US Soft Power in Ukraine is Missing Hard Power's Escalation Control

The most frustrating thing about watching events unfold in the Ukraine is the realization that the United States apparently learned nothing from the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008. If you recall the invasion of Georgia in 2008 by Russia, you will also recall it took place right in the middle of an American election. It would appear that timing favored Russia, because lessons were apparently not learned, indeed there is scant evidence the issue was truly studied.

Today, in nearly every avenue of action, tactical options are being discussed on how to 'react' to Russia's occupation of Crimea. For the last 5+ years, time has been lost that could have been used developing a policy that included strategic options for how to deal with aggressive Russian military behavior. Many of those options are finally being explored (like working the region towards energy independence from Russia) but they are years away from being employed, and lack value in dealing with the current crisis.

In 2007 the United States Navy developed the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower in which the strategic object of preventing war was elevated to a primary mission statement of the US Navy. There was some hope that the DoD would adopt this stance as part of it's lexicon of capabilities provided. In rhetoric, the DoD demonstrated some appreciation for the concept of preventing war, but there is scant evidence the strategic object has been developed into an actual capability. Planning and rhetoric aside, the United States right now needs to prevent a war in the Ukraine. Yes, Russia has invaded the Crimea, and is using military power - but this is not a war, yet. Should the shooting start inside the Ukraine, the distinction between the non-violent occupation by the Russian military and an all out shooting war will be made evident, so no need to parse definitions.

As of Tuesday March 4, 2014, success for President Obama's soft power diplomacy policy depends entirely on preventing a war inside the Ukraine. I have been observing two starting assumptions represented in the mainstream assumptions of many "experts." I guess I am naïve to reject the prevailing wisdom of experts, time will tell.

First, I do not underestimate Putin, and I believe too many important people in this process are underestimating Russia right now. I have seen a number of media and political folks who talk to the White House regularly speak as if they believe Putin is acting from a position of weakness, and that Putin has somehow lost control of the situation and is improvising. Please stop. The EU is who lost control of the situation, and everyone has been scrambling ever since as Russia has set the parameters for the conditions inside the Ukraine to date. This administration has a history of underestimating Putin right up to the point where they get kicked sideways and told what the end game is - which seem to always favor Russia and leaves the US in a poker game holding a pair of twos trying to save face. This Rice/Kerry/Hagel team has yet to win on the field of play in foreign policy has no business underestimating this or any opponent, and has every reason to continuously expect the unexpected. The US must shape conditions favorably when given any opportunity, and right now I do not see the United States taking this kind of full court press approach to suggest we are in it to win it.

Second, I believe we are overestimating our ability to shape the outcome. Today NATO met and started discussing the situation, and tomorrow the EU will meet and start discussing their options. The US really needs the assistance of both NATO and the EU to prevent a war and shape the outcome favorably to our interests, but I am unsure the US will ultimately get much assistance from either the EU or NATO. It didn't even take 24 hours for both Germany and Great Britain to fold on economic and trade sanctions as a form of diplomatic coercion, and with the constant reinforcement in rhetoric by Senior US officials that there are no military options, I think it is absolutely clear that the study of strategy is completely dead in the DoD today. The effectiveness of the President's preferred soft power approach to crisis resolution depends on a single condition - that war inside the Ukraine is prevented. I am unclear how the US or Europe can guarantee that war is prevented inside the Ukraine without deterring the further use of Russian military power, and even though the situation might not escalate into a war, diplomatic success depends on the guarantee that war is prevented.

The US needs to shape conditions towards a favorable diplomatic solution, and I am not convinced the US is doing this today.

I believe Russia's primary objective is to take Crimea without using violent military force. Russia believes they can play a long game, wait out the Ukrainian military forces still inside Crimea, and eject those forces from the region. I am not one of those who believes Russia will simply annex Crimea, rather Russia will establish an autonomous state like they did in Georgia with South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Just like in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russia is the only country that wins that arrangement. The US needs to be thinking right now how to handle this outcome - because this is the best case outcome right now and we know it. History shows US policy over time does nothing but punish the people inside those regions, not Russia, so the US clearly needs to start the hard work of developing a new policy that addresses the situation more realistically.

I believe President Obama and the United States could potentially soon be standing alone against Russia on the issue of the occupation of Crimea in the Ukraine. I am not convinced the US can apply sanctions unilaterally without serious blowback by Russia, but maybe we can? It seems to me the US needs to define exactly what our national interest is in the Ukraine before we apply sanctions, because there are ways that Russia can put pressure on other, well defined, national interests in a game of diplomatic warfare against one another. I have no idea if President Obama sees the Ukraine situation as a national interest to the US, because I am yet to hear him articulate his argument why the crisis in Ukraine unfolding is a national interest of the US.

If we assume the occupation of Crimea represents a threat to our national interests, and I do believe it is, the US must guarantee that we do everything possible to prevent escalation of hostilities. To do so, the US must deter Russia from taking any further territory with military force. I am of the opinion that if 1) Russia starts facing a violent confrontation in any form, including insurgency, or 2) if our diplomatic warfare activities actually hurt Russia, that Russia will seek to occupy more territory in the Ukraine with hard military power, and will not hesitate to create a refugee problem with hard power. Ukrainian authorities continue to observe, every day, that Russia is massing more troops on the Russian border side of the Kharkov, Luhansk and Donetsk regions. If things start to go unfavorably for Russia, as of today nothing exists that will stop Putin from drawing a line from Kharkov to Odessa and occupying all points East. I don't think Putin is interested in a prolonged occupation, but that territory would given Russia several key advantages in diplomatic negotiations - including not just the territories, but a forced relocation refugee problem that would make everything inside the Ukraine considerably more complicated for any nation attempting to support the Ukraine with economic packages.

Obama has several military options to prevent a war. First, NATO could establish a air defense zone over Ukraine. If NATO is conducting the anti-air defense of Ukraine, the Russian military is not going to find success advancing in the Ukraine while being bombed from the air by the Ukrainian Air Force while also fighting the Ukrainian Army on the ground. NATO support for the Ukraine towards Air Superiority over the Ukraine would add significant assurance to the situation on the ground inside the Ukraine that Russia would not further advance militarily. I do not understand why the US DoD hasn't already been out front with this military option, diplomacy depends on the prevention of further hostilities, and the US is often quick to discuss setting up no-fly zones over enemy states, but is somehow slow in providing the same level of support to people we call friends?

NATO should also start mobilizing MIW capabilities just outside the Black Sea in case they are needed, because if the port in Odessa gets blocked by Russia, logistics is going to get very difficult for the Ukraine quickly. The railroads in the region are not that great, and cannot support Ukraine if - for any reason - access to the port of Odessa becomes restricted. Bryan discussed the need for more US seapower, but in my analysis of the kind of seapower the US would use in a situation like this given the various treaty obligations and operational challenges, the US Navy doesn't really field the kind of naval capabilities most needed for this type of conflict prevention strategic objective with the exception of the Littoral Combat Ship. The capabilities at sea needed are those for operating in the littoral, functional for electronic warfare and ISR, and capable of MIW. A CVN in the Eastern Med could sink the entire Black Sea Fleet in a day if it came to that, but this is about sea control without hostilities - soft power at-sea capabilities, not hard power like aircraft carriers. I'm not convinced even the LCS is a good fit for this crisis, but a combat capable corvette certainly would be. Other NATO nations have that capability, so perhaps US Navy logistics is the best capability for the US Navy to bring to this type of war prevention engagement.

Finally, NATO should commit some special units for military training and Ukrainian Army readiness inside the Ukraine - and do it starting today. The presence needs not be large, but the need to prevent war demands reassurance to the Ukrainian military to reinforce professionalism and maintain preparations towards the prevention of escalation of conflict with Russia. Sending ground forces in gives the US and EU escalation control, and does not represent escalation of tensions in and of itself - in fact it stabilizes tensions. The cost of these type of engagement activities in prevention of war pales in comparison to the costs of a refugee crisis on the border of yet another NATO nation, and one look at the refugee crisis coming from Syria should be a reminder that preventing a war before it starts is an excellent investment by NATO compared to reacting to the conditions of war after the the shooting starts.

