The US Navy and the Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Tuesday

YOKOSUKA, Japan (July 11, 2024) The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) moves into Dry Dock 4 at Fleet Activities (FLEACT) Yokosuka to continue repairs and assess damage sustained from its June 17 collision with a merchant vessel. FLEACT Yokosuka provides, maintains, and operates base facilities and services in support of U.S. 7th Fleet's forward-deployed naval forces, 71 tenant commands and 26,000 military and civilian personnel. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Peter Burghart/Released)

Tuesday's Senate Armed Service Committee hearing was one of the most important engagements politicians in Washington, DC have conducted publicly with the Navy in a very long time. It has been years since we have watched an important hearing between the Senate and leaders of the US Navy where the primary focus of the hearing wasn't a budget. Tuesday's hearing was about something much more important, it was about the safety of American sailors. After 17 lives have been lost in two collisions at sea in the Pacific this year, this was the moment where elected officials would evaluate and determine if the US Navy is meeting the standards expected by the American people following a series of several tragedies where lives have been lost.

To the credit of the Senators in the Senate Armed Service Committee, as an American citizen I felt well represented by the probing questions that triggered several honest responses. However, as I listened to the answers provided by the Navy, considered those answers overnight Tuesday and all day Wednesday, I am uncomfortable with some of the answers provided by Admiral John Richardson, CNO. The Navy leaders accurately testified that "organizational culture" is part of the problem, and anyone who knows squat about challenges related to "organizational culture" in a big organization like the US Navy understands that among all the challenges the Navy faces with fleet material condition problems - an organizational cultural problem is always the hardest challenge to solve. When any organization has a serious culture problem, particularly one that has results where people die, the only question that demands an answer by the US Senate is whether the Navy leaders tasked to deal with the culture problem are capable of dealing with it successfully.

That hearing did not convince me this group of Navy leaders is prepared to do that today. That can change, but as of Tuesday it's blatantly obvious ADM Richardson does not know how to address the problem, and it's questionable if he even understands the problem yet. Below are two (there were more...) of the issues and comments from the Senate hearing that, quite bluntly, should not be allowed to be said by Navy leaders in front of the Senate and the American people. These statements are not acceptable under any circumstances if the expectation is Navy leaders can successfully address the organizational culture problems in the Navy today.

An Indefensible Statement

I will quote this article over at USNI News. This paragraph is an unbelievable, indefensible statement by ADM Richardson and I was shocked on Wednesday that I couldn't find a single member of the Navy community countering such complete nonsense publicly. But privately... this was widely circulated as a huge pile of complete bullshit.

Asked if requesting a delay in deployment date would negatively affect a commanding officer, Richardson said no and added that “if I could go down and give that commander a handshake and a medal I would do that. This is exactly the type of honesty and transparency we need to run a Navy that’s safe and effective.”

The CNO would give that CO a medal? That answer is absurd at best, and is indefensible if the Senate hearings are supposed to represent serious discourse on a serious subject regarding a specific action that the FITZ or MCCAIN COs could potentially taken that could have saved lives.

ADM Richardson appears to understand he needs Commanders who will be honest and transparent about the true state of his force, but if Admiral Richardson believes there wouldn't be a negative affect to the career of that Commander in his Navy today, then that's a serious problem. I can't find anyone who believes that. In any large business or government culture, much less military culture of the US Navy, nobody in senior management tells executive level leadership "no" because of risk. What happens instead is the executive level leadership demands risk mitigation, and the senior manager does the job as required, and the organization accepts the risk. There isn't an option for Commanders to say "I can't deploy my ship right now" without career consequences, and at minimum it was either naive or ignorant to suggest otherwise.

Here were the follow up questions never asked. Is there a single naval officer who has made Flag in the 21st century who, when a CDR or Captain, requested a delay in deployment to their superior because the request to go to sea carried too high a risk? The answer, of course, will be no.

Is there any example of any COs of any ships in the last ten years that requested a delay in deployment because of a ships material condition? If it happened, was that CO promoted? Has anyone checked to validate the CNO's testimony?

The only legitimate answer ADM Richardson could give in Senate testimony is that "yes, that's a symptom of the culture problem in the Navy." Until ADM Richardson can get that question and answer right, he cannot and will not solve the culture problem in the Navy that led to the death of 17 sailors. If someone was to research the questions listed above, it will reveal there are zero SWO Flag officers today who delayed a deployment because of a ships material condition. They will likely find that among any officers who were brave enough to ask for a deployment delay due to a ships material condition, not a single one of those officers was promoted.

