Mischaracterizing a Notional Deployment of THAAD in South Korea

Last Friday, Sukjoon Yoon, a senior fellow at the Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy, published an opinion piece in The Diplomat regarding the potential implications of a hypothetical U.S. deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems to South Korea upon relations between Seoul and Beijing. I fully appreciate the political sensitivity of the issue to the South Korean government and have no comments on that aspect. The article was quite enlightening with respect to South Korean political and strategic considerations.

I take issue, though, with how some of THAAD’s capabilities were described and what the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea was alleged to have said about its notional deployment. First, there’s this:

Jane’s Defence Weekly reported in April 2013 that the first THAAD was installed in Guam that month; it is intended to provide early intercept capability for North Korean missiles during their boost or ascent phase.

I can’t find the Jane’s article being cited, but I’d be extremely surprised if it claimed that THAAD units placed in Guam would be able to perform boost or ascent phase intercepts against North Korean ballistic missiles. As noted above, the ‘T’ in THAAD stands for Terminal. It is designed to perform last-ditch, inner-layer intercepts against inbound reentry vehicles or non-separating ballistic missiles. Its coverage footprint is the immediate area surrounding a defended target. I can’t begin to imagine how close you’d have to place a THAAD launcher to a threat ballistic missile launcher in order to perform a boost or ascent phase engagement, and that’s assuming such an engagement was even kinematically possible.

Next there’s this:

Military leaders in Beijing will have noted General Curtis Scaparrotti’s infamous remarks during his keynote speech at a defense-related forum held in Seoul on June 3, 2014. Scaparrotti recommended the deployment of THAAD to South Korea as a superior option to KAMD, citing THAAD’s capability to engage all classes of ballistic missiles and in all phases of their trajectories.

It surprised me greatly to see that a U.S. General allegedly publicly denigrated an ally’s developmental system. Since the General’s speech as posted on his command’s site doesn’t even reference THAAD or KAMD, I have to assume the discussion of the topic came during the question period. So I checked the English-language Korea Herald article used as the linked citation in the above selection. Nowhere did that article attribute such a statement to General Scaparrotti. Instead, the General merely asserted that he had recommended to his leadership that THAAD deployment should be considered—while also adding the caveat that any such deployment would be subject to a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and South Korean governments. This is echoed in English-language reporting by the South Korean press here and here, and by American press here and here. If there’s reporting to support the claim made against the General, it’s definitely not prominently published in English.

Then there’s this:

What has particularly disturbed the Chinese military is the prospect of the U.S. linking individual sensors, interceptors, and communications assets dispersed all around the Asia-Pacific region into a comprehensive and integrated BMD system to interdict Chinese ballistic missiles in the boost and ascent phases of their trajectories. This would allow THAAD to penetrate and severely compromise China’s air defense zone.

Again, THAAD is a terminal phase system. It has no utility outside of BMD missions. How could it even conceivably “penetrate and severely compromise China’s air defense zone?” The only way any notional South Korea-deployed THAAD units could even conceivably be employed against Chinese missiles is if China had already launched missiles at targets in South Korea.

There’s one other set of technical points in the article I want to comment on:

Moreover, THAAD’s range will extend beyond the Korean Peninsula. The coverage provided by the existing sea-based Aegis system will be greatly extended by the planned deployment of AN/TPY-2 radars. These track inbound short- and medium-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs and MRBMs) with a high-resolution X-band (8-12.4 GHz) phased-array sensor system providing a 120-degree azimuth field out to 1,000∼3,000km, effectively covering the whole of mainland China.

Since it’s clear that the THAAD interceptor could not reach much beyond the Korean Peninsula, the implication of the above is that the system’s greater value to overall U.S. theater BMD would be the AN/TPY-2’s use as a cueing sensor to support remote engagements by other assets. I don’t disagree with that. But the article should have noted that the U.S. would have no monopoly on radars that monitor some volume above or otherwise the approaches to other sovereign countries in East Asia out to several thousand kilometers downrange. The Chinese Over the Horizon-Backscatter (OTH-B) system for maritime surveillance is a primary example. Or, since we’re dealing in hypotheticals, consider the radar coverage if China procures S-400 from Russia. Now that would have real effects on other countries’ air defense zones.

So while I found the author’s political-strategic analyses of the South Korean THAAD question quite interesting, I just don’t see any basis for several of his military-technological arguments…or his assertions regarding General Scaparrotti’s comments.
 

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.  

From the PACOM Playbook to PACOM's Plan B(MD)

WATERS TO THE WEST OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA (March 17, 2024) The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS John S. McCain (DDG 56), front, the Republic of Korea Navy Aegis-class destroyer ROKS Seoae-Yu-Seong-Ryong (DDG 993), middle, and the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS McCampbell (DDG 85) move into formation during exercise Foal Eagle 2013. McCampbell and McCain are members of Destroyer Squadron 15, forward deployed to Yokosuka, Japan, and are underway to conduct exercise Foal Eagle 2013 with allied nation Republic of Korea in support of regional security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Declan Barnes/Released)

Every year as winter ends in March, North Korea holds an annual military exercises as part of their spring training period that usually concludes with a big meeting with all the leaders in early April. This years meeting appears to have occurred on April 1st with the announcement that North Korea will restart their dead reactor. Despite news reports, I am skeptical that reactor will be back online this calendar year.

This annual training period in North Korea typically coincides with South Korea and the United States holding their annual Foal Eagle and Key Resolve exercises. For the past few years the pattern has been fairly consistent with North Korea being extra threatening (and feeling extra threatened) and usually a war of words breaks out for about a month or so. Once the US/South Korean military exercises end, North Korea will call for negotiations and take credit for resolving the crisis they manufactured in the first place. Last year when this chess game was over, many in the US had a bad taste in their mouth unhappy with the result, and as a result a lot of thought and planning by PACOM went into this years Foal Eagle 2013 exercises.

Everyone who follows me on Twitter might have noticed about mid-February that I was gearing up for this years annual chess match on the North Korean peninsula. I will never be an Asia expert, but I admit to being fascinated by the North Korean government that has somehow remained completely resilient to any type of external influence for over a half century. In particular North Korea, not China, is a subject I like to raise when talking about geopolitical issues in the Pacific with Admirals and Generals, because with North Korea the biggest threat is the lack of good intelligence.

Earlier this year I was following up with various Admirals and Generals I had met over 2012. As part of those calls I had a long conversation with someone I have gotten to know at PACOM on AirSea Battle and specifically the Pacific region; and more specifically we often discuss North Korea, not China. I was informed that the 2013 Foal Eagle exercise would be something I, in particular, would appreciate because it truly leverages public affairs within the context of both strategic communications and operations; a topic I have frequently written about. I was given no hints as to what this meant, except I was told Secretary Panetta had set aside extra funding for the Air Force for Foal Eagle 2013, and most of the details were already worked out. This conversation took place 2 months ago.

The Playbook

Adam Entous and Julian Barnes at the Wall Street Journal have revealed the US script that has played out over the month of March. Described as the 'Playbook', they detail events in their latest Wall Street Journal article.

The U.S. is putting a pause to what several officials described as a step-by-step plan the Obama administration approved earlier this year, dubbed "the playbook," that laid out the sequence and publicity plans for U.S. shows of force during annual war games with South Korea. The playbook included well-publicized flights in recent weeks near North Korea by nuclear-capable B-52 and stealth B-2 bombers, as well as advanced F-22 warplanes.

