command ship and four DDGs that will be permanently assigned to it from 2015 onward (though those DDGs are based on the other end of the Mediterranean in Spain), with only occasional rotational presence from ships passing through its area of regard on the way to or back from the Middle East. Though the U.S. does have allies in the region with credible maritime combat power, the Russians are working to drive wedges into these relationships; which not coincidentally is the second pillar of regional Russian strategy.

The Russian effort to decouple longstanding allies such as Turkey, Greece, and Egypt from political and military alignment with the U.S. is helped by policy choices the U.S. has made, as well as favorable circumstances the Russians can exploit. In the case of Greece, the formation of a coalition government by far-left and right wing parties that are deeply resentful of the European Union (and its American allies), committed to breaking out of the fiscal austerity “straitjacket” imposed as terms for European Union loans, and ideologically aligned with Russian “Eurasianist” geopolitical theory has opened new opportunities for extending Russian influence. The Russians have waded into this fray, supporting the Greek government politically and entertaining the possibility of assisting Greece with its debt issues. Greco-Russian relations have unsurprisingly warmed considerably. In the case of Turkey, Russia has taken advantage of a decade-long trend by the Erdogan government away from democracy toward authoritarianism. As the West has criticized Erdogan for imprisoning journalists, fabricating charges against political opponents, and repressing civil dissent, the Russians have remained supportive to the point that Erdogan is now praising Putin directly. The other Russian charm offensive in the region has been focused on Egypt. Faced with a virulent insurgency in the Sinai, and a U.S. Administration that until recently was withholding military aid as punishment for the suspension of democracy, Egypt's repressive military junta has instead turned towards the Russians for military equipment procurement for the first time since the mid-Cold War. The sum total of these actions is to cultivate Russian goodwill with three countries that control chokepoint access to and freedom of maneuver within the Eastern Mediterranean, not to mention use of the Eastern Mediterranean to access the Black and Red Seas. Neutrality by these countries in the event of a Russian-American crisis or conflict could be devastating to U.S. strategy.

With access for their credible maritime combat power vastly improved, the final aspect of Russian regional strategy is to secure and expand basing agreements. Limited by geography, the Russians have no port on the Mediterranean; anything they want to put in the region would likely come via the Black Sea (though assets could be deployed from there other fleets as well assuming they could pass through Gibraltar or Suez). Even though Turkey may be friendly with Russia now, basing agreements hedge against a risk of change in the political winds that could bottle the Black Sea Fleet up. Additionally, as Admiral Greenert states again and again, forward basing allows a Navy to keep more assets in theater, multiplying the impact of a smaller force. Russia's only base outside of the former Soviet Union is in Tartus, Syria, which of course is in the Eastern Mediterranean. Recently the Cypriots, long prone to Russian sympathies, agreed to an expansion of Russian port calls and even potentially an air base, giving the Russians an additional strategic location to use in the region. Current deployment of land based Russian-supplied Yakhont anti-ship cruise missiles in Syria provides an additional boon to the area denial aspect of their approach, which could be augmented by further sales or deployments of Russian forces equipped with ASCMs to friendly countries.

According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, the presence of Yakhont ASCMs in Syria alone has been enough to create a surface naval A2/AD zone in the northeastern corner of the Mediterranean. Furthermore, rolling the three Russian thrusts together, it becomes clear how an expanded Eastern Mediterranean A2/AD envelope could be enacted in the very near future. As Mahan famously wrote, the land features of a region can play a large role in determining maritime influence and access. For example, consider the military implications of a Russian deployment of advanced long-range SAMs alongside its existing Yakhonts in Syria, or perhaps a deployment of those SAMs in notional locations in Cyprus. Much has been written about the capabilities of Russian “triple digit” SAMs (in service S-300s and S-400s and the developmental S-500). S-500s will have up to a 600 km anti-air range according to some Russian sources - enough to blanket the region from Crete east assuming they are based in Cyprus (the same sources cite S-400 range at 400km and newer S-300 variants at a more modest 200km). The Russians may also seek to adapt these systems to enable integration aboard surface ships beyond the existing S-300F integration in Russian cruisers; further increasing deployment flexibility. A Russian deployment of Kilo-class submarines to the region would insert a further threat into the undersea domain at a time when more advanced but already overtasked U.S. nuclear submarines continue to decline in force structure. The degree to which U.S. and allied surface and air access in the Eastern Mediterranean would be imperiled by any single one of these potentialities, and especially by combinations of them, should be clear.