It is incredible to me that the DoD has offices like Air-Sea Battle and the Office of Strategic Landpower and yet the DoD seems incapable of offering what I see as obvious military options that help deter Russia from further conflict. My biggest concern is that these military options have been presented to the President, and the Obama Administration (Susan Rice?) rejected these options, because I believe rejecting such options would represent nothing short of faith based foreign policy absent the serious substance necessary to control conditions in the real world; a political decision that, in my opinion, would justify every criticism related to weakness and incompetence of the administration and the people in it made to date.

As of today there are no obvious efforts being made towards preventing escalation of the crisis in the Ukraine by Russia if they choose to do so, even though US diplomatic activities will - by intent and presumably by effect if effective - escalate the crisis by imposing costs on Russia. Hard power in the form of forward deployed military presence represents the deterrence capability necessary to empower the effectiveness of diplomatic solutions by the Obama administration, and has the capacity to contain crisis through the stabilization of conditions that work favorably for our diplomatic soft power.

If the US is unwilling to set conditions for US diplomacy to work, expect the conditions to be changed by Russia in a way that works unfavorably against our diplomatic activity.

Operation Tomodachi: Following USS Tortuga (LSD 46)

This story continues to interest me. USS Tortuga Loads Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Vehicles By Task Force 76 Public Affairs.

Sailors aboard USS Tortuga (LSD 46) and soldiers from the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) Northern Army loaded vehicles and trailers pierside in Tomakomai Ko, March 15, in support of earthquake and tsunami relief efforts.

Tortuga’s crew loaded 13 jeeps, 10 utility trailers, six water trailers and three humvees via crane onto the flight deck and additional equipment via landing craft into the well deck, totaling 90 vehicles and 300 JGSDF soldiers.

"This is an extraordinary opportunity for us. Seeing these vehicles on our ship really demonstrates the bonds between the U.S. and Japan," said Cmdr. Adrian Ragland, commanding officer of Tortuga.

Tortuga’s visit to Tomakomai Ko, though brief, marks the first time a Navy ship has ever pulled into the port. After the ships brief stay, Tortuga will offload the equipment in Ominato, which will be used to transfer supplies, personnel and water to areas affected by the earthquake and tsunami in northern Honshu in support of Operation Tomodachi.

US amphibious ships have conducted exercises for years with the men and material of other nations embarked on our ships, but I am curious... is this the first time it has been done during a real operation? I really don't know, I keep thinking it has happened in other humanitarian operations before, but I am not sure.

Can anyone educate us?

Coast Guard and Navy Assist Stranded Cruise Liner

This was the story I never got to on Tuesday.

A stranded Carnival cruise ship, disabled by an engine room fire Monday, is being towed to San Diego where it is expected to arrive Thursday night with 4,400 passengers and crew on board.

“The ship has been operating on auxiliary generators, and engineers have been unable to restore additional power to the vessel,” said the Carnival statement. “Thus far, one tug boat has reached the ship and has begun towing, with additional tugs en route to expedite the vessel’s return.”

This is the assist from the maritime services:

Three U.S. Coast Guard cutters, a Coast Guard HC-130 Hercules aircraft and a 965-foot container vessel that was in the area initially responded to the distressed cruise ship. Also assisting was a Mexican Navy 140-foot patrol boat and aircraft. Two of the cutters, including one from San Diego, have since left the scene, as has the plane, according to the Coast Guard.

A Coast Guard team did board the ship board to inspect the damage, assess the health of the crew and passengers and ensure the food and water are safe, said Coast Guard spokeswoman Jetta Disco. In addition, two members of the Coast Guard in San Diego are assisting with the initial investigation of the fire. Because it is a Panamanian-flagged vessel, Panama is overseeing the probe, she added.

At the Coast Guard’s request, the U.S. Navy’s aircraft carrier Ronald Reagan was diverted from training maneuvers to take a position south of the Carnival ship to help deliver needed supplies, the Navy said.

Two planes from North Island Naval Air Station in Coronado made a total of eight flights to the Reagan Tuesday, delivering 65,000 pounds of supplies, including bread, canned goods, utensils and frozen milk, “all stuff you could serve cold,” said Cmdr. Greg Hicks of the Navy’s Third Fleet in San Diego. Once aboard the carrier, a helicopter was took the supplies to the cruise ship.

The whole story by Lori Weisberg is worth reading.

The always excellent USS Ronald Reagan Facebook page had this update late Tuesday evening:

Ronald Reagan just completed sending requested supplies to the Carnival Splendor. We took 7 CODs with supplies today, and sent 60 pallets via 20 helicopter lifts with food and supplies.

And this photo album of the assist. I can't imagine anything being more comforting to a passenger on a stranded cruise liner than a US Coast Guard Cutter off the bow, except perhaps the silhouette of a US Navy nuclear powered aircraft carrier on the horizon.

Exercising Soft Power in 2012

I've been trying to figure out how I would work in a mention on the blog of how my Arkansas Razorbacks will be beating down the Crimson Tide of Alabama on Saturday. Football, my other passion, is not exactly a blog topic appropriate for ID...

Unless you get news like this:

When Notre Dame and Navy play in Dublin, Ireland, in 2012, they will do it in a brand new, state-of-the-art stadium.

Naval Academy athletic director Chet Gladchuk said Tuesday that the game would be held at Aviva Stadium, home to the Irish rugby union team and the Irish national soccer team. The stadium, which opened this past May, seats about 50,000 people. All of the seats are covered by a steel roof that is in the shape of a wave, reminiscent of the main Olympic stadium in Beijing.

The game has been scheduled for September 1, 2012. The US Navy should give serious thought to sending a aircraft carrier. Send the USS Enterprise (CVN 65) and send an escort like the USS Freedom (LCS 1) or USS Independence (LCS 2). Put a face on the 21st century Navy with the LCS, and leverage a name like the USS Enterprise (CVN 65).

It is Notre Dame in Ireland, so the game is already going to be an enormous spectacle. Hell - someone should have ESPN on the phone tomorrow morning talking about getting the ESPN Gameday crew out there and hosting the show from the deck of the USS Enterprise (CVN 65). Would they turn down an opportunity to host the show overseas for the first time and on the deck of a US aircraft carrier surrounded by thousands of cheering American sailors from all over the country?

I think they would go for it.

September 1st is the first week of the 2012 college football season - Labor day weekend 2012. With a new season, it has the potential to be the biggest college football game that Saturday, and if done right the most watched Navy football game that year. Also noteworthy, for the last three seasons the English Premier League has not played soccer on the first Saturday in September - meaning Notre Dame vs Navy may be the only show in town in the UK that weekend as well.

You would have to be a fool not to see the enormous opportunity the US Navy has in terms of strategic communications to a global audience as a result of this football game.

Imitation is the Sincerest Form of Flattery

Were you paying attention to Pacific Partnership 2010? If you weren't, it is OK... but the Navy PAOs out in the Pacific did a fair to good job getting the word out what the USNS Mercy (T-AH 19) was out there doing. The ship deployed back on May 1st and wrapped up business on August 24th, and is expected to return to San Diego later this month.

These naval medical diplomacy deployments are interesting to observe because the success of these types of deployments are very difficult to measure. I have been sitting on some outstanding information provided to me regarding the USNS Comfort (T-AH 20) deployment to Haiti earlier this year - contemplating how to measure success or failure. Both missions are different of course, Comfort responded to disaster while Mercy is a diplomatic mission part of a larger soft power strategy. The bigger question that lingers over any US Navy hospital ship deployment is whether or not we are getting value for the effort - a return of state investment if you will. I understand the polling methodology the Navy uses, but I also find any kind of polling measurement to be questionable, at best.

