Al Qaeda Calls For Naval Terror Cells

Eagle1 highlights this report and offers some excellent analysis regarding a topic that may reshape the calculus in the Persian Gulf. The day after the incident in the Gulf involving shots fired from the SS Westward Venture at small boats reported to be the color blue in the Persian Gulf, MEMRI noted some internet traffic we believe is very critical to the information stream of events taking place.

On April 26, 2008, the Islamist website Al-Ikhlas posted an article from Jihad Press, an e-journal reportedly linked to Al-Qaeda, which urges the mujahideen to establish naval terror cells. The article argues that gaining control over the seas and sea passages - especially around the Arabian Peninsula - is a vital step towards renewing the global Islamic caliphate.

It points out that such operations are feasible, because Yemeni groups have already carried out successful attacks against oil tankers, tourist vessels, and commercial vessels in the Gulf of Aden; and other jihad fighters have carried out "two successful attacks on Zionist-Crusader targets in the [territorial] waters of Yemen: ...the attack on the American destroyer [USS] Cole in October 2000, and the [attack on the] French oil tanker Limburg in 2002."

The article adds: "As we draw near to the [crucial] hour when the leadership of the Zionist-Crusader campaign will be dragged to the [negotiation] table to accept the [mujahideen's] terms... it is necessary to [extend] the battle to the seas. The mujahideen have successfully established units of martyrdom-seekers on land; the sea is the next strategic step towards controlling the world and restoring the Islamic caliphate."

Finally, the article stresses that the seas off the coast of Yemen, namely the Gulf of Aden, the Bab Al-Mandeb strait and the Red Sea are of supreme strategic importance in the campaign to expel the enemy from key locations. If the enemy loses these key areas, it explains, "he will not be able to defend himself on land and [to protect] his naval bases from the mujahideens' attack."

We observe a memo like this can change the calculus for Naval forces operating in the 5th Fleet, and should be a serious concern to all nations in the region. Lets assume that the mujahideen has heard of blue paint, a safe assumption, and decides to buy the very common fast speed boats used by both the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Pasdaran forces and pirates in Somalia.

What happens when they approach in formation a small task force of US surface ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz? When we observed the incident in January involving the three US Naval vessels and the Iranian small boats, we gave credit to the intelligence and training for being prepared for tense situations but keeping their cool when faced what appears to be threatening behavior. We note that the intelligence of that time made it almost a certainty those craft are Iranian and will not conduct a suicide attack. Now that Al Qaeda is establishing what are almost certainly small suicide boat forces, what do you think intelligence and training is going to tell these sailors to do next time? Unfortunately, the only legitimate answer is blow them to hell.

This should be a real concern for Iran, because if they do not want war they would immediately inform their IRGC naval forces that unprofessional behavior like what occurred in January could be the trigger for escalating conflict. If President Bush doesn't send a warning to Iran in this regard over the next few days, Harry Reid or one of the Presidential Candidates would be an absolute fool not to, because unless you truly believe Al Qaeda has never heard of blue paint, this is exactly the kind of situation the asymmetrical style that Al Qaeda is known to capitalize on. If Iran and Al Qaeda elements are truly enemies as claimed by many, then clearly they see high tensions and military exchange between Iran and the US to their advantage. An Al Qaeda suicide boat painted blue striking at a major US Naval vessel in the region appears to be an obvious tactic by Al Qaeda waiting to happen. Iran should be put on notice regarding the risks of unprofessional behavior at sea, as should all mariners.

Another major problem with this development occurs if Al Qaeda begins to conduct operations against unarmed commercial traffic, specifically large tankers very common in those seas. We have highlighted how the US Navy has shrunk due to its focus on an all battleship Navy many times, and how the US Navy simply lacks enough forces to maintain an effective patrol against piracy. The lack of ships becomes even more evident if free trade by sea becomes threatened by terrorists with any consistency.

While terrorist attacks against commercial shipping is a threat to the US, we observe the large majority of shipping from that region has destination ports in Europe and Asia. It occurs to us that if Al Qaeda begins any kind of effective offensive maritime campaign against commercial traffic in that region, while the whole world will feel the economic effects due to rising insurance premiums, Al Qaeda is essentially making a declaration of war against Europe, and potentially China.

While we observe this has potential to be a very bad development in the long war against extremist groups, this is also a very good opportunity to build a larger maritime coalition to fight terrorism. It strike us that the Navy's new Maritime Strategy was well designed with exactly this purpose in mind, however, the resources of the US Navy are so out of balance that we may find our naval forces very poorly resourced to handle these kinds of maritime challenges. In our opinion, the Admirals need to get their maritime sea basing strategy resourced quickly with some smaller vessels ready to distribute and offer sustained forward presence against irregular threats. It has been 8 years since the Cole incident, long enough to be ready.

Lock and Load: Duncan Hunters Navy

We covered the renewal contract for the HSV Swift on Friday, but we didn't discuss the other contract announcement for the high speed vessel. On Friday along with the HSV Swift contract the Navy also spent the earmark funds of one Duncan Hunter on their soon to be commissioned FSF-1 Sea Fighter. We previously covered how Duncan Hunter would like to see his fleet of one commissioned into the Navy, and the resistance from the Navy towards that end. Congress usually wins though, and the Navy has been upgrading Duncan Hunters Navy using it as a test platform off Florida for the Littoral Combat Ships. Well, earmarks are being spent, and the Navy never refuses money unless it is for the Marines (bad joke).

International Systems LLC, DBA L-3 Communications Advanced Systems Division, San Diego, Calif., is being awarded a $20,036,760 cost plus fixed fee contract for the Sea Fighter Vessel modification. The purpose of this research is to design, integrate, and implement modifications to Sea Fighter that will improve ship survivability features and improve various hull, mechanical and electrical capabilities. Work will be performed in San Diego, Calif., and work is expected to be completed Apr. 2009. Contract funds will not expire at end of current fiscal year: This contract was competitively procured under Office of Naval Research Broad Agency Announcement 08-001. Office of Naval Research, Arlington, Va., is the contracting activity (N00014-08-C-0625).

As Defense Industry Daily points out, this money is probably being spent to make the ship more survivable. We don't like earmarks, so we give Duncan Hunter a hard time on this, and if this ship had been shoved on the Navy through the regular Navy budget we would be OK with that. However, despite being an earmark and a ship the Navy doesn't want, we are happy to see the ship getting 'armed up' and hopefully it will be 'forward deployed.' This is what Duncan Hunters website has to say on the subject.

The Sea Fighter, formerly known as X-Craft, is a high speed, shallow draft vessel for littoral warfare. Deployment of the Sea Fighter can demonstrate and validate many of the Navy’s operational concepts for littoral warfare, and more specifically reduce risk in the Littoral Combat Ship program. Funding will be used to add offensive and defensive armament, improve ship survivability systems, and complete command and control.

In particular, we observe that the Sea Fighter could do some good fighting pirates, because as a high speed vessel able to support RHIBs and has deck space to land two helicopters. Why do we like Sea Fighter a hell of a lot more than the LCS? I got into some talks awhile back with some good folks at L-3. OK so I gave them shit like this blog does about being an earmark away from a new contract, but still...

They insist, with NVR changes and everything the Sea Fighter can be mass produced with 4 or more a year, armed up with CEC, at $130 million. At that price, you can build 10 advanced Sea Fighters and a LPD-17 for the price of one DDG-1000. Those 11 ships, supposed by a DDG-51, a T-AKE, and a T-AO and you will kick the snot out of any small war situation from piracy to special forces support from the sea, and btw, those 14 ships represent a hell of a sea base in a strategic sense that is ready for action.

Instead the Navy uses 2-4 big AEGIS destroyers supported by a LSD to do the work, and depends on other nations to support security operations. The Navy can do better, and needs to learn to do small wars on the cheap. Sea Fighter is one alternative towards those ends.

Strategic Sea Basing Enables Fleet Constitution Evolution

As bad as we thought Proceedings was last year, this year the publication has made a comeback with a vengeance. I get a considerable amount of email from active duty officers O-6 and below who love to rant against Proceedings. My recommendation, don't cancel your subscription, and if you already did, think seriously about subscribing again. Either Robert Timberg has grown in his role as editor, which is likely, or the Board has given some advice to refocus content to insure relevance in wartime, which is also possible. For whatever reason, April 08 had some of the best articles I have read in years, and so far I think May 08 is great. If you get locked out of any links from this blog to Proceedings, that means its time for you to subscribe.

