The Use of Simulators and “Synthetic” Environments for Advanced Tactical Training

Jon's note: so my one-week August hiatus turned into a month-long break. Family and work obligations will always take precedence. I managed to write a few weeks worth of new pieces over the last few days, though, and I hope to maintain that pace for the remainder of the summer and early fall.

In late July, USNI News reported that the Navy will build a training center at NAS Fallon that will include simulators for three Aegis cruiser Combat Information Centers (CIC), two E-2D Hawkeyes, and eight F/A-18s. These simulators will be linked such that aircrews and CIC watchstanders will be able to “fight” training scenarios as an integrated force. Additional ship and aircraft simulators will be added over time. Eventually, a datalink will be introduced that enables actual aircraft flying on Fallon’s training ranges to inject themselves into the scenarios being run on the simulators.

A facility like this can never fully replicate the complexities of operating at sea. Simulators are getting better and better at representing the intricacies and variability of real-world radiofrequency and acoustic conditions, but there’s nothing quite like the real thing. Moreover, land-based synthetic training can only partially capture the operational constraints—and crew performance effects—caused by varying weather conditions.

Land-based (and pierside) synthetic training, however, will fill at least two critically important niches in developing our naval forces’ advanced tactical proficiency. First, a crew that isn’t at sea can focus its training attention entirely on the fight. The tactical foundation it gains inside or linked with the simulators is thus already strong when its battleforce begins its underway workups. As less underway time will likely need to be spent on basic skills refreshment, more underway time will be available for advanced scenarios and experimentation. Considering the fact that funding for underway periods will likely continue to be highly constrained in the coming years, and considering the high overseas demand for our inadequately-sized fleet’s ships and aircraft, land-based advanced tactical training will allow the Navy to extract maximum value from each underway opportunity it receives.

Second, this synthetic training will allow crews to operate under tactical conditions and employ tactics that they simply could not do (or for security reasons would not want to do) at sea in peacetime. As I’ve noted previously:

“Some doctrinal elements or tactics that are considered war-critical, as well as tactical situations too complex to generate in forward theaters, can be practiced in home operating areas. In-port synthetic training can also be used for these purposes; it has the added benefits of enabling more frequent and intensive training than may be possible at sea…” (Pg. 106)

The Navy’s Director of Air Warfare, RADM Mike Manazir, alluded to this in the USNI News article on the Fallon facility:

“I can’t train to that highest level in clear air. I’m not allowed to use those modes in clear air. We typically have called those war-reserve modes, and if you go out on a range and you use a war-reserve mode there is a chance that anybody watching could collect information on that war-reserve mode…In this way, in a [virtual-constructive] environment, we can use all of those capabilities…I can give them the worst day of their life that we hope they would never see during deployment…The operation of their missiles and their weapons systems will adequately show what kind of jamming they’re going to see.”

Unit and group-level synthetic training, whether at facilities like Fallon or via pierside training environments in homeport, will allow the Navy to condition its crews for operating under intense and protracted cyber-electromagnetic opposition without safety risks to actual fleet assets. Moreover, it allows those crews to practice, experiment with, and innovate electromagnetic maneuver warfare doctrine and tactics using tools that—if smartly architected—will do much to reduce the risk of disclosure to potential adversaries. That’s a big deal.

Aggressive use of synthetic land-based or pierside tactical training can never completely replace at-sea tactical training. But if synthetic training is designed and executed in ways such that it tightly complements at-sea training, the benefits to fleetwide tactical proficiency and combat conditioning could be immense.

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.

Revisiting Some Old Concepts

The aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76), foreground, USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63), center, and USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72). 2006 U.S. Navy photo by Chief Photographer's Mate Todd P. Cichonowicz

The following contribution is from Prof. Robert C. Rubel, Dean, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College.

