In Somalia, We Have a Problem

Events over the weekend that included the capture of an al Qaeda operative in Libya and a raid in Somalia are the focus of military conversations I've been involved in since Friday night. I have nothing to add to the news in public regarding the operation in Libya. Well done to all on that action. My focus, as it has been since the early days of the blog, is with Somalia.

By now everyone has likely heard a story regarding events Friday evening local time in Somalia, but because the story has been told many different ways and the media has been running a stealth auto-correct campaign to virtually every news article posted as new facts become known, allow me to tell the story as I know it to have happened so you are keen on the details as of October 8, 2013.

In the late evening of Friday October 4, 2024 local time Navy SEALs belonging to the now famous DEVGRU, or SEAL Team 6 depending upon your preference, inserted into Somalia by small boat near the coastal village of Barawe, Somalia. The objective of the SEAL team was to capture, alive, a Kenyan insurgent named Abdukadir Mohamed Abdukadir, known by the nickname “Ikrima.” As the SEALs approached a seaside villa, the target house, they came under fire from security posted near the villa. A firefight broke out almost immediately and the SEAL team came under heavy fire. Rather than fighting a frontal assault, the team withdrew under cover of helicopter gunships back to their boats and returned to a US Navy ship offshore.

Intelligence

One of the most interesting aspects of the action in Somalia on Friday is that the intelligence appears to have been very good. First we have the target, Abdukadir Mohamed Abdukadir (Ikrima), who appears to be a very smart target for the US in the context of a 'capture alive' operation. Ikrima is a foreign militant in Somalia with ties to al Shabaab Central leadership including Ahmed Godane, ties to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and ties to al-Hijra - a terrorist organization in Kenya with ties to al Shabaab that is believed to have executed the recent Westgate mall attack. As a central figure he represents an intersection between foreign fighters in al Qaeda, local Somali insurgents, and al-Hijra operating in Kenya. His escape from capture Friday night means he is basically a walking dead man.

The intelligence of the location was also very good, because it turns out the reason for high security was because not only was Abdukadir Mohamed Abdukadir at the villa, but Mahad Mohamed Ali, known as “Karate,” was also there. Mahad Mohamed Ali (Karate) is the leader of Al Shabab’s Amniyat division, the intelligence wing of al Shabaab. According to the Toronto Star, there was a third leader there as well, but the name is not given. The journalist only describes the 3rd individual as Abu Hamza, which is not a name and simply means kunya or "father of," which is not helpful in identification.

Regardless, the presence of three major figures - one of which was the head of al Shabaab's intelligence wing - suggests the intelligence regarding the target villa was good. It is worth pointing out that presence of both Abdukadir Mohamed Abdukadir (Ikrima) and Mahad Mohamed Ali (Karate) in the same place would appear to validate suspicions that the Westgate attack was not only well financed, well planned, and well executed but also demonstrates some coordination between al Shabaab Central leadership and expertise across other organizations in the al Qaeda network. It certainly should trouble folks that multiple large, well resourced al Qaeda organizations were potentially coordinated in the attack at a detailed level, even if the details themselves weren't disseminated widely prior to the attack. Combining expertise and resources from across the various al Qaeda associated groups not only increases the likelihood of attacks, but increases the lethal potential of those attacks.

Environment and Geography

When Kenyan military forces invaded Somalia from the south in October 2011, the offensive was a disaster. Invading during the wet season, the Kenyan Army soon found themselves, literally, stuck in the mud. After slogging their way through the mud for eight months, Kenyan forces were formally integrated into the UN sanctioned AMISOM force in Somalia. That's another discussion for another time, but basically Kenya was granted political cover by the rest of the world for invading Somalia. Finally, in September of 2012 the Kenyan force under the AMISOM flag liberated Kismayo from al Shabaab control. The loss of Kismayo represented the recapture of the last major city stronghold al Shabaab had in Somalia.

The AMISOM military leadership projected expectations that with the loss of control of major cities by al Shabaab, Somalia was at a turning point. The reality is, over the past year AMISOM has done little outside of skirmishes near the towns of Burkakaba, Dinsoor, and Tieyglow - small inland towns north and west of Mogadishu. The lack of offensive military activity by AMISOM since the fall of Kismayo has been matched by a lack of offensive action by al Shabaab, which has spent the last few months in an internal power struggle that appears to have been resolved with Ahmad Godane consolidating his power over al Shabaab in Somalia.

Somalia in October 2013 looks very different than Somalia in 2011, before the Kenyan Army invaded Somalia with the objective of seizing Kismayo. The most important feature change from a military perspective is how the posture of al Shabaab's forces has changed from one of a mobile force roaming the rural country in the exercise of establishing local control to one of consolidated control in a more garrison posture. When US special forces went to Barawe, they basically ran into a garrisoned force that had fortified the city, and it is important to understand that nearly every town under the control of al Shabaab is likewise a fortified town with a garrison force.

It is very important to understand what Somalia is today compared to what Somalia was prior to the AMISOM success of liberating Mogadishu and Kismayo. Westerners often describe Somalia as an ungoverned, lawless territory with an insurgency, but on the ground in southern Somalia it is more akin to a dispersed collection of independent city states loosely affiliated with the Federal Government of Somalia in Mogadishu or a collection of smaller, independent villages under local tribal control under a very strict al Shabaab rule.

In the north with Somaliland and Puntland - both territories are officially unrecognized but self-declared sovereign, autonomous but not yet officially independent states, and are not the focus of this discussion.

Obviously Somalia is much more complicated than I can summarize in a few paragraphs, but I feel this background is necessary for discussing the broader points below that are more relevant to this audience.

US Military and Somalia

In the last week of September, USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) was sent to Djibouti to offload all elements of the 26 MEU and take on board special operations forces including the SEAL team that executed the raid this previous weekend. When a US Navy ship has it's command authority switched over to SOCOM, there are a number of details involved, particularly when it involves an amphibious ship. First, all Marine Corps equipment is offloaded - air, sea, land - everything Marine Corps is taken off the ship. Special operations forces bring it's own everything - including aviation, and there is no such thing as "Joint" in the context of terminology used elsewhere when discussing the US military. There is no such thing as a traditional COCOM command structure for these type of military operations either. Basically, when SOCOM needs something from a COCOM for assistance in situations like Somalia, they tell the COCOM what to give them. It is a one way street, and the COCOM that is supposed to run military operations is often just lucky to get a memo after the fact regarding what happened. It shouldn't be this way, but this is the way counter terrorism policy under the Obama administration works when it comes to special operations forces, some drone activities, and Cyber warfare sourced from DC.

Command authority for special operations off Somalia are directed by the Joint Staff in DC and the National Security Council, with SOCOM integrated throughout. The COCOM is a sideshow when it comes to command authority of these kind of operations.

SOCOM is bringing the tactical and operational lessons learned from Afghanistan, Iraq, and beyond to Somalia, with step one being grab some bad guys for intelligence purposes. It would be a mistake to call the events of last Friday evening a failure, because failing a primary objective is not the same as a failure. The reaction by al Shabaab since the Friday night raid suggests the impacts have, in fact, been anything but a failure.

In response to the raid by US special forces it is noteworthy al Shabaab Central leadership has been remarkably quiet, despite some in western media describing the US Navy SEAL action as a failure. You would think if they saw the events of Friday night as a victory they would be out shouting as much as loud as possible. Not so, none of the major players are doing any such thing. When US special forces hit the villa with some of al Shabaab's top people inside, considerable fear and doubt was injected into the organization. The population in Barawe, through Tuesday morning in Somalia, remains in lockdown with a curfew being enforced. Reinforcements have been sent to increase the garrison there. US intelligence was ultimately too good for al Shabaab's comfort level, and it is a good bet they have spent the last few days turning their own organization inside-out trying to plug security leaks.

Putting doubt into the enemy force is a feature of US special operations.

But the core problem still exists, and someone in the DoD needs to speak up. Somalia under al Shabaab in October of 2013 is a distributed garrison. In the history of special operations in Somalia, I am unaware of a single special operations incident in any area controlled by al Shabaab that took place in a populated town or city that didn't result in a major battle. Jessica Buchanan was in a secluded rural area nowhere near a town. Warsame was taken offshore. Indeed, every reported special operations action by every country that has been reported in the last several years took place outside a populated town or city. There should be no expectation that US special forces will successfully conduct any major operation without a major battle inside an al Shabaab controlled population center, because it has never happened.