The U.S. stepped back from the plans this week, as U.S. officials began to worry that the North, which has a small nuclear arsenal and an unpredictable new leader, may be more provoked than the U.S. had intended, the officials said.

"The concern was that we were heightening the prospect of misperceptions on the part of the North Koreans, and that that could lead to miscalculations," a senior administration official said.

The Wall Street Journal goes on to detail the Playbook, even describing Secretary Hagel as one of the playbook's chief backers, even though I know for fact the Playbook was actually written by PACOM on Secretary Panetta's watch and with his full support. The article then highlights the meat of the politics.

The public-relations effort was designed not only to send a message to North Korea, but also to assure a hawkish new government in South Korea that it had full U.S. backing and there was no need for it to respond militarily to the North's provocations.

U.S. intelligence agencies assessed the risks associated with the playbook and concluded there was a low probability of a North Korean military response because the regime's top priority has been self-preservation. U.S. officials believe the North understands that taking military action could prompt a devastating U.S. and South Korean counter-strike that could destabilize the regime.

"Everyone is concerned about miscalculation and the outbreak of war. But the sense across the U.S. government is that the North Koreans are not going to wage all-out war," a senior Obama administration official said. "They are interested first and foremost in regime survival."

The U.S. plan was discussed during several high-level White House meetings, according to participants. The effort was backed by Mr. Hagel in one of his first acts as defense secretary. John Kerry, the new secretary of State, supported the Pentagon, as did other top administration officials, according to meeting participants.

In the deliberations, supporters said it was better for the U.S. to control the escalating steps, to ensure the situation didn't spin out of control. In part, according to these officials, the plan was an effort to ensure that South Korea's new government wouldn't feel compelled to respond to North Korean threats, which often emerge at the time of the exercises, as the North conducts its own annual legislative meeting.

But within the administration, some officials voiced concern about unintended consequences of provoking North Korea. Some of these officials questioned the faith the White House and Pentagon placed in the intelligence agencies, which have a mixed record of predicting North Korean behavior.

The intelligence gaps are particularly acute when it comes to reading new North Korean leader Kim Jong Eun, who remains an obscure figure and someone who intelligence agencies themselves have described as potentially more unpredictable than his father.

However, few objections were raised at the highest levels during the meetings, according to participants—unlike in other Obama administration deliberations about using military force abroad, including Libya, Northwest Africa and Syria, that have been marked by protracted debates. President Barack Obama gave the green light to proceed with the playbook, these people said.

The First Quarter: March

The Playbook was intended to function as escalation control by the Obama administration. As someone who jumps online every night at 8pm EST to read the morning news in North Korea, allow me to suggest the Playbook worked better than expected. When North Korea abandoned the Armistice back on March 10, it was clear to observers that North Korea was operating from a script. As I discussed at that time, escalation control was the key to managing the tensions, and I do think the US still maintains escalation control over the situation today, with or without the old Playbook.

As I have observed the US airpower show of force that has visited South Korea over the past month, I found myself in huge admiration for how well the US was playing the game with North Korea in 2013. What headlines that bluster the presence of US military power failed to mention is that every single aircraft that has been flown over South Korea over the past month had been planned many months ago as part of the planning process for the Foal Eagle 2013 exercise. This was never a secret btw, I exchanged emails with a public affairs officer who confirmed this for me right after B-52s made their appearance on March 19. The B-52s, the B-2s, the F-22s, etc... all those flights and activities were planned to appear in Foal Eagle long ago, and there was nothing new or reactionary by the United States taking place as events unfolded throughout March. While bombers and advanced fighters have been involved in previous Foal Eagle exercises, the key distinction this year was the announced use of those platforms.

Unlike previous years, this year the US publicized the presence of B-2s and F-22s through defense public affairs, because otherwise North Korea (or you and I) would never know they were involved in the exercises, even though the actual flights by those aircraft were planned and paid for months ago. So what is new this year? The public affairs piece that mentions their presence and activity, and the PA professionals who were able to mingle those activities into the context of the North Korean rhetoric - so reporters could go write plenty of news stories - is the only thing that is actually different from the US/SK perspective relative to previous years. Talk is cheap, which may explain why our defense public affairs folks are actually pretty good at it when given the green light.

Throughout the entire month of March as North Korea has stepped through their well orchestrated script for escalating tensions in the region, the US has been following a script of their own; a script written long ago for the Foal Eagle exercises and supported fully by the White House. In my opinion, everything North Korea is doing - even through today - is part of their script, and everything we have been doing has been part of our script. The intelligence officials in the WSJ report are right, there is no evidence that North Korea is off script. We do not know what their script is, but there does appear to be broad agreement that North Korea didn't write a script that ends with them being wiped out in a war. Neither script was written in a way that predicted the others actions, and public affairs and the use of media by both North Korea and the US is solely responsible for connecting the activities of the other side.

It would appear that in the end, the actions contained in the North Korean script forced us to abandon our script.

April Fools Day

If the US and North Korea have been playing a game of chicken as each side executed their scripted events in the public sphere, it is now clear that beginning on April Fools Day North Korea won that game of chicken, and the US was the first to flinch.

Every military activity related to the Korean peninsula discussed in the public was part of the script until on Tuesday - for the first time - the narrative being produced by US media was no longer fully incorporated into the Playbook. The retasking of USS Decatur (DDG 73) to head towards North Korea was a new event, and everyone who follows naval power closely knew it. The problem was, PACOM was one ballistic missile defense destroyer short of what was needed to meet demand signal coming from North Korean activities.

While most of the media made a big deal about the USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) being close to the Korean peninsula, the fact is the US Navy has a BMD capable destroyer on that patrol every single day of the year. Without going into too much detail, USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) is on a regular patrol that gives the United States an early warning detection capability should someone in Asia launch a ballistic missile at us. There is an AEGIS warship there 24/7/365 and on leap year day too. As soon as the media started talking about USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) and USS Decatur (DDG 73), neither of which has any attachment to Foal Eagle 2013 or the Playbook, apparently that is when the Obama administration got nervous and pulled back on the Playbook.

But here is the issue: PACOM needed USS Decatur (DDG 73) because there wasn't another BMD ship available. Attention Congress, there is a capacity issue in 7th Fleet for BMD capable destroyers in the Obama administrations 'pivot to Asia' plan, because the Navy fell short one forward deployed BMD capable warship when PACOM came calling in regards to a North Korean crisis.

The challenge PACOM faces is that PACOM believes North Korea is going to be launching a ballistic missile soon, but the difference between this ballistic missile and previous North Korean ballistic missile launches is that this missile has a mobile launching platform. That makes the launch time of the next ballistic missile an unknown, and just as important the launch point for the next ballistic missile an unknown. This combination of unknown time and unknown launch location requires PACOM to cover every threat axis from North Korea in this threat environment, just in case, to insure regional security.

What you have been reading in the press is only partially correct, because there are actually nine US Navy ballistic missile defense capable warships operating throughout the 7th Fleet today, not two or three as has been reported. As we navalists know, AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense is an integrated network approach to developing a very large regional shield where each ship is both a radar and a shooter, and by integrating other assets in the region, the Navy can track a ballistic missile at launch and potentially develop a firing solution within only a handful of seconds. The more sensors and the better the quality of data, the faster a threat assessment can be made by AEGIS thereby enabling options for response quickly. This process is one that the Navy is well trained for, and in complicated exercises has practiced successfully in actual intercept events that last no longer than 20-30 seconds in practice windows that have spanned days.