Until today, I have had a hard time finding some piece of tangible, meaningful evidence that the US Navy should be doing this. Like i said - until today when I saw this.

A Chinese navy hospital ship will leave China for the Gulf of Aden on Sept. 1 to offer medical services to Chinese escort missions in the waters, the Chinese Defense Ministry said here Monday.

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) hospital ship Peace Ark will also provide medical services to officers and soldiers of other countries conducting anti-piracy activities in the waters.

The ship will also call at Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, the Seychelles and Bangladesh.

There is even a mention of the deployment on the official Chinese government website. Andrew Erickson provided his thoughts on his blog today:

This promises to be an extremely positive Chinese contribution to regional security, and illustrates the increasing potential of Beijing to serve as a responsible maritime stakeholder.

I'm not sure I would go that far, but it is certainly an interesting development and could indeed end up as Andrew describes. I see the event itself differently though.

The forward deployment of a PLA Navy hospital ship is the best affirmation I have seen to date regarding the success of our own naval medical diplomacy deployments for the purposes of soft power to specific regions - and in particular the Pacific. While the PLA Navy has grown fairly rapidly over the last decade, the PLA Navy has not actually attempted to mimic US Navy patterns in any meaningful way in terms of deployment patterns or even operational methods. Sure they sent ships to Somalia, but the PLA Navy has almost exclusively been involved in convoy escorts - which is not similar to US Navy anti-pirate operations. I also do not consider PLA Navy deployments of a few surface vessels around the world that make port appearances for domestic political propaganda a compelling comparison to US Navy activity.

The key to this deployment for me is how this represents the first time during the rise of the PLA Navy where we can legitimately claim the PLA Navy is imitating the behavior of the US Navy. The imitation by the PLA Navy of US Navy medical diplomacy deployments is the strongest indication I have seen to date regarding the positive perception of influence a proactive hospital ship deployment is producing - because imitation does represent the sincerest form of flattery.

From a perspective of justification to Congress, I think the PLA Navy hospital ship deployment represents a much stronger indicator of our own success than polls do, or at least the regional perception of our successes with this type of activity in the Pacific.

What Battle For Hearts and Minds

I spent some of the day going over the figures regarding the damage in Pakistan, and the damage that has taken place over the last several days of the monsoon season is beyond what any single nuclear weapon is capable of. Even more interesting, the areas impacted in Pakistan are the areas that every single think tank that has written a report regarding the Afghanistan war has discussed as being a vital part of the war.

And yet... there is virtually no analysis of what this incredible disaster might mean for the war. It is barely stretching an analogy to suggest God just pissed his Sunday afternoon 6-pack all over Pakistan during Ramadan while the national security experts in the US discussed Secretary Gates future. It could be worse, we could be the foreign policy expertise of the United States stuck in a political rut discussing a mosque in lower Manhattan pretending that is somehow the most important Muslim issue on the same day 20% of the second largest Muslim country in the world is underwater.

On Monday I felt like I was living in the twilight zone. These are the official numbers to date, and take care to note that Sindh is mostly unreported and the worst hit.

Province	Villages Affected	Persons Affected	Area Affected (Acres)	Crop Area Affected (Acres)	Houses Damaged		Persons Died	Persons Injured
					Partially	Fully
Punjab	1,527	1,908,015	2,693,436	1,470,989	43,458	44,752	65	196
Sindh	-	-	-	378,976	-	122,798	8	-
KP	581	1,550,256	-	466,451	68,079	105,214	1,011	968
Balochistan	2548	76,845	4,605	321,651	-	19,619	24	98
FATA	-	-	-	6,500	-	1,432	62	59
Gilgit-Baltistan	195	87,000	-	2,949	-	2,820	183	16
AJ & K	-	-	-	9	4,941	1,416	70	87
G. Total	4,887	3,662,116	2,698,041	2,647,525	119,478	298,051	1,423	1,424

Source: Pakistan Minister of Water and Power

There is a long history of natural disaster playing a significant role in the global security condition, or influencing war, or having a significant and generational impact on nations. When considering the scope and geography of this disaster, it would be difficult to suggest that the monsoon floods of 2010 won't have a huge impact on the security of Pakistan, or a significant impact in influencing the war in Afghanistan, or a huge generational impact on Pakistan.

But the issue appears to be invisible. I don't know what to say - maybe it doesn't matter. I would have thought had we nuked Pakistan someone would have written a war related op-ed to discuss the potential ramifications, but if mother nature drowns 20% of the country doing about the same amount of damage over a significantly larger portion of land - it doesn't seem to be important.

A few thoughts come to mind.

1) There are now 18 US aircraft operating for flood relief efforts in Pakistan. They are competing for hearts and minds against the whole of the Taliban allied political wings who live throughout that region of Pakistan. The DoD has elevated the priority of soft power - specifically disaster relief and humanitarian response - in strategic documents over the last few years. Here we are in direct competition for hearts and minds in the midst of a disaster, with the largest concentration of military forces we have assembled on the planet in the neighboring country - and the best we can do is 18 helicopters a week later to help the X millions of people impacted by the flooding?

Pakistani people know the United States unmanned drone very well thanks to their newspapers and our actions in that country against Al Qaeda and affiliates. Here is a chance to put a positive visible symbol of US power over Pakistan at a time the need far exceeds local capacity - and we can't do it why?

2) Private funds to Pakistan is incredibly low for reasons several media outlets have only begun to speculate. Perhaps no one trusts the current Pakistan government, or perhaps people believe donations will go towards helping fund terrorism? I have no idea, but in the first 10 days after the Haiti earthquake the world was able to raise $1 billion. So far the world has raised almost $305 million for Pakistan flood victims - and $86 million is US. Holy WeDon'tGiveAShit batman!

3) Ahmed Rashid sums up the problem better than I ever could:

Though it has received only moderate attention in the western press, the torrential flooding of large swaths of Pakistan since late July may be the most catastrophic natural disaster to strike the country in half a century. But even greater than the human cost of this devastating event are the security challenges it poses. Coming at a time of widespread unrest, growing Taliban extremism, and increasingly shaky civilian government, the floods could lead to the gravest security crisis the country—and the region—has faced. Unless the international community takes immediate action to provide major emergency aid and support, the country risks turning into what until now has remained only a grim, but remote possibility—a failed state with nuclear weapons.

I don't know what the US government has decided to do about Pakistan. Maybe the option of a full court blitz of soft power into Pakistan was offered and denied. Maybe there was no offer for additional help at all, or perhaps the US believes doing very little is better than doing a lot. Maybe we picked teams and mother natures team looked most appealing. Whatever we have decided to do, the only thing that seems clear to me as a bystander half a world away is that this is the most important battle being fought in the Afghanistan war - if Pakistan matters at all to our Afghanistan war objectives.

We have spent a decade talking about how the enemy has a better communication strategy in Pakistan than we do. If 18 helicopters is the best we can do when 20% of that country is underwater - then either our apathy or inability to be agile in reaction to situations like this explains why. It doesn't make sense for us to fight the war in Afghanistan and not be serious about making a positive American impact on this part of Pakistan - not when we keep noting in strategic reviews how much influence this region has on the Afghanistan war effort. We aren't even trying to win the populations that matter in this war - and in my opinion that represents the best case to date why it is time to pull our troops out of Afghanistan.

Culture Influences Partnerships

This picture comes from an album on the US Pacific Command's Facebook page.

Sometimes a picture is worth a 1000 words. This exchange is important, because it represents a cultural issue the US Navy will have as it builds a relationship with Vietnam. It also represents one potential reason why a US aircraft carrier could not be welcome to visit Vietnam.

There is a gift exchange culture in Vietnam that would make life very difficult for the relatively poor country when 5000 sailors come ashore. Gift giving is important to Vietnamese because of the significance of interpersonal relationships in Vietnamese culture, and the symbolism it has within the context of special occasions (like a US Navy destroyer partnership exchange and port call).