The Navy has metrics that can prove or disprove the statement made by ADM Richardson in testimony to the Senate on this topic, so I hope someone in the Navy turns the CNO's speculation on this topic into a fact finding review. The intent of getting the metrics isn't to prove ADM Richardson wrong, of course his answer in the Senate was wrong, but instead it's important for the Navy to see the context for why no one was ever promoted when the CO did actually ask for a delay - in each case - to better understand both the culture problem and the material condition problem.

CHANGI NAVAL BASE, REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE (August 21, 2024) Damage to the portside is visible as the guided-missile destroyer USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) steers towards Changi Naval Base, Republic of Singapore, following a collision with the merchant vessel Alnic MC while underway east of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Significant damage to the hull resulted in flooding to nearby compartments, including crew berthing, machinery, and communications rooms. Damage control efforts by the crew halted further flooding. The incident will be investigated. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Joshua Fulton/Released)

Misrepresentation of a Basic Organizational Leadership Principle

I am one who is skeptical of President Trump's business acumen, but... if he is the professional business leader he claims to be, this statement by CNO Richardson would represent a huge red flag. Again, from USNI News:

“We have a can-do culture, that’s what we do. Nobody wants to raise their hand and say I can’t do the mission, but it’s absolutely essential that when those are the facts we enable that report,” CNO said.

“We don’t meet more than 50 percent of the combatant commanders’ demands as it is, it’s from a force structure standpoint and a combination of that and readiness. And there have been times where I’ve spoken with my subordinate commanders where there’s just insufficient time to get a force trained and certified to meet the deployment date, and we have to go back to the combatant command and say you’re going to have to wait.”

More than a few editors leveraged the "can do" culture statement in headlines that gave the perception that CNO Richardson was somehow suggesting "can do" culture is a problem. Even the USNI News article I am citing has the headline: CNO Richardson: High Optempo and ‘Can-Do Culture’ Culminated In ‘Pervasive’ Expired Certifications in Forward-Deployed Surface Forces.

I am trying not to interpret the CNO's comment in the way the headlines are suggesting, but it's hard to agree with the CNO's comment in any context that a "can do" culture in the Navy is a problem. When the CNO made his "can do" comment in testimony on Tuesday, it immediately sparked discussion across multiple social media platforms by several of the top military observers who were watching the hearings. The commentary of "can do" being negative didn't sit well with folks, but whether it is the nature of social media or because the hearing kept moving quickly beyond the CNO's comment, no one effectively described why this comment didn't sit well with anyone.

The reason the CNO citing "can do" culture in a problematic context doesn't sit well with people is because the CNO misrepresented what "can do" culture in an organization represents. When an organization can be described as having a "can do" culture what it means is that the employees of the organization are positively motivated towards objectives in support of the organization, and are willing to work harder towards organizational goals. Within the Federal government's own civil service materials for senior management promotional exams, a "can do" culture of a department is an example cited as a reflection of positive work being done by supervised managers. In seminars that discuss organizational leadership principles, "can do" culture is a positive reflection of a good working team environment.

I have no doubt that a "can do" culture exists in the US Navy, but where a "can do" culture exists, it has nothing to do with the Navy's organizational culture problems that the CNO is responsible for fixing related to ship material condition. Leveraging "can do" culture should be part of the CNO's solution, not identified as a problem. In the very same testimony the CNO gave to the Senate, he actually discusses characteristics of a cultural problem that is well known to be toxic in organizations, and btw - ironically, these characteristics of an organization are also cited in the Federal governments own civil service promotional exam materials as representing potentially toxic managers within teams.

Asked by Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) if it was “irresponsible” to allow a ship to deploy with an expired certification, Richardson likened the certifications to a driver’s license.

“What had happened in those areas, ma’am, is that the team out there was conscious that these certifications were expiring. And it’s a bit like your driver’s license expiring - it may not necessarily mean that you don’t know how to drive any more, it’s just that expired,” he said.

“However, we do need to recognize that … they need to go back and recertify. What had happened instead is that they would do an evaluation, and say hey, your certification is expired, we’re not going to get a time to get onboard and do the certification for some time, so we’ll do a discussion or administrative review to extend that. It’s called a risk-mitigation plan. That became pretty pervasive, so it was kind of this boiling frog scenario that over time, over the last two years really, became acute.”

