Russia's Latest Spacecraft Problem

If you haven't heard this story, I encourage you to read the entire article. It is a news story that I intend to follow, although I may or may not blog on it again - although potentially it may become major news.

A Russian spacecraft on its way to Mars with 12 tons of toxic fuel is stuck circling the wrong planet: ours. And it could come crashing back to Earth in a couple of weeks if engineers can't coax it back on track.

Space experts were hopeful Wednesday that the space probe's silent engines can be fired to send it off to Mars. If not, it will plummet to Earth. But most U.S. space debris experts think the fuel on board would explode harmlessly in the upper atmosphere and never reach the ground.

This was the second failure by the Russian space agency to send a rover to Mars. I do not know what that means for the future of the Russian space program, but given the questionable ballistic missile track record and now repeated failures in space bound rockets, there is clearly evidence of scientific and engineering decline in Russia over the last decade as it relates to rocket and space technology. The increase in commercial aircraft crashes in Russia are also relevant data points.

If the fuel is believed to freeze before reentry, the potential for a hazardous material spill upon reentry is legitimate. I do not claim expertise in the various potential dangers, but the frozen fuel issue was the primary political rationale for shooting down the US-109 satellite a few years ago. As with any space debris, as long as it lands in the Ocean no one cares, but the second it lands in someones back yard the political costs will go up.

It is not outside the realm of possibility that this rocket could be recovered and complete it's mission to Mars. It is also not outside the realm of possibility that this rocket gets shot down.

Like I said, read the article - this is news worth tracking over the next few days-weeks.

Space - China's Next Frontier

From the Guardian. China space station unmanned lab animation - video

This video was released ahead of the launch on 29 September. China released an animation that simulates space module Tiangong-1 entering its orbit. It also shows Tiangong-1 joining up with an unmanned Shenzhou 8 spacecraft that China plans to launch later this year. The unmanned Tiangong-1 laboratory is a step towards a bigger orbiting platform that China expects to be cheaper than the US and European-backed International Space Station.

Now, just in case you didn't the first time, make sure you turn up the volume loud enough to hear the music when you watch the video. I'm sure it is just a coincidence the Chinese released the video with "America the Beautiful" playing the background.

Or perhaps they are sending us a message. I'll let the reader decide.

These Things Are Not Similar

The following is from Recent Developments in Space Debris Mitigation Policy and Practices (PDF) by Nicholas L. Johnson, NASA Chief Scientist for Orbital Debris in 2006.

Following the establishment in 1995 of detailed space debris mitigation guidelines for all NASA space projects and programs, several additional space debris mitigation policies were developed, including by the space agencies of Japan, France, and Russia, as well as the European Space Agency. After several years of coordination with U.S. industry, the U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices were formally adopted in February 2001 and are referenced in the latest U.S. National Space Policy signed by President Bush on 31 August 2006.

In recent years, emphasis has shifted from national efforts to control the space debris population to international ones. Here, too, great progress has been made, most notably by the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) and the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) of the United Nations. Today, a firm international consensus is rapidly building on the principal space debris mitigation measures.

The IADC is an association of the space agencies of ten countries (China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Russia, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and the European Space Agency, representing 17 countries of which four (France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom) are also full IADC members. At the 17th meeting of the IADC in October 1999, a new Action Item (AI 17.2) was adopted to develop a set of consensus space debris mitigation guidelines. The purpose of the activity was to identify the most valuable space debris mitigation measures and to reach an international agreement on common directives. The IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines were formally adopted in October 2002 during the Second World Space Congress in Houston, Texas. Two years later a companion document, entitled Support to the IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, was completed to provide background and clarification for the guidelines.

The history demonstrates China played an active role in developing international guidelines for space debris going back to at least 1999.

The release of Wikileaks cables showing the discussion back and forth between the US and China following China's ASAT shootdown in January 2007 of a Chinese FY-1C weather satellite, and later in the context of the US shootdown of the USA 193 satellite is making some news. The cables, which I will not discuss here, are all very interesting to read. The analysis of those cables so far in the news has not been as interesting.

These are my thoughts on these two incidents.

The US shootdown of USA 193 may or may not have been a valid safety issue. There appears to be a global consensus that if a dangerous substance on satellites has an odds of greater than 1 in 10,000 of not burning up in reentry, it is an issue. Depending upon who you ask, the odds were both above and below 1 in 10,000 for USA 193. The cost of cleaning up a mess from USA 193 would have been high, not only in financial costs but in political costs. The costs of doing nothing about USA 193 were not very high in my opinion. Ultimately there was an opportunity, and the US took it. A few years later there is no debris left from the USA 193 shootdown in space.

I don't think the USA 193 shootdown was necessary, but I do think it was the right thing to do and has ultimately proven to be excellent for the US because the results contributed significantly to the Phased, Adaptive BMD approach focused on AEGIS BMD of the Obama administration.

In that context, the Bush administration spent less than a few hundred million on what can be described as an anti-satellite test and the Obama administration has been able to save billions in BMD as a result. In my book, that's a a good outcome. From an international perspective, when one considers that many of our closest allies are heavily invested in AEGIS, I think the reassurance in AEGIS alone is a huge boost for the United States. Executed responsibly and effectively, USA 193 has had many good outcomes. Virtually all of the detriments from the action are political, but none of them in my opinion rise to a serious level of concern - even as some are legitimate concerns.

On the other hand, the Chinese ASAT strike against the FY-1C weather satellite is the biggest disaster in the history of space exploration, and every statistic proves it. As a result of that incident China became the biggest contributing nation to low orbit space debris. There are some 2,500 major pieces of space debris that will remain in earths low orbit until at least 2030, and an additional 100,000 smaller pieces of debris that will not fall into earths atmosphere until next century.

When we compare the two incidents, they are not equal by any standard. The carelessness of China cannot be legitimately compared to the careful calculus of the United States. China didn't tell anyone about their ASAT test, but the US gave plenty of warning and time for every nation around the world to ask questions and give opinions.

