How would you describe the evolution of social media in the Navy?

Today's guest is Rear Adm. Dennis J. Moynihan, U.S. Navy Chief of Information

How would you describe the evolution of social media in the Navy?

There have been profound changes to the way that the U.S. Navy approaches social media since Gahlran first launched his blog five years ago.  In 2007, the Navy had a scarce social media presence.  Besides a few disparate early adopters like @flynavy or @NavyNews on Twitter, or Naval Station Rota on Facebook, the Navy had no real organizational appreciation or approach to social media.  Many within the Navy were generally aware of the potential of social media, but effectively articulating the costs or return on investment were stumbling blocks to gaining institutional buy-in.  Since I became the Chief of Information in 2009, my perspective has also changed.

Every few months, I travel to discuss Navy public affairs with prospective commanding officers.   During the first few visits, I asked them to consider whether or not their command should have a presence in social media as they considered their responsibilities of command.  However, during those same visits I pose the question much differently today.  The question is no longer whether a command should have a social media presence, but how they are going to engage in social media.

Three events over the last three years have illustrated the importance of social media.  The first example was when Haiti was ravaged by an earthquake in January, 2010.  The national media and really the world wanted to know the extent of the damage, and what was being done to help the Haitian people.  During the humanitarian assistance disaster relief operation, more than 22,250 military personnel provided support to those in need. The Navy sent 23 ships, and more than 300 military aircraft were used to assist.  The public and our extended Navy family especially families and loved ones of those dispatched to provide relief - shared an instant and insatiable appetite for real-time information.  The traditional ways of communicating - press releases, web postings to www.navy.mil, and phone trees, were no longer good enough.  Using social media, the Navy was able to extend to anyone and everyone as much information we had as soon as we had it.  

YOKOSUKA, Japan (Nov. 24, 2009) Chief Mass Communication Specialist Palmer Pinckney makes updates to the official U.S. 7th Fleet Facebook social media site. U.S. 7th Fleet began using social media in the Spring of 2009 to promote interaction with the people who have an interest in the U.S. Navy. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Gregory Mitchell/Released)

The second example occurred later that same year when the city of Millington, Tenn., home to 28 Navy commands and over 7,000 Navy families and Federal government employees, experienced widespread flooding on a weekend.  Dispersed on weekend liberty, unable to reach desktop computers, unsure of where to travel for assistance, Sailors and their families turned to their mobile phones for information.   At the touch of a button they were able to get - and share - the latest and most up-to-date information on the status of the base through regular updates from the base commanding officer and their respective commands through Facebook and Twitter.  The old ways of doing business simply weren’t fast enough or good enough.

Operation Tomodachi was the third event that generated intense interest from a variety of interested stakeholders and audiences, and showed us that operating in full visibility in the social media environment is inescapable in today’s landscape and society.  The world wanted to know what was being done to assist the people of Japan, and Navy families stationed in Japan needed information to make decisions on whether or not they should return to the United States.  Commands throughout the U.S. Pacific Fleet used their social media sites to assist families in providing them information they needed to make the important decision on whether they should depart Japan and U.S Seventh Fleet’s Facebook page was the place where media could turn to get the most up-to-date and comprehensive information on Navy efforts.

The choice in whether or not to participate in social media is a false choice.  Choosing not to participate in social media cedes the conversation to others.  People will be talking about your command and forging your public reputation - just without you.  Choosing not to participate simply means you surrender your stake in the outcome.

Not every leader is comfortable using social media.  Some leaders think that social media is just a public affairs tool or a way to communicate with external audiences.  It’s not.  It has, can and should be viewed as a powerful tool for leaders to communicate to Sailors and their families.  

In my view, there are three key watchwords which guide our engagements in social media: 

Risk.  Yes, there are risks to engaging in social media.  There are bad guys looking at our stuff too.  As with any communication tool to be anytime security is paramount.  We don’t talk about classified information on a phone, a fax machine, or unclassified email.  Security at the source remains paramount in this medium.  There is also real risk in not participating.  The Navy’s brand, and that of every command within the Navy, should not be left to others to define for us.  That is the risk we suffer when we don’t engage. In any crisis in this environment, this risk compounds dramatically.

