7th Fleet Focus: On Power

Globally deployed, globally present. This is another example how naval power is an instrument of national power in the 21st century.

Following the aftermath of Super Typhoon Choi-Wan, USNS Alan Shepard (T-AKE 3) and two MH-60S helicopters from Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 25 arrived on station in the early morning hours of Sept. 17 to provide humanitarian support to residents of Alamagan and Agrihan.

The islands, part of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), are approximately 146 nautical miles north of Saipan.

At the request of the Governor of Saipan, Alan Shepard, a Military Sealift Command dry cargo-ammunition ship, was tasked with transiting to the area to assist the residents who required basic survival needs following the effects of heavy rain and winds in excess of 150 mph brought on by the super typhoon.

Read the rest here.

It is easy to take this for granted, and by the absence of press coverage (2 stories, here and here), we apparently do. We shouldn't. Our naval presence everywhere and the capability to respond anywhere quickly is what makes the US unique in the world today.

Smart Power is Global Power

The African Partnership Station quietly represents one of the most interesting activities of US soft power today. I have got to find a way to spend a few weeks on one of these ships.

What makes the African Partnership Station so special? I'm not really sure to be honest, but they must be doing something right because once again, a major European power is sending one of their major naval assets to participate. This time its the Dutch.

The amphibious transport ship HNLMS Johan de Witt will be leaving today from Den Helder to participate in 'Africa Partnership Station' for two months. With this operation the naval vessel will offer a contribution towards the realisation of a stable coastal region in West and Central Africa.

During the tour HNLMS. Johan de Witt will operate in the waters of Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ghana and around the Cape Verde islands. Together with these countries they will, amongst others, do hydrographic recordings of ports and do exercises. The vessel also carries, at the request of several non-governmental organizations (NGO), a large quantity of relief goods for the African coastal countries. Furthermore, Americans and Dutch on board will give training to many African sailors.

The article ends by saying:

Africa Partnership Station
The Africa Partnership Station operation is part of the U.S. global maritime strategy for the 21st century. Part of that strategy is to strive for a safe, stable and prosperous West and Central Africa, through good coastal management. This is done by setting up fishery inspections, combating illicit trade in commodities and trafficking. Moreover, the focus will also be on the creation of a good 'Search and Rescue' organization and the protection of drilling platforms and combating environmental pollution.

In order for this to succeed, Africa Partnership Station promotes cooperation between countries and between various maritime authorities and organizations.

The US Navy is clearly doing something right with APS, because the Europeans have bought in. We have seen consistent presence with the French, and it is hard to call HNLMS Johan de Witt (L 801) anything other than a major contribution from the Dutch. With the efforts of the European nations combined with our efforts, all of the activities create sustained presence and increased efficiency for maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. The participating nations in the region benefit by getting training and exposure with different tactics and techniques from the various professional participants.

African Partnership Station is beginning to represent a unique convergence of the two big US Navy strategic concepts of the 21st century: the 1000-ship Navy and Sea Basing, or put another way: a cooperative international global fleet station.

It is interesting to observe what the (East) African Partnership Station is doing, but lets examine the question differently. Have you considered where (East) African Partnership Station is going? What does the Gulf of Guinea look like in 10 years? What does it look like in 20 years? What does this mega cooperation of US and European nations with regional partners in the Gulf of Guinea lead to? I can't say I know yet, but there is clearly a 21st century form of naval diplomacy here many nations find quite attractive.

It may not be self evident, but somehow the naval vessel used for amphibious assault in wartime has become one of the most important soft power tools in the arsenal of major naval powers during peacetime. The flexibility of amphibious ships continues to represent an investment that politicians globally can agree with. This is something the Navy and the Marine Corps needs to get their head around. It is commonly said the LPD-17 is a well designed ship built poorly. To be fair, only the first two ships of the class have the reputation of being built poorly, the rest of the class suffers from being very expensive, although I don't know how we make a 24,000 ton combatant any cheaper without quantity increases (which I recommend for LSD(X)).

I would like to know if the QDR asked the question whether the Navy should built a Global Fleet Station ship, and what the arguments were for and against. When you start thinking about the smaller, inexpensive LPD hull one would want for a GFS ship, it is easy to see how a commercial specification vessel operated by the MSC could coordinate with DHS domestically and State internationally for humanitarian assistance and disaster response. With a range of options including acting as a C4 node following disasters that typically stress communication networks, an offshore medical facility, or a station ship able to support coastal vessels and Coast Guard cutters, such a ship appears to be very flexible and suitable for current requirements. An inexpensive, commercial specification vessel also wouldn't be a bad way for the US shipbuilding industry to get in on the amphibious ship export market, which one would expect to increase as climate change becomes more and more of a global political issue.

The success of the African Partnership Station can now be validated by the 'buy in' of major European powers who see the political value of such soft power operations. In my mind, that is a much larger validation of the strategic concept than taking public opinion polls from the population in areas of activities and attempting to understand the results will ever be.

HT: Gijs!

USAID - An Orphan of State Power

From Tom Barnett's blog, with a statement that is almost a universal truth that is only contradicted by politically motivated folks often without a resume to back the opinion. At just about every conference I have been to this year, whether Joint Warfighter in Virginia or Current Strategy Forum in Rhode Island, this theme always won out.

Like many people who've worked in developmental aid over the years (several years consulting with business-process reengineering efforts at USAID under Veep Gore's initiative), I think the decision to move USAID into State was a disaster, and that complete merger will be that much worse.

As former USAID administration Andrew Natsios notes, USAID and State are like oil and water.

I continue to see USAID as the logical core of a Department of Everything Else.

But I believe Clinton will want a complete merger as part of consolidating her control--again, short-term political desires trumping long-term strategic thinking.

USAID is broken. I have no idea what the solution is, but I appreciate the Dr. Barnett's idea of the Department of Everything Else because there are a lot of functions of national power that are badly matched to agencies. How many times has the question been asked if Medical Diplomacy should be a core mission capability for the US Navy? It is a valid question, and even as I recognize Medical Diplomacy through hospital ships as a valuable tool in US policy, I don't think I can make the case it is a core Navy role.

Provisional Reconstruction Teams represent another example of a necessary capability that may not be well matched to the DoD, although by necessity the DoD does it because no one else can, or even will. One of the great foreign policy challenges for the US in the 21st century is to get soft power capabilities organized, funded, and supported in a way that aligns itself to the requirements of both the Department of State and Department of Defense, and unfortunately that probably means some agency other than either State or the DoD built on the idea of cooperating through both, but under the control of both, and neither.

Just thinking out loud, but from an organizational model perspective the Coast Guard may be a good model to build upon. As part of both Department of Homeland Security and Department of Defense, the two hat approach the Coast Guard takes is quite effective. Perhaps that is an option for the approach needed for these orphan activities of foreign policy that really don't fit in either State or DoD, even as they are necessary for both.

Observing Typhoon Morakot

When Typhoon Morakot slammed the Taiwan coast on Sunday, news reports suggested rain would be the primary cause of damage. Those reports have proven true, as a record 118 inches of rain has been suggested to fall in some places of Taiwan, burying villages and triggering massive mudslides. This storm has created a broad disaster on the island nation, but what is remarkable is how few people the storm has apparently killed relative to the amount of rain that has fallen. There is something to be said about the preparation efforts prior to the storm, and upon observation, there is also something to be said for the emergency response by the Taiwan military.

This is an older BBC report with some video of the damage, and this is another video. I quote from this is the latest AFP article that sets the discussion.

"We have found around 700 people alive in three villages last night and 26 more this morning. We are deploying 25 helicopters to evacuate them," said Major-General Richard Hu.

Rescuers said Tuesday around 100 people in Hsiaolin were feared dead, while some media reports had speculated that up to 600 people had been killed in the landslide triggered by torrential rains brought by Typhoon Morakot.

As of late Tuesday, 219 people from Hsiaolin and several nearby villages had been airlifted to safety, Hu said.

"We believed that some were buried but it's not possible to estimate how many at this moment as almost 90 percent of the houses were buried," he said.

The latest death toll is 66, with another 61 missing and 35 injured. Rescue operations to date have included over 17,000 troops using armored vehicles, marine landing craft, and RHIBs for rescue operations. In several southern villages, the roads have been washed out. The typhoon has caused at least $225 million US in agricultural damage, and 30,000 houses were still without power. AFP also reports that 750,000 homes are without water as of Wednesday.

