Last Week's Other Transition of Power

RADM James Shannon USN meets Commander South Sea Fleet RADM Shen Jinlong PLA-N in HMAS Perth at IMDEX Asia, Singapore. (Picture courtesy of Ivan Ingham, Commanding Officer of HMAS Perth.

Last week the largest Navy in Asia undertook a transition of power at the top for the first time in over a decade. The official announcement can be found here, but the English version was reported here.

The People's Liberation Army Navy has appointed a new commander — 60-year-old Lieutenant Admiral Shen Jinlong.

In a news release distributed by the PLA Navy on Friday, Shen spoke in a video conference with officers and sailors of the 25th Escort Fleet in the Gulf of Aden in his new capacity as PLA Navy commander.

That means he has replaced Admiral Wu Shengli, 71, to take charge of the largest navy in Asia. Although the Navy did not disclose when the transition took place, observers believe it was this week.

A point of interest that will be noted by most PLA Navy experts is that Shen Jinlong had been the Commander of the PLA Navy South Sea fleet since December 2014. As we have seen over the last many years, virtually all Commanders of the South Sea Fleet eventually rise to one of the top offices in the PLA Navy. These military moves within the PLA Navy come as China has discussed reorganizing that command into a more "joint" organization.

The South China Morning Post covered the possibility of Shen Jinlong becoming the new PLA Navy Commander last week, prior to it happening, and has additional information on the reorganization that is proposed, and may in fact already be underway.

The PLA is set to break with a long-standing tradition if a proposal to appoint a naval officer to head its strategic southern command is adopted, four independent sources said.

The proposed reshuffle at the helm of the Southern Theatre Command, which is responsible for the South China Sea and the PLA South Sea Fleet, also underscores the rising importance of the navy in the Chinese military and the decline of its army-centric doctrine under an overhaul begun by President Xi Jinping last year.

The article goes on to note other changes, but in discussing Shen Jinlong later in the article, this stood out as worth noting.

If Shen secures the top navy job, it will surprise many PLA watchers at home and abroad. Shen would have beaten a number of rivals, including Vice Admiral Qiu Yangpeng, the chief of staff for the navy, and Vice Admiral Wang Hai, the navy’s deputy commander.

Wang is tipped to be the new commander of the South Sea Fleet and deputy commander of the Southern Theatre Command, according to the sources.

Shen would be the least experienced naval boss for decades.

There are several news reports that the reorganization has taken place, the most interesting new development being that Vice Admiral Yuan Yubai has taken command of the new Southern Theater Command.

While I look forward to the analysis of these events from PLA Navy experts like Andrew Erickson, I see three important takeaways from the early news reporting.

First, Shen Jinlong is as much a scholar as he is a sailor. Shen Jinlong was President of Naval Academy of Commanding from 2011-2014, prior to taking command of the South Sea Fleet. Prior to that he was President of Dalian Naval Academy from 2010-2011. In other words Shen Jinlong spent five years as an Admiral immersed in the two academic establishments most noted for advancing the strategic and academic acumen of PLA Navy officers.

Would it be a feature or a bug if the US Navy CNO had spent five years as a Flag Officer Commanding either Annapolis and the Naval War College. What about both? Is it a feature or a bug that the new Commander of the largest Navy in Asia spent five years in Command of the equivalent of both? I can't speak to the US Navy admirals who take command at Annapolis, but in my opinion based on my own observations, US Navy Admirals who spend time in command at the Naval War College change while they are there, and almost always come out the other side with an increased strategic and academic acumen not easily rivaled by their peers.

Second, reorganizing the Southern Theater Command structure to be under the leadership of a naval officer represents a commitment towards true joint operations that China has been discussing for well over a decade. The Southern Theater Command incorporates Marine forces (sea, land, and air), the air force units in the region, and the rocket forces under the command a naval officer for virtually all military forces with domain responsibilities over the South China Sea region.

The significance of this change cannot be understated. This change ultimately discards PLA military tradition that has been in place for over seven decades where strategic rocket forces commanded by Army officers have controlled the command structure for a region. The Southern Theater Command structure represents the official beginning of a Command structure that includes naval officers, and the first instance of this inclusion takes place in China's most important strategic theater.

Finally, news that the Southern Theater Command will be led by Vice Admiral Yuan Yubai simply cannot be ignored. The world knows very well where Vice Admiral Yuan Yubai stands on South China Sea issues, because he certainly hasn't mince words and his promotion signals his previous comments on the subject almost certainly contributed to his promotion. From September of 2015:

The South China Sea, Yuan said, “is a sea for all the nations around, and a sea of peace.

“The South China Sea, as the name indicates, is a sea area that belongs to China. And the sea from the Han dynasty a long time ago where the Chinese people have been working and producing from the sea.”