Fortunately there are options available to mitigate the risks of such an outcome. Beyond political, economic and diplomatic solutions, of which there are a great many possibilities, there are three broad Navy-focused options that could be pursued. The first of these, and the least desirable, would be transferring forces from other theaters to increase our capability in the Eastern Mediterranean. The issues in the Eastern Mediterranean are fundamentally a symptom of a U.S. Navy that is undersized for the global tasks assigned it and a NATO maritime force that no longer provides sufficient deterrent effect. To redeploy existing U.S. forces to the Mediterranean would simply exacerbate these symptoms in another part of the world. The second option, which is from a navalist's perspective the most desirable but simultaneously the most politically challenging, is to grow the size of the U.S. Navy. During the Cold War, carrier and amphibious group deployments to the Eastern Mediterranean were routine and kept the Soviet fleet in check. By contrast, the Navy’s current supply of day to day deterrence through credible combat power and presence is far outstripped by demand the world over.

Acknowledging this issue, and taking the fiscal policy conflict between Congress and the Administration into account, reinvigorating NATO Standing Maritime Groups may be the quickest and most feasible way to push back on the Russian A2/AD threat. Currently NATO operates two Standing Maritime Groups, though between them both only seven ships are combatants (and three of those were recently augmented above normal force structure). Given that no allied submarines and only a handful of helicopters exist within both combined groups, this force is highly vulnerable to Russian submarine attack or coercion. This could be addressed by augmenting the standing group assigned to the Mediterranean with allied undersea forces. Furthermore, with the allocation of dedicated land-based air power and additional surface combatants, NATO maritime forces’ credibility in the region would be greatly increased. To be maximally effective, this Standing Group should field electronic warfare capabilities and be trained to employ counter-surveillance techniques that can together defeat the over-the-horizon targeting systems supporting the Syria-based Yakhonts. Additionally, Standing Groups have the deterrent benefit of tying nations together as an attack on the group would affect at least a half-dozen different countries. To add further effect, NATO leadership should work to ensure Greek and Turkish participation (though perhaps not concurrently for historical reasons) in the Mediterranean Standing Group and cycle it through the Eastern Mediterranean regularly.

Whatever course of action the U.S. and NATO ultimately pursue, it is important for policymakers and strategists alike to recognize the gross implications of a Russian A2/AD envelope in the Eastern Mediterranean. Such an envelope would present grave challenges to U.S. influence in the region, and would imperil the free flow of commerce that is essential to U.S. (and global) prosperity.

Jonathan Altman is a Program Analyst with Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc. who holds a Master’s Degree in International Security from the Korbel School at the University of Denver. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis Inc., and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.

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[1] Though not all of these ships can be assumed to be self-deployable. Counting only principal combatants and amphibious ships, the Black Sea Fleet has 14 self-deployable ships; though it should be assumed that any deployment of these ships would be accompanied by some number of smaller combatants (missile boats or patrol craft), of which the Black Sea Fleet has 19.

Conventional Deterrence by Denial and the Baltics

RAND’s Terrence Kelly published an excellent opinion piece at U.S. News & World Report last month outlining analysis-derived requirements for a NATO conventional deterrent in the Baltics:

Unclassified RAND war games indicate that Russian forces could overrun local defenders and the light U.S. and NATO units currently able to respond within as few as two days. While the capitals and a small number of key points could be held for some time, Russian forces could seal the border between Lithuania and Poland, prevent reinforcement by sea, and confront NATO with a fait accompli.

Once secured, these territorial gains would be defended by heavy ground forces occupying the conquered states, along with very capable Russian anti-air and anti-ship defenses on Russian territory. Any serious attempt to liberate Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would entail attacks to suppress these systems.

If a Russian invasion of the Baltic states could not be deterred or defeated, the North Atlantic Council and the U.S. president would be faced with a very unpleasant choice: conduct a costly counteroffensive and risk nuclear escalation, or abandon the Baltics to renewed subservience to Moscow. Such a catastrophic failure to uphold the mutual defense responsibilities of NATO could cripple or even destroy the North Atlantic alliance, one of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s primary goals. It is therefore of paramount importance to deter Russian aggression before it happens.