The storm has also moved into China, although now it is out to the Yellow Sea moving towards South Korea at much reduced strength. Among the damage reported, 6 apartment blocks collapsed due to the storm, and officials say they have managed to pull six people alive from the rubble in the town of Pengxi in Zhejiang province. The death count due to the current Tropical weather in Asia over the last week includes 23 in the Philippines due to Typhoon Morakot, 14 in Japan due to Typhoon Etau (16 have additionally been reported missing in Japan), and 6 in China due to Typhoon Morakot. To add to mother natures fury, Japan suffered from a 6.4 magnitude earthquake prompting the government to deploy 400 troops for disaster response.

What I find noteworthy though is how the USS George Washington (CVN 73) pulled into Manilla yesterday for a 4 day stay, and immediately Rear Admiral Kevin Donegan offered assistance to areas recently devastated by the Typhoon. In other words, in 2009 the forward deployed 7th fleet can get an aircraft carrier to the Philippines following a Typhoon faster than FEMA can get to the Superdome in New Orleans in 2005.

Storm season is approaching, and as it does weather is sure to be a topic of emerging interest on the blog this storm season as it has over the last few years. As is always the case, the maritime services almost always play a role not only in national response to disaster, but international response to emerging crisis following disaster in places less fortunate than the United States for resources managing crisis.

The Obama administration has made 'smart power' the emphasis of the new administrations foreign policy, and two legs of the smart power stool are humanitarian aid and disaster response. It is unclear if the DoD has been given any special political guidance beyond the Bush administration HA/DR policy in regards to these activities, but it is very clear from a political examination that HA/DR carries more emphasis as political policy for this administration, an emphasis sometimes inconsistent in the last administration. As climate change is also a major political position of this administration, it will be interesting to see if there is any noticeable activities by the maritime services in preparing for, or perhaps prepositioning for DR scenarios. After all, there is no question the 2004 Tsunami response was the major foreign policy achievement of the Bush administration, not only wiping out piracy in the Strait of Malacca but also creating a massive favorable, measurable shift in public opinion in several areas throughout Southeast Asia. That point is often overlooked, because the Bush State Department was so initially mediocre compared to the DoD in that effort.

With the George Washington arriving in Manilla just days after the Typhoon, clearly 7th Fleet gets it. It is about being in the right place, at the right time, with the right equipment. After all, according to this latest report in Science Daily, it was only last year the world saw the eighth deadliest cyclone recorded worldwide in history with a death toll that may have exceeded 138,000. Given the devastation of the 2004 Tsunami, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and other recent Cyclones, Typhoons, and Hurricanes there will be few excuses for not being ready to respond to tragedy with prompt reassurance, - as outlined in maritime strategy.

Wargaming the Future Maritime Environment

In March 2009 edition of Proceedings, under the Professional notes section or page 79 if you subscribe to the print copy, Jose Carreno; Captain George Galdorisi, U.S. Navy (Retired); and Antonio Siordia have an article titled The Return of Naval War Gaming: Global 2008. The article explains Global 2008, a wargame conducted at the naval war college back in August of last year to "examine the challenges, issues, and implications of implementing the new U.S. maritime strategy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower."

Reflecting the cooperative theme that underscores the maritime strategy, among the roughly 200 participants were representatives from 19 foreign navies, as well as members from other branches of the U.S. military, several U.S. government agencies, international and nongovernmental organizations, and participants from the defense and shipping industries. The success of this exercise underscores the importance of international and multi-agency cooperation in helping to meet the challenges of the future security environment.

What I find interesting is that this week, the Naval War College published details of the wargame, indeed 80 pages of wargame analysis can be found in this wargame report. I quote some of the findings from the executive summary. I'll comment on each issue independently.

Maritime Security: Game participants unanimously saw maritime security as an important mission, and it was a central focal point of game discussions. International players, in particular, considered maritime security primarily a law-enforcement rather than a counterterrorism function. Many of the participants also preferred U.S. assistance in the form of training and exercises. Finally, most participants perceived the facilitation of maritime security as an activity that could be leveraged to enhance trust between the U.S. maritime services and their counterparts in other countries.

It is noteworthy the executive summary lists this item first, although from an international point of view I can see why it is. From a US Navy perspective however, I do not get the impression it is as high of a priority. Maritime Security is one of those action items that goes on the board, rolls off the tongue, and turns out being very hard to do successfully. According to UN statistics, compared to 2007, in 2008 piracy was UP, illegal trafficking of humans was UP, and the smuggling of narcotics (including simi-submersibles) was UP.

If maritime security is really such a high priority for the US Navy, is it wrong for someone to take an objective look at the global maritime environment and point out the statistics suggest that maritime security efforts have been largely ineffective? If maritime security is a high priority for the US Navy, then who is responsible for the failure? The truth is, maritime security is not a priority, cooperation towards building maritime cooperation is the priority, and the priority has not been producing meaningful results that can be calculated using statistical arguments (which is sad, because statistics can usually be skewed).

If you graph the rise in criminal activity by sea, it is noteworthy the rise in maritime criminal behavior globally is inversely proportional to the size of western naval forces, which are reducing in numbers across Europe and the US. Also important is to note the increase in the size of navies in the Pacific has to date had no influence on statistical trends.

I'm not even counting 2009 statistics to date, which for piracy has already been widely reported to be much higher than last year... and it is only July.

Persistent Maritime Presence: Many participants regarded the regular and sustained presence of forward deployed maritime forces as a critical enabler for all other themes, and an important part of the Navy’s contribution to the national security objectives of the United States. Specifically, forward maritime forces allowed the Navy to meet the challenges identified in Global ‘08 as requiring a timely response.

This is where current talking points define, rather than innovate, the concept of a global power projection fleet that is globally sustained and persistently present in the maritime domain. Where are the logistical innovations that attempt to support several ships off a long coast line? Where is the evidence the Navy has learned a thing from supporting sustained maritime security just off the coast of Iraq protecting a tiny coastline and only two oil terminals? The only service I see innovating logistics at sea is the Marine Corps, looking for better ways to support Marines on land. I would love to see some new innovations towards the support of many, many smaller vessels at sea to sustain presence, but supporting long endurance requirements of inexpensive, smaller naval vessels does not appear to be a priority for the US Navy.

Credible Combat Power: Participants identified five key components of credible combat power: defeating anti-access strategies, providing integrated air and missile defense, achieving sea control, projecting power ashore, and aggregating and disaggregating forces. They further emphasized two key capabilities associated with credible combat power: the ability to exercise sea control and subsequently project power ashore, and deterrence.

This is a huge topic. Anti-access strategies are obviously important, but I still question how this is done with any platform other than an aircraft or a submarine. The US Navy is the best naval force in the world in terms of integrating air and missile defense, but ironically, despite the overwhelming attention the capability gets in terms of funding, the problem is the lack of confidence (due to several reasons) in the existing system. Projecting power ashore is very important to the Marines, but people are running around saying an amphibious assault against another country will never be done again. I hope they knock on wood when they speak such phrases, because amphibious lift sure appeared to be useful to Russia only last year.

The real question is what the definition of Sea Control is these days. Aggregating and disaggregating forces is an operational discussion, but I don't think one can begin talking about operations until first agreeing what it means to control the sea. I believe the definition of Sea Control depends upon a specific variable, Rules of Engagement, and depending upon the RoE the level of Sea Control the US Navy is well suited to exercise is quite debatable. The more relaxed the RoE, the better the US Navy is designed to control the sea, but as the RoE becomes more restrictive, I think the US Navy is quite obviously less capable of controlling the seas.

I can sum it up like this. The US Navy is currently designed to be the 99% solution to less than 1% of maritime challenges, specifically unrestricted maritime warfare. The problem is that for the RoE to ever get to the point of unrestricted maritime warfare, the event that triggers the war will have to be on par with Pearl Harbor.

Building Partnerships: For game participants, building partnerships meant developing relationships with allies, friends, and stakeholders across the full spectrum of maritime activities in order to create trust and effectively accomplish shared maritime goals. They applied this concept of partnership across all regions, futures, and the full range of maritime activities, indicating that foreign partners wanted the U.S. to be involved with their maritime security in most conceivable futures. From that perspective, the participants noted that the United States will have to make significant investments in maritime resources on a global basis to build partnerships that meet the expectations of existing and potential partners. As participants and others have stated, “you can’t surge trust.” Building partnerships will accordingly require tolerance, patience, and some willingness to adapt and conform to partner standards.

We may not be able to "surge trust," but reliance on friends and partners has been a losing strategy for the US in Afghanistan. I know a lot of people don't understand how the factors will work together, but the test for both the "Cooperative" strategy and the US Navy is the second half of this year off Somalia. The Global Maritime Partnership is going to look like folly if piracy off Somalia is as bad in the second half of 2009 as it was the second half of 2008, and the credibility of the Navy will be shot to pieces.

