The Fleet in Being Strategy

PACIFIC OCEAN (Jan. 20, 2017) Aircraft from Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 17 conduct flight operations aboard the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71). The carrier is currently off the coast of Southern California conducting carrier qualifications. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Bill M. Sanders/Released)

The US Navy has dealt with the fiscal controls of sequestration put in place by Congress and the Obama Administration over the last few years by making a strategic choice that favored new shipbuilding activities over the maintenance of ships and aircraft - among other things. Budgets are zero sum, and Defense News is reporting the consequences of that strategic choice.

The U.S. Navy’s F/A-18 Hornet and Super Hornet strike fighters are the tip of the spear, embodying most of the fierce striking power of the aircraft carrier strike group. But nearly two-thirds of the fleet’s strike fighters can’t fly — grounded because they’re either undergoing maintenance or simply waiting for parts or their turn in line on the aviation depot backlog.

Overall, more than half the Navy’s aircraft are grounded, most because there isn’t enough money to fix them.

Additionally, there isn’t enough money to fix the fleet’s ships, and the backlog of ships needing work continues to grow. Overhauls — “availabilities” in Navy parlance — are being canceled or deferred, and when ships do come in they need longer to refit. Every carrier overall for at least three years has run long, and some submarines are out of service for prolonged periods, as much as four years or more. One submarine, the Boise, has lost its diving certification and can’t operate pending shipyard work.

Leaders claim that if more money doesn’t become available, five more submarines will be in the same state by the end of this year. 

The article has plenty of details, but the eye popping quote comes after the article cites "$6-8 billion" in immediate needs. There is only one way to describe what this means.

The dire situation of naval aviation is sobering. According to the Navy, 53 percent of all Navy aircraft can’t fly — about 1,700 combat aircraft, patrol, and transport planes and helicopters. Not all are due to budget problems — at any given time, about one-fourth to one-third of aircraft are out of service for regular maintenance. But the 53 percent figure represents about twice the historic norm.

It doesn't matter how many ships are in the US Navy's shipbuilding plan, the unequivocal truth of the situation is - the US Navy today is a hollow force. When the fleet cannot leave port and has been degraded to the point it cannot maintain it's own resources, it is a fleet in being. It was an intentional choice, by both Navy leaders and Congress - they all own the situation as it is today. This has been the strategy of the last several years to insure new construction and new ships. No one, whether a civilian in either political party or an Admiral in the Navy today, can claim they are not accountable. Priorities get funded, and a lot of priorities that have nothing to do with the maintenance of naval power have been funded over the last many years.

Consider for a moment that it is very likely the training squadrons are probably among the squadrons actually getting maintenance funding, which means it is very likely the US Navy couldn't field more than 4, and probably not even 5 aircraft carriers with functioning combat aircraft today in response to a national emergency. I don't know what percent of the F-18s force is grounded, but I bet the percentage of helicopters grounded is much higher, because if there is one thing we can make a safe bet on - it is that naval aviation leaders will have prioritized the F-18s and done only the minimum everywhere else.

Last week the Question of the Week asked whether the US Navy was prepared for combat at sea. My answer to this question would be, "Yes the US Navy is prepared to fight, at least initially, and while the tip of the spear is very sharp - it's the shortest spear the US Navy has represented since the 19th century."

In 2010 I remember listening to fleet leaders who were very concerned that the US Navy was on the verge of being a hollow force, and today in 2017 the US Navy is absolutely hollow. There are entire squadrons of aircraft that cannot fly today, and ships that not only can't get underway - but it is unclear when they next could get underway. When I read articles discussing the size of the US Navy in 2017 I roll my eyes wondering if they have any idea how meaningless the numbers they use actually are. Numbers on paper have nothing in common with reality. The CNO telling any and all who will listen that the state of maintenance in the force has already passed critical levels - that's the reality.

The Need for a Small Surface Combatant Capability Based Assessment (CBA)

PACIFIC OCEAN (Feb. 16, 2015) Sailors assigned to Surface Warfare Detachment Four of the littoral combat ship USS Fort Worth (LCS 3) Crew 102 prepare to board a naval training vessel as part of visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) training during an Independent Deployer Certification Exercise (IDCERTEX). IDCERTEX, led by Commander, U.S. 3rd Fleet (C3F) and executed by Commander, Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 15, is being conducted Feb. 9-20 off the Coast of Southern California and Hawaii. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Katarzyna Kobiljak/Released)

The following contribution comes from Matthew Cosner.

"Without a clear capabilities-based assessment, it is not clear what operational requirements the upgraded LCS is designed to meet. The Navy must demonstrate what problem the upgraded LCS is trying to solve. We must not make this mistake again." Sen. John McCain (R-AZ), March 2015.

Executive Summary

• The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) concept and Frigate variant (LCS/FF) trace their origins to incomplete analyses conducted in the early 2000s, coupled with flawed assumptions regarding future geopolitical, threat, technical and fiscal environments.
• The Navy should pause any further invesments in LCS/FF program to sponsor a Small Surface Combatant Capability Based Assessment (CBA) to define the missions, capabilities, and required attributes for its future Small Surface Combatant.

Background

The decision announced by Secretary of the Navy Mabus earlier this year to redesignate modified versions of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) as Frigates (LCS/FF) and adapt twenty as to fill the Navy’s future Small Surface Combatant requirement has not diminished the debate surrounding the LCS program.  The LCS has been mired in controversy since its inception and has yielded a product which bears little resemblance to the initial concept. In short, comparing the LCS in-service today to the concept originally envisioned in the early 2000s:

• LCS high speed requirement appears to have been met, but may have imposed severe compromises and limitations in other facets of the designs;[i]
• Seaframes appear unlikely to meet required range (LCS-3 projection of 1,941 nautical miles (nm) versus a 3,500 nm requirement);[ii]
• Survivability of LCS in a wartime environment has been called into question by both the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) and Congress;[iii] 
• Expected acquisition cost of an LCS seaframe approaches $470 million compared to a 2006 Congressional mandated cost cap of $220 million per seaframe;[iv]
• The surface warfare (SUW) module with its current Hellfire missiles is significantly outranged by potential enemy ships displacing around 10% of LCS tonnage[v]
• The Remote Minehunting System (RMS) critical to the LCS mine countermeasure (MCM) module is unreliable and has met significant criticism from DOT&E;[vi]
• The antisubmarine warfare (ASW) module, which was rescoped from distributed offboard systems to a more conventional variable depth sonar and multi-function towed array MFTA, has not yet been delivered and is currently overweight;[vii]
• The original concept of quickly swapping mission modules within days to allow rapid mission reconfiguration (e.g. SUW to MIW) appears infeasible.[viii]

The Patterns of the Current LCS Debate

It is important to acknowledge that LCS supporters do exist - although this author suspects that if one discounted those who are professionally connected to the LCS program, they would number in single digits.  Arguments in favor of the LCS fall into two broad categories.

The first category involves citing unit cost stabilization, reliability improvements, and increased seaframe deliveries as evidence of the LCS program “turning the corner”.  These arguments are myopic: delivering reliable systems, within cost and schedule are what program offices are expected to do.  This line of argument also relies on questionable accounting practices:  until the mission modules are delivered, any discussion of LCS cost or schedule refers to an incomplete item.  It also focuses the discussion too narrowly on production metrics while ignoring whether or not the LCS delivers actual warfighting capability.