And yet, that's apparently the new policy of the Obama administration. The US is apparently going to attempt to conduct low level military operations inside Somalia against al Shabaab forces that are postured like traditional Army forces with an expectation of success and a low profile. To protect SOCOM rice bowls, we are not going to use military forces in the region that operate under COCOM control, because SOCOM is not a joint force and in this case, insists it should not operate with the joint force. There will be no heavy forces provided by the Marine Corps available to help SOCOM if things go bad, and that is an intentional choice that the Command authority for Somalia operations - the Joint Staff in DC and the National Security Council - endorses.

It is policy to discard lessons from 1993 learned in blood in Somalia, but good luck trying to get an explanation from Susan Rice why this policy makes sense, because she is probably completely clueless smiling and nodding to her SOCOM handler oblivious to the details. The lack of experience on the President's National Security Council really does matter, and this is yet another example. Maybe General Dempsey should be asked that question, although given his leadership record, expect him to simply punt the answer to someone not picking up the phone at SOCOM.

I have long believed US special operations forces are incredible, intelligent, and always make good choices, but I have to admit I'm struggling with the policy that has been developed and is being executed by the Obama administration in Somalia in October 2013. From the outside looking in, this looks like SOCOM defending rice bowls for no reason other than defending rice bowls, and while I understand the political reluctance to use Marines in Somalia, it is very hard for me to believe the US is making the best use of Special Forces in Somalia when all of the targets of value are postured in military garrisons.

That isn't going to work.

Looking Ahead

It is going to be interesting to watch Somalia unfold over the next few weeks. I do not see a scenario where special forces find much success trying to grab useful intelligence sources from the fortified town areas al Shabaab controls, because al Shabaab knows we are coming and will have a huge numerical advantage in every fight. Does that mean President Obama will do nothing? Unlikely. The question is, how far is the President willing to go to achieve a meaningful strategic victory against al Shabaab?

Let's be honest, a drone strike on that villa Friday night would have been a huge victory for the US. It is unclear if we would have known how effective the drone strike would have been, but had the US killed Abdukadir Mohamed Abdukadir (Ikrima) and Mahad Mohamed Ali (Karate) that would have been a huge counter terrorism win for the US against al Shabaab.

Some of the instant analysis following this past weekends events suggest the President is moving away from a drone centric counter-terrorism strategy. Not so fast, because in Somalia his preferred alternative of using special operations forces on the ground isn't likely to work out well against garrisoned military forces. That is going to force a decision by the President:

1. Increase the use of Drones in Somalia.
2. Use the rest of the Joint Force as designed to augment special operations on the ground.
3. Nibble ineffectively around the edges of towns and in rural areas with SOF.

If the US tries to operate SOF in the fortified, garrisoned towns al Shabaab has control of, don't expect things to go well, because history consistently says it will not. The US faces significant operational problems in Somalia if the nation is indeed serious about increasing counter terrorism operations against al Shabaab. The celebrated option this week is using special operations forces on the ground, but the reality is, Somalia is the wrong place to send in lightly armed military forces, and US history in Somalia is a story why that approach to al Shabaab is a bad idea. In Somalia to use special operations forces on the ground effectively the options are either to heavily increase the use of drone strikes to wither down enemy force, or use heavily armed Marines to augment special operations forces in reducing the threat from the garrisons.

The use of Marines and assets of the Joint Force has the potential to significantly increase civilian casualties and the likelihood of US casualties, although used in hit and run operations also give the US a much higher potential for success in significantly damaging al Shabaab. That option may not be politically possible or desirable though.

Which takes us back to contemplating the use of drones, whose demise in recent days has been widely overstated.

Africa Maritime Updates

With so much in the news this month, it's been easy to overlook the interesting events occurring in and around the water of today's most dynamic continent.

Somali Piracy remains practically non-existent this year, thanks to the continued presence of armed security detachments on commercial vessels.  While commercial shipping in the Gulf of Aden is relatively safe, hundreds of smaller private sailing vessels and motor yachts remain unable to transit the area because they simply can’t afford armed security.

Two years ago this month, U.S. and NATO forces were pounding away at Libya's armed forces and pretty much totaled Gadhafi's Navy.  Earlier this month, Royal Navy frigate HMS Kent made an unprecedented good will visit to the port of Tripoli.  Other countries such as France and Malta have been helping Libya to rebuild its naval forces, which are critical for patrolling the country's 2,000 kilometer coast line, interdicting smugglers and migrants trying to reach Europe, and securing the export of more than 1.3 million barrels per day of petroleum.

The MEND is at it again.

On the west side of the continent, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) group killed 10 police in a boat and renewed attacks on maritime oil infrastructure.  More troubling though, are reports that MEND, historically a group with secular aims, may be entering the sectarian conflict started by Boko Haram terrorists in the North.  Threatening attacks on Muslims in the Niger Delta, the group's spokesman recently issued a statement: "On behalf of the hapless Christian population in Nigeria, The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta will from Friday, May 31, 2013, embark on a crusade to save Christianity in Nigeria from annihilation." Nigerian security forces are already overwhelmed fighting terrorist in the North (with very heavy handed tactics it must be noted) and a renewed insurgency in the South could threat stability in this important economic anchor for West Africa.

Also in the Gulf of Guinea, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration recently conducted a rather audacious under-cover operation at sea to detain Guinea-Bissau's former Chief of Naval Operations and drug kingpin Bubo Na Tchuto.  The impact of narcotics proceeds on the ledgers of terror groups in Africa has been overstated by DEA (at least in my opinion), but this operation was worthwhile if only to remove one of the most corrupt officials in West Africa.

 

In Northern Mali, French Forces have begun a gradual withdrawal from fighting al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. AQIM and its associated militant groups made use of the Niger River during the French intervention.  France is hoping for a U.N. force to replace African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) troops and that force will certainly need some sort of riverine capability to keep the waterways leading up to Timbuktu and Gao clear of extremist activity.

Malian military patrols the Niger River.

 The last update isn’t really maritime-related, but does involve the USN participating on a unique foreign internal defense mission in the Sahara.  Last month, four U.S. naval officers deployed with special operations forces (SOF) from all over the globe to West Africa to train African special operators for counter-terrorism missions in the region.   SEAL LCDR Kaj Larsen explains more here about FLINTLOCK 13.

 

Instability around the continent and the recent attacks on U.S. embassies last September have driven the military to examine various options for both future crisis response and steady state capacity-building operations.  The Army is regionally aligning some forces, with a dedicated Brigade Combat Team to support training missions and be prepared to intervene on the continent should the need arise.  Africa has been described as an "economy of force" operation for DOD and generally the introduction of any element other than culturally-attuned, small footprint forces (read SOF) raises the eyebrows of State Department diplomats.  I find it hard to believe that the Army could get a brigade-sized element - or even pieces of it - nimble enough to deploy rapidly, with a minimal number of "boots on the ground" and adequate logistics train to satisfy these requirements.  Along similar lines, the Marine Corps has instituted a company-sized crisis response element for this mission which leverages the speed and long-range mobility of the MV-22.   Expeditionary crisis-response is in the Marine Corps DNA, but without adequate amphibious shipping, the Corps' unique capabilities can't be exploited.  That said, it will be interesting to see which force the COCOM and Ambassador calls on next time there is a crisis in Africa.

 The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Lawfare and NGO Maritime Actors

In this undated photo released by Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, its new Antarctic patrol ship SSS Sam Simon steams on the sea. (AP Photo/Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, Carolina A. Castro)

On the One Year Anniversary Special of Midrats 2 years ago, CDR Salamander opened his discussion with a question submitted by Admiral James Stavridis that asked what the panel believed would be the next big thing after next (over the horizon) for naval operations. In his answer, Claude Berube discussed the concept of emerging Maritime Shadow Zones which he defined as geographical maritime security gaps where naval power lacks the strength, authority, or interest to enforce maritime security in maritime regions globally. In his description of this potential emerging future, Claude mentioned that it is possible that both legitimate an non-legitimate non-governmental actors would be emerge to fill those voids.

While it wasn't the first time I had been exposed to that concept, his presentation of what a potential future role of the maritime NGO might look like inspired several ideas in my mind, and I admit I have thought about the topic in the way he presented it many times since. Due almost entirely to the his answer that night, I began paying closer attention to the activities of the Sea Sheperd Conservation Society, perhaps the most renowned of the modern legitimate NGOs currently filling the maritime shadow zone in the Southern Ocean.

Did that word bother you? The word I refer to is legitimate, which does require some definition and I am open to adopting a different word for the lexicon if you have any suggestions. Maritime piracy, maritime banditry, smuggling and trafficking, oil theft, and a host of other criminal activities at sea are conducted by non-legitimate non-governmental actors in various places in the world. While causes may be increased population density of coastlines, poor regional governance and failed states, or the absence of an effective regional maritime security enforcement agency, criminal activity on the seas - particularly in the littorals - is not going away anytime soon. As more commercial interests emerge offshore and as the commercial population on the seas increase in the maritime domain, it should be expected that criminal activity on the seas will increase, and as the recent history of Somalia shows us; well financed enterprises will emerge as well.