Gates has made two things clear: he is retiring after the FY11 budget cycle and his attention is on the Air Force, not the Navy. I think Danzig will be (read - should be) his replacement, and if the press turns sour off Somalia later this year then things will appear to go from bad to ugly in a hurry in the Navy. Piracy is purely a political issue, not a strategic issue, but the politics of piracy will drive more decisions than all but the most brilliantly disseminated US naval strategies, and the US Navy doesn't even have a sub par naval strategy evangelical capacity for itself right now.

Humanitarian Assistance (HA) / Disaster Relief (DR): All of the player cells agreed that HA/DR - defined within the event’s conceptual framework as the ability to “alleviate human suffering and contribute to regional security and stability through deliberate (HA) or immediate (DR) response” - was a valuable component of CS 21. Participants also felt that the role that conducting HA/DR operations and training played in building partnerships and improving coordination with non-U.S. forces was valuable. They articulated three important criteria for the successful execution of HA/DR efforts: timeliness, well-considered strategic communications (in particular, placing a local face on the operation), and preparation (including investment in physical infrastructure and personnel training).

I think the Navy is on the right track here, indeed the whole DoD, plus international cooperation, PLUS non-government organizations...

Wake me up when another US agency gets involved outside the embassy level. The use of HA/DR as a national asset in the arsenal of state power would be more convincing if the Department of State had someone in Washington making an effort that was visible. Can Hillary Clinton make a difference in that organization? If so, it would be an accomplishment on par with anything her husband ever did.

Shared Awareness: Virtually all of the players viewed information sharing between stakeholders (both governmental and non-governmental agencies and organizations) as vital to the development of improved situational awareness. They came up with five primary insights regarding shared awareness. First, information sharing is a key enabler, particularly for information-related concepts such as maritime domain awareness (MDA) and common operational picture (COP). Second, the barriers to the successful sharing and exchange of information are policy-related as well as technical, such that policy changes - not just technological advances - can lead to improved information sharing. Third, trust, developed through engagement activities such as coalition exercises and operations, would help expand the range and depth of interaction between the United States and partner countries. Fourth, information sharing must be a two-way street. Finally, ISR, particularly persistent ISR provided by maritime forces, is a key maritime requirement.

I cringe when I see discussions of MDA and COP in this context. What is MDA off the coast of Florida? Observation of the traffic patterns of the American fishing community? What is MDA off the coast of Somalia? It certainly can't be something to sing happy tunes about, the same waters international naval forces have set up a secure transit route against piracy also happens to be one of the largest human smuggling migrations at sea in the world, from Somalia to Yemen.

I look forward to seeing someone define when and why MDA and COP is the environment, and when they are the threat. I don't think these are complicated concepts, but will wait and see what comes of these buzzwords for a few more months before throwing my hat into the discussion ring.

Strategic Communications: All of the cells considered effective strategic communications - defined as the sum of all actions and messages (intentional and unintentional) influencing target audiences - as an integral part of any successful U.S. strategy. An important corollary was that the Navy had to develop and disseminate coordinated and consistent strategic communications. Thus, to be successful, the Navy must establish the ability to design and implement a standardized process at the Navy component commander level for effectively coordinating maritime actions and messages so as to convey consistent U.S. government purposes and objectives.

Very wise words, but this is an enormous topic and really is a sea change for the Navy in terms of how they manage information. If you read it carefully you will note the intent is to develop information as an extension of naval activity with the intent of linking that activity to a public diplomacy effort. I think the strategic communication model the wargame suggests is needed would drive the Navy towards the return of naval diplomacy in the information age.

The current Navy information model is about communication of how and what the Navy does, but it lacks the declaration of why and therefore is not 'strategic' at all. It is a model of information that is absent advocacy, and when absent advocacy the discussion is not diplomacy. It is not enough to just do something; one must also declare why you do something.

The Navy's Strategic communication should be used to convince people of the fundamental ideas we as a nation believe in, and to undermine the support of ideas counter to our national virtues. Strategic communication should declare certain principles and objectives as part of our actions with the intent to create a better understanding of the benefits of Navy activity. Until we add advocacy with the intent to influence into our communications, they lack a strategic objective and any associated information carries no value in the activities naval forces conduct.

Bottom line, strategic communication will remain absent in the activities of the Navy until everyone in Navy public affairs is trained (and legally empowered) to advocate principles and objectives as part of naval activity. CHINFO is not organized, trained, or legally empowered to perform such a function today.

Soft Power Conducted Two Ways

When ADM Roughead brags about the Arleigh Burke class destroyer as a soft power instrument, I think it sounds rather absurd. I won't back down from that position, because even if it makes perfect sense the argument simply does not sell, and it opens up the Navy to unneeded criticism because the argument is an obvious distraction absent honest transparency in our intentions and actions. With that said, let us stop and examine what it looks like on the big board when you examine the chess board.

We begin in the Black Sea.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev was shown around the guided-missile cruiser Moskva, the flagship of Russia's Black Sea Fleet, at the southern port of Novorossiisk on Tuesday.

The Russian cruiser Moskva is a cool ship, but I know of one that is better.

The guided missile destroyer the USS Stout on Tuesday anchored off Batumi, where its commander, Mark J. Oberley, was welcomed ashore with Georgian music and wine.

"This visit and the combined training demonstrate the U.S. and Georgian commitment to work together, to cooperate and maintain maritime security," Oberley said.

USS Stout (DDG-55) isn't just some Flight I Arleigh Burke class destroyer, she is a BMD capable Arleigh Burke destroyer that just happens to be in the Black Sea, the best sea location to track any ballistic missile attack that originates from Iran. Sure the visit functions as a bit of gunboat diplomacy, but tell that to the Russian Air Force - which for the record, wouldn't want a piece of USS Stout (DDG-55) either.

Russian warplanes, meanwhile, conducted mock bombing runs in exercises just a few hundred kilometers northwest.

That is a lot of Black Sea friendly relations just a week after the conference in Moscow. USS Stout (DDG-55) will be working with two Georgian Coast Guard vessels in training exercises over the next few days. USS Stout (DDG-55) is 9000 tons of ass kicking, while the combined displacement of both ships may be around 900 tons. It is absolutely rediculous that ADM Roughead calls this soft power, and at the same time, deep in my heart - I honestly do admire him so much for doing exactly that!

The 6th Fleet isn't done conducting naval diplomacy though, because several thousand miles south of the Black Sea, in South Africa, the USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) is conducting another soft power deployment, sometimes referred to as the East African Partnership Station. Again, even though South Africa has the largest naval force on the African continent, it just seems ridiculous that an Arleigh Burke class is acting as a Global Fleet Station. GFS is supposed to be a purely soft power naval engagement activity. The ship has already made port visits in Djibouti and Kenya and is scheduled to continue similar port visits to Mauritius and Tanzania in the coming months. The USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) probably displaces more than the entire Coast Guards of Mauritius, Tanzania, and Djubouti... although I admit in South Africa a Burke can be a productive vessel for engagement.

"It's always great when two partner nations can schedule meaningful and productive events such as these," said Captain James Tranoris, Commander, Task Force 363. "It not only enhances the professional element of each of our navies' ability to work with one another for a safer maritime domain, but renews the strong ties of partnership we have with South Africa. For some of our Sailors, this will be their first time interacting with the South African Navy. It's a superb opportunity for them to make new friends and learn how another foreign navy operates."

The 6th fleet is currently operating two very powerful DDG-51s in partnership and engagement activities with countries that the ships are complete overmatch. OK, so I concede South Africa, but I won't concede Kenya, Mauritius, Tanzania, and Djubouti.... or Georgia for that matter. I think the Navy needs to clearly state, and find some agreement with Turkey, the intention to operate an AEGIS BMD capable ship in the Black Sea as often as possible. Unless Turkey wants to pay for BMD capabilities, that is where the NATO BMD shield belongs.

I still say the USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) is just a bad fit for an African Partnership Station. If anything, that is probably the best argument yet to SLEP the Figs, which are much better suited for engaging an African military, particularly if combined with a MSC charter. Sending a Burke to Africa to build coast guard capacity is like sending a logistics ship to hunt a submarine. Given the activities between Israel and Iran, there is probably a legitimate unstated reason why USS Stout (DDG-55), USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51), USS Laboon (DDG 58) and USS James E Williams (DDG 95) basically form a line respectively from the tip of Africa to the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea to the Black Sea.

Now compare these engagement activities with others taking place globally.

First there is CARAT 2009 going on, currently engaged in Thailand.

