Maritime IW Case Study

NWC Professor Paul Povlock has written a superb article at Small Wars Journal on the Tamil Sea Tigers. This study provides a worthwhile history of the Sinhalese-Tamil conflict, including a broader discussion on the nature of the insurgency. Most interesting (to me, at least) is the elaboration on the role and importance of maritime insurgents in a protracted irregular warfare conflict. To summarize some of the more pertinent points:

On the conflict’s littoral-centric terrain
-“Sri Lanka has 833 miles of coastline”
-“Large numbers of fishing vessels ply the coastal waters, making it difficult to detect and track hostile contacts amongst the numerous native small craft.”
-“The Palk Strait, which separates Sri Lanka from India, is less than 40 kilometers in width. Reefs and shallow waters make the strait treacherous to navigate and hence unsuitable for most deep draft vessels.”


On the Sea Tigers' ingenuity and adaptability
-“During their zenith, the Sea Tigers fielded over 3000 members and conducted operations from the littoral seas of Sri Lanka to the deep ocean areas of the Indian Ocean.”
-“Without large scale shipyards, the insurgents had to build a navy by scratch, often in jungle workshops using off the shelf components…These home constructed vessels had very low superstructures and an angular construction which tended to maximize their stealthy characteristics”
-“The Sea Tiger activities extended below the surface of the Indian Ocean as well. While efforts to buy or build miniature submarines were ultimately unsuccessful, the innovative engineers of the Sea Tigers built floating mines that were used in Trincomalee harbor and off the Sri Lankan coast to hinder SLN operations and damage the Sri Lankan maritime commerce.”
-“When not occupied by wartime duties, the Sea Pigeon ships raised money for the LTTE by transporting legal cargo and by illicit activities such as running drugs and human trafficking.”
-“While efforts to buy or build miniature submarines were ultimately unsuccessful, the innovative engineers of the Sea Tigers built floating mines that were used in Trincomalee harbor and off the Sri Lankan coast to hinder SLN operations and damage the Sri Lankan maritime commerce. The Sea Tigers also developed a combat diver capability. In the 1990s members received training in underwater sabotage, allegedly by Norwegian naval instructors. Rebreather equipment for clandestine diver attacks was purchased to allow stealthy approaches. Semisubmersible “human torpedoes‟ were constructed and jet skis that could be packed with explosives were purchased for use by the Black Sea Tigers, the maritime component of the LTTE‟s crack suicide department.”

On the operational and strategic impact of the Sea Tigers
-“The combination of speed, firepower and suicide tactics made it very difficult for the larger, deeper draft and less numerous SLN units to handle the Sea Tiger attacks”
-“Videos of the destruction of Sri Lanka aircraft and warships helped create enthusiasm and promote continued attachment of the diaspora members for the national aspirations of the oppressed minority remaining on the island.”
-“Effective propaganda motivated an external population to financially support the LTTE war effort, providing the funds to buy more war material to support the struggle…Perhaps most importantly, the Sea Tigers provided the images to reinforce the LTTE propaganda themes required to gain the upper hand in the cognitive domain of the information environment.”
-“The Sea Tigers achieved local sea control to bring this material into the theater of operations. This in turn increased the overall combat potential of the insurgents, allowing them to field more powerful conventional forces as well as conduct devastating suicide attacks against compelling enemy targets.”
-“The Sea Tigers proved as elusive an enemy at sea as the LTTE ground cadres did on land. The Sea Tigers would typically initiate the engagements, choosing the time and location of the encounter. Operating close to the coast, the Sea Tigers fiberglass fast attack craft and suicide boats were difficult to detect and classify amongst all the normal fishing vessel traffic. The tactical engagements tended to wind up as wild melees as opposed to a coordinated engagement based on coherent doctrine. As most of the actions occurred at night, the SLN was hesitant to call for air support as the close action and similarity of the combatants made blue-on-blue attacks likely.”

Ironically, the 2004 Tsunami appeared to be a greater blow to the Sea Tigers than the Sri Lankan Navy ever was up to that point in the war. Professor Povlock describes how in the end, an expansion of Sri Lankan naval power and the destruction of the Sea Tigers’ vital logistics vessels allowed the government to gain the upper hand against the insurgents. The paper also contains several interesting lessons for COIN practitioners, especially on control of the information environment.

Finally, this conflict should serve as a lesson to small coastal countries with limited resources for military expenditures such as those in Africa. Ignoring the development of a competent maritime force at the expense of building a large land force can have strategic consequences. I highly recommend this article for those interested in IW at sea.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Sri Lanka Lessons Learned

If you haven't seen it, the recent article in The Island titled Sri Lanka’s Admired Innovations in war highlights several interesting points in the defeat of LTTE by Sri Lanka. It starts by making the case for a military solution to insurgency - which is a point to be discussed by experts elsewhere. There are other points made though - many of which are worth noting.