When conducting cyber security audits in the IT industry, a good security auditor will look for persistent risk mitigation activities as part of the evaluating the hygiene of security culture within an organization. If during a cyber security audit the auditor determines the ISO is constantly taking steps for risk mitigation for a specific system or service, and there is no evidence of organizational commitment towards solving the root cause for the risk mitigation activities, it basically means the leadership of an organization is the source of the poor security hygiene for the system or service. When there are widespread examples, it's called having a "must do" organizational culture, and the organization "must do" things that carry high risk until eventually, the organization adopts high risk activities into the culture as part of normal status. At that point, even high risk mitigation activities become standard operating procedure, and once something is SOP organizational leadership becomes blind to the risk, and the risk is no longer important enough to resolve at a root cause level.

"Can do" cultures don't require risk mitigation plans, but "must do" cultures do. The distinction is the difference. A "Can do" culture in an organization is a bottom-up culture of productivity, while a "must do" culture within an organization is a top-down culture of productivity. The specific characteristics that distinctly identifies whether an organization has a positive "can do" culture or a negative "must do" culture is the persistent requirement for risk mitigation and the acceptance of risk mitigation as part of standard operating procedure at the senior leadership level.

The CNO's own testimony before the Senate on Tuesday suggests that the US Navy has a toxic "must do" top-down culture, because he not only cited risk mitigation but a tremendous amount of evidence was presented in testimony that the acceptance of risk mitigation as part of standard operating procedure is prevalent in the Pacific theater.

The CNO testimony also suggests the US Navy has a "can do" bottom up culture, and the CNO seems to believe at minimum that the "can do" culture represents part of the problem. If a positive "can do" culture of the organization is part of the problem, it is a symptom, not a cause. As a symptom it suggests the CNO has another problem, because it can lead to senior level blame gaming. A "can do" culture in the US Navy represents a positive characteristic of the US Navy culture and the CNO needs to take a hard look whether or not that positive culture is being exploited by a toxic command culture of "must do" senior leaders. Who is demanding high risk? Where is high risk institutionalized as standard operating procedure?  How is accountability for risk being determined?

If the CNO actually believes that the "can do" culture is the problem instead of a symptom, ADM Richardson may be incapable of solving the organizational cultural problem in the Navy. Correctly identifying the difference between a symptom and problem is a requirement. How can the CNO be weeks into this process, be testifying in front of the Senate, and still potentially be getting problem identification wrong? Where are the smart people on the CNO's staff?

Remember, what was the first thing Navy senior leadership did when ship material condition problems started several years ago? The Navy classified INSURVs, which virtually insured risk mitigation would become standard operating procedure when public criticism would no longer be a problem.

The CNO's own testimony suggests the problem is a "must do" culture because he testified that the two specific aspects that represent a "must do" toxic top-down organizational culture problem exist - persistent requirement for risk mitigation and the acceptance of risk mitigation as part of standard operating procedure at the senior leadership level. There are metrics that can identify the culture challenge the Navy faces, and those metrics are not going to support the CNO's testimony that COs can delay deployments due to a ships material condition without career consequences, because that action would be counter culture. The Senate is asking the right questions. Yet some the answers by the CNO himself aren't believable.

Who suggested to the CNO that the first visible action the Navy needs to take before analysis is completed to identify the basic stuff like 'work hours and duty shifts' should be the Navy should stand up a new staff? What credible analysis has the Navy conducted that identified the first, most important, immediate step to be taken towards solving really tough organizational problems is constituting a new staff organization, rather than a manning review related to number of hours deployed sailors are working per day or week?

In my opinion, given what was said in Tuesdays testimony, the only new staff the US Navy needs is one ready to bring research skills, analysis skills, a significant increase in critical thought to some serious cultural problems in proximity closer to the CNO, because letting the CNO describe symptoms as problems in Senate testimony related to the death of 17 sailors insured Tuesday was a terrible, horrible, no good, very bad day for the US Navy. If creating new staffs and implying blame should be directed towards sailors who are obviously sacrificing themselves towards successful objectives demanded by Navy leadership is being described as the problem... I just don't see how this group of Navy leaders can be trusted to successfully grow and improve the Navy looking into the future when there are so many red flags related to how this group of Navy leaders is struggling to deal with the challenges that already exist today.

Fact Check: John McCain vs Bob Work

Photo by: Jacquelyn Martin

As Bryan also discussed tonight, John McCain and Bob Work had a nice little exchange today in the Senate during today's nomination hearing. There are several things going on here, but like Bryan I don't see any scenario where Bob Work has his nomination blocked by John McCain very long, particularly if someone in the mainstream press decides to do even basic fact checking.