While I suspect we will all learn more as the Chinese experts weigh in more facts and opinions on events taking place in the PLA Navy, my initial impression from changes in the PLA Navy last week is that the force took meaningful steps towards more strategic and academic acumen at the top of the PLA Navy, took serious organizational steps towards a joint forces approach for the South China Sea theater of operations, and among all the candidates that could be chosen to lead the Chinese military forces into this new joint forces era in the South China Sea - the PLA Navy ultimately picked one of the most well known vocal hard liners in their ranks for the position.

A Case for Emplacing U.S. Personnel on Allied Ships in the South China Sea

Note from Jon Solomon: The article below was written by my Systems Planning and Analysis colleague, Jonathan Altman, to expand upon an idea he suggested during one of our running discussions on deterrence dynamics. Creating a credible extended deterrence ‘tripwire’ is never a simple task; this is arguably even more so at the low end of the conflict spectrum over maritime sovereignty rights or isolated unpopulated ‘rocks.’ I find Jonathan’s proposal quite interesting on that front, and offer it to you for debate.

In the South China Sea, the Chinese are using a “salami-slicing” approach to incrementally shift the norms and territorial balance to their favor, to the detriment of U.S. allies like the Philippines. Until now, the U.S. response to this challenge has been fairly muted; though calls for more transparency and respect for norms frequently come out of the Obama administration, few if any non-verbal steps have been taken to thwart the Chinese approach. However this need not be the case. The act of emplacing U.S. Government personnel aboard friendly nations’ vessels, perhaps including uniformed members of the armed services, could present a major challenge to current Chinese strategy in the region. I will talk more about why this tactic could be so effective in a later paragraph, but first I’d like to address why the Chinese salami-slicing approach has been so successful, and why other attempts to blunt it have had little effect.

To use the famous framework developed by Herman Kahn, Chinese “salami-slicing” strategy has proved effective because they have created conditions in which they have been able to establish and then sustain escalation dominance. By using fishing boats and other non-military craft to harass our allies, seize property, and increase their claims to land features in the South China Sea, the Chinese have rendered U.S. dominance in conventional arms immaterial. The U.S. cannot plausibly use military force to respond to Chinese uses of non-military power against a treaty ally. Because the US has not been able to respond decisively with tools that match the escalation level of those being employed by the Chinese, U.S. policy responses have been limited to official statements that have had little effect thus far due to the lack of leverage. A demand therefore arises for existing tools that can be easily (and cheaply) employed to symmetrically counter Chinese moves at the lowest rungs of Kahn’s escalation ladder. Though there are more tools beyond emplacing US personnel on friendly vessels, this particular tactic seems like a promising place to start. 

It’s critical to be clear up front; this is not an argument to formally dual-crew an allied ship. The legal framework and rules to enable that approach are simply too complex and ultimately unnecessary to achieve the desired effect. What is being suggested is that the U.S. should consider emplacing small groups of U.S. Coast Guard personnel or even other maritime agency personnel (such as U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service officials) as ‘observers’ or ‘advisers’ aboard allies’ maritime law enforcement vessels, and military personnel aboard allied warships or military patrol aircraft. These personnel should principally be armed with cameras, and their purposes would be twofold. First, raise the stakes on Chinese aggression in the region. It is an entirely different calculation to conduct dangerous maneuvers against a Philippine patrol vessel with U.S. Government personnel on board. The Chinese seem comfortable pushing around smaller neighbors knowing that these nations have little recourse beyond lengthy (and largely ineffective) public and private diplomatic complaints. This calculation becomes much different if Chinese strategists were presented with the risk of threatening American lives (whether by ramming or other action) and thereby upsetting a more powerful nation to achieve the same effects. Think back to the Cold War; American soldiers in West Germany were not reasonably expected to defeat a Soviet incursion, but their presence ensured American casualties—which therefore committed American prestige. The ‘tripwire’ forces along the Central European front therefore committed the U.S. to mobilization and retaliation against any Soviet offensive. The same principle applies with American personnel aboard allied platforms.

The second purpose of emplacing American personnel would be to document Chinese transgressions. Even if the mere presence of American personnel does not deter all Chinese actions, providing a direct and timely conduit to the most expansive media networks in the world would likely cause a rethinking of strategy in Beijing. Since the Chinese have chosen to keep action in the South China Sea low on the escalation ladder, global public perceptions of Chinese behavior and Chinese plausible deniability of illegality remain important. If all of a sudden every Chinese transgression made its way onto CNN complete with a verified video account, it seems reasonable to believe that perceptions of China worldwide would be adversely affected, and that the chorus of world opinion might begin to bring uncomfortable attention on their actions as well as a loss of stature.

The intended effect of emplacing U.S. personnel aboard allied vessels ideally should be twofold. First, help our allies by lowering their risk of operations (such as resupplying isolated garrisons) and assuring them that the U.S. is a stalwart friend. Second, negate Chinese escalation dominance by forcing them to confront Americans in order to achieve their ends. This would force them into a choice between moving to higher level rungs on the escalation ladder and therefore incurring a greater risk of conflict with the U.S., or backing off. Whatever course they chose, their incremental approach would be dealt a setback.