But it is the trend of legitimate NGOs that interests me most, and regardless of what you think about the organization or their politics, the Sea Sheperd Conservation Society is a legitimate non-profit non-governmental organization. Legitimacy means a lot of things, but first and foremost being a legitimate NGO means the organization can be held to the rule of law, when applicable.

To celebrate the upcoming sixth season of Whale Wars, the political struggle between the Sea Sheperd Conservation Society and Japan's Institute of Cetacean Research has moved beyond clashes at sea that somewhat resemble non-lethal irregular maritime warfare activities towards another type of political combat often found in war zones: Lawfare.

A U.S. appeals court ordered American anti-whaling activists to keep 500 yards away from Japanese whaling ships off Antarctica.

The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals issued an injunction against the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, which sends vessels every December to disrupt whale killings by Japan's Institute of Cetacean Research.

The whalers sued Sea Shepherd last year to prevent the protesters from interfering, but the judge refused to grant the request.

The 9th Circuit ordered Sea Shepherd not to approach any of the Japanese vessels until it can rule on the merits of the whalers' appeal.

Japan's whaling fleet kills up to 1,000 whales a year for research. Whale meat not used for study is sold as food in Japan, which critics say is the real reason for the hunts.

In response to this injunction, and just days into the Sea Sheperd Conservation Society's latest anti-whaling campaign Operation Zero Tolerance, Paul Watson has relieved himself from duty.

For the 35 years since I founded the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society I have strived to act non-violently and within the boundaries of the law.

Sea Shepherd has never been a protest organization nor have we engaged in civil disobedience. We are an anti-poaching organization established to uphold international conservation law. We operate within the guidelines of the United Nations World Charter for Nature that allows for intervention by non-profit non-governmental organizations and individuals to uphold international conservation law.

During Sea Shepherd’s long history we have never caused a single injury to any person. Although we have broken some bureaucratic regulations like Canada’s so called Seal Protection Act, we did so to challenge the validity of these regulations, which were in contradiction to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In all other respects we have always operated within the boundaries of the law, both international and national.

In 1998 Sea Shepherd USA complied with the order by the United States Coast Guard to not approach within a thousand yards of the Makah whaling operation in Washington State.

I myself have never been convicted of a felony crime.

And for this reason, the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society in the United States and myself as a U.S. citizen must comply with the order by the 9th Circuit court of the United States.

Because I have been personally named in the injunction I have resigned as the President of the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society in the United States and as President of the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society Australia. I have also resigned my position of Executive Director of Sea Shepherd Conservation Society USA and I will hold no paid position with Sea Shepherd anywhere Sea Shepherd is registered and operates as a non-profit organization in any nation.

I have also stepped down as campaign leader for Operation Zero Tolerance. Former Greens Party leader and former Australian Senator, Bob Brown of Tasmania will now hold this position.

I have also stepped down as Captain of the Steve Irwin. Captain Siddharth Chakravarty of India is now in command of the Steve Irwin. The other three Captains are citizens of Sweden, France and Australia.

As a United States citizen, I will respect and comply with the ruling of the United States 9th District Court and will not violate the temporary injunction granted to the Institute for Cetacean Research.  I will participate as an observer within the boundaries established by the 9th Circuit Court of the United States.

Some people pick sides in the struggle between Japan's Institute of Cetacean Research and the Sea Sheperd Conservation Society. Don't be that guy, because the actual politics of either side of their issues have absolutely nothing to do with our interest in their disputes here at ID.

I have no idea how much money Japan's Institute of Cetacean Research is spending on their legal battle against the Sea Sheperd organization in the 9th Circuit court, but it is probably a lot. What have they accomplished? They basically turned Paul Watson into a living martyr, able to freely roam around the planet fundraising for more activities against Japanese whalers, but they haven't accomplished anything else.

And that is the key point here - Lawfare is going to be a fact of life for legitimate maritime NGOs that conduct any engaging activity at sea. However, I also expect that legitimate non-governmental organizations are going to be able shuffle resources around multiple countries under any number of Flags until they find a legal system supportive of their organizational goals - and by doing so avoid legal consequences solely by avoiding legal jurisdictions.

Until now Sea Sheperd has been the largest legitimate maritime NGO operating in the maritime shadow zones, but an even larger organization is about to step up and unlike the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, these guys will be packing heat!

A private navy founded by businessmen, former marines, retired captains and soldiers will protect its first group of oil tankers and bulk carriers from pirates in the Indian Ocean in late March or April, according to Bloomberg Businessweek.

Typhon, a venture formed by a group of U.K. businessmen led by Glencore International’s Chairman Simon Murray, will recruit 240 former marines and sailors for its navy...

Typhon, the company behind the venture, is chaired by Simon Murray, a millionaire businessman who joined the French Foreign Legion as a teenager and walked unsupported to the South Pole aged 63.

Typhon has been set up because the Royal Navy, NATO and the European Union Naval Force lack the vessels to patrol an area of ocean that is as large as North America, said Anthony Sharp, chief executive. "They can't do the job because they haven't got the budget and deploying a billion-pound warship against six guys (pirates) with $500 of kit is not a very good use of the asset," he said.

Typhon said its aim is to deter pirates from attacking its convoys, rather than engaging in firefights.

The pirates will face former marines in armoured patrol boats capable of 40 knots and able to withstand incoming Kalashnikov fire. They will be armed with close-quarter battle weapons, such as the M4 carbine, and sniper rifles with a range of 2km.

Also worth noting this particular NGO is bringing it's own brand of political celebrity.

Other Typhon directors include Admiral Henry Ulrich, former commander of US Naval Forces Europe, General Sir Jack Deverell, former commander in chief Allied Forces Northern Europe, and Lord Dannatt, former chief of the general staff.

The last major commercial vessel hijacked off Somalia was MT Royal Grace, a Panama-flagged oil tanker owned by a UAE-based company that was hijacked on March 2, 2012.... 10 months ago! The last pirate attack on a commercial vessel came Saturday when a merchant vessel was able to repel an attack when USS Halyburton (FFG 40) responded and all pirates were rounded up by the French Frigate FS Surcouf (F 711).

Some are calling this a private Navy, but there is very little difference in modern international law between Typhon's private Navy and the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society. One organization is arming themselves with weapons like rancid butter and the other is using bullet proof fast boats armed with ex-Marines fielding M4s and sniper rifles.

But there is a big difference between Somali pirates and Japanese whalers, right? A more legitimate question is how different are Somali pirates and Somali fisherman?

There are a lot of people making a lot of money on the Japanese whaling industry. There are also a lot of people making a lot of money on the Somali piracy industry.

The Typhon private Navy is not something radical, although it also doesn't really have a lot in common with the 19th century articles of marque either, despite the appearance of similarities. Typhon represents the next evolution of a maritime NGO setting up shop in the worlds most popular ungoverned maritime shadow zone. Over the next few years and in response to increased resource competitions offshore in greater frequency and intensity, organizations like the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society that are engaged in political activism and organizations like Typhon that are engaged in armed maritime security are going to become more common as global naval power trends towards more expensive, less numerous high end capability combat platforms that will almost certainly leave huge gaps in global maritime naval coverage necessary for good governance at sea.

With no unified ruleset governing the laws of the maritime domain, we should only expect these early examples to be carried forward as precedents. What does an armed fishery protection NGO in the South China Sea look like five years from now, and could such an entity be the catalyst for a proxy war in the South China Sea? If I am the Japanese government and I'm looking for a way of disrupting Chinese fishing vessels operating in my EEZ, I'm not sure why I wouldn't be looking at exactly this type of low cost, unofficial solution. When naval power lacks the strength, authority, or interest to enforce maritime security, alternatives will and are emerging, and I do wonder if the ruleset we are allowing to be set forth by others is actually in our long term national interest. The maritime NGO was an issue easy to ignore when it was the Sea Sheperd hippies, but now we are seeing a well funded, armed maritime NGO with significant political ties to major maritime nations.

I have no idea how maritime NGOs will continue to evolve, but one thing I am sure of... I won't be surprised the day Henry Ulrich is specifically named in some lawsuit in a US court in the future related to the murder of an AK-47 wielding Somali fisherman off the coast of Somalia, because when it comes to legitimate maritime NGOs, Lawfare is one of many expected consequences.


Additional Notes:

Midrats will be having a three year anniversary special this Sunday. I look forward to it.
The legal troubles for Paul Watson are bigger than simply the 9th circuit ruling. If that topic interests you, this link probably will too (PDF).
More on the Sea Sheperd here and here.