A second line of pro-LCS arguments addresses warfighting utility - but focused on conceptual future capabilites rather than what can be reasonably anticipated.  The argument starts that the LCS modular concept allows the flexibity to introduce new capabilites as needed.   Yet it is hard to accept this claim given that it has taken the LCS program over a decade to design, acquire, test and field the first three “flight zero” mission modules - particulary when one considers that these modules are far less complex than what had been planned at program conception.

LCS proponents may then argue that even without mission modules, the LCS provides comparable capability to the recently-retired Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates. The counter is that benchmarking capability against a forty year-old frigate design with much of its weapons removed is a false comparison; if all that was required was a de-missiled, 1970s-era frigate, then perhaps there was little need for a new ship at all.

The Bigger Debate: Are We Building the Right Ship?

The premise of this article is that while it is important to monitor and hold NAVSEA and prime contractors accountable in terms of building the ship right, it is far more important for resource sponsors (with the aid of the analytic community) to determine whether the Navy is actually building the right ship.  Thus, the target audience for this article and its recommendations is the OPNAV staff who develop and manage requirements, rather than the Program Executive Office for Littoral Combat Ships (PEO-LCS) which are responsible to build to those requirements.

Despite the spirited exchanges between LCS critics and proponents on this website and others, the tenor of the debate itself misses the larger picture.  Success or failure of LCS to meet a design specification, or deliver within cost and schedule, or comparing what it delivers compared to a now-retired frigate is irrelevant if LCS is not the ship the Navy needs in the future.  Imagine a magic wand existed which would instantly correct LCS program and technical failures and deliver thirty-two LCSs, built as designed, within cost parameters, and with the currently projected mission packages. The question would still remain whether a ship the Navy envisioned in the early 2000s is a sound basis for a future Small Surface Combatant mission.

The above question can be addressed by examining the assumptions that existed when the LCS concept was formulated, how its foundational analysis was conducted in the early 2000s, and how the more recent Small Surface Combatant Study arrived at its recommendation.

Challenging LCS Assumptions

In examining LCS foundational analyses, it is first vital to consider whether the assumptions under which the original LCS concept was developed are still valid.  The simple answer is no; the technological, geographic, threat, and fiscal assumptions which underpinned LCS conceptualization do not appear to be valid in 2015.

Technology: Reliance on Unmanned Systems.  Net centric warfare (NCW) was a key technology-centric concept which informed the LCS concept and design.  NCW theorizes “…increased combat power through networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self-synchronization.”[ix]   NCW proponents placed strong reliance on the ability of ship-based unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), unmanned surface vehicles, and unmanned undersea vehicles, to provide LCS with significant mission and scouting capabilites.[x]    Yet with the possible exception of the Fire Scout UAV, the unmanned systems which were central to the original LCS CONOPS, have not matured as projected.

Geography: The Pacific Pivot.  The mid-2000s saw a renewed emphasis on the Pacific Command (PACOM) area of responsibility (AOR). The so-called Pacific Pivot was driven in large part by a rising China and its perceived threat to the existing economic and military order.   Statements by the Commander of the US Pacific Fleet in 2012 indicated that by 2020 over 60% of the US ships will be stationed in the Pacific.[xi]   Although the LCS was supposedly intended to operate in all global theaters, the Pacific represents a unique environment with specific challenges; notably immense open ocean distances and fairly sparse logistics support.  Logically, if one were to design a ship class to operate primarily in the Pacific, it would need to possess range/endurance, moderate cruising speed, and sufficient manpower to self-sustain.  It would be a ‘distance runner’ rather than the ‘sprinter’ which the LCS program is delivering.

Threats: Anti-Access / Area Denial (A2/AD).  Concurrent with the “Pacific Pivot” was the recognition of the threat posed by enemy anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) operations.  A2/AD are concepts employed by an enemy intended to delay the assembly of US power-projection forces (to include their battle networks), and keep them beyond effective range of their territory, or to defeat them once they come within range.[xii]   Denial of command, control and communications, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (C3ISR) networks may pose significantly challenges to the LCS concept - which relies upon access to the C3ISR network for both SA and survivability.  Similarly, an enemy which can conduct a crippling first-strike on US forward bases (via ballistic missile, cruise missiles or other methods) can impose severe logistics challenges to the relatively short-legged LCS.

Fiscal: Dwindling Resources. The mid-2000s were an era of relatively ample fiscal resources, due in no small part to the use of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) to augment the baseline shipbuilding account.  The drawdown from overseas operations reduced that funding sources, while the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011ensures little to no growth in overall defense resources.  Compounding the reduction in available resources are the pending demands for major ship construction projects including a new ballistic missile submarine (SSBN(X)) the Gerald Ford Class aircraft carrier (CVN-78) cost overruns, and DDG Flight III.  This lack of available resources has resulted in a relative decline in the perceived utility of single purpose, low-end warships (LCS) in favor of multi-purpose warships capable of operating independently against a broader array of challenges (frigates).

Considering resources, the cost of LCS/FF modifications are currently estimated at $75-100 million per unit.[xiii]    Adding this amount to the seaframe cost of an LCS ($479 million) and the expected unit cost of a mission module ($100 million) yields a total cost of $654-679 million.[xiv]   As a point of reference the FFG-7 unit cost in FY77 dollars was $168 million, equating to $677 million in FY15 dollars.  While it is admittedly problematic to compare shipbuilding costs based purely on inflation, this should at least raise the question as to whether comparable or even better-value options exist for the Small Surface Combatant than the LCS/FF.

PACIFIC OCEAN (Aug. 15, 2015) Sailors assigned to Surface Warfare Mission Package Detachment 2 prepare to be hoisted out of the water by the littoral combat ship USS Coronado's (LCS 4) twin-boom-extensible crane following a visit, board, search and seizure training exercise. Coronado conducted predeployment assessment and evaluation on the performance of shipboard equipment during a week-long underway off the coast of California. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Debra Daco/Released)

Baseline LCS: Incomplete Analysis

As an analyst, challenging an acquisition program’s requirements often becomes a tautological exercise.  When questioned, a typical response from program officials and resource sponsors is that the requirements are the requirements because they were at one time signed by leadership.  The fact that leadership may not have fully understood the analysis basis for the decision, was responsible for many decisions involving multiple acquisition programs, and has by now moved on to another assignment (or even retired) is often overlooked.

The LCS program emerged in late-2001 as an element of the now-defunct future surface combatant program - which included the LCS, a land-attack focused destroyer (DD(X)), and an air-defense focused cruiser (CG(X))  Conceived at a time in which the Navy perceived limited near or mid-term challenges to its ability to conduct operations in the open ocean (‘blue water’), the LCS was intended to counter asymmetric threats to action in the littoral waters (‘green water’): notably sea mines, small boats, and diesel-electric submarines.