Jonathan Altman is a Program Analyst with Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc. who holds a Master’s Degree in International Security from the Korbel School at the University of Denver. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis Inc., and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.

Chinese Frigate Runs Aground

This is the latest news from the South China Sea.

A Philippine military aircraft confirmed Saturday that a Chinese naval frigate remains stranded in disputed waters of the South China Sea, a military spokesman said.

The Chinese frigate and smaller craft were sighted by a Philippine Islander plane, said regional military spokesman Colonel Neil Anthony Estrella.

"During the aerial reconnaissance mission, they were able to confirm, based on photographs, that there is indeed a ship with bow number 560 aground at Half Moon Shoal," he told AFP.

He said five more vessels and a number of smaller boats were assisting the grounded ship.

A navy ship and a coast guard vessel had been dispatched to the area to monitor the Chinese operations, he added.

He stressed that the shoal was just 60 nautical miles from the western Philippine island of Palawan, well within the country's 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone, as recognised by international law.

That would make the ship that ran aground the frigate Dongguan (560), a Jianghu-V class frigate. Welcome to the South China Sea littorals.

While the Half Moon Shoal is within the Philippine EEZ, the Chinese frigate has every right to be within the waters of the EEZ; although not necessarily on the shoal itself. With that said, this wasn't intended to be an amphibious assault.

What is noteworthy here is that the Philippines are well within their right to confiscate the warship. has few options here. The shoal is not habitable, and not within 5 miles of a habitable island. Funny thing about being the weaker power in this kind of power struggle though, the Philippines really can't do anything except what the Chinese allow them to do even though this is within the EEZ of the Philippines mainland, and in the end all we'll do is nothing but watch (which is probably the right move politically).

Another Hawk in the Party Calls for PLA Military Action in South China Sea

Today we see another Chinese hawk advocating military action, this time against the Philippines and Vietnam. I encourage everyone to read the entire editorial. Be careful to neither casually dismiss nor overstate the importance of this editorial, because this is a sanctioned editorial by the Party's mouthpiece Global Times, but it also only one of many opinions among Chinese Party leadership regarding how to manage the South China Sea tensions over energy resources. The author is identified as the strategic analyst of China Energy Fund Committee.

It’s very amusing to see some of the countries vow to threaten or even confront China with force just because the US announced that it has “returned to Asia.”

The tension of war is escalating second by second but the initiative is not in our hand. China should take part in the exploitation of oil and gas in South China Sea.

For those who infringe upon our sovereignty to steal the oil, we need to warn them politely, and then take action if they don’t respond.

We shouldn’t waste the opportunity to launch some tiny-scale battles that could deter provocateurs from going further.

By the way, I think it’s necessary to figure out who is really afraid of being involved in military activities. There are more than 1,000 oil and gas wells plus four airports and numerous other facilities in the area but none of them is built by China.

Everything will be burned to the ground should a military conflict break out. Who’ll suffer most when Western oil giants withdraw?

But out there could just be an ideal place to punish them. Such punishment should be restricted only to the Philippines and Vietnam, who have been acting extremely aggressive these days.

The impacts of nationalism will only create more tension between the cautious and hawkish elements of the Party moving forward. The other issue is that there are as many reasons to be concerned with the leadership changes next year as there are to be heartened.

It is a time of change in China. A time when outsiders should be both excited for the future of China while remaining cautious of that future as well. Predicting the results of the rapid growth in China with any accuracy is very difficult. Beware of all who aren't very cautious of China's intentions, because even Chinese leaders can't predict the future as they focus on the consolidation of their own power while balancing their intentional nationalism against the tensions that result from greater demands of a rapidly growing society.

It does concern me that we see ranking members of the Party in the Energy sector aligned with the hawks of the PLA, because it fits easily into the discussions and analysis regarding why China would take a more militarily hawkish policy towards other nations, including their regional neighbors.

DoD Releases Annual Report on Chinese Military and Security Developments

Every year the DoD releases their Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (PDF), and most years (like this one) it is released very late. There are some interesting quotes in this years report, and I'll start what will likely be a very long series of posts on the topic with this one on page 56. I believe this quote gives guidance towards what to expect in the near future.

The pace and scope of China’s military development, combined with a relative lack of transparency, remains a point of concern in the United States and among our regional allies and partners. In recent years China has demonstrated occasional signs of assertiveness in Asia, particularly in the maritime domain. This trend has contributed to friction between China and some of its neighbors over disputed maritime territory in the East and South China Seas.

Additionally, the United States and China continue to hold differing views over the rights of coastal states in the waters and airspace beyond their territorial seas. In 2010 several PLA fighter aircraft conducted unusually close intercepts of U.S. military aircraft operating in international airspace. In recent years Chinese ships have also harassed U.S. military survey vessels operating beyond China’s territorial seas.

As Rory Medcalf of the Lowy Institute has already suggested (on Twitter), this portion of the report suggests another EP-3 incident off China is possible, probably sooner than later.