The Fall of Kismayo

The Somalia Report has an interesting article discussing some of the naval aspects of the long-awaited defeat of al Shabaab in Kismayo.  Over the course of nearly a year, Kenya's small Navy has hit above its weight during the campaign to defeat al Shabaab's strong-holds in southern Somalia.  While AMISOM forces, largely composed of Ugandans trained and equipped via the U.S. ACOTA program squeezed al Shabaab from Mogadishu in the North, the Kenyan Defense Forces entered Jubaland last fall and moved deliberately northward. Although KDF ground-forces reflagged under AMISOM command a few months ago, the navy has remained under Kenyan control throughout the campaign.  Naval operations have included maritime interdiction and naval gunfire support, and culminated last Friday in a roughly company-sized amphibious landing into the vital port of Kismaayo.  Among the vessels participating in the assault was Kenya's newly-acquired Jasiri OPV (see below video).

Al Shabaab's fighters had largely retreated from the city in anticipation of the assault, some to their few remaining strongholds in the south and mountains in Puntland, some dissolving away to fight again, and others reintegrating with local clan militias.  Fighting continues though, and the security situation is fragile.  As we've discussed, a peaceful transition in Kismaayo, either to friendly clan-based militias or more legitimate Somali security forces, will be the KDF's next major milestone.

The KDF, including Kenya's Navy, should be commended for their staying power and the effectiveness of Operation Linda Nchi.  The unilateral advance initially surprised and offended the UN and Western diplomats who apparently intended for the well-entrenched al Shabaab forces to magically disappear by sheer dint of verbal discourse.  However, in the face of political opposition, a robust but largely untrue social media driven information operations campaign...

KDF ships cowardly shell #Kismayo overnight, killing 2 children & injuring several people despite the withdrawal of HSM administration.
— HSM Press Office (@HSMPress) September 30, 2024

and numerous terrorist attacks against their own population, the Kenyans stuck with it to achieve their military objective.  Hongera!

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Somali Warlords Jockey for Position

Via the Somalia Report, we learn (unsurprisingly) that Somali militias ASWJ and Ras Kamboni each have their eyes on the strategic prize of Kismayo.  This blog has repeatedly discussed the importance of this port as a revenue source for al Shabaab and to whomever controls it next.   The Kenyan Defense Force set the goal of capturing Kismayo following their incursion into southern Somalia nearly ten months ago.  After halts due to weather and other factors, the KDF (now operating notionally under the writ of AMISOM) campaign has picked up momentum again and it appears likely this objective will be achieved within the two months or so following Ramadan.  I still subscribe to the expectation (see comments here) that al Shabaab will fade away without much of a fight, and stick to the hit and run tactics we've seen since they vacated Mogadishu last year.  A desirable, but probably unlikely outcome would be for the TFG to assert governance and maintain order at this vital port once al Shabaab is defeated there.  However, as long as this key territory and revenue source is wrestled from al Qaeda's East African brothers, the situation will be an improvement over the status quo.

German-made blasting caps intercepted by PSF

With the impending loss of Kismayo, al Shabaab is on the ropes in the South, but continues a migration northward towards sanctuary in the mountains of Puntland.  Last week, Puntland Security Forces intercepted a boat carrying military-grade IED precursors and other weapons, likely intended for employment against AMISOM forces.  This successful interdiction represents the tip of the iceberg of munitions and fighters flowing from al Shabaab's militant partners in AQAP.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

EU Strikes Somali Pirate Depot

Apparently the Europeans were serious when they voted to start striking targets on land. Release from EUNAVFOR.

15th May - Earlier today, following the decision taken on 23 March 2024 by the Council of the European Union to allow the EU Naval Force to take disruption action against known pirate supplies on the shore, EU forces conducted an operation to destroy pirate equipment on the Somali coastline.

The operation was conducted in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1851 and has the full support of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia. The focused, precise and proportionate action was conducted from the air and all forces returned safely to EU warships on completion. Whilst assessment is on-going, surveillance of the area during the action indicates that no Somalis were injured ashore as a result of EU action.

Speaking about the operation, the Operation Commander of the EU Naval Force, Rear Admiral Duncan Potts said “We believe this action by the EU Naval Force will further increase the pressure on, and disrupt pirates’ efforts to get out to sea to attack merchant shipping and dhows. The local Somali people and fishermen - many of whom have suffered so much because of piracy in the region, can be reassured that our focus was on known pirate supplies and will remain so in the future.”

At no point did EU Naval Force ‘boots’ go ashore. Rear Admiral Potts went on to say “The EU Naval Force action against pirate supplies on the shoreline is merely an extension of the disruption actions carried out against pirate ships at sea, and Operation Atalanta remains committed to fighting piracy off the Horn of Africa and the humanitarian mission of protecting World Food Programme ships that bring vital aid to the Somali people.”

Operation Atalanta is part of the EU’s comprehensive approach to tackling symptoms and root causes of piracy in the Horn of Africa and the EU strategic framework for that region adopted in November 2011. Currently there are 9 warships in the EU Naval Force and 5 Maritime Patrol Aircraft.

The reach of Somali pirates is vast; they have attacked merchant ships up to 1,750 miles off the Somali coast. Preventing them getting out to sea is a crucial step in removing their impunity ashore and to further the success of counter-piracy operations.

First, this is the French and the Danes, both of whom have had enough of piracy. The Danes have been particularly effective in their anti-piracy tactics for a long time. The attack was likely launched from the French Mistral class vessel in the area. I am hearing the shooters were British, and concentrated on taking out the outboard motors of pirate boats. We have discussed this in the past on the blog - indeed taking out outboard motors on pirate boats has been something US Navy officers who have patrolled off Somalia have mentioned several times in several venues as being one way to quickly hurt pirate operations. Why hasn't the US Navy done this before? Someone should ask the State Department...

A target in Somalia with no people was probably low hanging fruit. Its hard to believe an airstrike against a depot so important no one was there is going to be an effective deterrent against piracy.

I don't mean to sound cold, but I do think the EU is going to have to actually kill pirates if their little land attack strategy is going to be an effective deterrent. Based on the way this press release is worded, I'm not sure that's the plan.

Updated: Turns out it was a Spanish SH-60B from the frigate Reina Sofía (F-84) with other EU forces supporting. What a good sign to see the Spanish engaged like this, and with success it is more likely we will see more of this kind of activity.

The Dutch To Fight Pirates On Shore

On March 23 the European Union decided to extend operation EU NAVFOR until December 2014. At the same time the AOR has also been extended to include Somali coastal territory and internal waters. 

On April 3 their operation plan has been adjusted accordingly.Soon after that, the Dutch government has decided that they will act according to the new operational plan. The Dutch have wanted this extention for quite some time now.

And to be effective against pirates, the Dutch had also agreed last year to put helicopters on every ship they would send to the Horn of Africa.

Because the NH90 has been delayed and the Westland Lynx' are end-of-life, instead of the frigate HNLMS Tromp, the Dutch will now send HNLMS Rotterdam, a LPD. In 2010 they also sent a LPD and used LCU's and LCVP's to block the Somali coast. But HNLMS Johan de Witt didn't have a helicopter on board. This time the Dutch will be sending 2 Cougars (that have been training for this during excersice Cold Response 2012), along with a Scan Eagle.

And they will send in another submarine. And some extra marines. 

So from September-December the Dutch presence is substantial.

But the kicker.....from September-December the Dutch will be leading a Standing NATO Maritime Group for Operation Ocean shield from their LPD, and the sub is also in the area after a NATO request.

So will the Dutch do what they did when freeing the MV Taipan, and temporarily put their ship under national command (or EU command), so they can tackle those pirates ashore?

Fisheries, Piracy, and Stability in Somalia

Life in Mogadishu is returning to some semblance of economic normalcy as shown by this catch (hammerhead, mako, swordfish, and tuna) in the fish market. Thanks mostly to the dedication of AMISOM contributors Uganda and Burundi and the TFG’s unexpected staying power (a bit of Uncle Sam's money for ACOTA didn't hurt, either), al Shabaab has been driven from the Somali capital. The al Qaeda affiliate is not on the ropes yet, but has also been squeezed in the south by the incursions of Kenya and Ethiopia. More on that topic another time.

The importance of fisheries and their protection to coastal-based economies can’t be underestimated. As an example, revenues from the UK’s fisheries enforcement supported free university educations for Falklands Islands teenagers following the 1982 war. One of Somalia's other major problems (there are many) is of course, piracy. The negative economic impacts of piracy are often mentioned in terms of global shipping disruption, higher insurance and security costs, etc., but the price to law abiding Somali people is also tangible. There are indications that the populations in regions where pirates still operate are fed up with their criminality and that people realize the negative attention piracy has brought on these areas. Another good sign is that local policing and military efforts against pirates are picking up steam ashore.