As a creature of habit, I always dive into the comments section first to read responses to previous articles, and this one advocates something we have been discussing privately. About a month ago I wrote an article regarding our vision of Sea Basing as a strategic concept.

Our position reflects a belief that strategic speed for strike groups is more important than tactical speed on platforms, and strategic speed is achieved through forward deployed, well resourced, sustained presence. We believe Sea Basing is best developed bottom-up, not top down. We believe that with a bottom-up approach, the Navy and Marines will evolve capabilities that scale from small wars to major power war, and effectively address the unknown variables contained in each that will only be identified through operations. The capabilities desired for the Marines have been well defined within the context of Sea Basing as two MEB assault. We like this as a goal to work towards, but not as a standard to build first. What we have not observed to date with the emergence of the Marine Corps Sea Basing vision is joint integration.

We believe the Navy should resource to integrate joint supporting elements as Sea Basing evolves bottom-up toward major war scenarios involving the Marine Corps. Examples would include NECC roles including riverine and construction, forward air controllers and related equipment, EOD teams and equipment, SOCOM forces and equipment, and integrated agency follow-on support.

In developing a strategic approach for Sea Basing, the bottom-up approach for Sea Basing establishes the bottom as the logistical supply and repair, command and control, and reconnaissance enabler for naval forces to forward deploy smaller vessels in forward theaters to address irregular warfare environments. We base this assessment on historical analysis ranging from operation Game Warden in the 60s, but also Earnest Will in the 80s, modern afloat staging bases off east Africa today, but even going back to the naval activity in the early 1800s off Tripoli examples can be found.

As a strategic concept for the Navy Sea Basing becomes the Command and Control, but also logistical enabler for small vessels and unmanned platforms in forward theaters. We envision the starting place for this concept to be the large mothership, what amounts to an independent Forward Operating Base at Sea. While we envision motherships to carry unmanned and manned platforms, it has been suggested a well designed large mothership should also be designed to support and sustain patrol ships for independent operations. It is on the patrol ships topic Proceedings has an interesting comment in the May 08 issue.

I read Rear Admiral Holland's article as I was finishing a deployment as CO of the USS Siroco (PC-6). The more I read about the Littoral Combat Ship, and the problems associated with the program, the more I am convinced what we need is more Cyclone-class coastal patrol ships (PCs). The PCs are the ultimate littoral combat ship, with a shallow draft of nine feet, plenty of speed (approximately 35 knots), and the right manning (28 Sailors). In addition, PCs are highly maneuverable, fast, and they pack a punch with a 25-mm MK38, 25-mm MK96, twin .50-caliber mounts, 240B mounts, and MK19 grenade launchers. Navy leadership should take a closer look at this program, conduct minor improvements to the engineering plant and weapon systems, and build 15 or 20 more ships. PCs can perform most littoral missions such as oil platform protection, maritime security operations, close combat support of riverine units, and shallow-water visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS).

Also, these ships, the smallest commissioned vessels the U.S. Navy currently operates, are great for interaction with smaller navies in the Arabian Gulf, Africa, and Latin America. The Cyclone class needs a few improvements such as a better communications system, a replacement for the MK38 mod 0, and a small portable missile system for surface engagement that would give it more reach or a small multiple rocket launching system that could be used against small boat formations. If the Navy really wants to get creative, a medium-endurance PC can be developed. It would be approximately 200 feet long, have a 12- to 14-foot draft, incorporate the same hull design of the current PCs, and have a combat craft recovery system or stern ramp. These heavier PCs should be equipped with the Rafael Typhoon Gun System, allowing them to accomplish point air defense and have a better surface warfare capability.

The bottom line is that the PCs are the original littoral combat ships and they are a proven design. They provide early command opportunities to junior surface warfare officers, and invaluable shiphandling, weapons, and multi-discipline training to the entire crew. They are tough, minimally manned, and cost a lot less than LCS. Let's build more of them!

There is a recent article in Newsweek by Christopher Dickey called Bluff and Bloodshed, The Persian Gulf is more dangerous than ever. Will the U.S. and Iran go to war at sea? While it is another story on how the Navy could escalate a full scale war with Iran over an accidental shooting, despite the fact the intent of the Navy's maritime strategy is to deescalate tensions, we found another aspect of the article excellent. We are huge fans of Herald Lee Wise's book Inside the Danger Zone: The U.S. Military in the Persian Gulf, 1987-1988. In our opinion, it is the best story of the Tanker Wars between the US and Iran from the 80s time period, and combined with The Night Stalkers by Michael J. Durant and Steven Hartov, one can get a real sense of the operations in that region during the Tanker Wars conflict period. Herald Lee Wise contributes some interesting insights to Christopher Dickey's article.

Low-tech weapons are effective in naval conflict.
"Modern technology remains weak at detecting undersea mines," says Wise. But mines are not the only problem. In the 1980s, as now, the Iranians used "swarming" tactics against larger merchant and naval vessels, sending relatively small boats at high speeds buzzing around and near the U.S. ships. The same thing happened in January this year, and possibly—the boats were never identified—just last week around a merchant ship on contract to the U.S. Navy.

Fight fire with fire.
In 1988 the most effective way to combat the Iranians turned out to be with weapons similar in scale to their own. Special Operations Forces using stealth helicopters from bases built on huge oil barges in the northern gulf effectively shut down Iranian mine-laying activity there.

By contrast, the billion-dollar guided missile cruiser USS Vincennes, gunning for Iranians near the Strait of Hormuz, fought a battle against a swarm of Iranian gunboats in July 1988 that was inconclusive.

What was memorable about that day was that in the heat of the moment the Vincennes mistook a civilian airliner overhead for an Iranian warplane and shot it down, killing all 290 people aboard.

We conduct many naval simulations, and in our simulations have tried to figure out what about the Littoral Combat Ship 3000 ton mothership concept would be superior to much larger motherships supported by PCs. Perhaps our simulations are flawed, but we note Millennium Challenge 2002 and the entire Streetfighter development argues multiple small forces enabled by C4ISR offer a number of tactical and strategic advantages over adversaries, but more importantly scales very well in addressing both small wars and major power war. We believe there is a role for patrol ships in the US Navy today, although we acknowledge for them to contribute, they will require Sea Based logistical and C2 solutions to be effective.

As the first picture in this article highlights, the Navy finds itself in a similar time period to that of the squadron of evolution. It has been a decade since the strategical and tactical ideas of our time were originally identified, and the Navy has only one more decade before the entire shipbuilding budget must be dedicated to replacing the most expensive part of the surface fleet as it ages out. We believe the Navy has all of the metrics and concepts for the surface fleet right, and unlike many we also believe the Navy has the strategy right. However, we believe the application of those metrics and concepts to strategy is flawed. There are a number of alternatives, and we don't claim to know which is better, but any alternative that chooses small combatants over big combatants, and large motherships over mini motherships is smarter than more battleships and an unrated flotilla. It is time for the Navy to align resources to strategy and patrol ships represent one way to align means with ends and ways for small wars at sea as outlined in strategy.

For Sea Basing that means realistic development and evolution. Today's ESG cannot even carry all the equipment for a modern MEU, and tomorrows ESG won't be able to either. Shouldn't both the Marines and the Navy establish what is required just to conduct an assault with one MEU against a hostile coast before both jump straight to 2 MEBs? How many small craft equipment sorties will be required to clear a beach from mines? How many UUVs are required to clear the sea of mines for a LCU to travel from the Sea Base to the shore? How quickly will air traffic controllers be able to deploy 200 miles in land with all equipment to support the new long range of MV-22s and Joint Strike Fighters? Sea Basing is going to be complicated, it includes much more than just the man and material of the Marines, because there is a rather long tail for the Navy extending well into land. With the 2 MEB Sea Basing concept consuming every resource for the Marines, what Joint capabilities are truly available in this strategy? In the 1980s against Iran, the Sea Basing platforms supported small Army helicopters, yet this transformation MPF(F) concept skipped that capability.

Sea Basing is going to be at least as complicated as Naval Aviation was to develop, yet instead of building the Langley, the Navy and Marines are developing a Nimitz. In our observations of proposed Sea Basing plans, the Navy and Marines have skipped over all of the various small war possibilities just to achieve the least likely, most difficult major war requirements. Shouldn't the services build up to this point rather than skip to it? Suggesting the highest end requirements scale down is dishonest because the Sea Base concept lacks the obvious capabilities of Sea Basing demonstrated historically in both Vietnam and against Iran. Unless we are parking LSDs/LPDs in the middle of small wars hot spots at sea and calling that a Joint Sea Base, the bottom-up joint services approach seems the wise way to invest in such an important strategic capability.

