5th Fleet Focus: Restless Nights Approaching

I get the impression something like this can give certain people a restless nights sleep. While the 5th Fleet will be losing a CSG soon, they are getting an interesting upgrade as well.

KINGS BAY, Ga. (April 26, 2024) The guided-missile submarine USS Florida (SSGN 728) departs Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay for its first operational deployment after undergoing conversion from a ballistic-missile capable submarine (SSBN) to a guided-missile submarine (SSGN). The normal patrol for an SSBN is about three months; however, as an SSGN, Florida will be deployed for approximately 12 months. Florida departed with her blue crew, led by Capt. William Traub. The blue crew will rotate duties every three months with the gold crew, led by Capt. John Litherland, during the deployment. The use of two crews allows Florida to have a greater forward presence and the conversion from ballistic missiles to guided missiles allows for greater payload capacity and mission flexibility. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Kimberly Clifford (Released)

Click image for link and Hi-res.

Clearly this is the stuff conspiracy theories are made of. One point though, with DDS the SSGN loses some Tomahawk capability, so if I was estimating, if she has a full load figure between 98 and 112 cruise missiles. When the Navy opened up the USS Ohio (SSGN 726) to the press earlier this year, it was implied the submarine had 105 cruise missiles aboard.

Observing the Rotation of US Naval Power to the Middle East

As you might observe in our latest Order of Battle, the US Navy is currently operating two Carrier Strike Groups in the Middle East. Additionally, we are observing two Expeditionary Strike Groups and a British Carrier Strike Group in the region as well. As we read the events as they are disclosed in public sources, we believe the United States is on the verge of major offensive operations in the Middle East.

These rotational periods where strike groups overlap durations in forward theaters do occur every year, and are not abnormal, however it is noteworthy that this year the rotation coincides with a large naval presence from Europe in the 5th Fleet theater. We also observe the possibility that this massive increase of naval power may not be reduced as quickly as we observed it would last week.

We default to better sources, including the Small Wars Journal and Long War Journal for understanding the tactical operations taking place in Afghanistan and Iraq, but in observing an increase in naval forces in the region, we believe the increase is directly related to events taking place on the ground in both theaters.

The USS Harry S Truman presence is directly related to activity specific to supporting the current events surrounding the fighting in Basra, and the larger activities unfolding with the Mahdi Army. Our observation of General Petraeus is that he isn't keeping surged troops in Iraq simply to wait around and watch events unfold, rather we believe he has a stopwatch regarding Mahdi Army activity, and the clock is quickly counting down to zero. We believe that if the Mahdi Army situation doesn't resolve itself quickly, MNF-I will be solving that issue with force. The additional carrier air power in the region is to support that offensive if it is required, and because the deployment of the USS Harry S Truman (CVN 75) is approaching its conclusion over the next two weeks, we believe Petraeus will insure the carrier is on station if the offensive is required.

The issue for CENTOM isn't that an aircraft carrier can't support operations in both theaters, the Navy has proven one carrier can support both wars at the same time many times over the last few years. The issue is that a single aircraft carrier can't support offensive operations in both theaters at the same time. In that context, we observe the 24th MEU is on the move, and we believe this 'surged' Marine force was sent to the region for a purpose, and it wasn't to guard a border. News reporting supports our theory.

U.S. marines are crossing the sands of southern Afghanistan for the first time in years, providing a boost to a NATO coalition that is growing in size but still short on manpower, especially where it counts.

Military officials say some of the marines who make up the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit in Afghanistan were among those who helped to tame a thriving insurgency in western Iraq.

Plans are for the newly arrived forces to move into regions of Afghanistan now controlled by the Taliban.

With Pakistan negotiating with the Taliban again, we believe the 24th MEU is about to go on the offensive, and that will require close air support. It doesn't appear to us as coincidental the 24th MEU is on the move just as the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) arrives to the region.

With two major offensives either already begun or about to begin in the region, ground forces will require more air power than usual to support these activities. The USS Harry S Truman (CVN 75) deployed on November 5th, 2007. The 6 month mark will come and go on May 5th, 2008, and the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) has already arrived on station to replace the Truman CSG. We observe that the Canadian frigate HMCS Charlottetown (FFH 339), which was part of the Truman CSG, has already crossed into the Suez Canal on its way home. This implies the deployment for the Truman CSG has been extended.

We read any sustained increase of two aircraft carriers to be a signal that a considerable amount of military activity is about to take place in both Afghanistan and Iraq. It will be interesting to see how long the Truman CSG remains in the region, and it could be that events on the ground in Iraq over the next few days will decide how long the carrier remains in theater.

Update: Yes, we are intentionally ignoring the Iran possibilities, although we will be monitoring this and this closely. We admit we might be willfully denying the possibility of a strike against Iran, despite the fact that if you add the European forces, we are currently observing the highest level of naval presence in the Middle East region since late 2003.

Spain Sending Signals to Somalia

This is how it started last time too, quiet movements of specific forces.

According to latest reports, the pirates who captured a Basque tuna fishing boat off the coast of Somalia last Sunday have demanded €400,000 euros for the safe release of the 26 hostages, 13 of whom are Spanish.

In related news, it seems that four Spanish Air Force planes have been sent to the area to keep an eye on the pirates from above and provide support for a possible special forces rescue mission.

Spain's Foreign Affairs minister Miguel Ángel Moratinos confirmed offcially yesterday that an Orion spotter plane equipped with radar had been deployed to provide air cover for the Spanish Navy newest battleship, the 'Méndez Núñez', which is now in place after being diverted from manoeuvres in the Red Sea.

According to a report in today's El País, the three other Spanish Air Force planes are a Falcon fighter jet, a Hercules transport plane and a Boeing 707.

We usually don't learn of ransom figures while the hostages are still being held, but €400,000 Euros is interesting. That is around half the total demanded from the French. There is a big difference this time though, the hostages were removed from the boat.

That doesn't usually happen, but says something about the region and lack of law enforcement, and perhaps support for piracy from the local population.

6th Fleet Focus: Where are the Amphibs?

In the cold war, the phrase asked by Presidents was "Where are the Carriers." Much to the chagrin of folks like Mike who believes that big deck amphibious ships are no longer necessary, in the Long War the phrase has changed, the question now asked is "Where are the Amphibs?" There are events taking place in the world, and it appears the question has been asked again. Welcome to the Long War.

The U.S. Navy has replaced two ships it sent off the coast of Lebanon last week amid political deadlock there to send a signal to Syria, officials said on Tuesday.

The cruiser USS Philippine Sea and the destroyer USS Ross replaced the destroyer USS Cole and a refueling ship over the past day, U.S. Navy officials said.

Another refueling ship remained in place, meaning the United States continued to have three warships in the area, said the officials, speaking on condition of anonymity.

It is one thing to sit the USS Cole (DDG 67) off a coast to cover operations other than war in a potential war zone. In fact it's smart to do so, rapid response for civilian evacuation is part of what the Navy does. It is an entirely different thing when major elements of an Expeditionary Strike Group begin patrolling off a war zone. The Nassau Expeditionary Strike Group consists of:

USS Nassau (LHA 4)
USS Ashland (LSD 48)
USS Nashville (LPD 13)
USS Philippine Sea (CG 58)
USS Ross (DDG 71)
USS Bulkeley (DDG 84)
USS Albany (SSN 753)

The election in Lebanon is March 11th, this upcoming Monday.

Stratfor has interesting analysis regarding the Israeli military operations in Gaza. They speculate that Israel is weakening Hamas because they believe they are about to fight a war with Hezbollah in Lebanon very soon. Stratfor notes an important detail, in the Winograd report which laid out the failures of the 2006 War, Israel was said to suffer from slow decision making in dealing with Hamas in Gaza as they also fought Hezbollah in Lebanon. If Israel believes they are about to be attacked by Hezbollah, in that context the military actions against Hamas sooner rather than later tend to fit perfectly as a lesson learned from the 2006 war. We note the allegations of Iranian supplies for both groups have already hit the media.