The initial rationalization of Somalia’s pirates was that foreign fishermen and other vessels' disposal of hazardous waste in Somali waters had put them out of business. The narrative persists, but the reality is that the motivation of today’s pirates is based on outright greed and criminality. However, as evidenced by the number of Asian fishing vessels captured by the pirates', it's likely that illegal fishing continues in Somalia's waters, and will continue even after Somalia piracy dissipates.

I've mentioned many times in this blog as well as other forums that securing Somalia's waters -- and not just against piracy -- is one of the keys to long term stability in Somalia. To date, these efforts have come in fits and starts. One of the latest controversies involves UN opposition to the creation of the Puntland Marine Police Force. The UN must realize that their inability to drive enforcement of the various resolutions the body has passed is partially responsible for the mess in which Somalia finds itself in now and that as long as governments are not willing to directly intervene to train and equip Somalia's navy, coast guard, and marine police forces, indirect efforts involving private security firms funded by various entities will fill the void. Regardless, were any sort of U.S. or international cohesiveness on Somalia policy suddenly to materialize, maritime security capacity building efforts focused on fisheries protection should become a top priority. A properly regulated fishing industry could replace and more equitably distribute at least some of the income derived from piracy in Somalia's economy.

And speaking of piracy, the latest issue of USCG Proceedings is dedicated to the subject.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Africa Maritime IW Potpourri

AQIM Maritime Terror Plot Disrupted: Algerian officials recently detained three terrorists from al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb plotting a COLE-like attack against U.S. or European ships in the Med. Had this attack been executed, it would have represented a significant escalation in AQIM’s tactics, which thus far have been mostly focused on kidnapping Westerners for ransom and smaller local bombings.

al Shabaab Flees to Sea: Numerous reports have discussed al Shabaab's use of the sea as a means of travel both up and down Somalia's long coast and to and from Yemen. These stories demonstrate al Qaeda's continued interest in maritime attacks and the sea as a means for movement and support. They also reflect AQ's strategic shift out of the FATA into Africa as drone strikes have successfully hammered the networks's core leadership in Pakistan.

Also from East Africa:
Pirate/Human Smuggler Nexus: This is an interesting twist on the Pirate/al Shabaab nexus and demonstrates the extent that pirates have entrenched themselves into Somalia's illicit economy.

Finally, some new news on Africa's river wars: “A new 2010 Cooperative Framework Agreement, now signed by most of the key upstream abutters, would give all riparian states (including the Congo, where a stream that flows into Lake Tanganyika is the acknowledged Nile source) equal access to the resources of the river. That would give preference to large scale upstream energy and industrial, as well as long-time agricultural and irrigation uses.

Egypt and Sudan have refused to sign the new agreement, despite years of discussions and many heated meetings. Given climate change, the drying up of water sources everywhere in Africa and the world, Egypt, which is guaranteed 56 billion of the annual flow of 84 billion cubic meters of Nile water each year, hardly wants to lose even a drop of its allocation. Nor does Sudan, guaranteed 15 billion cubic meters.”

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Finding Stability with Somalia's Nascent Navy

Here's a good article from the Somalia Report on the TFG's underfunded, underequipped Navy. The littorals play no small part in Somalia's instability. Piracy from Somalia's shores continues to threaten the Indian Ocean, despite a dropping success rate due to a greater acceptance of embarked armed security teams. Al Shabaab has begun to exercise its own crude maritime force, skirmishing with the Kenyans at sea in November and December. Al Shabaab also receives funding, weapons, and fighters from the sea. Finally, some combination of Somali pirates/criminals/al Shabaabers continues attempts to kidnap tourists from Kenyan coastal areas.

Building indigenous naval capacity is one of the ways that the international community can help stabilize Somalia. As we know from recent experience trying to stand up Iraq's Navy, building a nascent navy is not easy, inexpensive, or fast. US legislation on security force assistance doesn't facilitate multiyear funding mechanisms optimal for these sorts of efforts, and Navy culture and force structure (outside of MCAST) are not conducive to working with smaller navies. However, there may be a role for US and allied support to the African Union in training, equipping, and deploying an AMISOM maritime capability. The US State Department's ACOTA program has supported training Ugandan Defense Forces which are the bulwark of the AMISOM mission. A program to deploy willing West African navies to Somalia under the auspices of the AU, train and equip them with patrol boats that they might retain following mission completion, might be enough to bolster the tiny Somali Navy and reduce the impact of maritime crime, insurgency, and terrorists who ply the coast of Somalia. In turn, these navies would redeploy more capable, interoperable, and experienced to defend their own shores.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Industry Invests in Maritime Mall Cops

The private sector is stepping up to deal with piracy. This article discusses details of the emerging maritime mall cop business model, which expects to have several ships operating within the next five months.

Convoy Escort Programme Ltd., backed by the marine insurance industry, will initially deploy seven former naval patrol boats, each with armed security teams of eight people on board, Angus Campbell, chief executive officer, said by phone from Swarland, England today. The bullet-proofed boats will charge about $30,000 per ship traveling in a convoy of around four vessels over three to four days, he said.

“We are going to be a deterrent,” Campbell said. “We are not in the business of looking for trouble but if anybody tries to attack a vessel we are escorting, our security teams will deploy force if they have to act in self defence.”

7 boats capable of 5-6 convoys per month at around ~$100,000 a convoy. If we assume 8 months of operation per boat, this is a ~$30 million a year business model. The story adds a bit more detail:

The venture, backed by U.K. insurance and reinsurance broking company Jardine Lloyd Thompson Group Plc, needs about $30 million from investors to complete the first-stage, patrol boat purchase, Campbell said. A second stage adding another 11 former offshore boats, will follow, taking total investment to around $50 million, he said. Venture capitalists, oil companies and marine insurers are among possible investors.

The project, first discussed more than a year ago, experienced some delays in getting a state jurisdiction to register its vessels. Cyprus agreed to add the ships last month, following a U.S. State Department veto for registration in the Marshall Islands, Campbell said.

By my math, that would add an additional $50 million or so a year. Long term, this private sector option is 18 small boats with 144 security personnel that intends to escort less than 2,000 ships if limited to 4 ships per convoy - which is less than 8% of all ships that move through the area. Piracy is big business, and as it becomes bigger business there will be less incentive for governments to do anything about it.

My guess is the maritime security personnel will be former naval and special forces operators from around the world. My guess would also be that most of them will be highly professional, well educated, and well trained operators, but that won't stop accusations and innuendo otherwise, for example, being labeled "maritime mall cops" by folks like me.

Whether the intent is there or not, by action governments could be conceding that the legal problems associated with global maritime piracy are too much to overcome by passively allowing the privatization of maritime security to private security contractors. It is hard to see a scenario where a private security contractor will make an arrest under any sort of legal mechanism, which leaves very few options except to issue warnings, shoot, and ignore questions later. By nature the sea offers private security privacy from their actions, and as nations with sophisticated law support technology have had a hard time generating enough evidence to bring about legal trials, so too will the pirates who attempt legal mechanisms against private security contractors. Short of "blood on the deck" or first person witnessing of illegal actions by a naval power willing to share data with the attorney's of pirates, evidence of any excessive force by private security at sea seems very unlikely.

Which is part of the issue here no country or even the maritime shipping industry is ready to deal with - wide scale privatization of pirate security increases the stakes because it changes the rules of the game as they are today. If actions at sea by private security become more violent, is it not possible the actions by pirate attackers will also become more violent? Any disruption to the status quo can lead to unintended consequences, but with governments giving token efforts (at best) to curb piracy, it isn't hard to see why private security isn't anything other than a natural evolution for protection by the shipping industry. This is particularly true since armed security has a 100% success rate as a protection scheme against modern piracy.

Battleground Africa: The Upcoming Siege of Kismayo

The war taking place in east Africa is very difficult to follow through the media, indeed without good background on events it might be impossible to get an accurate picture on any given day - although there are several great summery articles like this one every few days. Several reporters from news agencies across the globe are struggling to follow unfolding events due to the confusion and chaos that comes from the fog of war. There simply isn't much information outside of official sources, and it is not safe for journalists (or anyone else) to seek information themselves.

There are several factions, clans, nations, and organizations - all with different objectives, fighting on the same Somalia battlefield with different military objectives. The level of cooperation between these factions is unclear, and the degree to which any one faction will work with another is limited so far. Suggesting alliances or even assistance unifies different factions involved is an abuse of either term, and thus is the complex nature of the 2011 war in Somalia.

