Outlining FA/XX

At last week’s Office of Naval Research expo in D.C., ADM Greenert made several statements about the proposed next-generation F/A-XX fighter that are getting a lot of play.

From Sam LaGrone’s reporting at USNI News:

CNO Adm. Jonathan Greenert described options for the next Navy fighter - the F/A-XX - that would overwhelm or suppress enemy air defenses instead of outrunning or hiding from threats.

“You know that stealth maybe overrated,” Greenert said during a keynote at the Office of Naval Research Naval Future Force Science and Technology Expo.

“I don’t want to necessarily say that it’s over but let’s face it, if something moves fast through the air and disrupts molecules in the air and puts out heat - I don’t care how cool the engine can be - it’s going to be detectable.”

That also may mean developing new weapons for future threats.

“It has to have an ability to carry a payload such that it can deploy a spectrum of weapons. It has to be able to acquire access probably by suppressing enemy air defenses, Greenert said.

“Today it’s radar but it might be something more in the future.”

As for speed, he said the proliferation of high-speed anti-air weapons could lead the Navy to develop an aircraft that would not need to travel at a high speeds.

“I don’t think it’s going to be super-duper fast, because you can’t outrun missiles,” he said.

I’ve seen a few people interpreting his remarks on stealth to mean that F/A-XX will not be ‘low observable.’ Well, given that the officially defined bounds of ‘low observable’ aren’t exactly quantified for public consumption, I find it hard to prejudge how much Radar Cross Section and infrared signature suppression might be envisioned for the fighter. Suffice to say that it probably won’t be broadband ‘very low observable’ like the B-2 or its proposed LRS-B successor (which owes a lot to these bombers’ physical sizes in any event). On the other hand, it probably will have more signature suppression than ‘reduced observable’ legacy fighters.

Stealth is more than just platform shaping and coatings, though. It’s also about when, where, and how you use the platform. It includes activities by the platform or other supporting forces to suppress the adversary’s sensors using kinetic or non-kinetic means. In the latter regard, F/A-XX’s degree of ‘structural’ observability will probably be designed low enough to allow for considerable use of electronic countermeasures. F/A-XX’s overall observability will also depend on how it senses the battlespace and communicates with other forces. The ability to classify threats with high confidence at a significant standoff distance and then report findings to other friendly platforms via highly-directional communications pathways, and vice-versa, will be key. In turn, both the onboard and external sensor inputs will support onboard weapons employment. Payload over platforms, indeed.

F/A-XX’s other major attributes ought to be range and endurance with a reasonably large weapons loadout. As ID readers well know, I disagree with arguments that carrier-based aircraft must to be able to strike targets deep within an adversary’s territory—or even the innermost reaches of a maritime contested zone—during the first days of a major war in order for the carriers to have high value in the context of a protracted conflict.

That said, the greater F/A-XX’s tactical reach or on-station duration, the more Joint and Navy operational options that open up. This is about more than just strike missions—this is also about the outer layer screening of Surface Action Groups or carrier battleforces. This is about providing air support to frontline forces within a contested zone. This is about creating opportunities for offensive anti-air warfare. The ability to carry a sizable number of long-range air-to-air or air-to-surface missiles will be central.

It should be no surprise, then, that when I picture what I would want in F/A-XX, I think of several of the roles once performed by this aircraft: 

F-14D Tomcat at Udvar-Hazy Center of the National Air and Space Museum (author's photo)

Oh, and note the AAS-42 electro-optical/infrared system under the nose. Back in the day, a terrific sensor for standoff-range, silent visual classification of air contacts…

(author's photo)

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.

--Updated 2/11/15 10:53PM to correct typo in 3rd paragraph--

15 Classified Intel Reports Say Stealth Ships Aren't Stealthy

The Washington Post is railing against defense earmarks, but that wasn't what got my attention.

And last July, when the Navy's top brass decided to end production of their newest class of destroyers -- in response to 15 classified intelligence reports highlighting their vulnerability to a range of foreign missiles -- seven Democratic senators quickly joined four Republicans to demand a reversal. They threatened to cut all funding for surface combat ships in 2009.

Later in the article.

Intelligence reports have warned that the ship will be unable to fend off missile threats, including an advanced missile being developed by China and simple ones already possessed by Hezbollah. As a result, the Navy agreed to end production of the hard-to-hide 14,000-ton vessels, capping the program at two ships instead of seven.

I'm not impressed with the political discussions in this article. Am I supposed to be impressed that independent sources have verified that the political party in power is receiving more political donations from the defense industry? Shocking...

What I find interesting is the "15 classified intelligence reports highlighting their vulnerability to a range of foreign missiles." I think someone, or 15 someones, suggest that stealth at sea has turned out to be unrealistic even against the electronic threats it is intended to defeat, as opposed to the visual MK 0 eyeball it fails to help against already.