While Foal Eagle and the "Playbook" was essentially a strategic communications exercise with North Korea in this environment of higher tension, when PACOM faced a situation where the potential for an actual missile launch in this environment became a legitimate possibility, PACOM has reacted by establishing a regional ballistic missile shield around our partners and bases. This regional ballistic missile defense shield layers around the Japanese ballistic missile defense capabilities, which can be integrated with the US Navy capability through AEGIS.

The US already has an X-Band radar in Japan that can track launches, additional radars in South Korea that can be utilized for launch detection, and nine BMD capable warships that can help track and develop firing solutions for intercepting any ballistic missile threat. Because the area that requires defense from the particular missile North Korea intends to launch is fairly vast, the US Navy ultimately was one ship short to meet the ballistic missile shield demand PACOM needed for full protection. When USS Decatur (DDG 73) was retasked, as a public asset outside the Playbook, political leaders got the impression they had lost escalation control with the Playbook and apparently gave it up. It is somewhat disappointing the Playbook was so rigid it couldn't adapt when inserting a new asset into it's strategic messaging.

Seapower as Strategic Deterrent

Throughout the duration of the cold war, mutually assured destruction is often credited for deterring nuclear war. While the debate over mutually assured destruction still exists today regarding the wisdom of the policy; the bottom line is MAD worked. Ballistic missile defense, in theory, adds a new strategic option for the United States in dealing with nuclear powers like North Korea that have limited capabilities. For the first time in human history, the United States is fielding a fully mature and developed ballistic missile defense shield to protect US allies and territories from an announced threat of nuclear attack.

One of the key strategic differences between ballistic missile defense as a deterrent and mutually assured destruction as a deterrent is that the United States is basically saying the enemy can shoot first, and if the attack is a nuclear attack but is also successfully defended against, then the United States reserves the option of responding without using nuclear weapons. This is a critical point critics of ballistic missile defense apparently don't believe is important, because a successful nuclear attack against US allies or territories requires a nuclear response. The option of not having to respond to a nuclear attack with nuclear weapons is the value of successful ballistic missile defense, and why smart investment and stewardship of ballistic missile defense is in the best interests of the United States.

It has been reported that the deployment of land based interceptors to Alaska is going to cost one billion dollars. That suggests the latest announcement that THAAD interceptors will be deployed to Guam will probably also cost one billion dollars. THAAD interceptors are expensive, and about half the time they even work. Those two land based ballistic missile defense deployments cost as much as a single new AEGIS ballistic missile defense destroyer, and while the AEGIS system is only capable of intercepting ballistic missiles in the very early and final stages of a ballistic missiles flight, the AEGIS BMD system has a much more reliable track record and has been tested under much more realistic conditions, including multiple targets and decoys, unlike the THAAD system. An AEGIS ballistic missile defense destroyer is also mobile, which is why the US Navy will be protecting Guam with an AEGIS ballistic missile defense warship for the next several weeks until the THAAD system can be deployed to Guam.

In theory THAAD is more capable than the AEGIS system because it can intercept at a higher altitude. The problem is THAAD is less reliable than AEGIS, less mature than AEGIS, and more expensive than AEGIS; but for now it is all the US has.

There is another reason why I believe Seapower is important right now as a strategic deterrent. I believe North Korea's creativity is interesting primarily because they are limited by means and are simplistic in method, and sometimes North Korean methods are so simple they appear absurd at first glance. North Korea publicized today that they have "smaller, lighter and diversified" nuclear weapons, which in theory makes some sense because they have only a limited supply of material to make nuclear weapons with. I know it has been something of a running joke for years, but if things go hot I would not be surprised if North Korea tried to deliver a nuclear weapon via a sea mine rather than by missile. North Korea is very skilled in developing sea mines, but not so much when it comes to rocket technologies. The ability to keep North Korea's naval forces from causing any problems is going to be important over the next month in preventing a war. An incident like the sinking of the Cheonan 3 years ago right now could spark a chain of events that leads to Korean War II, but an even worst case scenario is if North Korea was to find a way to sink a US or Japanese warship, because that puts South Korea in the middle of a crossfire.

Halftime Adjustments

While I can understand why PACOM called in the US Navy to build a regional ballistic missile defense shield when it became clear North Korea might launch a ballistic missile from a mobile launcher, I don't understand why the Obama administration threw out the Playbook and then ran off to tell the Wall Street Journal about it. Regardless, someone clearly needs to clue Hagel in on a little secret: Seapower is the winning playbook if the objective is to prevent war.

The ballistic missile defense shield PACOM is setting up is a defensive capability. It is also a very limited piece of the US Navy's capability - indeed it's only a small piece of the surface combatants being used for the ballistic missile defense shield. There are no carriers projecting power into the Yellow Sea, there are no submarines launching missiles, and there are no amphibious ships preparing to send Marines ashore in South Korea.

If North Korea does continue to escalate further, and I believe they will, the Stennis Carrier Strike Group is deployed and is currently in port in Singapore, and the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group is deployed currently off the US west coast heading east. Those two carriers represent 100+ aircraft that can project power as needed in any contingency, and can do so right into downtown Pyonyang if necessary.

And if tensions result in a hot war, those submarines nobody in North Korea can detect will be the first strike that knocks out the Command and Control capabilities of North Korea in the first minutes of hot war.

And if for some reason the US needs to reinforce the South Korean Army, US Marines will be delivered into theater from amphibious ships.

And if, God forbid, a nuclear device goes off in South Korea, the nearby SSBN that no nation on the planet can find today will make sure Pyonyang is melted off the face of the planet.

American Seapower is inherently designed to be an escalation control mechanism for political leaders during a crisis. Seapower is a stabilizing presence capable of preserving peace through projecting strength or providing defensive, and an enabling capability when it is time to deliver the US Army to win a war.

No matter what the Playbook was last week, the winning Playbook for the US going forward dealing with North Korea is Seapower. Military strategists have spent most of the 21st century convincing political leaders in Washington that US military power is best exercised with land power - in Asia of all places, but hopefully with a splash of cold water called the threat of nuclear war, political leaders are waking up to the historical reality that Seapower is how Superpowers manage enduring peace without being intrusive on the sovereignty of partners. Seapower enables nations to enjoy enduring prosperity through maintenance of stability, lines of communication for trade, and security. Seapower is also going to be how PACOM will be managing peace in the Pacific crisis of the present and future, so I hope those involved with Hagel's strategic review are paying attention.

It's only April 4th, Foal Eagle still has 25+ more days. It is going to be a long month with plenty more threatening rhetoric and behavior ahead. Is a ballistic missile launch how this ends? Maybe, but I still believe North Korea desires a limited skirmish of some sort as part of their script, although it could be that the Playbook has actively deterred that potential outcome.

There is a lot of good analysis of the situation in North Korea out there. I highly recommend two sites in particular that may not be part of your regular web readings. The Interpreter Blog at the Australian Lowy Institute is always a great source for analysis of events in the Pacific, and in particular North Korea right now; and just about everything written by Jeffery Lewis these days covers every angle of North Korean nukes and missiles.

BMD and Theater Stability in Northeast Asia

This is another interesting development in the context of the upcoming North Korean rocket launch. It would appear it isn't just South Korea and Japan preparing to shoot the rocket down if necessary, but Taiwan as well.