Something else interesting to read related to China... this AEI article from the other day offers a lot of interesting analysis worth thinking about.

Tensions Rise in the South China Sea

From the International Institute for Security Studies (Shangri-La Dialogue) as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Shangri-La Hotel, Singapore, Saturday, June 04, 2011. Full transcript here, but this section caught my attention.

Maritime security remains an issue of particular importance for the region, with questions about territorial claims and the appropriate use of the maritime domain presenting on-going challenges to regional stability and prosperity. The U.S. position on maritime security remains clear: we have a national interest in freedom of navigation; in unimpeded economic development and commerce; and in respect for international law. We also believe that customary international law, as reflected in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, provides clear guidance on the appropriate use of the maritime domain, and rights of access to it. By working together in appropriate regional and multilateral fora, and adhering to principles that we believe are of benefit to all in the region, we can ensure that all share equal and open access to international waterways.

Experience consistently shows that pursuing our common interests together increases our common security. As I have stated before, providing for security and upholding the principles I mentioned earlier is not the task of any one nation alone, but the shared responsibility of all nations. This is the one reason we have placed a premium on building the partner capacity of friends in the region and enhancing the role of multilateral cooperation and organizations in Asia-Pacific security affairs.

Even so, we recognize that the American defense engagement - from our forward deployed forces to exercises with regional partners - will continue to play an indispensable role in the stability of the region. Although much of the press in both the United States and the region has been focused in recent years on our efforts to modernize our basing arrangements with traditional allies in Northeast Asia - and our commitment to those efforts is absolute - we’ve taken a number of steps towards establishing a defense posture across the Asia Pacific that is more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. A posture that maintains our presence in Northeast Asia while enhancing our presence in Southeast Asia and into the Indian Ocean.

For example, this past November, the U.S. and Australia established a force posture working group tasked with expanding opportunities for our two militaries to train and operate together - to include alliance arrangements that would allow for more combined defense activities and shared use of facilities.

Together, we are evaluating a range of options, including:

• Increasing our combined naval presence and capabilities to respond more readily to humanitarian disasters;
• Improving Indian Ocean facilities - a region of growing international importance; and
• Expanding training exercises for amphibious and land operations, activities that could involve other partners in the region.

In Singapore, we are strengthening our bi-lateral defense relationship within the context of the Strategic Framework Agreement and pursuing more operational engagement - most notably, by deploying U.S. Littoral Combat Ships to Singapore. We are examining other ways to increase opportunities for our two militaries to train and operate together, to include:

• Prepositioning supplies to improve disaster response;
• Improving command and control capabilities; and
• Expanding training opportunities to help prepare our forces for the challenges both militaries face operating in the Pacific.

Although we will continue to maintain and enhance our traditional presence in the Asia-Pacific region through efforts such as these, we believe that U.S. presence, and the associated impact and influences should not solely be measured in terms of conventional metrics, or “boots on the ground.” In the coming years, the U.S. military is going to be increasing its port calls, naval engagements, and multilateral training efforts with multiple countries throughout the region. These types of activities not only broaden and deepen our relationships with friends and allies, they help build partner capacity to address regional challenges.

Taken together, all of these developments demonstrate the commitment of the United States to sustaining a robust military presence in Asia - one that underwrites stability by supporting and reassuring allies while deterring, and if necessary defeating, potential adversaries.

There are few details regarding the deploying of Littoral Combat Ships to Singapore. Does that mean forward basing of ships, or just basing of modules? It is still unclear.

The region is certainly getting a lot of attention lately though. Folks may not be following it, but tensions are rising in the South China Sea. A few weeks ago it was reported that China has set up military garrisons and outposts on six islands within Philippine-claimed territory in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. This morning news from the Philippines is that the US Navy is sending the USS Chung-Hoon (DDG 93) to the region amid the escalating tensions.

There are also details out this week of recent events that involved the Chinese Navy shooting at Vietnamese and Philippine fisherman. Both articles are very detailed accounts of the actions, and are expected to be included in diplomatic protests filed with the UN this week by both nations.

China Flexes Muscles in the South China Sea

Good analysis by NIGHTWATCH of some events taking place in the South China Sea.

Philippines-China: The Philippine military on 2 March sent two military aircraft to patrol the ocean and air space near Reed Bank, a long time Philippine-occupied territory in the South China Sea. The Philippines took the action in response to the behavior of two Chinese patrol boats which harassed a Philippine ship searching for oil, according to Philippine military commander Lieutenant General Juancho Sabban.

A Philippine OV-10 aircraft and an Islander light patrol aircraft were deployed after the incident was reported, Sablan said. The Chinese boats appeared ready to ram the Philippine vessel on two occasions before turning away, a military official said. No warning shots were fired and the ships later left, officials said. A Philippine navy patrol vessel was sent to secure oil exploration activities at the Reed Bank, and the Chinese Embassy would not immediately respond to Philippine requests for an explanation.