There is one thing that should be noted. The Lebanese press is going nuts over the possibility of amphibious ships off their coast. The threats are mostly in regards to the "last time Marines were in Lebanon" and other such rhetoric. One problem with the rhetoric, there are no Marines on board the Nassau ESG, the MEU was sent to Afghanistan as part of the Marine surge in the headlines recently.

While we have stated in the past we hope the Navy has deployed the ESG with a number of maritime toys within the big spaces of the amphibious ships; we honestly have no idea what the ships deployed with. In observing these developments, we can't help but notice the obvious. While there are discussions of wargames and studies regarding the roles of Sea Bases, what they are, and what they can be/do; the Navy is in a unique position to set up one right off the coast of Lebanon leveraging the best of what amphibious ships and the MSC can do for operations other than amphibious assault. We hope they give great consideration in finding useful ways to leverage this capability (ie think Joint, and International), but also protect it should hostilities break out.

Finally, we have not yet identified what aviation squadrons are deployed with the Nassau ESG, but in noting the type of aircraft that were on board as of last week we are hoping Springboard can tell us. He is our go to guy for that particular aircraft. Click the photo for a better look.

2nd Fleet Focus: Venezuela Mobilizes Military

This is hardly surprising, Chavez never skips a beat in grabbing a headline. If we didn't import so much of our oil from Venezuela, this wouldn't be worth close observation.

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez ordered his country's embassy in neighboring Colombia to close and told his military to move tank battalions to the border after a Colombian air strike into Ecuador, an ally of Venezuela.

``This could be the beginning of a war,'' Chavez said in comments broadcast today by state television. ``We are on alert, and we'll support Ecuador in any circumstance.''

Colombia launched an air strike yesterday on an Ecuador camp of Colombia's biggest guerrilla group to kill one of its leaders, Raul Reyes. Diplomatic relations between Chavez and Colombian President Alvaro Uribe have unraveled since Uribe withdrew his support for Chavez's negotiations with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia to secure the release of hostages.

Right before Hurricane Katrina, Chavez called the training of the USS Bataan (LHD 5) with Mexico the potential invasion of Venezuela by the United States, so anytime I read a comment by Chavez that says "beginning of a war" I think of the boy who cried wolf.

CNN is also reporting 10 tank battalions have been ordered to moved to the border. The rush to react by American citizen observers is hard to watch. I've even read people try to call into action the Rio Treaty, also known as the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance which is a defense treaty between several nations of this hemisphere. It is suggested if Venezuela invades Columbia, the US is obligated under treaty to respond. Ironically, Chavez is invoking the same treaty on behalf of Ecuador. If there is ever a treaty that defines the futility of defense treaties in the modern era, the Rio Treaty is the posterchild.

Isn't it interesting, several days ago the US took out a terrorist inside Pakistan, and even though Pakistan was pissed we attacked a terrorist target in their territory, Americans thought it was the right thing. Further to the irony, this is exactly the position of the Obama campaign to deal with Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.

In this case we have a case where Columbia attacks a FARC leader, recognized as a terrorist by the US government. This is basically the same position of the US against Al Qaeda. We should not be surprised there are some unhappy a nation hit a target in a neighbor though, so the outrage was all but mute.

Israel hit Gaza today, killing as many as 80. We are seeing predictable patterns. We are actually seeing consistency. Clearly despite 9/11, no one really does all it can to 3rd world countries, including in Africa, South America, the Middle East, and SE Asia, to stop supporting non-state military actors, what we generally term terrorists even though they represent insurgencies. Anyone who claims the US is being consistent on that front needs to explain the PKK. The advocacy that takes up for either side in this issue highlights the lack of strategy by the US government. Who is ready to defend Columbia, and watch the price of gasoline go up? Who is ready to watch Chavez topple the government in Columbia? Would America really watch Germany invade Poland again 70 some off years later?

We expect the Navy to be dispatched to quietly, it is unlikely we will see a headline from the Navy, rather we'll learn from a Pentagon leak as the media rushes to give away intelligence regarding US troop movements. The news will play directly into the Chavez propaganda campaign once the leak occurs.

From solely a Navy perspective, this will be very interesting to observe. We believe, as many do, the next CNO will either be Adm. James Stavridis or Admiral William "Fox" Fallon.

Adm. Fallon was seen as a peacemaker in his time in the Pacific, and is now seen as the premier warfighter in his role for CENTCOM. Adm. Stavridis has a reputation solely of that as a peacemaker. If this situation develops into something, or is prevented from doing so in some way, this strikes us as one of the those tests the rest of Adm. Stavridis career may be judged by.

6th Fleet Focus: Observing Operations in the Med

This is something we intend to keep an eye on.

The US Navy is sending three warships to the eastern Mediterranean Sea in a show of strength during a period of tensions with Syria and political uncertainty in Lebanon.

Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told reporters the deployment should not be viewed as threatening or in response to events in any single country in that volatile region.

"This is an area that is important to us, the eastern Med," he said when asked about news reports of the ship movements. "It's a group of ships that will operate in the vicinity there for a while," adding that "it isn't meant to send any stronger signals than that, but it does signal that we're engaged, we're going to be in the vicinity and that's a very, very important part of the world."

Another military officer, speaking on condition of anonymity because full details about the ship movements are not yet public, said the USS Cole is headed for patrol in the eastern Mediterranean and that the USS Nassau, an amphibious warship, would be joining it shortly. The officer said a third ship would go later, but he did not identify it by name.

The USS Cole (DDG 67) had been part of the HMS Illustrious (R06) Orion 08 deployment. That raises the possibility there are other ships from other countries that might react to the situation in Lebanon, and I am thinking specifically about France who has been all over Syria about staying out of Lebanon.

The third ship could be any number of ships. The USS San Jacinto (CG 56) is currently operating in the Black Sea. The USS Gonzalez (DDG 66) and USS Nicholas (FFG 47) both deployed to work with the NATO fleets recently. One of the other ships in the Nassau ESG that recently deployed could also be rotated into that theater.

However, we believe the most likely ship the Navy sends as the third ship will be the USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41). The first order of business for the Navy if hostilities breaks out is evacuation, not confrontation, and the other three ships have specific missions that probably will go on without interruption unless hostilities breaks out. If that is indeed the 3rd ship, it will be several days before we learn of it because it will take several days to arrive to that location.

It is very interesting the USS Nassau (LHA 4) is being sent. We note, the ship does not have Marines onboard, in fact we aren't really sure what the Nassau has onboard for this deployment, so it will be interesting to see how the ship (and what tools) will be utilized in this type of peacemaking scenario. I know we are very interested.

We only have two requests for those ships moving into that theater. Keep a sharp eye out for ASMs and mines, because the last ASM fired and last mine found were both in the 6th fleet AOR.

Kosovo Declares Independence

The best news report I've seen yet is from the BBC.

The diplomatic gulf between Russia and many Western governments is widening with the declaration of independence by Kosovo.

What the United States and many EU countries see as the inevitable result of war and history is regarded as "immoral and illegal" in the words of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Most EU governments, certainly the British, see the move as a one-off, the final piece of the shattered jigsaw that was Yugoslavia being put into its new place.

We can expect Serbia to fight back. What the BBC article does well is describe the split between Russia and the US, a split that can be expected to grow much wider after today. As of 5 minutes ago, Drudge is running a huge front page giving Russia's opinion on the US satellite shootdown. Here is a tip, Russia is going to criticize everything the US does for a long time after today, on every subject.

The biggest blunder of the modern political era is also the greatest victory, the fall of the Soviet Union. While Americans jumped up and screamed in joy that the cold war was over, political leadership failed to capitalize, and the US was not prepared for the fall of the Soviet Union. It never reacted and did not build bridges, and approached everything except the nuclear weapons stockpiles with the attitude that Russians can fix their own problems. Economic packages and assistance, cooperation, and other diplomatic efforts were token at best, with intimidation included. The opportunity to build a genuine friendship between the US and Russia following the cold war slipped away, and we are on a slow return to the cold war, with today being a huge intersection crossed.

