There is a tendency in the United States to confuse
the study of war and warfare with militarism. Thinking clearly about the
problem of war and warfare, however, is both an unfortunate necessity and the
best way to prevent it. As the English theologian, writer, and philosopher G.K.
Chesterton observed, “War is not the best way of settling differences, but it
is the only way of preventing them being settled for you.” As George Washington,
who addressed Georgetown students in August 1797 observed, “To be prepared for
war is the most effectual means to promote peace.” One of the patterns of
American military history is to be unprepared for war either because of wishful
thinking or a failure to consider continuities in the nature of war—especially
war’s political and human dimensions…
…It was during the divisive
Vietnam War that many universities confused the study of war with advocacy of
it and tended to view military forces and weapons as propagators of violence
rather than protectors of peace. Some saw war as the cause rather than the
result of international tensions and competitions…
…It was Aristotle who first
said that it is only worth discussing what is in our power. So we might discuss
how to prevent particular conflicts rather than eliminate all conflict, and
when conflict is necessary, how to win. And in the pursuit of victory, how to
preserve our values and make war less inhumane.
And we might discuss war to
understand continuities its nature and changes in its character. It was a
misinterpretation of the lopsided military victory in the 1991 Gulf war that
gave rise to what would become the orthodoxy of the Revolution in Military
Affairs, the belief that American military technological advantages would shift
war fundamentally from the realm of uncertainty to the realm of certainty. The
language was hubristic. The United States would use dominant battlespace
knowledge to achieve full spectrum dominance over any opponent. The U.S.
military would shock and awe opponents in the conduct of rapid decisive
operations. War would be fast, cheap, and efficient. The thinking betrayed what
Elting Morison warned against in 1967 when he wrote the following in Men, Machines, and Modern Times.
"What I want to suggest here
is the persistent human temptation to make life more explicable by making it
more calculable; to put experience into some logical scheme that by its order
and niceness will make what happens seem more understandable, analysis more
bearable, decision simpler…."
The orthodoxy of the
Revolution in Military Affairs aimed to make war more explicable and
calculable. This fundamentally flawed thinking about future war set us up for
many of the difficulties we would encounter in the long wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq.
So we should discuss war in
places like this great university because we have much to learn and because the
stakes are high.
LGEN McMaster’s other topic was on academia’s important roles
providing bridges between a free society’s warriors and the citizens they
serve. His focus was on society’s need to prevent further erosion of the
warrior ethos due to the many forces and trends that have weakened the
civil-military bond in America over the past half century.
I want to
pull the thread slightly, however, on an additional reason why the veteran’s presence in
the classroom as a student or scholar is so vital. Regardless of whether a
veteran saw combat or not, he or she was a witness at some level to the
complexities and difficulties of military operations. His or her experiences
can enlighten (or if necessary, counter) those who have never witnessed Clausewitzian fog and friction first-hand. He or she will often be best placed
to appreciate how military theory, which Clausewitz asserted was nothing more
than a tool for self-education, both informs and diverges from circumstance-based reality. The
veteran’s service not only enriches his or her study of war, but also that of
his or her peers.
McMaster thusly concludes:
Understanding war and
warriors is necessary if societies and governments are to make sound judgments
concerning military policy. It is our society’s expectations that allow our
military to set expectations for ourselves and our fellow soldiers, sailors,
airmen and Marines. And in our democracy, if society is disconnected from an
understanding of war or is unsympathetic to the warrior ethos, it will become
increasingly difficult to maintain the fundamental requirements of military
effectiveness and to recruit young men and women into military service.
I highly recommend the entire piece.