I do not normally quote so much of the content of a single news article - but this article is brilliant and must be examined in full (including what I do not quote, so read it!. For example:

Strategic Communication:

Sri Lanka made several innovations in order to win the war. The government started a website, "Defence.lk" in order to obtain public support for the war. This website was a great success. It became the most visited Sri Lanka website, with a daily average of 8 to 13 million hits. It provided hourly updates on the progress of the war. ‘Defence.lk" was the subject of a MBA research project.

Regional Partnership:

Sri Lanka devised a ‘unique arrangement’ to keep India briefed on Eelam War IV .A team consisting of Defence Secretary, Secretary to President and Basil Rajapaksa was formed, by passing the Foreign Ministry. India was represented by its Foreign Secretary, National Security Advisor and Defense Secretary. Gotabhaya Rajapakse said ‘We visited India many times, they came here and we discussed many issues. Lines of communication were kept open at all times. There was continuous dialogue and the war continued unhindered’. India is now considering using this model in its discussion with other nations.

Naval Tactics and Equipment:

The main tactic used by the LTTE at sea was the ‘swarm attack’ of 20-25 boats with 5-6 suicide craft and sophisticated equipment. Each boat had about 15 persons, with each combatant donned in helmet, body amour and carrying a personal weapon. Swarms were used to attack isolated naval craft, to escort LTTE craft coming from deep sea carrying ammunitions, and also terrorists moving along the coastline. To counter this, the Navy decided to create its own ‘swarm’.

Navy engineers designed three types of small, high-speed, heavily armed inshore patrol craft, suitable for operations in different types of sea .These boats were built at Welisara where there were rudimentary facilities for boat building. 150 boats were manufactured in three years .It took just eight days to complete and fully equip a single craft. "We manufactured these boats through day and night because we needed them quickly ". They manufactured more than one hundred 23- feet long, fibre glass ‘Arrow’ boats, powered by Japanese 200 horsepower outboard motors. ‘Arrow’ was very effective in shallow waters where Dvora could not go. There was also a 17- meter long command-cum- fighting boat. All boats were manned by highly trained sailors from elite units, such as the Special Boat Squadron.

In 2007 the navy was able to launch a flotilla of "Arrow" boats which outnumbered the LTTE boats. When LTTE launched 20 boats, the navy launched 40. It was ‘swarm against swarm’. The boats operated in groups of four. Squadrons consisting of 25-30 craft were kept at strategically important locations. Squadrons could be shifted from place to place in a very short time. They were combined when necessary and about 60 boats were available for some battles. These boats used infantry tactics. They went in arrowhead formation or in three adjacent columns in single file so as to mask their numbers and increase the navy’s element of surprise.

"These boats used infantry tactics" is very interesting to me, because I believe that is how swarm tactics will be successfully deployed in the maritime domain. Several years ago there was a popular Iranian military forum (mostly Russian language) where the most popular post discussed small boat swarms in the context of Soviet era armor tactics - and how small boats fielding guns, mortars, and rockets could leverage Panzer tactics of WWII to leverage communications, mobility, and speed to defeat an objective - which was usually a large navy warship.

Organization and formation alone will not bring success with swarm tactics though - the key to successful swarm tactics at sea will be the ability of each individual boat commanders ability to think and act independently as necessary to achieve the objectives of the overall plan. Decentralization of command at the tactical level while operating within the framework of the battle strategy is critical to successful swarm tactics - and I note that was not mentioned in this article - even though there are numerous cases in the Sri Lanka battles against LTTE at sea where decisive action taken by individual officers during the battle often made the biggest differences in the fight.

On Maritime Security:

The Navy also created On Board Security Teams (OBST). These were deployed on merchant ships to provide security when the ships transited through dangerous waters. These well trained teams were an effective deterrent against terrorist attack. Navy authorities said these teams could be used to combat modern day piracy. Recently, Sri Lanka’s Permanent Representative at the UN, Palitha Kohona pointed out to the UN Security Council, that the dense shipping lanes south of Sri Lanka had been free of any piracy in the past 28 years, despite heavy traffic. This was due to On Board Security Teams. They were a visible deterrent, they could react immediately to attacks. He said Sri Lanka was ready to share its expertise and personnel regarding the OBST with the rest of the world.

On Tactical Choices Against Insurgency:

Had the govt ordered an all out war effort, ignoring civilian casualties, the war would have been over in February 2009. UN chief Ban Ki-moon, when he flew over the Vanni battlefield in the last stages of the war, had asked why they did not carryout an amphibious assault on the Mullaitivu beach to conclude the offensive. The President ordered a No Fire Zone, in the east where the LTTÉ was using the villagers as a massive human shield. Air attacks were prohibited and army was ordered not to use heavy guns while LTTE continued to use them. The decision to create a No-fire Zone was Sri Lanka‘s own, innovative decision. International law did not demand this. This No-fire Zone is unique to Sri Lanka. Gotabhaya Rajapakse said that other countries should also follow its example.