Since 1995, the CARAT bilateral exercise series has provided the U.S. and six other Southeast Asian nations - Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia - the opportunity to exchange knowledge and expand and sharpen maritime security through shared training, equipment and manpower.

Ships and aircraft from both Thailand and the U.S. comprise the combined CARAT task group, under the leadership of Royal Thai Navy Rear Adm. Chaiyot Sunthornnak, Commander, Frigate Squadron 2, and Commodore William Kearns III, Commander, Task Group 73.5.

Task Group 73.5 consists of the amphibious dock landing ship USS Harpers Ferry (LSD 49), guided-missile destroyer USS Chafee (DDG 90), guided-missile frigate USS Crommelin (FFG 37) and rescue-salvage ship USNS Safeguard (T-ARS 50).

Other units participating in CARAT Thailand include P-3C Orion and SH-60 Seahawk aircraft, U.S. Navy Seabees, a U.S. Coast Guard training team and a U.S. Navy mobile security squadron.

By any definition, that is a well balanced force using an amphibious ship, a salvage ship, and a Fig to engage a broad spectrum of capabilities within the level of regional partners. Balance. Task Force 73.5 has a broad spectrum of capabilities for engagement, an obvious reflection the folks planning the annual CARAT exercise are on top of their game.

Then there is the Richard E. Byrd (T-AKE 4) conducting Pacific Partnership 2009, the medical diplomacy deployment in the Pacific.

Pacific Partnership 2009 departed Samoa July 10 after working alongside Samoans and other partners and friends, delivering a variety of humanitarian civic assistance programs.

"When we first arrived, our goal was to grow in friendship, learn from one another and build skills that will allow us all to respond in the event of any future humanitarian crisis," said Commodore Andrew Cully, Pacific Partnership 2009 mission commander, during his speech at the closing ceremony at National Hospital in Apia.

"There is no question that we have accomplished that and so much more."

A big MSC ship with a large medical detachment. Was intended to be an amphibious ship, but all signs suggest the Richard E. Byrd (T-AKE 4) has been doing fine, and I do wonder if the Navy is conducting the operation at a lower cost using the T-AKE instead of the amphibious ship. Would be interesting to know what the cost difference was, because it could be higher.

What about USS Oak Hill (LSD 51) conducting Southern Partnership Station (SPS) 2009.

USS Oak Hill (LSD 51) conducted joint maritime exercises with the Uruguayan Navy in the Atlantic Ocean July 9 as part of Southern Partnership Station (SPS) 2009.

Oak Hill participated in a mine-sweeping exercise with several Uruguayan ships. Uruguayan pilots were also given the opportunity to land their helicopters on the Oak Hill's flight deck during flight operations.

Capt. Brad Williamson, commodore, Destroyer Squadron 2 said the exercises were important because they embodied the spirit of SPS 2009.

Finally, there is a West African Partnership Station soon to begin, with an appropriately sized vessel for developing regional security.

Departing from Portsmouth, Virginia July 1, 2009, Coast Guard cutter Legare is on its way to the African continent to conduct maritime safety and security exchanges with countries along the west and central coast.

During the three-month Africa Partnership Station (APS) mission, the 270-foot cutter and its crew will visit and work with countries to include Morocco, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Cape Verde.

I think the contrasts are interesting. It is possible to say the USS Stout (DDG-55) is in Georgia as a form of gunboat diplomacy with Russia. I can buy that, indeed, I think the Obama administration will bring back gunboat diplomacy (something progressives might find shocking). The fact is, I see President Obama as a remarkably creative diplomat. Gunboat diplomacy can be offensive, but it has a reputation of preventing conflict, not actually starting a conflict. President Obama doesn't strike me as the type of guy who says "Nope, I don't want to use that diplomatic option for quiet, yet apparent diplomatic escalation."

One can even say the USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) activities in South Africa makes sense, although that argument doesn't really apply to Kenya, Mauritius, Tanzania, and Djubouti. The fact is, a Coast Guard cutter, a Littoral Combat Ship, or a Fig could do what the USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) is doing, and actually be better sized for that role. Is optimization for these types of engagements important? I think so, yes.

We highlight and take time to explain in depth the limit of our resources (ship numbers) for conducting a security operation like anti-piracy off Somalia, and yet the Navy will publicly promote sending a $2 billion, 9000 ton Burke for the stated purpose of exercising with the Mauritius Coast Guard or the Georgian Coast Guard? Does the Navy realize the perceptions at work these kinds of talking points?

I don't want to suggest the Burke can't do the job, but at $2 billion, I am not sure this is efficient manage of these low end activities. The Burkes can do work for the fleet better in tune with the capabilities of the destroyer, specifically securing US interests in the maritime spaces the bad guys are operating in today.

The Reality of Generation Y's Virtual World.

We may find the Tweeters take political power and what are we going to do then? Talk about a paradigm shift.

- Dr. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Director of Policy Planning for the State Department, June 18th, 2009

There is irony that Dr. Slaughter was expressing this opinion on Wednesday morning, because this week Twitter has become not only a tool for channeling population centric political power against a government, but perhaps even a tool for leveraging population centric military power. As I observe the events unfolding online surrounding the Iranian elections, I see a sustained global, generational, multinational cyber skirmish against the current government of Iran with the intent of expressing political support for the Iranian people.

If that sounds a bit odd to you, all I can say is welcome to the 21st century, because you have just stepped into the reality of Generation Y's virtual world.

Virtual Terrain

One side effect of the US invasion of Iraq is the enormous investments that have come to the Middle East region, particularly in the form of telecommunications. It isn't just cell phones and cyber cafe's, the submarine cables laid to support the requirements of a western military presence include the requirements for the associated non-military activities and infrastructure investments necessary to support operations in places Western military's deploy. In this decade the Middle East has experienced an explosion in technology access, and one result from the higher oil prices that has come from the instability in the region is a modernization of most major global industries based there. In Iran, virtually all global business, particularly with China, takes place on information networks just as they do in the West.

Iran has 6 major telecommunications companies, but all internet traffic is filtered through the state owned Data communication Company of Iran (or DCI), which is essentially the firewall for network traffic in and out of Iran. Arbor Networks, an IT security research firm, has a network monitoring tool called ATLAS 2.0 which monitors about 80% of the global internet traffic. The last entry on Arbor researcher Craig Labovitz's blog lays out the cyber battlefield.

In normal times, DCI carries roughly 5 Gbps of traffic (with a reported capacity of 12 Gbps) through 6 upstream regional and global Internet providers. For the region, this represents an average level of Internet infrastructure (for purposes of perspective, a mid size ISP in Michigan carries roughly the same level of traffic).

One the day after the elections on June 13th at 1:30pm GMT (9:30am EDT and 6:00pm Tehran / IRDT), Iran dropped off the Internet. All six regional and global providers connecting Iran to the rest of the world saw a near complete loss of traffic.

Most Internet traffic to Iran goes through Reliance (formerly Flag) Telecom, the major Asia Pacific region underseas cable operator. Singtel, a major pan-Asian provider and Türk Telekom also provide significant transit. Initially, DCI severed most of the major transit connections into Iran. Within a few hours, a trickle of traffic returned across TeliaSonera, Reliance and SignTel — all well under 1 Gbps. As of 6:30am GMT June 16, traffic levels returned to roughly 70% of normal with Reliance traffic climbing by more than a Gigabit.

Many people are speculating why Iran is running at around 70% of normal. Most security researchers agree it is because Iran is conducting packet inspection, but the methods Iran is using to conduct packet inspection is purely speculative. The main point is, 5 Gbps is not much, and on the cyber battlefield Iran is not only limited due to bandwidth, but bandwidth control is limited due to probable ownership of Chinese IT hardware usually 2-3 generations behind western equivalents (often clones of western hardware 2-3 generations older than modern versions). Because Iran cannot conduct global business with partners without the internet, shutting down the internet brings economic problems that would only compound the political problems taking place in the Iranian streets.

For years strategic thinkers have suggested that the technological connectivity requirements for global commerce is a dynamic that will radically influence the calculations of governments that lack transparency. We are seeing that dynamic at work in how the Iranian government is currently managing this crisis of information control in and out of Iran.

Virtual Insurgency

I got into a theoretical debate with Professor Samuel Liles, Cyber Security Researcher and Professor at Purdue University. The debate is whether what we are seeing is open cyber warfare or hacktivism (terrorism in cyberspace). The answer to the question seems to hinge on scope, and how scope is defined. Joining the debate, cyber security and intelligence expert Jeffery Carr suggested a broader definition of cyberwar to be an extension of political will with a strategic objective. Professor Liles suggested that in order for what we are seeing in support of a segment of Iranian people to rise to the level of cyber warfare, there must be a full spectrum engagement and not just a single tactic or tool used. My argument would be that tactics are derived by strategy, and any cyber strategy in support of the Iranian people would not attack the infrastructure of the Iranian people, rather concentrate on preventing control of information networks by the regime (which is what is happening).