Why do I keep pounding this issue to death? Corbett warned about the dangers of a battleship Navy. While supporting all the big deck carriers and an AEGIS battleship fleet, it is hard not miss how the fleet continues to decline in numbers. Balance is key. For a nation like the US, which sends its Navy half way across the world to defend our interests, the processes that will be needed to support sustained forward presence is where change begins. The Navy will not recognize the value of small vessels until they recognize how to support and sustain them, and that is where the strategic concepts of Sea Basing comes into play. Once the Navy realizes that Sea Basing enables options otherwise not possible at sea, and the Marines see the advantages of a joint approach for going in to land, we believe that will be when the platform designs that define both the naval aviation fleet, surface fleet, and expeditionary fleet today will begin to evolve.

Navy May Need a Plan B For USS Enterprise

We have previously discussed what we consider a big issue in the Fy2009 budget facing Congress and the Navy in regards to the USS Enterprise (CVN 65). Basically the Navy is looking for permission to reduce the number of aircraft carriers from 11 to 10 (which would actually only be 9 due to nuclear refueling) for a total of 33 months from November 2012 until the delivery of the USS Gerald R Ford (CVN 78) in September 2015. We haven't seen any evidence the Senate even addressed the issue with their markup, although we also haven't seen much beyond the summary. The House, led by House Armed Services’ Seapower Subcommittee Chairman Gene Taylor (D-Miss.), has strong opinions on the issue.

Last week, House Armed Services’ Seapower Subcommittee Chairman Gene Taylor (D-Miss.) affirmed that he does not plan to include language in the FY 2009 defense authorization bill that would allow the Navy to reduce the aircraft carrier fleet below the current legal requirement of 11 carriers. According to Taylor, the Navy has a “responsibility” to fund 11 ships. With the USS Gerald R. Ford joining the fleet in 2015, the Navy has argued that the $2.2 billion it would cost to keep the aging USS Enterprise operational from 2012-2015—thus maintaining the 11 career requirement—is not worth the cost.

While we consistently see Congress tell the bean counters in the US Air Force to deal with it regarding their heavy lift aircraft, basically telling the USAF heavy lift is a national interest worth the costs, it has been awhile since we last saw Congress give these type of instructions to the Navy. Usually the bean counters in the services win these fights, or at least they became comfortable winning these fights when the Republicans were in control.

Whether you agree or disagree with the decision, what we see happening in these debates is Congress participating in the definition of what constitutes a military priority toward the national interest. The critics attempt to claim that Congress is simply making these decisions for political gain and for purposes of pork, but that is a difficult argument intellectually. Is Congressional protection of the C-17s and C-5s really simply been a matter of pork? The USAF argument is that F-22s are more important because of reduced numbers of fighter aircraft. We have sided with Congress on this issue in the past, the value of C-17s and C-5s are unfairly balanced against the F-22 in our opinion, both are critical, but what we see the problem isn't the importance Congress puts on strategic airlift, rather the strategy of the air force to build fighters at the expense of strategic airlift.

The same criticism is being leveled at Congress over the aircraft carriers. Basically, it is claimed that Congress wouldn't allow the Navy to reduce the number of aircraft carriers to 10 for nearly 3 years for reasons of Congressional pork. The problems with this argument are many, beginning with there is no certainty the USS Gerald R Ford (CVN 78) will be ready by September 2015. Additionally, the Navy doesn't have any alternatives for taking aviation to sea with the LHA(R)s being built during that time specific for the Sea Base plan, not as an alternative for naval aviation. Furthermore it was a big deal to reduce the number of aircraft carriers from 12 to 11 with the early retirement of the John F Kennedy, and at that time the Navy assured Congress many times there would be no drop below 11. In order to accuse Congress of making a decision based on pork promises, one would have to make the argument that aircraft carriers are not important to the national interest, which is an argument the Navy wouldn't even make.

We don't know how many aircraft carriers are appropriate for the Navy, and have never seen a study released publicly to examine for an independent conclusion, but we do note there was a major study prior to the development of the USS Gerald R Ford (CVN 78) to evaluate what the next aircraft carrier should be. A number of metrics were measured, like big or small, new design or an evolved design, and many other factors. That study concluded the Navy would get the most bang for the buck with a big carrier of an evolved design from the Nimitz class which is what the Ford class represents. It has also been suggested that because the Ford class doesn't require a nuclear refueling, at that time the Navy could reduce the number of carriers to ten, a build rate of one every 5 years, and sustain aircraft carrier construction and costs indefinitely without loss of capability.

It looks to us like the Navy needs a Plan B for the USS Enterprise (CVN 65) if retirement is not an option. We have stated in the past, long before this debate hit Congress, that instead of looking for permission to retire the USS Enterprise (CVN 65) early, the Navy should ask for funds to convert the USS Enterprise (CVN 65) into a Sea Basing aviation evaluation platform. We think Sea Basing should start bottom-up, meaning build requirements at the low end and work up towards higher requirements like the 2 MEB benchmark. We say this because while we don't hear about it often, the Sea Basing concepts as is clearly still have problems. The biggest problem is aviation for Sea Basing, the current Sea Basing concept steals aviation amphibious ships that can do assault just meet the highest, least likely requirement that doesn't meet the assault requirement. This high requirement is the problem, and as is obvious to everyone but the Navy and Marines, Joint Sea Basing as a complete strategic concept will be at least as difficult to do as naval aviation was, why not start with a Langley approach to Sea Basing, instead of skipping straight to Nimitz capability out of the gate?

The USS Enterprise (CVN 65) offers an excellent platform to examine alternatives for high end Marine aviation requirements for Sea Basing, but additionally a CVN offers other options to examine as well. What is the value of a nuclear reactor for providing water to a Sea Base? What is the value of a large deck alternative, potentially a commercial design, for the Sea Basing concept? There are dozens of questions like this. Instead of spending $2.2 to keep a ship operating like a current aircraft carrier, why not spend much less and use the ship to help define future aviation requirements for strategic sea basing for "Joint" services support.

Because here is the question we believe could make significant impact towards a "Joint Sea Basing" strategic approach. With a dedicated USS Enterprise (CVN 65), what modifications would be necessary and what other assets would be necessary to fully deploy the 2nd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division? Seems to me testing that capability would be worth the investment that would cost less than the $2.2 billion required to keep the Enterprise in service for 3 years.

4th Fleet Green Water Strategy

Today, I observed the winds of change. In today's blogger roundtable, SteelJaw Scribe was unable to attend, but he had submitted his questions and it was read anyway. The response captured the various angles of 4th Fleets Green Water Strategy.

Q: "With the decline of the supporting infrastructure in the region and the closure of naval stations Roosevelt Roads and Rodman, et cetera, how sustainable do you see the Fourth Fleet's small unit presence in the AOR, particularly outside the Caribbean?"

A: I would think that if you do an analysis of the countries -- I mean, 15 years ago, there wasn't any democracies in Central or South America, period. And this year, if you look, you'll see just about all democracies with the exception of one and a couple that are very, very far left. But that is the good thing. And the good thing about that is that they welcome the United States into their ports, and so the at-sea sustainment really isn't an issue.

However, if you look at, you know, the capabilities that the United States have -- has if you have have a big-deck amphibious ship, if you have aircraft carriers, if you have high-speed vessels, then essentially you can kind of have your own afloat staging base, where, you know, acting as mother ships and can refuel ships, and we can maintain our presence down here, and we can maintain our cooperation through exercises and training venues and what have you.

So I think it's dependent, and I think that's the huge value that our Navy brings in some of its core competencies, which is its forward presence and the ability to sail anywhere, any time and sustain itself.

(PDF Transcript)

Our initial impressions of the Navy standing up 4th Fleet was one in the context of leadership and strategy. After participating in today's blogger roundtable on the subject, I think our instincts on this was right. Rear Adm. James Stevenson is very impressive, after speaking with him I admit a bit of frustration that he is retiring, and hope that in his next profession he finds a useful medium to articulate his strategic ideas regarding leveraging the Sea as Base as clearly as he did today. The strategic vision for naval Sea Basing he discussed during the roundtable regarding operations for the 4th Fleet could have been ripped right from the content of this blog, and there were a few times that I had a huge cheesy grin on my face listening to him speak.