While I would not characterize the years since 1945 as a golden age, in terms of naval warfare, the seas have been a remarkably peaceful place.  The United States has enjoyed unchallenged command of the sea, allowing her commerce to move unmolested and allowing her to insert the US Army virtually anywhere she chose.  Even engaging in local sea control was a rare need.  For the most part, the US Navy has focused on power projection ashore.  However the good old days are drifting away as China, Iran and others develop potentially contending navies and land-based forces that can exert powerful influence out to a thousand miles or more.  The Navy will have to get its mind right about fighting at sea again, and to do this it wouldn’t hurt to dredge up some old concepts, knock the seaweed and barnacles off and see if they can be made seaworthy again.

On Tuesday, June 4th, the 71st anniversary of the Battle of Midway, I gave a presentation to the students at the Naval War College on operational leadership connected with the battle.  To do this, I engaged in comparative analysis in which I argued that the mistakes in planning and decision making that General Robert E. Lee made in the Gettysburg campaign were similar to those made by Isoroku Yamamoto during the Midway campaign.  I wrote an article about this in the Naval War College Review back in 1995.  Of course, a lot of new books have been written about Midway since then, and I decided to go into some of the newer literature to make sure my remarks were up to date.  As I read the Parshall and Tully book Shattered Sword, I realized that there were some additional insights I could use concerning the role of moral courage in high level leadership, but also, a couple of operational concepts jumped out of the page at me.  The first was the notion of a combined air fleet, and the second was the utility of skirmishers.  I think that both of these ideas are at least worth a second look in today’s emerging naval operational environment.

Combined Air Fleet

This was the brainchild of Minoru Genda.  His idea was to combine six aircraft carriers together in order to have a virtual air force at sea.  Depending on the classes of carrier in the mix, the combined air fleet might have 3-400 aircraft available.  That air strength, operating from six decks created something that was more than a naval task force.  In those days, it was well understood that naval forces should not get into a mano-a-mano fight with land-based forces, resulting in the “250 mile rule.”  Moreover, in 1942, the offense was king; he who struck effectively first won.  Carriers toted relatively fewer fighters, so the dive bombers were likely to get in devastating hits if they found the carriers.  This was true tactical instability.  However, if you had a lot of fighters, radar directed or not, defense was more robust.  Moreover, lots of decks meant you could multi-task; perhaps do power projection at the same time you were engaged in a sea fight.  In any case you were packing a serious punch either way.  Had Nagumo had two more CVs at Midway, the outcome would likely have been much different, American code breaking or not.

What would a combined air fleet look like today?  Let’s start with the basic inventory of CVNs.  We certainly have enough to gang six of them together.  That would give us roughly 300 strike fighters in a single air force.  The question is would we know what to do with such a force?  In Desert Storm we had seven CVs participating, but they were just feeding an ATO; there was no underlying naval doctrine for how the planes should be used.  Plus there was no appreciable sea threat other than some mines.  What would an air strike doctrine look like for a modern combined air fleet? 

I think doctrine would have to start with understanding the differences between command of the sea, sea control, sea denial and battlespace superiority.  Without going into detail on these things (you can check out my NWC Review article at http://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Naval-War-College-Review/2012---Autumn.aspx ), we can say that offering up six CVNs as a target is pretty risky, so a) they either would need to operate tactically dispersed and/or b) the threat level would have to be manageable, plus c) the strategic stakes must be worth the risk.  The idea would be to concentrate effects.  What effects would we want?  I would say that the first thing would be air superiority.  The good news today is that we have strike fighters, so the old tradeoff dilemma between bombers and fighters is moot.  But we must work in conjunction with the Air Force, surface units and even subs to create a condition for the enemy in which if it flies over water, it dies.  At the same time we work to eradicate their surface shooters (especially ones with good SAMs).  Once those conditions are met, suppressive ASW becomes a possibility.  Of course, the enemy still might have land-based missile systems that could contest the sea space, and if defensive means do not suffice (both right and left of launch), then strike will have to be considered, but preferably with our own missiles.