As everyone knows, I have been and remain a very strong supporter of the Littoral Combat Ship program. My argument since late 2008, when I spent 3 nights aboard USS Freedom walking through the ship with very smart folks thinking about what the Navy is doing with the Littoral Combat Ship program, has been that the naval warfare theories found in the concept of LCS will heavily influence surface warfare in the 21st century. I still believe that to be true.

To date, USS Freedom has yet to do anything that can be described as anything other than an activity designed for domestic political purposes. Whether it was the tour of ports across the US prior to being commissioned, the short patrol off the US southern coast, the deployment to Singapore, and even the response to the recent tsunami in the Philippines - USS Freedom has basically proven to be an operational lemon and a political flop.

But that doesn't surprise anyone paying attention to the LCS program, because all LCS observers have seen how the Navy has had to slap on one change after another to put the ship to sea, only to frequently see the ship limp back to port. It is a first in class lemon paid for by R&D funding, forced into operation too quickly for purposes of being tested by fire only to see the Navy burned every time. So the first ship, redesigned after construction begun, is a lemon. No shipbuilder - even those at Lockheed Martin - are surprised by that reality. The only real surprise with LCS to date is that USS Independence - the Austal version first in class - apparently isn't a lemon also.

But the Navy put their lemon out there, tried to make lemonade, and so far it looks more like dog urine. Worth a try? Maybe? I honestly don't know, time will tell. The question is, does anyone honestly believe the rest of the Lockheed Martin LCS class is going to be a lemon too? I don't. It is also important to contrast all the publicity of USS Freedom with the complete absence of publicity for USS Independence. I do not mean to imply the LCS will be some great class of ship by itself, rather I do strongly believe the impact that LCS will have on surface warfare is going to be very positive for that community long term.

Despite all the news you may be reading right now, to me I am thinking 2014 is the turning point for the entire Littoral Combat Ship program, and thanks to John McCain's circus in the Senate, people might finally realize it as new events start unfolding. The conversation has, almost entirely, been what the ship presumably can't do. The conversation, very soon, will transition into what the Littoral Combat Ship is doing. For the past 15 ship classes (mentioned below), that simple transition has made a lot of difference in how people looked at ships that couldn't meet early cost estimates.

When Talking Points Fail

John McCain is one of the best in Washington, DC when it comes to complaining as loud as possible about unpopular defense programs. Unfortunately he complains so much about what he is against, no one knows what he is actually for anymore when it comes to defense. Today the Senator made a big scene, and as long as no one actually fact checks what he said, he might not take a hit for the magnitude by which he was completely wrong today... again, and again, and again. This is what I like to call terrible preparation and staff work by a Senator and his office.

John McCain: Mr. Work, as a former Navy Undersecretary you wrote a very candid paper about the Littoral Combat Ship program. I have a memorandum from Secretary Hagel to the Chief of Naval Operations, I don't know if you are aware of it or not, he says "Therefore no new contract negotiations beyond 32 ships will go forward" talking about the Littoral Combat Ship. Do you agree with that assessment?

Bob Work: As I understand it, what the assessment is saying is we will stop building the Flight 0+ LCS at 32 ships and we will consider follow-on ships - small combatants - a modified LCS could be one of the options, a domestic or foreign design could be one of the options, so I think this is very normal with Navy shipbuilding. We build Flights...

John McCain: You think it's normal? You think it's normal that the cost overruns associated with this ship? The fact that we don't even know what the mission is, that there has not been a, this whole idea of moving different modules off and on? You disagree with the Government Accountability Office statement about the cost overruns? This is normal Mr. Work?

Two things here. First, LCS is not being cancelled like Senator McCain is suggesting, rather the Senator's staff isn't smart enough to realize this is what down-select for the LCS looks like. Hagel is basically reintroducing competition back into the LCS program while building upon lessons learned from the first Block 0+ ships. Yeah, someone is going to offer up some incredibly expensive FFG in the analysis of alternatives, but don't bite the hook, rather expect the winner to be a Block I LCS based on one of the two designs, but the Block I will add firepower while keeping to some of the core concepts of the original LCS... that's where this is really heading.

Second, did Senator McCain really ask if cost overruns are "normal" three times?