Transparency.  In large organizations there’s a tendency to communicate only when we have all the answers, and only when the news is good.  It’s ok to tell people what we know as soon as we know it, even when we might not have all the answers.  By the time we have all the answers, the public understanding of the issue is already being shaped profoundly by others.  As for bad news, word travels fast - geometrically fast - in social media.  “Hiding” information and hoping it’s not exposed is not a viable course of action.  It erodes faith in our Navy and its leadership, and when the truth is revealed by someone else it is never as we would have it characterized.

Speed. Every week we learn something new and become more proficient in social media.  The speed of moving information and the pace of new techniques make this an incredibly intellectually challenging and agile medium to operate.  At 12:15p.m. on April 6, 2012, an F/A-18 Super Hornet crashed into a civilian apartment complex just outside Naval Air Station Oceana.  Within the first hour there were over 70,000 tweets sent on Twitter, ranging from eyewitnesses to national media.  If we weren’t participating in the environment immediately, public perspective and understanding would have continued to morph in unhelpful ways.

Compelling.  Time and attention are in short supply.  People are bombarded with messages and demands on their time.  What we communicate in social mediums must matter.  I believe every communicator must, “Produce as they would consume.”  As government leaders and communicators, if we wouldn’t click or share the content we produce ourselves, why should we expect someone else to do the same?  What we produce must be compelling.  Our ideas and products must rise above the noise, information and demands we confront in our personal lives.  Sometimes that means taking risk in the marketplace of ideas.  Once again, there is risk in being mainstream and predictable --no one will listen.  Then who will be left to understand our institution or follow in the footsteps of those who are currently serving?     

In summary, the means by which some people come to understand the world around them has changed because increasingly their view is shaped by what they consume in social media. We have recognized that in the Navy, and are all in on ensuring they understand - and value - their Navy by sharing our story in that environment.

Flattening the Chain of Command

Following the recent public news articles of the toilet troubles on CVN77, I think it is time to ask some questions that - at least today - may not have answers. Has Navy senior leadership created a cultural environment within the ranks that allows - even encourages - a sailor to go outside the chain of command and publicly air grievances on the internet? Do sailors now have the expectation that every electronic complaint should merit four-star attention? In doing so, is the system trending towards undermining the authority and responsibility of the Commanding Officer?

When a four-star admiral reads and personally participates in discussions about the Navy on blogs and message boards, it is and should be hailed as great dialogue and engagement. But what about when an admiral personally replies to electronic whines and rants posted by officers and sailors on blogs and message boards and publicly orders one star admirals to dig into these complaints? I understand not all of these situations are equal, but it is worth asking whether these type of actions by admirals is changing the culture of communication and undermining the authority of commanding officers. When senior leadership enters crisis mode every time negative press hits the wires, it can serve to encourage others to use this known, predictable response for their own benefit.

Instead of dropping a note in the CO’s suggestion box, making a suggestion on a survey, or even speaking with the chain of command, sailors are now finding it more effective and expeditious to rant and air grievances publicly on the internet. It is the responsibility of the leadership of the command to ensure that there is encouragement and positive reinforcement for making challenges known to the command. Yet, today, even if a command enjoys a command climate that encourages healthy internal dialogue, some now see the internet as the place to conduct that dialogue anyway.

When the admiral shows interest with an online post, that interest might be as simple and innocuous as a single question in an email to a chief of staff. But then that email takes on a life of its own as it travels downstream. Time pressure to respond to the admiral’s question falls squarely upon the shoulders of the commanding officer. As it should. The flag-level attention takes over the plan of the day and draws the command’s attention. What might be one of many competing command priorities suddenly might garner as much priority as a shipboard mishap. By allowing and encouraging the dialogue to go beyond the chain of command directly to senior flag officers, are we observing a mechanism forming for the statistical outlier to represent the population?