Captain Hughes defined stealth at sea as cover. Some people don't like that definition, and those people are usually taking an Army or Marine point of view to cover. Appropriate if you ask me, the Navy has been taking an Air Force point of view to stealth. I think what is important it that environment matters, and specific concepts will be different because the environment is different.

I think Hughes was right to describe stealth at sea as cover, and the mistake to adopt other definitions and treat stealth at sea like stealth in the Air Force is why pirates operate with stealth off Somalia and the Navy actually believed it was a good idea to build 14,500 ton stealth battleships.

Scouting and Antiscouting

My latest over at the US Naval Institute blog covers stealth in the littoral including what stealth on the sea really means, and why stealth is the antiscouting tactic the worlds best naval forces are being flanked and embarrassed by.

4th Fleet Green Water Strategy

Today, I observed the winds of change. In today's blogger roundtable, SteelJaw Scribe was unable to attend, but he had submitted his questions and it was read anyway. The response captured the various angles of 4th Fleets Green Water Strategy.

Q: "With the decline of the supporting infrastructure in the region and the closure of naval stations Roosevelt Roads and Rodman, et cetera, how sustainable do you see the Fourth Fleet's small unit presence in the AOR, particularly outside the Caribbean?"

A: I would think that if you do an analysis of the countries -- I mean, 15 years ago, there wasn't any democracies in Central or South America, period. And this year, if you look, you'll see just about all democracies with the exception of one and a couple that are very, very far left. But that is the good thing. And the good thing about that is that they welcome the United States into their ports, and so the at-sea sustainment really isn't an issue.

However, if you look at, you know, the capabilities that the United States have -- has if you have have a big-deck amphibious ship, if you have aircraft carriers, if you have high-speed vessels, then essentially you can kind of have your own afloat staging base, where, you know, acting as mother ships and can refuel ships, and we can maintain our presence down here, and we can maintain our cooperation through exercises and training venues and what have you.

So I think it's dependent, and I think that's the huge value that our Navy brings in some of its core competencies, which is its forward presence and the ability to sail anywhere, any time and sustain itself.

(PDF Transcript)

Our initial impressions of the Navy standing up 4th Fleet was one in the context of leadership and strategy. After participating in today's blogger roundtable on the subject, I think our instincts on this was right. Rear Adm. James Stevenson is very impressive, after speaking with him I admit a bit of frustration that he is retiring, and hope that in his next profession he finds a useful medium to articulate his strategic ideas regarding leveraging the Sea as Base as clearly as he did today. The strategic vision for naval Sea Basing he discussed during the roundtable regarding operations for the 4th Fleet could have been ripped right from the content of this blog, and there were a few times that I had a huge cheesy grin on my face listening to him speak.

Based on our observations of previous deployments for SOUTHCOM, the leadership style and priorities of Adm. Stavridis, and the appointment of Rear Adm. Joseph Kernan, we believe 4th Fleet is about to execute a very unique Green Water Strategy that may serve as a model for peacetime strategy in the 21st Century. Adm. Stevenson continuously highlighted the value of amphibious forces during today's roundtable, but when speaking of them in an operational context outlined the strategic value they bring to peacetime operations. With access to regional ports, with good relations with many regional neighbors, 4th Fleet is taking an engagement approach across the spectrum ranging from security cooperation to proactive humanitarian impact while it deals with the low end naval requirements of dealing with illicit trafficking.

The engagement by the US Navy to the 4th Fleet AOR is well known historically for response to natural disasters. Whether hurricanes, mudslides, earthquakes, forest fires, or flooding; the 4th fleet AOR brings a range of peacemaking challenges to the Navy to be responsive in peacetime. The value of amphibious forces for meeting these challenges was continuously articulated by Adm. Stevenson.

While this sounds good, we foresee some major challenges in execution here. We do not believe the Navy will be able to sustain forward deployed amphibious ships to 4th Fleet, there simply aren't enough amphibious ships to do that. We would also note that every metric Adm. Stevenson listed regarding why he likes amphibious ships is virtually every metric the Littoral Combat Ship doesn't offer for peacetime missions in the future. In that context, we see the 4th fleet strategy having well defined ends and ways but lacking the means either presently or in the future to execute strategy. It will be interesting to observe how the Navy addresses that issue, or even recognizes it as an issue before it is too late to do something about it.

During the roundtable the only issue discussed that really bothered me is that 4th Fleet is commanded by a 2-star billet, not a 3-star billet like other fleets. I missed this during the announcement, and I think that decision sends the wrong message. It is something that should be addressed, although I think there may be a Congressional requirement for that. It doesn't make sense to elevate a peacetime strategy to equal levels of wartime strategy as stated in 21st Century Seapower, stand up a new fleet with the peacetime strategic purpose in mind, and then fall short in equality for leadership billets. Consistency is important, and when there is evidence of a lack of consistency in regards to maritime strategy, in serves only to weaken the strategy.