I have not settled that debate in my mind, and it probably isn't relevant.

What I do think we are seeing may be the first virtual insurgency supporting a political ideal (democracy) for people who are attempting to take power in another country, and clearly feel they were cheated from that power by the existing government. I also observe a broader scope of tactics being deployed, although I have not necessarily been paying attention to the influence of these attacks, or to what scale they have been successful or not.

The strategic weapon is clearly information, and the propagation of information is primarily used by tactical weapons including social software, proxy servers, tor, bit torrent, education, and I would suggest the most effective effort I have seen yet was a simple text website with mobile app downloads ready for install on popular cell phones used in Iran.

Can you imagine an act of cyber terrorism from the United States against another government where Esquire magazine publishes an article by a politically connected new media hacktivist who brags how he helped leverage Twitter to wage cyber jihad against the Iranian leaderships primary news website? Like I said, this is the reality of Generation Y's virtual world.

The link that I repackaged and distributed on Twitter this week was to a tool called PageReboot.com. It does exactly what you'd expect it to do: refresh whatever Web site you want at whatever frequency you set. Sure, the site's intentions center more on winning eBay auctions than, say, affecting the outcome of a democratic election, but democracy's a loose term in Iran. All people had to do, then, was click my link and leave it open, and the lie-spewing servers of The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) would be slammed 3,600 times an hour.

So anyway, my tweet didn't take long to catch on. (I work in political new media, so the people I interact with online really know how to make some noise.) And it didn't take very long for the IRIB site to start slowing down. So I tweeted about it, and e-mailed a few friends in the new-media world, who retweeted it out of courtesy and (somewhat mischievous) human decency. By sundown, our army of not-quite-hackers had swelled to forty or so, and just like that, the official news site of Iran was gone for a few hours.

I highlight that tactic for the purposes of noting the potential of social software to organize populations for purposes of political cyber sabotage. I want to clearly state the strategic objective of the virtual insurgency supporting the Iranian people is not to directly engage in the sabotage of Iranian government internet hard points.

The strategic objective of the virtual insurgency in support of the Iranian people is to increase transparency. Information is the weapon, not being leveraged by our government, rather being used by multinational peoples primarily represented by Generation Y. Information is being channeled to strengthen the network to insure the free flow of information into Iran with the intent of supporting greater output of information from Iran. All tactical aspects of the virtual insurgency that support those strategic ends empower the Iranian populations credibility towards legitimate democracy. It should be noted, the virtual insurgency is also supporting the objectives of those in opposition to the existing government who have a likely intent to reproduce a 1979 revolution.

Generational Trends

Diversity means something different to someone of the Baby Boomer generation than it does to someone in Generation Y, but the generations are turning out to be very similar. The political activism in the 60s towards causes of domestic freedom are not dissimilar to the modern era political hacktivism towards international freedoms. There were many grassroots organizational groups developed and cultivated in the 60s, and we call those organizational groups netroots today.

While the cyberspace activities in support of the Iranian people today are not officially organized by any single political party, Generation Y tends to generally be socially liberal, tends to engage in causes that organize in networks, and tend to get engaged in politics even as the majority of Generation Y can barely articulate a political policy or position (including their own). I'm politically tone deaf when it comes to issues, but as an observer of political movements I would suggest one reason Generation Y gravitates left is because the progressive base actively engages in activities that leverage networks for political ends.

When I got off work today I was forced to listen to a radio talk show host debate Pat Buchanan. The talk show host (Sean Hannity) was attacking the Obama administration for, in his words, "not standing up for Freedom by denouncing the regime in Iran like Reagan did the Soviet Union." If the official position of the Republican Party is to be reliant on the government for a token political statement, the Republican Party is doomed in 2010 because they are too old to get it, and too out of touch to see it.

The Obama administration can only screw this up by engaging in the Iranian dialogue, but with that said the administration would be very wise to find leadership opportunities within the spacial grid of the ungoverned, people initiated virtual insurgency many in the United States are supporting. Avoiding public engagement on the issue while providing indirect guidance for promoting a productive strategic objective like transparency and attempting to prevent tactical efforts that can cause damage to the movement taking place in Iran would seem to be a wise political policy. Getting both political parties on board for a simple, but unified strategic objective would also seem to be important. Allowing this Generation Y movement to act in unison, absent political divisions, promotes a higher chance of success and sends a strong population centric message to the Iranian people.

Why is that important? Because polls continuously show that Iranians have a higher opinion of western peoples than they do of western governments. This policy would literally put our best face out front.

There will be an enormous number of lessons in cyber warfare to learn from the activities we see unfolding. A 4GW model is clearly visible. We have non-state actors primarily made up of a younger generation of people living in the stronger economic nations of the world engaging in forms of cyber terrorism with the intent of producing political objectives. That non-state actor may even be leveraging military level cyber warfare capabilities against a political party currently holding state level power in a country half way around the world.

Somehow I doubt that scenario was previosly being examined in the Department of Defense's QDR cyber warfare discussion. Welcome to the reality of Generation Y's virtual world.

Public Diplomacy and Maritime Strategy

This morning I attended day 2 of the Current Strategy Forum at the US Naval War College, which turned out excellent this year with some high profile speakers and presenters. I really enjoyed the symposium, and cannot give enough credit to the NWC Foundation for putting on such a lively event. Tuesday's focus was military strategy, one of my favorite subjects, and featured speakers like Economics Professor Kenneth Rogoff of Harvard University and the CNO Admiral Gary Roughead. The panels on Tuesday were also lively, with insights from G. John Ikenberry of Princeton University, Stephen Walt of Harvard University, the infamous Donald Kagan of Yale University, and my personal favorite Eliot Cohen of John Hopskins University. I have plenty to discuss from Tuesday, but on Wednesday morning the topic shifted to Public Diplomacy and Policy and it is on the Wednesday morning topic I want to discuss first.

Given the make up of the audience, it is a fair assessment that only a handful of naval personnel who either work at the NWC, on the staff's of the various officers in attendance, or were part of the military public affairs offices were younger than I am, and a fairly safe bet that at 33 I was at least among the youngest 5 folks in attendance. I think my age, my background in IT, and my experience in social software may have shaped my opinions regarding Tuesday mornings discussions, so I am putting it out there as something people can blame should my observations be taken as offensive, inaccurate, or simply unjustified.

I was very impressed with Dr. Anne-Marie Slaughter, she is in my opinion a breathe of fresh air when it comes to discussing and representing diplomacy and policy for the US State Department. The primary point of her keynote address was that in the 21st century, alliances and treaties will rarely dominate the diplomatic space and instead, in a period of rising Great Powers, informal partnerships will be developed and cultivates based on mutual interest. She gave numerous examples, highlighting how an informal economic partnership exists between the US and China in dealing with the global economic problems we face today, while no security partnership exists between the US and China. She described the partnerships as targeted, directed, and loose, but also important in meeting diplomatic objectives in both regional and global challenges that might arise.

She also described a world where hierarchy is replaced with networks, and it is through networks the United States will foster relationships and promote interests with diplomacy. She described networking not only as state centered politics but also people centered politics. It was within these mutual ideas that she lost me, and I was somewhat taken back when on a panel titled "The Strategy of Influence" Michael Doren of NYU, Thomas Finger of Stanford University, and Shibley Telhami of the University of Maryland endorsed her vision of public diplomacy.

I personally think the vision outlined in the Current Strategy Forum had a rather enormous gap as a policy, would incorrectly guide strategy, and I would even suggest that while Dr. Shibley Telhami spent 20 minutes going through some fascinating poll results, he completely missed the point by suggesting popularity is a factor of influence, when indeed these are mutually exclusive concepts.

Dr. Slaughter specifically described the world changing from a hierarchical world to a horizontal world, and noted specifically that technology tools are enabling this shift. The tools allow public diplomacy to make connections to peoples in other country without an embassy, indeed creates a conceptual view of a potential virtual embassy in some places in the future. The problem I had with the articulation of this position is that everyone described the shift as a linear vertical hierchy into a linear horizontal, and generates a flat world in the spirit of Thomas Friedman. Sounds great, rings true, etc... right? Not exactly.