Comment: The significance of this incident is that it shows that China intends to assert its claims to sovereignty of the South China Sea to the shores of the Philippines. Incidents involving the Japanese are neither unique nor isolated. Ship ramming appears to be an approved Chinese tactic.

Prior to this incident, the Japanese complaints about Chinese behavior appeared anecdotal, idiosyncratic and racial. This incident shows the Chinese claim everything in the South China Sea, regardless of race, color, creed or national sovereignty.

The AP has an article on the initial incident. The Philippines Star reports there was a protest, and China has not responded to the protest in a very productive way, by namely claiming the area as their territory.

As if pushing around the Philippines in the South China Sea was just an appetizer, today Hanoi filed a protest regarding a Chinese naval exercises in their maritime territory.

2011 is starting in much the same way 2010 did, with China pushing their neighbors around over territorial claims. This did many good things for US relations in the region in 2010, and with more of this it is sure to do good things for US relations with the region in 2011 as well.

Robert Kaplan in the Washington Post

More and more, there is a relentless drumbeat of concern showing up in the editorial pages of our great newspapers.   It is a concern that reflects the strategic dialogue that has occupied navalists for some time now, and that is the growing power of the Chinese Navy. 

The latest is a view from The Atlantic/CNAS guru Robert Kaplan.  I'm struck by the extent to which this once highly concentrated debate has now spilled out into the national dialogue.  This is a good thing, one that I hope has an impact on the strategic direction of our country.

I grow more convinced as time goes on that we need to act now to avert a future war with China.   I see two ways to do so.  The first is to walk away from the Western Pacific as an area of interest to the United States.  Were we to do so, China would likely be unbound and positioned to act as the region's hegemon.  Nations in the region would reach accommodations and a new security balance would be achieved, albeit one in which we were without any real voice or influence. 

The second way to avert war is to convince China that we are in the Western Pacific to stay, and that we intend to remain the region's hegemon.  We should consider new and innovative employment patterns, in addition to forward deploying additional forces to new locations--irrespective of the financial burden of doing so.  We should aggressively court new friends, and we should warmly value old ones.  We must make Chinese officials wake up every morning and look out the window--before saying  "today is not the day" (this is rumored to have been Joe Sestak's mantra at N8--something for which I give him great credit).  This is because once China eventually takes an aggressive move--it will not back down from it.  We will either go to war over it, or we will accept it as a fait accompli.  Our strategy MUST be to ensure they do not make the first dumb move.

What we cannot do is continue the current strategic uncertainty.  I see signs of the Administration waking to its responsibilities here, and I hope they continue.  But a strategy in which China arms while we siphon off national resources to Asian land wars, is a strategy in which China will eventually become emboldened.  This will result in the first dumb move (have we not seen evidence enough lately of China's being its own worst enemy?). 

Man up or move out.  That is the choice we face.  I move for the former. 

Bryan McGrath

Perfect Timing for Policy Change

Time magazine has an article out discussing the possibility that the report of the South Korean investigation regarding the sinking of the Cheonan will be released to the public very soon. The TIME magazine article doesn't contain any new information about the sinking, but it does end with an interesting point:

The report will have repercussions beyond Seoul. It could conceivably generate more heat for both China and Russia, given their role in carrying North Korea's water in the Cheonan affair at the United Nations. China originally even opposed the weak "Presidential statement" that the U.N. Security Council ultimately issued, diplomatic sources have said. Beijing modified its stance ultimately when presented with the joint investigative group's report earlier this summer, but then protested loudly when the U.S. and South Korea announced plans to stage five day naval exercises as a response to the attack. The Lee government invited the Chinese to send a delegation to review the findings of the Joint Investigation Group together, but Beijing declined.

That's probably not surprising. The report appears pretty damning, and once it goes public, Beijing, as the North's sole economic lifeline and diplomatic big brother, will likely just want to change the subject. It's hard to argue with South Koreans who believe the Cheonan attack was an act of war; and just as hard to argue that Pyongyang is paying much of a price for it.

Since the sinking of the ship in March, this issue has been one of the central events in the Pacific during the Presidency of Barack Obama. It is a big of part of the greater Pacific region policy being developed in that part of the world under his administration. The event has been both harmful and helpful for our interests.

The Obama administration came into office with a new approach to foreign policy. The speech in Egypt was his approach to the Middle East, and the Obama administration initially made several efforts to bridge relations with China. The administration weathered the volatile political adjustments in Japan very well, and despite their initial desires to back off from the close ties with the US, Japan and the US have found that they have an indispensable relationship with one another. The Obama administration has tried to change and encourage China to change, but after his first year it became clear that everything is still basically the same.

Beginning in 2010 a lot of folks began to legitimately question whether the Obama administration had the balls to stand up to China. The private jokes that Tim Geithner was hired to kiss ass in Asia are actually very funny - but worse, hard to argue with. In virtually every policy area, at the beginning of 2010 the United States was beginning to look weak and inept, and when the Cheonan was sunk off South Korea - it perpetuated the image of weakness by the United States once it became clear the Cheonan sinking was an attack, but the US wasn't going to do anything in response - for several legitimate reasons.