4th Fleet represents the first major decision for CNO Roughead, as all other major initiatives have been inherited. While we think the decision to go 2-star is one in need of correction, we see the establishment of 4th Fleet as positive for the Navy. We believe the strategic vision 4th Fleet will execute for peacetime sustained presence and engagement will be quite different than what is traditionally associated with the deployment of naval forces to other regions, and will be more evident compared to the token SOUTHCOM deployments of the past. We look forward to observing the strategy for leveraging maritime forces in what is primarily a green water operational theater, and believe we will get a good early peek into the strategic vision for 4th Fleet this summer as hurricane season approaches.

There was some other news from the roundtable, including Unitas Gold (50) next year being hosted off the Jacksonville coast, the next Global Fleet Station to South America using a diving ship as a platform, and more information regarding the Kearsarge/Boxer deployments to South America. We got the impression the Kearsarge deployment will be timed with Hurricane season in mind prepared to respond to any potential disaster zones. In all it was an interesting conversation.

The Iranian Kilo Incident Sounds Like a Song

In early November the Daily Mail ran a story about a Chinese Song class submarine surfacing near the Kitty Hawk Carrier Strike Group. It caused a bit of a stir, even hit the Drudge Report for a few hours, only to be highlighted as the same story told in November... of 2006.

The surfacing of the Song class submarine so close to the US Navy was a major media event, so good in fact it was able to earn press regarding the power of the Chinese navy (in the eyes of the media anyway) for two Novembers in a row.

When observing the Iranians, they are very proud of their weapons, which is why we get silly pictures of divers standing on a submarine delivery vehicle riding down a parade route on the back of a truck in 100 degree summer heat. Those poor guys. The problem for Iran is they can't get any one to take the quality of their weapons seriously. The Shkval and the Sunburn, the two weapons supposedly the most capable in the Iranian arsenal, are vintage 1970s designs.

When the Lede reported the details of the latest incident involving the Iranian Kilo surfacing incident last week, it sounds to me like Iran was looking to get some media attention.

Not many weeks back, an Iranian Kilo-class submarine surfaced within one-half mile of the Vicksburg, the closest encounter of any kind anyone on board could recall with a foreign, potentially hostile hunter-killer submarine in the Persian Gulf.

Sounds spooky! Finally, the Iranian public relations department has found a way to make up for their proud leaders "GAY"-dir comments. OK, so maybe not, as the Lede goes on...

The Iranian submarine had been spotted leaving its home port, tracked through Iranian territorial seas and followed as it crossed into international waters. So its presence was not a surprise, according to officers and crew members on board that day. The submarine took no hostile action, they said, and the Iranian sailors behaved in a wholly professional manner. Even so, the decision to sail and surface so close to the Vicksburg remains a complete mystery — like much Iranian behavior remains to Americans.

Iranian sailors climbed atop the submarine’s tower-like sail. Vicksburg sailors came to the rails. The Iranians pulled out binoculars. So did the Americans. Iranian officers could be seen speaking into radios. Vicksburg officers were in touch with Fifth Fleet headquarters. Digital cameras on both sides captured the moment.

The key to a surprise is to make sure the other guy doesn't know your coming. The Navy, and in this case the New York Times, is sending a signal to Iran: We See Your Submarines. Why would we tip Iran that we can see their submarines? I honestly don't know, but it is starting to sound to me like SECDEF Gates and Admiral Fallon are getting tired of the Iranian propaganda and constant attempts to stir up trouble with their propaganda in the region.

We don't believe Iran has any intention to listen to Gates and Fallon, it could be that Iran seriously believes their weapons are as amazing as their own propaganda advertises. You know, like when Iran claims they will sink the US Navy with their incredible, unstoppable, stealthy and superior flying boat.

The Lede and every other news source quotes Navy officers on the Vicksburg who question the motive of the Iranians. To me it seems pretty clear, they were hoping to get the same level of excitement from the US over this incident that the Chinese got for the Song class submarine. Maybe they can salvage the situation and email the photo's of the Vicksburg to DEBKA, that way someone will write a panic piece while the rest of us roll our eyes.

5th Fleet Focus: The Enemy Exploits the Gaps

The Discussion of Maritime Strategy is on, and it is over at CDRs place and at SJS's place. I intend to be focused on it at least once every day this week, and probably more than that for awhile. We are told the new Maritime Strategy is the "strategic concept which clearly formulates its relationship to the national security." This was on my mind as I read this today.

Eagle1 picked up two reports of events taking place off Somalia. The first one.