A military spokesman yesterday refused to comment on media reports alleging that two advanced anti-missile systems — the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) and Tien Kung-III “Sky Bow” (TK-III) air defense systems — had been deployed in eastern Taiwan to deal with the possible launch of a North Korean rocket later this month.

Ministry of National Defense spokesperson David Lo (羅紹和) said the military was collecting information about Pyongyang’s anticipated rocket launch and added that the military had requested its anti-missile units monitor and respond to the situation as appropriate.

Something has been on my mind, and it goes back to something discussed on the blog last week by Bryan McGrath. A lot of people were up in arms about the President making the comment that he would be better positioned to negotiate with Russia on nuclear issues after the election - because he won't be running for reelection. In a democracy we elect our leaders to represent us, and we bestow upon them through that election process the trust to make decisions for the people in scenarios like a nuclear agreement with Russia. Some are really bent out of shape that the President would suggest this issue would be easier to manage after an election. I am not one of those people, the exchange itself didn't bother me, what bothered me was what Bryan quoted in the speech given the next day by President Obama in his attempt to address the issue. Specifically:

"I don't think it's any surprise that you can't start that a few months before a presidential and congressional elections in the United States, and at a time when they just completed elections in Russia and they're in the process of a presidential transition where a new president is going to be coming in in a little less than two months.

So it was a very simple point, and one that essentially I repeated when I spoke to you guys yesterday, which is that we're going to spend the next nine, 10 months trying to work through some of the technical aspects of how we get past what is a major point of friction -- one of the primary points of friction between our two countries, which is this whole missile defense issue. And it involves a lot of complicated issues. If we can get our technical teams to clear out the underbrush, then hopefully, in 2013, there's a foundation to actually make some significant progress on this and a lot of other bilateral issues.

So I think everybody understands that -- if they haven't they haven't been listening to my speeches -- I want to reduce our nuclear stockpiles. And one of the barriers to doing that is building trust and cooperation around missile defense issues. And so this is not a matter of hiding the ball, I'm on record. I made a speech about it to a whole bunch of Korean university students yesterday. I want to see us, over time, gradually, systematically, reduce reliance on nuclear weapons."

Bryan McGrath is right, the two issues of Russian nuclear weapons and Ballistic Missile Defense cannot be linked, and the President needs to seek better advice regarding Ballistic Missile Defense if he has somehow confused it with an issue he appears to care a lot about - which is a nuclear free world. I appreciate that President Obama has high goals regarding nuclear weapons, but I am not convinced at all that President Obama appreciates Ballistic Missile Defense and the strategic role it is playing in the 21st century that has absolutely nothing to do with cold war era nuclear exchanges.

Playing out before our eyes in Asia is politics of the highest order with North Korea, and it is almost certain that the President's own National Security Council has warned him by now that under no circumstances can North Korea be allowed to launch the rocket planned for launch sometime during the next 2 weeks. The Obama administrations policy for North Korea has been to break the cycle of North Korean provocations and specifically to get North Korea to stand by agreements made within the six-party talks framework. By every definition the rocket launch will repeat a cycle of breaking agreements within the six-party talks, and if allowed to be successful will signal to regional partners that the US policy for North Korea has failed - again. Given the amount of attention without detail that China is putting into North Korea over the last few weeks, it appears that China is becoming increasingly frustrated with Pyongyang like everyone else.

The US is pulling back food aid to North Korea because the US claims that the food deal agreed to last month included a moratorium on long range missile tests, and the rocket launch is seen as a long range missile test. North Korea sees the suspension of US food aid as us breaking the agreement first. Whether you agree or not that the US should be pulling back food aid, it is very hard to claim the US has broken the cycle of provocation with North Korea, and many experts are suggesting that no matter what happens - North Korea will simply test another nuclear weapon at the end of this current diplomatic dustup - which is the very definition of repeating the cycle of provocation the Obama administration policy for North Korea claims to be aimed to prevent.

All we are learning is that the Obama administration is not having any more success than the Bush administration or the Clinton administration did, and that US diplomacy with North Korea is struggling to be relevant in curbing North Korean provocative behavior under any internationally agreed upon process model. It is unknown what impact shooting down the North Korean rocket may have, although it is noted in several circles that taking aggressive action like this with North Korea is in itself a way for the US to attempt to break the cycle of provocation by North Korea - by being provocative ourselves.

I think the US should allow nations in the region deal with the rocket, and the US should simply sit back and provide support for those nations - any and all support requested, but no more or less.

Bigger Picture

Consider for a moment what it looks like if the North Korean rocket goes over Japanese soil. Would a successful shoot down of a North Korean rocket make it more or less likely that Japan would develop nuclear capabilities? What happens if Japan tries to shoot down the rocket and fails? How many scenarios exist in the upcoming North Korean launch where the outcome leaves the Japanese public asking whether they need nuclear weapons to protect themselves? I imagine the Chinese are studying the various possible answers to that last question with considerable detail.

Ballistic missile defense is playing out in Northeast Asia in front of all of us as a major strategic capability bringing allies together against a common foe. South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan are all fielding US Ballistic Missile Defense technology to - perhaps - be used to shoot down the North Korean rocket. At its core, Ballistic Missile Defense is the strategic capability in play right now that forms the foundation of our regional alliances dealing with the regional threat of North Korea, and most importantly (and something President Obama needs to apparently get a briefing on) strategic Ballistic Missile Defense is acting as an alternative for Japan to developing nuclear weapons to counter North Korean nuclear and ballistic weapons development. As a capability, the diplomatic value of Ballistic Missile Defense at this moment in time may be higher than it has ever been in the capabilities history, because BMD serves as a visible reminder of what it means to be in a working strategic relationship where United States is in full support of a nation.

I believe the scenario playing out leads to an important question and discussion - could China or Russia shoot down the North Korean rocket even if they wanted to? Short of the rocket turning towards the Chinese mainland, I am not certain even if under those conditions China could shoot the North Korean rocket down. As for Russia, they have the capability to shoot the missile down, but whether that capability is deployed, trained, and ready to respond in immediate crisis is certainly questionable - and it is important to note that the naval forces of both nations is currently not capable of deploying for purposes of strategic protection from a ballistic missile attack against a partner, friend, or in support of allies.

Both Russia and China have some of the most sophisticated ballistic missiles in the world, but neither country has a credible defense from ballistic missiles that is fielded within the context of an alliance like the US capabilities are, nor are they globally deployable like the BMD capabilities of the US Navy. BMD is a strategic capability that neither Russia nor China has as an offering to friends as a protection in a time of need. When you consider the enormous advantage legitimate Ballistic Missile Defense gives the United States at the strategic and geopolitical level with our Asian allies today, it strikes me as remarkably foolish that on any level the President could potentially be considering conceding that advantage to any competitor for any purpose in a diplomatic negotiation.

The United States should not take for granted the strategic advantage of Ballistic Missile Defense, nor how Ballistic Missile Defense capability translates throughout our alliances to our friends and allies. With all due respect to the President, the suggestion that Ballistic Missile Defense is in play in negotiations with Russia related to nuclear arsenals is a serious miscalculation on his part.