Of the nine first in class ships previous to LCS, four had overruns of greater than 100% (Avenger class, Osprey class, Arleigh Burke class, San Antonio class), three had overruns between 40-60% (Oliver Hazard Perry class, Ticonderoga class, Whidbey Island class). Only two had overruns less than 20% (Wasp class and Virginia class). NONE came in lower than expected. Now, if we also count the Seawolf class, the America class, the Zumwalt class, the Ford class, and throw in Independence and Freedom as unique classes of ships...

The last 15 classes of US Navy ships have started out with cost overrun problems. For the entire career of John McCain as a Senator, this has been normal by any definition of the word. John McCain is either the most remarkably ignorant Senator on Navy shipbuilding issues in US history, or he's intentionally acting like a clown. I'll let you decide.

Bob Work: Well sir, up until 2007, 2008, 2009 when the program almost imploded there were significant cost overruns. When Secretary Mabus, Secretary Stackley, and I arrived in the Department of the Navy in 2009 - I believe since then the program has met it's cost targets. In 2001 the guidance to the Department of the Navy was to be able to build 3 LCS's for the price of one Arleigh Burke. The Department of the Navy is doing that, today. So I think you have to look at the performance of...

John McCain: So it makes it hard to understand why Secretary Hagel would, when the original plans as presented to Congress for their approval was 52 ships. And by the way, was anyone ever held responsible for these failures 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010?

Bob Work: Those happened in the administration prior to ours so I don't know what... 

How many folks involved in the Littoral Combat Ship program from 2005 - 2008 have been nominated and approved by Senator McCain to become a Flag Officer? The only person in this conversation who was legitimately in a position to hold people accountable for failures in the LCS program was Senator John McCain. The only person in this conversation whose record reflects a positive contribution to the Littoral Combat Ship program problems is Bob Work.

Senator McCain, your music is playing.

John McCain: So everything has been fine under this administration as far as the LCS is concerned?

Bob Work: I believe that the program is on solid ground and is meeting its cost targets, yes sir.

John McCain: You do believe that?

Bob Work: Yes sir.

John McCain: So you are in direct contradiction of the Government Accountability Office study of 2013.

Bob Work: I haven't read that particular uh....

John McCain: You haven't read it?

Bob Work: No sir. 

Like Bob Work, I was guilty of not reading the full US Government Accountability Office study of the Littoral Combat Ship from July of 2013. I read the highlight page back when it was released, then shrugged and went on to do more important things. No matter how John McCain tries to spin it, the GAO report isn't in direct contradiction of anything Bob Work said, indeed the report highlight page starts by saying:

GAO found that the Navy has made progress in addressing some of the early design and construction problems on the LCS 1 and LCS 2 seaframes, and quality defects and unit costs are declining, now that the seaframes are in steady production. Based on projected learning curves, shipyard performance can be expected to continue to improve over time.

I went ahead and read the entire GAO report because Senator McCain made it sound like the report says something incredibly important, but I could never could find where the report contradicts what Bob Work said, indeed it basically answers Senator McCain's question by suggesting that the Littoral Combat Ship is doing much better under the current administration.

Hmm...

John McCain: Wow... uhm... I'm stunned that you haven't. But the fact is that the ship has still not, uh, had a clear, uh, mission. The modules that were supposed to be moving back and forth have not, uh, we have not persued the fly before you buy, uh, uh, policy. And, uhm.. Do you remember the original cost estimate for the LCS?

Bob Work: It was $220 million for the sea frame Senator, and depending on the number of modules that you would buy the total cost for a missionized LCS, average cost was supposed to be no more than $400 million in FY2005 dollars.

John McCain: And what is it now?

Bob Work: I think, I haven't been briefed on the most recent cost - I'll do that if confirmed and look at it but I know that we are on track...

John McCain: Thank you for doing that, what's the cost now? You don't even know the cost now Mr. Work?

Bob Work: I believe the average cost with modules is about $450 million but not in FY2005 dollars, two thousand five dollars. So if you take a look at the original costing factors, I believe the cost of today's LCS's are very close to the costs that were set back in 2002-2003.

Senator McCain, no one outside the DoD has the real cost of LCS sir, because the cost of the modules has not been released publicly.  Why would Bob Work know the cost of LCS considering he hasn't been in government service for almost a year?

