The Exception to Every Defense Budget Rule

There is a new talking point coming from military leaders, and the Navy got the memo.

The Navy's second-highest-ranking officer signaled Monday that troubled weapons programs will fall victim to the budgetary ax as the service tries to spend its money more wisely.

During a speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Adm. Jonathan Greenert, vice chief of naval operations, said the termination of inefficient or ineffective programs will be one part of the service's so-called wholeness reviews of its plans, priorities, and budgets.

If the Navy determines "we're just not going to get there" with a program, the service will kill it and redirect the funding to higher-priority items, Greenert told an audience that included several defense industry executives.

The thing is though, the application of this talking point will be quite selective. For example, the troubled Joint Strike Fighter program will continue to be funded regardless of the problems because it is too big to fail.

The possible delays were first reported by Bloomberg on Monday. It said projections based on preliminary test data indicated that development of the planes could cost as much as $5 billion more than previously estimated. That comes on top of a $2.8 billion increase in the spring, which brought the total for development alone to $50 billion.

Bloomberg said that the versions for the Air Force and the Navy could be delayed by an additional year, while the Marine Corps model, which has had the parts failures, could be delayed by two to three more years.

The problem here is the F-35 is getting more expensive by the day, and very little in terms of detail is getting out to the public. Stephen Trimble had some details worth considering at the DEW Line back in September:

Here's what we do know: LRIP-4 negotiators will have to work hard to keep the average price per aircraft on a downward trajectory.

In May 2008, Lockheed received a $2.2 billion contract to build 12 F-35s in LRIP-2, which averaged $183 million per jet excluding the engine and long-lead acquisition costs.

Fourteen months later, Lockheed received a $2.1 billion contract to build 17 F-35s in LRIP-3, or $123 million per jet with the same exclusions as above.

Now we're waiting to see the value of the LRIP-4 order for 31 or 32 aircraft.

According to Aviation Week, %20Billion-Plus%20JSF%20LRIP%204%20Talks%20Concluded">the LRIP-4 figure was around $5 billion, and they have additional information:

As of June, the Pentagon estimates the average per-unit cost to be $108.7 million, an 84% increase (averaging the price of all the conventional, carrier and short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing variants). Procurement acquisition unit cost is estimated at $132 million, an increase of 82%. Total estimated cost for development is $54.8 billion, up from $38 billion. These figures are all in Fiscal 2010 dollars, and were provided by the Pentagon.

So is Bloomberg (and now the New York Times) reporting the $54.8 figure Aviation Week reported back in September as new news, or is this $5 billion on top of the number Aviation Week reported back in September? Danger Room is reporting these costs are on top of the previously reported costs, which means the actual development cost is now approaching $60 billion? Will the real numbers please stand up?

I have no idea how many F-35s the nation will eventually get, but for over a year and half I've been saying the decision to close down the F-22 line and prioritize the F-35 line would cost more in the long run than keeping the F-22 line open a little longer and giving the Air Force their 60 F-22s. The Joint Strike Fighter is the exception to everything Secretary Gates has said about defense spending accountability, and my bet is the new Congress will remind him of exactly that come next budget cycle. With F-18s being purchased at less than $43 million each, and F-16s available at ultra low costs as well; one imagines the Air Force could have got their 60 F-22s and enough brand new F-16s to meet quantity requirements while the JSF continues being delayed.

Notes from the SASC Report

Did anyone else see section 111 - section 113 from the Senate Armed Service Committee markup?

Treatment of Littoral Combat Ship program as a major defense acquisition program (sec. 111)

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Department to manage and report on the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program as a major defense acquisition program (MDAP).

The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (Public Law 111-23) emphasizes the need to start acquisition programs on sure footing as a central mechanism by which the Department of Defense (DOD) can get control of cost growth and schedule slippage on MDAP programs. The cost and schedule reporting requirements in chapter 144 of title 10, United States Code, play a key role in ensuring that the Department and Congress are aware of emerging problems in such programs.

The Navy was able to avoid this oversight in the case of the LCS program by claiming that the program was just to build a handful of ships to test their capabilities and then see what the Navy wanted to build later. From the outset of the LCS program, however, program proponents within the Navy, including all three Chiefs of Naval Operations in office during the development of the LCS program, have invariably called this a 55-ship program. Some officials have even suggested that it might grow to be larger than that. The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 amended section 2430 of title 10, United States Code, to ensure that the Department include future program spirals in assessing whether a program should fall within the definition of a MDAP. That modification alone should cause DOD to define LCS as a MDAP, but the committee recommends this provision to remove any discretion in treating this program.

Had the Navy leadership been operating within the spirit of the title 10, United States Code, provisions regarding MDAPS, LCS would have fallen under the management and reporting requirements required for MDAPs.

No one can say that MDAP oversight would have prevented the problems of poor requirements generation, poor requirements control, poor program oversight, insufficient supervision of program execution, and abysmal cost estimating. However, when a program is expected to cost roughly $12.0 billion (even under the rosiest cost scenario), it should be subject to the requirements development, cost estimating, acquisition planning, and other requirements established in statute and regulation for the beginning of MDAP programs. Otherwise, we will have little chance of fixing such programs after they fall into trouble, and DOD will never be able to get control of its acquisition problems.

I have never really had a sense the Littoral Combat Ship program was in any trouble on Capitol Hill even when Winter was canceling ships. This doesn't really change my perception in that regard, but the language is a bit tougher than I would have expected.

Report on strategic plan for homeporting the Littoral Combat Ship (sec. 112)

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of the Navy to report on the Navy's strategic plan for homeporting the Littoral Combat Ship on the east coast and west coast of the United States.