The complete screw up by China in their ASAT test is monumental. The amount of debris that resulted from their little military exercise is enormous, and accounts for 45% of all the low orbit space debris around the planet. Russia and the US were in a space race for decades with what today is seen as low technology, and neither country ever approached the stupidity exercised by China. What China did was akin to detonating a nuclear weapon in their own house just to prove they have nuclear weapons. It's that colossal in stupidity.

With all the focus on this issue, I see only two serious questions. First, how in the world did China miscalculate so badly in their test? Second, how come China has never explained in detail their miscalculation? With China heavily investing in space, but with a track record of terrible environmental safety combined with being the biggest contributing nation of trash in space, the world should be demanding better answers from China.

I don't care how much trash and pollution China collects on their property, but the world should collectively demand better given China's record in space, because it is our planet too.

Strategic Communications and Information Operations

I have something on my mind, and open the topic for discussion in hopes the feedback is of professional quality.

Should the Navy conduct Information Operations?

I feel like they do every day, but they target the wrong people. There is an information operation taking place right now, supported by industry, and it targets Congress directly. The change to the Littoral Combat Ship program is a perfectly executed information operation intended to pressure lawmakers into a decision without debate or consideration of consequences. It really is clever, and only required a few steps.

1. Wait until after the election, the day after to be specific, to insure no public debate or discussion.
2. Apply industrial pressures on Congress, pressures the Navy forced on industry by waiting until after the election to make a selection for LCS.
3. Take advantage of the busy lame duck period to avoid public discussion and debate, which would highlight the complete absence of a TOC discussion the Navy has no answers for.

It is a clever little information operation and the target is Congress. Without showing any financial information, the Navy claims huge savings in buying 20 ships of two distinct classes with two distinct support and maintenance lines compared to the original plan of purchasing 17 ships with a single support and maintenance line. Even in Washington DC, that is unbelievable!

An information operation is a form of information warfare, and if we simply use the definition of information warfare we can ask whether this is indeed what the Navy does when it comes with shipbuilding - the LCS being an example - when one considers Congress the enemy.

Information warfare is the use and management of information in pursuit of a competitive advantage over an opponent. Information warfare may involve collection of tactical information, assurance(s) that one's own information is valid, spreading of propaganda or disinformation to demoralize or manipulate the enemy and the public, undermining the quality of opposing force information and denial of information-collection opportunities to opposing forces. Information warfare is closely linked to psychological warfare.

It is my opinion that the only information operations the Navy, under current leadership, is effective in conducting are the information operations that are conducted on the American people and Congress. I believe the DDG-1000 program history on Capitol Hill is another perfect example of a successfully conducted IO campaign against Congress. I welcome any comment and criticism of this observation.

Should the Navy conduct Strategic Communications?

The absence of strategic communications as a starting point, or even the subjects inclusion to any significant degree, is a tremendous weakness of the current Naval Operational Concept. Consider for a moment the deployment today of the USS Carl Vinson and associated strike group - here is the official Navy article in full:

SAN DIEGO (NNS) -- USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) and crew members of Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 17 will depart Naval Air Station (NAS) North Island Tuesday, Nov. 30, for a training exercise followed by a scheduled routine deployment to the U.S. 7th Fleet and U.S. 5th Fleet Areas of Responsibility.

As the flagship of Carrier Strike Group 1, led by Rear Adm. Samuel Perez, Vinson will deploy with USS Bunker Hill (CG 52), USS Stockdale (DDG 106) and USS Gridley (DDG 101). Embarked aboard Vinson is Destroyer Squadron 1 and CVW 17, which includes the "Red Lions" of Helicopter Anti-submarine Squadron 15, the "Fighting Redcocks" of Strike Fighter Squadron 22, the "Fist of the Fleet" of Strike Fighter Squadron 25, the "Sunliners" of Strike Fighter Squadron 81, the "Rawhides" of Fleet Logistics Support Squadron 40, the "Garudas" of Electronic Attack Squadron 134, the "Stingers" of Strike Fighter Squadron 113 and the "Tigertails" of Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron 125.

This deployment will be the first deployment for the Arleigh Burke class destroyer USS Stockdale.

"This will be Stockdale's maiden deployment," said Commanding Officer, Cmdr. Jeffrey Bennett. "Our team of awesome warfighters are ready to deploy, executing missions across all warfare areas and joining Destroyer Squadron 1 and the Vinson Strike Group team to be prepared to execute a full spectrum of military operations from presence and security to humanitarian assistance and disaster response."

The mission of the Vinson Strike Group while deployed will focus on maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts, which help establish conditions for regional stability.

Media wishing to cover the departure of USS Carl Vinson can embark aboard Vinson for the day as the ship departs San Diego Bay; and be flown back to Naval Air North Island at approximately 4:30 p.m.

For more information on CSG-1 and the USS Carl Vinson, visit www.cvn70.navy.mil or www.facebook.com/ussvinson. For more information on USS Bunker Hill, visit www.public.navy.mil/surfor/cg52. For more information on USS Gridley, visit www.public.navy.mil/surfor/ddg101. For more information on USS Stockdale, visit www.public.navy.mil/surfor/ddg106 or www.facebook.com/pages/USS-STOCKDALE-DDG-106/128805733826735
>
For more news from Commander, U.S. 3rd Fleet, visit www.navy.mil/local/c3f/.

Uhm, 3rd Fleet Public Affairs - do not take this criticism personal.

What is the strategic communication in this Navy.mil article? Who is the audience? What is the context? Lets review the talking points...

• This is Stockdale's maiden deployment
• The "team of awesome warfighters" are both "ready to deploy" and will be "executing missions across all warfare areas"
• The "team of awesome warfighters are "joining Destroyer Squadron 1 and the Vinson Strike Group team" to "execute a full spectrum of military operations" like "presence" and "security" and "humanitarian assistance" and "disaster response."

The audience for this article is... unclear.
The context of this article is... not provided.
The strategic communication of this article... is not strategic.

We are left with information, provided for an unknown purpose to an unknown audience and with an unknown context. Is it even possible to be less informed by this information? Below is my version of the same article - an example of how I think the Navy needs to be thinking when deploying every single ship in the fleet.