The UN World Food Programme on Monday renewed pleas for deployment of foreign naval vessels to protect food aid in Somali waters, a day after its chartered freighter escaped a piracy attack.

On Sunday, WFP-chartered, Comoran-flagged MV Jaikur II came under attack 60 nautical miles off the Somali port of Brava, south of Mogadishu, where it had had just unloaded 7,275 metric tons of WFP food and was sailing back to Mombasa.

The pirates fired, but the ship managed to escape.

And this one.

Somali pirates have seized a cargo ship off the east African coast, the head of a local seafarer's association said on Monday.

Gunmen attacked the vessel on Wednesday, said Andrew Mwangura, the program co-ordinator of the East Africa Seafarers Assistance Programme, but due to chaotic communications with war-ravaged Somalia the incident had taken several days to confirm.

He did not have details on the number or nationality of the crew members aboard the Almarjan, a cargo ship of over 2 500 tons that was flying under a flag from the Comoros Islands and operated by Dubai-based Biyat International.

...

Somali pirates attacked four ships over two days last week, hijacking a Dubai-based vessel that is still in their possession, the head of a local seafarers group said Monday.

Pirates chased after three of the boats and shot at one of them on October 17 and 18, but the ships were able to escape a hijacking. The other, seized last Wednesday, was not as fortunate.

How timely. As I noted yesterday, the USS Carter Hall (LSD 50) exited the region while the USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41) entered the AOR, both crossing the Suez Canal on Saturday. Somehow I missed that also crossing the Suez the same day was FS Commandant Blaison (F793), replaced by the FS Commandant Ducuing (F795) which entered the AOR. As I noted also entering the Red Sea was SNMG2, although SNMG2's destination is yet unknown.

Is strikes me as more than coincidence that the two ships most reported to be working off the coast of Somalia, specifically USS Carter Hall (LSD 50) and FS Commandant Blaison (F793) just happened to be returning home during these pirate attacks.

It is very clear the pirates of Somalia have excellent intelligence of coalition naval operations taking place in TF150. It also seems to me that somebody over at CENTCOM dropped the ball here. Either the forces covering for the two ships were unequal to the task, or CENTCOM made a conscience choice to not protect the coast due to some other reasons (force limitations perhaps) while rotations were taking place at the Suez. Either way, this has all the appearances of a blunder in dealing with piracy off the African West Coast.

The new Maritime Strategy, "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower," offers specific guidance for the Navy through 6 Tasks, 6 Capabilities, and 3 Priorities. They are

Six Tasks:
1. Limit regional conflict with forward deployed, decisive maritime power.
2. Deter major power war.
3. Win our Nation's wars.
4. Contribute to homeland defense in depth.
5. Foster and sustain cooperative relationships with more international partners.
6. Prevent or contain local disruptions before they impact the global system.

Six Capabilities
1. Forward Presence.
2. Deterrence.
3. Sea Control.
4. Power Projection.
5. Maritime Security.
6. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response.

Three Priorities
1. Improve Integration and Interoperability.
2. Enhance Awareness.
3. Prepare our People.

I want to focus on the Task "Prevent or contain local disruptions before they impact the global system." The strategy defines it as such:

Maritime forces will work with others to ensure an adequate level of security and awareness in the maritime domain. In doing so, transnational threats—terrorists and extremists; proliferators of weapons of mass destruction; pirates; traffickers in persons, drugs, and conventional weapons; and other criminals—will be constrained.

By being there, forward deployed and engaged in mutually beneficial relationships with regional and global partners, maritime forces will promote frameworks that enhance security. When natural or manmade disasters strike, our maritime forces can provide humanitarian assistance and relief, joining with interagency and non-governmental partners. By participating routinely and predictably in cooperative activities, maritime forces will be postured to support other joint or combined forces to mitigate and localize disruptions.

I don't know the specific reasons this came to prominence in the new Maritime Strategy, but for us laymen looking for a reason why these types of maritime security issues matter to the larger regional maritime safety, I encourage you to check here and follow the links.

The new Strategy is designed to reach the interested citizens of the nation, what I call the Boston Maggie's of the US, although that might be setting the mark way too high cause she knows her stuff. Basically, interested citizen John's and Jane's who give a shit. So this is my citizen John and Jane test. If NATO, including the US Navy pulls off the coast of Somalia, and several ships get attacked by pirates including a ship chartered for the UN World Food Programme, did the Navy properly execute the strategic guidance as described above? I'd be willing to bet Maggie would say no.

I think it was the 'routine' and 'predictable' nature of rotations that allowed the pirates to disrupt the maritime domain off Somalia. I am pretty sure when the UN World Food Programme chartered vessel is attacked, it falls under the category of either pirate or 'other criminals' as described in the new Maritime Strategy.