By July the US appeared to be on the brink of a serious perception and credibility problem in the Pacific, and at the same time Russia and China was heading to Seoul to discuss the Cheonan sinking. I strongly believe that China made a strategic miscalculation, because had China and subsequently Russia backed Seoul regarding the sinking - it would have been recognized by the region that China's influence on this major regional security event was greater than the influence of the US. Because China could not support the findings of the international Joint Investigation Group, it signaled to the rest of the region that China is still not a responsible or reliable partner in the security conditions of the Pacific. Despite what the tone of the TIME magazine article suggests, the government of every single major Pacific nation besides Russia and China believes the report that North Korea sank the Cheonan with a torpedo.

In mid-July I heard the questions being asked again - is there anyone in Washington that has the balls to stand up to China? Well, timing is everything, and after a year and a half of attempting a soft approach with China in an effort to open up the relationship - an attempt that had clearly failed - the Obama administration has changed policy in the Pacific.

The announcement by Hillary Clinton that the United States intends to play a prominent role in a new regional effort toward resolving territorial disputes in the South China Sea is the single most important foreign policy action by the United States directed at China in the 21st century. While a lot of serious people have been wondering who has the balls in Washington to stand up to China, it turns out that they have been hiding up Hillary Clintons skirt the whole time. Robert Gates was in the room in Vietnam when Hillary Clinton made this announcement - so this policy change isn't just some State Department rogue moment by the Secretary of State.

We do not know how this will play out or what is coming next, but this is an enormous change in policy towards China. I don't think the Obama administration wants a war with China, but they have no longer decided to be nice to China - because China sent the message that nice guys will finish last with them.

The question for readers of this blog is - what does this mean for naval forces? Right now, forward deployed naval forces are in Japan, and soon to be Guam. While effective for reaction to the north Pacific, it doesn't help sustain forward naval power in the South China Sea. Distances will be very difficult without some way to sustain logistics, and ultimately I don't see how this policy works without another DESRON somewhere in near proximity to the South China Sea.

Should be interesting to watch unfold.

Observing "How the US Lost the Naval War of 2015"

Americans woke up to a different world the day after the attack. The war was over almost as soon as it had started. Outmaneuvered tactically and strategically, the United States suffered its greatest defeat at sea since Pearl Harbor. The incident—could it really be called a "war"?—had been preceded by a shallow diplomatic crisis between the two great powers. No one in the West expected the dispute to spiral out of control. George Washington was conducting routine patrols off the coast of China to send a signal of U.S. resolve. China responded with a signal of its own—sinking the massive ship. The ship broke in two and sank in twenty minutes. The Chinese medium-range ballistic missile had a penetrator warhead that drilled through all fourteen decks of the ship and punched a cavernous hole measuring twenty-feet wide from the flat-top landing deck through to the bottom of the hull. Ammunition stores ignited secondary explosions. Two million gallons of JP-5 jet fuel poured into the sea. The attack was calamitous and damage control was pointless.

While the Pentagon was reeling to determine exactly what happened, a well-orchestrated and pre-planned ‘‘rescue’’ effort was already underway by a flotilla of first responders from China. The Chinese media reported on the bravery of Chinese naval forces, fisheries enforcement police and common fishermen who happened to be in the vicinity of the disaster and were able to save numerous lives. The massive warship had a crew of 3,200 sailors, and there were nearly 1,800 additional sailors and airmen embarked with the wing of aircraft on board the ship. Among this floating city, thousands of souls either incinerated or drowned. In the end, China saved hundreds of desperate survivors floating in the water. Chinese state television filmed distraught young U.S. navy personnel, weeping, grateful to be alive as they were plucked from the oily water. Family members back in the States rushed to Beijing to reunite with their sons and daughters, hosted by the Chinese government and state media.

Beijing denied the attack. China shuttled to the Security Council, claiming that an accident on board the aircraft carrier had created a "radioactive incident" in its fishing zone, spreading nuclear fallout throughout the air and water in the region. The International Maritime Organization had declared the area of the attack a marine sanctuary one year earlier, and China had publicly warned that foreign warships posed an environmental risk to the natural marine environment. The United States, it was suggested, was liable for damage to China’s living and nonliving resources in the oceans, in accordance with the Law of the Sea Convention. Beijing also rushed to the area activists from environmental NGOs to monitor the situation. Expressing solidarity and sorrow for the U.S. loss, China flatly denied that it had anything to do with the catastrophe.

Kraska, CDR, James, "How the U.S. Lost the Naval War of 2015," FPRI Orbis, Winter, 2010, pp 40-41.

CDR Kraska has a very interesting article in the latest issue of Orbis. The article projects a bit over 5 years into the future a scenario where China launches a single anti-ship ballistic missile striking the USS George Washington and killing around 4000 sailors and airmen. What follows is a well orchestrated strategic communications strategy intended to create an atmosphere of global intimidation and doubt regarding the incident. The scenario goes on to note it takes several weeks for the US Navy to gather enough forces to project power in the Pacific, with no small assistance by a various coincidence of events including closure of the Panama Canal for 'maintenance' purposes, leaving the US incapable of developing regional support for a military response.