Based on our observations of previous deployments for SOUTHCOM, the leadership style and priorities of Adm. Stavridis, and the appointment of Rear Adm. Joseph Kernan, we believe 4th Fleet is about to execute a very unique Green Water Strategy that may serve as a model for peacetime strategy in the 21st Century. Adm. Stevenson continuously highlighted the value of amphibious forces during today's roundtable, but when speaking of them in an operational context outlined the strategic value they bring to peacetime operations. With access to regional ports, with good relations with many regional neighbors, 4th Fleet is taking an engagement approach across the spectrum ranging from security cooperation to proactive humanitarian impact while it deals with the low end naval requirements of dealing with illicit trafficking.

The engagement by the US Navy to the 4th Fleet AOR is well known historically for response to natural disasters. Whether hurricanes, mudslides, earthquakes, forest fires, or flooding; the 4th fleet AOR brings a range of peacemaking challenges to the Navy to be responsive in peacetime. The value of amphibious forces for meeting these challenges was continuously articulated by Adm. Stevenson.

While this sounds good, we foresee some major challenges in execution here. We do not believe the Navy will be able to sustain forward deployed amphibious ships to 4th Fleet, there simply aren't enough amphibious ships to do that. We would also note that every metric Adm. Stevenson listed regarding why he likes amphibious ships is virtually every metric the Littoral Combat Ship doesn't offer for peacetime missions in the future. In that context, we see the 4th fleet strategy having well defined ends and ways but lacking the means either presently or in the future to execute strategy. It will be interesting to observe how the Navy addresses that issue, or even recognizes it as an issue before it is too late to do something about it.

During the roundtable the only issue discussed that really bothered me is that 4th Fleet is commanded by a 2-star billet, not a 3-star billet like other fleets. I missed this during the announcement, and I think that decision sends the wrong message. It is something that should be addressed, although I think there may be a Congressional requirement for that. It doesn't make sense to elevate a peacetime strategy to equal levels of wartime strategy as stated in 21st Century Seapower, stand up a new fleet with the peacetime strategic purpose in mind, and then fall short in equality for leadership billets. Consistency is important, and when there is evidence of a lack of consistency in regards to maritime strategy, in serves only to weaken the strategy.

4th Fleet represents the first major decision for CNO Roughead, as all other major initiatives have been inherited. While we think the decision to go 2-star is one in need of correction, we see the establishment of 4th Fleet as positive for the Navy. We believe the strategic vision 4th Fleet will execute for peacetime sustained presence and engagement will be quite different than what is traditionally associated with the deployment of naval forces to other regions, and will be more evident compared to the token SOUTHCOM deployments of the past. We look forward to observing the strategy for leveraging maritime forces in what is primarily a green water operational theater, and believe we will get a good early peek into the strategic vision for 4th Fleet this summer as hurricane season approaches.

There was some other news from the roundtable, including Unitas Gold (50) next year being hosted off the Jacksonville coast, the next Global Fleet Station to South America using a diving ship as a platform, and more information regarding the Kearsarge/Boxer deployments to South America. We got the impression the Kearsarge deployment will be timed with Hurricane season in mind prepared to respond to any potential disaster zones. In all it was an interesting conversation.

Sunday Links

The Photo is the Bourbon Oceanteam 101, an interesting design in the context of the Sea Base concept. Consider the current approach, the cranes are on the ship making the delivery of materials, not on the ship intended to operate as the pier. From an outside perspective, that sounds backwards to us. This ship is not as big as it looks, and is less expensive than you think. Remove all that oil gear and use your imagination. Do we think this design should be in the Sea Base? Not really, rather we use this as an example of how the pier should be the crane, because it allows for backwards compatibility to existing heavy lift vessels. Homepage here, specs here (PDF).

A quick history reminder, last time the M80 Stiletto was moved from one port to another the MSC did the work.

The Nimitz CSG currently on deployment to the Pacific is getting more escorts half way through its deployment. We observe it very rare for a CSG already on deployment to have escorts surged. Can't say we have seen this before, makes us wonder, what is going on in the South Pacific we aren't hearing about.

This is one of the most interesting blog ideas we have seen in awhile. Purpose is stated as follows.

This blog is made up of transcripts of Harry Lamin's letters from the first World War. The letters will be posted exactly 90 years after they were written. To find out Harry's fate, follow the blog!

Very cool.

Finally, the Destroyermen delivers an excellent update to their deployment. It comes off as that "welcome to the suck" naval style post that allows the reader to feel the rising anxiety and tension the crew feels as the ship enters the war zone. Well done.

Observing The Omission of Seabasing In the Navy's Maritime Strategy

Hopefully by now you have taken the opportunity to read the contribution to the Maritime Strategy discussion by the Center for Strategic Studies written by Bob Work and Jan van Tol regarding the Navy's new Maritime Strategy.

When we talk about strategy on this blog, we discuss it as context, ends, ways, and means for a complete strategic vision. Building on the many discussions of seabasing off Liberia we had last week, we observe that by highlighting the purpose and methods of that operation is an excellent starting place for discussing the strategic concepts and the strategic questions surrounding the Cooperative Maritime Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (from here on called 21st Century Seapower).

The CSBA strategy assessment discusses seabasing in its conclusions as a critical omission, and we couldn't agree more.

A third obvious omission is the concept’s lack of any substantive discussion of “seabasing.” The idea of using the sea as a joint base of operations in both peacetime and wartime has been a central theme of the Navy-Marine Corps story since the mid-1950s, and especially since the late 1990s. Its absence suggests that this central theme no longer pertains in the Global Era’s cooperative phase. When asked why seabasing had been dropped from the Sea Services’ primary narrative, one of the authors of the strategy responded that the Services had purposely steered away from addressing or highlighting any specific “program.” This answer is itself quite revealing. It suggests that framers of the concept now view seabasing simply in programmatic terms (e.g., what platforms to buy) rather than as a strong foundation for any maritime strategic concept.

This is unfortunate. The rationale for seabasing is stronger than at any time since the end of World War II. During the Transoceanic Era/Cold War, the United States adopted a global defense posture that emphasized forwardbased combat forces in the theaters in which they were expected to fight. During the Global Era, the US has begun shifting away from this garrison posture toward one that emphasizes the forward-deployment of US combat forces from bases located on American sovereign territory. In such an expeditionary posture, the value of maritime forces in general, and seabasing in particular, naturally goes up.74 By omitting any discussion of the general strategic, operational, and tactical advantages of seabasing, the authors seem to have lost an important opportunity to further distinguish the Sea Services’ maritime strategic concept from those of the other Services. Moreover, this omission is inconsistent with the 2006 QDR, which stressed the need for innovative basing concepts to maximize US global freedom of action.

In the early discussions on the blogs regarding the Maritime Strategy, CDR McGrath (as Strategy1) used the description of "hobby horse" in the discussion of seabasing, fully representing this "programmatic" view of seabasing. We find it unconvincing that the strategists are looking at seabasing as a program when indeed the various applications of seabasing clearly represent a strategic concept, and in many cases we observe multiple applications of seabasing where none can be defined by any single program. The ongoing operation off Liberia clearly represents at least two different applications of the strategic maritime concept of seabasing.

We are reminded that the African Partnership Station (APS) is an example of Global Fleet Stations, which National Defense Magazine reported the Navy defined as seabasing.

The global fleet station, the Navy paper says, “is a persistent sea base of operations from which to coordinate and employ adaptive force packages within a regional area of interest.” Its primary responsibility would be “shaping operations, theater security cooperation, global maritime awareness, and tasks associated specifically with the war on terror.”

By this definition the APS can be described as a maritime strategic concept intended to promote theater security cooperation, global maritime awareness, and tasks associated specifically with the war on terror (ends or purpose) by coordinating and employing adaptive force packages (ways or method to achieve the ends) to the participating nations of the APS. Within the context of 21st Century Seapower the 'program' element would be classified as the means (or resources) used to accomplish the ways. Instead the naval strategists are claiming seabasing is simply a program. If Seabasing is simply a program, why is the term 'seabasing' used to describe the execution of four different mission sets: Disaster Response to the 2004 Tsunami, Global Fleet Stations, Anti-Piracy operations off Somalia, and a joint Sea Base for supporting amphibious operations.

How can seabasing be a program if the implementation capitalizes on various types of resources (means) depending upon the strategic concept leveraged for seabasing? For the disaster response mission to the 2004 Tsunami the Navy used grey and white hulls for humanitarian operations. For Global Fleet Stations the Navy is using HSVs, amphibious ships, and RO/ROs. For Anti-Piracy operations the Navy is using amphibious ships and MSC T-AKEs, and for the Joint Sea Base the plan uses all the above and some.