SAN DIEGO -- USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) and crew members of Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 17 will depart Naval Air Station (NAS) North Island Tuesday, Nov. 30, for a training exercise followed by a scheduled routine deployment to the U.S. 7th Fleet and U.S. 5th Fleet Areas of Responsibility.

Carrier Strike Group 1 is departing on schedule despite a disruption in training schedules that occurred when USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) and Bunker Hill (CG 52) supported disaster response and humanitarian operations in Haiti earlier this year. This deployment includes several firsts. This is the first major deployment for USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) after a three year nuclear refueling. Additionally, this deployment is the first deployment for Bunker Hill (CG 52) underwent Cruiser modernization, the first Ticonderoga class guided missile cruiser to complete mid life modernization. Finally, this deployment is the first deployment for the Arleigh Burke class destroyer USS Stockdale.

This will be the third deployment for USS Gridley (DDG 101) despite the ship being commissioned less than four years ago.

"The Vinson Strike Group is a remarkable collection of warships containing the latest technologies and capabilities," said PACFLT REAR ADMIRAL I_WENT_TO_STRATCOMM_SCHOOL. "The sailors of the Vinson Strike Group are well trained to meet multiple challenges that may be encountered during their seven-month deployment."

As the flagship of Carrier Strike Group 1, Vinson will deploy with USS Bunker Hill (CG 52), USS Stockdale (DDG 106) and USS Gridley (DDG 101). Embarked aboard Vinson is Destroyer Squadron 1 and CVW 17, which includes the "Red Lions" of Helicopter Anti-submarine Squadron 15, the "Fighting Redcocks" of Strike Fighter Squadron 22, the "Fist of the Fleet" of Strike Fighter Squadron 25, the "Sunliners" of Strike Fighter Squadron 81, the "Rawhides" of Fleet Logistics Support Squadron 40, the "Garudas" of Electronic Attack Squadron 134, the "Stingers" of Strike Fighter Squadron 113 and the "Tigertails" of Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron 125.

"This deployment comes as tensions are rising on the Korean Peninsula and our forces are engaged in heavy fighting in Afghanistan," said Commanding Officer, CAPTAIN I_KNOW_MY_STRATCOMM. "Our team of awesome warfighters are ready to meet these challenges, executing missions across all warfare areas. Carrier Strike Group 1 is fortunate to have Rear Adm. Samuel Perez, who recently took command of CSG-1 in late October. His experience as a former commander of the Japan based forward deployed Destroyer Squadron 15 will benefit the Vinson Strike Group as we cooperate with other US Navy forces already forward deployed, not to mention our South Korean and Japanese allies over the coming weeks and months dealing with tensions in northeast Asia."

The mission of the Vinson Strike Group while deployed will focus on maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts in the Pacific and Indian Oceans to help establish conditions for regional stability.

I assure you 3rd fleet public affairs could do this better than me.

The audience for this article is informed citizens and foreign populations examining the purpose and intentions of a US Navy Carrier Strike Group deployment, primarily because the context of this article is current events. The strategic communication of this article is one of projecting American power abroad in support of our interests and resolve towards assisting our allies.

Note the strategic communications to Asia in this fictional article is delivered in context of current events even though the deployment was scheduled long ago. The strategic communication is targeted - projecting confidence for the domestic population, projecting strength towards adversaries, and demonstrating our national resolve and support for allies.

A study of the details, something we know every naval analyst in the world does, would reveal an ultra modern collection of warships in Carrier Strike Group, and also note CSG-1 commander came on late but is apparently a perfect fit for operations during a period of tensions on the Korean Peninsula. These details, by being touch early on, allow the Navy to further develop strategic communications in the future in directing messages to specific audiences. For example, projecting confidence towards Japan should the Vinson Strike Group exercise with the Japanese Navy sometime in the future is an option because Rear Admiral Perez lived and served - in Japan. Familiarity and experience represents a context that can be leveraged to engage audiences.

Want to send a signal to North Korea? Run a simple information operation by discussing the new sonar tail on Bunker Hill. This stuff really isn't complicated, and if the operational side doesn't know how to do it - they can ask OPNAV in the Pentagon for assistance - after all, they've become great at it on Capitol Hill.

I see the absence of strategic communication in official Navy information equivalent to the absence of value in official Navy information. How much value is lost when a Navy ship or fleet cannot communicate effectively at the strategic level every time the ship conducts any action, including movement? As a taxpayer and a citizen who studies the history of naval power, I think there is tremendous value in thinking about that question. I welcome any comment and criticism of this observation.

What I see today in the US Navy are information operations that target domestic audiences and a complete fail by the Navy when it comes to strategic communications. If a question gets asked about shipbuilding, the answer reads like a smoke grenade thrown by the Navy. If a question gets asked about a deployment, the answer is packaged and shipped like a brochure and often is completely void of context.

This is an organization that coined the phrase "Information Dominance?" Perhaps the scope of what is covered by such a profoundly ironic description should be examined more closely.

The Rogue NOTAM

A lot of media organizations are discussing a NOTAM from yesterday, which was released after the launch. It reads:

NOTAM for LA.
KZLA LOS ANGELES A2832/10 - THE FOLLOWING RESTRICTIONS ARE REQUIRED DUE TO NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER WEAPONS DIVISION ACTIVATION OF W537. IN THE INTEREST OF SAFETY, ALL NON-PARTICIPATING PILOTS ARE ADVISED TO AVOID W537. IFR TRAFFIC UNDER ATC JURISDICTION SHOULD ANTICIPATE CLEARANCE AROUND W537 AND CAE 1176. CAE 1155 WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR OCEANIC TRANSITION. CAE 1316 & CAE 1318 WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR OCEANIC TRANSITION. CAE 1177 WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR OCEANIC TRANSITION. W537 ACTIVE, CAE 1176 CLOSED. SURFACE - FL390, 09 NOV 20:00 2010 UNTIL 10 NOV 01:00 2010. CREATED: 08 NOV 20:52 201

This is W537

And this is the Google Earth location.

So even if you ignore the timestamps being all wrong, I don't think they are related folks.