This picture represents one of things on my mind when I wrote the last paragraph in this article yesterday. I am not suggesting we make force structure decisions based on these issues, but I think everyone would agree that cultural issues are important when developing our partnership strategies. The USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) has a crew of around 270. I wonder how the US Navy handled the gift exchange culture with so many sailors.

I know it is a small thing, but small things matter a lot with soft power.

HNLMS Johan de Witt and soft power

HNLMS Johan de Witt ended her tasks of the Somali coast on June 29.

Just before her return to Den Helder she did a little soft power.

First it's crew gave a training session on the 17th for 50 members of the Yemeni Coast Guard. The CO of the ship, Ben Bekkering, said that having the landing craft enabled them to let the Yemenites do things on their own.

On June 24 Somali elders from Xhabo met with Dutch navy personnel aboard one of the LPD's landing craft. They told that local villagers are also at risk from the pirates, who confiscate boats from the local fishermen and rob the locals.

The village of Xhabo does not have any medically trained inhabitants, so the crew of the Johan de Witt organised a possibility for the locals the get medical treatment aboard one of the landing craft. It had to be done this way because the EU mandate does allow for operations on land. So on the 28th 73 people went to the landing craft by skiff to receive medical treatment.

The next Dutch ship off the Somali coast will be HNLMS De Zeven Provinciën, a frigate, that is already on her way. She will lead SNMG2 in NATO operation Ocean
shield.
That means wainting for another LPD untill September, when the Spanish will send SPS Galicia, a sister of the Johan de Witt, to Somalia. We'll have to wait and see if they will use the same tactics with their landing craft as the Dutch have used.

And I'll also use this blogpost to give kudos to the PR department of the Dutch MoD for the amount of attention they generated in announcing the Netherlands will send submarine HNLMS Walrus to Somalia, following a NATO request. I'm still wondering why it is that newsworthy.

(And for tho who want to sea the landing craft in operation and hear an explanation from the CO and the Dutch Minister of Defence (in English!) about the tasks the LPD performed: a video.)

Belgium Stepping Up: Joining Africa Partnership Station And Leading Operation Atalanta

BNS Godetia (A960) will leave for Africa on February 8, becoming the second European country after the Netherlands to join the Africa Partnership Station with the sending of a vessel.

That Belgium has become the second country to join APS really surprises me. Belgium has no real maritime tradition and only a really small navy (which isn't even called a navy, but the 'marine component') with the largest vessels being its 2 M-class frigates. So they lack larger vessels that, perhaps, are better suited for such a mission - the Godetia is only a small ship at 2,500t and therefore doesn't have a lot of room for either equipment or foreign 'trainees'.

The symbolism that another European country is stepping up is, however, more important.

But I had really expected one of the Mediterranean countries to be next since their direct interests (the large stream of immigtants) in Africa are much bigger, but maybe they'll follow suit.

Some time ago Belgium has also offered to lead EU NAVFOR operation Atalanta at the end of the year. For this they have asked the Netherlands to 'lend' them a ship, since their M-class frigates are not suitable for this.

I haven't heard any answers as of yet. But although the Netherlands has officially only announced ships for the first half of this year (HNLMS Tromp and HNLMS Johan de Witt), I have already read in an interview with a Dutch Cdr. they want to send 3 vessels this year.

Belgium will send their own BNS Louise Marie along with any Dutch ship.

Operation Unified Response Update

USS Normandy (CG 60) completed work off Haiti today and listed out in detail their contribution over the 21 days on station in support of Operation Unified Response.

Normandy Totals:

• 123,500 portions of HA/DR meals
• 291 MRE’s
• 1000 gallons of water
• 2800 portions of rice
• 1800 portions of dehydrated soup

Helo Det Totals:

• 75,142 lbs
• 17,705 lbs of parts
• 146 hours of flight time
• 287 Lifts (sorties)
• 3,000 pounds in medical supplies
• 107 MEDEVACS, 66 of those non-ambulatory

That is significant work for a cruiser, and flight time is just barely under 30%. The source for this information is the USS Normandy page on Facebook. Also the photo above is from VADM Harvey.

This highlights two ways the US Navy is using social media today that we have not seen in the past.

The Calm Before The Storm in Haiti

At Southern Command, we are also working with our partner nations to meet challenges to the Community of the Americas—whether they are international terrorism, illicit trafficking, international crime, poverty, inequality, corruption, radical movements, illegally armed groups, mass human migrations, natural disasters, or other humanitarian crises. It is critical to this endeavor that we also stem the tide of anti-U.S. populism and open the door for improved prosperity and security in the region. Through communicating to the people of the region our shared values, what in today's military is called "strategic communications," we are sending the message that we are collectively committed to the people of the Community of the Americas.

Sailing in Southern Waters: A New Wind, By Admiral James Stavridis, USN, Proceedings, May 2007

On Friday morning as you wake up and read this post, there will begin to be media panic that chaos is breaking out throughout Port-au-Prince. The State Department and SOUTHCOM have hopefully already predicted this event in the unfolding crisis. We are entering a 48-72 hour phase where the absence of physical security becomes a contributing factor to the existing catastrophe. It will not be an indicator of failure however, even if it may be suggested as such on TV as hours and hours of coverage unfold over a three day weekend in the United States. It should, however, serve as a reminder that failure to set expectations with strategic communications by US government leadership to both our citizens and the world over the last 48 hours will have set back our global strategic communications efforts made in the emerging soft power campaign.

Things are going to get a lot worse in Haiti before they get better, and that was never clearly articulated by the President, State Department, SOUTHCOM, or Rajiv Shah to the American people, who may begin to doubt our governments efforts in the very near future. President Obama is positioned to take a political hit for what happens over the next 48-72 hours for apparently having advisors who are treating Haiti as anything but the most important event of his political career to date.

In my opinion, and I will let time determine the accuracy, so far it is my impression the Obama administration appears to be completely unaware of how much trouble Haiti can bring upon his Presidency. I'll bet a Heineken keg that if the President attends a Martin Luther King event Monday instead of focus on what is going to be a political public relations nightmare unfolding in Haiti on television, it will cost the President 5 points in his approval ratings and he will be dogged by claims from his own political party that he is as distracted with Haiti as Bush was during Katrina.

The stakes at risk in Haiti are high for SOUTHCOM and the Navy, even if the Department of Defense is not the lead agency in Haiti. The trust and relationships that have been built on promises kept to the Caribbean and Latin America by ADM Stavridis in SOUTHCOM will come crumbling down around us if we do not get Haiti right. The Navy has made several decisions over the past many years that shape the resources available today for Haiti. This included several calculated bets that have been discussed in the halls of Congress many times. The wisdom of those decisions is soon to be determined, and failure to meet the demand placed on the Navy by the American public's interest in Haiti right now will create damning public criticism that will significantly influence any plans for POM 12.

The outbreak of violence in Haiti and the perception of chaos on television is not what has my alarm bells going off. My alarm bells are going off because I am not convinced by the information that has been released to the public that SOUTHCOM is pushing hard enough. Today's press conference is illustrative, and I would not be surprised to learn if reporters in attendance walked away concerned. I do not get a sense of urgency in 'leaning resources forward' from General Doug Fraser that the situation appears to demand. With that said, lets examine what the Navy is doing.

Tomorrow morning the United States carrier Carl Vinson will arrive on station. It will bring with it a complement of 19 helicopters. It has 30 pallets of relief goods. And it will now provide the platform in which we can take care -- get around the poor infrastructure in Haiti to get goods to where they need to be, most needed. And so we'll work actively to support that during that time frame.

In addition, on the 19th we will have three ships of an amphibious ready group, headed by the USS Bataan, with roughly 2,200 Marines, heavy equipment, and the ability to move that heavy equipment from ship to shore to start providing capacity and capability there. We will continue over those days to have elements of the 82nd Airborne Division arrive with approximately 1,000 -- excuse me -- 700 soldiers will be on the ground within the next four days. They're there to help assist in the relief efforts.