In other words, allowing the enemy (pirates, criminals, whatever) exploit the gaps in our "forward presence," these incidents represent a failure in "preventing and containing local disruptions before they impact the global system."

Yes, I am borrowing a bunch of language from the new Maritime Strategy to highlight events. It is what it is, I didn't write it. I point out that the task "Prevent or contain local disruptions before they impact the global system" is on an equal level as the task "Win our Nation's wars." The Navy has said as much, because the Navy has made a big deal about the task "Deter major power war" being on the same level as the task "Win our Nation's wars." So answer me this...

Is failure in "Prevent or contain local disruptions before they impact the global system" equal to failure to "Win our Nation's wars?" Somehow, I seriously doubt it, nor would I advocate it to be, but if the Navy is serious about their own strategy they need to take very seriously the failure within the 5th Fleet regarding the recent activity off Somalia, because not to do so cheapens the content of the new Maritime Strategy.

I'll be watching Standing NATO Maritime Group 2, it could be we are seeing the very early implementation of new Maritime Strategy. I hope so, I also doubt it.

Electronic War in IAF Strike in Syria

The NY Times position is that the Israel strike hit a Syrian nuclear facility that was being built with North Korean assistance. The project was reportedly in an early phase of construction and was discovered earlier this year by satellite photographs.

To be honest, I've lost interest in what exactly Israel hit, my interest has shifted to how they did it. From Ares:

U.S. aerospace industry and retired military officials indicated today that a technology like the U.S.-developed “Suter” airborne network attack system developed by BAE Systems and integrated into U.S. unmanned aircraft by L-3 Communications was used by the Israelis. The system has been used or at least tested operationally in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last year.

The technology allows users to invade communications networks, see what enemy sensors see and even take over as systems administrator so sensors can be manipulated into positions so that approaching aircraft can’t be seen, they say. The process involves locating enemy emitters with great precision and then directing data streams into them that can include false targets and misleading messages algorithms that allow a number of activities including control.

A Kuwaiti newspaper wrote that "Russian experts are studying why the two state-of-the art Russian-built radar systems in Syria did not detect the Israeli jets entering Syrian territory. Iran reportedly has asked the same question, since it is buying the same systems and might have paid for the Syrian acquisitions."

For those who may recall, "Project Suter" first showed up in the black toolbox prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom when a mysterious item popped up in the public record. Specifically, extra funding was added to the FY02 budget to modify the capabilities of the US Air Force EC-130H Compass Call in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Other than the bit disclosed in the budget, the only other readily available source of information on Project Suter is from AviationWeek.

Senior Suter is a Big Safari-managed special access program. Big Safari itself is a shadowy Air Force unit that has developed small numbers of specialized reconnaissance systems, including drones, in what are often classified programs. The Suter technology was developed during the last several years by BAE Systems and involves invading enemy communications networks and computer systems, particularly those associated with integrated air defense systems (AW&ST Aug. 16, 2004, p. 24; Nov. 4, 2002, p. 30). Suter 1 allowed U.S. operators to monitor what enemy radars could see. The capability enables U.S. forces to assess the effectiveness of their stealth systems or terrain-masking tactics. Suter 2 permits U.S. operators to take control of enemy networks as system managers and actually manipulate the sensors, steering them away from penetrating U.S. aircraft. Suter 3 was tested last summer to add the ability to invade the links to time-critical targets, such as battlefield ballistic missile launchers or mobile surface-to-air missile launchers. Aircraft involved in the Suter programs include the EC-130 Compass Call, RC-135 Rivet Joint and F-16CJ strike aircraft specialized for suppression of enemy air defenses.

Since WWII there has been a constant shift in balance tilting between radar systems and stealth. As stealth technology improved into the 1990s, more advanced radar systems were invented to counterbalance back into the favor of detection. It is said the F-22A currently holds the balance in favor of stealth, but it is also said that as the Joint Strike Fighter comes online in numbers worldwide, radar systems will have caught up to sophistication to detect it.

That may be true, but I am not sure it will matter. The advancement of electronic warfare systems appears to be on a wider curve than either radar systems or stealth, and the future points to electronic warfare. There is a school of thought that believes lasers will never be able to replace ballistics in weaponry because lasers are electronic systems that will be subjected to advanced electronic countermeasures. I tend to agree with this, for the long term anyway, because the ability to overload electronics is getting easier as greater power sources become available to mobile platforms, like ships and aircraft.

There has been a lot of speculation regarding how "Suter" works. Some of that speculation has been wrong. Cited in a number of places, the YES satellite TV network has been down since Israel conducted its air strike. There has been speculation that it is a side effect of the electronic warfare capabilities that Israel deployed. It turns out, maybe not.

