
The Small Wars Journal is truly facilitating discussions of complex military and national defense questions to a new level. Building off the the thought provoking piece
The Demise of Secretary Wynne by J. Bernhard "Jon" Compton last week, Richard Andres has posted a response titled
The New Role of Air Strike in Small Wars. We are not here to play sides, rather learn from the discussion because we are absolutely certain of one thing, the conventional wisdom of air power's role in COIN is wrong, and the role of air power in COIN is misunderstood by the vast majority of non experts who have commentated on it in the past. We want to understand it better, because the forward deployed nature of carrier aviation demands the necessity to understand how carriers can effectively integrate and impact counterinsurgency operations. The new article has this very interesting paragraph.
How effective is this new air-ground synergy? Since the surge began, the vast majority of enemy dead have been killed by air strikes. The vast majority of noncombatants killed have not been killed by air strikes. More importantly, insurgents have become increasingly reluctant to mass or to take action in the open. Put succinctly, the answer to why General Petraeus disregarded the new doctrine’s advice on the use of airpower in a strike role in COIN is that the doctrine got it wrong. Airpower technology has changed and General Petraeus recognized those changes and acted on them.
Who enables this reality? The boots on the ground, for a variety of reasons. We continue to believe this is an issue that warrants further research.
Brickmuppet is asking good questions, and I'd love to know the answers. Why is the cost of the Coast Guards OPV now projected at a cost $323.9 million apiece? That seems very high. Brickmuppet links to
this interesting piece on Global Security that notes charts the cost increases over time. Doesn't explain it, in fact it just raises more questions. If this is an American shipbuilding industry problem, they are making the case better than anyone else that it is time to start building hulls somewhere else. If this is a government procurement problem, which we suspect it probably is, we would like to see the procurement folks at DHS roasted on the open flame of Congress until we get some answers. If you can point to a single cost effective solution procured by DHS, we'd be interested. You won't find it though, and that is the point.
The
World Food Programme still can't find anyone to escort their food shipment ships. Nobody, and lets be crystal clear,
nobody at all cares about Somalia. The WFP is sounding as many alarms as possible, if someone doesn't step up soon
it will trigger a famine in Somalia. This is exactly where a company like Blackwater, working under a UN contract, has a role in the maritime domain.
With all of the piracy that targets ships from the Middle East to Europe, one would think this would be something the European Navies would take upon themselves and do, at a minimum to use it as an opportunity to develop better intelligence on pirate activity. Not so, did you look at
our latest Order of Battle?
We are not sure what it means, but unless we are missing something we are unable to find any ships from Europe in the entire Middle Eastern seas except those from the Royal Navy. In other words, The US, Canada, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand have the only forward deployed naval forces to the region. We can't help but think
that should increase insurance rates for maritime traffic to and from Europe, particularly now that most of the US Navy is supporting the war efforts, and no where near the Horn of Africa. There is nothing to stop the pirates from running wild, and Europe has left the Canadians to patrol millions of square miles almost entirely by themselves.
General Sir Richard Dannatt, Chief of the General Staff,
gave a speech on Thursday night regarding the role of military forces in 21st century conflicts.
Defense of the Realm had analysis prior to the speech, and you can find initial discussion here with a
transcript of the speech available here (PDF). What is interesting is we get the impression that without saying it, General Sir Richard Dannatt is asking how the British forgot all the important lessons of post conflict governance during the British Empire. While that way of phrasing it probably promotes rejection, we have already learned that the military has to establish civil order before the civilians can post conflict, so maybe he has a good point.