Canary in the Coal Mine

This post at AOL Defense by Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. is worth reading in full, but I want to quote this specific section. To me, this is very well written, and right on point.

"We intercept about 33 percent of what we know is out there, and that's just a limitation on the number of assets," said Air Force Gen. Douglas Fraser, chief of the U.S. Southern Command, at a breakfast with reporters this morning. And, Fraser admitted, that percentage is "going down... More is getting through."

The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq and, after 2014, Afghanistan may free up some aircraft and boats for drug interdiction, Fraser said. But the limitations on what some partner nations can do are more intractable - and any improvement in American capabilities is at the mercy of increasingly tight budgets and a possible sequester.

At sea, Fraser explained, the U.S. Navy is retiring the smaller ships that have traditionally been the mainstay of drug interdiction patrols, the aging and increasingly expensive to operate Perry-class frigates, while their much-delayed replacement, the Littoral Combat Ships, is just beginning to enter service. "We 'll see a gap in the numbers of those types of ships," Fraser said. "So we're working with the Navy to see what other types of vessels and capability that's coming back from Iraq might be available," particularly small craft that have been used for river patrol and offshore patrol in the Gulf. Such boats could boost the U.S. fleet's own interception capability but also, and perhaps more importantly, some could be transferred to friendly countries that are currently short on assets to intercept drug boats moving through their own territorial waters. (Fraser focused on Navy vessels and did not specifically address the Coast Guard, which does contribute some ships to Southern Command operations).

The shipbuilding budget has seen a lot of discussion, some here, but mostly elsewhere since the beginning of the year. I think so far Congress is handling this right - focus on sequestion, the rest is what it is. I think the FY13 budget is simply a reflection of the Obama administration - it avoids every difficult decision the DoD supposedly faced - including sequestion - and the budget fails to lay out any guidance for future difficult choices. That is a purely political move by the SECDEF and President, which is absolutely fine and valid, but let no one pretend the DoD FY13 budget is anything but a politically focused budget specific for an election year.

If someone wants to jump on the issue of the Navy needing more ships, I'm all for it, but I think it is important to highlight that no one in the Navy is making that case... so in many ways I'm not too swayed by others who try to make the case for more Navy ships. For example, Ray Mabus got blasted in Congress by Representative Forbes on Green Energy (YouTube). Legitimate? Politically - Yes, but the sin Secretary Ray Mabus has committed in the eyes of folks like Randy Forbes is one of omission not commission - the SECNAV has failed to focus on Navy specific issues and has instead focused on what every one rightfully sees as 'other crap.'

But the ugly truth is, 4 star Navy Admirals are not beating the table for more ships, so why are folks so upset that the SECNAV doesn't pound sand for that cause as well? The Navy uniformed leadership has publicly consented to the DoD on virtually all the big issues so that the DoD can take a haircut (or trim across the top everywhere) in an election year instead of get a new hair style (legitimate maritime focus for Pacific shift). Does that mean big changes are coming next year? Maybe, probably not, but it doesn't really matter... because without someone in political leadership setting legitimate national defense policy, the annual Navy budget has become a rock drill in contingency planning - not an exercise in short or long term planning - meaning for this CNO the budget planning process will be primarily be about hitting targets within existing margins instead drawing new lines as new margins.

With all due respect to the Obama Administration, you have not given anyone a legitimate national defense policy. This is handful of used toilet paper (PDF) that is embarrassing to label strategic in any context. How does anyone make a strategic choice from that? Where would one even begin making strategic choices with something like that? That is a very sad document, and pretty much sums up the last decade of strategic thinking from the DoD as a nice little bow tied turd.

It is the random disparity of priorities from services and COCOMs that makes comments by Air Force Gen. Douglas Fraser very interesting to me. Am I wrong in suggesting that Air Force Gen. Douglas Fraser has made a stronger argument than Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert for more Navy ships so far in 2012? I think the question is legitimate, even if General Fraser's argument isn't really that good.

In truth, the reporter is more accurate - Air Force Gen. Douglas Fraser is basically saying he needs more Coast Guard Cutters with his argument regarding this specific problem and solution. Janet Napolitano disagrees, but there is little evidence she takes serious the drug problems taking place south of the United States, so her credibility due to simple trend lines, statistics, and facts on the issue of narcotics and drug related violence is already strained.

But again, I have watched the Coast Guard's leadership so far in FY13 and I have not seen Admiral Papp making a serious case for more Coast Guard Cutters, except perhaps the need for more ice breakers in the future. Unfortunately the Coast Guard is simply struggling to keep what they have in existing plans, instead of trying to build political momentum towards a future.

In conclusion, here is what I see. Combatant Commanders not named PACOM have needs in the maritime domain that a smaller sized Navy cannot meet, but the assets those Combatant Commanders tend to need are not aircraft carriers, ballistic missile destroyers, fighter squadrons, or attack submarines so their priorities don't matter as much to the Navy. Basically the Navy is going to have enough of the 'right kind of ships' despite hell or high water, and everything else will suffer - including priorities that are low on the Navy's internal totem poll like narcotics. As long as the Navy is going to have enough of the 'right kind of ships' then the Navy sees itself as OK, and not necessarily in need or more ships. That is what it is, maritime strategy can be tailored later to meet this objective.

According to the National Drug Intelligence Center, The Economic Impact of Illicit Drug Use
on American Society (PDF) is now around $193 billion annually. The Coast Guard doesn't even spend 1% of that total annually building Coast Guard Cutters to address the problem, and the entire annual procurement budget for the entire Coast Guard for everything ships and aircraft is about 5.5% of that figure. I believe there are several ways to read Air Force Gen. Douglas Fraser's comments, but the way I read them is simply - the United States Coast Guard is neither sized nor capable of meeting the national security and homeland defense responsibilities with which it is tasked, and on the narcotics issue the US Coast Guard today is only capable of meeting 1/3 of the requirement. While not a scientifically drawn number, it is statistically sound - which is more than most political arguments for money on Capitol Hill.

So here is my concern. If the Coast Guard is so underfunded it is only able to meet about 1/3 of it's mission requirements, and we know the future Navy is going to be too small to fill in gaps for the Coast Guard, which organization is actually capable of being a reserve for the other? It makes a lot of sense to cut the Navy at the low end if the Coast Guard is being sized/shaped to potentially fill in those gaps, or it might actually make sense to cut the Coast Guard if the Navy is going to be filling in gaps in their capabilities. How does the United States reconcile a true national defense strategy when the gaps created by cuts in both the Coast Guard and the Navy directly impact specific, credible, legitimately cited and fiscally accounted threats to the homeland in any context from social to economic to security?

Air Force Gen. Douglas Fraser sounds a lot to me like a canary in the coal mine. When people who should know better hear the canary as just a narcotics problem, rather than what it represents as also a smuggling and violence problem, the sound of the canary gets ignored.

Nacro Subs

This story in the Houston Chronicle on the captured narco submarine in Ecuador last year is an interesting read.

The only narco submarine ever captured — a 73-foot-long camouflaged vessel capable of carrying at least 7 tons of cocaine while cruising stealthily beneath the ocean's surface — sits raised on concrete blocks in a South American seaport.

Its belly is caked with grime. Its hatch is open.

Many of its secrets are no more.

In the seven months since the game-changing discovery of the submarine, built by drug traffickers in a covert shipyard deep in the Ecuadorean jungle, naval experts from multiple countries have studied the vessel.

Their conclusion: It is the "real deal" — fully capable of making multiple journeys to North America.

"There is nothing amateur about it," said Jay Bergman, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration's chief of the Andes region. "It is everything it is supposed to be. It is a bona fide long-range, fully submersible craft."

The article notes the submarine could submerge up to 50ft and make 20 knots for short periods of time on batteries. It is quite remarkable what can be built in the middle of a jungle these days.

Operation Unified Response Update

USS Normandy (CG 60) completed work off Haiti today and listed out in detail their contribution over the 21 days on station in support of Operation Unified Response.