We can't rewrite history, but the west needs to start learning from it. The BBC article claims the British "see the move as a one-off" as a result of the war, but will it be a "one-off" next time too, specifically in Iraq if in ten years from now the Kurds want to declare independence? Westerns, and admittedly this blog from time to time as reflection, downplays the nationalistic protectionism that prevails in political circles in Moscow. What could possibly happen? The chain reaction could begin, as the BBC highlights.

Whether Russia will use the Kosovo precedent as an argument that Abkhazia and South Ossetia deserve independence or secession from Georgia remains to be seen.

At a recent security conference in Munich, the former Russian defence minister, Sergei Ivanov, spoke of Kosovo "opening a Pandora's box".

It didn't begin with Kosovo, Pandora's box between Russia and the West has been open for years now, the problem is it won't end there either.

The Confusion in the Strait Continues

The Pentagon is going to release the full video of last weeks Strait of Hormuz incident. The video is reported to be 36 minutes long. I have not seen a full copy available online for download yet, will update when it is.

It is very interesting how many reported details are wrong. For example, there were a number of reports that there were objects dropped in front of the USS Ingraham (FFG 61). We speculated the Navy must have been able to quickly detect these objects, and we are now learning that indeed was the case. According to news reporting from the Washington Post today, the white box incident doesn't appear to involve the USS Ingraham (FFG 61) as earlier reported, it was actually the USS Port Royal (CG 73). The Washington Post article has a lot of new details.

Although Mullen described last weekend's incident, in which five small Iranian speedboats approached three U.S. warships in the Strait of Hormuz, as the most "provocative and dramatic" encounter he could recall in the area, the Navy announced a few hours later that two other incidents occurred last month in which its ships had close calls with Iranian speedboats. On Dec. 19, the USS Whidbey Island fired warning shots when a single Iranian boat came within 500 yards of it in the strait. On Dec. 22, the USS Carr emitted warning blasts as three Iranian vessels sped close by in the same area, a Navy official said.

The USS Carr (FFG 52) is on its way home from the Gulf with the Kearsarge ESG. The USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41) isn't exactly a gunboat, what did it fire, flares? There is more to this story, I'm starting to smell a Fox. As this unfolds, I'm not going to be surprised if we find there are more incidents beyond these few leaking out, I've had the impression for awhile now Fallon has been controlling the information so he can control the message in his theater. In observing Fallon, even back when he was in the Pacific (remember the Song incident), he never liked to create public political tension between the major regional actors and the US when these types of incidents occurred. That doesn't mean he dismisses the seriousness of the situation, rather he has always preferred to approach serious problems without the public political noise.

The Washington Post article has a lot of interesting details, worth reading in full.

We noted after the incident that the Navy must have had intelligence regarding small boat operations attempting to draw US Navy warships into a gunfight in the Strait. It would appear that there have been previous encounters that support that earlier theory. I had speculated early on that releasing the full video would be a good idea since the incident had been leaked into the public. I think it has been politically good for the US in dealing with regional partners, and releasing the entire video again highlights the dishonesty of Iran. I am no longer certain that the leak of this incident to the public has been good for the Navy, as it has turned into a no win situation. If the Navy doesn't shoot if raises questions if the Navy is protecting themselves. If they do shoot, they start a major incident.

Clearly the Gulf of Tonkin theory that the Navy is trying to start a war doesn't apply. Not only have their been previous incidents involving warning shots fired that went previously unreported, and can now be verified by talking to USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41) sailors (it is no longer an OPSEC issue because the Pentagon said it happened), but for a conspiracy to exist here it would require nearly 1200 sailors on what is now 5 different warships to make up stories. The flip side of that is it would require the CIA to be the people in the small boats, and in this latest incident those CIA operatives would be so well infiltrated that they can put their movie on Iranian TV. The conspiracy doesn't really mean much here.

I expect to see the serious news organizations transition from the Gulf of Tonkin implied line of thinking to the Fox Fallon factor. There is clearly a split between CENTCOM and the administration on how to deal with Iran, and this incident again highlights that split.

This incident highlights the increased concern the Navy has regarding the IRGC operations in the Gulf. The IRGC appears to have learned something from the media storm following the British hostage incident last year. In that incident, international support went to the British by just about everyone, because it was the IRGC that instigated the problem. The new approaches by the IRGC appears to be an attempt to lure the Americans into being the instigator. Several naval professionals who have operated in the region have highlighted the professional nature of the regular Iranian Navy, particularly regarding their P-3 aircraft and primary naval ships. From all indications, the US Navy is still adapting to interactions with the IRGC on these small boats.

It will be interesting to see what happens next. The formal protest and the media attention has sent the signal these small boat encounters are very effective for the IRGC in intimidating the Navy, because it does play into the Navy's concerns of small suicide boats based on the lessons of the USS Cole (DDG 67) incident, not to mention the concern the Navy expresses in the language used to justify the requirement for the LCS program. We tend to think the IRGC will adapt and become more aggressive if intimidation is indeed their intent with these interactions, meaning our earlier opinion the video would help reduce tensions would be inaccurate.

It will be interesting if the US attempts to find a way to reduce the tensions in the Gulf, as under Gates and Fallon that has been the strategy on every issue regarding Iran, whether Iraq or the nuclear issue. If it is up to Fallon, it is a good bet this incident becomes less and less threatening from a CENTCOM perspective, they desire the lack of public tension as part of their larger strategy. Many have speculated that is opposite the desires of the administration, so we'll continue to observe what happens as this incident continues to move forward.

As Pakistan Descends Into Mourning

It was an interesting day as we woke up to learn of the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. There are a lot of really good round ups on the net, this one being the best btw, but as the day approached late afternoon I began searching for a few specific details. First, I was waiting to read what Ahmed Rashid, perhaps the best reporter on all things Pakistan, was going to write.

The assassination of Benazir Bhutto has left a huge political vacuum at the heart of this nuclear-armed state, which appears to be slipping into an abyss of violence and Islamic extremism. The question of what happens next is almost impossible to answer, especially at a moment when Bhutto herself seemed to be the only answer.

This next paragraph could only be written by someone who personally feels the emotions that must be straining that nation today.

Benazir Bhutto and her Pakistan People's Party were the closest anyone in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan has ever gotten to espousing a secular, democratic political culture. In a country where political advances have been made recently only by the Taliban, the role Bhutto filled, trying to bring modernity to this nation of 165 million people, was immensely brave and absolutely necessary if Pakistan is to remain in the polity of nations. Whatever her shortcomings, she loved her country and gave her life for it.

His entire article is an excellent read. He realizes there is real potential for bad to turn worse quickly, and the passion of his country really comes out well in the article.

While I'm sure the US media will descend into mourning and round table politics to observe events in Pakistan, I am not sure we are going to learn much with that approach. If you want to get a feeling for what will happen here, I think one will need to keep a close eye on China. They have already issued their strong condemnation, but that isn't what I'm waiting to see.

I don't see a scenario where China sits by and watches a nation on its border, particularly one where so much economic and strategic partnerships have been established the last few years..., stand idle should Pakistan starts turning into chaos. The US may 'encourage' Musharraf to take this or that action, but China has a lot of influence throughout the Pakistani military, and they will quietly extend a boot into someone's rear side to keep things in control, with or without Musharraf.

China has the influence in the military to steer events, we have seen the evidence time and time again. There is a reason the only tribes the Pak military actively engages are the tribes found near Gwador, and it wasn't an accident earlier this year that shortly after the extremists killed the Chinese nationalists during the Red Mosque incident the Pakistan military quickly concluded that sad episode. Indeed, don't get lost listening to the US media's fixation with American solutions and responses, if you want to observe what will happen next in Pakistan, observe how China reacts, they have a tremendous amount at stake, much more leverage than the US from the inside, and as a nation with a shared border with Pakistan, they are much closer to the issue.