If we bought into this concept, the next question would be how do we generate such a force and in what time frame.  Right now, it would take some doing to round up the necessary decks.  Having such a force in readiness year round would mean that we would not be able to continue deploying CVNs as we do now.  Moreover, we would have to conduct quite a bit of exercising in order to work out the kinks and nail down doctrine.  Presence would have to be performed by gators or CRUDES.  So, there would be a strategic price to pay for developing such a concept, but man, would it be impressive.  I can see it scaring people into being quiet. 

Variations on the theme: perhaps all the CVs don’t carry the same kind of wing.  Some have different kinds of UAVs; X-47s, big wings, etc.   Perhaps you pack the E-2s, and most helos on one deck and load the others with fighters.  The whole concept is a blank canvas just waiting for artists to start painting.

Skirmishers

This sounds like a Civil War thing, but as I compared Gettysburg and Midway I realized that skirmishing played an important role in the carrier fight.  Gettysburg: Brigadier General John Buford placed his dismounted cavalry in a blocking position to delay Heth’s division until Major General Reynolds could bring up the First Corps.  The First Corps, in turn, conducted a delaying action (really they were forced into flight) long enough for General Mead to get his army into position along Cemetery Ridge.  Buford’s command acted as a skirmisher to find, delay and disrupt the enemy.

Midway Island, that is its air base and air forces performed a similar role at Midway.  They found Nagumo’s force and their attacks, while unsuccessful, served to delay and disrupt the Japanese carriers, forcing them to maneuver.  This disrupted fighter operations and arming/rearming, and produced the golden moment when McClusky, Best and Leslie arrived overhead unmolested.

In a new era of potential sea fights, we ought to think again about the potential utility of skirmishers.  What would constitute cavalry in this age?  LCS?  Subs?  The USN has been locked into the group paradigm for so long, it doesn’t even have words to describe something else.  I have a feeling that in the event of a real fight, the flags and COs would improvise, probably brilliantly in some cases and rediscover skirmishing on the fly, but why not think about it now?  Yes, I get that cyber could be a skirmisher too. 

Ok, nothing cosmic here, but I thought that these two ideas, popping out at me from the pages of history, were worth a second look; at least they might stimulate some good dialogue.

Back to the Future - Targeting the New TASM

Raytheon’s Tomahawk is arguably one of the U.S. Navy’s most storied and well-employed weapons systems.  Over 2,000 missiles have been launched in combat in seven or so countries since 1991 with another 500 successful operational tests launches.  The Navy recently ordered 361 of the latest variant (BLK IV) at a cost just short of $1 million apiece, so clearly the weapon is valued by the Combatant Commanders.

While the Navy has enjoyed strong success with this strike weapon, our surface-based ASuW capabilities have atrophied.  The subsonic LRASM-A (the supersonic LRASM-B was canceled in January 2012) in development by DARPA offers promise, but will not see fleet service for quite some time, if ever.  SWOs old enough to have served in the 1980s and 1990s aboard ABL or VLS-equipped ships will remember the RGM-109B, or Tomahawk Antiship Missile (TASM).  The problem with this fire-and-forget weapon was that we had no good way to cue and target the missile.  As a young TLAM engagement officer, I recall that doctrine for its employment was rather squishy and we tended to either wish away or just ignore the over-the-horizon targeting problem which would be required to successfully employ this missile at its maximum range of more than 200 NM, especially if neutral shipping was present.  Complicating the targeting problem was the weapon’s early 70’s era Harpoon active radar seeker and subsonic speed, which would enable an enemy ship traveling at thirty knots to move more than twelve miles from when the TASM was launched. Because of these limitations, the TASM was withdrawn from the fleet later in the 1990s.  Many of the TASMs in storage were modified to the BLK III version to meet the growing demand for strike weapons.