As all scenarios go, there are several premises the scenario is based upon, beginning with complete political and strategic failure. For me, the assumptions of the scenario offered are part of simulating future scenarios in exercises, as accepting conditions no matter how probable is how wargaming works (and after this decade, haven't we learned to respect the possibility of improbable scenarios). That is one reason why I was disappointed in Tom Ricks analysis of the article. He should have traded in his reporters cap for his CNAS analyst cap when examining this article.

With that said, I note this only partially a military scenario specific to weapon systems like the anti-ship ballistic missile, but also a strategic scenario dealing with China's non-military strategic communications efforts intended to shape political outcomes. With that in mind, lets examine both.

Military Considerations

When considering this article, I first began wondering about how a self-guiding anti-ship ballistic missile could create dangerous problems for the US Navy in the future. We don't know enough detail yet to outline how such a weapon system will work, but what concerns me is how it might work. If, for example, the weapon is a fire and forget weapon that is fired towards an area at sea intended to strike the largest detectable target within an area; the ASBM would immediately become the most dangerous weapon in history that could be potentially exported.

What if, for example, one of these missiles somehow ended up in the hands of a non-state actor and was set up for launch in the Sudan. When thinking about the possible range, the weapon could be fired at a nuclear aircraft carrier transiting the Mediterranean Sea. How do you think the Europeans are going to react if a nuclear powered aircraft carrier is sunk in a major fishing area in their neck of the woods? What are the credible political options at that point, and to what degree would China be accountable for exporting such a weapon?

The thing that concerns me about China isn't necessarily a war between the US and China, rather the more likely possibility that Chinese weapons end up fighting the US somewhere else. China is a military supplier to North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan - all of whom have not always been responsible with exports, including nuclear technology.

One more note. This piece by CDR Kraska is the first public source article I have read that points to the Type 041 Yuan class submarine as a major military capability. Expect more of this. The Song class submarine has a much inflated reputation based on the Kitty Hawk incident that has been reported in the press, but in general I do not get a sense from anywhere the Song is considered a major weapon system.

The Yuan class, on the other hand, is considered a major weapon system in the PLAN. There is a lot of speculation that the Yuan class may have a range on diesels around 10k nautical miles. If true, that would put Pearl Harbor within the potential patrol zone of a Yuan class submarine. If you are one who believes that COSCO would act as an arm of the PLA during times of tension, how long could a Yuan be supplied to operate around Pearl Harbor? In the context of CDR Kraska's futuristic analysis, how does lawfare and maritime regulation contribute to PLAN operations of conventional submarines around Hawaii? A lot to think about.

Strategic Communications and Soft Power

While the article focuses on a military act, it is really the strategic communications element discussed in the article that poses the greatest threat in the scenario. Part of the solution is the integration of information systems as part of the overall cooperative strategy. There is something to be said for transparency, and while I share several concerns expressed in this article regarding Maritime Domain Awareness (ironically also written by CDR Kraska) in this months Proceedings, an advantage of sharing information is that partners share data in regards to threat assessments like a ballistic missile launch. In the case of a Chinese ballistic missile launch, integrated BMD sensors throughout the Pacific by partners like Japan, South Korea, and Australia with the US greatly reduces the chances that China could launch such a missile and be convincing regionally in denial.

Something else though. The loss of an aircraft carrier with 4000 killed would unquestionably represent an enormous blow to the US, but the question I have is whether it would significantly shift the balance of naval power in the region? I don't think so, because I believe in major war the power at sea lies with submarines, not aircraft carriers. With that said, that leads to another point... would submarines be allowed to conduct unrestricted warfare on commercial shipping bound for China under the scenario introduced in CDR Kraska's article? The answer to that question is more than just a military consideration, indeed it is a strategic communication question.

One of the most common discussions regarding smaller warships is what they would do during major war hostilities. My first answer would be that they would be used for the interdiction, indeed to capture (not sink) enemy shipping. The STRATCOM battle with China is a lot easier to win when naval forces capture enemy vessels, and a lot harder when naval forces sink enemy vessels. If pirates were sinking ships and killing sailors on a more regular basis off Somalia, that threat would be seen in a completely different way than it is today where very few people are being killed, and no major commercial ships are being sunk. It is unlikely to be any different in wartime, and if China is limited to sinking enemy shipping while we are capturing enemy shipping, they will lose the global STRATCOM position. It should be of concern, because China is the nation building the large fleet of small vessels that can be dispersed to capture enemy commercial vessels.

Something to consider.

China Adds Expeditionary to Streetfighter

I think China has taken seriously the development of a Streetfighter capability for the South China Sea. With estimates China is building 81 Type 022 Fast Attack Missile Craft, this deal would appear to give China a matching high speed expeditionary capability for their developing Streetfighter doctrine.