Unless one is sure that Putin’s Russia would not take these steps - a dangerous gamble, given Moscow’s recent track record - the United States and its NATO allies need to be able to deter, and if need be defeat, Russian aggression in the Baltics.

Kelly suggests that the standing peacetime deployment of one armored BCT in each of the Baltic states, supporting (but undefined) tactical air forces, and Division and Corps-level Headquarters to exercise unitary command and control over this combined arms forward defense would be sufficient to prevent Russia from achieving a limited but decisive territorial fait accompli. Based on this force’s size, it would do this presumably through delay and disruption. The U.S. Army arguably does not possess enough armored BCTs to carry the entire weight of this presence, though, while simultaneously meeting its other global contingency readiness commitments. As a result, the BCTs would likely have to be composed of forces contributed by multiple NATO countries. This underscores the importance of a unitary NATO approach to exercising command and control over this frontline deterrent.

Kelly does not comment on the degree to which existing NATO air forces deployed in Central and Eastern Europe might require permanent peacetime augmentation (presumably using U.S.-based squadrons). He does note that rolling back a Russian onslaught would require surge reinforcements, and given the state of European NATO members’ ground and air forces it’s hard to escape the conclusion those reinforcements would largely need to come from the U.S. This begs the question of how a modern analogue to REFORGER would be conducted. This would hardly be a small endeavor; even more so if debarkation air and sea ports or cross-continent supply lines came under fire from Russian long-range conventional strike weaponry.

He next details the tradeoffs between deterrent force positioning and posturing options. One path would be to warehouse heavy equipment in the Baltics, with crews flown in from the U.S. and other NATO allies to deploy this gear in the field in the event of a crisis. Such an approach might be rationalized as a signal of ‘flag-planting reassurance’ to the Baltic allies that is ‘less provocative’ to Russia than a standing manned heavy deterrent. Kelly correctly points out that the likelihood of dispatching crews to these stockpiles in time to mount an effective defense would depend almost entirely on detecting, correctly interpreting, and rapidly acting upon warnings of war—a sequence of events for which history and human psychology suggest there is little cause to be optimistic. He also correctly observes that these concentrated stockpiles would be highly vulnerable to Russian conventional first strikes, and by implication would be crisis-destabilizing.

Kelly follows by noting that standing ground forces based in (as well as equipment prepositioned in) Central Europe would be comparatively less exposed to the first strike threat, but would face the risk of not being able to deploy eastward fast enough to thwart a fait accompli thrust. This would effectively foreclose NATO options to pursue a defensive strategy of delay/disruption, never mind assured defense. Hence, Kelly concludes that a standing heavy presence in the Baltics—or in Poland at minimum—makes for the only credible ground force positioning and posture for deterrence by denial.

There is no doubt in my mind that some heavy ground forces contributed by NATO’s principal members would need to be positioned in the Baltic states in order to latently back constabulary forces responding to ‘plausibly-deniable’ offensive operations by Russian special forces or ‘civilian’ proxies. In the event of a conventional Russian ground offensive, these forces would be central to arresting the thrust’s progress while simultaneously incurring the commitment tripwire effect. Beyond that, it is reasonable to investigate options for splitting a standing deterrent’s positions between the Baltics and Poland in ways that increase their maneuver space as well as survivability against a first strike.

There is a broader deterrent-designing challenge, however, in that Russia could hypothetically escalate horizontally via offensive operations against other European regions in order to prevent NATO from concentrating combat power in Poland and the Baltics. While any such ground offensives would likely be fairly limited in scope, they would nevertheless hardly be inconsequential from the victims’ standpoint. Recent research published by the Royal United Services Institute’s Igor Sutyagin suggests much of the combat-ready Russian Army is tied down supporting operations in Ukraine, though. If Sutyagin’s analysis is accurate, and assuming Russian forces are not disengaged from the Ukrainian conflict anytime soon, then it seems Russia would be hard-pressed over the near-term to field enough combat-ready ground forces for major protracted anti-NATO offensives. This amplifies the potential credibility of delay/disruption-centric forward deterrents in the Putin regime's eyes, as it would heighten the likelihood of a protracted and risk-laden clash with NATO. These deterrent forces would certainly help backstop the 'first responder' constabulary forces needed to prevent 'non-linear war' fait accomplis.