Underlying the LCS concept were the theories of “transformationalism” (an influential 2004 paper on the LCS used the term no less than sixteen times[xv] ) and “net centric warfare (NCW).  NCW theorized “…increased combat power through networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self-synchronization.”[xvi]   Proponents of NCW also placed confidence in the capabilities of largely unproven ship-based unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) and unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) to provide significant situational awareness (SA) and mission capabilites to the LCS.[xvii]

LCS enjoyed strong backing from Navy leadership and thus proceeded rapidly from concept to reality.  Indeed, by mid-2003, Navy leadership was confident enough in its need for a small, fast, modular surface combatant (as well as the capability/capacity of industry to manufacture the ship and its modules) to undertake a number of critical steps.  It established an LCS program office; developed a draft concept of operations (CONOPS); funded several industry led trade studies on the designs, and released a request for proposal (RFP).[xviii]

Remarkably, the above steps were conducted by Navy prior to any of the formal studies expected in a major defense acquisition program to identify and validate capability gaps, and assess a wide array of potential solutions.  Neither the exact nature of the “littoral combat” problem to be solved, nor the presumption that a small, fast, modular surface combatant was the best and only solution to the “littoral combat” problem were tested via rigorous, structured analysis.[xix]     Indeed, VADM Johnathan Nathman (then-Vice Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements) admitted in Congressional testimony in April 2003 that more rigorous mission-level analysis of the LCS was only conducted after the decision was made to acquire LCS.[xx]

PACIFIC OCEAN (April 30, 2024) An MH-60R Sea Hawk helicopter and an MQ-8B Fire Scout unmanned helicopter, both assigned to Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron (HSM) 35, conduct coordinated flight operations with the littoral combat ship USS Freedom (LCS 1). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Joan E. Jennings/Released)

The Small Surface Combatant Study: Putting the Cart before the Horse

The mistakes made in the LCS analysis of the early 2000s were largely repeated  a decade later, following the decision by then-Secretary of Defense Hagel to halt production of baseline LCS at hull 32 and examine alternative concepts to provide a Small Surface Combatant.  In February 2014, Secretary Hagel directed Navy leadership to:

“…Submit to me, in time to inform the PB 2016 [President’s Budget for FY2016] budget deliberations, alternative proposals to procure a capable and lethal small surface combatant, generally consistent with the capabilities of a frigate. Options considered should include a completely new design, existing ship designs (including the LCS), and a modified LCS.”[xxi]

The Navy’s Small Surface Combatant Task Force (SSCTF) were given approximately six months to complete the study.  However, rather than conduct an up-front assessment to determine gaps and examine system-of-solutions beyond the frigate to meet those gaps, the SSCTF relied on surveys of fleet commanders for expert judgement.  According to Robert O’Rourke of the Congressional Research Service (CRS) this approach has disadvantages:

“One potential disadvantage of this approach is that it deprived the Navy of a chance to uncover the kind of counter-intuitive results that a formal analysis can uncover…. another potential disadvantage is that fleet commanders can be focused on what they see the Navy needing today, based on current Navy operations, which might not be the same in all respects as what the Navy will need in the future...”[xxii]  

The SSC Study considered completely new designs, existing ship designs, as well as modified LCS designs.     The recommendation briefed to and approved by Secretary Hagel in late 2014 was to acquire 20 modified LCS with an improved air defense radar; air defense decoys; a new, more effective electronic warfare system; an over-the-horizon anti-ship missile; multi-function towed array sonar; torpedo defenses; and additional armor protection.[xxiv]

While the decision to adapt a modified LCS over other potential concepts has been subject to significant discussion, it is difficult to argue the decision since the SSC study itself is not available to the public.  However, what can be openly debated is the deeply flawed analytical path by which the decision was arrived, and the manner in which it is being implemented.

The SSC Study yielded a detailed modified LCS designed to satisfy current shortfalls - yet lacked the analysis to determine whether it will meet future requirements.  The modifications recommended will undoubtedly make the LCS “better”, but no study was done as to whether they will make the LCS “good enough” to meet the Navy’s future threats.

Further confusing the issue is Congressional testimony by Mr. Sean Stackley (Ass’t Secretary for Research Development and Acquisition) which indicates that the Navy had not even begun the LCS-FF requirements development and staffing process until after it had selected the LCS-FF design.  It thus appears that the Navy is attempting to make the question fit the answer.[xxv]

The Need for a Capability Based Assessment

It should be clear from the above paragraphs that: the assumptions which existed at LCS conception are largely outdated; the baseline LCS conducted in the early 2000s had an incomplete foundational analysis; and the recently completed SSC Study essentially selected a ship design to meet current gaps with no analysis of future mission requirements.

An analysis method which could address these myriad of flaws exists and is referred to as a Capability Based Assessment (CBA).  A CBA is required by the Joint Capability Integration Development System (JCIDS) prior to selecting a material solution.  It provides recommendations on whether to pursue a materiel solution to an identified capability gap that meets an established need.

A CBA assists Navy decision makers in determining the problem, whether or not it needs to acquire ‘something’ to address the problem, and what requirements for that ‘something’ should look like.  A CBA is often confused with an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) - in fact they are separate but interrelated efforts with the CBA occurring first.  The general steps of a CBA are:

• Define the mission;
• Identify capabilities required;
• Determine the attributes/standards of the capabilities;
• Identify gaps;
• Assess operational risk associated with the gaps;
• Prioritize the gaps;
• Identify and assess potential non-materiel solutions and;
• Provide recommendations for addressing the gaps[xxvi]

Proceeding from the first step, and based on the information in the paragraphs above, the LCS analysis of the early 2000s was focused on both a mission (“littoral combat”) of decreasing relevance, and assumptions regarding the future environments which have proven largely invalid.  If these factors have in fact changed then a ‘daisy-chain’ ensues: the recognition of a changed problem/mission should drive the Navy to reinvestigate its required capabilites (i.e. what it will need to do), resultant gaps (i.e. what it cannot do with its programmed portfolio), and the required attributes of the ship(s) it needs to acquire. 

What Should Be Done and What It Will Take

It is imperative for the Navy to determine the capabilities it needs in a future Small Surface Combatant which will serve the fleet well into the middle half of this century. The recommended course of action is to immediately ‘pause’ the ongoing LCS/FF capability improvement effort, reconsider the decision to acquire LCS/FF hulls 33-52, and conduct a Small Surface Combatant CBA in accordance with JCIDS.

There are numerous qualified, highly-skilled, analysis organizations available to lead such a CBA including but not limited to the Center for Naval Analysis, RAND and the Institute for Defense Analysis.  However, under no circumstances should PEO-LCS be allowed to lead the study since by definition this would represent a conflict of interest.  PEO-LCS should instead focus on addressing the many issues associated with ‘baseline’ LCS - particularly in developing an alternative course of action for the failing (but critically needed) MIW mission module.

Multiple other organizations would need to play roles to the CBA.  An Executive Steering Group (ESG) consisting of OPNAV, NAVSEA and Commander Naval Surfaces would provide high-level guidance.  Naval Warfare Development Center would assist in identifying scenarios, tasks and metrics.  The Office of Naval Intelligence would identify threats and enemy CONOPS.  Fleet subject matter experts would provide inputs CONOPS - although their near-term, qualitative inputs would not be viewed as a substitute for the actual analysis.