The requirement for a surface-based launch range ASuW capability has recently reemerged. NAVAIR has awarded Raytheon a contract to update the BLK IV Tactical Tomahawk with maritime interdiction capabilities to be deployed by 2015.  This upgrade will be a tremendous step up from the old TASM in targeting and takes on the BLK IV’s 900 NM range.  As a point of comparison to other long range anti-ship missiles, the subsonic Russian 3M-54 Klub ranges about 1350 NM while the new Indian BrahMos travels about the 160 NM, but at the blazing speed of Mach 2.8.

As seen in Raytheon's recently released concept video above, the new "TASM" will use advanced targeting features including ESM and an Active Electronically Scanned Millimeter wave radar seeker.  More important is the two-way UHF SATCOM data link which will allow for cueing and updated tracking of targets in conjunction with naval drones, manned ISR, or SOF during the missile's long flight.  These improvements will mitigate some of the challenges in firing the missiles over-the-horizon, especially against targets in crowded litoral seas.  Also critical is the flexibility of these missiles to still be employed in their traditional strike mission, saving space in surface and sub VLS magazines.  Now is the time to start developing the operational concepts and experimenting with TTPs for employment of these missiles. 

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Goldwater-Nichols: 25 Years Later. Call For Papers

October will mark the 25 year anniversary of the Goldwater Nichols Act, the most important DoD reorganization in the lifetimes of most of us. To mark the anniversary I would like to encourage our many readers to contribute articles regarding their thoughts of Goldwater-Nichols. I am under the firm belief that a review of Goldwater-Nichols at this point in time could in fact be useful both for the Congressional audience of this blog as well as the military leadership audience of this blog as both struggle with the current fiscal challenges facing the United States.

With the intent and genuine desire to get folks motivated to give an opinion on Goldwater-Nichols 25 years later, I figured I would start by giving some of my own thoughts on the subject.

I believe a brief history of Goldwater-Nichols can be given by noting there are three phases of Goldwater-Nichols as they have influenced modern American military history: the first five, the next ten, and the last ten.

The First Five refers to the first five years from 1986-1991. In 1987-1988 the major military operation at the time was Operation Earnest Will from July 24, 2024 through September 26, 2024 which also overlapped with Operation Prime Chance. While these operations were mostly naval centric with the protection of tankers, Operation Prime Chance also focused on preventing Iran from disrupting shipping lanes in the Persian Gulf. The use of Army special operations helicopters and special forces from USSOCOM was only a small part of the operation, but nonetheless led to several integration activities so that Army aviation elements of the 160th SOAR could operate from and communicate with Navy ships. While this may seem like a seemingly trivial event, it was an early important first step for interoperability between the two military services following the Joint services mandates of Goldwater-Nichols.

In December of 1989 President George Bush ordered Operation Just Cause, the invasion of Panama where dictator Manuel Noriega was deposed. Operation Just Cause marked another significant Joint services operation that included elements of the US Army, US Navy, US Air Force, and US Marine Corps. A lot of operational lessons were learned in Operation Just Cause regarding the logistics requirements for the Air Force in supporting both Army and Marine units, not to mention several early lessons in joint operations between the services, particularly in regards to communications. A lot of those lessons came in handy only 8 months later when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait.

With the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 through mid-March of 1991 the United States and coalition partners put on one of the most impressive displays of military power the world had ever seen by completely crushing what was at the time an Iraqi Army rated fourth in size in the world. While mostly an American military operation, the size of the operation with over half a million people involved in the coalition combined with the scope of the destruction rained upon Iraqi military forces was stunning and solidified positive views in Washington related to the merits of Goldwater-Nichols. In the end, more Americans had died from friendly fire in the first Gulf War than by enemy fire, and that drove the necessity for the US military to fully integrate joint service commands towards interoperability and Jointness. The changes made under Goldwater-Nichols specific to the COCOMs was also validated and solidified as a result of the first Gulf War largely thanks to the CENTCOM commander at the time - Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf. The key point as it relates to Goldwater-Nichols is that General Schwarzkopf was able to develop a strategy from policy, call up forced from the individual services, and develop and execute a campaign plan under a Joint forces with a high degree of success.