The most likely explanation remains a Boeing BMD interceptor launch from San Nicolas Island, and as far as I know they don't always announce such test launches so it fits the profile. Still, one would think that the DoD would be able to confirm that yes or no within 20 hours, and yet the DoD still says they don't know.

Update: For those who have inquired, yes I called Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division at Pt Mugu, and the guy I spoke to said it wasn't them - then dismissed me to talk to the folks over at the Pentagon. While I probably spoke to someone on base, and not someone in the range OPs, I would still think at this point that if it was them - we would know by now.

Latest on Mystery Missile Over West Coast

This is a statement on the missile launch being circulated by the AP. Navy Times picks it up.

The Pentagon says it's trying to figure out whether a missile was launched off the coast of southern California and who might have launched it.

Spokesmen for the Navy, Air Force, Defense Department and North American Aerospace Defense Command say they are looking into a video posted on the website of Southern California television station KFMB.

The video appears to show a rocket or some other object shooting up into the sky and leaving a large contrail over the Pacific Ocean.

Pentagon spokesman Col. Dave Lapan said Tuesday that officials can't confirm that there was a launch and if there was, by whom. He says officials are talking to the Air Force, Navy and NORAD as well as civilian authorities who control and monitor air space.

Maybe Col. Lapan hasn't seen the video, but news helicopters don't fabricate ballistic missile launches for audience consumption, and the video suggests there was a launch. There isn't a question of whether there was a launch, the question is who launched it.

And does anyone else think the Pentagon answer of "we don't know" is probably the worst possible answer 20 hours later? There were no notice to airmen that I could find, indeed I can't find any announcements anywhere in the usual places.

My questions are:

• Where was the missile launched from?
• Who launched a missile?
• Where did the missile land?

NORAD gave the LA Times blog a bit of non-information worth consideration.

"We are aware of the unexplained contrail reported off the coast of Southern California yesterday evening," according to a statement Tuesday from the North American Aerospace Defense Command and the U.S. Northern Command, which operates the U.S. and Canadian missile warning system. "At this time, we are unable to provide specific details but we are working to determine the exact nature of this event.

"We can confirm that there is no indication of any threat to our nation and we will provide more information as it becomes available," the statement said.

When someone makes an unannounced launch what looks to be a ballistic missile 35 miles from the nations second largest city (at sea in international waters), and 18 hours later NORAD still doesn't have any answers at all - that complete lack of information represents a credible threat to national security. If NORAD can't answer the first and last question, then I believe it is time to question every single penny of ballistic missile defense funding in the defense budget. NORTHCOM needs to start talking about what they do know, rather than leaving the focus on what they don't know.

If this missile was launched at sea, was it launched from a ship or sub? If it wasn't our ship or sub, then whose ship or sub was it? Did anyone cross-reference the launch with public AIS logs from the port of Los Angeles yet? How many dozens of times have we had someone give Congressional testimony regarding the scenario where a non-state actor launches a short ranged ballistic missile from a ship off the coast?

I raise that last point to note, if the mystery missile didn't come from our military, you have to start looking for alternatives... and most of those alternatives are a threat to national security.

Mystery Missile Off West Coast

When big missiles launch 35 miles from major population centers during daylight hours, usually someone knows something - but apparently not?

If you can't view the video - direct link here.

That video goes with this print story.

A mysterious missile launch off the southern California coast was caught on video Monday evening by a KCBS news helicopter.

The spectacular contrail could easily be seen up in Los Angeles, but who launched this missile and why, remain a mystery for now.

The magnificent images were captured from the KCBS chopper around 5pm. The location of the missile was described as west of Los Angeles, north of Catalina Island, and approximately 35 miles out to sea.

A Navy spokesperson tells News 8, this wasn't its missile. He said there was no Navy activity reported in that part of the region.

On Friday, November 5, Vandenberg Air Force Base launched a Delta II rocket, carrying the Thales Alenia Space-Italia COSMO SkyMed satellite, but a sergeant at the base tells News 8, there have been no launches since then.

And we thought this type of thing only happened off China? Looks to me like it could be a ballistic missile. Usually these types of launches are announced to insure that aircraft aren't in the area, and hopefully we didn't just launch a ballistic missile and forget to tell China or Russia - because that would be very bad policy.

Observing STS-125

I can't remember the last time I was interested in the launch of the space shuttle, but there is an air of danger surrounding STS-125 that has my interest. The Space Shuttle Atlantis is expected to take off at 2:01 pm eastern. Atlantis is expected to conduct 5 spacewalks to fix problems on the Hubble Space Telescope, a mission that will cost taxpayers $1.4 billion dollars.

But there are several things you may not know. This space shuttle launch has been canceled once already due to concerns for the safety of the shuttle crew. The problem is space debris, and part of the plan going forward is that the space shuttle Endeavor is on launch pad 39B, on standby, just in case it must perform a rescue mission.

STS-125 is considered one of the toughest space missions in decades, repairing equipment that was never intended to be repaired in space. For context, imagine replacing a hard drive in your computer, while in a zero gravity environment, while wearing a space suit, while traveling at 17,500 mph, and oh btw you have to replace nearly 100 hard drives. Don't lose those little bitty screws either, because you have to use them to put the thing together when your done.

Finally, a little known fact. I have mentioned that ADM Willard played the role of the bad guy wearing the black helmut in Top Gun the movie, but the stunt double for Tom Cruise in that movie was played by former US Navy fighter pilot Scott Altman, who is leading the space shuttle Atlantis mission. Say a prayer for these folks this week, NASA has taken on a lot of risk with this mission, and risk in space can be deadly.

Chinese space program

I found this article on global security today. And I have to say this is one of the most well written and thoughtful articles I have ever read on the Chinese space industry.

It spends a great deal of time talking about China's goal of creating its own space station and how that would affect its manned lunar program. I think it also raised interesting points in that the Chinese program is actually not getting as much money as compared to the military programs in spite of the dual use nature of space technology. And also, it's important to point out that China has adopted a general strategy of relying all on domestically sourced parts. Which is also a choice it has made in its military complex (although it has not reached that stage yet).