Further to the point, in Liberia we observe a transshipment capability with INLS, enabling a port where none exists which would lead to a question, is the INLS program the Sea Base? The vehicles are moved to theater by the RO/ROs, tailored to the mission by the amphibious ship, and deployed to the objective by a HSV. However, we also have the SS Cleveland involved in the humanitarian delivery, which highlights yet another resource in use for implementation of a strategic concept. Is this really a program, or perhaps an omitted strategic concept being executed to support the maritime strategy?

We see the omission of seabasing as part of a larger issue of 21st Century Seapower, something the Navy needs to get its intellectual rigor behind to execute 21st Century Seapower successfully. There is a mission statement in bold and italics on page 4 of 21st Century Seapower, (PDF) it reads:

We believe that preventing wars is as important as winning wars.

We see this phrase as the mission statement for the Navy's maritime strategy. The phrase has got a lot of attention, and is covered in the CSBA document as follows:

when used as part of a maritime strategic concept, the statement that “preventing wars is as important as winning wars” is much different than saying that “preventing war is preferable to fighting wars”—which, as mentioned above, goes without saying. Consistent with Huntington, the former statement implies that organizing the Sea Services (the third key element of any strategic concept) primarily for “Missions of Peace” is as important as organizing the Sea Services to win wars. This thinking would appear to conflate the idea of deployment strategies—how the Sea Services choose to employ the warfighting fleet in peacetime—with organizing and structuring the Sea Services primarily to meet an existing or emerging national security threat.

As Huntington wrote, this would be a great mistake:

A military service may at times, of course, perform functions unrelated to external security, such as internal policing, disaster relief, and citizenship training. These are however, subordinate and collateral responsibilities. A military service does not exist to perform these functions; rather it performs these functions because it has already been called into existence to meet some threat.

Huntington goes on to say that when the American people and their elected representatives decide to devote resources to the maintenance of a military capability, “it is necessary for the society to forego the alternative uses to which these resources might be put and to acquiesce in their allocation to the military service.” There are far cheaper ways to allocate resources for “Missions of Peace” than building or organizing military units dedicated solely for these purposes. However, as Huntington suggests, allocating resources to build and organize forces to meet a national security threat, and then using them to conduct “Missions of Peace” when the threat is quiescent or in check makes perfect sense: it accrues a higher rate of return on the resources allocated by the American public to the service.

CSBA is making brilliant observations here, 21st Century Seapower is promoting a broad strategy in that the mission statement can be read to say warfighting is as important as peacemaking, which becomes a critical point in the execution of the Navy's maritime strategy. The implication is to the point of duality in purpose, as the object of maritime strategy is no longer simply Command of the Sea in the context of Mahan or Corbett, rather in its duality the strategy seeks a second object that promotes conditions that prevent the outbreak of war.

My read of Huntington is that he would disapprove of the Navy's duality approach in 21st Century Seapower, but my read of Thomas Barnett is that this is an important requirement, and absent a SysAdmin force for executing peacemaker roles, the military is filling the gap. The question remains, is it the job of the Navy (or Marines) to be the SysAdmin force, or is that a role for another agency? I do not blame the services for filling the critical gap here, the rest of government has shown a remarkable lack of initiative to fill the capability gaps for these SysAdmin roles, and I do not observe any political leadership willing to force the changes needed for other agencies to fill those roles. It doesn't change the question, but in some ways it explains the Navy's decisions.

Assuming this duality in strategy is executed with equal priority, if 21st Century Seapower is to be executed successfully in pursuit of both objects outlined in strategy, the Navy is going to need to spend considerable intellectual rigor in developing principles of peacemaking for the maritime strategy, and do so with a clear understanding of what contributes to peacemaking and warfighting in regards to naval resources and capabilities.

For example, if we apply the maritime strategy of duality to the strategic concept of AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense, the strategic concept behind ballistic missile defense must be evident in both warfighting and peacemaking. In that regard, we can make a pretty good argument to support the warfighter in the defense of ballistic missiles, but as was discussed at the blogger roundtable (transcript here), we can also make an intellectual argument for peacemaking in regards to escalation control. The issue going forward is to produce the intellectual rigor in how to leverage AEGIS BMD for escalation control in pursuit of the second object "that prevent the outbreak of war."

Another example is seabasing. The contrast between a seabasing operation for supporting a humanitarian mission (like what we are observing off Liberia) and supporting an amphibious assault mission (as defined in the program of record) demonstrates the warfighter and peacemaker capabilities of seabasing within the context of 21st Century Seapower.

Is Ballistic Missile Defense a program? Apparently not, it is discussed in 21st Century Seapower as a strategic capability. Is Seabasing a program? Apparently it is seen that way by the strategists, because it is not discussed in 21st Century Seapower due to it being a 'program'. Our concerns regarding 21st Century Seapower is that in order to execute the duality nature of the Strategic Concept presented, a considerable amount of intellectual rigor will be required to define the peacemaking aspects that are given equality to the traditional warfighting aspects. In this way the Navy can demonstrate a lack of strategic vision whenever it executes programs that do not demonstrate pursuit of both objects outlined in the strategy, or equally damaging when the Navy omits strategic concepts that are in pursuit of both objects.

Others are discussing Maritime Strategy today as well:

SteelJaw Scribe - Contributes an excellent discussion regarding the CSBA assessment.
CDR Salamnder - Contributes an excellent discussion regarding the CSBA assessment.

I will update as other contributions are made. We will further expand our thoughts on the duality nature of the maritime strategy tomorrow.

Pictures of the Day: Leveraging the Sea as a Base

As long as the Navy continues to contribute excellent photography and stories regarding events taking place off Liberia, we'll continue to expend the blogger bandwidth highlighting the story.


A few thoughts. Anyone want to speculate a bit on the tugs? How many would be used in an operation like this? Would two be enough? Is that LCU acting as a sentry in the background of the second picture? One more thought, in observing the lighting setup, while it may work for this type of operation, one would imagine that isn't an optimal configuration for a Sea Base in wartime.


I don't know about you, but this story doesn't get old. They say a picture is worth a thousand words. From our POV, the pictures have us craving a thousand words not only on the Sea Basing aspect, but now we are curious about the work this base at sea is supporting.

In observing these photo's, are we right in assuming the pictures are being taken from one of the Ro/Ro's looking out onto the causeway pier? Somewhere I imagine the gods of the sea are smiling down observing this in the fine historical tradition of Hercules, Wimbrown VII, and Ocean 6 among too many others to name from Vietnam. As the gods would tell their servants, we have moved way beyond refitted barges for building bases at sea.

Does anyone else think it is time to come up with a clever name for this little US Navy FOB at Sea off the Liberian coast. I'd be curious to know what those folks in the picture are calling their sea base.

I still want to see a picture from sky view, something to give a context to the size and scope.

Observing the Sea Base Off Liberia

I don't know if the African Partnership Station Public Affairs office is reading the blog, but if you are we appreciate you being responsive to our request for more information, detailed information, and excellent information in covering the Sea Basing operation off Liberia. We credit Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class (SW/AW) Elizabeth Merriam for this excellent contribution to the Sea Basing discussion.

The INLS is a redesign of a floating dock system originally used during World War II. Composed of smaller component links the system pieces can lock together to create ferries, causeway piers, or roll-on, roll-off discharge facilities to transport cargo and equipment from ship to shore while leaving a minimal footprint tailored to the individual mission.

The construction began aboard container & roll-on/roll-off ship USNS Lance Cpl. Roy M. Wheat (T-AK-3016) when various commands from Naval Beach Group 2 worked together to crane the links off of the ship and combine them into their final structures...

Once the construction on the INLS components was completed the discharge facility was transported to container & roll-on/roll-off ship USNS 2nd Lt. John Bobo (T-AK-3008) where it was loaded with Marine Corps vehicles...

The vehicles were then transported to the staging deck aboard amphibious dock landing ship USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43) where the ship's crew and the members of Assault Craft Unit 2, piloting the roll-on, roll off discharge facility, would attempt to dock an INLS structure in a well deck for the first time...

Once the Sailors secured the discharge facility in the well deck members of the 4th Marine Logistics Group simply drove the vehicles off the platform rolling directly into the staging area.