Two large Joint services campaigns in five years, both with a high degree of military success, had proven Goldwater-Nichols a success.

The Next Ten years from 1992-2001 was spent better integrating the military services under what some now refer to as Jointness. The United States military, under rules for a Joint construct set forth by Goldwater-Nichols, became the most lethal operational military force in the history of human conflict. While political talking heads ran around in the 1990s discussing questionable theories like The End of History following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States failed to recognize that significant national security threats posed by those who were losers in the emerging geopolitical global order still existed, and the United States did not plan properly for the global economic shift from Europe to Asia that would occur only a decade later. During the 1990s under Goldwater-Nichols, two simultaneous events occurred that were thought exclusive to the Act: budget cuts to defense and strategic drift in defense policy.

When seen through the eyes of Goldwater-Nichols, the use of American aircraft carriers to provide naval aviation for operations in Kosovo was an excellent example where duplicate capacity was leveraged in the interest of sharing roles and missions under a Joint construct, rather than streamlining roles and missions between the services during a period of budget cuts. Ultimately, each individual military service sacrificed many capabilities in the 1990s during budget cuts that had to be rebuilt later primarily because the individual military services felt entitled for inclusion in military activities under the Joint construct of Goldwater-Nichols as a way to justify their budgets. The reduction in capabilities of each service and the entitlement expressed by the individual services to be included in military operations should have been a red flag there was a flaw in Goldwater-Nichols, but the operational success credited to Goldwater-Nichols continued to provide spectacular results that served as a rationale for dismissing any criticism.

Throughout the 1990s leading into the 21st century, the United States failed to formulate a national defense strategy that tied COCOM strategic requirements for protecting national interests to the individual military services budget requirements strained under the politics of a world absent major nation conflicts. It wasn't until North Korea, Pakistan, and India started testing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles did the US shake the malaise of a future without war between nation states, but by then it was too late - September 11, 2024 arrived.

The Last Ten years began ten years ago from this Sunday, on September 11, 2001. This Sunday will mark the ten year anniversary of many things, but from the perspective of Goldwater-Nichols, 9/11 marks the ten year anniversary of our ongoing land wars in Asia and air wars throughout Asia and Africa. Without a strategic vision of national defense articulated by both the political leaders of the nation since the Cold War, but also because the military services were never organized around a strategic vision for the defense of the nation, the United States responded to the attacks on 9/11 by 19 terrorists with the longest running military campaign in our nations history.

Obviously the strategic threat to the United States is bigger than the 19 individuals directly involved in 9/11, but it is noteworthy that the government of Afghanistan was toppled without any primary forces of the US Army. It wasn't until after the Taliban was toppled in Afghanistan that the US Army showed up, but we all knew they had to eventually show up - after all, Goldwater-Nichols insures that each service gets a piece of the action.

From a Goldwater-Nichols perspective though, the real justification for the Acts success came with the invasion of Iraq. From a purely military perspective, the invasion of Iraq proved that the Joint military approach the United States had perfected for the previous 14+ years was indeed brilliantly lethal and effective as a military force. The United States military today is unmatched in operational capabilities conducting the ugly, messy, and costly business of war. The precision lethality of military capabilities leveraged by the United States is indeed so capable that the United States today conducts six simultaneous wars in four theaters on two continents: Afghanistan and Pakistan in Asia, Iraq in Asia, Yemen in Asia and Somalia in east Africa, and Libya in North Africa.

But the strategic drift continues. Because of the hollowing of military force within the individual services in the 1990s, and because today each service must get a piece of the action in each theater of war under the COCOM model for Joint services warfare, the defense budget has skyrocketed over the last ten years to support the various wartime capabilities desired by the individual services despite the wars themselves being paid for through a separate overseas contingency operations budget.