Attack Satellite with the recent ShenZhou-7 mission

Just thought I'd pass by a little post after watching the final presidential debate. After the Shenzhou-7 mission, Richard Fisher posted an article on strategycenter. He focused mainly on the possible military applications surrounding the mission. In fact, most of it is devoted to the 40kg BX-1 microsatellite. It's interesting that he talked about BX-1 as an attack satellite (a new form of ASAT weapon) and how it came within 45 km of the ISS. Was this really the Chinese attempt to create a space weapon? At the time, I thought that he might be onto something, but wasn't too sure about it. Just today, I read a source (that I personally view highly) state that BX-1 in fact is an attack satellite. I don't know how exactly it's suppose to function, so I guess reading that article would provide some insights into that.

It's interesting that PLA figured out a much less controversial way of testing ASAT weaponry after the 2007 test.

Update: Galrahn here, two more Chinese space articles on Asia Times by Peter J. Brown here and here. Interesting times.

ASW Will Always be a Secondary Mission

From this viewpoint it is possible to define the relation of the Navy's important anti-submarine responsibilities to these newer functions. Submarine warfare is fundamentally a raiding operation directed at the Navy's base. If not effectively countered, it can of course have serious results. But A.S.W., although vitally important, can never become the primary mission of the Navy. For it is a defensive operation designed to protect the Navy's base, i.e., its control and utilization of the sea, and this base is maintained so that the Navy can perform its important offensive operations against shore targets. Antisubmarine warfare has the same relation to the Navy as guarding of depots has for the Army or the protection of airfields and plane factories has for the Air Force. It is a secondary mission, the effective performance of which, however, is essential to the performance of its primary mission. And, indeed, the successful accomplishment of the primary mission of the Navy--the maintenance of American power along the littoral--will in itself be the most important factor in protecting the Navy's base. For holding the littoral will drastically limit the avenues of access of Soviet submarines to the high seas.

National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy, Proceedings, May 1954, Samuel Huntington

This paragraph immediately follows this paragraph previously quoted on the blog in this timeless, brilliant article by Samuel Huntington. Written in May of 1954, this article could be reprinted in full today by the US Naval Institute and would be spot on in offering guidance for the next generation of officers looking into an uncertain future.

I have a theory that the reason antisubmarine warfare gets second fiddle to other capabilities is somehow linked to the theory in guidance laid out in this article. Within the context of an offensive strategy, Huntington is fundamentally correct. Submarine warfare is fundamentally a raiding operation against naval forces, and the defense against submarines, while vitally important, can never become the primary mission of the Navy. Technology, including the advantages gained with nuclear propulsion, have not changed this strategic imperative regarding how the US Navy should approach submarine threats today.

With this said, it should be noted the threats from submarines are changing. It is also noteworthy that the US Navy and China appear to be going two different directions in this regard. For the US, we have made major configurations to ballistic missile submarines to support more conventional capabilities. The Ohio class SSGNs are not only the most powerful cruise missile platforms in the Navy's arsenal, but also have advanced capabilities to support special forces, anti-submarine warfare, and mine warfare.

The Chinese are moving a different direction with submarine capabilities. We have previously discussed the development of anti-satellite capabilities in discussion in China for submarine forces. As we have discussed, the Chinese are also developing a ballistic missile with the properties of a cruise missile, or what is also being described as an anti-ship ballistic missile. When you add in the large numbers of conventional submarines, it is easy to see the differences in how the US and China view the tactical application of submarines.

However capable these new technologies China is developing become in the future, these new capabilities do not adjust the fundamental strategic point Huntington is making regarding the primary mission of the US Navy. What it does do though is raise a serious question, while defensive operations like ASW today is still a defensive operation designed to protect the Navy's control and utilization of the sea, is the United States slow in adopting the offensive capabilities necessary to use the sea as base against enemy targets? The world in the 21st century is rapidly becoming more networked, systems are no longer fixed to land, but are distributed to land, sea, and space.

As the Navy moves into the 21st century, while it is vitally important to maintain ASW capabilities to protect naval forces that leverage the sea as base, it is also important the Navy maintains perspective that this is a secondary mission of naval forces. US Naval forces today must embrace the realities of the 21st century environment and recognize that the primary mission is to be capable of taking the offensive against the distributed, networked 21st century foe. That means the US Navy needs to embrace the ability to strike not only to targets on land or sea, but it is time to start discussing how the Navy intends to neutralize targets in space when required. This is a difficult subject, primarily because many people in this country are yet to embrace a view into the future of the 21st century.

It is noteworthy that the PLA Navy, although not yet capable of actually implementing all of these offensive capabilities yet, appears to have already embraced the necessity to do so. In this regard, the DoD has not done the legwork necessary to educate not only the political leadership, but the population whose support will be required in adopting what many will consider a radical suggestion to build weapons capable of waging war in space. The US population has not been prepared, and does not have a clear understanding of the necessities to fight war in the 21st century. When one looks at the wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan, it might be fair to say the US population has actually adapted more towards understanding the 4th century challenges the Army is facing in Afghanistan than the population has adapted to understanding the 21st century challenges facing Naval and Air Forces in the 21st century from other emerging major powers.

Only a dedicated, steady, patient approach from both political and military leadership will be effective in bringing about the slow change necessary to build towards a 21st century defense posture and capability. The nation does not need these capabilities today, but may need them by the mid 2020s, and if ballistic missile defense is an example of the political challenges... the sooner the discussion starts on space capabilities, the better.

After all, China is now well past the political stage of the development process.

Reflecting Upon US 193

Today was a great day for the Navy. If you are feeling proud of your Navy, make sure you drop an email to say thanks to the good folks on the USS Lake Erie (CG 70).

This event is a reminder that the United States Navy is the most capable, smartest, most educated Navy in the world. The US Navy is an all-volunteer service, conscripts and draftees won't do. This event, particularly with the media attention and success, is a reminder that the US Navy remains very capable to the challenges that face our nation. In this case a unique mission presented itself, and yet the Navy was able to overcome the technical challenges in a short amount of time to hit a small piece of a school bus sized target, a fuel tank, which was reportedly only 40 inches wide, and hit it at around 133 nautical miles above the ground while it was racing across in orbit at a speed of over 4.7 miles per second.