Electronic disturbances that have played havoc with the YES satellite television company's broadcasts in the past month were caused by powerful radar equipment deployed onboard a Dutch Navy vessel off the Lebanese coast, The Jerusalem Post has established. The disturbances took the form of time delays on soundtracks as well as distorted and fragmented pictures during broadcasts.

Sources close to YES say that the disturbances, which have caused the company significant financial harm, were caused by an extremely powerful radar system, exponentially stronger than the signal beamed to subscribers' home dishes.

The radar was deployed by a UNIFIL vessel, possibly the Dutch vessel HNLMS De Ruyter, an air defense frigate, off the coast of Lebanon. Observers and subscribers are calling on YES to return the monthly fees for YES subscription over the time of the disturbances. Should YES return one month's fee to every subscriber affected, the damages could potentially add up to NIS 100 million.

OK, so it isn't intentional, but consider for a minute that Thales had no idea the radar system of the HNLMS De Ruyter (F 804) would have this kind of side effect. It raises the questions what other nasty tricks can the Thales APAR system do? The ability for a warship to project jamming capability from satellite communication over an area the size of northern Israel, and one would assume Lebanon as well, sounds like capability I'd be interested in. After all, if you integrate the capabilities as described by "Suter" into a warship that can project signals over large areas of land, conceivably you can remove the entire coastal defensive network of a nation like Iran with a relatively small number of ships without firing a shot.

Noteworthy, if you bring up Google Earth, you can measure the approximate distance between the YES subscribers and a reasonable guess for the location of the HNLMS De Ruyter (F 804) which would not be off Israel, rather off Lebanon. Noteworthy, because it is about the same distance between Taiwan and China. Hmm...

Cormorant or Skat

If you had to choose, which armed unmanned aircraft would you choose?

CDR Salamander introduces the Lockheed Martin Cormorant, while Defense Tech introduces the MiG Skat.

Chap has follow up on Cormorant, while Flight Global has follow up and video of Skat.

Tough choice for me, Cormorant is a huge technical challenge, but the MiG record on modern aircraft is shaky. Both highlight the future though.

Northrop Grumman Wins UCAS Bid Over Boeing - UPDATED

In the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Department of Defense directed the Navy to “develop an unmanned longer-range carrier-based aircraft capable of being air-refueled to provide greater standoff capability, to expand payload and launch options, and to increase naval reach and persistence.”

On August 1st, 2007 the Navy chose Northrop Grumman to design the UCAS "to demonstrate critical carrier suitability technologies of a Low Observable-Platform Air Vehicle in a relevant environment." Navy Times reports:

Northrop Grumman has beaten a Boeing team as the Navy’s choice to develop the Unmanned Combat Air System Carrier Demonstration — intended to prove the technology to provide the fleet’s aircraft carriers with a long-range pilotless jet strike aircraft.

The award of a $636 million cost-plus-incentive-fee development contract was announced by the Navy late Aug. 1.

The competition to develop the aircraft — also known as UCAS-N, for UCAS-Navy — was between Boeing’s X-45N and Northrop Grumman’s X-47B test aircraft. Northrop now will be the prime contractor to build and fly the new aircraft.

This is the next big step in developing the future combat capability of the US Navy Carrier force. A low-observable and air-refuelable carrier-capable unmanned combat air system (UCAS) is critical to taking that step through greater range, greater persistence, and improved stealth. While I don't believe the UCAS system will replace manned fighter interceptor roles or close combat support roles for decades, these systems are excellent options for long range carrier strike on fixed targets in the mid term, and the UCAS-N is an excellent augmentation to existing and future strike aircraft.


People who think the UCAS-N is a potential replacement near or even mid term for the Joint Strike Fighter have their expectations too high. While the technology exists for unmanned aircraft to carry out a variety of roles, the artificial intelligence technology to replace the manned requirement for decision making is several decades away. The Joint Strike Fighter will still be needed, and it should be noted the potential of integrating the UCAS-N, or attaching them to a Joint Strike Fighter flight will likely add a tremendous capability to Joint Strike Fighter pilots to identify targets well off the horizon, thus giving naval aviators a tremendous advantage against adversaries.

There are a couple of excellent backgrounders recently released on the UCAS issue by the Center for Strategic and Budgetery Studies (CSBA), in fact both pictures in this post are from these slides. This backgrounder is also an excellent read on the subject.

Update: David Axe is reporting Boeing may protest the decision. This could lead to delays in a program very familiar with delays.

Update 2: The Northrop Grumman media center website for the X-47B UCAS-N. A lot of good stuff including photos of the first model, movie, brochure, and fact sheet.