While Fort McHenry's crew worked with the discharge facility, John Bobo moored next to the INLS causeway. As part of the exercise, Marines reloaded the platform and the discharge facility and departed Fort McHenry to rendezvous with John Bobo, again exhibiting the ability of the INLS to dock with an amphibious vessel to transport cargo from ship to ship. Once the roll-on, roll-off discharge facility and causeway ferries were attached to the causeway, High Speed Vessel 2 Swift moored next to John Bobo, where ready receive Marine vehicles were transported to ship to shore.

This is the first time INLS has been used successfully at sea to transport cargo from ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore. During the rest of WATC the INLS will be used to aid in transporting humanitarian assistance supplies to Monrovia as part of the APS contribution to the area.

I've admittedly butchered an excellent story, so I encourage people to read the story without my cut outs, particularly as I think some of the details offered in the interviews tell the 'rest of the story.' For our purposes though we remain focused on the process for now.

From our perspective, observing the news reports and admiring the photography, it appears the Improved Navy Lighterage System (INLS) has demonstrated an amazing degree of capability for Sea Basing operations. As we previously covered, the West Africa Training Cruise (WATC) 08 will continue until April 5th, which we believe means the Sea Base built with the INLS will remain constructed for another week supporting humanitarian operations before being broken down. As some commenter's have previously noted, the port infrastructure in Monrovia is subpar, at best, and almost certainly not of a condition to support the USNS Lance Cpl. Roy M. Wheat (T-AK-3016) or USNS Lance Cpl. Roy M. Wheat (T-AK-3016).

This demonstration leveraging the INLS has thoroughly impressed us, bringing together the combinations of well decks, large Ro/Ro prepositioning ships, and a high speed vessel shallow draft connector has changed our perspective regarding the possibilities of Sea Basing, not only for peacetime operations but also for warfighter operations. With selective offload in the future, we see the potential to leverage amphibious assault ships for multiple assaults, simply reloading Marine Corp equipment from a secure, remote location at sea.

The interconnecting nature of the ferries, causeway piers, and roll-on, roll-off discharge facilities sparks our imagination in regards to potential. In the excellent coverage to date, we observe the only thing missing is a photo from above to get an idea regarding the size of the INLS causeway pier system constructed.

Picture of the Day: More Sea Basing Off Liberia

Today we feature another picture from the Sea Basing operation off Liberia. I still say this is the best Navy story the media doesn't talk about. Another great photo, but again, this picture makes me think this is a slow process.


80322-N-0193M-107 MONROVIA, Liberia (March 22, 2024) Members of Navy Cargo Handling Battalion (NCHB) 1 guide a Marine Humvee from the Marine Corps container roll on roll off ship USNS 2nd LT John P. Bobo (T-AK 3008) onto the deck of a roll-on roll-off discharge facility as part of West Africa Training Cruise 08, a sea basing initiative in conjunction with Africa Partnership Station. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Elizabeth Merriam (Released)

Picture of the Day: Sea Basing Off Liberia

This is a good picture of the INLS in action off Liberia. Still attempting to gather more information to discuss further. I have to admit, this is a great beginning to a capability that can do so many good things, and we find ourselves impressed despite a number of questions.


Very cool. People keep saying this isn't a new capability. We tend to disagree, there is some fine print here that makes some of this very new, although we acknowledge there is a lot of existing here as well. What do we mean by fine print? Show me the last time a RO/RO offloaded to a LPD at sea without a port. Exactly.

Navy and Marines Form First Sea Base off Liberia

The Navy is leveraging an opportunity during the African Partnership Initiative deployment to establish its first Sea Base off Liberia. OK so it is a bit unclear what is being transfered, and it looks to mostly be humanitarian in nature, not exactly heavy military equipment, but it is certainly something we are interested in nonetheless. The news started on Thursday.

Military Sealift Command ships USNS 2nd LT John P. Bobo and USNS LCPL Roy M. Wheat arrived off the coast of Monrovia, Liberia, in the Gulf of Guinea March 20, to participate in a sea-basing and humanitarian aid distribution exercise in conjunction with U.S. Marines and Africa Partnership Station ships USS Fort McHenry and HSV-2 Swift.

Bobo and Wheat are U.S. Navy cargo ships that are part of Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron One, or MPSRON One, one of three squadrons that preposition U.S. military equipment in strategic locations at-sea for rapid delivery ashore in response to military or humanitarian crises.

Pretty straight forward stuff, both Ro/Ros are big ships, so if they are fully loaded with humanitarian supplies Liberia is feeling the blessing of a considerable donation. We are unable to get a feel for the impact this has on Liberia, it is simply impossible to evaluate the impact of the supplies themselves without independent media coverage, which appears absent. However, we are very interested in the Sea Basing process, and the MSC article gives us an idea of what is going on.

Sailors embarked aboard Bobo and Wheat will assemble the MPSRON's Improved Navy Lighterage System, or INLS, which is a roll-on/roll-off discharge platform comprised of barges and ferries that allow ships to off-load cargo at sea and deliver it ashore when traditional harbor facilities are unavailable.

Once the INLS is assembled, cargo from Bobo, Wheat and Fort McHenry, including trucks, equipment and humanitarian aid supplies, will be transferred at sea from Bobo to Swift while the high speed vessel is docked on the discharge platform. Swift will then ferry these supplies to Monrovia where they will be delivered to a number of schools and medical clinics in Liberia.

That is the basic idea, but we get more detailed information from a Marine Corps News article from today.

“This seabasing portion is designed to take future operational concepts and execute them using today’s platforms,” said Michael Harvey, prepositioning officer, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe. “We are taking equipment that was originally designed for ship-to-shore movement and we are using it as a ship-to-ship connecter.”

Assisted by their naval counterparts, the Marines’ mission was to transfer seven Marine Corps vehicles embarked on the USNS 2nd Lt John Bobo of the Maritime Preposition Squadron One, to the Navy’s new Improved Navy Lighterage System. The INLS is a system of floating causeways designed to move equipment from ship-to-shore. After a short ride on the INLS, the Marines drove the vehicles from the INLS platforms directly into the well deck of the USS Fort McHenry, where they are being prepared for the next phases of WATC 08.

“We are dealing with multiple naval platforms during this exercise, tying in with African Partnership Station,” said Lt. Col. Clarence R. Edmonds, Eurasia regional planner, Marine Forces Europe. “[The INLS] gives us the stable platform we need to offload vehicles and equipment from one ship to another at sea.”

The exercise marked the first time that the INLS had been assembled and used in an open sea environment, Edmonds said. The capabilities provided by the INLS make it possible for the Marine Corps to operate in more flexible ways.

“The seabasing environment gives us the opportunity to offload select equipment, materials and supplies to conduct arrival and assembly operations at sea,” Edmonds said. “This gives us multiple capabilities to execute a mission ashore, within a very limited time frame and with a very limited footprint (ashore).”

The successful demonstration of the offload and transfer of equipment to the USS Fort McHenry marks only the first stage of the total WATC 08 mission. When vehicle preparations are complete, the Marines and sailors will load them back on the INLS for transfer to the High Speed Vessel Swift, which will then take the Marines and vehicles into the Port of Monrovia in order to conduct the humanitarian assistance mission.

The article notes the WATC 08 mission will continue through April 5th. Hopefully we will continue to get more photography and descriptions of the Sea Basing process, and maybe some American journalists who pretend to give a shit about Africa can find time in their busy schedule fawning over politicians to inform us what our Navy has been up to down in the Gulf of Guinea. Unlikely.

As the first official Sea Basing operation that best highlights the transshipment ideas of Sea Basing, naturally we are very interested. The promise of this capability in the future could change the way the Navy provides humanitarian assistance in the future, and also potentially change the way amphibious assault is conducted in the future. We have several questions. Which platform carried the INLS to the theater? How long did the transfer of 7 vehicles to the Fort McHenry take? Does anyone know what weight the crane on the Bobo is rated for? What about the INLS, how much weight can it support? Can we get some better details and statistics of the total operation?

We ask because while we are certainly pleased the capability is being evaluated, this looks like it would be slow, and we don't get the impression this scales beyond lightweight vehicles and lightweight supplies that are humanitarian in nature. Example, we wonder if this process would work for sending the supplies and Seabee equipment ashore necessary to build an air strip for C-130s, or even C-17s. I'd like to see how quickly a one of these Ro/Ro ships could transfer an entire MEU to a 3 ship amphibious group. If the Marine Corp can get to that point with existing equipment, we think that would be a major capability.