Normandy Totals:

• 123,500 portions of HA/DR meals
• 291 MRE’s
• 1000 gallons of water
• 2800 portions of rice
• 1800 portions of dehydrated soup

Helo Det Totals:

• 75,142 lbs
• 17,705 lbs of parts
• 146 hours of flight time
• 287 Lifts (sorties)
• 3,000 pounds in medical supplies
• 107 MEDEVACS, 66 of those non-ambulatory

That is significant work for a cruiser, and flight time is just barely under 30%. The source for this information is the USS Normandy page on Facebook. Also the photo above is from VADM Harvey.

This highlights two ways the US Navy is using social media today that we have not seen in the past.

The Calm Before The Storm in Haiti

At Southern Command, we are also working with our partner nations to meet challenges to the Community of the Americas—whether they are international terrorism, illicit trafficking, international crime, poverty, inequality, corruption, radical movements, illegally armed groups, mass human migrations, natural disasters, or other humanitarian crises. It is critical to this endeavor that we also stem the tide of anti-U.S. populism and open the door for improved prosperity and security in the region. Through communicating to the people of the region our shared values, what in today's military is called "strategic communications," we are sending the message that we are collectively committed to the people of the Community of the Americas.

Sailing in Southern Waters: A New Wind, By Admiral James Stavridis, USN, Proceedings, May 2007

On Friday morning as you wake up and read this post, there will begin to be media panic that chaos is breaking out throughout Port-au-Prince. The State Department and SOUTHCOM have hopefully already predicted this event in the unfolding crisis. We are entering a 48-72 hour phase where the absence of physical security becomes a contributing factor to the existing catastrophe. It will not be an indicator of failure however, even if it may be suggested as such on TV as hours and hours of coverage unfold over a three day weekend in the United States. It should, however, serve as a reminder that failure to set expectations with strategic communications by US government leadership to both our citizens and the world over the last 48 hours will have set back our global strategic communications efforts made in the emerging soft power campaign.

Things are going to get a lot worse in Haiti before they get better, and that was never clearly articulated by the President, State Department, SOUTHCOM, or Rajiv Shah to the American people, who may begin to doubt our governments efforts in the very near future. President Obama is positioned to take a political hit for what happens over the next 48-72 hours for apparently having advisors who are treating Haiti as anything but the most important event of his political career to date.

In my opinion, and I will let time determine the accuracy, so far it is my impression the Obama administration appears to be completely unaware of how much trouble Haiti can bring upon his Presidency. I'll bet a Heineken keg that if the President attends a Martin Luther King event Monday instead of focus on what is going to be a political public relations nightmare unfolding in Haiti on television, it will cost the President 5 points in his approval ratings and he will be dogged by claims from his own political party that he is as distracted with Haiti as Bush was during Katrina.

The stakes at risk in Haiti are high for SOUTHCOM and the Navy, even if the Department of Defense is not the lead agency in Haiti. The trust and relationships that have been built on promises kept to the Caribbean and Latin America by ADM Stavridis in SOUTHCOM will come crumbling down around us if we do not get Haiti right. The Navy has made several decisions over the past many years that shape the resources available today for Haiti. This included several calculated bets that have been discussed in the halls of Congress many times. The wisdom of those decisions is soon to be determined, and failure to meet the demand placed on the Navy by the American public's interest in Haiti right now will create damning public criticism that will significantly influence any plans for POM 12.

The outbreak of violence in Haiti and the perception of chaos on television is not what has my alarm bells going off. My alarm bells are going off because I am not convinced by the information that has been released to the public that SOUTHCOM is pushing hard enough. Today's press conference is illustrative, and I would not be surprised to learn if reporters in attendance walked away concerned. I do not get a sense of urgency in 'leaning resources forward' from General Doug Fraser that the situation appears to demand. With that said, lets examine what the Navy is doing.

Tomorrow morning the United States carrier Carl Vinson will arrive on station. It will bring with it a complement of 19 helicopters. It has 30 pallets of relief goods. And it will now provide the platform in which we can take care -- get around the poor infrastructure in Haiti to get goods to where they need to be, most needed. And so we'll work actively to support that during that time frame.

In addition, on the 19th we will have three ships of an amphibious ready group, headed by the USS Bataan, with roughly 2,200 Marines, heavy equipment, and the ability to move that heavy equipment from ship to shore to start providing capacity and capability there. We will continue over those days to have elements of the 82nd Airborne Division arrive with approximately 1,000 -- excuse me -- 700 soldiers will be on the ground within the next four days. They're there to help assist in the relief efforts.

And finally, on the 22nd we'll have the United States Navy ship the Comfort. The hospital ship Comfort will arrive in Haiti. We are aggressively pursuing every action we can to provide relief to Haiti.

This is an awesome response by the Navy based on initial calls to action of 2 days ago while we still lacked solid information to work with in the early hours of an emerging crisis. What is currently in motion as outlined represents the decisions of the first 48 hours, and is very commendable. With that said, the decisions of the next 48-72 hours carry with them serious consequences for our nation, and I do not get the sense with the public statements that the severity of the strategic consequences is being recognized at many levels of government.

Lets start by looking at more solid information learned over the first 48 hours.

Facts: 48 Hours Later

The State Department has identified the solid number of three million people that are in need of aid. There are currently two pipelines into Haiti. One would be the limited roads from the Dominican Republic that have already been log jammed at the border and has everything moving very slowly. Fuel on the road is already a major concern. The other pipeline is a single runway airport, also log jammed and also suffering from fuel concerns.

We obviously cannot depend on the limited road system from the Dominican Republic or the single runway airport to meet the logistical demands of a catastrophe involving 3,000,000 people. Rajiv Shah needs a logistics expert - like yesterday, or he is going to have a real short term at USAID. This WSJ article begins by describing the mess the Air Force was dealing with Thursday at the Toussaint L'Ouverture International Airport in Port-au-Prince, but goes on to identify the bigger problem is the condition of the port in Port-au-Prince.

Making matters worse is the that supplies cannot come in by sea. Haiti's main seaport has "collapsed and is not operational," says Maersk Line's Mary Ann Kotlarich. The main dock is partially submerged. Cranes that moved containers on and off ships at the port are now partially under water and listing badly. Ships carrying supplies have nowhere to dock.

Numerous maritime companies are trying to devise stop-gap solutions, but nothing is in place yet.

"Nothing has been proposed that would really be a solution at this point," says Mark Miller of Crowley Maritime Corp., a Jacksonville, Fla., shipping company that maintains an extensive logistics network in the Caribbean.

Maersk Line operates a small ship that unloads containers from larger vessels and then brings them to the port. That vessel is currently anchored off the coast of Port-au-Prince, as the company tries to determine how it can be put to use.

Shipping companies are now examining other areas in the vicinity to see if they can find a place that could serve as a makeshift unloading area for ships.

The port issue will make or break the entire effort in Haiti. Regardless of everything else happening right now, the units being deployed as outlined in this Navy Times article will ultimately determine how the world sees the US effort in Haiti. If they are able to rapidly reopen port services, the US will achieve a significant strategic victory in the 21st century. If they are unable to rapidly reopen port services, the consequences will be devastating to the strategic interests of the United States.

The people are going to start getting hungry and thirsty, and social order is going to start breaking down over the next 48-72 hours. Nineteen small Navy helicopters are not going to be able to meet the demands of 3,000,000 people, nor will they come close to reaching or even being consistently visible to a significant number of those people. How far would you go to provide food and fresh water for your family when social order is breaking down everywhere around you?

The Next 48-72 Hours Matter

The other day at the Surface Navy Association’s annual symposium, ADM Harvey discussed concerns regarding the consequences of Norfolk being taken out of operation. The maritime services have participated in many conferences since 9/11 discussing the responses necessary to open ports following disaster. In the situation before us today, Port-au-Prince represents a port of 3 million people less than 1000 nautical miles from Norfolk that following this catastrophe, requires the port facilities opened for survival.

As I am looking at the assets that will be moved into place, my concern is that because distances at sea add time to response, and because the scope of the disaster is so large, I have serious concerns that sufficient resources will not be arriving in time to influence the soft power strategic objectives at stake with Haiti. So far in the 21st century, when "shit happens" on land, the most important resources provided by the US Navy to support US operations on land have been aircraft carriers, the Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, and the Maritime Sealift Command. I have several questions, and I believe some of the answers to these questions will be indicators of a successful US response or an unsuccessful US response unfolding.