Is this just a part of life in the electronic age? Is the Navy simply “flattening the chain of command?” Are we simply observing the dynamics that comes with competing the hierarchical structure of the chain of command against the flattening of communications that has resulted from tools that allow greater accessibility? Is the Navy effectively balancing the flattening of and hierarchy of the chain of command?

If the Navy is willing to flatten the input side of public communications, the Navy should also be willing to flatten the feedback response. The proper response to a public complaint about a specific command should come from the commanding officer of that command, and no one else. In my opinion, the actions taken by Captain Luther regarding the toilet troubles on CVN77 is the model for dealing with these types of public complaints.

When sailors take grievances about a specific command publicly with intent of bypassing the chain of command, while it does represent a challenge to be addressed by the specific command, it also represents a challenge for those up the chain of command - all the way to the 4-stars. In my opinion, it is a legitimate challenge for admirals to know when and when not to engage public grievances about a specific command. I also tend to believe there is a broader issue for the Navy at large, for example, does it become paradoxical for someone in the Navy to publicly bash AM1 and and his mommy for blogging about toilet problems on CVN77 when USFF encourages and enables the same behavior publicly? I believe these are thin lines, and the questions are worth the discussion towards answers.

And to blunt the criticism ahead of time, as a civilian unassociated with the Navy - the paradox doesn't apply to me.

Finally, life in the Navy is not easy. The first response to challenges should always be to work together as a crew to find solutions, not find ways to blame the command.

Observing the Sh!t Talking About George H. W. Bush

On Monday the Navy Times ran a story about the USS George H. W. Bush (CVN 77) having some problems with their toilets. It is one of those news stories where the jokes write themselves, if you are the general public and only see the issue from an outsider (non-Navy) perspective. What is less known is that there is a back story that has led to the media attention. Apparently the mom of an AM1 (supposedly w/ 16 years experience in the Navy) set up a blog dedicated to this specific problem.

Obviously a discussion about shit, literally, is not the kind of news the Navy wants to see discussed publicly in the press following the amazing public relations achieved with the Carrier Classic on the USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70), but the blogger has reached out and driven as much media attention as possible to this issue. Headlines in response to the issue include:

Toilet Trouble on Navy Carrier Leaves 5000 Sailors Doing the Pee Pee Dance from Gizmodo, Broken toilets keep sailors squirming from the Atlanta Journal Constitution, $6B Navy Carrier Has Lousy Toilets by Newser, and 10000 man hours to keep 423 aircraft carrier toilets working by The Inquisitr.

Today the CO of the USS George H. W. Bush (CVN 77) published a statement on the aircraft carriers Facebook page regarding the toilet issue. I quote in full:

Dear Families and Friends,

It has come to my attention that a blogger has posted about our Vacuum Collection Marine Sanitation (VCHT) system…our heads (i.e., restroom facilities). The blogger provided her blog as a “media release” to various news outlets. Unfortunately, the blogger has never once contacted us for information and the blog has since been quoted in multiple outlets as undisputed fact. The blog casts the ship in a very poor light. It paints a picture of heads frequently out of order, out of order for 24 hours or for 8 days at a time. Further, the blog states that only ship’s company heads worked, operating heads are locked so Sailors cannot use them, or that medical issues have developed as a result of the heads. Lastly, the blog claims that heads are even affecting morale and military readiness. Had this blogger contacted the ship I could have provided some facts about each and every one of her claims.

All individuals embarked - whether permanently assigned to CVN 77 or one of its embarked units - are responsible for the cleanliness, stocking of supplies, and upkeep of their assigned spaces to include heads. If a system or piece of equipment is malfunctioning, the individual unit is required to place a trouble call (request for maintenance) with the CVN 77 engineering department. The engineering department dispatches repairmen on a job priority basis. Additionally, there are no individuals assigned to USS George H. W. Bush - or any other naval vessel - whose sole job is monitoring of commodes.