INS Hanit: Stories From the Sea (Part #2)

Yesterday I opined about the INS Hanit incident, basically linking to all the relevant information reported in the press regarding the analysis, conclusions, and questions left unanswered of the incident. If you haven't read Part #1, and researched the details provided to satisfaction, this blog entry may not make much sense.

in the INS Hanit story there are some lessons learned, and some questions for the US Navy in its own path to deploying a ship with a minimum crew capabilities on a small ship deployed for a long period of time.

I believe the story I told in part #1, which might make me a gullible fool, but I refuse to go into any specifics into why other than to say I've been lucky enough to encounter a second source, a more credible source in my opinion, answered enough questions to confirm the details of the story told by Rambo Rabbi Brody Lazer is accurate.

For me, accepting the story as true allows me to speculate on aspects of the battle that are relevant to current and future naval design, as well as current and future missile defense. In a break with the traditional posts of this forum, the rest is admittedly almost completely weakly sourced speculation.

For example, as there was no structural damage except on the helicopter pad to the INS Hanit, and considering the crane on the SA'AR 5 is not small, large enough in fact to hoist an 11m RHIB from the helicopter pad over the ship into the sea, and from the sea onto the helicopter pad, accepting that the crane was what was hit by the C-802 isn't much of a stretch. It leads to a question though, why the crane?

Well, for starters the crane is the largest part of the INS Hanit that isn't coated with radar absorbing materials (or at least was at the time). When it comes to stealth coating, the parts of a ship that are sometimes excluded are weapons, sensors, and things like the crane itself (probably not the crane cover).

Additionally, the C-802 is believed to require a designation source radar system. This radar would have been the more powerful coastal radar systems of Lebanon that the IAF took out after the INS Hanit incident. It is possible those radars were capable of detecting the INS Hanit, or perhaps the crane of the ship, and provide enough bearing on target to effectively launch.

However, many experts have opined for years the Iranian version of the C-802 likely has a limited terminal guidance system, and considering the rather historically limited demonstrated capabilities of the Iranian C-802 version, it is entirely plausible that the terminal radar didn't even detect the INS Hanit, but was able to detect the crane which was deployed over the hanger in an upright position.

The damage to a deployed crane from a C-802, which btw has a rather substantial warhead for an anti-ship missile, would tend to indicate the elevated impact blew most of the exploding fuel and fire into the sea across the ship, leaving a burning crane and burning fuel on the helicopter pad. That fuel would be hot enough to burn through the helicopter pad into the crew quarters and engine room directly below it, which btw, were the only two areas of the ship that was reported to take direct damage.

Assuming something like this is what happened with the INS Hanit, then either the stealth system of the INS Hanit is a legitimate capability, or the terminal guidance system of the Iranian C-802 leaves a lot to be desired. Considering the C-802 was detected by other Israeli corvettes, but not the INS Hanit, it is possible the jamming capability of the C-802 is effective, but only against a limited axis (straight ahead). Considering a total of 5 C-802s were reported to of been fired in the 2006 Lebanon-Israeli war, but only 2 missile hit... 1 against the crane of the INS Hanit, and the second 60 km offshore on the small merchant ship Moonlight with the other 3 missiles missing completely, the C-802 effectiveness can be legitimately questioned.

Did stealth make a difference? Hard to tell, there is so very little reported on the 2nd C-802 missile attack on August 1st that we don't know if other defensive measures, like ECM, was used to deflect the missiles. The largest part of the INS Hanit that didn't have stealth coating appears to be where the C-802 hit, so there is evidence that hull form + stealth coating played some part in the defense of the ship.

The story appears to be a tale of human error leading to a wartime defeat to the Israeli Navy, yet it was the human element of Israeli religion that played a direct role in the low casualty rate. If it was indeed stealth techniques applied to the INS Hanit that prevented the hull from getting hit, but the lack of stealth on the crane that led to that damage, again human error not technology would be what is to blame. In the end, the total story with the details provided by the Rambo Rabbi does tell of a believable war story that almost always rears its ugly face in battle, but is also dismissed by professionals as the elements involved in the fog of war.

INS Hanit: Stories From the Sea (Part #1)

On my trip, I finally had the opportunity to approach someone with a number of questions I have accumulated over the last many years regarding the effectiveness of stealth at sea. I was rather disappointed at how much information I was unable to get, but I do understand the reasons. In the process of inquiring about stealth tech for ships, I was however able to ask and get confirmation of one specific event that has peeked my interest on the only known combat event involving stealth at sea.

Last July when the Iranian version of the C-802 missile hit the Sa'ar 5 Israeli corvette Hanit, a number of people started asking a number of questions. The fallout of information included confirmation that the INS Hanit was not operating its anti-aircraft defense systems, there was no detection or warning of the missile, and that only 4 crew was lost despite a major fire at the end of the ship that completely burned out the sleeping quarters of a number of sailors. The final report by Brig. General (Res.) Nir Maor implicated human error, not technology, as the main factor in the attack, and yet no one was fired... hmm.