Kenya's military objectives have been explained as developing a buffer zone between Somalia and Kenya, with a focus of the operation on overthrowing Al Shabaab from the major port hub in Kismayo. From my perspective, taking Kismayo is the primary military objective of the operation - because over the last many months the port at Kismayo had become the primary logistics hub for Al Shabaab.

The invasion of Somalia by Kenya has been ugly to observe. The Kenyan Army is better armed and thus a very formidable force relative to Al Shabaab, but not relative to other African nations, like Ethiopia. The Kenyan Army is also a foreign military invading a country that doesn't like foreigners, and as an organization the Kenyan Army is inexperienced and not very disciplined. This is a serious concern for nations Kenya is seeking support from, because military occupation forces require discipline to be effective.

The key question facing the US is whether or not to openly and actively throw direct support behind Kenya in their ongoing military operations in Somalia. This is how the US is presenting the question diplomatically as an open, unanswered question:

Question: Would the U.S. support a request for international assistance (NATO or some other international org) to blockade Kismayo?

Answer: We are aware of the request from Kenya and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to impose a blockade on Kismayo. Blockades are generally difficult to enforce and may have unintended consequences in the midst of a humanitarian crisis. This proposal must be discussed with international partners, particularly the African Union and UN Security Council and carefully considered in the context of the overall strategy for restoring peace and stability in Somalia.

What the US is trying to say with this cryptic word puzzle of an official State Department response is that we are not yet sure we are ready to fully commit our resources in support of Kenya's military operation and objectives. It's not clear what role the US is playing in support of Kenya, but the answer at this time appears to be that we are not contributing directly in any significant way - and I've heard more than a few credible diplomatic and military folks legitimately describe the US actions in response to Kenya's invasion of Somalia as political dithering. Being that all major military decisions by the Obama administration are made on Friday, perhaps we are only hours away from announcing our policy.

While recent reporting highlights the USAF is now flying Reaper drones from an upgraded airfield in Arba Minch, Ethiopia, this activity is part ongoing military activity by the US is completely independent of Kenya's Operation Linda Nchi. Had Kenya not invaded southern Somalia, the base would still exist and still conduct the same missions. We are seeing evidence of indiect US support for Kenya, for example, detailed information related to arms shipments for Al Shabaab to the airport in Baidoa is very likely a product of US intelligence. The only Western nation that has announced they are publicly supporting Kenya at this time is France, and that support is limited to military logistics that is mostly, if not all, done within the Kenyan borders.

It is important to note that both Kenya and the US are two different sides of a multi-sided war taking place in Somalia. The completely ineffective Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which the UN recognizes as the legitimate government of Somalia, is a third side. AMISOM, the African Union military force established to support the TFG, often acts as it's own side in Somalia as well. There are also several different clans in southern Somalia, which are not really the side of the TFG or Al Shabaab, and there is a very strong pirate organization that operates out of Kismayo with 'very loose affiliations' with Al Shabaab, and by 'very loose affiliations' it is more accurate to describe that relationship in the context of blackmail.

And as always, there are innocents who are caught in the middle of these factions.

It would be inappropriate to suggest the upcoming siege of Kismayo as one of the pivital military battles in Somalia given the length of time the nation has been at civil war and following the August liberation of Mogadishu from Al Shabaab, but there is one context we can accurate describe the upcoming siege of Kismayo.

From a US national security interest point of view, the battle for Kismayo will be the most important military battle fought against Al Qaeda aligned transnational terrorist organizations outside of Afghanistan and Iraq since September 11, 2001. From the perspective of geography and logistics, not to mention financial support, Kismayo is a key holding by Al Shabaab, and the removal of AL Shabaab from Kismayo would be a strategic defeat even beyond that the organization suffered in Mogadishu earlier this year. No single military battle holds more opportunity at a strategic level for all parties involved than the upcoming siege. The question isn't whether the US gets involved in the battle - after all the US has been striking targets around Kismayo for years - the key questions are to degree the US will get involved - and to what degree can successful achievement of military and political objectives in Kismayo create genuine change in the region.

After all, it isn't just social and environmental change potential with taking a port like Kismayo and the mouth of the Jabba River, the economic potential and resources throughout that region of Africa from Southern Somalia, Uganda, Ethiopia, and South Sudan potentially adds balance to opportunity costs that come with the development of a regional port like Kismayo, and the financial opportunity is in the trillions of dollars. As Kismayo goes, so does the region. It will be very interesting to see how committed the international community becomes as the siege of Kismayo approaches, because I think Kenya is on the verge of discovering several fair weather friends if the upcoming siege of Kismayo doesn't turn into a strategic blunder for their military.

What would I do? I would send the Bataan ARG along with every FFG and PC in the region to establish sea control off Kismayo, and prepare for the inevitable humanitarian catastrophe that is almost certain to result from the siege of the city. The US has committed significant military forces in the region over the last many years with a clear understanding that this region represents a clear national security interest in the defense of the United States. Al Shabaab and AQAP represent the significant national security threats by Al Qaeda to the US, passing on the opportunity to deal a significant blow to Al Shabaab when others have committed to doing the heavy lifting would be a strategic mistake. Establishing sea control and insuring access of humanitarian assistance would be the primary objectives of the United States, and having the Bataan MEU available to insure security in those roles gives the US the best possible opportunity to achieve success in those roles. If there is any military role outside of sea control or humanitarian assistance, it would be logistical and perhaps limited fires support for AMISOM - not Kenya, in securing the infrastructure and port facilities to support the aftermath of a Kismayo siege.

The US has no business getting military engaged on the ground in any type of sustained way, but having operational flexibility at those key moments almost certain to reveal themselves in the near future for a surgical strike operation or an amphibious raid operation to insure success of key objectives could potentially be the difference in success or failure towards guiding events towards a conclusion aligned with long term US national security and foreign policy objectives in that region. The Obama administrations military approach of leading from behind but selectively engaging with minimal force has to date been a very smart adjustment in the use of US military power - and has been largely successful in guiding outcomes of ongoing chaotic events towards achieving US national objectives with minimal commitment. The same policy approach may soon be necessary in Kismayo with so many US national interests at stake in that region.

East Africa Updates

A variety of interesting, though sometimes confusing news has emerged regarding Somalia in the past few weeks. What follows is an attempt to provide ID readers some insight into these developments and amplify Galrahn’s recent post.

Kenyan Offensive into Jubaland:
Kenya’s offensive into Southern Somalia under the guise of UN Article 51 (right to self-defense) began as retaliation for al Shabaab kidnappings in Kenyan refugee camps and coastal areas (more below on those). The Kenyan air force is dropping bombs, and ground troops have captured key coastal terrain and intend to push all the way to Kismaayo. Note, contrary to some reporting, the US is not supporting this offensive. There is no shortage of of interest and discussion on Somalia in US and European governments these days, but frankly, that interest hasn't translated into a desire for action, at least on the part of policy makers.

Unencumbered by bureaucratic paralysis, al Shabaab has already retaliated in Kenya with a series of minor grenade attacks in Nairobi. A future escalation of these attacks to include some of AS’s tactics regularly used in Mogadishu, such as suicide bombers, is certainly possible. However, if the Kenyans do take Kismaayo, this will be a huge blow to one of al Shabaab’s fundraising and facilitation hubs as a major revenue source disappears. Holding the terrain is a different matter, and probably best left to one of Kenya's proxies.

The political and diplomatic responses to Kenya’s incursions have been a little bit less straight-forward. On one hand are the TFG’s contradictory positions. On the other are those of pro-TFG militias Ras Kamboni and ASWJ, who have voiced their support to the effort. These pronouncements should not be surprising as they stand to gain significantly from a capture of Kismayo and the financial windfall it would bring either group. At least one US diplomat has publically discussed the potential of future support to the operation. Western countries should seriously consider immediate assistance to Kenya - logistics, intelligence sharing, ISR, and fires support, if needed. One idea is to provide airlift or sealift for a contingent of AMISOM and TFG troops (even a token presence) to Kismaayo to extend the reach of their governance into Southern Somalia and provide a means for Kenya to gradually withdraw. The longer Kenyan troops are in Southern Somalia, the staler their welcome will become, so anything Western countries can do to speed their victory and withdrawal will increase stability there and alleviate the millions of Somalis still suffering from the al Shabaab-exacerbated famine there.