How long will it take the Naval Expeditionary Combat Command to open up the port in Port-au-Prince? I think everyone in the United States with concerns of a disaster in a major US port should watch closely to see what that answer is.

How effective will the helicopter operations of the USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) be in meeting the demands of this crisis? Will the decision by the US Navy not to build a medium lift helicopter carry significant consequences regarding the capacity for the US Navy to respond to this disaster?

Has SOUTHCOM responded sufficiently with US assets, specifically assets carried forward by the MSC related to supporting over the shore logistics? Will SOUTHCOM insure enough pipelines are available from sea to sufficiently meet the quantity of aid that will be required to support a humanitarian operation of 3 million people in a timely manner? If ships with full loads of aid end up sitting off the coast while people are visibly starving, SOUTHCOM will lose credibility with nations throughout the region.

Can only three amphibious ships provide enough capability to support the over the shore logistics requirements for a large city without a functioning sea port? How influential would the capabilities of the proposed, but rumored to be canceled in FY2011 budget, Sea Basing concept be to this operation? General Conway needs to send a memo to Ray Mabus that his February 16 wargame is happening right now in Haiti.

The Marine Corps is poised to be the only winner in an operation where the potential for many losers exist. The Marines understand HA/DR, strategic communications, and soft power better than anyone else the US - including the State Department in my opinion. Perhaps the Marine Corps should be mobilizing more than just a single MEU or two, just in case? 3,000,000 people is a lot of people.

How proactive is SOUTHCOM being in preparing follow on assets that may be necessary before full awareness is determined regarding the requirements? Are we accurately predicting events before they unfold, controlling the chaos as necessary as we place assets? I am specifically thinking of security requirements for 3,000,000 people should large scale violence break out, but my thoughts in this regard also include assets like MSC vessels with equipment like INLS that an amphibious construction battalion might need to potentially open a harbor location outside the existing port facilities.

So far, the response by the rest of the international community have not been very significant, suggesting that it is possible the rest of the world expects the US to do the vast majority of the work. To answer yesterday's question that asked who will be the nation to step up like India did after the 2004 SE Asian Tsunami - the answer appears to be no one. This is a troubling early trend.

I believe the strategic success of Haiti operations rests upon a sufficient quantity of supplies being capable of reaching the people of Haiti by sea in time to prevent a catastrophe to turn into something much worse. It is the responsibility of the Navy to enable port access, a responsibility the Navy cannot afford to fail in executing.

Strategic Communications

One topic kept popping up today among many observers: why is China kicking the State Department's ass in strategic communication in Haiti? It doesn't look good when somehow the Chinese can get a fully loaded plane into Haiti all the way from China before we can get many of our own search and rescue teams in from the US. I sat dumbfounded watching CNN this afternoon seeing a big red Chinese flag waiving in the background, and became frustrated when I saw a different Chinese flag an hour later behind an NBC reporter in a different area. There cannot possibly be that many Chinese in Haiti already, and they did bring humanitarian supplies and not flags, right? What the heck is going on?

This is soft power; symbolism and perception matters a lot to achieving strategic objectives in disaster recovery and humanitarian response operations. In the opening hours of crisis, the people are still in shock. The first 48 hours is the calm before the storm, and every detail in public communication and public diplomacy matters. I was seriously impressed when I saw State Department folks engaged in an actual conversation on Twitter today, but every element of government needs to get organized a bit better in the online space.

How many different map applications do we really need anyway? Here is the Navy's version of a Haiti map, IE only, and does not include information on the ground from folks who are uploading to open source maps. Everyone has a map meaning there are many maps, but if everyone knew to use the same map it could be advertised and utilized by people on the ground with phones capable of reading maps. Maps are an example where the lack of synchronization in agency capabilities is hampering an information opportunity, and many maps is just as effective as no maps in contributing towards a whole of government common picture that interfaces with the public on the ground. Someone at State or DoD needs to organize information opportunities like maps and other redundant data generation opportunities emerging in the crisis towards common and shared goals where governments, private groups, and people can organize, utilize, and synchronize.

Is the Twitter hash tag the Navy uses #Haiti or #USHelpsHaiti? You people in Navy information office need to get on the same page now that you have shifted virtually all of your strategic communications to online and social media. You also need to engage the American people, because simply broadcasting facts or photos creates almost no connection between your communication efforts and the very real personnel patriotic unity that is eminating from the people of the United States over Haiti right now. Navy information folks need to be real people in giving information right now, and not only a link provider. Navy information folks are connecting our Navy's actions with our nations people; be a live connection.

If the US Navy ships off Haiti are not flying their battle flags, then the US Navy has not spent enough intellectual energy developing a comprehensive soft power strategy in disaster response. I was disappointed today when a photo of the USS Carl Vinson flying the battle flag at sprint speed after dawn did not pop up as the front page picture on Navy.mil. A strategic communication opportunity wasted in my opinion, and it would have been a hell of a lot more significant towards shaping the perception of the US Navy response in Haiti than anything that might come from repeating the CHINFO Rhumb Lines talking points distributed on the crisis today.

It will probably be worth the time and effort to get a picture from the three ship ARG flying battle flags Saturday afternoon when the press starts pressing home the chaotic picture in Haiti on 24/7 news. The US Navy needs to prepare for the coming battle for hearts and minds, including those at home whose confidence in the effort will begin to waiver as events turn chaotic in Haiti.

Beginning Friday, the USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) becomes the representative of the emotional and financial unified patriotic American sympathy and support the American people are extending to the Haitian people, and the US Navy needs to be clearly thinking in detail about how to best represent that American spirit when conducting operations in what will likely soon turn into chaotic conditions.

It is a three day weekend for most Americans with Martin Luther King holiday coming Monday, and as social order breaks down in Haiti, the events in Haiti are going to be widely observed by the American people. The decisions made and the actions taken over the next 48-72 hours will significantly influence the perception of the entire world regarding the United States, the United States Navy, and whether he realizes it or not - the President of the United States himself.

Given the scale of the crisis and the interest and attention it is receiving globally, it is very likely the legacies of people ranging from Rajiv Shah, Hillary Clinton, General Doug Fraser, and Barack Obama will be determined based on decisions made over the next few days and the events of the next week. If the Navy struggles to open the port, Admiral Roughead may take incoming as well.

Perception is a powerful thing, and one of the most important things in achieving soft power strategic objectives during HA/DR operations. I hope everyone has been advised what is at stake in Haiti.

UNITAS Gold 50-09 Order of Battle

Not a complete list, but SOUTHCOM public affairs do an outstanding job. For the record, this picture is one of my favorites in a awhile. One of my favorite US ship classes with one of my favorite European ship classes in one photo.

One day I'll do a post on all the reasons why I love the Berlin class, because while it may not look it, those are two of the most scalable medical capable military vessels afloat in the world. In my world, that looks like part of the high mix in a high/low Influence Squadron.

United States

24th Marine Regiment
Air Test and Evaluation Squadron ONE (VX-1)
Amphibious Squadron 8
Carrier Air Wing 3
Destroyer Squadron Four Zero
Florida Air National Guard
Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing 11 (CPRW 11)
Riverine Group One
U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command / U.S. Fourth Fleet
USCGC Thetis (WMEC 910)
USS Ashland (LSD 48)
USS Donald Cook (DDG 75)
USS Doyle (FFG 39)
USS Forrest Sherman (DDG 98)
USS John L. Hall (FFG 32)
USS Kauffman (FFG 59)
USS Mesa Verde (LPD 19)
USS Oscar Austin (DDG 79)
USS San Jacinto (CG 56)

Brazil

BNS Constituicao (F42)
BNS Tikuna (S 34)

Canada

HMCS Montreal (336)
HMCS Corner Brook (S 878)

Chile

CF Blanco (CF-15)

Colombia

ARC Almirante Padilla (FL 51)
ARC Catagena De Indias (BL 161)

Germany

FGS Sachsen (F219)
FGS Lubeck (F214)
Franfurt Am Main (A1412)

Mexico

ARM Mina
ARM Oaxaca

Peru

BAP Palacios (FM 56)

Friendly Advice of the Day

I try to give an opinion every time I add a blog post, but this time I'm going to give an opinion while also taking the wallet out of my pocket, turning it upside down, and shaking all the money out of it.