I'm not trying to downplay the US role, nor downplay the stakes with the nuclear arsenal, rather I'm highlighting that our leverage hasn't produced results to the same degree the Chinese have in encouraging action against Islamic extremists who stir the pot in Pakistan.

For those who are interested, the next series of scheduled US Navy deployments begin starting today (Friday December 28th). With these scheduled deployments already in the pipeline over the next several weeks, it is unlikely we will see any surge activity, although I'm sure the US media will overplay these scheduled deployments as something otherwise.

Yet Another Twist to the Kitty Hawk Incident

The Hong Kong based Ming Pao daily is now speculating along the same lines I did yesterday, specifically the snub to the Kitty Hawk had something to do with the Chinese Navy exercises. From the Taipei Times:

Another explanation was offered by the Hong Kong-based Ming Pao daily, which said the Chinese snub was connected to a large-scale military exercise recently conducted by the Chinese Navy's Eastern and Southern Fleet in an area of the Pacific Ocean east of Taiwan and north of the Philippines.

The exercise was a drill for blockading Taiwan, it said.

"Sources ... said that during the exercise some Chinese ships ran into the Kitty Hawk's battle group in international waters sailing toward Hong Kong," an online version of the Ming Pao article said.

By refusing to allow the Kitty Hawk into Hong Kong, China "wanted to hide the details of their naval exercises and combat capability" to blockade the Taiwan Strait as part of a military attack on Taiwan, the newspaper said.

Dear President Bush, the explanation that this was simply a "misunderstanding" isn't good enough, not for the Navy, and not for me. The White House needs to do better, leaving the issue at "misunderstanding" is a slap in the face to the Navy and this nation. This country has no use at all for a President who is unwilling to stand up for our nations armed services serving over seas. This administration acts tough towards Iran, then loses its voice when it comes to China.

Did you notice something new in the press report? I did, this is not a typical PLAN exercise, in fact this is one of the first I have heard about that includes two different fleets in China, in this case both Eastern and Southern Fleets. That is a big deal, at least to people who observe such things like me. The speculation that this exercise would be for "blockading Taiwan" appears absolutely correct, as in such a case both fleets would have to operate together while the Northern Fleet sortied to set up for potential US Navy response.

Feng noted it in his original post and I didn't note it, clearly the quality here is in decline.

However, in trying to recapture the quality expected from our readers, we worked double time today pulling better information of the event, reviewing such trivial details as weather patterns and the details as reported. Note a few things. The Kitty Hawk was 300 miles away from Hong Kong when China finally allowed the Strike Group to return. According to my maps, that put the Strike Group South Southwest of Taiwan, with a choice to make...

Sail directly into bad weather, or take the short route through the Strait of Taiwan. According to the weather data we pulled, the storm was pretty nasty, and the storm that hit the 2 minesweepers earlier in the week was no picnic. We are hearing the Kitty Hawk sailed north through the Strait of Taiwan.

Which no doubt has pissed off China even more, they still talk about the incident in 2000 as the biggest threat their nation has faced in the last decade. My opinion, too bad for them, thousands of commercial ships cross the Formosa Strait a year, and had one of the Kitty Hawk CSG escorts sailed into the storm after being denied access to Hong Kong and been damaged, this wouldn't be a few bloggers complaining about an administration failing to stick up for American sailors, rather this would be an international incident.

Bill Arkin has a great quote from Admiral Keating:

The minesweeper incident, "causes us a little more concern," Keating said. "[T]his is a kind of an unwritten law among seamen that if someone is in need, regardless of genus, phylum or species, you let them come in; you give them safe harbor. Jimmy Buffett has songs about it, for crying out loud."

Arkin assumes that because Keating hasn't spoken to the Chinese that the Navy sees this as a non-issue. I disagree. When an Admiral makes a Jimmy Buffet reference, I'd say he is trying to get the attention of a broader audience. In all of the media coverage I have read, Roughead is clearly pissed off, and he should be.

The TV media has been remarkably silent on this issue, and the Pentagon appears to be incredibly clueless as to what actually happened. I hope the media bloggers who have been telling the story don't let it pass by easily, because if China was following a blueprint to harm military relations between the US and China, this would be one possible scenario. As I noted a few weeks ago, that trip by Gates to China was a complete failure, he is doing a great job handling the irregular war stuff, but if it at the expense of the big stuff someone over in the Pentagon is missing the point.

You Don't See That Very Often

Lets assume the official site is telling the truth.

as of November 5, 2024

Ships and Submarines
Deployable Battle Force Ships: 278

Ships Underway (away from homeport): 136 ships (49% of total)

On deployment: 109 ships (39% of total)

Attack submarines underway (away from homeport): 36 submarines (66%)

On deployment: 21 submarines (38%)
Ships Underway

Carriers:
USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63) - Pacific Ocean
USS Enterprise (CVN 65) - 5th Fleet
USS Nimitz (CVN 68) - Pacific Ocean
USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) - Atlantic Ocean
USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) - Pacific Ocean
USS George Washington (CVN 73) - Atlantic Ocean
USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) - Atlantic Ocean
USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) - Pacific Ocean

Amphibious Warfare Ships:
USS Nassau (LHA 4) - Atlantic Ocean
USS Peleliu (LHA 5) - Pacific Ocean
USS Wasp (LHD 1) - 5th Fleet
USS Essex (LHD 2) - South China Sea
USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) - 5th Fleet
USS Boxer (LHD 4) - Pacific Ocean
USS Bohomme Richard (LHD 6) - Pacific Ocean
USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7) - Atlantic Ocean
USS Denver (LPD 9) - Pacific Ocean
USS Juneau (LPD 10) - South China Sea
USS Tortuga (LSD 46) - South China Sea
USS Rushmore (LSD 47) - Pacific Ocean

That would mean the Stennis, Roosevelt, and Vinson, all three of which are either in dry dock or under nuclear conversion, and the Bataan which is in dry dock, are the only CVNs, LHAs, or LHDs not at sea. The only LHA not listed in the Tarawa, and it deploys today.

In other words, according to the official Navy website, over 75% of the carriers, 90% of the LHA/LHDs, and 66% of the nations submarines are at sea. You don't see that very often.

Coercive Diplomacy and the Threat to Use Force

While this might be new to some, these sales were discussed in the Senate back in August of 2006. Most people probably didn't notice, because we were watching the Israel - Lebanon war at the time. Isn't it interesting how this all of sudden becomes a priority?

The Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives has approved a bill to grant to Turkey three decommissioned U.S. military ships and to sell a fourth to the allied nation at a large discount. The panel passed the bill on a voice vote.

Under the arrangement, the U.S. should transfer to Turkey two Oliver Hazard Perry-class guided-missile frigates and an Osprey-class coastal minehunter. Another coastal minehunter was offered to Turkey at the sale price of nearly $28 million.

The two frigates, recently decommissioned by the U.S. Navy, are valued at about $125 million each, and the Osprey-class minehunters are worth about $130 million each, U.S. and Turkish military officials said.

The bill now must be approved in a House floor vote and by the Senate before being signed by President George W. Bush.

Under the same bill, the U.S. also is planning to grant two other Osprey-class minehunters to Lithuania and to sell another two to Taiwan.

We all know why this has suddenly risen to the top of the list. Everyone thank Nancy Pelosi for her incredible foresight; true leadership indeed.

All is not lost if the US House and Senate actually learn the lesson here. Apparently, as Turkey is proving once again, despite what we are often told in regard to Iran, coercive diplomacy backed by legitimate threat to use force is still the best way to avoid having to apply actual force.

We are two to three weeks away from the time we can expect the heavy drum beats from the US regarding Iran to pick up again. That drum beat is going to be emphasized as the Navy deploys a large number of ships on scheduled deployments within a few weeks time frame. If you thought Bush and Chaney have been rattling the sabers with talk of WWIII and promises of a no nuclear Iran, get ready for a thrill ride.