Kidnappings: A series of high profile kidnappings/murders of European (and now an American) aid workers and vacationers in East Africa has occurred in the past months. At this point, these kidnappings appear to be a fundraising mechanism for various malign actors in Southern Somalia. Westerners have been valuable hostage targets for Islamic terror groups (see AQIM, AQI, AQAP, especially) the past decade. What we are seeing in East Africa seems (from my perspective) to be a mutually beneficial relationship evolving between various criminal/clan, al Shabaab, and pirate groups to capture and ransom Westerners in Somalia and Kenya. Al Shabaab has probably lost funding in the form of taxation as TFG/AMISOM have captured and held territory. Pirates are also likely seeing their revenue streams dry up as their attack success rate drops (primarily attributable to embarked armed security detachments, rather than the coalition naval presence). Larger shipping companies, which have better insurance and resources for paying ransoms, have shifted some of those resources to armed security. This leaves smaller, poorer shipping lines - and the handful of flag states who are still myopically failing to protect their crews - as vulnerable targets. Note, Somali piracy is non-traditional in that it is really kidnapping for ransom at sea, rather than cargo seizure. (The expanding piracy in West Africa is focused on profiting from captured cargoes, not crews.)

Developed countries’ inaction towards addressing shore-based pirate facilitators has left these networks intact and apparently some of them have moved onto new and potentially more profitable business. Until these actors are targeted - lethally, since there is no law enforcement reach into Somalia and mildly worded diplomatic press statements aren’t helping much - expect these kidnappings to continue, if not multiply.

Other Recent Related News:
- Al Shabaab in America Al Shabaab’s global facilitation network stretches throughout Africa, into Europe, Australia, and yes, even the United States. The tens of thousands of Somalis in America -- the vast majority of whom are law-abiding citizens -- create a challenge for law enforcement agencies who must sort out the small percentage (still probably hundreds) of bad apples in the diaspora.

- Finally, for the benefit of the random DOS person reading this blog, if I haven't already raised your hackles enough thus far - this - is a colossally dumb idea. Other agencies are still cleaning up the mess made from the last time do-good diplomats opened the floodgates to un-vetted refugees from “countries of concern.”

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Kenya Gets Help From Mystery Western Air Force

The invasion of Somalia by the military forces of Kenya does involve western help, and no matter what the reporting to date has suggested - I am fairly confident the US was not surprised this action took place. No one wants to describe what kind of help Kenya is getting from foreign powers, nor who exactly is providing the help, but US officials have been quick to highlight what our help is not.

A Kenyan military spokesman, Maj. Emmanuel Chirchir, said that “one of the partners,” possibly the United States or France, had been behind airstrikes in the past few days, killing a number of Shabab militants. The French Navy has also shelled rebel positions from the sea, the Kenyan military said in a statement.

Two senior American officials in Washington said Sunday that neither the United States military nor the Central Intelligence Agency had carried out airstrikes in Somalia in recent days. One of the officials, who follows American military operations closely, said the Kenyan offensive had forced many Shabab fighters and commanders to disperse, making them easier potential targets, but emphasized that there had been “no U.S. military strikes in Somalia at all recently.”

All we really know for sure based on the very limited reporting of military activities is that the Kenyan ground and air forces have been operating at a level of effectiveness that exceeds their organic capabilities. The New York Times knows this as well, and mentions it in the latest reporting on ongoing events.

Kenya’s military — especially compared with those of its neighbors, like Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan and Somalia — has scant experience. Several military efforts over the past 20 years by other external powers, from the United States to the United Nations, have failed to deliver a sustainable government in Somalia.

Kenyan military officials say their plan is to squeeze the port of Kismayu, one of Somalia’s biggest towns and a major money-earner for the Shabab, from two sides in a pincer movement with troops massing to the west near Afmadow and to the south in Raas Kaambooni. Heavy rains, though, have literally bogged them down, and after an initial burst of activity, the Kenyan advance seems to have slowed.

Major Chirchir said the Kenyan Navy had also positioned ships along the coastline from the Kenyan border toward Kismayu.

“Any vessel that is there with a militia we will take it down,” he warned.

On Sunday, Kenyan officials said that a French naval ship had shelled the city of Koday, south of Kismayu, and that casualty figures were not yet available. The French military has also launched small, covert strikes in Somalia in the past, aimed at terrorism suspects and pirates.

Kenyan military spokesman Emmanuel Chirchir confirmed to the Kenyan newspaper The Daily Nation that the port city of Kismayu was under persistent air attacks, but denied those attacks came from the Keyan Air Force.

“It is confirmed that Kismayu has been under aerial attacks, but it is not our troops, it must be one of our allies.”

This is believable, the only fighter aircraft the Kenyan Air Force has are F-5s, and it is hard to imagine they would be successful in precision target runs against terrorist fortifications in Kismayu.

So who is the mystery airpower bombing terrorists in Somalia? The US has two carrier strike groups - the USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) and the USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77), and an amphibious readiness group - the USS Bataan (LHD 5), in 5th Fleet region that includes the Somali port of Kismayu. Until it is determined who is doing the airstrikes (and I am skeptical it is us, I think our role is ISR/logistics), the US is the obvious nation to be accused of conducting those strikes.

But if we assume it isn't the US military bombing targets in Somalia, and we also assume it is not the Kenyan Air Force, it makes more sense to presume the strikes are either French military or contracted out. One possibility is that the French are launching strikes from a few bases in the region, which is the most plausible scenario. There are a handful of private security outfits these days that operate UAVs for hire in Africa, which is another reasonable, but unlikely possibility.

Either way, this assault has the potential to be 'end game' for Al Shabaab. It does appear the US is playing a limited, supporting role in the background of these Kenyan military operations (mostly ISR and C2 it appears, but logistics is possible), and I for one support the US helping Kenya clean up their Somali backyard. None of Somalia's other problems will ever see the resources needed to build solutions until Al Shabaab is dealt with, and the unfolding situation in southern Somalia appears to be the first legitimate opportunity to deal the death blow to the organization in many years.

French Military Operating in Somalia

From STRATFOR here.

French military troops discovered suspected members of the al Shabaab Islamist militia attempting to cross the Kenyan-Somali border in two boats at Raas-Kaambooni in Lamu, Kenya’s The Standard reported Oct. 10. According to unnamed sources, the French military cornered the militants’ boats in the deep sea, exchanging gunfire with the militants. Four militants were arrested after disembarking the boats but six others are presumed to have drowned. Lamu West District Commissioner Stephen Ikue confirmed that the French military was involved in an operation that occurred inside Somali waters but declined further details. French security teams have joined their Kenyan counterparts in battling militancy in Lamu, according to the sources.

The French military is probably operating in Somalia following the abduction of a French citizen from Kenya in an attempt to track down her whereabouts and rescue her, but there may also be more to it than that. Either way, the French military is on the ground in Somalia, armed and apparently ready to use force.

Noteworthy this week we hear about British special forces rescuing a pirated ship off Somalia, and now French special forces inside Somalia. While the US special forces are apparently everywhere else, the Europeans appear to have stepped it up inside Somalia.

Notes From Around Somalia

It was strange to watch news reports filter in on Tuesday afternoon, and several hours later it is still very much unclear what happened, or what is happening. Before we get caught up in current events, this Guardian article reviews recent events to explain why fear is gripping Northern Kenyan coast.

On Saturday morning a 66-year-old disabled French woman was kidnapped from her beach house in the Lamu archipelago by Somali gangsters who bundled her into a speedboat and escaped to mainland Somalia. The attack came two weeks after a British woman was abducted while on holiday further up the coast in Kiwayu, close to the Somali border. Her husband was killed. She is still missing.

On Tuesday events became very difficult to follow as fear apparently struck the region again. It began with Sky News reporting that evacuations were underway on Manda Island in Northern Kenya due to reports of approaching skiffs from Somalia filled with armed men. According to TV news reports from Sky News, authorities were evacuating tourists from the regional resorts due to threats from armed attackers by the sea, and those reports included details like 5 skiffs with 5-7 armed men in each skiff. Given the recent kidnappings and murders from the resorts, such a report on Sky News sent a panic through the resort region as foreigners fled.

It is worth noting that advisories of closings like this one are popping up online for resorts along the Lamu Archipelago. It is also worth noting that there has been no confirmation yet that 5 skiffs filled with armed men even existed, because this could be nothing more than a rumor spread through fear.

Regardless, the UK Foreign Office issued the following travel to Kenya warning on Tuesday. The US State Department has not issued a similar warning, but this US State Department warning on Kenya from December 2010 remains in effect.

The use of the sea to circumvent the Army at the border between Somalia and Kenya is not new, but the recent leverage of the sea by those in southern Somalia to raid and kidnap foreign tourists right off the beach has sent fear through the area completely disrupting the tourism season just as it is beginning in northern Kenya. It is very much unclear if Kenya has the Coast Guard and Navy resources to protect their northern shoreline, but it is very probable the nation does not.