The Digital Planet and Analog World

I don't know if Dr. Slaughters presentation of the emerging networked planet was intentionally linear for explanation purposes, but the world isn't rapidly shifting from a vertical, linear network model into a flat, horizontal, linear network model of strategic communications and public diplomacy as described by the experts, rather a better way to describe the network is one of a three-dimensional spacial grid. The grid has many types of connections: some are unilateral connections, some are bi-directional connections, and some are multidirectional connections. While it can be accurate to associate tools into the various categories, I noted a technology dependency as a foundation for the arguments made by the experts, which implied to me the network model is missing an important feature. It turns out that in the State Departments digital world of strategic communications and public diplomacy outlined by the experts at the Current Strategy Forum, many people are not on the grid, and in the digital planet most of the people we want to communicate with live in an analog world.

I believe the necessity to articulate networks as spacial grids and not linear models in policy is critical, because strategy developed from policy absolutely will be three-dimensional, complex networked information strategies or they will fail to reach intended targets in communication. Network analogies are important, and linear thinking is damaging.

Information As a Weapon

Michael Doran opened his presentation by stating as fact that "we don't do influence in the DoD." His point was that the DoD looks at information as a weapon, and the implication was that this condition may represent a problem. He went on to make an interesting point, the DoD does not have a leader in what needs to be an information influence enterprise. The topic of leadership within the information networks was a reoccurring theme, the suggestion being that in a linear model there are no leaders, otherwise it would be a hierarchical system. Well, because a leader is apparently required, I would suggest that perhaps the State Department is using the wrong model.

In the emerging spacial grid network, the leader is the node with the most connections, and in the digital world that leader is the United States. This is globally accepted, when countries need to get together to discuss an economic meeting, perhaps calling together the G-20, no other country in the world can do this except the United States. The reason China promotes the idea of the G-2 is because they are attempting to position themselves as a leader, a nation that can call a meeting of the G-20 (for example) and reasonably expect every nation to show up. China's problem is, when China calls for the G-20 meeting, 18 countries ask the question... Will the United States be there? In other words, the country with the largest number of strong connections will always be the leader in the emerging network model.

It is unclear to me if Michael Doren was suggesting it is a problem that the DoD sees information as a weapon, because from a perspective of strategy I would suggest information is one of the preferred weapons of influence. The question is not whether to use information as a weapon, because in fact our technology, transparency, and open society already allows our citizens to use information as both a shield and a weapon every day, the Iran elections is actually a good example of this. The challenge I see in using information as a weapon is how do we direct information when so many target audiences are off the grid? Dr. Salughter's Facebook, Twitter, and Blogosphere isn't going to reach those folks, and air dropping a few million cell phones isn't going to work either.... because 18 hours later the phone batteries are dead.

Strategic Network Links

In my opinion, Michael Doran is half right, but he is also half wrong. I found it ironic that in front of the Navy centric audience he suggested the DoD doesn't do influence, because he apparently doesn't know much about how the Navy is using hospital ships and amphibious ships for proactive medical diplomacy and engagement. These deployments as well as the Global Partnership Stations typically take place in areas of the world where telecommunications links do not exist, otherwise known as off the grid. The Navy engages in activities that promote the US national interest in these places, change perceptions, and the Navy even evaluates these efforts through polling data.

Ahh... so while Michael Doren is half wrong, he is also half right. There is no organized communication strategy to coincide with these naval diplomacy efforts, and that is probably the case because 99% of the population is completely off the grid. In order to prepare the local population for the arrival of these ships, the State Department acts as a communication proxy to inform the local citizenship that free medical care is coming. These proxy channels are an example how we connect those people disconnected from the grid to the grid. The idea of proxies are not new, indeed our enemies use proxies in strategic communication to great effect.

In Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Taliban has distributed several micro-broadcasting radio stations throughout the region to broadcast openly to people otherwise disconnected from the communication grid. AM/FM radio is what I call unidirectional communications, essentially from the grid to an audience that is typically off the grid. These AM/FM Taliban stations act as proxies, and are typically run by people who are on the internet (thus connected to the grid) to organize folks off the grid and disseminate the latest talking points and propaganda. We should be using proxies as well, indeed the Navy should be leveraging as much as possible the use of proxies to coincide with the efforts and activities of our naval diplomacy.

Executing Strategic Communications and Maritime Strategy

My good friend Matt Armstrong is an expert in public diplomacy, and one thing he often describes is what he calls the "first three feet." The essential idea is the development of proxies for strategic communication and public diplomacy, and to him the 'first three feet' is the local media. In most of the places the Navy deploys ships for medical diplomacy, the reporters are on the grid while most of the people are not. Furthermore, the distribution of information is off the grid, whether paper or AM/FM radio.

While US citizens may occasionally take cheap shots at American media entities like the New York Times, globally the New York Times represents an institution in journalism circles, a prestigious organization of credible journalistic integrity and respect that credentialed professional media members globally desire to emulate. One major problem exists in the third world though, there is a real lack of training and education for journalism in many of the places where the Navy is engaging in influence activities.

So hire a professor and put on a journalism class as part of the diplomatic program, and invite journalists to participate. The DoD should look to hire someone like Jay Rosen at NYU, ask him to develop a 2 week class for journalists in places where the Navy intends to engage in medical diplomacy, and train objectivity and transparency to the local media. On some of these stops, the Navy is treating more than 10,000 people. If the Navy is able to get objective and transparent reporting through local media from these activities, then these programs now have a complimentary strategic communications strategy for disseminating activities throughout a region of influence. The State Department understands the value of an objective, well trained local media in foreign countries, so the benefits from the education provided go far beyond the efforts of the medical diplomacy activities. When media members are trained and educated to be objective, the effects can influence many levels of a state. More importantly, an objective local media perspective could potentially result in better polling samples to measure the success, failure, and general value of our maritime soft power, joint agency initiatives.

If the State Department is focused in on developing connectivity through the grid as a way of population centric diplomacy, then the only way ahead for reaching the masses off the grid is with proxies. The best proxies for the disconnected places the Navy visits is the local media. Incorporating them into the medical diplomacy program seems to be a logical step, after all, not only do they get the training, but it engages the communicators in the local regions we target which gives the US a potential opportunity to get an objective local report on our activities.

Everything Hinges on QDR Decisions

“There are some folks that would say that the best way to do cooperative security is with small, cheap and benign little patrol boats operating in various areas around the world,” he said. “I would argue that the model that we have, with the Africa Partnership Station on Nashville, is a great way to do cooperative security.”

- Admiral Gary Roughead, Inside the Navy May 9, 2024

Inside the Navy (subscription only) ran an article on May 9th, 2009 called Roughead Amphibious Force Structure A Top Issue For Navy In QDR where the above quote comes from. Roughead goes on to add some details to his line of thinking.

“If I put five Country X sailors on one of our small patrol boats, and we teach them how to do maritime security, that’s great for those five sailors,” the admiral explained. “But consider what we’re doing with Nashville. She goes into an area and can still do, using the indigenous country’s capabilities, ways to do maritime security patrols. And oh, by the way, she has a well deck where you can bring boats in and teach and work with sailors from that other Navy on boat maintenance and boat repair, which is another way of teaching skills.”

Nashville also hosts officers who teach their counterparts in the various West African navies staff procedures, organization and maritime security constructs. And the ship is large enough “that if we want to have a maritime security conference to bring in other agencies from that country, we can bring them together,” Roughead added.

“At multiple levels we’re engaging and we’re working with not just the sailors who are responsible for the operations of their Navy, but with the leadership, and then being able to work in the broader maritime security construct,” he said. “For me, amphibious ships are great for that.”

Recently the H1N1 swine flu popped up among the crew of the USS Dubuque (LPD 8), which had been scheduled to conduct Pacific Partnership 2009, the annual medical diplomacy partnership operation in the southern Pacific. ADM Willard decided to keep the ship home, which turned out to be a smart decision as other crewmembers have come down with the bug. The replacment ship will be USNS Richard E. Byrd (T-AKE 4). HSV Swift conducted the global fleet station in central America earlier this year. My point is ships other than amphibious ships have been carrying out the security cooperation role even as fewer Marines are available on amphibious ships, so there is plenty of room for a debate whether or not the amphibious ship is the appropriate platform for security partnerships.

In general I disagree with the premise of what ADM Roughead is suggesting, as if the choice is somehow either small patrol boats or amphibious ships. This is an artificial choice, hopefully the QDR rejects these type of myopic opinions and takes a realistic view of ship types and missions.

While I think that is an interesting topic, this was the key quote for me in the article.

An additional key Navy discussion area for the QDR will be irregular warfare, and “what are the components that make that up,” Roughead said, including the role of Naval Expeditionary Combat Command and riverine forces...