China's navy is to purchase four Ukrainian military hovercraft in a 315-million-dollar deal potentially shifting the South China Sea naval balance, the Interfax news agency reported. A shipbuilding firm in Ukraine's Black Sea port Feodosia will construct two Zubr (translation - Bison) class craft, and a second pair of vessels will be built in China under the supervision of Ukrainian technicians.

A Ukrainian government publication listing state contracts confirmed the order without giving its value. Officials at the Morye shipyard in Feodosia declined comment.

The Zubr hovercraft is designed to carry three tanks, 10 armoured personnel carriers, or as many as 500 troops at speeds exceeding 63 knots.

The vessel can due to its larger size operate in rougher seas than smaller hovercraft.

The Russian, Ukrainian, and Greek navies currently operate the Zubr, with a total ten hovercraft produced since 1988.

I think we all know China will eventually copy these systems and build them at Chinese shipyards. Given the rate of construction for the Type 022, it is entirely possible China could field several dozen by 2015, enough to move thousands of troops around the South China Sea.

The Zubr landing craft has a cargo area of 4,300 sq ft and a fuel capacity of 56 tons. It can carry three main battle tanks or up to ten armored personnel carriers with 140 troops (up to 115 tonnes), or up to 500 troops total. The working parameter for range is typically 300 miles (480 km) at 55 knots.

At that speed, a single Zubr can cross from China to Taiwan, self deploy a 500 troop Marine force, and be back in China in about 3 hours, and conduct 4 such operations in a single day. That means 4 Zubr's could theoretically land 8000 Chinese Marines per day in a cross strait scenario.

Observing the Scarborough Shoals PLAN Submarine Incident

This is a very interesting blog post by Ken Adams, who I am borrowing the image from displayed on the right. Ken raised points based on the details of Friday's Navy Times article suggesting the location of the incident appears to be a little confused in US reporting.

Read his post before reading below.

Using this information I looked around and have found he appears to be exactly right. Several Chinese news sources are claiming the incident took place not off Sudic Bay as CNN reported, nor around the Mindoro Strait as the AP reported, but near the Scarborough Shoals. If you observe the image borrowed from Ken Adams, you can open up Google Earth and see for yourself that while the satellite clearly covers the island, the details of Scarborough Shoals are blurred out... probably for a reason.

The following is from cache of a blog written by Philippines reporter Ellen Tordesillas, whose website is not online as of this writing. Ellen is claiming the incident likely took place around 2nm off the Scarborough shoals, which as of four months ago would be counted under the new Philippines Baseline law (see this quick tutorial video on youtube) as inside the sovereign territory of the Philippines.

The four-month old Philippine baseline law got its first test last Friday and it failed miserably and embarrassingly.

Last Friday, CNN reported a Chinese submarine collided with an underwater sonar array towed by the destroyer USS John S. McCain off the Philippines.

Other wire reports from Washington D.C. described the location as “off Subic Bay” in Zambales. Chinese media said the encounter was near Scarborough Shoal.

The Philippine government version of the location of the high seas collision, given two days after the incident, was closer to that of China. Defense Assistant Secretary Alberto Valenzuela said “it was 125 nautical miles off Subic, near the Scarborough Shoal, which is 123 nautical miles from Subic.”

Under the baseline law, Scarborough shoal is part of Philippine territory classified as a “regime of islands.” Inclusion of the shoal in Philippine territory was protested by China which also claims the shoal as well as the whole of South China Sea.

From the three versions of the location of the collision, it can be concluded that it is in Philippine territory.

The law, which had a lot of controversy and debate surrounding its passage (including protest from China and Vietnam), is heavily based on the United Nations Law of the Sea. While I don't think it is as clear as Ellen does that the incident took place in Philippine territory, I find it very odd that recent satellite imagery of the Scarborough Shoals exists, and for some reason Google has been asked to conceal the details.

As I understand it, there are no people who live on the shoals, although without satellite it is difficult to find imagery other than a few rocks of the shoals. Unless you have been there, which I haven't, I'm not sure whether the shoals simply are a handful of rocks above sea level or if there is enough land mass to leverage the shoals for high technology like military equipment. With both the US and Philippine governments already denying the event took place in Philippine territory, and it is unlikely the exact location of the incident will be revealed, it seems to me the question is whether China has any activity taking place on the shoals themselves, never mind 2nms off the shoals.

The picture in Google Earth is smudged for a reason, and it isn't a bad assumption that the reason is related in some way to the reason a PLA Navy submarine is operating that close to the shoals, or why a US Navy destroyer would be hunting a PLA Navy submarine in that area.

These territorial issues in the South China Sea are no joke. If China has no problem harassing the US Navy over territorial rights, it is a good bet they look at the Philippines with disdain on the issue and will be equally aggressive and provocative... perhaps even more so. As for me, I don't like the lack of transparency from Google Earth in a region we are having naval incidents with the PLA Navy. That just doesn't look right to me.