Bush is soon going to push Iran on their nuclear program very hard with his own coercive diplomacy backed by legitimate threat to use force. He will push past the point where western liberals begin to panic, because he needs that effect to amplify his message. The question is, when Iran believes the US is coming, will they push back or approach the table. If they approach the table realistically, Bush will talk this time. Otherwise, start expecting the unexpected.

Will Congress learn from Turkey's example? Yet to be seen, but remember, it was Turkey's elected body that voted to use force that ultimately forced our hand. In other words, I concur with Stratfor's analysis that the only peaceful solution leads to Democrats eventually empowering Bush to use force and trust he doesn't. I imagine that doesn't sit well with the far left kooks who desire peace, and may ironically prove to be the biggest roadblock in preventing war.

Naval Surge Ends as Naval Buildup Begins

While the world is watching the Middle East, the Navy has quietly been rotating its warships in and out of theaters.

As of the end of August, the Navy had 4 Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) and 2 Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESG) at sea. In October, the Navy will enter the month with only 1 Carrier Strike Group (CSG) on deployment (Enterprise), 1 Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) on deployment (Kearsarge), and the surface combatants of the Bonhomme Richard ESG back home with the Bonhomme Richard ESG amphibious ships on their way home.

When you consider the return of the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG), the Kitty Hawk Carrier Strike Group (CSG), the Bonhomme Richard Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG), and the Partnership of America's Strike Group (PoA 2007) the Navy begins October with the fewest number of warships on deployment as of any time in 2007. Also noteworthy is only three warships have officially begun their deployments over the last several weeks, all three of which (USS Reuben James (FFG 57), USS Wasp (LHD 1), and USS Bainbridge (DDG 96)) are replacing existing warships in common deployment theaters finishing their deployments. In other words, there are no additional warships deploying.

I have been predicting the Truman Carrier Strike Group would deploy by the end of September. At this point, I appear to be wrong, which I'm actually pleased to say because for the most part, Naval Strike group deployments have been remarkably predictable for the last 18 months or so of the Fleet Response Plan. Why the Truman CSG deployment hasn't been announced is still unclear, it could be next week for all I know, but current events could certainly be a major factor.

First of all, FY2008 begins on Monday, and Congress has not passed a defense budget. It really is a shame the American people watch Congress take off so many days every year, watch them give themselves a raise every year, then shrug when Congress can't do the only thing they are supposed to do every year... specifically pass a budget on time. And they want to call other nations elected officials dysfunctional? Look in the mirror. It could be the Navy is waiting for its budget before deploying its ships. Smart, but Congress should get called out on it in public if true.

Second, it could be an Admiral thing. Roughead's confirmation hearing was earlier this week (coverage here), and lately Fallon has sent signals he wants more control of deployments so he can control the message to Iran. While either or the combination of both is possible, the budget issue is more likely.

Finally, current events within the Navy could be a factor, specifically the upcoming home port change in Japan. While it is true the Navy is entering October with only a single CSG and a single ESG deployed, the US Navy appears to be moving towards 2008 to peak at the highest level of availability I have observed (perhaps ever), which is truly remarkable for a shrinking fleet.

Below are my observations. All information is public record.

On the East Coast, the USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) and USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) are both in preparations for upcoming deployments, with the Truman ready to go. The USS George Washington (CVN 73) is out of maintenance and is in its preparation for the home port move to Japan. The USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) is in dry dock with work scheduled to be completed in December. The next carrier to enter maintenance on the east coast is the USS Enterprise (CVN 65), currently deployed to the Middle East. This will give the Navy 3 CVNs on the east coast available by 2008, with a 4th operational as it changes home ports to the Pacific.

On the West Coast, the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) is currently in workups for its next deployment. The USS Nimitz, which returns from its deployment on September 30th, will remain available until its next deployment next year, while the USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) prepares to enter dry dock for a 6 month maintenance period. Currently in dry dock, due out in November is the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76). Finally, the USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63) is unlikely to make any more major deployments before it is replaced by the USS George Washington (CVN 73) next year. By 2008, the Navy will have 3 CVNs available with the Kitty Hawk in reserve until retirement.

By my math, that means 6 CVNs, all recently modernized, in some form of preparation or deployment by 2008, and that doesn't include the rotation of the USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63) and USS George Washington (CVN 73), both of which would be available in an emergency.

I know what knowledgeable people are thinking, 6+2, we can do that today. True, but keep in mind three of those six today would be the Nimitz, Stennis, and Kitty Hawk... all of which would have returned from a deployment at some point over the the last 35 days. 6+2 is great in theory, but it isn't always a reality. I think it is noteworthy that simply because of an interesting scheduling quark of the Fleet Response Plan, started years ago before any current event (Iran is an example) was taking place, the US Navy will just happen to reach a position of peak readiness just in time for the rhetoric of war in 2008.

George Friedman Might Be Right - Updated

On September 17th, George Friedman posted the article Red October: Russia, Iran and Iraq. If you haven't read it yet, you should, as it will give you the reason why a large number of reasonable people who support the President in Iraq are not very excited about the Petraeus strategy. A key excerpt:

The Russians are chess players and geopoliticians. In chess and geopolitics, the game is routine and then, suddenly, there is an opening. You seize the opening because you might never get another one. The United States is inherently more powerful than Russia, save at this particular moment. Because of a series of choices the United States has made, it is weaker in the places that matter to Russia. Russia will not be in this position in two or three years. It needs to act now.

Therefore, Putin will go to Iran on Oct. 16 and will work to complete Iran's civilian nuclear project. What agreements he might reach with Iran could given the United States nightmares. If the United States takes out Iran's nuclear weapons, the Russians will sympathize and arm the Iranians even more intensely. If the Americans launch an extended air campaign, the Russians will happily increase the supply of weapons even more. Talk about carpet-bombing Iran is silly. It is a big country and the United States doesn't have that much carpet. The supplies would get through.

...

Petraeus' area of operations is Iraq. He may well have crafted a viable plan for stabilizing Iraq over the next few years. But the price to be paid for that is not in Iraq or even in Iran. It is in leaving the door wide open in other areas of the world. We believe the Russians are about to walk through one of those doors. The question in the White House, therefore, must be: How much is Iraq worth? Is it worth recreating the geopolitical foundations of the Soviet Union?

The article is a lot longer and more in depth than this small sample provides.

Updated: Stratfor hid the article behind the firewall today, so I am redirecting to one of the dozen places online the article is posted.

The Revolution in Transatlantic Affairs

Eagle1 is linking to the most interesting thing you will almost certainly read this week, a very thought provoking piece listed in todays RealClearPolitics Tuesday roundup. Written by Tony Corn, who wrote the incredible thought provoking and controversial "Clausewitz in Wonderland," an excellent read for those looking to be intellectually challenged, comes a new piece again from the Hoover Institutes Policy Review "The Revolution in Transatlantic Affairs."

Both are very long pieces, (very long) with today's piece going into a number of directions that can't possibly be analyzed by any single blog post. It would take a week for me to hit on the major points. However in reading the piece I was drawn to the maritime aspects, of which there were several, but specifically on the focus of the US Navy today. Tony Corn, a graduate of the US Naval Academy, raises a number of interesting points in his new piece, but he hits on two points that I thought were on target. First his comments on NATO and the 1000-Ship Navy.

In the 1990s, some foreign policy analysts called on the United States to adopt a policy known as "offshore balancing." Succinctly put, "offshore balancing is predicated on the assumption that attempting to maintain U.S. hegemony is self-defeating because it will provoke other states to combine in opposition to the United States, and result in a futile depletion of the United States' relative power, thereby leaving it worse off than if it accommodated multipolarity." 31 Whether such an offshore balancing is still possible or desirable for the U.S. in a post-9/11 environment is highly debatable. But a maritime globalization of NATO could become, for the Alliance itself, the continuation of "offshore balancing" by other means. Its main merit would be to constitute a hedging strategy of sorts against the SCO.