At its core, the Small Surface Combatant CBA will be a scenario-based assessment focused on likely missions and threats in the post-2030 timeframe.  The missions and scenarios would be identified by the ESG and refined during the CBA but would likely include:

• ASW. Escort in the open ocean;
• SUW. High-end, surface action group;
• Counter-piracy;
• Maritime Interdiction Operations;
• Visit Board Search and Seizure;
• Support to Navy Special Warfare;
• Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Response and;
• Global Presence.

It is important to note that, consistent with Secretary Hagel’s original guidance, the MIW mission would remain ‘off the table’.  It is presumed this mission would be performed by the baseline LCS - if and when the MIW mission module is fielded.

The CBA would be resource informed, meaning that any materiel solutions would need to be considered against an assessment of available shipbuilding dollars in the 2030-40 timeframe.  Given the many competing priorities in that timeframe (including SSBN(X), continued CVN-78 cost overruns, and the DDG Flight III) cost-effectiveness and affordability should feature heavily in the assessment.  However, care should be taken to not simply identify and recommend the lowest-cost solution; capability should be the dominant measure.

Critics may argue that such a Small Surface Combatant CBA would jeopardize the ongoing LCS/FF program; would be too expensive, and would take too long. The first point is germane only if the LCS/FF is in fact the optimal solution to meet future missions; since a proper CBA was never conducted this is impossible to determine.  As to the second and third points, if one thinks analysis is expensive and time-consuming, they should try ignorance.



_________________________________________________

[i] http://nation.time.com/2012/10/05/the-navys-new-class-of-warships-big-bucks-little-bang/

[ii] “DOT&E Report for Fiscal Year 2014”, published January 20, 2015.

[iii] “ibid

[iv] “Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)/Frigate Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” CRS, September 2015.

[v] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_022_missile_boat

[vi] https://news.vice.com/article/the-us-navys-new-ships-are-supposed-to-hunt-mines-but-cant-actually-find-them

[vii] http://news.usni.org/2015/07/30/lcs-anti-sub-warfare-package-too-heavy-3-contracts-issued-for-weight-reduction-study

[viii] http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20120714/DEFREG02/307140001/LCS-Quick-Swap-Concept-Dead

[ix] “Network Centric Warfare”, DoD C4ISR Cooperative Research Program, 2002.

[x] “Naval Transformation and the Littoral Combat Ship,” Robert O. Work, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, February 2004.

[xi] http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2158343/U-S-Navy-shift-60-PER-CENT-fleet-Pacific-China-builds-military.html

[xii] “Why Air Sea Battle?”  Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010.

[xiii] Navy information paper dated April 22, 2015, referenced in CRS report, dated April 22, 2015.  

[xiv] Seaframe and mission module costs per CRS report on LCS.

[xv] See “Naval Transformation and the Littoral Combat Ship,” Robert O. Work, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, February 2004.

[xvi] “Network Centric Warfare”, DoD C4ISR Cooperative Research Program, 2002.

[xvii] “Naval Transformation and the Littoral Combat Ship,” Robert O. Work, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, February 2004.

[xviii] ibid

[xix] “Navy Littoral Combat Ship(LCS)/Frigate Program: Background and Issues for Congress,”  September 2015

[xx] “Admiral: Most LCS Requirement Analysis Done After Decision To Build,” Inside the Navy, April 14, 2003.

[xxi] “Navy Littoral Combat Ship(LCS)/Frigate Program: Background and Issues for Congress,”  CRS, September 2015

[xxii] ibid

[xxiii] ibid

[xxiv] Statement by Secretary Hagel on the Littoral Combat Ship, December 11, 2014.

[xxv] Testimony by Mr. Sean J. Stackley to the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 18, 2015.

[xxvi] CJCS Instruction 3710, Joint Capability Integration and Development System (JCIDS).

Is That Fleet Worth Buying?

The opening statement by Ronald O'Rourke during his October 23, 2024 testimony before the House Armed Services Seapower Subcommittee on the US Navy's FY2014 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan is excellent. The following was his statement regarding the affordability of the 30-Year shipbuilding plan.

In a situation of reduced levels of defense spending, such as what would occur if defense spending were to remain constrained to the revised cap levels in the Budget Control Act, the affordability challenge posed by the 30-year shipbuilding plan would be intensified. Even then, however, the current 30-year shipbuilding plan would not necessarily become unaffordable.

The Navy estimates that, in constant FY2013 dollars, fully implementing the current 30-year shipbuilding plan would require an average of $16.8 billion in annual funding for new-construction ships, compared to an historic average of $12 billion to $14 billion provided for this purpose. The required increase in average annual funding of $2.8 billion to $4.8 billion per year equates to less than 1% of DOD’s annual budget under the revised caps of the Budget Control Act. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that, in constant FY2013 dollars, fully implementing the current 30-year shipbuilding plan would require an average of $19.3 billion in annual funding for new-construction ships, or $2.5 billion per year more than the Navy estimates. This would make the required increase in average annual funding $5.3 billion to $7.3 billion per year, which equates to roughly 1.1% to 1.5% of DOD’s annual budget under the revised caps of the Budget Control Act.

Some observers, noting the U.S. strategic rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region, have advocated shifting a greater share of the DOD budget to the Navy and Air Force, on the grounds that the Asia-Pacific region is primarily a maritime and aerospace theater for DOD. In discussing the idea of shifting a greater share of the DOD budget to the Navy and Air Force, some of these observers refer to breaking the so-called “one-third, one-third, one-third” division of resources among the three military departments—a shorthand term sometimes used to refer to the more-or-less stable division of resources between the three military departments that existed for the three decades between the end of U.S. participation in the Vietnam War in 1973 and the start of the Iraq War in 2003. In a context of breaking the “one-third, one-third, one-third” allocation with an aim of better aligning defense spending with the strategic rebalancing, shifting 1.5% or less of DOD’s budget into the Navy’s shipbuilding account would appear to be quite feasible.

More broadly, if defense spending were to remain constrained to the revised cap levels in the Budget Control Act, then fully funding the Department of the Navy’s total budget at the levels shown in the current Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) would require increasing the Department of the Navy’s share of the non-Defense-Wide part of the DOD budget to about 41%, compared to about 36% in the FY2014 budget and an average of about 37% for the three-decade period between the Vietnam and Iraq wars. While shifting 4% or 5% of DOD’s budget to the Department of the Navy would be a more ambitious reallocation than shifting 1.5% or less of the DOD budget to the Navy’s shipbuilding account, similarly large reallocations have occurred in the past:

• From the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, reflecting a U.S. defense strategy at the time that placed a strong reliance on the deterrent value of nuclear weapons, the Department of the Air Force’s share of the non-Defense-Wide DOD budget increased by several percentage points. The Department of the Air Force’s share averaged about 45% for the 10-year period FY1956-FY1965, and peaked at more than 47% in FY1957-FY1959.
• For the 11-year period FY2003-FY2013, as a consequence of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department of the Army’s share of the non-Defense-Wide DOD budget increased by roughly ten percentage points. The Department of the Army’s share during this period averaged about 39%, and peaked at more than 43% in FY2008. U.S. combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan during this period reflected the implementation of U.S. national strategy as interpreted by policymakers during those years.