In 2012 Ballistic Missile Defense has become one of the big puzzle pieces that is keeping several of our allies (like Japan and Saudi Arabia, to name a few big ones) from developing their own nuclear arsenals, and removing that incentive from our allies in an effort to simply reduce Russia's nuclear stockpile is counterproductive towards efforts of curbing development of nuclear weapons, and potentially destabilizing in the specific parts of the world the US defense strategy is specifically committed to maintaining stability.

Ballistic Missile Defense Takes Center Stage in the Pacific

News broke yesterday that North Korea has been stepping up Air Force training and has begun fueling their rocket scheduled for launch next month. South Korea has already claimed they will shoot the rocket down if it crosses into their territory, and now Japan is saying the same thing.

Japan will shoot down any part of the long-range rocket that North Korea plans to launch next month that enters its territory, the Japanese defense minister, Naoki Tanaka, said Friday.

Speaking at a news conference, Tanaka said he had issued the official order after instructing the Japanese military earlier in the week to prepare the country's missile defense shield against the planned rocket launch.

North Korea announced earlier this month that it would launch a rocket carrying a satellite between April 12 and 16 to mark the 100th anniversary of the birth of Kim Il Sung, the founder of the Communist state.

I have no idea how South Korea could shoot the missile down. Patriot 2 missiles and SM-2 missiles simply don't have the range except under the most optimistic circumstances to shoot down the missile, but Japan fields better technology and has more capabilities like SM-3 to shoot it down.

The US Navy put the X-Band Radar Platform to sea last week, and from everything I hear - the West Sea is getting crowded with naval forces.

The launch is expected in two weeks. The US is rightfully leading from behind on this issue, supporting Japan and South Korea side by side but staying out of the spotlight. With USS Enterprise (CVN 65) soon to be heading towards the 5th Fleet AOR, I expect the USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) to rotate back to the Pacific, and sometime over the next 2 weeks I suspect we will see the USS George Washington (CVN 73) get underway.

2011 Patterson Spring Crisis Simulation

Last weekend the Patterson School complete its annual Spring Crisis Simulation. This year's crisis involved a disaster and succession crisis in North Korea, and included teams representing North Korea, South Korea, Russia, China, Japan, and the United States.

Structure and Course of the Simulation

The simulation was conducted by about forty terminal MA students, with a selection of program faculty and graduates operating as Simulation Control and as team leaders. In addition, students and faculty from the UK School of of Journalism operated three in-simulation media websites, conducted interviews of participants, and attended press conferences. The simulation lasted twenty "real hours", operating on a schedule of one simulated day for every two real hours. This gave us some time to allow the situation to play itself out. Our simulations are primarily didactic rather than predictive, meaning that we will sacrifice realism to the need to put students into useful decision-making problems. This does not mean, however, that the simulation cannot expose real policy problems. The primary motivating concept behind a Patterson Crisis simulation is to force students to make decisions in a short period of time using limited, faulty, and often asymmetric information.

The catalyzing event for the simulation was a leak from the Yongbyon facility that spread radiation across parts of the DPRK, the ROK, and Japan. This leak was intended to spur North Korea's neighbors into action, as well as to provide the rationale for a protest movement within the DPRK. We had anticipated that the protest movement would be the primary driver of the crisis simulation. Our thoughts regarding the protests were guided by the intersection of popular dissatisfaction with the regime and perceptions of regime vulnerability. The nuclear incident andother domestic problems created a base sense of dissatisfaction. South Korean propaganda about Libya and Egypt created a perception of vulnerability sufficient to generate a small protest movement. This movement was primarily coordinated through the North Korean expatriate communities in Russia and China. In addition to being plausible, this allowed us to give Russia, China, and South Korea insight into and a degree of influence over the protest movement. Whatever steps the regime took to manage the protesters would either magnify dissatisfaction or increase the perception of vulnerability, putting the regime into a no-win situation.

The initial moves concerned an assessment of the disaster, as well as steps taken for containment. Ambiguity was a key value for planning the simulation. The only team ever made fully aware of the circumstances of the incident were the Russians, who sent a team to assist with cleanup and damage assessment. All of the other teams received their information through intelligence services of varying reliability. The North Korean leadership finally tortured its on-site nuclear engineering team into confessing that American and Japanese intelligence had arranged the incident, which provided closure of a sort. This would eventually cause additional problems, including another small leak at Yongbyon.

The protest movement didn't have immediate effect, but it did put pressure on the DPRK team over time. A reformist faction developed within the team, eventually convincing the bulk of the team that repressive efforts would likely create more disorder. Reports that police were reluctant to put down protests fed this perception. These developments were roughly in accord with our expectations. And then the North Korean team did something interesting. The military-led reformist faction killed Kim Jong Il, and handed power over to Kim Jong Un. Jong Un proved predictably erratic and aggressive, which gave the military the excuse to step in and displace him in a coup. The resultant junta immediately promised reforms to both domestic and international audiences.

This left Simulation Control, not to mention the protesters and the Six Parties, non-plussed. We judged the military regime to be somewhat less vulnerable than the Kim Jong Eun regime, and because the military said the right things about economic reform and nuclear cleanup, we also judged that some protester grievances were being answered. Accordingly, we slightly scaled back the protests, giving the regime some breathing room. The North Korean military took advantage of this to buy itself some international space by calling for, and participating in, a reopening of the Six Party Talks. Russia also pushed for this, and made a strong show of support for the new regime. The simulation ended without war, revolution, or an accord on North Korea's nuclear ambitions. The actual impact of the coup remained unclear; as one member of the junta noted, "it's only been three days, and it's very easy to say the word 'reform'".

Team Summaries

Russia: Our Russian team saw this as an opportunity to increase Russian influence at a time in which Russia's maritime interest in the Pacific is expanding. Russia was very generous to North Korea, offering immediate technical and humanitarian assistance. Combined with Chinese intransigence, this indeed did open some opportunity for developing North Korea as a Russian client. Russia eventually parlayed this into a leadership role in the Six Party talks that concluded our simulation. However, the Russian team also bypassed an opportunity to head off the second leak at Yongbyon, in spite of a clear understanding of the risks that incomplete containment posed.

Japan: Japanese policy was relatively restrained. We had designed the scenario to give the Japanese team an opportunity to "break out" and take an assertive posture on the eventual northeast Asian political settlement. However, Japan played it relatively passive, in spite of the substantial economic damage caused by the fallout. Japan made no aggressive military maneuvers, and generally sought to hew to the United States. Upon learning of the second leak, however, Japan responded with quick offers of assistance and technical help for North Korea.

North Korea: At the outset of the simulation, I told two of the seven members of the North Korean team that they represented a "reformist" faction interested in PRC style reforms and limited opening to the world economic system. The DPRK team also included two leaders, one representing Kim Jong Il and the other representing Kim Jong Un. Unsurprisingly, DPRK policy cantered wildly from engagement with neighbors to hostility, the latter including an extended live fire exercise off Yeonpyong Island.

South Korea: The South Korean team divided into two factions, one pursuing an aggressive response and the other more accomodationist. Relatively early in the simulation, reformists in North Korea contacted the South Korean government, which helped to calm tensions. Nevertheless, South Korea came very close to taking action against the DPRK on several occasions, especially after North Korea resumed artillery exercises near Yeonpyong Island. The South suffered considerable long-term economic damage from the leak, which produced considerable anger in the ROK population.