Regardless of intentions or politics, that is a powerful capability no other country in the world can accomplish. While this isn't a capability that scales into a naval tactic, it highlights extraordinary flexibility of US naval forces at the high end of warfare. The inventive spirit of Lt Col James Doolittle is alive and well today in our armed forces.

In the context of the Maritime Strategy, we believe this event sends a powerful signal of deterrence to those who threaten with ballistic missiles, indeed it could be said a signal was sent that these new unsophisticated ballistic missiles like those being deployed by North Korea and Iran were highlighted as obsolete upon delivery. This doesn't mean the Navy can let down its guard or pull back its research and development, but we see an opportunity for the Navy to reassess its capabilities on a comprehensive level.

Based on the success of this event, particularly with the media attention focused on the event, conventional wisdom implies the Navy should move full speed ahead with more of this type of capability. The existing program for AEGIS ballistic missile defense will produce 18 capable warships by 2010, and follow that up with AEGIS ballistic missile defense modernizations on all 62 Arleigh Burke class destroyers. In our opinion, this builds an extraordinarily capable fleet, and unless the Missile Defense Agency would like to increase funding for the Navy, we see no need to adjust these plans.

What we do observe however is the need for the Navy to insure its capabilities in other areas of warfare are as flexible and capable in facing the nations challenges as the surface fleet proved it is today. As we look around, we are not so sure we believe that is true. The nation is at war, and we observe the naval capabilities required to fight the nations current war are woefully inadequate.

Take brown water capabilities for example, we continue to hear about the Riverine forces and their importance to the Navy in the 21st century. We observe the rotation of squadrons to Iraq, and how these rotations get plenty of media attention in the Navy, but few realize a riverine squadron is only 12 boats and around 200 sailors. The Navy has the expectation to control a river in a country the size of Iraq with a single squadron, with its 12 old reused boats, and hypes this as a priority capability?

We would suggest to the Navy to recognize the incident with US 193 demonstrates that the high end of the fleet capability mix has an amazing degree of flexibility. We believe the Navy should utilize its sizable technological lead over competitors to build up other aspects of the force that lack the same flexibility. We find the argument that this demonstration validates the investment of more large destroyers as counter to logical application of what we witnessed, as the existing force appears quite capable.

We see this demonstration as an opportunity for the Navy to invest in the low end of its capabilities mix, which clearly lacks flexibility. We believe this investment will help 'polish the edges' in dealing with other aspects of the Maritime Strategy, many of which focus on the low end of the warfare spectrum and are more likely scenarios in the near term. A few years of resource dedication at the low end of capabilities can go a long way, in fact for the cost of a single DDG-1000, the Navy could upgrade existing Riverine squadrons and actually build many more with modern equipment.

Roughead has been using the word balance often with the media recently, but we observe that there is no balance within the force, as everything weighs towards the most capable aspect of the existing fleet, and away from the forces that require a few years of attention with budgetary resources in a sound way that reflects the desires of the new Cooperative Maritime Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.

US 193 Prep Continues

There are going to be some great stories to tell, or hear, assuming some of this gets declassified when the satellite shot completes. We remain impressed with how much effort the Navy is putting into this show. All those reporters in Virginia are probably oblivious to what is happening right under their noses, or frustrated they can't see it.

We call it a show because in many ways, that is what it is, hopefully a drama and not a sitcom. The AP is reporting the first window will open up Wednesday night.

An attempt to blast a crippled U.S. spy satellite out of the sky using a Navy heat-seeking missile — possibly on Wednesday night — would be the first real-world use of this piece of the Pentagon's missile defense network. But that is not the mission for which it was intended.

The attempted shootdown, already approved by President Bush, is seen by some as blurring the lines between defending against a weapon like a long-range missile and targeting satellites in orbit.

The three-stage Navy missile, designated the SM-3, has chalked up a high rate of success in a series of tests since 2002 — in each case targeting a short- or medium-range ballistic missile, never a satellite. A hurry-up program to adapt the missile for this anti-satellite mission was completed in a matter of weeks; Navy officials say the changes will be reversed once this satellite is down.

The government issued notices to aviators and mariners to remain clear of a section of the Pacific beginning at 10:30 p.m. EST Wednesday, indicating the first window of opportunity to launch an SM-3 missile from a Navy cruiser, the USS Lake Erie, in an effort to hit the wayward satellite.

There is still good coverage over at the Danger Room, but with Dr. Lewis having a cow over the little things of the event, it has moved away a bit from the defense aspects and more into the politics. He talks about "administration" a bit too much for me, because as Chap pointed out on Dr. Lewis's blog, most of the bureaucracy involved in this test will be there in the next administration regardless of who it is. For those who are looking for more technical detail, the Milcom Monitoring Post has great coverage up. I concur with the assessment of Larry and John, the NOTAM will keep going until they either have a successful hit or until they have expended the three converted missiles, whichever comes first.

While the open source models are interesting, I'm not sure how accurate they will be for predicting the debris field. The models I have seen tend to focus on impact more so than anything. I'm not sure I buy into those models, it seems like a lot of this depends upon how accurate the model for breakup of the satellite is more than anything, and I don't think anyone but the DoD is going to be able to model that, because no one but the DoD actually has the technical details of the satellite. Too many armchair physics teachers on this one, not enough objective analysis. Depending upon the break points of the satellite on impact, this could be over quickly or be one huge mess, and have nothing whatsoever to do with the success or failure of the SM-3.

The media has confirmed what we speculated earlier, that the USS Lake Erie (CG 70) will be the shooter. That was an easy guess, Capt. Randall Hendrickson has commanded four previous AEGIS BMD tests and is the most experienced Captain in the Navy in the ballistic missile defense mission. Could a one shot success could change his career? We think it will be interesting to see.