“For the first time, we did a force structure assessment on expeditionary combat command, and, remarkably, as we went out into the [combatant commands], there was not a definitive requirement that came through loud and clear on riverine,” he said. “So I want to get into that.”

Roughead noted that holding the discussion about irregular warfare component plans, including NECC, during the QDR process will allow the Navy to more effectively factor in the military’s ambitions writ large.

Riverine gets a lot of attention because of Iraq, but I do wonder where the irregular warfare component plans for the Navy will fit in, and how well will these plans align with the Marine Corps. With the Marines developing the SC MAGTFs, my question is what does the matching Navy component look like? Does it include an amphibious ship? Should it? Is the JHSV a more appropriate platform? Is this where the Influence Squadron has legs?

One last quote from the same article.

In an April 15 interview, Brig. Gen. Ronald Johnson, who directs the Corps’ operations division, told Inside the Navy that the 38 amphibious ship requirement “is the absolute bare minimum,” a figure generated with “an extreme amount of rigor and risk.”

The Marines are sizing their amphibious force based on what operations conducted in Fallujah, which is basically two full Marine Expeditionary Brigades. Is this the proper metric? What about Sea Basing? Why didn't Gates cancel the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle?

These are just a handful of questions I look forward to discussing this week. Be sure and check out the history of amphibious operations between 1990-1999 and 2000-2009 to get a feel for what the Marines have been up to since the end of the cold war.

Pacific Partnership Will Go On

The news event that discouraged me this week was the announcement the USS Dubuque would not be participating in Pacific Partnership 2009. Anyone who has followed this blog since the beginning knows that I am in favor of these strategically important soft power missions.

I have been somewhat critical of the quality of ADM Willard's blog, and by that I mean the blog was generally boring. Sometime around the end of March the content began to change, and the blog is becoming more insightful as a tool for leadership. This part of the latest entry is an excellent example.

USS Dubuque has spent much of the last year preparing for its Pacific Partnership voyage in which it was to travel throughout the south Pacific providing Humanitarian Civic Assistance. Unfortunately, with the exposure of the crew and ship to the H1N1 virus I elected to cancel her deployment. We are certain we will contain this virus, and the ship will not pose a threat, however, we do not want to cause concern of the spread of this virus in such remote areas of the South Pacific. I have my team working up options to provide the Humanitarian Civic Assistance to the nations we had planned to visit through other means than the USS Dubuque. There are many non government organizations and partner nations that contribute to the Pacific Partnership effort and we will work with them and do our best to get as much aid into the region as we can. This is an unfortunate chain of events, but as with all challenges we face, the Pacific Fleet Team and her partners will find a way to get the mission done.

Navy news is reporting Pacific Partnership will go on, although details are still being worked out. I hope the joint force makes every effort to conduct the mission at the highest possible level, with or without a ship, and sends a strong message of commitment to the region.

It has become almost buzzword to say multi-national, joint agency, but the phrases apply to low intensity operations being conducted by military forces. Pacific Partnership 2009 was intended to include the five nations of Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands and Tonga. The challenges of each nation are unique, but there are similarities.

Low quality education, lack of access to health care, and poor infrastructure are characteristics of those countries, symptoms of the larger problem connected to the lack of economic development. The Navy, with international and other agency partners, has made fighting symptoms the mission, specifically by providing health care, building schools, and recapitalizing infrastructure. I think the general consensus is, fighting symptoms is an effective approach.

Except when the symptom is piracy… I am left with the impression the US Navy has put considerably more intellectual weight into the soft power partnership deployments that include medical diplomacy than they have dealing with low intensity security challenges at sea like piracy. I'd welcome being told how I am wrong about this, but from my point of view, I see a mismatch in priorities.

What to Watch For...

If you are not following the short video clips Commandant Thad Allen is uploading to the iCommandant blog, you are missing something interesting. Knowing the DoD, these videos are probably blocked to the folks reading this from your work location, so you may have to see it for yourself at home. This is a very clever idea. I got some detail from the Coast Guard regarding the technology at work here.

It is really low-tech effort with some good potential ROI. The videos are shot with a standard digital still camera with some basic video capability and then uploaded onto Flickr, which can then be blogged out through iCommandant which links to his Facebook.

This is a very clever way to leverage low tech stuff for strategic communications, and there are few limits to how useful this could be. The videos are short and sweet, leveraging simple technology for video-blogging that could realistically be done by any public affairs person on any ship in the fleet under virtually any circumstances, and the small size of the short & simple videos supports lower bandwidth requirements.

It reminds me of something VADM Harvey said the other day.

Just an example that woman from Scotland who sang [Susan Boyle]… I think the number of views of that 4-5 minute video is up to a fairly staggering number. Now clearly there is a fairly large human interest piece in that story, but I think of how, if we had on Facebook, the ability to respond rapidly to the events of Easter Sunday went down in terms of getting our hostage Captain Phelps back. I think that would have been seen by lots of people as an opportunity to talk about the Navy and why we have a role to play and what the role is and establish that broad level of awareness that I think is lacking in the nation for a large number of reasons.

VADM Harvey clearly understands that strategic communications is about capturing moments. It looks like the Coast Guard has found a clever way to do something exactly like that with a popular medium: video, and promote it not only through a blog, but also through a Facebook page. When I talk about leveraging social media for strategic communications, I try to emphasize consistency and congruency, because when implemented with consistency a social network can build expectations with the target audience and connect.

With something like this video-blogging concept, the Coast Guard connects directly to the target audience by bypassing the filters (opinion shaping) of the press. With a short video, one doesn't have to worry about which quote becomes the story, because the entire short video is available to all to be quoted by anyone.

This technology in the hands of some smart Coast Guard PA folks could be fascinating to observe when hurricane season comes. Add the two way content flow and ease of use (cell phone) potential of Twitter to the information flow possibilities available to the Coast Guard this upcoming hurricane season, and I'd suggest it is going to be very interesting to see how the new information tools the Coast Guard is leveraging influences the information flow in future hurricane emergencies. With a bit of planning ahead, the Coast Guard could potentially capture the moment that VADM Harvey is talking about.

Now you might be wondering how the Navy could use this type of technology. Easy. Interview folks on the USNS Comfort (T-AH 20) with a quick video 30 second clip every day and upload the videos to the Continuing Promise 2009 blog (and Facebook page).

But if they were really thinking, they would also do a video every day in Spanish and upload it to a Spanish language Continuing Promise 2009 blog targeting the media, naval enthusiasts, health experts and organizations, and every local charity, organization, or group that can be found online in the regions the ship is visiting. And when you get to those places, you interview the locals in the videos. With a bit of tactical success hitting the target audience of these regions, local politicians will request to be on the videos.

Russia Does Soft Power, Too

The Telegraph reports some of the efforts of Russia to reassert its influence in its former republics:

The Kremlin quickly recognized the importance of [Moldovan President] Voronin’s regime to Russia’s interests and worked hard to deny support to those who might challenge him from the West. In Georgia, Moscow is provid-ing nonintrusive, soft-power support such as extensive media coverage to the array of opposition groups that seek to dethrone Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili.

With the Ukraine presidential election due in six months, Moscow has no preferred candidate among the two most likely to reach the sec-ond round - Yulia Tymoshenko and Viktor Yanukovych.

It will not repeat the mistakes of its 2004 embrace of Yanukovych. The message from the Kremlin is: “We support pro-Russian positions, not candidates, and we will judge by deeds, not campaign promises.”

And arguably, they're doing it better than we are. Watch for an uptick in Russian efforts in Ukraine as elections get closer, and a spike if the results don't go Moscow's way.

Continuing Promise 2009 Online

The official blog of Continuing Promise 2009 is here. These blogs are very informative and useful in the study of US Navy soft power. I highly recommend those interested in understanding what the US Navy is doing in South America to update your RSS feeds.

My only question is, where is the Spanish language blog for Continuing Promise 2009? If it doesn't exist, I would suggest the US Navy needs to seriously work on its strategic communications strategy.

HT: Maggie

Leverage the Economy of Violence to Build a Somali Coast Guard

In 2008 the United Nations tracked 180 reported incidents of piracy off Somalia. This breaks down to 65 suspicious approaches, 69 attempted hijackings, and 46 successful hijackings, a success rate of 40%. Through April 15th, 2009 pirates have attacked around 80 ships and have hijacked 19 of them, with a success rate of 20%. There are currently 17 ships with over 300 mariners being held hostage off the coast of Somalia.