China: Chinese behavior during the simulation exhibited a degree of strategic confusion. The Chinese initially decided to play hardball with the North Koreans, under the assumption that the DPRK had nowhere else to go. The PRC closed the border, and didn't lend much rhetorical assistance to the North Koreans. Later, the PRC initiated a half-hearted crackdown against dissidents in the North Korean expat community. In part because of the Russian willingness to oblige North Korea, and in part because the North Koreans were too busy to pay much attention, Chinese hardball didn't have much of an effect.

United States: The United States, not directly affected by the radiation leak, played a coordinating role between the Japanese and ROK teams. The US restrained South Korean hawks and helped provide reassurance to the Japanese. One early move was to redeploy the USS Abraham Lincoln to the region in order to counter any DPRK adventurism. The US also helped manage the Chinese.

Lessons Learned

If a situation of vulnerability develops within the North Korea regime, the stance of the military will become very important. While neither comparison is particularly apt, the KPA resembles the Egyptian military much more than the Libyan; we can expect that the KPA will have the power and coherence to formulate an independent position in any transition crisis. The problem is that, like the DPRK itself, the KPA requires an environment of tension and hostility with Japan, the ROK, and the US in order to maintain its existence. However, the potential for the development of a measured reformist faction within the military that would tone down some of the more bizarre aspects of DPRK foreign policy and pursue certain PRC-style policies probably isn't out of the question.

In terms of the international lessons, the stance of Russia was quite interesting. If Dmitry Gorenburg is right about Russia turning its military focus to the Pacific, then Russian overtures to North Korea aren't out of the question. This is especially true if tensions with Japan continue to grow. I think that the simulation probably overstated the willingness of the Chinese to play hardball with the DPRK, although I also think that there's a good chance North Korea would react badly to Beijing yanking the leash. I also expect that in a scenario such as this popular sentiment would push Japan to more assertive action, which could trigger serious problems in most of the other teams.

Dogs that Didn't Bark

Apart from the existence of the Yongbyon facility, North Korea nuclear weapons played almost no part in the simulation. The North Korean team never inquired too closely about the disposition of the weapons, although the Americans were interested in determining their location as tightly as possible. As neither the ROK nor the US initiated military action, the discussion didn't go far beyond this point. I should also note that we played fast and loose with the Yongbyon situation; it's unclear that the reactor is currently in a condition that would make such a leak possible.

We also expected that there might be more in terms of naval confrontation between the North and the South. Naval confrontation would have allowed the DPRK to ratchet up tension without directly threatening a land war on the peninsula. For whatever reason, however, the North Korean team focused on mobilization of its land forces and on artillery bombardment rather than on naval provocation. It's possible that this was the result of overwhelming ROK-Japan-US superiority at sea, combined with China's recalcitrant attitude.

Conclusions

From our perspective, the simulation worked; our students left with more information about the situation, and they were forced to make critical decisions in limited time with limited information. The simulation didn't develop precisely as Simulation Control had expected, but then it never does; we would be disappointed if we could predict exactly what our students can do. In terms of predictive policy the simulation has limited utility, although it does suggest a few moves that key players, including Russia and the North Korean military, might make in case of a crisis.

New Korea Crisis?

A boat with 31 North Korea citizens drifted into South Korea waters and was picked up. North Korea being the kind of place that people sometimes don't like going back to, four are trying to stay:

North Korea on March 5 made a fresh demand for the repatriation of all 31 citizens whose boat drifted into South Korean waters, warning inter-Korean relations would be otherwise seriously affected. The latest message carried by Pyongyang's official Korean Central News Agency came a day after the North refused to accept 27 of the 31, insisting that Seoul also hand over four others who want to live in the South.

"The South Korean authorities are forcing the detained guiltless inhabitants to separate from their families by appeasement and pressure," it said in a notice sent to the South on March 5. "If the South Korean authorities do not comply with [North Korea's] just demand, it will seriously affect the North-South relations and the South side will be held wholly accountable for it," it said.

The North Koreans were on a fishing boat which drifted across the Yellow Sea border in thick fog on Feb. 5. After almost a month the South said it would hand over 27 but announced that two men and two women would be allowed to stay as they had requested.

In a message late March 4, the North demanded the unconditional repatriation of all 31, according to Seoul's unification ministry, whose officials had been waiting in vain at the border village of Panmunjom to hand over the 27.

A ministry spokesman has said the South would try to contact North Korea again early next week to send the 27 home across the border. The communist state late March 3 accused the South of "despicable unethical acts" and said the group on the boat had been held hostage in a bid to fuel cross-border confrontation.

Seoul's Unification Minister Hyun In-Taek told parliament the four had been allowed to stay in the South in respect of their wishes. The four include the 38-year-old boat captain, who apparently feared punishment if sent back and decided to stay when he saw how different life in the South is, the newspaper Chosun Ilbo reported.

The issue of involuntary repatriation of Chinese prisoners, of course, formed one of the core disputes of the last year of the Korean War. In this case, my sympathies are obviously with the ROK; I suspect that returning the four to North Korea against their will would constitute a violation of their human rights.

Incidentally, this Monday I'll have a post detailing our Spring 2011 Crisis Simulation, which involved North and South Korea.

Asia Sending Ships to Libya

From China Signpost, Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson offer some analysis regarding the latest news from the PLA Navy.

The PLA Navy has just dispatched Xuzhou, a Type 054 Jiangkai-II class missile frigate, from the ongoing seventh PLAN anti-piracy task force deployment off Somalia to steam to Libyan coast to provide support and protection for the ongoing evacuation mission there. The escort mission has been approved by the Central Military Commission, according to Xinhua, and at least 6,300 of the roughly 30,000 PRC citizens in Libya have been evacuated. The news agency adds that the Chinese evacuation is also utilizing chartered aircraft, overland routes to Egypt and Tunisia, ships from China’s major state shipping firms, and Greek merchant vessels in the region, which are said to be closely coordinating their operations with the Chinese government and plan to evacuate up to 15,000 Chinese from Libya.

They also have some insights into what this represents.

Xuzhou’s mission marks an important milestone because to the best of our knowledge, this is the first ever dispatch of a PLA military platform specifically assigned to help protect a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) to help PRC citizens trapped in an active conflict zone. Chinese policymakers now have a precedent for future military operations in areas where the lives and property of expatriate PRC citizens come under threat. We expect that the Chinese people’s popular support for the mission will be high.

Their entire analysis is worth reading.

Also noteworthy, the South Koreans are dispatching the 4,500-ton Choi Young KDX-II destroyer and the Indians are sending a three ship task force consisting of 2 destroyers and INS Jalashawa, the former USS Trenton. Both the Chinese and South Korean ships are being redirected from anti-piracy duties to Libya.

South Korea Storms Hijacked Ship, Rescues Hostages

This is the first all out assault by any modern Navy against a large commercial vessel hijacked by Somali pirates.

At dawn, South Korean special forces packed into a small boat approached a hijacked freighter in the Arabian Sea. Commandos scrambled up a ladder onto the ship, aboard which Somali pirates were armed with AK assault rifles and anti-tank missiles. A South Korean destroyer and hovering Lynx helicopter provided covering fire.

When Friday's operation ended five hours later, 21 hostages had been rescued, eight Somali pirates killed and five assailants captured. Pockmarks from artillery fire blanketed the ship's bridge. One of the hostages was wounded, but all were alive — a remarkable ending for a risky rescue.

The difference here is that the pirates supposedly had control of the crew, which is why the Captain of the vessel was shot during the raid. The details of the incident are still developing, with a few news reports containing contrary information.