Finally, some people were shocked, as in I am some sort of conspiracy guy to even suggest that US 193 uses a RTG power source after the DoD denied it. I'm in good company on that theory, a number of scientists aren't buying the "hydrazine only" story line either, and the number of military folks involved in this shoot down on a world wide level also tend to promote the theory this isn't some casual weapons test. The Navy has lined up this shot in a way to insure it almost certainly crashes into water. I'm not trying to wave a conspiracy flag here, all I am saying is 1) this is a weapons test and 2) there is something on that satellite the DoD considers very secret and wants to keep it that way. I don't see that as a conspiracy, simply the application of the facts as they have been presented, and withheld.

As far as I'm concerned, shoot it down, .... best with one missile.

John Pike said it 'probably isn't RTG so I'm probably wrong, he's the expert and I'm the observer. With that said, I honestly don't know what to make of Norman Polmar's strange argument for AEGIS BMD. I imagine the black helicopters are scrambling after that post.

The thoughtful argument against RTG is that the DoD would have had to file an EPA report to use RTG. Uh, yea, ok, whatever. Spy satellites can get exceptions to all kinds of rules, and while people probably don't like it, that is how it is. The best argument is that sunlight can effect RTG as a power source. That I buy, but the argument is counter to history considering so many other orbital satellites have used RTG, particularly the Soviets (as Norman points out).

The other possibility, an argument popular among the crew, is that the radar system is in fact the primary target. Without going into technicals, the materials that contribute to that radar could possibly stand reentry, and allowing it to fall into the wrong hands could create a major technology loss. I'm not sure I buy that argument, but only because I'm not sure I understand it.

Either way, we are done speculating about the satellite, nothing left to do at this point but have the popcorn ready for Wednesday night and hope for a one shot kill. To the sailors around the world putting this together, God bless and good luck.

Observing the Planning to Intercept US 193

It is going to be difficult to match Noah and the crew at Danger Room in their coverage of the intercept of US 193 shoot down, they are doing a masterful job, but there are a few things we feel we can add to the discussion.

We are not really interested in the politics, people will complain about anything, bottom line there is no treaty violation here nor was there a treaty violation by China. China's only mistake was not to warn everyone else what they were doing, something the Bush administration has done which is what has generated the criticism in the first place. The political aspects are a waste of time, in reality this is the first thing this administration has done in regards to any space program that has caught our attention, that it is military related should surprise nobody.

From our perspective, we note the Navy specific events that are unfolding in this shoot down, starting with the plan.

The Navy has issued orders to USS Lake Erie (CG 70), USS Decatur (DDG 73), and USS Russell (DDG 59) to take out the satellite. All three ships have the AEGIS technology to fire the SM-3, and all three ships have been involved in previous AEGIS ballistic missile defense tests, with both the USS Lake Erie (CG 70) and USS Decatur (DDG 73) successfully shooting down a test target. Additionally, USNS Observation Island (T-AGM 23) will track the satellite and collect information for the intercept, including the evaluation of the debris field. We believe the USS Lake Erie (CG 70) will be the shooter, Capt. Randall Hendrickson has commanded four previous AEGIS BMD tests and is the most experienced Captain in the Navy in the ballistic missile defense mission.

According to CNN, three SM-3s have been modified for the intercept.

"They want the period of a day or two to assess the effect of the first missile ... to probably get an orbit or two, to get an understanding of what effect the first intercept had on the satellite before launching another interceptor," Ham said.

While some might assume this is because the SM-3 will miss, we are thinking this might be for a second shot because one may not be enough. There is a suggestion the fuel tank with the hydrazine is the primary target. That may be true, but it seems to us the secondary target should be the Radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG) that needs to be broken into smaller pieces as well to insure burn up.

Another reason we believe the Navy may take more than one shot is the details and requirements. Jeffery Lewis describes the details.

1. The intercept will occur at 240 kilometers (130 nautical miles)
2. The mass of the satellite is 2,300 kg (5,000 pounds)
3. The mass of the interceptor is 20 kg. (From CBO)
4. The closing velocity will be 9.8 km/s (22,000 mph), suggesting a virtually head-on collision.

The satellite is about the size of a greyhound bus. The SM-3 KEI warhead unleashes about the same kinetic force of a 10 ton truck hitting a wall at 600 mph. While it is possible one shot will work, it is also more than possible the first hit will shred everything on the satellite except for the hardened hydrazine tank and Radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG), or more likely knock out one or the other, which will force a second shot.

The SM-3 is designed to bring down ballistic missiles with the desire to prevent accuracy of weapons of war, but we note SM-3 tests in the past have not completely shredded ballistic missiles, instead shattering the intercepted portion of the missile leaving some large pieces to be thrown harmlessly into the ocean. It is a very effective system for that type of interception, but for the purposes of shattering a large satellite into tiny pieces, we aren't so sure.

It has been suggested this will become a new capability of AEGIS. Maybe, but not for a long time. AEGIS BMD is largely misunderstood, or not understood, so many assumptions made by the press and even ballistics observers is done in ignorance or with speculation. They Navy currently operates 17 cruisers and destroyers with AEGIS ballistic missile defense, but only 3 cruisers and 6 destroyers can actually shoot down a ballistic missile, with the rest only capable of tracking targets.

For AEGIS BMD accuracy, more than one ship is required, what is sometimes referred to as a tracker and a shooter. They share information to confirm tracking data, and the design is such that either ship can be the terminal intercept guidance platform, but to be accurate multiple tracking systems are required. The choice of three ships is not unexpected, this allows for multiple trackers.

The 9 ships able to conduct intercept operate what is known as the 3.6 version of AEGIS ballistic missile defense. They are USS Lake Erie (CG 70), USS Shiloh (CG 67), USS Port Royal (CG 73), USS Decatur (DDG 73) , USS Stethem (DDG 63), USS Russell (DDG 59), USS John S. McCain (DDG 56), and USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG 54). The rest of the AEGIS ships converted to AEGIS ballistic missile defense use what is known as Long Range Surveillance & Tracking (LRS&T), also known as AEGIS BMD 3.0. As of today there are 17 total AEGIS ships converted to either version 3.6 or 3.0, but we only know the identity of 16.

The problem with version 3.0 is that ballistic missile defense is a toggle, a ship can either conduct normal AEGIS defense roles against conventional missiles, or ballistic missile defense, not both at the same time. The attack on the HMS Sheffield (D80) is a case study in why either/or capabilities are dangerous.