On Twitter, whoever is behind @southcomwatch asked a question yesterday afternoon. The question was:

Any good ideas on new ways to conduct blog from the hospital ship USNS Comfort during humanitarian deployment to LatAM & Caribbean this year

I gave them advice to check out Chris Albon, because I'd bet that is what they are looking for. However, I assure you their strategy for blogging is already flawed unless somewhere, someplace they also asked the following question.

Buenas ideas sobre nuevas formas de llevar a cabo blog desde el buque hospital USNS Confort humanitaria durante el despliegue en América Latina y el Caribe este año?

My Spanish really sucks so I cheated with babblefish, but since my English grammar sucks too, good enough. If SOUTHCOM doesn't understand why this advice has my wallet upside down empty of money, they shouldn't even bother with new media because they don't know what the hell they are doing with it anyway.

It is painful to watch the military services struggling to "get it" with social media, because it just isn't that complicated when you know what you can do, and understand how to get there. SOUTHCOM has everything every successful and profitable corporate social media program has and needs to be successful, and not only do they not know it, but they don't even have the same obligation to make a profit from it.

If Admiral Stavridis is interested in developing a real social media strategy, I'll take a GS-14, help you folks hire 2 GS-13s, and leverage the skills of one webmaster who can code and is very good with artwork, and together we will build the model and strategy the entire DoD wants to mimic as a social media experience. I'll also take on the challenge of convincing every single skeptic and teach them how to make social media work for them instead of against them when applicable.

The DoD spent $4.7 billion on media operations last year, while China spent $6.58 billion. A lot of people overreacted when they saw the $4.7 billion figure, because they don't see results and didn't have context for the figure. New media can fix that type of perception problem.

I'll show the DoD how new media gets more out of the content put out than reporters do. Several reporters know what I'm talking about. I bet 99 out of 100 times I get more email feedback regarding a Defense News, InsideDefense, or Defense Daily article that I discuss on the blog than email the actual reporter who writes the story does, and to prove it, just ask the reporters because I bet they would all agree! Considering they actually work for information, and I do this as a hobby, I'd also bet that fact pisses them off a bit.

1 GS-14 and 2 GS-13s can return on investment much further than however many folks are doing their work with $4.7 billion today. This isn't an insult to the information offices of the DoD, rather I am noting how social media is a many way, every direction network model, rather than the current node model where everything moves one way, usually in only two directions.

If I fail, just have Admirals draw straws regarding who gets to fire me, and given that I do give strong opinions on this blog, you may need a lot of straws.

One last thing. While this blog might be popular in maritime circles and several milblogs are popular among the miliary services, existing milblogs are not the model the services need to develop. If the services try to adopt this model, or any existing milblog model, I think they will find they are not getting what they want out of social media.

Observing The M-80 Stiletto OPEVAL

So what did SOUTHCOM do with its Skyship 600 leased from Airship Management Services of Greenwich, Conn.? According to a recent article in Defense Daily (subscription) by Geoff Fein, the airship has been part of a six-week test mission between Florida's southern coast and Cuba as part of the OPEVAL of the M-80 Stiletto to deter and disrupt illicit trafficking in the JIATF South area of operations.

The craft, built by San Diego-based M Ship Co., underwent OPEVAL this past summer. U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) conducted the OPEVAL, and it included participation from the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South, U.S. Coast Guard, the Army and U.S. Army South (USARSO), the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and a representative from Colombia.

In September, SAIC [SAI] prepared a 72-page after action report outlining the findings of the OPEVAL, test objectives, operational issues and recommendations.

The 80-foot long Stiletto, with its unique double M-hull configuration, was developed as a test bed for new systems and technologies, ranging from unmanned surface and aerial systems as well as Augmented Reality Visualization of the Common Operational Picture (ARVCOP), built by Maine-based Technology Systems Inc.

This article is brilliantly written for those like me interested in new technologies like the M-80. The article reads like the story of a platform earning its reputation.

"During operations in the Florida Straits, Stiletto was responsible for the interdiction and apprehension of a suspicious vessel that was identified by the [Coast Guard] as a target of interest," the report said.

Stiletto's speed and ability to keep up with a go-fast boat, even pursuing it into shallow waters, proved critical for mission success, according to the SAIC report.

There is a lot of interesting material here. Essentially the airship ends up being the aviation surveillance piece directing the fast M-80 as a maritime interceptor going after "targets of interest." The article goes on to note "Stiletto's OPEVAL was successful" but "many of the participants, according to the report, believed that ship's impact could have been much more significant if several limiting factors had been mitigated."

"These factors included the fact that Stiletto was restricted to operate in international waters where the weather and sea state conditions were unfavorable; limitations of Stiletto's communications and surveillance systems, including lack of secure chat and data access, problems with voice satellite communications (SATCOMs) when Stiletto was port side, and a commercial-grade radar that was ill-equipped to identify targets of interest; and maintenance problems with Stiletto and its rigid hull inflatable boat (RHIB) among others.," the report stated.

Put another way, the high sea state and weather conditions issue makes the case that these platforms need a mothership for support, either in the form of a well deck or a smart dock. The advantage of this would allow the M-80 to remain sustained in forward theaters, manage weather and sea variables encountered in forward operating environments, and otherwise better sustain crew support, platform repair capacity, and extend operations beyond a land base while putting the ship in the operation zone for a longer duration. In other words, this ship needs a sea base, highlighting once again that sea basing is a strategic concept beyond the tactical capability to land Marines on a beach.

The ship also appears to need better technology for better communications integration, and a new RHIB to for its boarding parties.

Information Dissemination was able to obtain a copy of the 72-page after action report that Geoff Fein discussed in his article. The report is labeled Unclassified / FOUO. I've given some thought about this, and I have decided to post on it while being selective regarding the content. Some will say I shouldn't post any of it, and others would say I should post the whole thing. Here is my contribution to that discussion.

The blogosphere is where ideas are disseminated and shared after being born elsewhere, and I believe this blog is a public place for responsible debate and discussion about maritime issues. I believe the content below contributes to the public knowledge in a number of ways to the industry, academic, strategic, tactical, and political folks who read this blog, and serve a benefit for understanding to the public at large in understanding the challenges of small ships in an emerging 4GW environment. I don't see the content posted below as any more of an information loss than what is found here. Tonight, for the 19th time, someone asked for this PPT presentation for use in a training evolution, serving as a reminder the blog continues to serve a serious purpose for our uniformed men and women of the Navy beyond the simplistic function of your entertainment and my education. I believe the content added below contributes to the discussion without risk. With that said...

The report cites "themes" that emerged in the development of the OPEVAL report.

• The importance of using Stiletto in a more appropriate (littoral) environment
• Deploying on Stiletto was a good experience and most interviewees stated that they would deploy on Stiletto again
• The RHIB requires extensive modifications or replacement
• The deployment in itself was a major success

There is a comment early in the conclusions that I think it worth mentioning, because this is something that comes off very obvious whenever we begin talking about the quality of work observed coming from SOUTHCOM. While this might be specific to the OPEVAL of the Stiletto specifically, I think it reflects something right taking place down in SOUTHCOM bigger than a single OPEVAL, at least in the opinion of this observer.

• Most participants commented on the fact that the OPEVAL was organized, planned and successfully executed in a very short period of time. The following quotation is representative of the feedback received regarding the OPEVAL, “commands were able to throw together three teams from different pots and deploy them in a short time; and everyone got down there, joined together and made one team. This was the success. No one got hurt, and nobody got in trouble.”

When evaluating new platforms, this blog author evaluates from the position of people, ideas, then platform. As such we focus in on the issues regarding people first, the ideas that went into operation, then finally the platform itself.

Based on the reports findings, there were problems with the training process, some of which appear due to equipment failure. The lists below are partial.

• At the start of the deployment, there was only one person with more than two weeks of training with Stiletto (Stiletto civilian technician).
• Typically when training commences, the vessel(s) are prepared; however Stiletto and her RHIB were not ready / available for training when the time came.
• The crew was given three weeks to train prior to the deployment, which included time for team integration training. However Stiletto and RHIB maintenance issues, and heightened sea state, consumed most of the allotted training time.
• The crew did not receive proper or adequate training, and integration training did not occur until they had arrived in Colombia. The 1st official training was toward the end of the deployment to prepare for the DVs visit.
  