Russia might have comparatively greater horizontal escalation flexibility in the aerospace and maritime domains. For example, Russia might conduct air and missile strikes or sea denial operations against NATO’s Black Sea members. Or perhaps Russia might conduct air and missile strikes, localized sea denial operations, small-scale amphibious assaults, or small-scale overland incursions against Norway or non-NATO Scandinavia. Some localized use of submarines or missile-carrying aircraft against NATO’s trans-oceanic and intra-theater sea lanes might also be possible. Depending on the strategic circumstances, Russia might even escalate both horizontally and vertically via long-range conventional aerospace strikes against Western European or North American NATO members. And of course, the possibility of Russian brandishing or use of theater nuclear weapons must be considered.

A fuller picture of a European conventional deterrent therefore ought to outline what kinds of tactical air forces are necessary to support ground forces, where those air forces should be positioned, what kinds of specialized aircraft (examples: AEW, JSTARS, electronic warfare aircraft, long-range bombers, tankers, etc.) would be necessary to support tactical air operations, and what the in-theater basing approaches would be to increase tactical air force survivability (examples: hardening, distributed operations using austere satellite fields and flexible command and control, etc.). Bases and ground maneuver forces will also require mobile air and missile defenses as well as electronic warfare support systems in the field in order to degrade Russian attacks. Defense of strategic targets against cruise missile attacks needs to be addressed. A approach for protecting the flow of logistics to forward forces additionally needs to be defined. Lastly, the roles of navies and coastal defense forces need to be outlined. The potential roles of Baltic Sea-bordering NATO members’ navies would be quite different from NATO members who border the Atlantic.

Kelly provides an outstanding foundation for examining NATO conventional deterrence requirements for the Baltics. His thoughts will serve as a starting point for the examinations of the other questions that I hope to write later this year.

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.

Observations on CS-21R

It’s taken me a few weeks to find the time to finish reading CS-21R and write up my thoughts. Overall I believe the document does an excellent job articulating how the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard intend to ‘man, train, and equip’ in this era of uneasy international peace, increasingly revisionist and adversarial great powers, dramatic technological change, and American self-imposed fiscal paralysis. The signals CS-21R sends regarding the importance of being prepared both materially and intellectually for waging major maritime war are exemplary, especially in the sense that our prospects for preventing such a war depend greatly upon that exact preparation. Likewise, CS-21R’s discussions of how the cyber and electromagnetic domains are central to modern warfare—and what steps the sea services will take to ensure their readiness to fight in those domains—are simply outstanding.

Strengths

Here are the items I found particularly commendable:

• Continues 2007 CS-21’s emphasis on international maritime security cooperation. Restates importance of working with longstanding allies, building new partnerships with formally non-aligned states, and even cooperating with competitors where possible on enhancing the security of the global maritime commons. Recognizes allies would play essential roles in major maritime combat, and that further interoperability enhancements are therefore required.

• Cements ADM Greenert’s maxim of “Warfighting First.” Sends unambiguous message that fleet design, operating concept development, platform and system procurement, and force-wide training are to be focused on developing the capabilities needed for waging major maritime war.

• Strong emphasis on maintaining peacetime forward naval presence. Details specific forces that will be deployed (whether permanently or rotationally) in specific regions for certain peacetime missions.

• Addresses the global strategic changes since 2007 CS-21. Chinese and Russian behavior called out as major influences on CS-21R. Chinese and Russian maritime warfare capabilities are clear factors (to those versed in modern maritime warfare concepts, emerging defense technologies, competitors’ orders of battle, etc.) driving the required Navy capabilities and competencies outlined in the document.

• Clearly informed by the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) and Air-Sea Battle/Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC). Heavy attention to measures for establishing/restoring/maintaining access to theaters of interest whether during peacetime or war. Advances idea that holistic ‘All Domain Access’ is a core Navy function on par with deterrence, sea control, power projection, and maritime security. Whether one agrees with it being a Navy function or not, it unmistakably indicates that Navy leadership is prioritizing development of capabilities, competencies, and operating concepts that will help overcome access challenges.

• Underscores expectation that future combat (especially in the event of major war) will occur under conditions of intense cyber-electromagnetic opposition. Articulates roles of cyberspace operations, electronic warfare, and command and control warfare in obtaining operational access as well as in defeating adversary forces.