The point here is not to argue whether it would be right or wrong to shift more of the DOD budget to the Navy’s shipbuilding account or to the Department of the Navy’s budget generally. Doing that would require reducing funding for other DOD programs, and policymakers would need to weigh the resulting net impact on overall DOD capabilities. The point, rather, is to note that the allocation of DOD resources is not written in stone, that aligning DOD spending with U.S. strategy in coming years could involve changing the allocation by more than a very marginal amount, and that such a changed allocation could provide the funding needed to implement the current 30-year shipbuilding plan. The alternative of assuming at the outset that there is no potential for making anything more than very marginal shifts in the allocation of DOD resources could unnecessarily constrain options available to policymakers and prevent the allocation of DOD resources from being aligned optimally with U.S. strategy.

As an alternative or supplement to the option of altering the allocation of DOD resources among the military departments, the 30-year shipbuilding plan could also become more affordable by taking actions beyond those now being implemented by DOD to control military personnel pay and benefits and reduce what some observers refer to as DOD’s overhead or back-office costs. Multiple organizations have made recommendations for such actions in recent years. The Defense Business Board, for example, estimated that at least $200 billion of DOD’s enacted budget for FY2010 constituted overhead costs. The board stated that “There has been an explosion of overhead work because the Department has failed to establish adequate controls to keep it in line relative to the size of the warfight,” and that “In order to accomplish that work, the Department has applied ever more personnel to those tasks which has added immensely to costs.” The board stated further that “Whether it’s improving the tooth-to-tail ratio; increasing the ‘bang for the buck’, or converting overhead to combat, Congress and DoD must significantly change their approach,” and that DOD “Must use the numerous world-class business practices and proven business operations that are applicable to DoD’s overhead.”

One potential way to interpret the affordability challenge posed by the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan is to view it as an invitation by the Navy for policymakers to consider matters such as the alignment between U.S. strategy and the division of DOD resources among the military departments, and the potential for taking actions beyond those now being implemented by DOD to control military personnel pay and benefits and reduce DOD overhead and back-office costs. The Navy’s prepared statement for the September 18 hearing before the full committee on planning for sequestration in FY2014 and the perspectives of the military services on the Strategic Choices and Management Review (SCMR) provides a number of details about reductions in Navy force structure and acquisition programs that could result from constraining DOD’s budget to the revised cap levels in the Budget Control Act. These potential reductions do not appear to reflect any substantial shift in the allocation of DOD resources among the military departments, or the taking of actions beyond those already being implemented by DOD to control DOD personnel pay and benefits and reduce DOD overhead and back-office costs. The fact that the Navy in its prepared statement did not choose to discuss the possibility of a changed allocation of DOD resources among the military departments or additional actions to control DOD personnel pay and benefits and reduce DOD overhead and back-office costs does not prevent Congress from considering such possibilities.

Before Congress or the DoD decides whether the US Navy should have additional funding relative to other services to fully fund the US Navy's shipbuilding plan, I think one of the questions that needs to be asked is whether the plan itself is worth fully funding.

The link above takes you to the hearing page, where this testimony by Ronald O'Rourke can be downloaded, but also the prepared statement Eric Labs of the Congressional Budget Office. In Eric Labs testimony there is quite a bit of detailed analysis regarding the Navy's FY2014 30-Year shipbuilding plan. As I reviewed the shipbuilding plan and the numbers provided by Eric Labs, I found myself unsure if I think the US Navy's shipbuilding plan is worth funding. The Navy has argued for their plan each year even as the Navy has adjusted it on the margins every year. The shipbuilding plan, and more specifically the fleet design of the US Navy, is primarily designed in alignment with the prevailing trends in technology of 21st century military power.

There are no technological changes in warfare that have fundamentally altered naval warfare since World War II, when war of the sea was primarily and decisively won by naval forces that attacked from over and under the sea. If anything, the advancement of technologies like nuclear power for submarines combined with the improved range and precision of guided weapons have increased the capabilities of both submarines and aircraft in naval warfare.

The next war at sea will be fought by naval forces over and under the sea, and by military forces in space and cyberspace. This reality is why, for the most part, most ongoing debates regarding US Navy force structure revolve around what ships will do in the next war at sea.

Based on the analysis in the prepared statement by Eric Labs, the FY2014 budget invests $382 billion over the next 30 years in large deck nuclear powered aircraft carriers, large surface combatants, nuclear powered attack submarines, and nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines - what I describe as the Battle Fleet portion of the US Navy. The US Navy will spend around 76% of the entire SCN budget on ships of the Battle Fleet.

Based on the same analysis by Eric Labs, the FY2014 budget invests around $68 billion over the next 30 years for Littoral Combat Ships, the LHA-6 program (well deck variant), and the LX(R) program intended to replace existing LSDs - the ships that I describe as the Flotilla portion of the US Navy. That breaks down as $16 billion on the current LCS program, $13 billion for the LCS(X) program, $15 billion for the LX(R) program, and $22 billion for the LHA-6 program. In total, the US Navy will spend around 13% of the entire SCN budget on ships of the Flotilla.

Here is the problem I see.

The Battle Fleet of the US Navy is organized for a single function: to defeat, deter, or cooperate with the military forces of another state, and through the organization of Carrier Strike Groups different ships within the Battle Fleet can be organized together towards a strategic object. The Flotilla of the US Navy is organized for two functions: to support the Battle Fleet in its primary function or to deliver Marines or material overseas. No ships of the Flotilla are designed to actually operate within the organization of the Battle Fleet, although individual ships of the Battle Fleet can operate with individual ships of the Flotilla.

The Flotilla of the US Navy today - FFGs, LCS, PCs, JHSVs, MCMs, other single purpose ships, preposition ships, and amphibious ships - has no organization within itself. Yes, amphibious ships are organized with themselves, but they do not organize with other elements of the Flotilla. No one aspect of the Flotilla is designed to work as part of a larger organization with other parts of the Flotilla. Unlike the Battle Fleet in nearly every way, each ship of the Flotilla is designed to perform a specific, single function, and no ship of the Flotilla is designed to operate as part of a larger organization towards a strategic object.

The future Flotilla appears to be nothing more than a resourced restrained new version of the existing Flotilla, suggesting the future US Navy looks exactly like the present US Navy - a navy organized to defeat, deter, and cooperate with military forces of other states, and only capable of achieving strategic objects that are obtainable if performing those functions.


With a US Navy capable of performing a specific strategic function for the nation, and only strategic functions specific to other states; and considering the US Navy exceeds capabilities and capacity of every state the United States might find itself in competition with, the question I ask myself is why should the US Navy shipbuilding budget be fully funded? I don't think there is any question the US Navy is operationally and tactically brilliant, and I think the US Navy fleet is very well designed for naval warfare in the 21st century, but at the end of the day, the strategic value of US seapower is limited when the US Navy is organized for only a small, very specific set of strategic functions.