It is true that the USS George H. W. Bush has a VCHT system that is unique amongst aircraft carriers but it is not unique to naval vessels. It uses a vacuum to draw waste from the commodes into the temporary holding tanks. The system divides the ship’s heads into two independent loops. The system is maintained by Hull Technicians (HTs) who respond to trouble calls associated with the ship’s VCHT system. These Sailors are also responsible for welding, brazing, and sundry other duties commonly associated with plumbing and pipe fitting. I’d like to share a little information my engineering department has reconstructed using the ship’s trouble call log over the last year.

• In the 12 month period from 15 November 2024 through 15 November 2011, 4054 trouble calls have been placed throughout the entire ship (electrical outlets, doors, leaks, etc.)
• During the same 12 month period, 2,036 of those trouble calls have been associated with heads (i.e., restroom facilities).
• Of the 2,036 trouble calls, 976 have been for commodes and 280 for urinals. The rest are for lighting, ventilation, etc.
• Trouble calls for the heads have been split 51% on the forward loop and 49% on the aft loop.
• Trouble calls for the head mentioned by the blogger include: one (1) each in July, August, and October - all three calls were resolved in less than 24 hours. There were zero (0) trouble calls in September and November. The blogger started commenting on November 7th when every commode in that head was working.
• In each instance, the individual trouble calls were for a single commode within the head. The head has 6 total commodes and 2 urinals. At no time has there been a trouble call for more than a single commode out of service in that particular head.

The HTs maintain the overall system and problems vary from loss of vacuum within a loop to clogs in system piping. Loss of vacuum is most often caused by damage to individual flushing mechanisms but can also be caused by a clog in the loop. I mentioned earlier that there were two loops in the system. A loss of vacuum momentarily affects all heads on the same loop.

• The most common loss of vacuum is a failure/disconnect of the vacuum valve connected to the individual commode. The average time to return the loop to full service is typically less than 15 minutes. The follow-on repair to the individual commode/head in question depends on the malfunction but is typically complete in less than 30 minutes.
• Severe clogs can also cause a loss of vacuum in a single loop. The average time to isolate, locate, and repair significant clogs is less than three hours.
• The single longest loss of service to an entire head occurred in June due to a massive clog while the ship was in port. It took three days to repair because a section of pipe had to be removed and re-welded into place. The three day repair affected a single head on the starboard side of the aft loop. That berthing had a second head in the same area on the port side of its berthing that was functional the entire time of the repair.
• Inappropriate items that have been flushed down the commode and caused clogs during deployment include feminine hygiene products and their applicators, mop heads, t-shirts, underwear, towels, socks, hard boiled eggs, and eating utensils.
• There have been ZERO (0) clogs caused by toilet paper and human waste.
• There have been six (6) instances of both loops of the VCHT system being simultaneously unavailable during deployment. The longest dual (i.e., whole ship) outage was 15 minutes.

I have addressed the crew multiple times during the deployment about the system and damage caused by inappropriate items being flushed down the commodes. The indifferent, inconsiderate and irresponsible actions of a few Sailors were adversely affecting everyone onboard. To address the abuse of heads and commodes, I made the decision to allow departments and squadrons to install cipher locks on all heads. This would limit access to heads to members of the berthing assigned and foster a sense of ownership amongst berthing inhabitants. It would also allow better forensics into the source of the vandalism because the number of people allowed in a particular head would be known. It worked… during the roughly 50 hours that some heads were locked, trouble calls dropped by 67% and Sailors reported their heads were noticeably cleaner.

• Eight (8) heads were identified as public heads which would not be locked. They included two (2) head each for both sexes on the port and starboard sides for each loop.
• Lock installation began on 3 November 2024 with 4 of the 18 departments assigned to CVN 77 because they had submitted trouble calls requesting locks and had ordered locks from Supply.
• The total number of heads locked was 23 of the 93 heads associated with junior enlisted berthing.