And finally, on the 22nd we'll have the United States Navy ship the Comfort. The hospital ship Comfort will arrive in Haiti. We are aggressively pursuing every action we can to provide relief to Haiti.

This is an awesome response by the Navy based on initial calls to action of 2 days ago while we still lacked solid information to work with in the early hours of an emerging crisis. What is currently in motion as outlined represents the decisions of the first 48 hours, and is very commendable. With that said, the decisions of the next 48-72 hours carry with them serious consequences for our nation, and I do not get the sense with the public statements that the severity of the strategic consequences is being recognized at many levels of government.

Lets start by looking at more solid information learned over the first 48 hours.

Facts: 48 Hours Later

The State Department has identified the solid number of three million people that are in need of aid. There are currently two pipelines into Haiti. One would be the limited roads from the Dominican Republic that have already been log jammed at the border and has everything moving very slowly. Fuel on the road is already a major concern. The other pipeline is a single runway airport, also log jammed and also suffering from fuel concerns.

We obviously cannot depend on the limited road system from the Dominican Republic or the single runway airport to meet the logistical demands of a catastrophe involving 3,000,000 people. Rajiv Shah needs a logistics expert - like yesterday, or he is going to have a real short term at USAID. This WSJ article begins by describing the mess the Air Force was dealing with Thursday at the Toussaint L'Ouverture International Airport in Port-au-Prince, but goes on to identify the bigger problem is the condition of the port in Port-au-Prince.

Making matters worse is the that supplies cannot come in by sea. Haiti's main seaport has "collapsed and is not operational," says Maersk Line's Mary Ann Kotlarich. The main dock is partially submerged. Cranes that moved containers on and off ships at the port are now partially under water and listing badly. Ships carrying supplies have nowhere to dock.

Numerous maritime companies are trying to devise stop-gap solutions, but nothing is in place yet.

"Nothing has been proposed that would really be a solution at this point," says Mark Miller of Crowley Maritime Corp., a Jacksonville, Fla., shipping company that maintains an extensive logistics network in the Caribbean.

Maersk Line operates a small ship that unloads containers from larger vessels and then brings them to the port. That vessel is currently anchored off the coast of Port-au-Prince, as the company tries to determine how it can be put to use.

Shipping companies are now examining other areas in the vicinity to see if they can find a place that could serve as a makeshift unloading area for ships.

The port issue will make or break the entire effort in Haiti. Regardless of everything else happening right now, the units being deployed as outlined in this Navy Times article will ultimately determine how the world sees the US effort in Haiti. If they are able to rapidly reopen port services, the US will achieve a significant strategic victory in the 21st century. If they are unable to rapidly reopen port services, the consequences will be devastating to the strategic interests of the United States.

The people are going to start getting hungry and thirsty, and social order is going to start breaking down over the next 48-72 hours. Nineteen small Navy helicopters are not going to be able to meet the demands of 3,000,000 people, nor will they come close to reaching or even being consistently visible to a significant number of those people. How far would you go to provide food and fresh water for your family when social order is breaking down everywhere around you?

The Next 48-72 Hours Matter

The other day at the Surface Navy Association’s annual symposium, ADM Harvey discussed concerns regarding the consequences of Norfolk being taken out of operation. The maritime services have participated in many conferences since 9/11 discussing the responses necessary to open ports following disaster. In the situation before us today, Port-au-Prince represents a port of 3 million people less than 1000 nautical miles from Norfolk that following this catastrophe, requires the port facilities opened for survival.

As I am looking at the assets that will be moved into place, my concern is that because distances at sea add time to response, and because the scope of the disaster is so large, I have serious concerns that sufficient resources will not be arriving in time to influence the soft power strategic objectives at stake with Haiti. So far in the 21st century, when "shit happens" on land, the most important resources provided by the US Navy to support US operations on land have been aircraft carriers, the Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, and the Maritime Sealift Command. I have several questions, and I believe some of the answers to these questions will be indicators of a successful US response or an unsuccessful US response unfolding.

How long will it take the Naval Expeditionary Combat Command to open up the port in Port-au-Prince? I think everyone in the United States with concerns of a disaster in a major US port should watch closely to see what that answer is.

How effective will the helicopter operations of the USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) be in meeting the demands of this crisis? Will the decision by the US Navy not to build a medium lift helicopter carry significant consequences regarding the capacity for the US Navy to respond to this disaster?

Has SOUTHCOM responded sufficiently with US assets, specifically assets carried forward by the MSC related to supporting over the shore logistics? Will SOUTHCOM insure enough pipelines are available from sea to sufficiently meet the quantity of aid that will be required to support a humanitarian operation of 3 million people in a timely manner? If ships with full loads of aid end up sitting off the coast while people are visibly starving, SOUTHCOM will lose credibility with nations throughout the region.

Can only three amphibious ships provide enough capability to support the over the shore logistics requirements for a large city without a functioning sea port? How influential would the capabilities of the proposed, but rumored to be canceled in FY2011 budget, Sea Basing concept be to this operation? General Conway needs to send a memo to Ray Mabus that his February 16 wargame is happening right now in Haiti.

The Marine Corps is poised to be the only winner in an operation where the potential for many losers exist. The Marines understand HA/DR, strategic communications, and soft power better than anyone else the US - including the State Department in my opinion. Perhaps the Marine Corps should be mobilizing more than just a single MEU or two, just in case? 3,000,000 people is a lot of people.

How proactive is SOUTHCOM being in preparing follow on assets that may be necessary before full awareness is determined regarding the requirements? Are we accurately predicting events before they unfold, controlling the chaos as necessary as we place assets? I am specifically thinking of security requirements for 3,000,000 people should large scale violence break out, but my thoughts in this regard also include assets like MSC vessels with equipment like INLS that an amphibious construction battalion might need to potentially open a harbor location outside the existing port facilities.

So far, the response by the rest of the international community have not been very significant, suggesting that it is possible the rest of the world expects the US to do the vast majority of the work. To answer yesterday's question that asked who will be the nation to step up like India did after the 2004 SE Asian Tsunami - the answer appears to be no one. This is a troubling early trend.

I believe the strategic success of Haiti operations rests upon a sufficient quantity of supplies being capable of reaching the people of Haiti by sea in time to prevent a catastrophe to turn into something much worse. It is the responsibility of the Navy to enable port access, a responsibility the Navy cannot afford to fail in executing.

Strategic Communications

One topic kept popping up today among many observers: why is China kicking the State Department's ass in strategic communication in Haiti? It doesn't look good when somehow the Chinese can get a fully loaded plane into Haiti all the way from China before we can get many of our own search and rescue teams in from the US. I sat dumbfounded watching CNN this afternoon seeing a big red Chinese flag waiving in the background, and became frustrated when I saw a different Chinese flag an hour later behind an NBC reporter in a different area. There cannot possibly be that many Chinese in Haiti already, and they did bring humanitarian supplies and not flags, right? What the heck is going on?

This is soft power; symbolism and perception matters a lot to achieving strategic objectives in disaster recovery and humanitarian response operations. In the opening hours of crisis, the people are still in shock. The first 48 hours is the calm before the storm, and every detail in public communication and public diplomacy matters. I was seriously impressed when I saw State Department folks engaged in an actual conversation on Twitter today, but every element of government needs to get organized a bit better in the online space.

How many different map applications do we really need anyway? Here is the Navy's version of a Haiti map, IE only, and does not include information on the ground from folks who are uploading to open source maps. Everyone has a map meaning there are many maps, but if everyone knew to use the same map it could be advertised and utilized by people on the ground with phones capable of reading maps. Maps are an example where the lack of synchronization in agency capabilities is hampering an information opportunity, and many maps is just as effective as no maps in contributing towards a whole of government common picture that interfaces with the public on the ground. Someone at State or DoD needs to organize information opportunities like maps and other redundant data generation opportunities emerging in the crisis towards common and shared goals where governments, private groups, and people can organize, utilize, and synchronize.