• Articulates the minimum overall fleet size as well as the minimum inventories of major power projection combatant types needed to execute the Maritime Strategy (and by implication national grand strategy) in peacetime and war. Note, though, that this force structure is—by definition—likely right up against the strategic “tipping point” as defined in CNA’s March 2010 study of the same name. James Holmes thoroughly dissects exactly this point in an excellent piece at Real Clear Defense this week.

• Strategic deterrence emphasized as a principal Navy mission.

• Recognizes that projection of power ashore can represent all forms of national power; it is not just physical strikes or amphibious assaults.

• Recognizes that sea control is a precondition for performing power projection tasks.

• Expands details regarding how Marine Corps and Coast Guard will be employed to execute the vision as compared to 2007 CS-21.

“Must” Statements

It is quite revealing to look at what CS-21R lists as imperatives. Unlike “Will” statements that pronounce intentions, a “Must” statement implies requirements imposed on the sea services. Of the five “Musts” in the document, three are directly related to cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare:

• “Naval forces must have the resilience to operate under the most hostile cyber and EM conditions.” (Pg. 8)

•  “…we must become more comprehensive in our offensive capability to defeat the system rather than countering individual weapons.” (refers to adversary long-range maritime strike systems, Pg. 21)

• “…the Navy and Marine Corps must maintain a fleet of more than 300 ships, including 11 aircraft carriers, 14 ballistic missile submarines (replaced by 12 Ohio Replacement Program SSBN(X)), and 33 amphibious ships, while the Coast Guard must maintain a fleet of 91 National Security, Offshore Patrol, and Fast Response Cutters.” (Pg. 27)

• “[Naval combatants] “must be complemented by reconfigurable platforms such as the Joint High Speed Vessel, National Security Cutter, and auxiliaries including Large, Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) ships, Dry Cargo/Ammunition (T-AKE) ships, Mobile Landing Platforms (MLP), and the Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB).” (Pg. 28)

• “The electromagnetic-cyber environment is now so fundamental to military operations and so critical to our national interests that we must treat it as a warfighting domain on par with sea, air, land, and space.” (Pg. 33)

Concerns

There are countless views on what CS-21R should or should not have contained, should or should not have said, and so forth. You can’t fully satisfy everyone all of the time, myself included.

In his comments on Bryan McGrath’s ID post on CS-21R, John McLain (formerly of OPNAV N51) talks about the numerous revisions that occurred while routing the draft document up the chain and across organizations for review. I’ve done my share of document development and routing, and I fully appreciate John’s point: consensus generally requires tradeoffs and compromises on content. He’s also quite correct that the process for developing a strategy, tracking its implementation, communicating its ideas, and adapting it over time as the strategic environment changes and lessons are learned is just as important as what the product document actually says.

In hopes of contributing to the next iteration of this process, I’ve listed my main critiques of CS-21R below:

• CS-21R seems to assume the reader already agrees with the assertion that forward naval presence is of vital importance to U.S. grand strategy. Though the document summarizes major benefits that flow from presence, it surprisingly does not go to the lengths previous publicly-released U.S. Maritime Strategies did to underscore the case. The 1986 publicly-released Maritime Strategy document was remarkably specific in explaining conventional deterrence’s dependence upon forward presence (examples: limited time available for mobilization, sheer distances to reach theaters of interest, immediate and short-term military balances in theater with emphasis on warfighting capabilities, and need for broad escalation management options). 2007 CS-21 did so as well, albeit to a lesser degree given the strategic environment of the time. The question of whether or not CS-21R should have been more detailed on this topic is not academic, as it is clear that many of America’s political leaders and opinion elites either do not appreciate what is at risk as forward naval presence (and domestic Coast Guard coverage) declines—or loudly refute these risks exist. I would argue that no good opportunity to increase the visibility of one’s case to those open to being convinced (especially by countering critics’ arguments) should ever be rejected. 

• Despite exceptional discussions of how forward presence will be achieved despite insufficient force structure to meet full Combatant Commander demands, there is limited discussion of how this presence will trade against the rest of the fleet’s surge readiness (even if the 2011 Budget Control Act ceilings are repealed). The Optimized Fleet Response Plan is explained, but the issues it mitigates are alluded to rather than spelled out. A non-navalist reader might come away with the incorrect impression that there were no serious trades between forward presence and fleet readiness/reset.