The blogger asserts Sailors are afraid to speak out for fear of retribution. Not true. I have an electronic CO’s Suggestion Box which allows anyone onboard USS George H. W. Bush to email me with questions, suggestions and comments. Because comments are emailed, each and every comment has the Sailor’s name on it. I received one email on the first day of installation, 18 on the second day and 15 on the third day. The comments ranged from understanding why the locks were being installed to complaints about the inconvenience associated with leaving their work center and walking to their berthing to use a head. On the third day, I was made aware there were insufficient locks available through purchase or reallocation to provide every head with a lock in a timely fashion. Accordingly, I directed that every cipher lock be reprogrammed to a common code. However, I briefed the crew that this would remain only as long as clogs did not return. Since all locks have been recoded, there has not been a single clog.

Based on blogger comments the media has reported increased health issues, such as dehydration, and increased urinary tract infections. Again, not true. In fact, for deployment, 91.5% of all personnel onboard this ship have not been to medical. There have been 60 total cases of urinary tract infection during deployment with two major spikes occurring immediately following port visits. This represents approximately 1.3% of the crew. During the period of the blogger’s comments, potential urinary tract infections have declined each month from September through November.

I understand the concern for your friends and loved ones and their living conditions onboard the world’s newest aircraft carrier. While I disagree with the blogger’s comments, I will defend with my life her right to make them. However, she presents the unsubstantiated comments of a single Sailor as fact and, in doing so, denigrates the efforts and sacrifices of the other 4,800 members of the entire strike group team who during the last six months supported ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. During this time we also have hosted ambassadors, members of foreign governments, foreign nationals, members of the foreign media, coalition partners, entertainers, folks from home and, without fail, they have left singing the praises of the Sailors and their ship.

I can assure you the ship has, and continues, to perform admirably. While we have a ways to go yet, your Sailors are healthy, happy and excited to be heading home. I am proud of each and every one of them and look forward to bringing them safely home to you soon.

Warm Regards,

Brian Luther

I appreciate the detailed response by Captain Luther. The Navy Times conducted a phone interview with the CO of CVN 77 about this issue today, and this second Navy Times article on the issue that resulted from that phone conversation paints a different picture than the one by Captain Luther.

The system was designed with unusually narrow pipes to help keep a high vacuum pressure. However, these narrow pipes make it more likely that the system will clog. They should be wider to let potential clogs move through, Luther said.

Additionally, the individual commodes need to be upgraded. Sometimes vacuum pressure is lost when someone presses the flush button with his boot instead of his hand, breaking a mechanism. Or a tube is knocked out of place during a regular cleaning, causing pressure to drop, Luther said.

The toilet problem has become unbearable, said sailors onboard the carrier, who spoke with Navy Times on the condition of anonymity because they are not authorized to speak with media. There have been occasions during the deployment when every toilet went offline. More frequently, every commode aft of midship will be out of order, they said. Or several heads in a single area will go down, and when they are repaired, a new problem will occur elsewhere, sailors said.

The problem has left sailors searching for a proper place to relieve themselves, a quest that can last an hour. Often, when they do find a working commode, they need to wait in line and the head is filthy from overuse. As a result, sailors are taking extra showers or using industrial sinks in their workspaces. Men are urinating into bottles and emptying the contents over the ship’s side. Some have cut down on their food and fluid intake, and some women are holding it for so long that they’re developing urinary tract infections.

Luther said that 8.8 percent of the sailors onboard have received medical attention for either dehydration or urinary tract infections, and sick bay data show that cases of urinary tract infections have declined through the deployment. Comparable figures for other deployments were not available Tuesday night.

The ship’s sanitation system is divided into forward and aft sections, which operate independently of each other. However, six times since the deployment began, both sections broke simultaneously, leaving each of the carrier’s 423 toilets inoperable. However, at the worst, both sections were concurrently down only for 15 minutes. No commode is immune, Luther said, and his own toilet has gone out of service.