We all have different 'unofficial' estimated numbers for the Littoral Combat Ship seaframe and modules. I have mine, and Bob Work probably has better numbers than mine. To protect my sources I will not detail mine exactly, but generally as of FY2014 I have the Littoral Combat Ship plus the average cost of one mission module costing around $548 million, which is $421 million in FY2005 dollars. Now, without going into too much detail, allow me to provide some insight into those numbers. The primary reason why the average cost of the Littoral Combat Ship is more than $400 million in FY2005 dollars is because the MIW module is incredibly expensive, indeed I believe the very high cost of the MIW module is why the LCS modules are yet to be released in the SAR. Once we see the module numbers in the SAR, we will all have a much better idea of how much LCS really costs.

But here is the rub... even if the LCS went away, the one part of the entire LCS program the Navy will keep under any circumstances is the Mine Warfare Module. It is the most desired piece of the entire program, so that cost is going to exist with or without the LCS.

And yes, if I replace the 24 MIW modules with 12 ASuW and 12 ASW modules based on the numbers I have, and applied the average, the LCS cost in FY2014 dollars is less than $400 million FY2005 dollars. Expect the MIW module to cost in the neighborhood of $70 - $80 million per module when the SAR finally reveals the cost. As we already know, mine warfare is very expensive.

John McCain: Well given that then it is hard to understand why the Secretary of Defense would curtail the production of it by some 24 ships, so Mr. Work every objective study whether it be the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, the Government Accountability Office, every other objective observer the LCS is not anywhere near what it was presented to the Congress by funding and this again makes me wonder about your qualifications because the one thing that we are plagued with is significant cost overruns and lack of capability.

John McCain's staff failed him today, because they forgot to update all the old talking points and forced John McCain to say a lot of inaccurate things about LCS in an attempt to stick it to Bob Work, stuff that was very much once true but today is clearly not. The Senator's implication regarding the cost of LCS is wrong, and I'm struggling to find all these objective observers saying otherwise today, because even the GAO in the July 2013 report the Senator claims to be citing concedes the cost of LCS is no longer the programs problem. Now maybe the Senator disagrees, but $421 million in FY2005 dollars appears to me to be pretty close to $400 million in FY2005 dollars, in fact the cost of LCS today is a lot closer to the original estimate than I think every reasonable observer would have ever believed possible back in 2007-2008 when the Navy was ceasing construction of ships in both shipyards.

Senator John McCain today is attempting to publicly slap Bob Work with the LCS program, which makes no sense because every data point suggests Bob Work was part of a team that took a really bad LCS program suffering from enormous cost problems, and clearly turned it around and got it back on track. If the Senator will publicly attack people who do a good job, and the same Senator voted affirmative for promotions to Navy officers who were directly involved in the problems of LCS, the Senator is hardly qualified to pass on judgment regarding qualifications, because the Senator is the one demonstrating clear lack of good judgment.

In hindsight, I find the whole thing sad. Bob Work might legitimately be the nations top civilian strategic thinker on defense issues since the cold war, and John McCain - who some consider to be the nations top defense Senator - has clearly gone off the deep end into the land of crazy nonsense. As soon as Senator John McCain realizes his staff let him down big time today, that the Senator is on the wrong side of the facts he argued, and assuming his ego allows the Senator to concede he made a mistake....

Bob Work will be the next Deputy Secretary of Defense.

As for that whole New Hampshire BRAC thing that happened today... either the Portsmouth Shipyard folks honestly believe they are in trouble keeping the yard open, or that was the Joint Strike Fighter lobby nervous as hell about Bob Work's appointment.

Something to keep an eye on.

Continuing Resolution = Bad Governance

Defense News has four (here, here, here, and here) articles discussing the impacts of operating under the continuing resolution instead of getting a FY11 defense budget passed - the budget that was supposed to have been passed by October 1, 2010. It is the second quarter of fiscal year 11 and still no budget.

Bottom line, folks on Capital Hill need to get in gear and get last years budget done already - we are still fighting a war and nobody seems to care. There are serious repercussions if the Navy is unable to get a budget soon, starting with disruption to production lines. The 'no new starts' issue that comes with a CR is a big deal too, the inability to issue a contract for a Virginia class submarine last month can turn into huge delay costs if the budget doesn't pass.

Why the President isn't hammering the new Congress on this issue every day makes no sense to me. Why the Republicans in the House aren't hammering the Senate folks on this issue makes no sense to me. It is as if nobody wants to do the job of the folks who failed to do their job last year.

That hardly represents admirable leadership by anyone.

Senate Littoral Combat Ship Hearing - Today

Scheduled at the last minute - starts today at 2:30pm.