We know, baby steps, and we agree this is a great first step. There simply isn't enough information to get an idea of whether this is a legitimate capability, or simply a limited capability where we are getting a lot of news for what amounts to be a small demonstration.

5th Fleet Focus: Opportunities, Pirates, and Putland

Update: Ransom Paid. Coverage here.


When I saw this article this morning, I decided to wait until Eagle1 had weighed in before posting. Ironically he ends up asking the same question I would have asked him. The issue: What to make of this.

A Cabinet minister in Somalia's Puntland State government has called on the United States government to withdraw its naval forces from Somali shores or help in the campaign against local pirates.

Said Ahmed O'Nur, Puntland's Fisheries and Ports Minister, told Voice of America' s Somali-language program that U.S. Navy warships have been watching a hijacked ship for nearly two months without taking any military action against the pirates on board.

He indicated that there is "no communication" between the U.S. Navy and the government of Puntland.

According to the minister, the U.S. naval warships "allow" the pirates to go to and from the ship - Russian-registered Svitzer Korsakov, which pirates hijacked on Feb. 5.

My question is the same as Eagle1's, Putland is a "breakaway" province of greater Somalia and not a sovereign government, but the sovereign government of Somalia has only superficial jurisdiction over Putland. Our desire for legal purposes to tie ourselves to Westphalian principles even in places where they simply don't exist is just another indication how the west doesn't really have a political strategy for dealing with rogue and ungoverned nations during the long war. It is unclear that the US would help, even if the offer was official.

There are currently three US Navy warships off the coast of Somalia: USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41), USS Winston S. Churchill (DDG 81), and USS Carney (DDG 64). Other coalition warships in the area would include HMCS Charlottetown (FFH 339), HMS Argyll (F 231), and FS Guepratte (F 714).

It is very unlikely the US will actually engage the pirates, while the Navy would smack pirates across the waves if they caught them outside the coastal areas, there does not appear to be any political will in Washington to seek any "final conclusions" with hard power to the piracy problems off Somalia. I don't believe that will always be the case...

Patience may be supporting a soft power effort though. Note the Putland folks aren't happy they can't fish (the local economy), even to the point they are angry at the Americans for fishing in Somalia waters according to the press report. Piracy in this particular region of Putland has apparently led to a domestic political problem due to economic losses. It is unclear if they are willing to talk about the problem with the Americans yet, but it is a good sign if they do.

Because in my book, fixing a maritime security issue that is creating havoc with a local economy is what I would call a maritime security business opportunity for the US Navy, and what the Navy also calls the definition of Global Fleet Stations. In effect, this episode is the entire spectrum of what I think a visionary sea basing concept should include all bundled up in one tidy unfolding scenario.

I think it would be a tragedy of strategic vision if the Navy or Marines are talking about building billions of dollars worth of ships for "Sea Basing" and this exact scenario is somehow missing from the primary mission profile of the Sea Basing concept and the ships being built. A successful Sea Basing scenario, from what is an afloat forward staging base today and could be a Global Fleet Station tomorrow, should be the reason Sea Basing is developed in the first place under the Maritime Strategy. This is peacemaking at sea at the top tier, there may be a big opportunity for success here, and it may not require Marines kicking down the door.

Obseving the Marine Maritime Debate on Capital Hill

Navy Times has an interesting article that overviews some of the Marine Corps discussions taking place on Capital Hill. We have mixed feelings on some of the press coverage, because in many ways it creates a perception that there is a conflict of interests in statements and desires.

Marine Corps leaders say they’re concerned about the Navy’s capability to support amphibious assault forces and is asking Congress to provide money for at least one new ship.

“Our nation needs this ship, and we need your help in procuring it,” Lt. Gen. James Amos, head of Marine Corps Combat Development Command, told a House Armed Services subcommittee Feb. 26.

Amos was referring to an additional LPD 17 San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock; the class is replacing a series of aging amphibious ships.

The Navy is on track to buy nine LPD 17s, and getting a 10th hull is the Corps’ top unfunded priority for the fiscal 2009 budget cycle.

The article goes on to highlight several points. First the Marine Corps want 33 amphibious assault ships; 11 “big deck ship” amphibious assault ships, 11 dock landing ships, and 11 LPD 17s.

Second, the Marine Corps desire 2 MEBs for amphibious assault, and the article highlights an important point, a single MEB requires 17 amphibious ships for assault, meaning the Navy needs to maintain a total amphibious force of 34 ships, if the amphibious support mix retains the current three types of ships.

Finally, despite recent Navy comments, Congress Rep. Roscoe Bartlett, R-Md observes something we have been unsure about. Apparently we are not reading the FY09 budget incorrectly.

Navy budget documents for the fiscal 2009 proposal show the production line for San Antonios will shut down after nine ships. Restarting production would raise the cost of future amphibs.

Rep. Roscoe Bartlett, R-Md., said the Navy’s decision to shut down that line seems like a bad one.

“With all the talk about controlling costs of shipbuilding, I was dismayed that the Navy would request and take specific steps that should only have the effect of increasing the eventual cost of the 10th LPD,” Bartlett said.

Thats the way we read it too, although we note the Navy has made several comments otherwise. While the press is giving some of the story, the testimony of General Conway in front of the Senate on Feb 28th makes clear in our opinion what the Marines are looking for at sea.

Based on strategic guidance, in the last several years we have accepted risk in our Nation’s forcible entry capacity and reduced amphibious lift from 3.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) assault echelons to 2.0 MEB assault echelons. In the budgetary arena, the value of amphibious ships is too often assessed exclusively in terms of forcible entry—discounting their demonstrated usefulness across the range of operations and the clear imperative for Marines embarked aboard amphibious ships to meet Phase 0 demands. The ability to transition between those two strategic goalposts, and to respond to every mission-tasking in between, will rely on a strong Navy-Marine Corps Team and the amphibious ships that cement our bond. The Navy and Marine Corps have worked diligently to determine the minimum number of amphibious ships necessary to satisfy the Nation’s needs—and look forward to working with the Committee to support the Chief of Naval Operation’s shipbuilding plans.

The Marine Corps’ contribution to the Nation’s forcible entry requirement is a single, simultaneously-employed two Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) assault capability—as part of a seabased Marine Expeditionary Force. Although not a part of the Marine Expeditionary Force Assault Echelon, a third reinforcing MEB is required and will be provided via Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) capabilities. Each MEB assault echelon requires seventeen amphibious warfare ships—resulting in an overall ship requirement for thirty-four amphibious warfare ships. However, given current fiscal constraints, the Navy and Marine Corps have agreed to assume greater operational risk by limiting the assault echelon of each MEB by using only fifteen ships per MEB—in other words, a Battle Force that provides thirty operationally available amphibious warfare ships. In that thirty-ship Battle Force, ten aviation-capable big deck ships (LHA / LHD / LHA(R)) and ten LPD 17 class ships are required to accommodate the MEB’s aviation combat element.

In order to meet a thirty-ship availability rate —based on a Chief of Naval Operation sapproved maintenance factor of 10%—a minimum of eleven ships of each of the current types of amphibious ships are required—for a total of thirty-three ships. The Navy has concurred with this requirement for thirty-three amphibious warfare ships, which provide the “backbone” of our maritime capability—giving us the ability to meet the demands of harsh environments across the spectrum of conflict.

Emphasis ours. There is a lot of good information here. Notice how this is breaking down.

For the 2015 MEB Assault Echelon (AE) the Marines require 17 ships (five LHD, five LPD-17, five LSD-41, two LSD-49), which as is confirmed in testimony means for the MEB ACE the Marines require 4 LHA/LHDs, 1 LHA(R), and 5 LPD-17s. Current plans leaves the Marines short 1 LHD, which is intended for the Sea Base. The primary equipment aspects include 18 LCACs, 30 JSFs. 48 MV-22s, 20 CH-53Ks, 18 AH-1s, 9 UH-1s, 2 MH-60s, and 8 UAVs. A full MEB ACE is basically 246 CH-46 equivalents. For the Sea Base, the 30 JSFs get put on CVNs, which could directly effect Navy specific aviation requirements.

The Marine Corps should never have accepted the reduced 2.0 capability, which was reduced to 2.5 during the cold war due to budget, because during the cold war it was actually 3.0. We continue to remind that the reduced 2.0 capability is counter to the studies leading into the 21st century, which noted the 3.0 MEB capability would become MORE important to meet irregular challenges in a world changing through globalization. The Marines are advocating for 33 ships to support a reduced 2.0 MEB assault capability, which actually requires 34 operational ships to fully assault with 2.0 MEBs, and all 34 would need to be 100% operational. This tends to imply what the Marines actually need is 36 ships. The Navy has no intention, and is under no obligation to support that.