China is emerging as a maritime superpower as quickly as America itself (not to mention the UK) is declining as a naval power, to the point where China could become the leading naval power by 2020. The Russian Navy, which until now was a pale shadow of Gorshkov's navy (since 1991, the number of submarines has declined from 317 to 61 and of surface ships from 967 to 186) has announced plans to build a class of four new aircraft carriers in 2013-14, with initial service to begin in 2017. 32 One would do well to remember that it took hardly more than a decade during the Cold War for Russia, the quintessential land power, to develop a formidable navy. In 20 years, we could realistically see a China/Russia-led SCO that is hegemonic not only on land but at sea. As counterintuitive as it may be at first, NATO would be wise to consider the possibility of making maritime cooperation the centerpiece of NATO-Russia security cooperation.

Maritime operations are of course not foreign to NATO. In the 1990s, Operation Sharp Guard constituted a dress rehearsal of sorts for Operation Active Endeavor after 9/11. In 2003, OAE was expanded functionally and geographically to cover the whole Mediterranean and ended up including some Mediterranean Dialogue countries as well as Russia and Ukraine. Many NATO allies participate in the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and it is no coincidence that the former head of Joint Forces-Naples, Admiral Mullen (the current chief of naval operations and JCS chairman-designate), is the one who developed the concept of the "Thousand Ship Navy" (TSN), which is today the talk of the U.S. Navy. 33 33 33 33 33

Though globalization has increased the importance of maritime affairs, there has been both a relative and an absolute decline of U.S. seapower, with a U.S. Navy today at its lowest level in the post-World War II era. For the first time in 20 years, the U.S. is in the process of drafting a new maritime strategy, but with a considerably reduced force that went from 600 to fewer than 300 ships, and with new responsibilities in terms of nonmilitary maritime security. Hence the concept of the Thousand Ship Navy, which is meant to create a global maritime partnership with foreign navies.

TSN is much more than an attempt to make a virtue of necessity. The Thousand Ship Navy -- the "Great White Fleet" of the twenty-first century -- represents a revolution in military affairs in that the concept raises the "network-centric" paradigm established by Admiral Cebrowsky from the domain of strategy (Network-Centric Warfare) to that of security (Global Maritime Partnership). In the process, it brings back a much-needed balance between techno-centric and culture-centric skills as components of success. Just as important, the TSN concept also represents a revolution in diplomatic affairs, in that a global maritime partnership would go beyond the traditional military-to-military contacts and, as Admiral Mullen points out, would unite "maritime forces, port operators, commercial shippers, and international, governmental and nongovernmental agencies to address mutual concerns."

As the Proliferation Security Initiative in Asia shows, though, this twenty-first- century naval diplomacy presents formidable challenges in terms of redefinitions of "sovereignty." Though the TSN concept is still a work in progress, it is worth noting that naval representatives from 72 countries have already taken part in the first symposium on the subject. NATO would do well to examine if the indirect approach of "going global" through a Thousand Ship Navy path is not also the best way to avoid making self-defeating waves in Asia.

Strategic considerations aside, there is an additional reason for Global NATO to get associated with the Thousand Ship Navy. Hard as it is to remember today, there was a time when NATO captured the imagination of Western audiences: Until the mid-sixties, in fact, the prospect of an Atlantic Union was seen in Europe as the wave of the future, while the idea of a European Union was associated mainly with coal, steel, and the standardization of electric plugs. 34 34 34 Today, hard as they try, the 700 million people of the West can't really bring themselves to get exited when the "deliverables" of NATO Summits amount to -- the purchase of three C-17s? If that is NATO's level of ambition these days, no wonder that even the EU is beginning to look good. NATO will require nothing less than a Thousand Ship Navy if it is to recapture the imagination of public opinion.

I added links to his citations, because they matter.

Is SCO a legitimate NATO competitor? You decide:

In the past hundred years, the instrumentalization of Islam has been a recurrent temptation on the part of every rising power, be it Wilhemine Germany or Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany or Soviet Russia, not to mention America itself. As the latest rising power, China itself would not be immune to that temptation even if it were energy self-sufficient. The fact that China's energy needs are huge guarantees that the constitution of a Sino-Islamic axis is for Beijing not just a tactical option, but a strategic necessity.12

While the pivotal states of this strategy appear to be Pakistan, Iran, and (more recently) Saudi Arabia, the geopolitical situation of Iran puts it in a class by itself, as the most precious proxy in China's "indirect approach" against American primacy. It is therefore no surprise to learn that China is using Iran as a conduit for the delivery of arms to both Iraqi and Afghan insurgents, and providing Iran itself the kind of small boats needed to conduct attacks against commercial shipping or the U.S. Navy in the Persian Gulf.13

If the instrumentalization of Islam constitutes the geographical axis of China's grand strategy, the functional axis is -- or ought to be -- of equal interest to NATO, since it consists in the artful combination of space power, sea power, and soft power.

Space power. While lending support to Russia's ludicrous posturing on NATO missile defense, China is experimenting with antisatellite weapons -- a disturbing trend given the reliance of modern military (especially navies) on space power.

Sea power. A hundred years after Theodore Roosevelt sent his Great While Fleet around the world to signal the emergence of a new great power, China is rediscovering the writings of Admiral Mahan on the importance of sea power in history and dreaming of a Great White Fleet of its own. Against the backdrop of an ever-shrinking U.S. Navy (more on that later), China is transforming itself as a maritime superpower at such high speed that Western analysts estimate it could become the world's leading naval power by 2020.

Last but not least, soft power. On the military side, China is focusing on developing security cooperation within the ASEAN Regional Forum framework with the intent of marginalizing America. On the civilian side, China is peddling "Asian values" from Africa to Eurasia and from Latin America to Southeast Asia. For the past six years, China has been promoting autocracy through soft power while America has been promoting democracy through hard power, and the verdict is in: China today has a more positive image worldwide than America.

No analysis necessary here, the rest of the paper is a more important read than anything I can say. Welcome to the geopolitics of the 21st century, where policy is the new substitute for strategy, and strategy is MIA in US, EU, and/or NATO policy.

2nd Fleet Focus: Observations of Operation Bold Step

Operation Bold Step, the recent exercise involving the Truman CSG, Eisenhower CSG, and HMS Illustrious produced quite a few headlines. The three most interesting stories I have read so far all come from the Navy Times; ‘Lusty’ is a refined carrier, U.S. pilots say, Training for deployment piles on the pressure, and International Integration, Bold Step Helps U.S., U.K., Other Navies Sort Out Communications Concerns.

The first article goes into detail regarding some of the philosophical differences between the Royal Navy and the US Navy. I wasn't really interested in that, the US Navy is unlikely to ever adopt some of these Royal Navy philosophical differences, but what did catch my eye were some of the comments regarding the 12 degree ramp and the discussions regarding the difference in landing on the ~20,000 ton HMS Illustrious compared to the ~40,000 ton Wasp class.

While I wouldn't advocate putting a 12 degree ramp on LHDs or the new LHARs to be built for ESGs, it does raise the question whether the 12 degree ramp should be evaluated for the future F-35B. Specifically, the major criticism, that I tend to agree with btw, with the future Sea Base concept is how it doesn't adequately address aviation support for the Marine Corp. One of the hallmarks of the US Pacific campaign in WWII was the dedication of carriers, specifically CVEs, for Marine Corp combat air support aviation. It has been suggested that the Marines need to take Marine Aviation back to see on dedicated platforms designed for the new, larger F-35B and MV-22. If platforms are ever designed to accomplish this, evaluating the 12 degree ramp should be part of the process.

In Training for deployment piles on the pressure I found one particular story very interesting.

The mystery frigate has decided to act.

“She’s coming right at us,” he says. “They’re coming at us at 21 knots.”

Within minutes, the ships are passing one another at a distance of 3,000 yards. Carney gets its positive ID. The opposing force ship is the Mayport-based frigate McInerney.