At a time when 90% of all trade globally is at sea, when the territorial disputes are taking place at sea, when the economic system is dependent upon the resources being retrieved at sea, and when non-state actors have never had greater capacity to threaten US economic and national security interests than they do today, the US Navy is organized around the false belief that superior military power that only functions with or against military forces of other states will somehow insure strategic success for the US in the 21st century.

Until US naval forces are being organized to achieve a broader set of strategic objectives by sea for the nation, I see very little strategic value in investing in the US Navy fleet as designed unless Congress determines the only threats globally worth the resources of the US Navy are those of other states, because under the current plan, the US Navy has almost no resources or flexibility to achieve a broad range of strategic objectives relevant to the age we live in on behalf of the nation.

A Fleet Design in Decline

Following the release of the Maritime Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, the Navy almost immediately tied budgets to strategy when John Morgan, as part of telling the story of 21st Century Seapower, claimed every budget is a strategy. Six years later under CNO Roughead and now CNO Greenert, it should be fairly obvious to everyone that strategic thinking in regards to Naval force structure is almost exclusively a military political strategy for dollar and industry share. Strategic guidance and thinking manifest as plans towards what a community can buy to build upon what a community already has.

I'm sure there is a sophisticated process behind how the Navy designs the future US Navy, but I'm also convinced that sophisticated process wouldn't survive a single debate with many competitors outside of OPNAV. If one stays with the same plan long enough expecting a different result, even a layman will eventually be able to point out the problems. In the case of the Navy's current fleet design under the plan released with this years budget, the math and real numbers suggest to this layman that the fleet as designed has peaked and is now in decline, indeed the Navy's own numbers highlight this very well.

I don't care about 30 year projections when it comes to shipbuilding. Short, Medium, and Long term trends and activities to me are measured in 5 years, 10 years, or 15 years respectively. Anything projected beyond 10 years is probably unreliable, and anything projected beyond 15 years except for ship retirements is surely fiction. For those playing at home, Military Times has all the PDFs you need to see the Navy's new plans. As I look at the new plan I am primarily focused on the next ten years and the last ten years, since the fleet numbered 297 ships in 2003 and is expected to number 297 ships in 2023 based on the Navy's own plan. I will also look at retirements beyond 10 years where applicable. As of May 20, 2024 the US Navy has 284 ships.

This link is the USN Plan for FY2014 (PDF), and this link has all the slides nice and neat (PDF). A lot of what I am about to discuss can be found there, with the rest of the details explain in future blog posts over the next few days.

The US Navy's Big Plan FY2014

The Navy makes clear the following planning assumptions.

• Battle force inventory of the "2012 Navy FSA" will remain the objective of this plan.*
• In the near term, the Annual budget for Navy shipbuilding will be sustained at the levels of the FY14 President's Budget (PB14) through the Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP). In the mid-term, annual budget will remain at appropriate (higher) levels,; and in the far term, be sustained at appropriate levels (slightly higher than current historical average).
• All battle force ships serve to the end of their planned or extended service lives. **
• The DoN will continue to acquire and build ships in the most affordable manner.

* FSA means Force Structure Assessment.
** Except for those that don't

I cannot explain the third point, except to say it is insulting. How can all battle force ships serve to the end of their planned or extended service lives when the Navy, down on page 21 of the same report, retires 7 CGs and 2 LSDs before their service lives are up? Glad you asked. Basically the Navy is moving these ships to a reserve status so the Navy can say those ships aren't technically retired early.

The unspoken planning assumption is that the President's budget completely ignores sequestration. We'll see how that turns out.

By 2023 the fleet will look different than today

The fleet increases the number of CVNs. The Navy had 12 CV/CVNs in 2003, has 10 CVNs today, and will have 12 CVNs in 2023. The Navy is sending a clear signal with this budget that the Navy will field 11 aircraft carriers (which is the legal requirement) until at least 2040 under current plans. I personally found it just a little ironic that the 11 aircraft carrier law is just about the only law that the Navy actually seems to care about in the entire shipbuilding plan.

The fleet increases the number of large surface combatants from 85 today to 87 in 2023, but by replacing CG53s with DDG51s, the overall number of VLS cells drops by over 500 by 2023. Even as the numbers of large surface combatants remain relatively constant throughout the 2020s, the number of total VLS cells will decline by 880 throughout the entire fleet by 2028. It is also worth noting all the DDG-51 Flight Is and Flight IIs that make up the bulk of the current ballistic missile defense fleet of the US Navy will apparently be retired from 2028-2034. To sustain this, the Navy expects to build either 2 or 3 DDGs at the cost of a DDG-51 Flight IIA ship from FY15 until forever.

The fleet decreases the number of attack submarines from 55 today to 48 in 2023. The total will actually fall to 42 by 2029 and never recovers to above 50 throughout the rest of the plan, and the plan never reaches the requirement of 52. The VLS payload module for Virginia class SSNs is not included in the budget, and will cost about $400 million per submarine. The SSGNs will retire without replacement in 2027 resulting in a total loss of VLS capacity of over 600 from the submarine force.

The fleet of 31 amphibious ships today will decline over the next few years but recover to 31 by 2023. There are only three amphibious ships built over the next decade until 2023, 2 LH(X) and the LSD(X), meaning two first in class ships. Noteworthy the 31 ship amphibious force could legitimately be 33 ships if the 2 LSDs weren't placed in reserve in FY15. Also noteworthy that with the upcoming retirement of USS Denver (LPD 9) and USS Peleliu (LHA 5) the Navy has two legitimate chances to convert amphibious ships into more AFSBs of different types. If you add Ponce (AFSB1) that gives the Navy 36 amphibious ships plus the MLP squadron, which in my book is a legitimate 2 MEB force. But too much wishful thinking, because in the end it's only 31 amphibious ships according to the plan on paper.

The combat logistics force of 31 ships in 2013 will reduce to 29 ships from now until forever, and under current plans the combat logistics force will be the smallest it has been in about a century. I have never heard a compelling reason articulated why the Navy would shift to the Pacific Ocean, and in doing so would reduce the size of the combat logistics force. I am sure there is a complicated reason for this well beyond the understanding of this layman observer.

All of the frigates and dedicated mine ships either already have been or will be retired by 2023, and the featured new additions to the fleet since 2003 and until 2023 will be 38 Littoral Combat Ships.

And for the record unless all public data on the F-35C, including that of GAO and CBO, is wildly incorrect, there is no math on the planet that suggests the Navy can field 10 carrier air wings in 2023 that are identical with 10 F-35Cs squadrons and 30 F-18E/F squadrons unless naval aviation gets a considerable increase in funding. I haven't seen this discussed anywhere, but the numbers for a little basic math and historical comparison is there to do some estimating. The Navy is going to fall billions short, unless flight hours are going to be down considerably on existing Super Hornets (which may be the plan?).

The current US Navy plan narrative goes something like this.