Either way, what South Korea has done here is very impressive no matter how one looks at it. Only the French have made similar armed assaults at sea against ships pirated with hostages, and they haven't always gone well.

So far we know 8 pirates were killed, the South Korean destroyer involved was the Choi Young, and the President himself made the call. A US Navy helicopter reportedly evacuated the ships Captain after he was shot, but his wounds are not considered life threatening.

Update: More from the New York Times.

On Tuesday, a South Korean destroyer, the Choi Young, pursued the Samho Jewelry and saw pirates aboard the freighter leave the ship to hijack a nearby Mongolian vessel, according to Yonhap.

A small, fast-moving boat and a helicopter were dispatched by the South Korean destroyer to rescue the Mongolian ship, sparking a brief gun battle with the pirates aboard the vessel. The battle left three South Korean soldiers injured and an unspecified number of pirates were missing and presumed dead after that exchange, said Col. Lee, the military spokesman.

A standoff between the South Korean naval destroyer and the pirates aboard the Samho Jewelry ensued until Friday morning’s rescue, with the South Korean military sending messages ordering the pirates to surrender.

South Korea’s military decided to storm the Samho Jewelry after it was determined that the pirates had wearied of the days-long standoff, according to Yonhap. Warning shots were fired by the destroyer as elite forced approached the cargo vessel. The battle between South Korean soldiers and the pirates, who were armed with AK-47s, heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, began just before 5 a.m. local time and lasted five hours.

This is noteworthy because the details make the entire engagement sound even more impressive. If Samho Jewelry was being used as a mothership, and South Korea engaged the pirates to prevent the hijacking of the Mongolian ship - and took three casualties during that action, consider for a moment that the South Korean Navy had already taken casualties before attempting the rescue of the Samho Jewelry.

I'm not sure every country would see their own folks wounded in an action, then choose to do something even more daring. Taking the action to storm the ship after taking wounded wasn't necessarily the call of the CO of the destroyer, indeed it was probably someones call higher in the chain of command - perhaps the civilian side. Things could have gone very wrong when storming the ship, the political risks taken were not trivial. It is something to think about, and something I'm sure the DPRK and China will think about.

Behind the Scenes of Yeonpyeong Island Exercise

A really interesting report from the Korea JoongAng Daily (English JoongAng Ilbo) describing some of the behind the scenes activities leading up to and during the Yeonpyeong Island exercise. First some interesting diplomacy.

A diplomatic source in Seoul believes that North Korea did not go any further to provoke the South because of a recent visit made by high-ranking U.S. officials to China.

The delegation that visited Beijing included Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg and Jeff Bader, senior director for Asian Affairs of the National Security Council. They were said to have delivered a “very tough message” to China...

The diplomatic source said the delegation had told Chinese officials that if North Korea launches another attack, the U.S. would not stand in the way of South Korean military retaliation.

“Steinberg and his delegation also informed China that if it did not take up a responsible role in blocking North Korea’s provocations, then North Korea will inevitably be brought up during summit talks between President Obama and Hu Jintao next year,” the source added. “We believe that China delivered this message to North Korea because of the pressure, and urged them to tone down their response to the South Korean firing exercise on Yeonpyeong Island.”

This New York Times article outlines how the diplomacy situation is changing with the US and China finding common ground. This is a most interesting, and very welcome development.

During the exercises North Korea was engaged, sort of.

The South Korean Armed Forces had deployed unmanned aerial vehicles to monitor unusual activity from the North, but its military jammed the plane’s navigation system, rendering the aerial vehicle ineffective.

There was also intelligence that North Korea was preparing to fire antiaircraft missiles. A South Korean military source said that light beams to guide surface-to-air missiles had been detected on Monday at an antiaircraft base in northern Hwanghae Province, but no missiles were launched.

“The F-15K and KF-16 fighter jets were targeted. Mobile missile launch pads were continuously deployed, then removed; we thought these were tactics to throw us off,” the military source told the JoongAng Ilbo.

The degree of disruption to the unmanned aircraft is unclear based on this article, but I can't say I am surprised. It is an unwelcome new normal that South Korean pilots flying over South Korea must hold steady while North Korean SA-2 systems are clearly locking the aircraft as targets.

To me that sounds like a recipe for escalation. Despite the tension, the good news for Christmas is that diplomacy is working, and the US and China are starting to find mutual ground to work with. That was always the prerequisite for any diplomatic solution.

Why Korean Peninsula Remains Hot

A lot of people will wake up on Wednesday and be alarmed to learn that South Korea is planning a live fire military exercise of "unprecedented scale" along the DMZ on Thursday. People might also notice the ROK 6 ship naval firing exercise that began on Tuesday and is expected to last 3 days. For those who are curious, the naval exercise is intended as practice to track, target, and sink midget submarines.

As I was watching the reaction to the lack of war outcome from the Yeonpyeong island incident I kept thinking to myself the collective sigh of relief was premature, and I also found myself very concerned that South Korea had presumed some form of victory. Thankfully with the latest developments of more exercises, sooner rather than later, South Korea still has their eye on the ball. Lets try to make sense of the last few days...

If we analyze the events of the Yeonpyeong Island exercise, all we really learned is that North Korea cannot be baited to fight on the terms of South Korea. All night as I observed the drill there were numerous reports that indicated that both South Korean and US aircraft were in the air. Open source reports from Guam indicated there was 'unusually high activity' several hours before the drill began, giving the impression the 30th air wing there had numerous bombers in the air in preparation for the ROK military exercise. To what extent the South Korean and US military's were prepared to fight is unclear, but what is clear is that the bar has been raised in terms of cost for South Korea to even hold an exercise.

And that is the point. The North Koreans can sink a naval ship and no one, including the UN Security Council, will do anything about it. The North Koreans can fire artillery into civilian neighborhoods in response to shells hitting open water not even in the direction of North Korea - even kill soldiers and civilians - and no one, including the UN Security Council, will do anything about it. Now North Korea has raised the cost of even conducting a military drill along the DMZ, something South Korea has done without incident for decades until November, to the point South Korea must scramble their Air Force just in case.

What is odd however is how we are observing events we cannot easily explain. For example, why didn't South Korea warn citizens to take shelter during the exercise? Why hasn't the US State Department not issued any sort of warning to Americans traveling to South Korea? Why hasn't the military begun the process of encouraging family members in South Korea to return to the States for reasons of safety? It is noteworthy that the travel ban on South Korean workers to the Kaesong Industrial Complex was lifted after the exercise, suggesting perhaps tensions had settled.

Then we see other acts of intentional defiance by South Korea beyond the new military exercises. For example, the giant Christmas tree along the DMZ was lit up tonight, protected by Marines, and Christmas carols sung at the site could be heard in North Korea. North Korea has threatened to destroy the Christmas tree. What comes next? More military exercises and if we are looking for another step beyond that; we might read soon that the loud speaker broadcasts of anti-regime and pro-democracy messages over the border have begun again. Previously North Korea has threatened to shoot out the speakers.

Understanding the WHYS

One might look at events and start asking lots of questions. Lets look at a few.

Why no 6-party talks? That answer comes in an excellent interview over at the Wall Street Journal blog with Gordon Flake (part 1 and part 2).

WSJ: Is there any chance of getting back to the six-party talks?

Mr. Flake: There’s no short-term prospect for going back. There is a reason to go back. It’s a nuance that’s hard to grab, but here it is.