At the end of the day (or should I say Sabbath eve?), casual and educated observers alike were left looking for answers. Why were there so few casualties? Why was the damage apparently so limited the ship was able to return to shore under its own power, and return to duty within 3 weeks? Finally, how effective is the C-802 used in that attack and how effective was stealth? I know a number of industry folks who love discussions on those two questions.

Well, after an extended discussion while on my trip, I was personally convinced that the only story told online specifically regarding the incident is at minimum, true. Apparently, the Israeli Naval Service is convinced through a combination of recovered debris and electronic signature the weapon was indeed a C-802. The guidance system of the weapon appears to be radar only. This implied to me the C-802s fired last year were of the variant built by Iran, not China, at least in their eyes. Additionally, the claim by the Jamestown foundation of a second attack involving C-802s on August 1st, 2006 is also legitimate. I am personally ready to accept these claims as a legitimate starting point, but it still leaves questions.

At first I thought the story was true, but then I wasn't so sure after research at the time, and some critical comments regarding the word of a 3rd party. But after my recent confirmations, and now that I have more fully researched the credentials of the original storyteller, the answers I have been given personally, and the questions yet to be unanswered, it would appear the story may have some merit after all.

Oh, you didn't catch the story I am talking about? Rambo Rabbi Brody Lazer, a man with a very interesting history, who has been recognized for his individual credibility and honesty in the past, tells the tale....

Read it, chew on it, is it legit, or am I nuts?

Yesterday, a young Israeli Naval sergeant boarded the northbound train in Tel Aviv. I was on my way to a moshav in the Haifa area and he was returning to his base in the Haifa port. He sat down across from me, looking at me intently while I was learning my Gemorra. I looked up at him, smiled, said "Shalom aleichem!"

He sighed deeply, as if relieved, and sheepishly asked, "Can I talk to you, Rav?"

"Of course," I answered, asking him how he knows that I'm a "rav". He said that he heard me eulogize one of his fallen friends during the recent war. The sailor had a relatively new beard, an almost new knitted kippa on his head, and the beautifully pure innocence in his eyes of a new Ba'al Tshuva. To make a long story short, he was a crewman on board the Hanit when it was hit in Beirut.

The sailor, who we'll call Moshe, began to relate the dozens of miracles that happened aboard the Hanit the night that it was hit. "It was Friday night. Usually, the crew would eat Friday night dinner in two shifts. But this time, since we were in a war zone, our three religious crewmen went to Lt. Col. A - the skipper - and begged that we all need Hashem's help. The first miracle is that the skipper agreed to leave only 4 sailors on the bridge, and allowed the whole entire crew to pray together; we piled into the chapel, and said a lengthy mincha and Kabbalat Shabbat. I was bored and wanted to eat quickly then catch a few hours sleep, because I had the midnight watch. But, I stayed with the rest of the crew. Then, all of us had a Shabbat meal together - 15 different sailors said Kiddush, each in the custom of his fathers; I'm talking about guys that aren't (weren't) even religious! The meal was drawn out - I had a headache and was dying to sleep. The religious guys started to say the grace after the meal, and BOOOFF! The missile hit, but on the opposite end of the craft. It should have sank the boat, but it hit a crane right above the chopper landing pad. What a miracle! If that's not enough, the helicopter-refueling tank - filled to the gills with chopper fuel - didn't explode despite the fact that the whole end of the boat was burned..."

At least twenty other crewmen aboard the Hanit should have been killed, but they were saved by Shabbat dinner on the other end of the ship.

Moshe had beads of sweat on his forehead; tears glistened in his eyes. "The newspapers don't write about the miracles that we all saw. I ran to my bunk on the deck right below the landing pad. It was charcoal; my metal bunk was completely melted down and all my possessions were ashes. If I hadn't been detained in the chapel and in the dining hall for Shabbat meal, I'd have been charcoal too. I haven't stopped thanking Hashem since - I've changed my life..."

Moshe continued with more miracles, including the engine room burnt to a crisp but a pair of tefillin was found unscathed. If that's not enough, amidst the embers of destruction, the sailors found a Book of Psalms - also unscathed - opened to Psalm 124. Read Psalm 124 and your hair will stand up!

The train was nearing my station, so I gave Moshe a blessing and a fatherly embrace, and we parted. The Hanit took a direct hit from a Hizbulla missile, but Moshe has turned the navy's setback into a victory.

I have personally been convinced the story is completely accurate, and I think it fills in many details that explain several 'whys?' that never had answers last year. Notice the date of the post? I remember finding and even discussing it back then, but I had forgot about it until during my Q&A session last week.

Part #2 tomorrow.