“He’s allowed to be here with us, too, and that’s OK,” Kuffel says. “Now we’ll just trail her. We get to look forward and he’s got to look back.”

Easier said than done. What follows is the naval equivalent of martial arts sparring, as both ships maneuver for advantage. McInerney can make tighter turns and tries to cut inside Carney’s loop. Standing on the port bridge wing, Kuffel keeps ordering turns and power adjustments. The ships end up tracking each other into a large circle and into overlapping turns.

McInerney still won’t talk.

“No response to query, sir,” Derges tells the captain.

Kuffel keeps the pressure on.

“He wants to be in a certain position, and I am not going to let him. He’s not talking with us, either,” he says. “I am happy to ride his beam or his stern.”

Finally, after several thrusts and parries, the frigate stops and backs off. Its navigation lights come on and Carney reciprocates as a subtle gesture of peaceful intent.

Such exercises train to simulate worst-case scenarios. The posturing of two ships could have easily escalated. In places such as the Persian Gulf, tactical maneuvering can quickly become a strategic problem, and the sailors know it.

“I don’t think I’d be doing this in the real world,” Kuffel said.

I'm not sure I agree with USS Carney’s captain, Cmdr. Glenn Kuffel. Historically speaking, this type of chess match at sea was a common theme in the Persian Gulf in 1987-1988 as told in several stories in the book Inside the Danger Zone: The U.S. Military in the Persian Gulf, 1987-1988, by Harold Lee Wise, not to mention commonplace in the cold war. The book tells multiple stories where ships in the Persian Gulf would compete for position with ships of the Iranian Navy. I am not really sure why Cmdr. Kuffel would dismiss the potential for another similar encounter in the future.

If anything, I expect such encounters to become more commonplace worldwide as nations continue to build larger Navies to compete regionally for dominance of the seas. The expectation that future naval wars will be fought over the horizon and that the US Navy will be given the green light to fire cruise missiles at enemy warships over the horizon in areas of heavy commercial traffic seems a bit like wishful thinking to me. Positive identification will be required, and insuring a safe flight path for any weapon system will be important in naval warfare for the US Navy in heavily trafficked maritime locals.

Jocking for tactical position goes back to the ships of sail, but the same tactics played an important role in both the cold war and in the Persian Gulf as a means of deterrence to hostilities. I see no compelling evidence that technology has changed the rules of naval warfare during peacetime enough that these tactics won't continue to be utilized in the future. If anything, with more potential rivals, the ability of the US Navy to maintain a positional advantage over a 'potential' rival during peacetime will be more critical in the future in deterring a potential confrontation.

Finally, in perhaps one of the most detailed and interesting stories, International Integration, Bold Step Helps U.S., U.K., Other Navies Sort Out Communications Concerns, a subscription article reproduced in Monday's CHINFO News Clips, details are released regarding the integration of allies in information sharing.

This blog has previously covered some of the Navy initiatives to streamline the integration of allies into Strike Groups. As the CHINFO article points out, the US Navy has integrated warships from other nations into its CSGs and ESGs, but one of the problems in the past has been the information sharing network behind the strike group has been unavailable to embedded foreign naval vessels. The Navy, as well as international partners, are trying to fix this.

Some will no doubt remember that Argentina, Spain, Canada, and others have integrated warships into Strike Groups over the past few years, but without the full integration required by information access, foreigners have complained that they have been assigned roles well below their capability. The communication problems behind that are being addressed with new, high speed information sharing technologies that integrate data sharing. Operation Bold Step tested these communication sharing tools, not only with the HMS Manchester (D95), but also with HMCS Charlottetown (FFH 339), which is currently preparing for a Gulf deployment this fall.

It is unclear if the submarines from Peru and Chile, or if the 3 French naval vessels that took part of Operation Bold Step were similarly integrated.

When put into perspective of the upcoming fall deployments, including the deployment of the USS Wasp (LHD 1), one can speculate how the rotation will change the naval presence in the 5th fleet region.

The composition of the Truman Strike Group still hasn't been officially announced, but it does appear the Strike Group escorts will consist of the USS Hue City (CG 66), USS San Jacinto (CG 56), USS Carney (DDG 64), USS Oscar Austin (DDG 79), USS Winston S. Churchill (DDG 81), HMS Manchester (D95), and the USS Montpelier (SSN 765). In addition Canada is deploying the HMCS Charlottetown (FFH 339), and to replace the USS Carter Hall (LSD 50) the US appears to be deploying the USS Wasp (LHD 1). This represents a massive increase of firepower even over the forces we saw this summer with the 2 carrier surge in the region.

When combined with the USS Bonhomme Richard ESG, USS Kearsarge ESG, and the USS Bainbridge (DDG 96) deployment to replace the USS Normandy (CG 60) in SNMG1 off the African coast, the US is increasing not only its mine warfare capability, its littoral AEGIS war fighting capability, its aviation capabilities, but more importantly its communications integration capabilities (think CEC) not only within the US forces, but also with allies. All of this doesn't even include the upcoming Royal Navy deployment of the HMS Illustrious which is expected to make a visit to the region later this year as well.

Get ready for the alarmist blogging, there are several deployments upcoming that will no doubt send the paranoid into a tizzy.

Middle East Foreign Policy is Hell

Whether it is using military force or diplomatic efforts, applying leverage in foreign policy always has substantial consequences. It is a myth that the consequences of diplomacy are more or less dangerous than military action, because in fact, either can and often are equally as dangerous, not to mention equally complex.

For example, war in Iraq has claimed a large number of lives. I have no intention to choose among the multiple sources, but regardless the loss of lives of Iraqi civilians, foreign fighters, US soldiers, and private citizens or contractors from all countries is not a small number. War Policies can be Hell.

But not fighting war can also be dangerous. This week a number of private intelligence firms, and open sources like strategypage and the DailyNK are reporting that deaths by starvation in North Korea are approaching the critical levels not seen since the 1990s. When you think about how many millions have starved to death over the decades, or simply been killed outright in internal violence in North Korea, it becomes difficult to intellectually argue that the cease fire hasn't been a dangerous policy that has resulted in an incredible loss of life. Peace Policies can be Hell.

Iran is the next big Foreign Policy issue facing the United States, and the more I look at it, the more it appears it is guaranteed to end ugly.

Despite the rhetoric otherwise, the US is now clearly engaged in a non-military policy for Iran. Whether or not this is the best, or even the wisest strategy, is certainly debatable, but nonetheless on many fronts the strategy of a non-military policy to handle Iran is afoot.

The first part of the strategy is a large informal Middle East alliance against Iran. Bill Arkin went back to back to back before coming up with the phrase "Middle East 2.0" to describe the strategy. I did several posts of my own to coin the phrase "The Diplomatic Surge." Both phrases describe the same strategy, Middle East arms are intended to upgrade regional security cooperation and integrate the region behind a coordinated military umbrella designed to protect the region from Iranian influence, expansion, and military capabilities.

The second part of the strategy is to leverage the United States soft power, namely economics, to slow bleed Iran similar to how the United States has done with North Korea. Stratfor's weekly Global Market Brief: U.S. Pressure on Foreign Firms and Iran's New Financial Direction (I believe it is free if you register), describes the latest move.

The U.S. House of Representatives on July 31 passed legislation amending the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) of 1996, expanding the scope of businesses subject to sanctions for investing in Iran's energy infrastructure. Further threatening Iran's commercial standing, the two largest banks in Europe that are still conducting financial operations in Iran -- Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank -- recently announced plans to halt transactions with private clients in Iran.

What the Stratfor article doesn't say though, is that Banking isn't the only industry the amendment to the ISA will effect. The Financial Times explains:

European governments are warning Congress that US legislation aimed at Iran could hit European energy groups, undermine transatlantic unity on Tehran’s nuclear programme and provoke a dispute at the World Trade Organisation.