• On that note, there is no discussion of the steps or resources needed to reset the fleet from the maintenance/manning shortfalls of the past decade and the more recent optempo crisis. This is one of the highest priority issues articulated in Navy leadership’s Congressional testimony as well as public statements, but it is surprisingly not addressed in CS-21R.

• CS-21R acknowledges conventional deterrence has requirements, variables, and implications that are distinct from those concerning nuclear deterrence. But unlike the publicly-released 1986 document or 2007 CS-21, CS-21R doesn’t connect how everything else it articulates is informed by basic conventional deterrence principles or otherwise promotes deterrence credibility. The discussions of how naval combatants support conventional deterrence is implicitly power projection-centric; the wording creates an impression that conventional deterrence centers on strike capabilities (and land-attack at that). The importance of sea control to deterrence by denial (examples: war at sea operations, protection of vital sea lanes for allies economic sustenance as well as reinforcement of our and their forward defenses) is overlooked. Additionally, CS-21R does not explain how the forces allocated to each theater of interest will support deterrence beyond simply ‘showing the flag;’ their latent warfighting roles within a theater deterrent are left implicit.

• Beyond platforms supporting strategic deterrence (SSBNs) or heavy conventional power projection (e.g. carriers, amphibious warships), it is left unclear how the rest of the fleet’s platforms trade against each other. SSN and LCS-FF acquisitions are arguably the Navy’s highest priority non-capital combatant programs right now per Navy leadership talking point emphasis, but neither is mentioned explicitly in that context. Nor is there any allusion to what will be sacrificed or what risks will be accepted to make those procurements possible. These considerations will become increasingly important in preparing U.S. maritime strategy for the fiscal pressures that will emerge during the final years of this decade and stretch into the 2020s…regardless of whether the 2011 Budget Control Act ceilings are lifted.

• CS-21R’s discussion of sea control recognizes that the condition reflects local margin of superiority, but it does not note that this condition is generally temporary. It also does not note that sea control is not something sought in and of itself, but rather is sought for discrete operational purposes.

•  Strategic sealift is mentioned but its criticality is not underlined. America’s ability to wage war overseas depends on strategic sealift; this message should not be left implicit.

• Standing peacetime European maritime security and deterrence is clearly being left to European militaries, with contributions from the four BMD-capable DDGs in Rota and forces transiting through EUCOM en route to other theaters. This may be all that is possible given the U.S. Navy’s fleet size and the operational demands in East/Southeast/Southwest Asia. It is also likely consistent with current Defense Planning Guidance. It strikes me as odd, though, for this to be the case in the theater in which the risk of major war is presently highest and conventional deterrence credibility is accordingly most needed. In this light, it is even odder that the section defining how and why the Navy will achieve presence in the European theater does not mention the Russian threat at all (especially when Russian revanchism was mentioned in the global security environment section). Europe is primarily referred to as a bridge for projecting power into other theaters or as a locus for maritime security efforts; in other words a means to an end rather than a set of allies (and a representation of values) that we are committed to defend. Given the fact that European militaries (and especially navies) are struggling for funding and are already far less capable than the U.S. Navy, it is questionable whether this element of CS-21R will endure long if Russian coercion against NATO continues to increase. If this is the case, then there is a gap in CS-21R regarding how trades with presence/operational requirements in other theaters will be managed.

•  The 1986 publicly-released Maritime Strategy was a product of the pre-Goldwater/Nichols era, and so its discussion of how the Navy would move pieces around on the global chessboard in a general war does not carry over into the Combatant Commander-dominant era in which CS-21R resides. But the 1986 document also explained how the Navy’s basic operating concepts provided specific means for achieving strategic ends in a generic major war. It outlined how each element of the fleet would operate together (as well as with Joint and allied forces) within combined arms campaign constructs. That’s still germane today under ‘man-train-equip,’ and it can be argued that it’s a crucial missing piece for justifying the force structure articulated by CS-21R as well as explaining to non-experts (and especially some critics) how a modern combined arms maritime force works.

o   Example: strike is the single explicitly articulated mission for aircraft carriers in CS-21R, even though their roles supporting sea control are arguably just as important. The caption addressing the E-2D Hawkeye’s role in the Navy Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air concept (pg. 20) speaks indirectly to the carrier’s central sea control roles; it is surprising that this was not echoed in the document’s main body narrative.

o   Example: very limited discussion of how the sea services are supported by the Air Force (beyond aerial refueling and intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance) and the Army (beyond Integrated Air and Missile Defense), or how the Navy supports those services (beyond kinetic and non-kinetic fires, plus intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance). This could have been used to further connect how CS-21R connects with JOAC and JAM-GC.