“If you use vacuum, you lose vacuum. Whether you’re me, the admiral, or the most junior sailors. And even I’ve gotten a call from the admiral who said ‘Hey! What’s up with that?’ ” Luther said. “It’s egalitarian."

It is a safe bet neither the CO nor the Navy saw this narrative associated with the maiden deployment of the nations newest aircraft carrier. I see three issues here.

First, this is an aircraft carrier that is supporting operations over Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, and Somalia and this discussion about the ships terrible toilet system represents the only headline the ship has been able to generate to date. Maybe if the Navy did a better job telling the public what they did with their multi-billion dollar warships when the fleet deploys for 6 months to CENTCOM, when a news article discusses toilet troubles on a ship, the news would also mention other more naval centric newsworthy events the ship has been previously involved in.

Second, this looks like a design problem on the ship. Why is the VCHT system divided into only two zones? Why does the Navy have this problem on their aircraft carriers but cruise ships, which rotate thousands of passengers every week, don't seem to have this VCHT problem? When 2,036 of the ships 4,054 trouble calls (50%) are specific to the ships heads, and 30% of the 4,054 trouble calls are specific to the toilets, that suggests to me there is a legitimate technical issue here and the problem isn't limited to human behavior.

Third, how can I ignore this nonsense in response to the CMC from an AM1 that supposedly has 16 years of service? When the CO says "individuals embarked... are responsible for the cleanliness, stocking of supplies, and upkeep of their assigned spaces" he is clearly responding directly to that specific blog post, and to what could be described as one whiny bitch of a First Class Petty Officer.

I don't know about the Navy, but in every private sector job I've ever worked, when an employee with 16 years experience and in a position of leadership complains about basic tasks like keeping their space clean, keeping supplies properly stocked, or maintaining upkeep to ones limited area of responsibility - we describe those type of folks in the context of a useless middle manager who works in the organization as a public reminder to everyone else what is broken within the bureaucracy. Sorry, but some 30 something year old First Class Petty Officer complaining to his blogging mommy about the CMCs legitimate, remedial instruction didn't sit well with me at all. The CMC had this exactly right, First Class Petty Officers should be expected to be part of the solution to a ships problems, but that guy decided to add an additional layer to the ships problem. Classy.

So what are we learning here? In my opinion, we are learning that Captain "Lex" Luther is the real deal. I like that he is using social media to tackle a social media centric public relations issue. I like that he is addressing the issue directly, publicly - owning the problem instead of ignoring the problem. I like that he has implemented solutions that have, at least according to some statistics, helped address the problem, although not completely. I like that the ship is carrying on it's responsibilities despite distractions and ongoing problems that have no permanent fix while on deployment. Public relations challenges are always difficult, particularly in the Navy that as an organization really doesn't always deal with public relations challenges well, but the CO of CVN 77 is doing everything right here. Information is the best weapon against ignorance, and I think the information by the CO was on target.

We are also learning about a very shortsighted engineering problem on CVN 77, because I can't think of any good reason for a VCHT system to be divided into only two zones. It's not like this issue is something new to the Navy. When 30% of all trouble calls over a 12 month period are specific to the toilets and urinals of the Navy's largest ship, this is bigger than a human behavior issue. If the Navy is serious about reducing crew sizes on ships in the future, smarter design and engineering for spaces and systems that consumes maintenance time of the crew while underway would be the logical place to start.

Finally, anyone who suggests the public attention by this AM1 or his mom has somehow contributed positively to the ship or crew would be wrong. Does public knowledge of a poorly designed VCHT or public knowledge of a misbehaving crew flushing inappropriate items in the toilets somehow help the ship? No. Are the folks who are working to address these problems aided by public awareness of the challenges they face when they work? No. Was the ships leadership somehow unaware of the issue? As I understand it, the CO has directly addressed this issue every few weeks throughout deployment over the 1MC, which suggests to me that this is not a problem being ignored, and the various actions taken like cipher locks also suggests the ships leadership was actively engaged in trying to address the issue as best they can. Can anyone name any specific good that might come from public awareness of this issue? I'm struggling to find any positive that comes from publicity of this issue.