Is the Twitter hash tag the Navy uses #Haiti or #USHelpsHaiti? You people in Navy information office need to get on the same page now that you have shifted virtually all of your strategic communications to online and social media. You also need to engage the American people, because simply broadcasting facts or photos creates almost no connection between your communication efforts and the very real personnel patriotic unity that is eminating from the people of the United States over Haiti right now. Navy information folks need to be real people in giving information right now, and not only a link provider. Navy information folks are connecting our Navy's actions with our nations people; be a live connection.

If the US Navy ships off Haiti are not flying their battle flags, then the US Navy has not spent enough intellectual energy developing a comprehensive soft power strategy in disaster response. I was disappointed today when a photo of the USS Carl Vinson flying the battle flag at sprint speed after dawn did not pop up as the front page picture on Navy.mil. A strategic communication opportunity wasted in my opinion, and it would have been a hell of a lot more significant towards shaping the perception of the US Navy response in Haiti than anything that might come from repeating the CHINFO Rhumb Lines talking points distributed on the crisis today.

It will probably be worth the time and effort to get a picture from the three ship ARG flying battle flags Saturday afternoon when the press starts pressing home the chaotic picture in Haiti on 24/7 news. The US Navy needs to prepare for the coming battle for hearts and minds, including those at home whose confidence in the effort will begin to waiver as events turn chaotic in Haiti.

Beginning Friday, the USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) becomes the representative of the emotional and financial unified patriotic American sympathy and support the American people are extending to the Haitian people, and the US Navy needs to be clearly thinking in detail about how to best represent that American spirit when conducting operations in what will likely soon turn into chaotic conditions.

It is a three day weekend for most Americans with Martin Luther King holiday coming Monday, and as social order breaks down in Haiti, the events in Haiti are going to be widely observed by the American people. The decisions made and the actions taken over the next 48-72 hours will significantly influence the perception of the entire world regarding the United States, the United States Navy, and whether he realizes it or not - the President of the United States himself.

Given the scale of the crisis and the interest and attention it is receiving globally, it is very likely the legacies of people ranging from Rajiv Shah, Hillary Clinton, General Doug Fraser, and Barack Obama will be determined based on decisions made over the next few days and the events of the next week. If the Navy struggles to open the port, Admiral Roughead may take incoming as well.

Perception is a powerful thing, and one of the most important things in achieving soft power strategic objectives during HA/DR operations. I hope everyone has been advised what is at stake in Haiti.

All Things Maritime And Haiti

There are so many things to cover. I have not seen much leadership in terms of setting expectations or an explanation from leadership in the State Department explaining how this major operation will unfold. Plenty of information released today in press conferences, but very little stage setting from what I saw.

A few notes. The Red Cross was reported to be out of medicine on Wednesday. UN Dispatch has two interesting items. First:

On a conference call with Medicines sans Frontiere moments ago, a representative in Haiti said that all of the hospitals to which it would normally refer patients have either collapsed or are otherwise unusable. All MSF can do at the moment is administer first aid. There are no "referral" options for secondary care beyond first aid, but MSF is exploring options to deploy a "floating hospital" to Haiti.

That report goes on to highlight reasons why the UN mission to Haiti may have been compromised by the overwhelming damage, at least for the time being. As an organization it is currently self involved with reestablishment, unable to engage the surrounding issues.

In a later report, UN Dispatch discusses the health care issues facing the population. While reading it I thought back to the TB outbreak on Comfort last year.

Want to see useful open source technology in action? Check these guys out. Google has a cool little tech operation for Haiti from their Crisis Response Team (yes they actually have one). Works with Google Maps.

The Coast Guard

The Coast Guard always arrives first when disaster strikes near the US. What an amazing organization, and when we consider it is smaller than the NYPD, I would argue we get more per dollar as a nation out of the Coast Guard than any other entity in government. This is a great report of ongoing Coast Guard activities by Lt. Cmdr Chris O'Neil. The 270 ft Coast Guard Cutter Forward arrived just after dawn and did an assessment of the Port Au Prince port.

Coast Guard personnel observed multiple oil and fuel spills as well as possible sewage spills in the area of the port, about one to one and a half miles from the coast. They also reported seeing multiple small fires along the shoreline and significant damage to or destruction of infrastructure at the port.

Damage to port infrastructure is reported to include the port's container crane and other cargo cranes. Some of the cranes are reported to be completely submerged and others appear damaged but the extent of the damage cannot yet be fully determined.

The article also discusses two Jayhawk sorties for medical evacuations on Wednesday and the work conducted by five different C-130s. How many C-130s does the Coast Guard have again? The Coast Guard Cutter Mohawk arrived off Haiti Wednesday afternoon, and the Coast Guard Cutters Tahoma and Valiant will be in the area by Thursday. The Tahoma is loaded with relief supplies for earthquake survivors, but one of the Cutters is expected to stay at Guantanamo Bay providing a 3 in Haiti / 1 in Guantanamo Bay arrangement. You can see video of the C-130 flyover here, and some additional photos here. I very highly encourage folks to view this 7 minute video of Admiral Thad Allen on the situation, it is excellent.

• The Coast Guard Cutter Valiant is a 210-foot medium endurance cutter homeported in Miami, Fla.
• The Coast Guard Cutter Mohawk, a 270-foot medium endurance cutter, is homeported in Key West, Fla.
• The Coast Guard Cutter Tahoma is a 270-foot medium endurance cutter homeported in Portsmouth, N.H.
• The Coast Guard Cutter Forward, a 270-foot medium endurance cutter, is homeported in Portsmouth, Va.

The Navy and Marine Corps

It takes longer for the Navy and Marines to get anywhere than it does for a service like the Air Force, or in this case the Coast Guard. While the Air Force opens up the airport and the Coast Guard inspects the port, the Navy will not show up until Thursday. The time of arrival for the USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) is unclear, but it doesn't matter. The helicopters will arrive long before the ship does, and if there are enough helicopters moving over the city the people will notice. The pictures on Navy.mil show HS-7 and HSL-11 deploying to USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70). There have been several indications by Navy information personnel to expect updates to the carriers Twitter and Facebook pages.

I want to make a brief point here. There have been 3 Admirals on C-SPAN in the last 6 months, and only once was it on an issue related to the sea - that was the BMD change. Every other time you see an Admiral on C-SPAN it is Mullen or the topic is prisoners at Guantanamo Bay. The media is focused on Haiti, and the symbol of American power is going to be the largest thing everyone can see - USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70). Be visible, take pictures from the air that include the carrier, and turn USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) into a symbol of hope. The Navy doesn't have a single Admiral actually in a Navy post today (which means Stavridis and Mullen don't count) who is recognizable by the average American, but every American knows what a Nimitz class aircraft carrier looks like - as does the rest of the world. Showcase the ship, because it is a symbol and symbolism matters in soft power. The whole world is watching.

Also expected to arrive tomorrow is USS Higgins (DDG 76), which is on the home stretch of her deployment. Originally deploying as part of the Nimitz CSG from the Pacific, USS Higgins (DDG 76) spent most of her time in the Med operating as the BMD ship for 6th Fleet. According to the Navy USS Higgins (DDG 76) will provide afloat logistical services for Coast Guard helicopters. I suspect that given the length of her deployment to date, her participation in the relief effort will be brief but necessary until other assets arrive.

USS Bataan (LHD 5), USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43), and USS Carter Hall (LSD 50) are coming with the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU 22). USS Normandy (CG 60), USS Underwood (FFG 36) and USS John L. Hall (FFG 32) will also deploy. Navy News has created a Twitter group for those who want to follow all the government activities. I suggest adding it to RSS.

As most of us know, but no one outside the maritime community appears aware, the USNS Comfort (T-AH-20) will take 5 days to get underway. The hospital ships are on 5 days readiness, and that actually means it takes 5 days from the moment the ship is put on notice before she can sail. Hospital ships are not rapid response assets. However, I think this is important for us to note.