Naval Aviation
The Navy will pay to maintain the 11 big deck carrier requirement. UCLASS will be ISR only through at least 2025, and as such has joined the E-2D and EA-18G in N2/N6. N98, with their current "all in" approach to the F-35C and "your out" approach to UCLASS, has effectively sucked all the money out of every other community in the Navy. The CVN carrier air wing is on the verge of remarkable cost efficiency with five different models of aircraft using only five different engines; specifically the F-35C, the F-18E/F and EF-18G, the E-2D, UCLASS, and the MH-60R and MH-60S helicopters. At the same time, the entire platform and system model has become so expensive that today the Navy can only fully maintain 7 carrier air wings, with 2 carrier air wings suffering from training restrictions - 9 total today. How the Navy ever expects to afford 10 identical carrier air wings for 11 aircraft carriers in the future is a feat of financial magic yet to be revealed, and will almost certainly require a significant increases in funding. It is hard to see a scenario where the CVN of the future will ever be as efficient as it has been over the last decade, because that simply isn't ever going to happen with F-35C. As a result, the CVN force will almost certainly decline in capability over the next ten years relative to today.

Submarines
The attack submarine force will decline to far below requirement just as the ballistic missile submarines are being built. The SSGNs will be retired without replacement resulting in a loss of over 600 VLS cells from our submarine force over the next ten years. The payload module for the Virginia class submarine is apparently not in the budget plan, meaning to sustain current VLS capacity in the submarine force the Navy will require a significant increase in funding per attack submarine to fill the gap. As a result, the SSN force will almost certainly decline in capability over the next ten years relative to today.

Large Surface Combatants
The retirement of the CGs and by replacing those large surface combatants with DDGs will result in a net loss of almost 900 VLS cells throughout the surface fleet over the next 10 years. All new construction DDGs are priced at the remarkably efficient price of the Flight IIA, despite the need to add the new AMDR radar and despite Sean Stackley all but conceding in testimony that all new DDGs in the Flight III configuration will lack the power necessary to field the advanced weapons like lasers and rail guns currently in development for the surface force without major modifications, indeed often coming at a trade off for even more VLS cells or hanger space. As a result, the major surface combatant will almost certainly decline in capability over the next 10 years relative to today.

Amphibious Ships
The fleet of 31 amphibious ships today will decline over the next few years but recover to 31 by 2023. By every standard the amphibious force of 2023 will be more advanced and more capable than the amphibious force of today, but just because the Navy gets the ship portion of the amphibious force right doesn't mean the Marine Corps will get the ship-to-shore connector part right. I am a believer that the F-35B and MV-22 is a legitimate 21st century capability, but this need for speed requirement in AAV replacements has me wondering if the Marine Corps is too stuck on old ideas to come up with a 21st century way of war from the sea. I've never heard of such a thing as littoral warfare without Marines, and yet instead of building 21st century capabilities on land and sea, the Marine Corps seems stuck on the idea of a 2 MEB Okinawa style invasion. The littoral property that is going to require a 21st century Marine Corps isn't the beach, it's the oil platform and the 300,000 ton VLCC that if sunk, instantly creates the 2nd largest environmental disaster in recorded human history in some neutral powers fishing spot. In 2023 the US will have a 21st century amphibious force, but it is still unclear if it will be fielded with a Marine Corps stuck in a 20th century mindset.

Mine Warfare and Small  Vessels
Over the last ten years the Navy has retired 12 MCHs and over the next ten years the Navy will retire the rest of the original 14 MCMs. It could be suggested these 26 dedicated mine ships are being replaced by 24 Littoral Combat Ships with 24 MIW mission modules.When the latest SAR comes out (hopefully Thursday) we'll look at the lifecycle costs of this in detail, but until then I'd just point out that based on FY12 numbers it would appear the LCS + MIW module as a mine warfare replacement for these two vessels is going to cost the Navy almost $1 billion a year.

Now obviously the LCS + MIW module is not the same as coastal minehunters or minesweepers. LCS can sweep a larger minefield, can self-deploy to the minefield threat, is much better armed and defensible than mine ships, doesn't require sailors to be in a minefield, and in theory the ship can be used for something other than mine detection and clearance.

In 2023 the Navy will have 38 LCS, each with 2 crews and it is likely several of these ships will be forward deployed to Middle East and Pacific region areas. It is still very unclear how effective the LCS will be in any role, or what exactly the ship will bring to the fight. The LCS does not add combat power to the fleet, and the degree to which LCS is a legitimate networked sensor capability is still very unclear.

Theory Meets Reality
I see all the promise of increased capability in the FY14 Navy plan as evidence that the Navy plan is a theory of advancement that fails to cloak the reality of decline. In theory, mission modules are great. In reality, mission modules are still very far from a real capability today. In theory, UCLASS is the future of naval aviation strike and the savior of the CVN. In reality, UCLASS is in N2/N6 and isn't even seen by the N98 crowd as a naval aviation strike platform yet. In theory, Large Diameter UUVs will pick up the slack of the reduced SSN force and impending loss of SSGN strike capacity. In reality, LDUUV is a PPT slide. In theory, five engines for five platforms and EMALS and greater efficiency and stealthy F-35s all makes for a great CVN capability. In reality, if you buy 10 CVNs, the answer to how much the CVN capability costs is simple - the cost is ultimately less of everything else in every other Navy community from now until forever, and that is a neverending decline with no evidence anywhere the CVN is capable of picking up the slack of what is being lost. In theory the surface combatant force is getting better radars and better missiles and can shoot down ballistic missiles. In reality, fewer VLS means less offensive strike by the SWOs who are being relegated to defending HVUs, and in my read of naval warfare, playing defense at sea in the missile era is a long term loser.

In theory, everything in the Navy is great. In reality, the current fleet design has apparently peaked, and from here going forward everything under the current fleet design is more expensive. The Navy is trading advanced ISR capabilities for strike capabilities, and in fact every community is significantly increasing ISR while legitimately decreasing strike. It's the trend of the current fleet design, and only through PPT promises does that trend look any different at some distant future point.

Finishing the Kill Chain
The only areas the Navy Plan is actually advancing seapower is with total CVNs, overall amphibious force capability, and the Littoral Combat Ship. Unless the combined capability of the CVN in 2023 and the LCS in 2023 is superior to any combination of networked systems fielded today, this Navy Plan is a course towards irrelevance for the US Navy.

The proof is in the numbers. The proof is in the math. Ultimately, the proof is the plan provided by none other than the US Navy. This plan needs lots of money just to be executed as is, even more money to make the adjustments necessary to fix the obvious flaws, and in my opinion it needs lots of work and critical thought to fix some areas that are consuming limited resources with limited, marginal, or altogether unclear advantages.

The current fleet design is one of naval decline because it favors doing the same thing the same way and expecting better results after a decade period where efficiency in fielded capability peaked, and is now slowly declining with the addition of new evolved solutions. To make matters more complicated, all competitors to the US Navy are building capabilities that specifically attack the weak links of the current fleet design - weak links like the CVN which is numerically limited but consumes an overwhelming percentage of total fleet capabilities and investment, and weak links like a numerically challenged logistics force.

Less offensive capabilities on and under the sea has made the Navy even more reliant on the limited number of aircraft carriers, and can anyone in the Navy explain why the F-35C is the only platform in the 3 major communities that is adding a new strike capability to the fleet? The proposed Flight III sure doesn't advance the surface community towards the future, the payload module for Virginia is unfunded, the LCS surely isn't adding notable combat power, and the UCLASS is ISR only?