The way I see it, generating public interest regarding the inconvenience of low quality shitters on CVN 77 isn't a whistle-blower scenario as this AM1's mommy suggests, and it is hard to find a legitimate intention for making the issue public other than to embarrass ships leadership who, according to every account I can find, has throughout deployment been legitimately trying to address a legitimate problem.

When I look at this story, in my opinion, this AM1s public whiny attitude towards a pristine pissing environment properly managed on his behalf by other sailors reveals itself as a questionable character issue at least as interesting as the issue of a poorly designed VCHT, and for that reason I find this whole story to be one of terrible judgment by a First Class Petty Officer and his blogging mommy in using social media as an instrument of publicity that ultimately does absolutely nothing to help a ship and crew dealing with a legitimate issue.

Introduction

Hello to you all. My name is Edward Westfall. Gahlren and the team here at ID have been kind enough to invite me to join the team as a part-time contributor. To regular readers, you may have seen me mentioned incidentally in some posts discussing the Coast Guard and strategic communications. I have been an author on an official unit blog in the past.

My posts here are done in an unofficial capacity. I am an active duty officer in the Coast Guard with over 26 years of enlisted and officer experience. I have served at sea for over 17 years and have commanded four cutters in that time. I have been stationed in a variety of locations in the United States, as well as at the US Embassy in Mexico City. I will be starting my JPME II at the National War College in the next few weeks.

For those that wonder, the Coast Guard is very supportive of unofficial social and print media authorship in both policy and practice (You can see the Coast Guard policy guidance starting on page 10-8, Online Self-Publishing, in the Public Affairs Manual here). Of course, I am required to place a standard disclaimer in any post that reiterates the unofficial nature of the post, so here it is:

The views expressed herein are those of the blogger and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Commandant or of the U. S. Coast Guard.

I am proud of my experience and certainly have thoughts and opinions regarding topics relevant to ID. That being said, I also recognize that expertise is relative and that my perspective on issues is likely not the only one. I plan on focusing my posts on topics such as strategic communications, social media at the field level, joint and multilateral operations, leadership and command climate, organizational planning and development, illicit trafficking interdiction, and Coast Guard familiarization. I also ask that you pass along any questions or topic ideas through comments or the e-mail link to the right.

Thanks for your interest. I appreciate the opportunity to tell the stories of the hard-working Coast Guardsmen I have had the good fortune to serve with, as well as provide whatever insights that I can. I look forward to your thoughts and comments as well.

Best regards,

Edward Westfall

The Slow but Steady Development of a Navy Influence Enterprise

This is Captain David Werner, the smartest sailor I know when it comes to social media. Also mentioned in this video is the wizard behind the scenes for Navy social media (Twitter and Facebook), LT Lesley Lykins. Hopefully as people watch this, they recognize the Navy is learning and adapting while moving rapidly. Social media wasn't even on the Navy map just 2.5 years ago, when for example, they invited me on USS Freedom.

By the way, note he mentions others by name (Spencer Ackerman, for example) when presenting Navy social media. It is a technique that can be described as public social networking. I honestly believe Captain Werner is the right man, in the right place, at the right time - because he is constantly networking. I believe the way networking is part of his personality is not only why he is good with social media, but why he is good at teaching social media.

The video is worth listening all the way to the very last question, which I think is a great question. I had to turn the volume up to hear the question, but the question deals with the process of turning classified information (operational information) into declassified information (operational information released by the Navy) presented to the public.

Watching the movie will you help understand the rest of this post...

Captain Werner gives the Navy answer, but I think the question carries with it a lot of depth for thinking about information flows and information uses in the modern information domain. It really is one of the most important questions facing the Navy today, and is not a question specific to social media. Stated another way, the question is:

How does the Navy align information with operations in a way where actions and information are congruent so that the message is delivered in context and the reader is informed as intended?