Hospitals are said to have been devastated and overwhelmed by the injured. One clinic director sent out an e-mail plea after the quake: "Port-au-Prince is devastated, lot of deaths. SOS. SOS."

Joseph said Haiti was most in need of a hospital ship stationed in Haitian waters, as well as supplies to help keep residents safe and warm.

Joseph is Ambassador Raymond Joseph, his appeal for a hospital ship was the first public government request made to the US in his AM press conference on Wednesday morning, as recorded in the time line at the AlJazeera Blog. That is best evidence regarding the influence of Naval Medical Diplomacy you will ever find, better than any population polling data ever produced. When talking hospital ships, can you say strategic asset?

Considerations

Half the Haitian coast guard personnel stationed at the port were killed by the earthquake.

There is a legitimate National Security Risk Assessment that has yet to be discussed anywhere in the media, at least that I have seen. The annual immigration season from Haiti to Florida by sea usually begins in February every year. If it has historically been easy for Haitians to choose the risks of sea immigration when they have a home and family, how much easier is it for a Haitian to risk the dangerous journey when their home is destroyed or family is dead? This is a critical point, because the US is in big trouble if 100,000 people, or potentially a lot more, attempt a massive migration at sea following this catastrophe. The Obama administration is going to have to spend money - potentially many billion dollars - to keep three million homeless people in Haiti. This a serious problem that will directly impact you and me unless you are somehow stupid enough to believe the US is ready to absorb the cost of a mass immigration of a population with a high illiteracy rate at the same time the government intends to pass National Health Care to protect the poorest in our country.

Do the math. How many soldiers does your COIN manual say it takes to control a population of 3 million homeless, hungry people? Haiti has no military, and the Haitian National Police numbers 8500 - for the entire country. Even if we count the 2nd Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division and 2 Marine battalions, we come up well short of what will be necessary based on the doctrine for population security adopted by our lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The US will lead in Haiti, even ahead of the now destroyed Haitian government and until we decide it is time for the UN to step in. In the 2004 Tsumani, the US had this amazing partner that did a tremendous job - India. Who will play the role of India in Haiti? It matters a lot if Haiti is as bad as some have estimated, because this has the potential of being the largest military effort in the western hemisphere in at least a century.

Earthquake in Haiti - Updated

By now I believe everyone has heard about the earthquake in Haiti overnight. As the nation turns to the maritime services to respond and assist our southern neighbors, the blog will naturally be observing these events.

This may develop into something very similar to the Tsunami response, as among other things, it appears Port-au-Prince has been completely destroyed, and the death toll may already be in the thousands including all UN staff there. The infrastructure of the country is likely completely wiped out, which will make the recovery very difficult.

For those who haven't heard, the son of recently retired CHINFO Frank Thorp IV has been in the news of the earthquake. I missed the morning shows participating in a blogger roundtable with ADM Stavridis, but the latest word I caught was that Frank's son was able to rescue his wife, although her condition is still unknown.

RADM Frank Thorp was not only the first Admiral, but among the very first naval officers who reached out to contact me when I began writing the blog. I ask this community to keep his family in our prayers, as well as the many others devestated by this massive natural disaster to our nations south.

Updated: First, on this blog, family comes first. I want to pass on something from RADM Frank Thorp's Facebook page.

Thank you to everyone for your outpouring of support for Frank and Jillian. Last we heard was that Frank was able to help rescue Jillian from the rubble of her Mission House and they are on the way to the embassy, possibly to be medevac'd... They understandably want to stay and help what they tell us is an absolutely... horrible and catastrophic situation... Please keep them in your thoughts!

Good news.

If you find something interesting or have a comment on the developing situation regarding Haiti, please note interesting news items in the comments. If you Navy information observers would leave links to your official articles, I would also appreciate it, including any links to photos taken.

It looks like the Navy is developing a massive Sea Base operation centered around the USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70), the USS Bataan (LHD 5), USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43), and the USS Carter Hall (LSD 50) with cruisers and frigates in support (note helicopter capable vessels). Also as should be expected, significant Coast Guard and assets from other services are being mobilized as well, so far I think I have seen 4 different cutters mentioned.

The USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) in particular will be what I am watching. With significant fresh water production capacity, that may turn into one of the most important early assets needed. It cannot be overstated the strategic and tactical significance of a large deck aircraft carrier arriving quickly to this situation. Consider for a moment what it means to look out into the sea following this disaster and seeing the distinct and globally recognized silhouette of a Nimitz class aircraft carrier. That really is by definition strategic communication of hope that the US is there to help. We should never take that symbolism for granted should we wish to remain a global power, as that soft power influence factors strategically well beyond the capacity for critics who desire to create hard power tactical alternatives.

There are rumors of helicopter packages being prepared for deployment on the Vinson, if you know the squadrons please leave in comments. Ironic the USS Wasp (LHD 1) was there just a month ago with a deck full of helicopters working with the Haitian military - suggesting we have recent mil-to-mil relationships to build upon when securing the population should the UN mission indeed be compromised.

As more information comes available, it is worth keeping an eye on the scheduled deployment of the Nassau ARG next week, and if I am not mistaken the USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) may be an asset close to that area as there have been pictures on navy.mil this week of their activities preparing for an upcoming deployment, although they must be north as they appear to be cold in those photos.

Connectivity is Soft Power

I was once asked what I would use a single airship in a massive natural disaster response scenario. The question was actually more specific, it was how I would use a single airship responding from Bahrain to Karachi, Pakistan in a humanitarian support operation following a massive natural disaster with an airship that could move at 100 mph to prepare the way for naval forces responding from the sea.

My answer:

I would have a loading plan prepared for moving COWs and Fuel Cell backups for rapid on-sight deployment. My airship would be specifically designed to broadcast the most popular local radio station with the largest possible signal strength. I'd use local DJs with local government officials as the on-air personalities. I would look into options for running the most powerful cellular antenna tower and electronic radio transceiver equipment possible from the airship itself. Basically, my military airship would be outfitted as a giant commercial communication system capable of being adapted to the regions it would be tasked to respond to.

See this article, this article, and this article for reasons why, and consider whether my answer represents the best way an arriving superpower can show up to support a humanitarian disaster. My theory is thus: everyone will bring the basic needs, but not everyone can bring essential needs to the target citizen that empowers the system supporting basic needs.

If you have a different answer you think is better, I'm interested.

HA/DR: Operational or Strategic?

From a Sept. 30 bloggers roundtable with Rear Adm. Richard Landolt, Commander of the Amphibious Force 7th Fleet based in Okinawa, Japan. I was supposed to make the call, but my work schedule has been fairly crazy for 6 weeks (ends later today, thankfully). I was able to email in a question early that morning, and Petty Office Selby let the question fly.

PETTY OFFICER SELBY: Okay. And we'll go back around the horn in a second. I have a question from Galrahn, sir: 7th Fleet generates a lot of regional publicity surrounding their humanitarian assistance programs, like Pacific Partnership, but also their disaster response and recovery operations -- the 2004 tsunami being one of the most visible, but also in several cyclone and mudslide responses in southeast Asia. As we are at the two-year anniversary of CS21, I was wondering if you can answer whether HA/DR is strategic or operational for the Navy, and how and why; or even what might be missing.

ADM. LANDOLT: I would say it's both strategic and operational. We're going to continue to do these. The amphibious force is that force that's on call and in high demand to practice these with other countries, as we do during Pacific Partnerships or African Partnership Station, or when they go down to South America. But we also make money when we do this and create those relationships during their execution that stand the test of time.

I have -- as I just said, USS Denver has done this twice now in the last two months. It's a good example of this -- to set for other countries who could be thinking about this, because a lot of countries take heat, their governments take heat when they don't respond well to these type of events. We are more than happy to show them how we train for this and the capability we bring. And that, in turn, might help them to drive some of their programs towards those kind of platforms or assets they may need.