With a second attack in a week against an US-flagged vessel, and hijackings occurring in the region at an astonishing rate, it is unlikely this is issue is going to go away quietly. The big question on everyone's mind seems to be, what can we do? Well, we have a lot of options actually, the question is what should we do. Piracy is a problem, but has not risen to the level of a strategic or economic threat yet.

If I was working this problem, this would be how I approach it.

Buy Time

If I was President Obama, I would tell the press that one thing holding up action on piracy is the confirmation of Ray Mabus and Bob Work, thus shift the attention to the Senate. I know it makes no difference, but piracy is a complex problem, and right now time is on the side of the United States. Anyone who has read this blog for several months has noted how limited action by the US Navy has paid huge benefits towards the goals of the United States regarding piracy. The problem continues to create pressures in Europe, and every increase in insurance premiums will hit the consumer in Europe harder both on the shelf and in terms of energy imports from the Middle East. If you are an American who doesn't want a war in Somalia, you want the Europeans to continue to get screwed by pirates until they get fed up. Nothing builds mutual support than when their political needs meet up with our political capacity. I think Obama would be quite smart to let the pressure build on Europe, so they come to us looking for a solution.

I noticed Mullen has called for an evaluation of strategy, which is exactly right. ADM Mullen knows this is going down on his watch, and he is going to be engaged. I was not a fan of ADM Mullen the CNO, but ADM Mullen the CJCS has been excellent. For the first time since the late 80s, the Navy SWO is being asked to come up with new ideas that are cheap. I bet they rise to the occation. May I recommend reviewing the lessons of Wimbrown VII and Hercules as a way to deal with small boats, and talking to some old vets how they dealt with this low level crap at sea. The extra insights may come in handy in framing the mind for the challenge. There are several tacticl options the Navy can look at, beginning with spending more time focusing on US flagged ships and coordinating convoys to buy time for the President.

The Economy of Violence

The last economic impact study I saw regarding piracy costs influencing the United States said it was something like 1 cent for every 6 gallons of gasoline. We can certainly manage the 2 cents per fill up. The real costs are being passed on to consumers in Europe, which puts pressure on their governments for more action and a more engaged policy. Mariner Unions in Asia are very powerful blocks in nations like India and the Philippines, and since we have spent considerable resources building the capability of the Philippines, this may come in handy. As EagleOne noted, the connection between Somali piracy and the Philippines is not trivial.

Piracy is not expensive in the grand scheme of things (PDF), for example, the 2,700 extra miles around the Horn of Africa can increase the cost of operating a 300,000 DWT tanker or a 5000 TEU container ship around $3.5 million annually, primarily because it decreases the number of annual trips those ships can make from 6 to 5, and increases the fuel and labor costs of the ship. The thing is, a 300,000 ton DWT delivers half a billion in oil annually, and a 5000 TEU container ship is also big time money in shipping. $3.5 million is just slightly more than a rounding error in the operation of these vessels. Besides, these costs get passed on to the European consumer, so this condition only helps US strategy in getting Europe to take a more active role.

Maritime traffic is already down considerably due to the global economy, which is why it has actually helped the maritime industry for ships to take the long trip around Africa. Fewer trips per ship means more ships get a charter, thus more work for the industry.

Ransoms are still being paid, with a Greek cargo ship released in the past week reportedly earning the pirates over $1 million. The average Somali earns $600 annually, while the pirate who hijacks ships is paid around $10 a day by these pirate cartels, plus any cash they may steal while looting a ships crew. There are plenty of operational costs, including fuel for the boats used to hijack and rent to fisherman to tow them out to sea (act as a mothership), but often pirates will steal a fishing vessel from another country (the two Egyptian fishing ships hijacked this week for example) and will use them as motherships, so these costs are not considerable. Ultimately, between equipment, maintenance, and payroll for hundreds of folks the total cost of an operation is probably often less than 50% of the earnings, meaning lots of profit to go around for a million dollar ransom payment.

Latest news reports are suggesting War Risk Insurance premiums for Somalia may rise to $30000 per day for ships, and with the attacks shifting east of Somalia and further offshore in that area, it is only a matter of time before that area gets declared a war risk zone. Maritime traffic in the region is down due to the global economy. The transit through the war zone area in the Gulf of Aden is usually 1 day, while the transit through a war zone area in the Indian Ocean east of Somalia, if it happens, will be around 2.5 days. For 20,000 ships in the Gulf of Aden, that adds up to around $600 million in war insurance annually at the very high end, not including rebates given when no claim is exercised on the policy, or the reality that not every ship actually buys war risk insurance. The actual figure is probably between $300 - $400 million annually. Should war risk insurance be required in the Indian Ocean region, it will influence fewer ships, but the costs will be 2.5x higher. That decision could push total war risk insurance for the region to approach $1 billion for 2009.

US ships have not seen an increase in insurance premiums while transiting the area as of February 2009 according to CRS, but the primary reason given by CRS is because no American ships have had cargo's stolen or had damage. It is unclear how the recent incidents may influence insurance rates on American flagged vessels. For understanding more about maritime insurance costs, I encourage reading that CRS report, it is useful. It also reviews options for the US government to take a more active role in insurance, which could be helpful in developing revenue models to pay for security in that region.

Yes, I think instead of security contractors, we should seriously consider our options regarding insurance premiums, potentially even renting out the US Marine Corps as a war risk insurance premium policy to safeguard our insurance investments. I highly doubt a squad of Marines are going to be disappointed they may have to blow a Somali pirate to hell so Uncle Sam can earn a few bucks towards a regional security solution.

With insurance premiums a cost effective means of protecting shipping companies from piracy, and the ransoms paid by the insurance companies feeding the cycle of violence, I think the US should consider injecting themselves into the economy of violence to get it working towards the goals of regional maritime security. Is there any way to encourage global shipping companies to pay war risk insurance to the US, who would underwrite the war risk insurance as a means of developing an income model towards regional security, and insure the policy with a squad of Marines through the war zone? Simply put LPDs at an entry and exit point, and we don't need to escort each ship, the Marine squads can provide on the spot security.

There seems to be a lot of money floating around the insurance costs here, money that if it could be obtained by the US, could be used to procure the necessary equipment and fund the training for a Somali Coast Guard.

Somali Coast Guard

I see three maritime problems off the coast of Somalia: illegal fishing, illegal dumping, and lack of security. These are three problems that every professional Coast Guard in the world can fix off their nations coast, so instead of doing a nation building exercise on land, why not look at Somalia in the context of developing a national maritime security capability at sea. There are all kinds of ways to help the emerging Somali government without western military power on land, but there are very few options regarding standing up a professional Somali Coast Guard without foreign military assistance. This is where Europe and the Philippines can add capability for training to share the manpower costs that will be required in the development of skills necessary to meet the challenges of the Somalia maritime domain.

I look at this as a "Sons of Somalia" model in the spirit of "Sons of Iraq" except with direct training and military equipment assistance, plus a long term cooperation commitment. If the Somali Coast Guard is paid a wage of $10 - $20 dollars a day, plus using better equipment that interfaces with the modern technology of international naval forces, that job becomes appealing for the Somali kid looking for a way ahead. It would also keep costs low.

A 2000 man Somali Coast Guard earning $10 a day, and a 400 man officer corps making $20 a day (officer pay would scale from say $12 up to $15 a day), the estimated high number for manpower costs would be $10.2 million annually. If we built and supplied 30 M-80s, for example, at $15 million a piece, worked in conjunction with the local security forces to build expertise for say, 5 years, the total equipment cost would be $450 million, but operated in conjunction with international forces for 5 years we would actually be looking at $90 million annually in procurement amortized over the 5 years, plus one would figure $1 million per vessel maintenance annually, so $120 million annually.

That comes in at a cost of around $130.2 million annually to build a 30 modern vessel Coast Guard with 2000 Somali Coasties and 400 officers.

The way I see it, that is around what the total number of ransom payments could be in 2009 given the current rate of piracy, and well below even the lowest estimates the war risk insurance premiums are costing the industry. The goal would be to find $250 million annually for developing a Somali Coast Guard with a sustained and supported 5 year program, using the rest of the money annually for larger chartered command vessels (motherships) to cover the operational requirements of the M-80s, but also deal with problems like environmental cleanup or forward sea basing. In conjunction with international forces already operating in the region, a long term maritime security capability could be stood up.

Clearly this idea needs a lot of work to flesh out, but this is the general overview of how I would approach building a national maritime security capability for Somalia. It seems to me that $1.25 billion over 5 years could do a lot of good, particularly considering war risk insurance premiums over the same period by the shipping industry would be higher, and potentially much higher if war risk premiums become required off the eastern coast of Somalia for the big ships making the trip around the Cape of Good Hope.