The report also gives a lot of credit to the Army personnel by Fort Eustis, noting the "Army has a long history of training high-speed craft crews." Indeed, this was an interesting note in the details. I'll let John or Brad carry this football.

• The Army typically employs small crews, though the Navy might have 20 guys in a crew. In the Army, there are typically only two rates: deck-side rate or engineer; the Navy uses many other rates. On an Army vessel, anything that needs to be done deckside, the deck personnel do it; same for engine side. Army personnel subsequently have a broader spectrum of training, and they are used to working in small crews. There are not as many problems of a crew with six or so; can still get the job done.

This was also an interesting detail, an issue we need to get right as we move ships with small crews into the littoral. Any desk jockey whose experience is sailing the deep blue that gives a LCS CO shit for the handling of a ship in 10 meters of water needs an asskicking. I get the feeling the future desk jockey I'm talking about was somewhere in this process.

• There were multiple reports of uncertainty with regards to whom the team should provide feedback to, and who to turn to for support. As one example it was reported that “there were times we wanted to make tactical recommendations” for Stiletto missions. The team would email one agency and then later learn that the agency was not informing others with OPCON and TACON authority. Additionally others reported that some within a particular agency were not receptive to the feedback the crews were providing.

If this wasn't so common in just about everything new, I'd probably make a deal of it. Truth is, this happens every time you do something for the first time. This is the kind of thing that gets sorted out with ownership of a program. Like I said above, the focus stays on the people.

• During the beginning of the deployment, the sea state was too rough for the quick transit that Stiletto had expected. Another person explained why the rough sea state impacted the crew: “in that environment [Stiletto] can’t go fast without wearing on combat effectiveness.”
• Crew sustainability, due to the rough sea state, was limited. One person explained that, “when Stiletto is at high speed (40+ kts), it is not cutting through the water, it is hitting the water very hard. This is tough on the crew and fatigue was a real killer.” Another person explained the impact constant vibration had on the crew: “vibration and movement of the ship was very rough on the crew. After constant battery, the body gets tired. And once a person gets tired or exhausted, you begin to break into and cut down on endurance - and then it is a down-ward spiral.”
• The crew had an “abnormally high rate” of sea sickness. While some sea sickness is to be expected, the crew members were all maritime veterans and most of them experienced sea sickness during this deployment. One person suggested that employing a simulated horizon device in the galleys may be effective at combating sea sickness in those passengers riding below the bridge.
• The crew reported that they had a contract technician on the boat, who “did everything in the world to keep up with the boat.” Another person explained that the technician did not ride onboard Stiletto during missions, but that he could be reached via cell phone to assist. Additionally once Stiletto docked, the technician provided any “on-the-spot repair services” that were needed. Another individual said that the technician provided guidance on fixing issues, but not actual support.
• Several individuals explained that there must be more discussion about the role of the technician, who acted as an advisor. It was suggested that one area that could be reviewed is how engaged mariners should be in Stiletto maintenance. While there were never any problems during the deployment, there were conflicting viewpoints at certain times.
  

The report goes on to note some injuries occurred during operations of the ship, mostly contributed to rough seas and the RHIB that nobody was happy with.

Just as important are the ideas behind using the Stiletto.

• All explained that while Stiletto was not able to participate in any interdiction opportunities in the Colombian area, if Stiletto was employed in an area with littoral waters - that would be the prime location to be most effective. This was evidenced by Stiletto’s involvement in an interdiction in the Florida Straits. As one individual stated, “two days in the right area is better than 45 days in the wrong environment.” Many individuals suggested new locations to include the Bahamas, Florida Straits, and areas surrounding Cuba, northern Antilles and Puerto Rico. Each of these areas offers a lower sea state, and provides a prime environment for targeting suspected drug traffickers.
• All interviewees explained that Stiletto should not be used as a patrolling vessel; rather Stiletto should be used for response and intelligence queuing only. One person explained that Stiletto should “be used like a sniper rifle or missile” i.e., aimed at a specific target rather than patrolling.
• Several interviewees explained that it would be good to add additional port stops or ports to a future Stiletto deployment. Adding additional stops would require extra logistics support, but many agreed it would be worth it for several reasons including ability to replace/exchange crew members, provide multiple opportunities for crew rest, potential opportunity to work with new partners etc.
• Several interviewees explained that for Stiletto be an effective vessel, she must have ballistic protection and an organic weapons and/or defense capability, or at the very least her current on-board weapons and sensor systems must be expanded. Though these factors have drawbacks such as additional weight and issue of who has authorization to control weapons, it was agreed this is imperative.
• Multiple interviewees agreed that Stiletto must be able to deploy for several days at a time, rather than just for eight hours at a time. In order to be self-sufficient for several days, this would require additional changes such as: berthing, a mess facility, and the ability to refuel at sea which could be facilitated by moving the refueling location from the starboard side to a more accessible location on the vessel.
• All agreed Stiletto’s communication suite must be upgraded to include, at a minimum, more secure SATCOMs, a secure fax, and ideally secure chat. It was imperative to many that Stiletto must have a SIPR terminal if she is to be an effective node in the counter-narcotics environment.
• Many recommended that the radar onboard Stiletto be updated to a “better” radar package; Stiletto must have military grade radar on board, and not one used by commercial fisherman. One person suggested the best method of finding the most appropriate radar is to “take a look at the operational environment and pick the radar that works best in that particular environment.”
• Many agreed that Stiletto should be more light-weight, and a common recommendation was to purchase a new more lightweight RHIB. An additional recommendation was to utilize, in the future, a multi-task crew or for the crew to hold multiple roles in order to reduce the forward footprint

The report cites a recommendation to add a UAV in addition to the radar system, and improve the platform for night operations with a number of recommendations. Since Stiletto was only able to operate in 8 hour intervals, it could be argued the night-ops upgrades were not necessary for this operational test.

The report concentrates on three areas where I've decided not to quote much information. The first is the specific electronics and technology issues the Stiletto faced during its operational test. This is cited throughout the report as a major limitation, particularly during the ships deployment to Columbia. The second aspect is the RHIB. The report has a laundry list of reasons that sums up the RHIB as a "piece of shit that floats" and it was an ongoing problem from the beginning. The third aspect of the report discussed in detail, enough detail I'm hesitant to publish details..., regarding the operations in Columbia. While there is probably some great discussions there, the Navy is still uncomfortable with blogs so I'm going to refrain from posting those details, for now.

Finally, some platform observations:

• The crew covered 6,000 nm while underway on Stiletto.
• When the seas were calm, Stiletto could transit very quickly; they were able to “get somewhere very fast.”
• The range of operations was shorter than expected because Stiletto’s top speed was less than they originally anticipated. A mission typically requires eight hours. However onboard Stiletto in this deployment, it “took two hours to transit out and two hours to RTB, leaving four hours to patrol.” Crew members suggested that four hours to patrol is not enough time on-station to have success.
• Most of the deployment time was spent patrolling with Stiletto 12 miles offshore in an area with 4 ft seas, which reduced Stiletto’s speed advantage.
• Stiletto became a “responsive” asset, due in part to lack of secure data which limited mission planning at sea.
• The Stiletto team reported that they had “RHIB launch/recovery down to a science.” The crew reported that RHIB recoveries always present risk, and they were able to successfully launch and recover the RHIB.
• The team conducted the RHIB launching in 6-8 ft seas, and another in occasional 8-ft seas. They reported that while it is typically too risky to conduct RHIB launch / recoveries in sea states this high, it could be done onboard Stiletto in “life or death” situations.
• There was one particular mission where the Stiletto had a go-fast target; Stiletto was in port and launched. After transiting out and seeing the rough sea state, the Chief made a decision that the water was too rough and to turn back - a decision that the LEDET team supported. At the same time, other COL support and military vessels, including a Midnight Express, turned back as well.
• In regards to the Florida Straits mission: USCG Sector Key West (KW) “got Stiletto for two days to conduct patrols.” During that time, the Army mariners work with four USCG groups, two from D7 TACLET and two from Sector KW. On the second day, another two came from the USCG operations center. In the morning of Day One Stiletto participated in a demo with the evaluation team and other DVs, and in the afternoon it patrolled the area. The morning served as integration training for the mariner crew and USCG members. On Day 2 Stiletto went northwest toward Williams Island, capitalizing on its shallow draft capability; during that time, Stiletto used D7 for law enforcement, not Sector KW. Stiletto was approximately five miles offshore Andros Island when the crew visually spotted a target; they then found it on FLIR (never saw the target using the radar). They chased this vessel in the shallow waters for approximately 15-20 minutes. When the suspect could not lose Stiletto, he then turned north toward Marathon in the open waters. However the waters proved to be too rough for the go-fast. The sea state was approximately 2-3 feet, and Stiletto was moving at 42.4 kts. At this rate and in these conditions, Stiletto was able to apprehend go-fast within two hours. Also involved in the apprehension was Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) aircraft; the aircraft had been flying overhead when it saw the Stiletto chase. After contacting Stiletto and learned it was not training they were watching, CBP assisted with the interdiction. Additional assistance came from Sector KW, OPVAC (USARSO Counter-Drug program) and three USGC members. There was also another go-fast on scene that other USCG officials apprehended. Once concluded, DEA officials said that the individuals apprehended were actually TOIs that had been identified earlier.