To compound the problem, the Marine Corps are trying to squeeze this capability into the new Sea Base MPF(F). No wonder they have slowed down, no wonder they are looking for a new amphibious ship mix, and no wonder the Marines inch up the number of LPD-17s they need every year, from last years number of 10 to this years number of 11. All of this is absent the discussion of the JHSV, which has an entirely different but important role for expeditionary warfare.

Absent from the discussion is the Amphibious Lift Enhancement Program (ALEP), which has never been tested but has five LKAs and four LSTs, providing a total of 201,000 square feet of vehicle lift capacity. Also absent from the discussion are the two Aviation Maintenance Logistics Ships (T-AVB), both of which will be retired by 2020. Each T-AVB carries a Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS) to a crisis area, without which would put a huge strain on strategic airlift to support.

Does anyone believe at this point the LPD 17 class replaces four classes of older ships—LKA 113, LST 1179, LSD 36, LPD 4? Does anyone believe the Navy and Marines should really give up the LHA(R) for the Sea Base? Anyone remember the warnings in the Defense Science Board Study on Seabasing? This is why ONR had it absolutely right, what is needed to solve the sea basing aviation issue is something very large, something like the Maersk S-Class Conversion Concept. 2 on each coast would be the biggest boost to capabilities for virtually every Sea Basing mission ever convinced, and would allow both the Navy and Marine Corps to rightsize the amphibious fleet to support not only the amphibious assault requirements for major war, but the mothership requirements for peacetime.

Amphibious ships continue to be the most flexible platform in the Navy today, Congress should ask Sec. Winter to develop alternatives for amphibious ship strategies either with or without the Sea Base for supporting a 3.0 MEB capability afloat, with a 2 MEB Prepositioning requirement, and at least a 2.0 MEB forcible entry capability.

While the Navy might claim that is exactly what is currently in motion with the Sea Base, clearly the data continues to tell a different story.

6th Fleet Focus: Where are the Amphibs?

In the cold war, the phrase asked by Presidents was "Where are the Carriers." Much to the chagrin of folks like Mike who believes that big deck amphibious ships are no longer necessary, in the Long War the phrase has changed, the question now asked is "Where are the Amphibs?" There are events taking place in the world, and it appears the question has been asked again. Welcome to the Long War.

The U.S. Navy has replaced two ships it sent off the coast of Lebanon last week amid political deadlock there to send a signal to Syria, officials said on Tuesday.

The cruiser USS Philippine Sea and the destroyer USS Ross replaced the destroyer USS Cole and a refueling ship over the past day, U.S. Navy officials said.

Another refueling ship remained in place, meaning the United States continued to have three warships in the area, said the officials, speaking on condition of anonymity.

It is one thing to sit the USS Cole (DDG 67) off a coast to cover operations other than war in a potential war zone. In fact it's smart to do so, rapid response for civilian evacuation is part of what the Navy does. It is an entirely different thing when major elements of an Expeditionary Strike Group begin patrolling off a war zone. The Nassau Expeditionary Strike Group consists of:

USS Nassau (LHA 4)
USS Ashland (LSD 48)
USS Nashville (LPD 13)
USS Philippine Sea (CG 58)
USS Ross (DDG 71)
USS Bulkeley (DDG 84)
USS Albany (SSN 753)

The election in Lebanon is March 11th, this upcoming Monday.

Stratfor has interesting analysis regarding the Israeli military operations in Gaza. They speculate that Israel is weakening Hamas because they believe they are about to fight a war with Hezbollah in Lebanon very soon. Stratfor notes an important detail, in the Winograd report which laid out the failures of the 2006 War, Israel was said to suffer from slow decision making in dealing with Hamas in Gaza as they also fought Hezbollah in Lebanon. If Israel believes they are about to be attacked by Hezbollah, in that context the military actions against Hamas sooner rather than later tend to fit perfectly as a lesson learned from the 2006 war. We note the allegations of Iranian supplies for both groups have already hit the media.

There is one thing that should be noted. The Lebanese press is going nuts over the possibility of amphibious ships off their coast. The threats are mostly in regards to the "last time Marines were in Lebanon" and other such rhetoric. One problem with the rhetoric, there are no Marines on board the Nassau ESG, the MEU was sent to Afghanistan as part of the Marine surge in the headlines recently.

While we have stated in the past we hope the Navy has deployed the ESG with a number of maritime toys within the big spaces of the amphibious ships; we honestly have no idea what the ships deployed with. In observing these developments, we can't help but notice the obvious. While there are discussions of wargames and studies regarding the roles of Sea Bases, what they are, and what they can be/do; the Navy is in a unique position to set up one right off the coast of Lebanon leveraging the best of what amphibious ships and the MSC can do for operations other than amphibious assault. We hope they give great consideration in finding useful ways to leverage this capability (ie think Joint, and International), but also protect it should hostilities break out.

Finally, we have not yet identified what aviation squadrons are deployed with the Nassau ESG, but in noting the type of aircraft that were on board as of last week we are hoping Springboard can tell us. He is our go to guy for that particular aircraft. Click the photo for a better look.

Sea Basing Slows Down,Studies Continue

Apparently last year the Navy and Marine Corps completed two MPF(F) studies. Inside the Navy (subscription) has an interesting article up with some insights of those studies, and word that a third study is underway.

The first study was designed to assess MPF(F) alternatives in the context of a mature campaign. It examined operations under three alternatives: the MPF(F) program of record; a similar collection of ships without organic big-deck amphibious shipping; and an MPF(F) with legacy Maritime Prepositioning Squadron-capabilities “enhanced with the means to conduct in-stream offloads/transfers at a distance of 25 [nautical miles] from the shore,” he said.

“The [first] study concluded that campaign objectives were met by all alternatives with varying levels of risk,” Doyle said.

The second study was designed to help determine how to distribute large-deck aviation ships between the amphibious force and MPF(F), he said. The effort assessed nine different amphibious/MPF(F) force mixes in 29 events across a range of military options -- including aggregating to support a major-combat operation.

The study concluded that “several” -- but not all -- of the alternatives “were capable of satisfying the majority of requirements generated by the 29 discrete events over a two year period,” Doyle said.

However, he noted, “there was insufficient residual capacity to support increased forward presence requirements (e.g. increased numbers of deployed expeditionary strike groups, global fleet stations, etc.) as envisioned in the Maritime Operating Concept.

What are we learning from this report? Easy, Sea Basing is not simple, will not be simple, and the desire to rush into it has finally been set aside. It was claimed early in the process Sea Basing will be at least as difficult as it was to bring aviation to sea in the early 20th century, so what is wrong with taking the time to get it right with so much money at stake? I think the slow down is a good thing. Here are the details provided on the third study.

Doyle said the third MPF(F) study -- the one under way now -- was designed to develop a baseline model for a specific major-combat-operation scenario. The baseline, he said, will serve as the initial assessment of the joint-force capability required for the scenario.

This third study looks at two MEB assault echelons working with an MPF(F) program of record and a legacy Maritime Prepositioning Squadron in support of forcible-entry operations, he said.

Build a base at sea or use the sea as a base? That is the question. Is anyone asking that question, or are we concerned with the specific metrics as determined by Rumsfeld's bunch following Turkey? The very last sentence of the article appears to highlight why Sea Basing needs to take it very slow.

Yet he noted that the Marine Corps’ perspective is “that other unresolved issues remain that are outside of the scope of these three studies, to include how crews for MPF(F) shipping will be trained/sourced and specifics as to how maintenance of the ships and embarked equipment will be conducted.”

Please don't spend $14-18 billion on this program until very difficult questions like this have very good answers. I still believe both the Navy and Marine Corps would be better off taking the slow approach. Build Forward Operating Bases at Sea to support the Long War, and take the time to mature the technologies that allow a joint service approach that allows everyone to utilize the sea as base.

While it is unclear what will be decided from the studies, that a closer look is taking place is a good thing. Sea Basing is an important future capability, but we believe it will be more if the Turkey example is seen as the exception, and not the rule. The fact is, the Sea Base needs to be designed to best utilize traditionally loaded vessels of which is most of the commercial shipping fleet worldwide, and hopefully not try to create some new limited capability that lacks backwards compatibility with legacy platforms.