Diplomats from France, Germany and the UK, among other countries, have stepped up a lobbying campaign on Capitol Hill against moves that would mandate sanctions on energy companies that invested more than $20m (€14.6m, £9.9m) in Iran.

Among such companies - already marked out by a US campaign to disinvest in energy companies that trade with Iran - are Royal Dutch Shell, Total of France and Repsol of Spain.

Royal Dutch Shell and Repsol, which are both looking for oil in US territorial waters in the Gulf of Mexico, are involved in a project worth up to $10bn to produce Iran’s first liquefied natural gas. The companies are due to take a final decision about their investment in 2008.

Most Americans reading this probably think this is some sort of Bush Foreign Policy push, but you would be mistaken. Bush is an open market kind of guy, and an oil guy, he would likely waive sanctions on the EU big oil.

President George W Bush has the power to waive sanctions on third parties doing business with Iran, but a bill introduced by Tom Lantos, chairman of the House foreign affairs committee, would remove his ability to do so. The bill has 322 co-sponsors, enough to overcome a presidential veto.

Diplomats stress that a parallel bill being considered by the Senate would leave Mr Bush’s waiver intact while seeking to introduce other measures against Iran.

But European officials say they are unsure what would emerge from efforts to hammer out a deal between the House of Representatives and the Senate and are worried that it could make some sanctions mandatory.

“Which do we fear more?” asked Jon Kyl, Republican senator from Arizona, last week. “A trade dispute with Europe or China or what Tehran will do with the revenues of a fully reconstituted energy sector?”

I'm not sure I have the answer Jon, but I'm glad the question is being asked. There is a lot of rhetoric thrown around in the media regarding who has the brass balls in the US government to make tough foreign policy decisions. In the past Bush has claimed to champion that role, although he has made a number of questionable moves that certainly brings into question his selective utilization of the brass.

Democrats on the other hand have a horrible reputation for breaking out the brass balls on issues of Foreign Policy, except maybe for the recent "Obama Option," but clearly the House Democrats are packing in this case (so far). Will they fold to pressure? I think they will, because virtually everyone in the region is interested in Iranian oil, so how much leverage can the US really apply before they back down?

The economic pressure on Iran is severe nonetheless, but how long and how broad it can be sustained is still in doubt. The UN sanctions help, but the US economic sanctions the Treasury Dept. applies is the real hammer that makes it very hard for Iran to sustain its energy infrastructure, and in general it has devastating effects on the Iranian economy as a whole. It takes time, but if applied consistently the policy has a better than average chance of success. There is a major hurdle though, and it is called the EU.

Someone needs to say it, so I will.

We are going to see intense lobbying on Capital Hill regarding the amendment to the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA). That lobby is going to be Big Oil, but not US big oil, rather European Big Oil.

The EU Big Oil lobby, or more accurately, the European greed for oil is now the primary hurdle standing against a tough, but non-military bipartisan US approach to the Iranian nuclear issue. How many Republicans and Democrats will cave to EU Big Oil? I don't think Congress has brass balls, rather a paper cup, so expect Congress to punt the issue and send the problem back to the President.

Which might explain why the US House, while taking a tough non-military Foreign Policy approach towards Iran, has also been weighing the potential world economic cost of a military approach to Iran as well.

5th Fleet Focus: The Diplomatic Surge

UNIDENTIFIED REPORTER QUESTION: So there's no, sort of, quid pro quo regarding Iraq support. These countries could get tremendous amount of U.S. military equipment but still not be supportive or even be the opposite with regard to Iraq?

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: There are no formal quid pro quos at all behind this, but it stands to reason that given the fact that Iraq is the number-one American foreign policy interest globally, we would want our friends in the region to be supportive, not only of what the United States is doing in Iraq, but what the -- but of the Iraqi Government itself. And we've made that point, obviously, repeatedly to these countries and we'll -- that will continue to be a major emphasis on our part.

Q&A; from U.S. Aid and Military Support to the Middle East Region
R. Nicholas Burns Press Briefing
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Washington, DC
July 30, 2024

Call me naive, but I do believe Mr. Burns, and I also believe that the timing is important. This is the best strategic policy for the region for the United States of America given the options currently available. The United States can either demand regional players participation to the growing regional problems, or we can convince them that their best chance is to join us by choice. In my opinion the policy Burns is laying out, giving regional nations the choice, has a lower cost and is a lot less complex than the alternative of making demands of regional players. The media is asking for the US to make demands, but that is a difficult strategy that can be summarized as the "Obama Option."

Patience with the GCC and other nations the US needs assistance from in the region like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan is starting to pay off. Tensions between the GCC and Iran have risen considerably in the last month, and Saudi Arabia is now facing a real possibility of US withdrawal from Iraq. While many of my conservative friends hate how Democrats call for withdrawal, the Democrat rhetoric is actually helping apply some political pressure to the region although I doubt that is the Democrats intention.

We all know where we have been in terms of the Middle East over the last 4+ years, but consider where we are in the region today and the effect it has on Iraq, Afghanistan, and Iran.

For Afghanistan, India and the US continue to build a relationship while Pakistan is now leading CTF-150. These two events taken together point to an emerging regional cooperation while at the same time put two rivals in the region invested in the shared interest of security. People say India isn't in the mix, but they are, and it starts with the Iranian pipeline to India which appears stalled despite comments otherwise.

For Iraq, Saudi Arabia can no longer ignore the challenges facing the United States, it continues to lose considerable prestige with the US for its OPEC driven intentional reduced oil output policy, its lack of obvious support for the US in Iraq, and its populations associations with the global war on terror. These points of contention with the United States are not timely for Saudi Arabia, as the Saudi's have now found themselves as the regional counterweight to Iran's growing influence in both the Persian Gulf and on the issue of Israel. This month Saudi Arabia will have dropped to #5 in oil exports to the United States, behind Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, and a Nigeria that is at about half production. Saudi Arabia finds itself for the first time in decades as needing the US security blanket at least as much as the US needs Saudi Arabia's energy resources.

The rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is also having problems. Iranian influence and intimidation of Oman, Qatar, UAE, and in particular Bahrain has reached a fever pitch in Gulf, and Arab media editorials are lashing out against Iran's imperialistic ambitions. The tension between Bahrain and Iran over the last month alone has probably been more beneficial for US strategic policy with the GCC than any other single event in the Middle East since 9-11, including Iraq.

Review the link if you are scratching your head.

Without making demands, the US is making progress in the Diplomatic Surge. The Diplomatic Surge starts by reducing forces in the region, which the US did this week by reducing the number of aircraft carriers to one. It includes bringing GCC states into the established international security frameworks, for example having Bahrain join TF-152, a huge victory for the US in the Diplomatic Surge. Saudi Arabia moving with other Arab states with Israel on the PA issue is part of the plan as well. The key though, is to convince Saudi Arabia to engage, and sustain a role in supporting US policy in Iraq to promote regional security. On all these fronts, the Diplomatic surge is working.

Did Burns lie, is there a quid pro quos? Are the arms deals really a down payment for more regional cooperation with the United States, or have the stakes in the region changed? The arms deals are part of the Diplomatic Surge. To ask regional partners to share regional security responsibility, the US will have to empower those partners with the tools required to rise to the occasion. The sale of the Littoral Combat Ship is hardly the problem, anyone who feels that is more than a defensive weapon misunderstands its capabilities, but the JDAM has raised concerns. However, the JDAM is an important weapon, but we are not talking about F-22s to Japan here, the scale is much smaller.

The strategic and political environment in the Middle East is beginning to bring US and Western interests in line with regional partners, and the Diplomatic Surge is designed to build cooperation regionally regarding security similar to how the military surge in Iraq is designed to build cooperation locally regarding security. The US has an opportunity to position itself with a unified GCC in preparation for the coming challenges. To miss this opportunity because of domestic politics would be disastrous to regional US national interests, waste a moment of opportunity when the US has leverage, and leave the US with more expensive, more complex "Oboma Options."