Finally we conclude with this.

• Several reasons for the lack of interdiction and counter-drug activities in the Colombian area were given by interviewees. Some suggested that Colombian police and Navy vessels were in the region at the same time, either warding away potential suspects or apprehending them without Stiletto’s assistance. Others suggested that people in Colombia knew Stiletto was in the area because of information leaks. As an example, the crew stated that one could “Google Stiletto and find updated data, pictures etc. The Saturday evening before Stiletto deployed [we] painted the roof a white color; by that Monday, pictures of Stiletto with a white roof were on the internet.” When the crew researched Stiletto, they found deployment dates and port stops listed online. Additionally others suggested that the lack of interdictions may be due to the stealth-like appearance of Stiletto because it attracts a lot of attention. “It was impossible for Cartagena citizens to not know about Stiletto. To pull into port there, you have to pull by all the high rises. We deployed at all hours, day and night; it was too cool looking for people not to know we were there.”

Welcome to 4GW at sea. This last part was one aspect I nearly didn't post, except to add context to the discussion. This is a good example why these platforms would be better suited for operations from a sea base. Stiletto is a stealth ship, but by the testimony of the ships own crew the stealth advantage was impaired in part by the MK 0 eyeball, the bane of stealth for any surface ship at sea.

Following Operation Continuing Promise

David Axe and Chris Albon continue their reporting from the USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) and have put out some outstanding stories. The depth and quality of the reporting that blogging is allowing the Navy cannot be understated, because not only are the tough questions being asked, but the right questions are being asked.

We think this is exactly the kind of public discussion the Navy wants to have, and needs to have regarding its soft power strategy.

I wanted to know whether the mission is even a good fit for the military. Sure, Damstra’s people, representing a dozen different military forces, are undoubtedly highly skilled. But they’re soldiers, sailors and airmen, for the most part trained to look after other sick and injured soldiers, sailors and airmen. These doctors wear uniforms. Some of them are even trained to carry weapons. But where we’re going, there are just sick civilians, whose only previous exposure to a military might have been in less, ahem, friendly circumstances. In light of this, can military personnel really make good humanitarians?

All over the world, many agencies have answered this question with a resounding NO. In Central Africa, civilian aid workers are often reluctant to work alongside military peacekeeping forces because they don’t want their charity associated with weapons, uniforms and potentially oppressive governments. The U.N. doesn’t allow the E.U. army in Chad to enter the very refugee camps that the troops are supposed to protect. They all fear the creeping “militarization” of what should be strictly peaceful functions. Even U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates last month warned against a similar militarization of U.S. foreign policy, which he said should remain squarely in the hands of the (unarmed) State Department.

So can military personnel make good humanitarians? [Commander David] Damstra thought about it for a moment then said, yes...

Read the whole thing, that is a brilliant blog piece analyzing important questions.

You can also find pictures at War and Health, while Tom Crowe (another blogger traveling with the Kearsarge) has a ton of pictures up with clever captions.

On the Horizon

The blog appears to have recovered, as news has it the gremlins of Google knocked a number of blogs down. We know the DDG-1000/DDG-51 discussion is one topic many want to talk about, but we are going to hold off for now.

Originally we had intended to beat the weekend with a handful of observations, because as we read the news, we do believe we have something to add to the conversation. That plan didn't happen due to the blogger issue. Plan B is in the works.

Meanwhile, time to get back to business.

While still low on the radar, the USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) departs on its humanitarian deployment to SOUTHCOM next week, and we intend to showcase the adventures of those bloggers as a theme. We are not sure who all the bloggers are, but will be getting that data as soon as it is available. We do know that David Axe, BostonMaggie, and Chris Albon are three of the potentially 10 bloggers part of the first segment. As we understand the process, there are multiple legs of the trip and various bloggers have made arrangements to come and go as part of that deployment, which is around 2 months total.

In particular, we note the questions Chris Albon has listed in that link above. Are these medical diplomacy deployments cost effective uses of Naval power? These are the type of questions I asked Admiral Morgan in a blogger roundtable in March, and I believe they are important questions. The Navy is a weapon in the soft power arsenal, that is the history of naval power. However, does that mean $30 million dollar hospital ship cruises or security training with regional partners? Which roles are best suited for the Navy, perhaps both?

In the past when we discussing naval soft power, there has been a tendency to jump straight to the equipment discussion regarding what ships should be managing these soft power mission profiles, and in particular many have asked is it really the role of a LHD.

We think that is skipping step one, the question is what are the best tactics for naval soft power in the 21st century. Measuring the success of the tactics, like medical diplomacy, is what the Navy needs to do first. Only when the Navy gets the tactics right is the discussion for platforms appropriate. We tend to think there must be ways of measuring success beyond statistics of patients treated, or polling data of public opinion following a medical diplomacy mission. We do not know what those ways to measure are, and we could be wrong, and those are the metrics to measure. Between David, Chris, and Maggie we should get a good range of impressions regarding the deployment, and we expect it will be fun following.

SOUTHCOM, as usual, is way ahead of the game with its strategic communications of what the Navy is doing. Another dynamic we intend to observe of this deployment is the effect of Web 2.0 from a ship on deployment. There are other things we are looking for as well, but the dynamics here go beyond a handful of folks on a Navy cruise. This is the national power by sea that has Hugo Chavez worried, not the massive US Navy battle group sailing off his coast, rather the best of what represents the United States exporting the American spirit to his backyard. He should be worried, because the USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) was invited to every port it will be visiting.

Update: Wow that was horribly written, the post has been cleaned up somewhat. I'll not blog next time I've had a Friday bender...

SOUTHCOM Scores Again

Do we give SOUHCOM too much credit? It has been suggested by an anonymous emailer that we do, but when news like this happens it only reinforces why we believe SOUTHCOM is doing an excellent job.

Three American hostages rescued from leftist guerrillas in Colombia were back in the United States Wednesday, more than five years after their plane went down in rebel-held jungle.

They returned to the U.S. late Wednesday, as their plane landed at Lackland Air Force Base shortly after 11 p.m. All appeared well as they exited the Air Force C-17 without fanfare. The men were flown by choppers to Brooke Army Medical Center in San Antonio, where they were expected to undergo tests and be reunited with their families.

The best analysis can be found at the Counterterrorism Blog. Essentially, this is what I would call five really good reads on how to put this into context and consider the details.

Colombia Rescues Ingrid Betancourt and Three US Hostages By Jonathan Winer

FARC is FARC'd: Assessing the Hostage Rescue By Aaron Mannes

Details on Colombia Hostage Operation Right Out of Spy Thriller By Jonathan Winer

The Importance of the Colombian Rescue Mission By Douglas Farah

Questions About the Rescue in Colombia By Aaron Mannes

As for whoever has been sending the anonymous email complaining we give SOUTHCOM too much credit, we will make a deal. When they stop making us look smarter for constantly pointing out how SOUTHCOM is taking smart strategic approaches fighting 21st century conflicts with a 21st century style, we will stop giving them credit. Until then, pay attention, because this is one command with lessons worth learning.