Having been around the world in a number of places, for instance, I see too many countries that -- they want to buy a fast, sexy, pointy-nose aircraft; and what they really need are helicopters that can lift cargo and get into mountainsides and help their own people out during times like these.

So I think it -- the answer is both, strategic and operational. We will continue to do this. Pacific Partnership, by the way, is going to involve Indonesia next year. And in fact, the Indonesians have a hospital ship called the "Doctor Soeharso," S-O-E-H-A-R-S-O. Because there was so much damage to the hospitals in Padang, the Soeharso pulled into port there, and was very useful to them. And that same ship will take those lessons learned -- she learned from this real-world exercise -- real-world event, and use it during the Pacific Partnership next year.

I would have followed up by asking what he means when he says "we also make money when we do this." I have a few ideas how this analogy applies, but I'd be curious for his specific examples.

I think the answer is interesting, but I'm not sure I am convinced. I remain unsure, two years after CS-21, whether HA/DR is strategic or operational. Obviously it is operational, but there are so many things that go into effective HA/DR and I am starting to lean towards the camp that says for the US Navy, HA/DR is operational.

That isn't to say HA/DR can't be, or isn't strategic, only that it isn't for the US Navy. Let me touch on my thoughts here.

Many of the aspects of HA/DR that make the effort strategic comes from outside the US Navy, for example, the strategic communications and political cooperation and partnerships that build from HA/DR can have a strategic quality about them, but the Navy piece is operational. With that said, all of those other pieces that make the combined total effort don't work without the Navy, so this is a complex issue and not cut and dry.

What this means is Navy can do everything right in HA/DR and still fail in a strategic objective, and the Navy can do everything wrong in HA/DR and still succeed in a strategic objective. That doesn't mean the quality of the Navy effort doesn't matter, only that the effort itself is dependent upon so many external factors and the work of so many others throughout government that I think that elevating HA/DR as a prominent strategic activity in CS-21 is going to always be controversial, particularly as it may not always be a strategic activity.

Obviously this is theory and academic as a discussion, built on the idealism that assistance is always welcome in times of disaster or need, but we all should recognize that is not always the case. In the Pacific I think there is a good argument to be made that assistance provided to the Philippines and Indonesia are strategic, when part of a strategic communications package at the political (and population) level that contrasts our response with the response of others, specifically the Chinese. I am not much into the financial analogy used by Rear Adm. Richard Landolt regarding how we make money, but I do see a college football sports analogy here.

As an operational effort the US Navy is scoring political points by helping the local political leaders be seen as responsive. As a strategic effort, the more our assistance is contrasted with the absence of assistance by those like China, we are scoring strategic points in the region as well. The domestic political points are field goals and close wins as they don't impress much, but the strategic points enabled by the STRATCOM wizards who engage the population and political level in a meaningful way are like touchdowns and can ultimately influence the perception of the games outcome, in particular by influencing the BCS voters around the region who like to see blowouts over close victories.

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I think there is plenty of room for a good discussion on this topic. I'll get the comments fixed tonight (doesn't show comment count), and be moderating throughout the day to insure comments are posted quickly (be aware, regular users are approved immediately and will no longer be moderated, only new users are moderated through the first 5 posts). If you want to sign up with a unique nickname for comments, sign up with a js-kit account.

On "Faces to Places"

I had quite a bit of feedback today about the salvos Bryan and I traded in the comments of his post yesterday. In particular, Bryan said something that triggered all kind of interesting commentary, and brought the phrase "Faces to Places" in my Inbox several times.

I was off doing things Sailors do when John Morgan called to tell me I was going to come write strategy. How did this happen? Well, Jim Stavridis recommended me--just like he recommended me nine years earlier to the CNO to be his speechwriter, and just as he and Walsh and Pandolfe and Morgan and others like them have always done and continue to do.

Bryan in this example is putting "Faces to Places," putting the right guy in the right place at the right time for the right job. His record and reputation speaks to what a smart move those leaders made in putting him in that position. The question is whether this is the exception or the norm? I don't know, for lateral movements in an organization, I could see where it could be the norm. For promotions though, I wonder if it is the exception? I think there is a discussion lingering in the air on that topic.

While this rarely used phrase, or perhaps buzzword, kept popping up today in my email I was looking at the HA/DR activities of 7th Fleet, and noted Rear Admiral Richard B. Landolt appears to be who is running the show. I had never heard of him before today, and had never read Rear Admiral Richard B. Landolt's biography before today either, but ever since I did I have not been able to shake this phrase "Faces to Places" from my mind. Check this out...

Rear Admiral Richard B. Landolt received his commission via NROTC at the University of Florida where he earned his bachelor's of Arts in Political Science.

He has served at sea aboard USS Morton (DD 948), USS Niagara Falls (AFS 3), USS Cayuga (LST 1186) and USS Roanoke (AOR 7). He commanded USS Ardent (MCM 12), forwarded deployed to Manama, Bahrain, USS Gladiator (MCM 11) and USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43) forwarded deployed in Sasebo, Japan. His Major command tour was of Amphibious Squadron 11, also in Sasebo, Japan.

Landolt served two tours on the staff of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a staff planner and subsequently as the executive assistant for Commander, Naval Forces Europe and Joint Forces Command, Naples Italy.

His shore duties include tours at the Bureau of Naval Personnel as head of surface placement (Pers-413) and as a federal executive fellow at the Rand Corporation where he studied NATO policy and Asian Affairs. On the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel (N00K) staff he served as the assistant for long range plans.

He’s been a senior fellow on the Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group (SSG XXIV), and deputy director, Expeditionary Warfare Division (N85B) on the Navy Staff.

He assumed duties as commander, Amphibious Force 7th Fleet in Okinawa, Japan in June of 2008.

A graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School, U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and the Armed Forces Staff College, Landolt also holds a Master’s degree in Telecommunications Systems Management.

Are you kidding me? It is almost as if this mans entire career has been building towards executing at the strategic level a large scale, regional wide humanitarian assistance and disaster response operation, and now that this almost impossible scenario of multiple massive natural disasters across a vast region has arrived, the Navy has the right guy is in the right place at the right time with the right resources?

Pardon my Persian, but that is pretty damn impressive!

PACOM on Point: Responding to Disasters

The response from PACOM to the numerous natural disasters all over the Pacific is fairly large, and in the Philippines in particular the media is taking notice.

First up, USS Cleveland (LPD 7) and USS Rushmore (LSD 47) are in Guam. Guam was able to avoid Typhoons, but the ships will be able to participate in community projects while the USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) catches up.

PACOM has sent C-17s to Indonesia and is also sending the USS Denver (LPD 9) and USS McCampbell (DDG 85) to help out. Some news reports suggest more ships are also being sent, but I have not seen any specific details of that yet. The death toll from the earthquake is expected to exceed 3,000.

USS Ingraham (FFG 61) is providing support to American Samoa following the Tsunami there, and the CO is expected to give a bloggers roundtable tomorrow at 3 EST. I unfortunately, will not be able to make it but look forward to the transcript. You can listen to the Q&A live here at that time. In the same region, New Zealand appears to be preparing to send HMNZS Canterbury (L421) to the island nation of Samoa in a humanitarian response deployment.

Finally, a few thousand Sailors and Marines from USS Harpers Ferry (LSD 49) and USS Tortuga (LSD 46) are in Manila to assist the government of the Philippines in their relief efforts in the wake of Tropical Storm Ketsana and Typhoon Parma.

Facebook users might want to check out the incredible images from all of the disaster recovery efforts on the US Pacific Command page. In particular I recommend the images of the Marine convoy delivering to massive crowds, with everyone standing in 2 feet of water. That country is a mess.

Image: PAGO PAGO, American Samoa (Oct. 3, 2009) - A Sailor assigned to the guided-missile frigate USS Ingraham (FFG 61) carts away rubble and debris during disaster recovery efforts in Pago Pago, American Samoa. The region was struck by an earthquake and tsunami. The Department of Defense is supporting the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) with its relief effort. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech Sgt. Cohen A. Young/Released)