A truly informative article by Kamalika Pieris. I was somewhat surprised how few people have apparently read the article as noted by the hit count at the bottom of the page.

UAV Shows LTTE Firing at Civilians

This is a YouTube video of UAV footage showing LTTE firing at civilians.

HT: Eric Moore

Tigers Sink Fast Attack Craft (FAC) With Sea Mine

This is something to keep a close eye on.

A locally built Fast Attack Craft (FAC) of the Navy came under a sea mine attack off Kokilai in the North-Eastern waters around 2.25 a.m. yesterday, Navy spokesperson Commander D. K. P. Dassanayake said.

Commander Dassanayake told the Sunday Observer that the Fast Attack Craft was caught in a LTTE sea mine while it was engaged in a routine sea patrol along with another FAC off Kokilai in the North-Eastern waters around 2.25 a.m. yesterday.

"The second FAC which was in the vicinity rushed to the scene and rescued six sailors including the skipper of the vessel when the explosion occurred. Sixteen sailors were on board at the time the FAC came under attack.

A search for the other ten sailors is being carried out by Navy vessels," Commander Dassanayake said.

If the Sea Tigers have developed or imported Sea Mines, this could tilt the balance of power in the ongoing insurgency. MIW is cheap, but it is also indiscriminate, and could spill over to commercial shipping heading in and out of India. That would change the nature of the conflict at sea in Sri Lanka to one of an isolated insurgency at sea to one where major regional powers, like India and potentially NATO, are forced to get involved to secure the global commons.

MIW is no joke, serious business at sea and very difficult to clear. This is a development that is hopefully isolated, and doesn't mark the beginning of a trend.

Another Battle at Trincomalee Port

While rarely discussed, there is currently a war at sea taking place, and it is incredibly violent. Sri Lanka is facing a well financed, well organized deadly foe in the Tamil Tigers, and despite assistance from neighbors, has not been able to turn the tide yet in battles at sea. Eagle1 has been covering it for years, and I encourage the curious to review his archives for takes of the various battles that have been fought between the Sri Lanka. In June the fighting at sea occurred off the Jaffna peninsula, the northern island area of Sri Lanka. In July there was a battle off the Trincomalee Port, and on Sunday, there was another battle near the Trincomalee Port

SLN, Sea Tigers clash in the seas off Pulmoaddai

[TamilNet, Sunday, 08 July 2007, 01:19 GMT]
A 3-hour long sea-fight ensued between the Sea Tigers and the Sri Lanka Navy in the seas off Pulmoaddai after SLN Fast Attack Crafts (FACs) attempted to intrude into the waters south of Mullaiththeevu Saturday midnight, LTTE officials in Ki'linochchi told media Sunday. 3 Dvora FACs were damaged in the clash. Two Sea Tigers were killed in action. Meanwhile, Sri Lanka Army along the Northern Front in Jaffna peninsula continued intensive artillery and Multi-Barrel Rocket Launcher (MBRL) fire towards the LTTE controlled areas for more than 12 hours from 4:00 p.m. Saturday.

21 SLN vessels, most of them Dvora FACs, took part in the SLN naval mission.

The SLN vessels were chased towards the east port harbour by the Sea Tigers amid heavy artillery fire from the Sri Lanka Army from the shores of Koki'laay, Kokkuththoduvaay, and Pulmoaddai.

The damaged Dvora FACs were towed into east port harbour by the SLN, according to the Tigers.

Sri Lankan military officials in Colombo are yet to realease any details of the clashes.

Heavy fighting in the seas off Pulmoaddai - LTTE

[TamilNet, Sunday, 12 August 2007, 23:02 GMT]
Three Sri Lanka Navy Fast Attack Crafts (FACs) were damaged and more than 20 Dvora gunboats were chased away by the Sea Tigers, the naval force of the Liberation Tigers of Tamileelam (LTTE), towards Trincomalee port Sunday night after a fierce sea battle off Pulmoaddai that lasted from 10:00 p.m. till 2:30 a.m. Monday, according to Sea Tiger officials in Vanni. Three Sea Tiger fighters were killed in action in the battle.

More than 20 Israeli-built Dvora FACs were "chased away to Trincomalee port after 4 hours of fierce fighting," a Sea Tiger official told TamilNet.

Sri Lankan military engaged in heavy artillery firing towards sea from their positions in Kokki'laay, Kokkuththoduvaay and Pulmoaddai.

A simillar battle off the Pulmoaddai seas was reported a month ago, on 08 July 2024 in the same location.

The Malabar 07-02 exercise is going to be taking place fairly close to this action. I know there are political concerns, but it is somewhat telling that India is building this enormous Navy, and yet some of the most violent, not to mention largest naval battles since the Falklands War are taking place what amounts to just over their southern horizon. The longer India lets the problems in Sri Lanka simmer, the more likely India is going to see China extend some influence into the situation.

China is engaging on all fronts in the energy sector of Sri Lanka, and once investment is realized defense considerations are sure to follow.