The question is about strategic communication, and the exposes the currently missing operational doctrine in the Navy where information is leveraged as part of an influence enterprise that tells the story of naval affairs, rather than simply informing the audience of a Navy action. The original question asked in the video could have also substituted the word "network" for "process" and hit the nail on the head.

I've often said that it isn't that the Navy doesn't have a credible story to tell, rather it is that the Navy doesn't know how to tell a credible story. Navy information today is always specific to a Navy action, and what happens is information crosses the classified-unclassifed bridge on any subject, from operations to acquisition etc., becoming a piece of Navy information that fits easily into a category:

strategy - operational - tactical - doctrine - acquisition - training - development

A lot of folks often wonder where the Navy narrative is. Well, an organization like the Navy requires many pieces of information to build a narrative from - and right now a lot of things the Navy is doing does not have an information component that makes the transition from classified to unclassifed. It is also important to note that the Navy also has a lot of information that does make that transition, and those pieces do fit into a category.

Should any piece of information in those categories not align with the narrative, then the problem is the narrative itself, the activity described in the information, or the absence of information that feeds the narrative.

But right now problems with the narrative doesn't actually matter, because the narrative doesn't exist. Worse, the Navy doesn't have anyone even trying to articulate a narrative for the Navy, yet. For example, on any day someone can find articles on navy.mil, Facebook, or any number of other official locations that are well written pieces of information and easily fit into the categories above. What you will not find is a network crafting the individual pieces of information the Navy puts out into a coherent and articulated narrative that tells the story of the US Navy today.

It has been suggested that the role of using pieces of information in a network is the responsibility of the Unified Combatant Commanders, or N3/N5, or maybe N2 should do it, or the role should be the CNOs to do. The answer, of course, is YES.

In order for a global organization like the Navy to 'operationalize' information at all levels into a narrative, the Navy is going to need to organize the pieces of information and assemble those pieces into a network that form a narrative. The Navy isn't there yet.

Like I said, when I look where the Navy is today from just 2.5 years ago, I am stunned by the rapid pace of progress, because impressive strides have been made in very a short time. Listen to Captain Werner describe what they are learning along the way with experience. There is a learning curve that directly impacts existing organizations, and fortunately the Navy is steady in making progress.

Change in an organization the size of the Navy will take time. I believe the next big change to watch for is when the Navy transitions from teaching processes and how to leverage various tools for organizing information in pieces; and begins to develop a global operational information network that takes all these various pieces and networks those pieces of information into an influence enterprise delivering a coherent narrative that tells the US Navy's story.

Who Else Reads Your Facebook Page?

From March 22, 2024 - Hey AT&T customers: Your Facebook data went to China and S. Korea this morning…

The author raises several questions:

• Should Facebook and or AT&T have notified their customers that their personal information was flowing over a network that they may not trust?
• Should Facebook enable SSL on all accounts by default?
• Was this actually a privacy breach or just the way the Internet functions?
• Does Facebook have an ethical responsibility to buy additional IP connectivity to major broadband and mobile networks to prevent routing mishaps?
• Is it time to focus on new options within BGP to prevent high profile sites from routing to non-authenticated networks?

This happens all the time — the Internet is just not a trusted network. Yet, I prefer to know that when I am on AT&T’s network, going to US located sites, my packets are not accidentally leaving the country and being subject to another nation’s policies. I guess that’s why you should not use Facebook in “bareback” mode and use HTTPS (SSL) any time you can.

The organizational power of technology tools like Facebook has been heavily utilized by those protesting across the Middle East the last few months. If a nation can reroute the AT&Ts network from the US, a nationally owned network can be rerouted too...

There are over 500 million Facebook users. It is the worlds largest community. Whether it was intentional or accidental that Facebook traffic was redirected to China, there is a lot to think about here.

Boundaries of Social Media

If you follow the security twittersphere, you're probably familiar with the work of @JCCentCom. I don't follow JC directly, but his tweets are regularly RTed by people I do follow. Adam Weinstein suggests that there may be trouble ahead.