How is it possible that after ten years of war and after already suffering one major defense budget cut in the 1990s the US military is still accused of lacking a policy -> strategy -> tactics/training -> doctrine process by which to guide budget decisions? The answer, in part, is Goldwater-Nichols.

One of the consequences of Goldwater-Nichols, and what I believe to be the flaw of the Act, is that defense strategy was shifted from the services to the COCOMs while budget remained the responsibility of the services. By design Goldwater-Nichols separates defense strategy (COCOMS) from budget (the individual services). This problem is evident by the strategic drift the nation has been suffering for the last 25 years, but because Goldwater-Nichols also was instrumental in bringing together interoperability between the military services, the resulting operational brilliance of the US military as a result from Goldwater-Nichols has masked this rather serious flaw.

Defense policy in Washington drives COCOM strategies, who then must go back to Washington to the individual services for resources. From the services perspective, they do not budget policy or strategy, rather they budget the doctrine and tactics/training that will be developed by the individual services who are deployed in support of COCOM resource requests. Because tactics and training now integrate joint services coordination, by the time the units within the individual services arrive at the COCOM level to be leveraged within the context of a strategy driven by policy, those units from each of the US military services are individually and collectively prepared to be operationally excellent under the Joint model - and have proven it time and time again.

The leaders of the military services continue to say that their primary objective is not to repeat the mistakes of the impending budget cuts to defense that are set to begin in FY 2013, but I honestly don't see a scenario right now where any of the services can avoid repeating those mistakes. From the services perspective of budgeting, their focus is on insuring that the tactical/training/doctrinal aspect of each individual military services budget is protected because in the 1990s, that aspect of the defense budget was shorted, and it led to a hollowing of the force structure. From the services perspective, to handle this emerging budget crisis, each military service will contract itself with the primary intent of retaining that precious tactical/training/doctrinal capacity within each individual services budget. The expectation is that when combined with other elements of national power, the Joint force will be operationally brilliant even though there is no question it will be smaller.

I believe this is the second least efficient approach possible for national defense - second behind the least efficient approach, which is the same approach used today except with the higher budget.

The problem with the simple contraction approach to defense budget cuts is that it in no way aligns the budget for the national defense of the United States with the political policies or even the COCOM strategic execution of defense policy of the United States.

I have been told several times by several people that the sole instruction to OSD to date by the Obama administration regarding defense budget cuts is to prevent the services from competing with each other over defense funding. If that is true, that suggests to me the United States will absolutely repeat the mistakes of the 1990s, when the services were also prevented from competing with one another during budget cuts. By removing the obligation of the services to compete at the policy level for funding, the Obama administration is removing the burden from the services to match budget to policy - and furthermore retains the entitlement felt by the individual services to be included in operations overseas rather than matching the right capabilities to the challenges being addressed.

Goldwater Nichols has created a framework that intentionally separates defense strategy executed by the COCOMs from defense budget managed by the individual military services, and the accepted norms for political processes related to national defense policy exclude the individual military services from the obligations of thinking strategically as a Joint force at the budget planning level. As we move into the defense policy and budgeting process for what some are calling the so-called Sword of Damocles cuts, under Goldwater-Nichols the next ten years are very easy to predict.

The military services will remain operationally brilliant as they have been under Goldwater-Nichols, and at the same time the nation will continue to drift strategically as we have been under Goldwater-Nichols. The only way this changes is if the services are forced by the Obama administration, thus obligated, to compete at the strategic and policy level against each other for funding by making the case for what each service brings to the table for the national defense of the United States of America. Should the Obama administration fail to force that competition between the services, I strongly believe they would be insuring the nation will suffer strategic drift for another decade under a flawed Goldwater-Nichols system that disconnects the national defense policies of the United States from the national defense budget of the United States.

If Admiral Mullen is correct, and the national debt is the top national security threat to the United States, it seems to me that an appropriate political response to that top threat to national security would be to insure that any disconnect between defense budget and defense policy is corrected. In my mind that begins by taking a hard look at how Goldwater-Nichols has divided budget and strategy. How will someone measure success? For the Navy, I'd suggest we know things are changing when N5 is no longer a paper pushing afterthought in OPNAV and N8 isn't a ridiculously powerful authority within OPNAV.