Well done everyone, and welcome home to Marc Gonsalves, Thomas Howes and Keith Stansell.

Observing The Navy's Global Soft Power Deployments

Captain Bob has brought sexy back to Civil Service Mariners (as the photo highlights) and as the first comment highlights his wife would agree. The blog for the USNS Mercy (T-AH 19) is a really good daily read. Yesterday the Mercy spent her last day in Vietnam and is on its way to Singapore. As we have been observing the deployment of the USNS Mercy (T-AH 19), we have found a tremendous amount of media attention given to Operation Smile in Vietnam. It took us a little while to figure out why, but it turns out Cindy McCain, leveraging some of that celebrity status she has during the presidential campaign, helped promote it. In fact, the Miss Universe contestants also helped promote it. Whoever is responsible for the marketing for the deployment is doing an ace job! Meghan McCain has some very good pictures of the work Operation Smile did there, about half way down on that link. Meghan, next time take a few pictures of the ship!

The ship that will execute the second SOUTHCOM Global Fleet Mission deployment departed Norfolk on Friday. We have previously discussed the creativity taking place under Admiral Stavridis's command. First it was using HSV Swift as a Global Fleet Station platform, then it was using Stiletto for chasing down drug runners, then it was the use of airships for surveillance, and now it deploying a Rescue and Salvage Ship, specifically the USNS Grasp (T-ARS 51), for what is being called Navy Diver-Global Fleet Station 2008. The divers are from the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command's Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit Two and Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group Two. Good luck to Capt. Jose Delfaus, we look forward to news from the Caribbean during this deployment.

The USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) is helping out following the Tsunami destruction in the central Philippines. I've read in some places this is overkill for a Carrier Strike Group, but I think that is a bad read of the situation. Does it require an aircraft carrier? Nope. However, it sends exactly the right signal regionally, that the US Navy will be there when they are needed, in force if necessary and with help when possible. Given the conditions right now in the Pacific, with a massive naval force involved in RIMPAC and North Korea blowing up their nuclear coolers, one wonders where else the strike group should be instead?

Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) is in Singapore in the middle of an 11-day exercise that will focus on anti-air, anti-surface, and anti-submarine warfare and security operations. While we aren't certain, we believe the exercise ends Thursday and these sailors will get the 4th of July off. The exercises includes 13 ships and 1 submarine. US forces for the exercise include the coast guard cutter Morgenthau (WHEC 722), USS Jarrett (FFG 33), USS Tortuga (LSD 46), USS Ford (FFG 54) and USS McCampbell (DDG 85). The USNS Safeguard (T-ARS 50), which had been expected to participate in the exercises, was sent to the Philippines to help with the ferry that overturned and killed several hundred. You can follow the news from CARAT on the Commander Task Force 73 news website, which is frequently updated with news believe it or not.

Finally, there are some discussions and observations that suggest elements of the USS Nassau Expeditionary Strike Group are on their way to the Gulf of Guinea, in fact already in the Atlantic Ocean. Due to press coverage in that region being limited at best, while we believe this is a planned aspect of the Nassau ESG deployment, given recent security concerns regionally one never knows if the mission profile has changed. The Coast Guard cutter Dallas (WHEC 716) is in the region as part of the ongoing U.S. Naval Forces Europe's Africa Partnership Station (APS) initiative. There has been no media coverage of the Dallas since it completed an exercise with the Cape Verde Coast Guard on June 17th. A lot of stuff happened in the region after June 17th.

The Navy's New Airship

Airship Management Service has a ~$1 million dollar contract to test an airship in the surveillance role for the Navy and Coast Guard off the Florida coast. From Reuters:

The Navy is leasing a Skyship 600, about the size of a Boeing 747, for the six-week test mission between Florida's southern coast and Cuba, Coast Guard Lt. Matthew Moorlag said on Tuesday.

The manned ship is held aloft by nonflammable helium and propelled by two Porsche 930 engines that consume 10 to 12 gallons of regular gasoline per hour.

While the airship is said to be able to operate for up to 52 hours without refueling, indications are it will run for periods no longer than 8 hours. The airship is said to be able to do up to 57 mph and will operate at an altitude of 1,500 to 3,000 feet.

Credit those SOUTHCOM folks... they continue to think out of the box. For the record, we think that thing needs a paint job.

Campbell, Zeppelin, call your office.

Update: Brickmuppet has more.

The SOUTHCOM Coaling Station

Sometimes a picture and caption tells a narrative and expands the imagination. Credit SOUTHCOM, these guys are being very creative. It almost has me looking forward to the return of Sea Fighter just to see what it can do when untied from its role as technology demonstrator for modularity.

We are always interested in operations involving small naval vessels, because whenever someone official begins talking about anything less than 9,000 tons, the Navy suggests it doesn't want to duplicate the efforts of the Coast Guard. We believe that argument lacks imagination, a characteristic that SOUTHCOM continues to demonstrate an abundance of in executing maritime strategy during peacetime.

This picture and caption gives the impression SOUTHCOM is using Guantanamo Bay in the role as a coaling station for the Stiletto. If it can be done at Guantanamo Bay for the Caribbean, we wonder why the same concept wouldn't work at Djibouti, Bahrain, or Ascension Island for other small, but longer range assets addressing peacetime challenges near those areas. Note, it doesn't have to be the M-80, as many comments have pointed out many times, the Asheville class was only twice this size.

GUANTANAMO BAY, Cuba (June 11, 2024) Stiletto sits pier side during a refueling before conducting counter-illicit trafficking operations in the Caribbean. Stiletto is a one-of-a-kind, experimental vessel designed for high-speed special operative amphibious insertions operated by Army mariners assigned to the 7th Sustainment Brigade, 10th Mountain Division in Fort Eustis, Va. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Nat Moger

And while we are pondering naval eye candy... this visual of Life Imitating Art is outstanding.

Admiral Encourages Sailors to Blog

We observe him to be one of the most innovative thinkers serving in a major command today. To borrow a phrase from Mike, in many ways we see him as the Navy's Petraeus, and by that we mean he is a rising star leveraging innovative approaches in applying a smart soft power strategy to a region the US needs to be better connected with. An unknown to most Americans, we have stated many times we believe he will be the next CNO, despite the snark against SWOs after three in a row as CNO. His book is sitting on my stack, 2nd from the top, and I'm still looking forward to reading it.

Adm. James Stavridis, the four-star chief of U.S. Southern Command, had some interesting words today about blogging at the US Naval Institute sponsored 2008 Joint Warfighting Conference & Exposition.

The four-star chief of U.S. Southern Command urged service members to become published writers and bloggers at a three-day conference of the U.S. Naval Institute beginning here Tuesday.

Adm. James Stavridis, author of several guides and books on the Navy, said it’s important for members of the military, contractors and retirees to “read, think, write and publish.”

But this is the money quote:

Either through published works or through weblogs, the goal is an exchange of ideas, knowledge and information — such as on the participator-driven Wikipedia, he said.

“No one of us is as smart as all of us together,” he said. “The speed of ideas you can get in the blogs is remarkable.”

He gets it, that last sentence is on the money, and the primary reason we value the commenters of this blog so much. Without input and opinions, the contribution of content by just us would severely limit the value of this blog to the naval conversations we have. Blogging is about building communities of ideas, or the dissemination of information towards a positive contribution.

When it comes to the blogger roundtable discussions, we have noticed that among the few discussions the Navy has had to date, the majority (yes three makes a majority 1, 2, 3) have centered around activity taking place under the umbrella of the Southern Command. We also observe the Admirals comments are very consistent, one thing probably not well known is that LCDR Heidi Lenzini, the public affairs officer for SOUTHCOM, has been remarkably open to bloggers. Examples of this will be more evident later this year. We think it is very unlikely the Admirals comments and the PAOs initiatives are unrelated.

I'm still waiting to see an official blogs though. Lt. Cmdr van Avery has done an excellent job, and we read Captain Willey's blog daily, but these two make up a rare pair in the Navy. I'm not going to tell the Navy how to run their shop, but if I was that guy, I'd instruct every webmaster to strive for this kind of excellence, and I'd give the PAOs a blog on such a fine website to publish contributions from.