What I believe is important to watch for here is whether we are seeing the early stages of Al Shabaab naval operations, specifically in the form of amphibious raids., or if these are random attacks. The kidnapping of the French elderly woman was reportedly done by the Marehan clan under the leadership of Aadan African. The hostage was reportedly originally being held captive between Dhobly and Kismayo, but there are reports that a French special forces team failed in a recent attempt to rescue her and her whereabouts are now unknown. As she is disabled and thought to be in poor health, it is unclear how long she is expected to survive.

Piracy Update

While I completely agree with CDR Chris Rawley's assessment that simple solutions are the best approach to maritime problems off Somalia, it is worth noting that the problems are getting more complex with each season. The monsoon season is over, and while it is true that fewer ships are being hijacked per attack, it is also true that 2011 is on pace to be another record year for number of piracy attacks in the region. For examples of everyday events I encourage folks to keep an eye on the IMB Live Piracy Report, for example, which highlights no shortage in the number of attacks and has become an activity log regarding the true value of security forces on merchant shipping in the region.

Something else worth noting... NATO has redesigned their piracy site yet again for Operation Ocean Shield (the anti-piracy patrol off Somalia) and this time is giving a daily briefing of updated threat information. Consider today's briefing.

Recent Activity

The monsoon season is over, resulting in pirate activities noticeably increasing.

There is a mothership approx. 300nm due east of Socotra Island, and two recent attacks within 200nm of the mothership off Socotra Island within the past week. A whaler Pirate Attack Group (PAG) has been reported approx 200nm off the Southern Somalia/Kenya coast. Masters are advised to proceed with extreme caution when transiting these areas and report any suspicious activity to UKTMO.

Current Situation

Due to the favourable conditions for small boats, the Bab Al Mandeb (BAM), Southern Red Sea (SRS) and the Gulf of Aden (GOA) remain Areas of Concern. Three alerts in this region over the last week (Alert 219, 220, 223) confirm the presence of pirates in these areas.

A Shu’ai type dhow with a brown fibreglass hull, the FV DEER, was reported pirated off the north east tip of Somalia, and is likely being used as pirate mother ship in the Arabian Sea and / or the northern Somali Basin. We assess that 3 dhows are operating as mothership in the Arabian Sea and the Somali Basin.

The weather in the Central Somali Basin/Arabian Sea has improved, and previously pirated dhows are operating in this area as motherships. There was a piracy attack against a fishing vessel on 03 October in position 04-59N 058-00E. Shots were fired from the skiffs before the fishing vessel evaded being pirated (Alert 225). This attack occurred within 120nm of a previous attack (Alert 222) and indicates there may be a PAG working in this region. Masters are advised to proceed with extreme caution when transiting in the Arabian Sea, especially in the region of 060 E and west towards the Somali Coast.

At least one Jelbut style dhow is believed to be operating in the central Somali Basin, and is described as having a red and brown hull with white superstructure. Any information or photography regarding this dhow can be sent to the NATO Shipping Centre at [email protected] for improved warnings to other ships in the area.

As the weather improves, more attacks are expected. Increasing activity along the coast also indicates that additional pirated dhows and whalers are preparing to head out into the central Somali Basin. It’s assessed that there are 3 dhows operating as mother ships in this area, one of which may be the FV DEER (see picture).

At least 2 or 3 PAGs are operating off the coast of Kenya (Mombasa/ Dar es Salaam approaches). A whaler PAG is in this region, in vicinity of 01-50S 044-54E (approx 200nm off the Southern Somlia/Kenya coast), and at least one Jelbut dhow is acting as a mothership for one of these groups.

Latest reports from vessel that have been attacked indicate that some of the pirates make use of sunrise/sunset to approach from the direction of the low sun (skiffs may also be painted dark blue) in order to gain extra time for surprise.

If Masters encounter suspicious activity (such as stationary radar contacts or skiffs laden with ladders or other piracy equipment), please report as much detail as possible, including photographs of skiffs and possible mother ships, to UKMTO Dubai or NATO Shipping Centre.

The terminology has changed rapidly. It was only 3-4 years ago I would blog about an attack as an uncommon event and describe the simple tools and techniques exploited, but now we actively discuss operational and tactical details like the last known locations of multiple pirate action groups, motherships, amphibious raids, geographic distribution, time of day tactics, and even the color of camouflage paint being used in specific areas for specific purposes. The biggest difference between then and now though was that back then, nobody was getting killed. Now death is much more common, although I think people are generally desensitized from it.

Given the evolution in maritime activities we have seen off Somalia over the last 3-4 years, what should we expect in 3-4 years from now should policy not change?

Politics

I don't know what to make of these comments by David Ignatius.

But in recent weeks a subtle limit has emerged in drone policy: Despite calls by some U.S. officials for drone attacks against the training camps of AQAP and al-Shabab, the al-Qaeda affiliate in Somalia, neither has been targeted. That’s a deliberate policy decision — aimed partly at preventing the spread of a Taliban-style insurgency to new theaters, such as Yemen and Somalia.

He goes on to frame it like this.

A senior administration official explains the policy this way: “If individuals target us, if they are in the chain of command for attacks against Americans,” then the United States will authorize “direct action” — putting such individuals on the “capture or kill” list that triggers a drone attack. But, the official cautions, “We don’t want to get involved in a domestic confrontation inside Yemen or Somalia, or increase anti-U.S. sentiment” in those places.

There is a deterrence formula implicit in this policy: So long as Somalia’s al-Shabab remains an insurgent movement fighting the Transitional Federal Government, the United States — while supporting the Somali authorities — won’t use drones. That weapon is reserved for those who directly threaten the United States.

If this is such an informed comment, then why was the biggest news over the last week a drone strike in Yemen? Why has STRATFOR (and other sources) been reporting consistent drone strikes (by the US) in Somalia over the last two weeks? David Ignatius appears to have swallowed someone's political spin on the rules of engagement in the US global drone war.

The argument that drone warfare target selection criteria is tied to a master deterrence theory doesn't appear very credible to me. Drone warfare is many things, starting with a politically low risk, offensive form of warfare intended to strike key leadership and infrastructure of the enemy. With all due respect to a number of scholars who have suggested or still believe otherwise, the network theory that suggests surgical strikes at leadership and infrastructure can't destroy disconnected networks appears to have been thoroughly discredited in Iraq where bomb makers and popular resistance leaders were targeted by SOF and taken out. In both Afghanistan and Yemen, where popular leaders of Al Qaeda have been taken out, Al Qaeda has lost much of their capacity and most of the violence in those areas is now led by domestic organizations with domestic objectives.

The Bush administration perpetuated the myth that you couldn't kill leaders to disassemble an Al Qaeda disconnected network, but the Obama administration has provided ample evidence that simply isn't true. As it turns out, in an era of globalization there is really no such thing as a disconnected network; we simply never had a good enough understanding of the links between different networks to fully understand the impacts of targeting leadership and infrastructure within those networks prior to doing it.

My sense is Admiral Mullen recognized that the network theories that argued against targeted strikes on leadership were inaccurate late in his term when he called out the ISI as the source to target for dealing with the Taliban.

I am certainly not a big fan of the global drone war being conducted by the United States, but I do admit the more I observe it used in various theaters the more convinced I am that it is remarkably effective at destroying the enemy networks being targeted. With that said, I sense there are legitimate and serious political and economic costs to conducting a global drone war that are going to come back and haunt us in the future, because our nations drone war approach to terrorism is like trying to kill a hydra by chopping off heads.

Indeed, we are chopping off the heads of terrorist organizations globally with our nations global drone war, but chopping off heads isn't how one kills a hydra. Chopping off the heads of a hydra may look like some skillful and intelligent deterrence theory to people speaking to David Ignatius, but to me, our nations global drone war looks more like short term solution to contain - not solve - a long term problem that we appear to believe can only be solved through generational development.

Which takes me back to Somalia. The US doesn't use drones for dealing with pirates, as drones are too busy dealing with true threats in the region like Al Shabaab. To be totally honest, the US Navy rarely has more than one drone (if that many ) for maritime surveillance in that region.

However, just because we do not use drones for anti-piracy doesn't mean we couldn't use them. Drones are not going to solve the piracy problem nor the Al Shabaab problem, but like every other theater - drones can contain those problems more effectively while we look for actual solutions. I'm not saying nations should fly armed drones around the Gulf of Aden blowing holes in any skiffs that are hauling guns and ladders, but I am saying armed drones would be an effective way to contain the problem of piracy by blowing up pirate skiffs (like it has contained the problem of terrorism in other places) while we continue to look for a way to employ a real solution.