---

If you, like me, have strong opinions on the impacts of Goldwater-Nichols towards the national defense of the United States 25 years later, I strongly encourage you to write up and submit to me via email an article on the subject that I can post on the blog during the month of October.

The Influence of Politics and Requirements on Seapower

It was actually Secretary of the Navy Knox who suggested the crazy acquisition scheme to George Washington. Few Americans realize that the first debt stimulus plan of the United States was for shipbuilding, indeed I doubt most Americans realize that spending government money on shipbuilding is the most common form of government stimulus you will find throughout our nations history - including most recently in the 1930s and the 1980s.

George Washington was unknowingly practicing classical Keynesian economics when, in order to gain the maximum level of support by the Congress, the President informed Congress that the Navy would build six frigates in six different shipyards in six different states. The early economy of the United States was one of massive debt and high unemployment. The nation was taking in limited tax revenue and intended to spend it on the Navy to the maximum benefit of the economy. The President and Secretary Knox both understood the economic benefits of shipbuilding; an industry that came with a dedicated supply chain, and George Washington understood the distributed approach would be appealing to Congress. Ironically, while the inefficient government spending did stimulate the economy, that same inefficiency was also a primary feature of the nations first shipbuilding program.

Joshua Humphreys was appointed Master Constructor of those early frigates and like most ship designers in US Navy history, he had gold-plated designs in mind. He insisted that the framing for the frigates would use southern live oak, which was going to be cut down off the coastal region in Georgia and delivered to the shipyards. Gathering the live oak became seriously problematic though, and drove the costs up substantially. The swamp land area where the oak was cut made transportation of the heavy wood very difficult, and sickness plagued the men who did the work - killing many men during that time. The delays and cost overruns became so bad that Congress eventually canceled 3 of the frigates, but the program continued and eventually the first three frigates were delivered. As real world events like piracy and trade disputes with European powers began to pressure the young United States, Congress eventually built all six frigates.

In the end, Joshua Humphreys insistence on using live oak paid off. The frigates carried 44 guns with three masts. When sailed by competent officers and crews, the ships consistently proved superior to frigates in service of the Europeans.

The requirements process in the US Navy has never been perfect, and it has never been used with efficiency in mind. Dating back to the very first six frigates, Naval tactics and ship quality has driven the requirements process for US Navy ships, and those requirements are often directly related to the primary missions of the ships.

The decision by the US Navy to build two versions of the Littoral Combat Ship in two shipyards in two different parts of the country may not work under the Rumsfeld enterprise model for DoD efficiency, but it is certainly a very American way of building Navy ships and also fits neatly in the historically inefficient distributed economic model for American shipbuilding programs.

The decision by the US Navy to emphasize tactical speed with the Littoral Combat Ship is also very American. The Oliver Hazard Perry frigate used turbines to insure that the ship could get up to higher speeds quickly, despite creating a readiness problem for the Navy at the time as most of the fleet that would operate at the 20 knot speed of the Perry frigates was still deisel powered. Live oak drove the requirements in the design of the first six frigates even though live oak only provided a very slight advantage to other types of wood, and despite how it directly contributed to higher cost both in construction and in maintenance of those early ships. Those frigates were fast though, and at that time, speed was a major tactical advantage.

I don't like the speed requirement of LCS, never have, but I do respect that the speed requirement for LCS is a legitimate tactical capability that directly influences a primary mission of the LCS - the small boat swarm threat. Few people truly understand small boat swarm threats, and most observers are snarky about it. Here are three things I find common on the topic of small boat swarms:

• Few people seem to understand the tactics used by small boat swarms
• Few people seem to understand the tactics used to defend from small boat swarms
• Few people realize the very real and serious threat of small boat swarms

Why does speed matter to the LCS? Because small boat swarm tactics are precision attacks that are time sensitive. A small boat swarm is primarily not a multi-directional attack as the "swarm" description would suggest. Tactically the swarm approaches a target from a single attack vector in mass for defensive purposes. The defense of the small boat swarm must be created by the swarm itself, because independently small boats can be picked off easily.