My critiques should not be interpreted to detract from the exceptional work done by the CS-21R development team. They have powerfully communicated the message that readiness to deter—and if necessary wage—major war is once again America’s sea services’ paramount priority. They have heralded the idea that 21^st Century seapower will depend in great part on the ability to fight in the cyber and electromagnetic domains. They have upheld the notion that maritime security cooperation remains central to the functioning of the international system.

Job well done.

 

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.

Russia Responds to Atlantic Resolve

Under Operation Atlantic Resolve, the U.S. has been rotationally deploying relatively small land-based force packages into Eastern Europe that are intended to signal American commitment to defending NATO’s boundary members against Russian aggression (while arguably also serving as deterrence tripwires). It's been pretty confusing trying to sort out what is being deployed where. Although last Thursday I noted the reported deployment of the 3^rd Infantry Division’s entire 1^st Armored Brigade Combat Team (BCT) to the Baltics, per the latest Atlantic Resolve fact sheet only a few hundred personnel and vehicles will actually be positioned in the Baltics. Furthermore, these vehicles will be consolidated with U.S. Army Europe’s prepositioned stocks in Germany at the end of the BCT’s deployment; they will not be left in the Baltics. According to LTG Ben Hodges, Commander of U.S. Army Europe, however, that does not preclude redistributing those vehicles to prepositioning sites in the Baltics or other Eastern European NATO members at a later date.

Russia’s response to all this is hardly surprising or unexpected. From Agence France-Presse via Defense News last Thursday:

Putin on Monday [3/16] ordered drills for more than 40,000 troops in regions spanning the country, from the Arctic to the far east to the volatile southern Caucasus, and ordered nuclear bomber jets to be deployed in Crimea a year after its annexation by Moscow.

Russia's chief of the general staff, Valery Gerasimov, said Thursday that the "number of troops taking part in the exercises has gone up to 80,000, and the number of aircraft has increased to 220," quoted by RIA Novosti state news agency.

Troops in the western and central regions and military aircraft were scrambled for exercises, Gerasimov said.

The drills are the latest in a succession of large-scale military maneuvers that Moscow has ordered as relations with the West have plunged to a post-Cold War low over the crisis in Ukraine.

One of LTG Hodges’s takeaways from the Russian exercises is particularly telling:

"I've been watching the Russian exercises...what I cared about is they can get 30,000 people and 1,000 tanks in a place really fast. Damn, that was impressive."

Conventional deterrence by denial rests heavily on creating a perception that a fait accompli isn’t possible, or that achieving one would be very costly and risky. This is why forward presence is so critical to deterrence credibility. The challenge becomes even harder when the adversary can mobilize and deploy an order of magnitude faster than the defender can.

Pavel Felgenhauer, a longstanding and often well-sourced Russian military analyst, notes at the Jamestown Foundation’s Eurasia Daily Monitor that:

This week (March 16-21), the Russian military began massive, “sudden” military exercises (“vnezapnaya proverka”). The authorities initially announced that the “sudden exercises” are intended to check out the battle readiness of Russia’s Northern Fleet and the possibility of reinforcing it with forces from other military districts. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, 38,000 soldiers, 3,360 military vehicles, 41 navy ships, 15 submarines and 110 aircraft are involved in the exercise. The mass deployment of air and naval forces in the Barents Sea practices ensuring the safety of Russian nuclear missile-armed submarines, which have to be defended at all costs before they launch their hundreds of nuclear warheads at the United States. The military plans to land marines and paratroopers on the shore of the Kola Peninsula close to the Norwegian border and on the polar archipelagos of Novaya Zemlya and Franz Josef Land.

According to a defense ministry source, the “sudden exercise” was intended to send a message to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that Russia is ready for war and can counter with force the deployment of limited US and other NATO forces to the Baltic, Romania, Poland and Bulgaria. Moscow, apparently, did not give Western nations any prior notification about the exercise (Vedomosti, March 17).

Neither side has had experience with brinksmanship on par with the darker moments of the Cold War in over a generation. That does not bode well for crisis stability, to put it mildly.

--Updated 3/24/15 7:38AM EDT to correct typo in 6th paragraph--

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.