The SM-3 Block IA was thought to only have a range of over 500 kilometers and max altitude of 160 kilometers, but the details of this intercept describe the intercept to take place at an altitude of 240 kilometers. This is a previously undisclosed detail of the SM-3 Block IA, Using the data collected by Jeffery Lewis, one can imply that the actual maximum altitude is much higher.

Finally, we want to highlight that AEGIS BMD isn't the only capability that could shoot down this satellite, there were several options, so the reason the Navy was chosen should be highlighted. Quite honestly, it is the only system that works as advertised. This blog will not hide the fact we believe the Missile Defense Agency needs to be imploded, we are anything but impressed with what has been produced to date. When it comes to missile defense it has been a wasteful spending juggernaut, but has spent hardly any of its budget investing in AEGIS ballistic missile defense, instead paying extraordinary amounts of money for 'reach for the moon' capabilities that have continuously been over budget with a lack of justified results for the cost.

Between FY1995 and FY2007, the Missile Defense Agency had invested a total of $7,012,400,000 in AEGIS ballistic missile defense, an average of a around $585M per year. Compared to the total MDA budget, this is an incredibly small annual percentage. Between FY08-FY13 the MDA intends to spend about 7%, around $6.5B of its estimate $51B total budget on AEGIS ballistic missile defense. AEGIS ballistic missile defense has long been the red-headed step child of the Missile Defense Agency budget, and yet in the door walks this scenario, and the MDA is calling on the Navy to carry the water for them and produce a success story, so they can get more money from Congress for other missile defense programs.

I hope someone in the media picks up on that fact, it is a big part of this story that needs to be told.

Additional observations by SteelJaw Scribe.
Track the satellite in real-time here, refresh, map at the bottom of page.

AEGIS Will Defend the Planet

It will take some time to dig into the details of this story.

The Pentagon says it will ask the Navy to shoot down a broken spy satellite that was expected to re-enter the Earth's atmosphere in late February or early March.

Because it’s all very preliminary, we might as well have fun with it for at least a day or two. Comments like this come to mind.

"When aliens invade earth, humans will be looking to the US Navy to protect the planet."

"Confirms why they called it the "USS Enterprise" and not the F-2020."

After all, some lucky Captain gets to be the first American to shoot down a space ship. At minimum that notch on the resume is worth free drinks at the Star Trek Convention after party.

To be fair, I took my wife to Vegas the day after she took the NY bar, had free nights at the Vegas Hilton to blow, and little did I know the Trek convention was the same week. I've been to that after after party, and I'm not kidding, it was a hell of a lot of fun.

The wife playing craps surrounded by 6 Klingon's in drag is a classic photo.

The US Navy shooting down a broken satellite falling to earth... that will make a very nice photo too. Don't screw up.

Chinese Submarine Launched ASAT Program

One year and one week following China's 2007 ASAT test, Bill Gertz has a story in his Inside the Ring column from yesterday regarding China's anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons program.

Pentagon officials are increasingly worried that China's military is advancing its clandestine anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons program by building a submarine-launched direct-ascent missile system.

New information indicates the secret ASAT program, which Chinese leaders refused to discuss in recent meetings with visiting U.S. military leaders, will involve a space-capable ASAT warhead for the new JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile. The new missile is being readied for China's new ballistic missile submarine, called the Jin-class, or Type 094. The ASAT submarine will provide the ultimate in stealth weapons and could cripple U.S. satellites.

Credit Noah Shachtman, just last week he hosted a three part series (part1) (part2) (part3) by MIT researcher Geoffrey Forde on the ASAT issue. What is interesting about the three part series, all ASAT launches described in the analysis are conducted from mainland China. In reading the excellent analysis and scenario presented by Forde, one conclusion that can be reached is that dispersal of ASAT launch sites is an emerging requirement for China to be competitive against the US, and nothing increases dispersal of the launch sites than using a submarine as a launch platform.

Bill Gertz has more.

The new information bolsters theoretical writings by Chinese military officials, which were disclosed in a report to Congress last year by Michael Pillsbury, a former Reagan administration defense official and specialist on China.

Mr. Pillsbury stated in his report, "An Assessment of China's Anti-Satellite and Space Warfare Programs," that China's sea-based and submarine-based ASAT were mentioned in 2004 by Liu Huanyu of the Dalian Naval Academy.

"An Assessment of China's Anti-Satellite and Space Warfare Programs" is an 80 page report that was put together following the Chinese January 11th ASAT test. It is a long read, but is the most up to date collection of research in the open source of the Chinese ASAT test, including hard to find materials on a Chinese ASAT strategy. Combined with the recent contribution by Noah over at Danger Room, the big picture in China's Space Power strategy becomes more clear.

If China is in fact building ASAT capabilities into its Type 94 SSBN fleet that would represent a major capability for their nuclear submarine forces. This kind of capability would require a great deal of testing, and a great deal of expertise and efficiency, all of which is something we have not observed from the Chinese strategic submarine force. As an emerging capability this could take several years to develop, although given China has already conducted one successful ASAT test some of those years may have already passed.

We have discussed China's 3 pronged strategy in the past: Sea Power, Space Power, and Soft Power. This report is an interesting combination of Sea Power and Space Power, but directly contributes to their Soft Power strategy particularly regarding Taiwan. ASAT, particularly submarine launched ASAT, contributes directly to the perception of an ever expanding anti-access / area denial strategy by China to push back the US Navy from freedom of operation in the Pacific Ocean in response to a Chinese military move on Taiwan. Space warfare, string of Pearls, and an expanding massive regional A2AD military network contributes to concerns of the expanding regional influence by China.

The challenge is to find balance between those who choose to ignore the potential of a confrontation between US and China, and those who want to create a cold war between the US and China. In the 21st century, we believe the emergence regional superpowers like India and China, and potentially Brazil a few decades, represents the prize to be won for successful US foreign policy in the 21st century. There are also many people, in all of the various nations mentioned, who see the relationships between the US and these nations as inevitable in eventual confrontation. The line that separates one from the other is very thin.