In the case of Iran small boat swarms, the Iranians use 107mm rockets that begin firing at regular 2-3 second intervals starting at around 8 miles out. They intentionally target the water in front of the clustered small boat swarm because those large seawater splashes from the 107mm rockets create line-of-sight barriers between the swarm and the target. If the speedy small boat swarm is not impeded before the swarm reaches the target, the swarm will arrive in firing range with plenty of firepower to mission kill any ship - including and especially large warships. The line-of-sight disruption created by the small boat swarm with huge splashes from the 107mm rockets directly influences the detection and targeting of nearly all short range anti-ship weapon capabilities used by modern naval forces. Radars can't lock on, automatic defensive weapons have trouble holding detection and lock for firing accuracy, and crew served weapons are typically short range and expose the crews to rockets strikes close to or on the hull.

The importance of aviation support against a small boat swarm cannot be overstated. The availability of rapidly deployed UAVs offer defenders the capability to look over the splashes, but concerns about MPADS in the swarm still exist. It is often suggested that the first sign of a small boat swarm attack will be when the defenders helicopter splashes in the water. Every good RW pilot will argue against that point, cautiously.

Special requirements are built into the Littoral Combat Ship to counter this primary mission threat. There is a reason the guns are loaded into module bays at the highest available point on both versions of the LCS. There is also a reason why it is a very good thing the ship is able to create a big wake. Those uninformed about naval tactics (like small boat swarm tactics) seem to think the big wake is some kind of joke tactical capability, but they simply haven't truly studied the tactical value.

Consider what you might do if you are in a boghammer going 50 knots over a wake created by LCS-1 going 45 knots. Both versions of the LCS are too big to be disrupted by the wake, as is almost any vessel the LCS is protecting, but small boats are not. A boghammer at 50 knots hitting a big wake off LCS-1 is going to drink sea water, potentially enough to crash or mission kill the boghammer. The speed on LCS creates significant problems to the timing of tactics used in small boat swarms, because it forces the swarm to slow down around the LCS wake - which completely disrupts the timing of a small boat swarm attack by craft with limited armament. If you think speed is a simply a clever joke of a capability for the US Navy against small boats, drive your sports car over a serious speed bump at 55mph a few times and see if you or your vehicle likes the effect. On water the boghammer driver will be lucky to maintain control of his boat.

Disrupting the timing and coordination of the small boat swarm is the single most important tactical objective towards defeating the swarm, and the combined capabilities of rapid fires and speed provided by the LCS gives the defender a legitimate advantage. I am not particularly happy the Navy has invested so much of the LCS design on a single primary mission capability, but tactical speed on a large ship does make a lot of tactical sense if the primary mission threat is small boat swarms.

If the internet existed in 1800, every single informed, rational American would have been outraged that Joshua Humphreys insisted on using live oak due to how that single requirement had such an adverse impact to the six frigate program. Our luxury in today's information environment to be informed on consequences of and complain about the speed requirement for LCS did not exist in 1800s, indeed few truly understood how the single Navy shipbuilding requirement of live oak consumed a significant portion of the nations entire annual budget for a couple of YEARS, never mind the cost of lives to folks trying to gather the live oak.

Ironically, the decision to build those six frigates with live oak is praised today, indeed we attribute the nickname "Old Ironsides" in part to the live oak on USS Constitution. We have no idea what the tactical impact of speed may have on a 3000 ton Navy ship except that we know it will positively contribute to the primary mission of the LCS. Speed is just as likely to be great thing for LCS as it is to be bad thing. Only time or clairvoyant fortune telling critics will tell us for sure.