The six-party talks is not about a format right now. It’s about a set agreement. The fundamental question is: Is North Korea a nuclear power or not?

North Korea claims they are a nuclear power. They assert that they must be negotiated with as a nuclear power and that one day they will talk about theoretical denuclearization, but that’s mutual, with the U.S. doing it, as well as leaving the alliance with South Korea and going away from the South.

North Korea says pi-hae-kwa. We translate that as denuclearization. But they are explicit about what they mean. To them, it means being recognized as a nuclear power first, getting a peace treaty and all their issues solved and way down the road we will have a mutual disarmament discussion as an equal.

But the Sept. 19, 2005, joint statement from the six-party talks says the exact opposite. It says North Korea is one of 180 other members of the NPT, that they must abandon all existing nuclear weapons and programs and return at an early date to the IAEA. And North Korea agreed to that. They agreed to unilateral disarmament, being a normal nation and part of the NPT.

The reason we won’t abandon the six-party talks is the U.S. is going to hold North Korea to the commitment they made in that process. The real problem with the six-party talks right now is the danger that the U.S. and South Korea are going to be portrayed as being obstacles to restarting it because we have preconditions. That’s what some people seem to be saying. Everybody [in Washington and Seoul] is being careful to say we don’t have preconditions for the talks. The question is what are the talks?

North Korea’s position is we’ll come to the six-party talks as a nuclear power. Those aren’t the six-party talks. The six-party talks are about the denuclearization of North Korea and they’re about the implementation of the Sept. 19, 2005, joint statement, which North Korea rejects. The real precondition, if you want to call it that, is that they agree to the terms of the talks.

This is the other reason why the Chinese proposal for an emergency meeting of the six-party powers over the Yeonpyeong incident was just rejected out of hand. It conflates two different things.

Why is South Korea conducting more military exercises? For that we turn to Robert Haddick at the Small Wars Journal.

South Korea called the North’s bluff and the North folded its hand, at least for now. The South boosted its leverage in several ways. First, it evacuated civilians on the island and in other forward locations. Second, it waited for clear weather and put F-15 fighter-bombers in the air, presumably in preparation for counter-battery strikes against North Korean artillery positions. Finally, about 20 U.S. soldiers participated in the exercise as observers, or more accurately as “trip-wires” for a U.S. retaliatory response against the North. The North’s leaders likely concluded that in this case they did not possess escalation dominance. The North has exposed itself as a bluffer and will have to run much greater risks in the future to reestablish its reputation for ferocity.

This weekend’s drama was a breakthrough for the South Korean government. Previous sable-rattling by the North typically resulted in multilateral negotiations, which usually concluded with some kind of payoff for the North in exchange for promises of future good behavior. The South Korean government now has an opportunity to break from that pattern.

I disagree with some of the other points that Mr. Haddick makes in that article, but on this point he has it right. The military drill over the weekend was intended to shape a conclusion that gave a sense of shifting political momentum. I am not in full belief that this momentum is real, but in politics perception is often enough to skew what is and isn't real. South Korea finds itself backed into a corner, losing in every effort, and needing to reset conditions back to normal. For awhile, that new normal will include tension, but after the deaths of 48 military personnel and 2 civilians, not to mention the incalculable political damage caused by an attack against South Korean soil, expect a lot of hard line diplomacy until conditions reset.

Where does the US and China fit into ongoing events? This is where it starts getting tougher, because one might conclude the US is winning and China is losing. Short term, this appears true. Following the Cheonan sinking incident we have seen Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Japan, Australia, and South Korea all seeking security arrangements with strategic partners like the US, India, and Russia as an alternative to China in the region. Those efforts are counter to stated Chinese goals of regional hegemony, and are not insignificant. I have not seen evidence, yet, that China's reaction to the latest attack by North Korea against South Korea has strengthened China's image with their neighbors as a responsible actor towards regional security. Indeed, one of the most interesting aspects of China in the latest crisis is that the US is no longer talking about China in the role of an indifferent bystander, but in statements appears to be holding China partly responsible.

With that said, I think Hugh White's analysis at The Lowy Institute Interpreter blog highlights the dangers for the US in the evolving situation.

We might assume that China has failed because its aim has been to demonstrate its power by controlling North Korea, or expand its influence by wooing South Korea, or both. But China has never claimed to control North Korea; it is the US that promotes the idea that Beijing has such control. So why should China see controlling North Korea as a test of its power, when they judge that America cannot control it either? Beijing may calculate that America's rash and easily falsifiable implication that it can stop further Northern provocations will make America look weak and China look wise.

Likewise, I don't think it has ever been part of China's plan to woo South Korea by promising to protect it from the North. Beijing's major card with Seoul is not its ability to control Pyongyang's actions today, but its central role in managing the consequences of the North's presumed eventual collapse. When Pyongyang crumbles, China will decide what happens, and Seoul will have to rely on Beijing to help manage the crisis and facilitate South Korea's absorption of the North. That remains true today, and it gives Beijing a strong hand to play.

In fact, I have a hunch — nothing more - that China's refusal to even condemn North Korea may have been intended to punish South Korea for its recent lean towards Washington. Beijing wants to remind Seoul that there is nothing much Washington can do to help when push comes to shove on the Peninsula. The message to Seoul is, 'Do not think you can cosy up to Washington and still expect us to jump when you call. If you want our help with North Korea, you need to lean back towards us. In the end, we are more use to you than America.'

That message might well have some traction in Seoul if, next time Pyongyang misbehaves, Washington does no more than talk tough again.

All three articles look at the events unfolding on the Korean Peninsula, and all three authors see the unfolding situation differently. I still believe there is an effort underway, either by South Korea or by the United States, to get back at North Korea for the attacks this year. When I hear news reports of an impending nuclear test in March, I can't help but think that sets a time line by which we will see some random action take place that has incredibly negative consequences for North Korea, but is very difficult if not impossible to trace back to any specific country like South Korea or the United States - even though everyone will know it was one, the other, or both. I would not immediately expect such random action to be military in nature.

Perhaps my analysis is callous, but I do not see the present situation as defused and I do see the situation getting much more tense before a format for official diplomatic negotiations is even discussed by South Korea, Japan, or the United States. The crisis on the Korean Peninsula will continue to be one of calculated steps that involves a number of public demonstrations of military power and plenty of bellicose statements from all sides.

Ultimately, I do not expect any military confrontations between South Korea and North Korea until at least after Chinese President Hu Jintao visits Washington, DC in January, no matter how many military exercises South Korea conducts. It is also important to note that the unofficial New York channel for diplomacy has been reopened. This might be important to events because if North Korea conducts a military action while engaged in negotiation, the consequences would be devastating for prospects of any future diplomacy for a long time - and diplomatic concessions for food, among other things, is something North Korea needs in the short term.

The one diplomatic issue that seems to be on everyones mind is the sale of the 12,000 plutonium fuel rods to South Korea. This concession by North Korea is very being hard to believe, but it is also outrageous to believe that South Korea should buy these fuel rods from North Korea after recent events. The best way I see the diplomatic ball moving down the court is if the US can somehow convince China to purchase and remove all 12,000 plutonium fuel rods. In order for this crisis to end well, somehow the US and China have to get on the same page on at least one of the major North Korean issues on the table. If China purchases the fuel rods and disposes of them, that action helps build up China's credibility as being committed to regional security.