We see some irony that Adm. Stavridis would talk to the folks at the USNI about blogging, because one of the biggest complaints we hear all the time about the USNI is how so many articles written for Proceedings have been purchased over the years, but never published. I can think of at least a dozen people in the last month who have emailed us to remind us they see the USNI as a place where thoughtful published works go to die. Once purchased, those thoughtful pieces cannot be utilized elsewhere, so essentially the USNI has a reputation for preventing "ideas, knowledge and information" from being widely discussed, because if purchased but never printed, the work is wasted and lost to the writer. Maybe the USNI needs a blog to get all those purchased but not published works a place a place to see the light. Should the USNI go that route, we'd suggest Jim Dolbow could be editor. If that is a non-starter, perhaps Jim can talk the board into allowing us to publish all those old articles laying around on behalf of the USNI. Worst case scenario, the USNI gets more submissions once people realize what they write will see the light whether published in Proceedings or not.

One final thought, with Adm. Stavridis bringing up the topic of naval blogging, given there really aren't very many blogs out there dedicated to the naval centric subjects, and on the slim possibility the Admiral is a casual reader, maybe he would entertain the idea of signing a couple copies of his book? I'll buy the books and pay for the shipping. After all, signed copies of the book would make a great item to auction off for Valour-IT.

4th Fleet Green Water Strategy

Today, I observed the winds of change. In today's blogger roundtable, SteelJaw Scribe was unable to attend, but he had submitted his questions and it was read anyway. The response captured the various angles of 4th Fleets Green Water Strategy.

Q: "With the decline of the supporting infrastructure in the region and the closure of naval stations Roosevelt Roads and Rodman, et cetera, how sustainable do you see the Fourth Fleet's small unit presence in the AOR, particularly outside the Caribbean?"

A: I would think that if you do an analysis of the countries -- I mean, 15 years ago, there wasn't any democracies in Central or South America, period. And this year, if you look, you'll see just about all democracies with the exception of one and a couple that are very, very far left. But that is the good thing. And the good thing about that is that they welcome the United States into their ports, and so the at-sea sustainment really isn't an issue.

However, if you look at, you know, the capabilities that the United States have -- has if you have have a big-deck amphibious ship, if you have aircraft carriers, if you have high-speed vessels, then essentially you can kind of have your own afloat staging base, where, you know, acting as mother ships and can refuel ships, and we can maintain our presence down here, and we can maintain our cooperation through exercises and training venues and what have you.

So I think it's dependent, and I think that's the huge value that our Navy brings in some of its core competencies, which is its forward presence and the ability to sail anywhere, any time and sustain itself.

(PDF Transcript)

Our initial impressions of the Navy standing up 4th Fleet was one in the context of leadership and strategy. After participating in today's blogger roundtable on the subject, I think our instincts on this was right. Rear Adm. James Stevenson is very impressive, after speaking with him I admit a bit of frustration that he is retiring, and hope that in his next profession he finds a useful medium to articulate his strategic ideas regarding leveraging the Sea as Base as clearly as he did today. The strategic vision for naval Sea Basing he discussed during the roundtable regarding operations for the 4th Fleet could have been ripped right from the content of this blog, and there were a few times that I had a huge cheesy grin on my face listening to him speak.

Based on our observations of previous deployments for SOUTHCOM, the leadership style and priorities of Adm. Stavridis, and the appointment of Rear Adm. Joseph Kernan, we believe 4th Fleet is about to execute a very unique Green Water Strategy that may serve as a model for peacetime strategy in the 21st Century. Adm. Stevenson continuously highlighted the value of amphibious forces during today's roundtable, but when speaking of them in an operational context outlined the strategic value they bring to peacetime operations. With access to regional ports, with good relations with many regional neighbors, 4th Fleet is taking an engagement approach across the spectrum ranging from security cooperation to proactive humanitarian impact while it deals with the low end naval requirements of dealing with illicit trafficking.

The engagement by the US Navy to the 4th Fleet AOR is well known historically for response to natural disasters. Whether hurricanes, mudslides, earthquakes, forest fires, or flooding; the 4th fleet AOR brings a range of peacemaking challenges to the Navy to be responsive in peacetime. The value of amphibious forces for meeting these challenges was continuously articulated by Adm. Stevenson.

While this sounds good, we foresee some major challenges in execution here. We do not believe the Navy will be able to sustain forward deployed amphibious ships to 4th Fleet, there simply aren't enough amphibious ships to do that. We would also note that every metric Adm. Stevenson listed regarding why he likes amphibious ships is virtually every metric the Littoral Combat Ship doesn't offer for peacetime missions in the future. In that context, we see the 4th fleet strategy having well defined ends and ways but lacking the means either presently or in the future to execute strategy. It will be interesting to observe how the Navy addresses that issue, or even recognizes it as an issue before it is too late to do something about it.

During the roundtable the only issue discussed that really bothered me is that 4th Fleet is commanded by a 2-star billet, not a 3-star billet like other fleets. I missed this during the announcement, and I think that decision sends the wrong message. It is something that should be addressed, although I think there may be a Congressional requirement for that. It doesn't make sense to elevate a peacetime strategy to equal levels of wartime strategy as stated in 21st Century Seapower, stand up a new fleet with the peacetime strategic purpose in mind, and then fall short in equality for leadership billets. Consistency is important, and when there is evidence of a lack of consistency in regards to maritime strategy, in serves only to weaken the strategy.

4th Fleet represents the first major decision for CNO Roughead, as all other major initiatives have been inherited. While we think the decision to go 2-star is one in need of correction, we see the establishment of 4th Fleet as positive for the Navy. We believe the strategic vision 4th Fleet will execute for peacetime sustained presence and engagement will be quite different than what is traditionally associated with the deployment of naval forces to other regions, and will be more evident compared to the token SOUTHCOM deployments of the past. We look forward to observing the strategy for leveraging maritime forces in what is primarily a green water operational theater, and believe we will get a good early peek into the strategic vision for 4th Fleet this summer as hurricane season approaches.

There was some other news from the roundtable, including Unitas Gold (50) next year being hosted off the Jacksonville coast, the next Global Fleet Station to South America using a diving ship as a platform, and more information regarding the Kearsarge/Boxer deployments to South America. We got the impression the Kearsarge deployment will be timed with Hurricane season in mind prepared to respond to any potential disaster zones. In all it was an interesting conversation.

Another Amphib For the Humanitarian Mission

The next humanitarian mission to SOUTHCOM appears to be in final preparations, and once again we see an amphibious ship deploying without Marines. This time the Navy is sending a LHD.

Sailors and Marines aboard USS Boxer (LHD 4) began loading more than $139,000 of "Project Handclasp" supplies April 15 in preparation for their humanitarian and civic assistance mission to Central and South America this summer. Established by the U.S. Navy in 1962, Project Handclasp's primary mission is collecting and coordinating the distribution of humanitarian, educational and goodwill materials to those in need. The program uses empty cargo space on U.S. Navy ships to transport the materials to Navy ports of call.

Materials to supplement basic necessities like food, clothing and hygienic items are donated by America's private sector at no-cost to the government and personally distributed by Sailors and Marines to those in need overseas. Lt. Cmdr. Matt Brown, U.S. Southern Command's (USSOUTHCOM) Project Handclasp desk officer, said the upcoming deployment will continue the United States' successful policy of providing humanitarian assistance to our neighbors in Central and South America.

Either there is more to the deployment than the reported humanitarian focus, or it is time to have a debate regarding what ship types to deploy for humanitarian deployments. The LHD is the second largest conventionally powered combat ship in the US Navy inventory behind the Kitty Hawk, the third largest conventionally powered aviation platform in the world. If we believe this is solely a humanitarian mission, this appears to be the most expensive way to conduct a peacetime proactive humanitarian deployment. Using a LHD solely for a proactive humanitarian deployment is like flying a B-1 bomber to Guam for the sole purpose of delivering mail.

Obviously we believe there will be more going on with the USS Boxer (LHD 4) SOUTHCOM deployment than a humanitarian mission.