Sorry, but my read of Wayne Hughes is that we need to strike effectively first, and while I agree winning the information/communication battle in any environment is a critical enabler, it also means Navy must be capable of putting warheads on foreheads at the point of contact. That second part is not evident in the current fleet design based on what I see in the Navy's latest plan.

How long would it take the shipbuilding industry to grow capacity and throughput if the nation faced a naval crisis or conflict?

Today's guest is Mike Petters, President and Chief Executive Officer of Huntington Ingalls Industries.

How long would it take the shipbuilding industry to grow capacity and throughput if the nation faced a naval crisis or conflict?

Anticipation, Not Reaction, is Critical

The fact is the shipbuilding industry is not designed to respond rapidly to a crisis. Whatever the conflict, the nature of our business dictates that we play with the team we’ve got.

Ours is a business of anticipation, not reaction. There is nothing magical about it. To meet tomorrow’s crisis or conflict requires continuous investment today to ensure we can deliver capability critical to our nation and economic security. It requires that we have robust, stable and efficient operations and a supplier base that allow us to build ships as quickly and as affordably as possible. I know one thing for certain: Further budget cuts in defense could have a potentially devastating impact to our healthy but fragile industrial base.

The shipbuilding business operates on extended cycles. Ships take years to construct. For example, it takes eight years to build a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. A stable, strategy-driven shipbuilding plan is crucial. We are sizing ourselves today to support the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan. If the Navy decided to double the numbers in the plan—for whatever reason—it wouldn’t necessarily take twice as many people or twice as long for us to build those ships, but it would take a long time (on the order of years) for us to hire and train the shipbuilders and create the infrastructure to do it.

By the same token, we can’t cut ships from the 30-year plan and expect to be able to quickly “ramp up” production years down the road when we decide we need more ships after all. That’s why maintaining the industrial base is so critical. I look at it in terms of software (hiring, training and retaining the right employees) and hardware (facilities, tools and equipment).



It’s all about the people

People are our most important resource. Building military warships today is highly specialized and complex work requiring specialized, skilled and talented workers. And retention of these skilled workers is most vulnerable during a crisis as the hiring landscape becomes more competitive.

The nature of today’s potential crises requires us to move away from commercial solutions and look to a more specialized workforce and product. That workforce must be able to create complex technology that meets the demands of the time. If we don’t maintain that workforce, we could find ourselves without the requisite skills needed to build the ships of the future.

When the Royal Navy set out in 1997 to develop a new class of nuclear attack submarines, it discovered some five to six years into the program that it did not have vital design and production skills to produce the Astute-class ships. The Royal Navy looked to the U.S. for assistance. Where would we look if we lost those skills? Newport News Shipbuilding, a division of Huntington Ingalls Industries, is one of only two remaining shipyards capable of constructing nuclear-powered vessels; it is a national asset that must be sustained and preserved. That includes sustaining and preserving the knowledge base.

Building a workforce to meet increased demand requires hiring people with the requisite skills and education, training that workforce and then retaining that workforce. These processes must be in place and robust to be able to react to a crisis. You cannot grow a highly specialized workforce overnight.

I know this from experience. Following Hurricane Katrina, HII’s Ingalls Shipbuilding division on the Gulf Coast was devastated. From that crisis we learned that you can’t rapidly recreate a shipbuilding capability. It took several years to rebuild our human capital and return to what we define as pre-storm “normal operations.”

If you wanted to create today’s shipbuilding capability from scratch, which for HII means hiring nearly 40,000 people, it would take years. In a perfect world, we might be able to hire 1,000 people a month, which equates to more than three and a half years to get to our roll numbers of today. Add to that another three to five years to train that workforce with basic skills and longer for specialized skills. Undoubtedly, it’s more challenging for us to hire qualified employees than it is for other industries because of our citizenship and security clearance eligibility requirements.

Let me share some basic facts on growing skilled shipbuilders: It takes three to five years to hire someone off the street then train and develop him or her into a journeyman-level employee; this can be significantly longer for someone to become qualified to perform nuclear work. For example, it takes an average of eight years to develop a fully certified nuclear pipefitter. Our apprentice schools at Newport News and Ingalls take four to five years to graduate a journeyman-level employee. 

Infrastructure requires investment

There are basically two shipbuilding companies (HII and General Dynamics) remaining in this country building complex and technologically advanced military ships today.

Again I think back to just after Hurricane Katrina and what it took to retool and rebuild the shipbuilding infrastructure on the Gulf Coast. If we were to start with a “green field” today, it would require a capital investment costing hundreds of millions of dollars. Where does this capital investment come from absent of a stable shipbuilding plan? Stability attracts both investment in our shipbuilding infrastructure and the critical talent. Assuming that this level of capital investment is available, you’d then have to build the facilities including steel, pipe and sheet metal lines, all of which would take two to three years due to lead time on equipment, adding buildings to house the equipment and getting the lines up and running. Like our skilled workforce, we have to look at ways of sustaining and preserving our current shipbuilding infrastructure to build the nation’s military ships.

Supply Chain is the third leg of the stool

Sustaining and preserving the supply chain is the third component of maintaining our shipbuilding capability. Each of our suppliers would face similar challenges, although they would likely be on a smaller scale and a much shorter timeline. Over the past two decades, we have witnessed a contraction of the supply chain for shipbuilding due to both decreasing shipbuilding demand and program instability. This has already impacted our nation’s ability to rapidly increase shipbuilding capacity. Some resource areas will be drivers of ship schedules due to the time it would take to get new capacity online such as foundries and major machine works.

I can tell you that more than half of HII’s 5,000 suppliers are the sole source of particular parts and services. If you step back and think about what sequestration could do to that, the more than half that are sole source, that number could go up. That can dramatically impact cost and schedule.

In recent years I have seen greater use of multiyear procurements for submarines and destroyers, and most recently, the block-buy contracts for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). These types of contracts enable greater economic efficiency to provide the shipbuilder and industrial base with a stable, relatively long-term business base that helps us justify maintaining a highly skilled workforce, process investment and infrastructure improvements that better position us to respond to the nation’s security requirements. The success of the Virginia-Class Submarine Program is a perfect example of the benefits of serial production. These ships are consistently delivered early and the efficiencies are greater from ship to ship to ship. I would encourage the Navy to make broadest use of multiyear contracts and block-buy contracts.

The U.S. has traditionally been sea dependent. Ninety percent of the world’s commerce moves on the water. Failure to protect our sea lanes of trade, shipbuilding industrial base and seaport infrastructure would severely damage the economy and our ability to maintain a strong national defense. To not invest today and to let this industry wither away is more than just a budget decision. I strongly believe it is a strategic decision with serious, long-term national security implications.

As I asserted earlier, shipbuilding is a business of anticipation, not reaction. Today it takes about three years to deliver a surface combatant ship, four years to deliver a large-deck amphibious ship and eight years to build an aircraft carrier. In a time of crisis or conflict, these times could possibly be condensed, but it would still be a matter of years before those currently unplanned warships went operational unless we have been leaning forward as a country, anticipating and building industrial base capacity in support of a long-range Navy strategy, and continuing to invest today to ensure the security of our country’s future.