Now this is going to be an interesting report. You can stick all 55 ships in Mayport (assuming the facilities existed to support 55 ships) and still not put the same number of people in that city as the Navy would by basing a single CVN there. BUT, concentration is going to be more important for the LCS than the frigates, because reasonable expectations would include a large number of shore support folks...

And that is going to be when crew size for the LCS goes from a naval debate to a political debate.

Procurement programs for future naval surface combatants (sec. 113)

The committee recommends a provision that would prevent the Navy from obligating any funds for building surface combatants after 2011 until the Navy conducts particular analyses, and completes certain tasks that should be required at the beginning of major defense acquisition programs (MDAP).

For at least the past couple of years, the Navy's strategy for modernizing the major surface combatants in the fleet has been in upheaval. The Navy was adamant that the next generation cruiser had to begin construction in the 2011-2012 timeframe. After 15 years of consistent, unequivocal support of the uniformed Navy for the fire support requirement, and for the DDG-1000 destroyer that was intended to meet that requirement (i.e., gun fire support for Marine Corps or Army forces ashore), the Navy leadership, in the middle of last year, decided that they should truncate the DDG-1000 destroyer program and buy DDG-51 destroyers instead.

The Defense Department has announced that the Navy will complete construction of the three DDG-1000 vessels and will build three DDG-51 destroyers, one in fiscal year 2010 and two in fiscal year 2011. Beyond that, the plan is less well defined, and includes building only a notional `future surface combatant,' with requirements, capabilities, and costs to be determined.

Notwithstanding Navy protests to the contrary, this was mainly due to the Navy's affordability concerns. The committee notes with no little irony that this sudden change of heart on the DDG-1000 program is at odds with its own consistent testimony that `stability' in the shipbuilding programs is fundamental to controlling costs and protecting the industrial base.

The Navy claims the change of heart on the DDG-1000 program was related to an emerging need for additional missile defense capability that would be provided by DDG-51s and is being requested by the combatant commanders, and would be used to protect carrier battle groups against new threats.

The committee certainly believes that the services should have the ability to change course as the long-term situation dictates. However, since we are talking about the long-term and hundreds of billions of dollars of development and production costs for MDAPs, the committee believes that the Defense Department should exercise greater rigor in making sure such course corrections are made with full understanding of the alternatives and the implications of such decisions, rather than relying on inputs from a handful of individuals. The committee has only to look at the decision-making behind the major course correction in Navy shipbuilding that yielded the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) to be concerned by that prospect.

Before deciding on a course of action regarding acquisition of surface combatants after 2011, we collectively have time to perform the due diligence that should be and must be performed at the beginning of any MDAP. That is what this section will ensure.

In addition, in order to deter any delaying action on conducting and completing the activities required by this section before 2011, the committee directs that the Secretary of the Navy obligate no more than 50 percent of the funds authorized for fiscal year 2010 in PE 24201N, CG(X), until the Navy submits a plan for implementing the requirements of this section to the congressional defense committees.

Nothing really new here, all this means is that force structure for the Navy will come out with the budget, but before the QDR. This is a lot of words that suggests the Senate sees what every one else notices, the Navy has a 2 year plan for surface combatants.

Report on a service life extension program for Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates (sec. 114)

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of the Navy to report on a potential service life extension program (SLEP) for the Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates, to include: (1) costs and schedules for a program, and shipyards capable of conducting such a program; (2) a detailed plan for achieving a 313-ship fleet; (3) the strategic plan for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) to fulfill roles and missions currently performed by Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates; (4) the strategic plan for LCS if a SLEP were performed on Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates; and (5) a description of the manner in which the Navy has been meeting the needs of United States Southern Command during the past 5 years.

Let it never be suggested that politicians care about defense dollars wasted, because there is no better waste of money than spending $300m on 30 year old ships just to get another 10 years out of them, when a new ship with a 30 year life that can perform the same function can be purchased with the same money.

That new ship is called a Coast Guard Cutter. For the same cost of adding 10 more years to 30 frigates (which btw doesn't include support for Romeo's, that would cost more), Congress could build 10 more Bertholf class high-endurance cutters that could go at least 30 years.

John Young Blasts GAO Report

Colin Clark at DoD Buzz has a good article on what he is calling John Young's Valedictory Defense in a 5 page memo (PDF) that slams the recent GAO Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.

The entire 5 page memo is interesting, and you can pick up a lot of interesting comparisons in Colin Clark's article, but what really jumped off the page for me was the way the John Young memo concluded. I've never been a fan of John Young, but I think he has a very valid point.

Let me offer one more alternative view of the data on the 96 defense acquisition programs. Eight programs (DDG-51, Future Combat Systems (FCS), JSF, V-22, C-17, Virginia Class Submarine, C-130J, and the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles) account for $220.4 billion, or 79%, of the $278 billion in DoD-measured cost growth. Six of these programs were started in or before 1996. For the DDG-51 and C-130J programs, the cost change was driven by quantity increases, accounting for $59.9 billion of the $278 billion total. In the other cases, the entire national enterprise - acquisition, requirements, budgeting and funding, and industry - performed poorly on these programs, resulting in a cost growth of $160.5 billion - a disturbing 36% over their original estimates. These programs, as well as many others on the list, have failed to deliver to their cost baselines, and this requires us to review and take corrective actions to prevent any reoccurrence. These eight programs, and the entire data set, make clear the importance of initiating programs with a solid analytical foundation, initial systems engineering, realistic cost estimates, and rational requirements. The remaining 86 programs account for a net $57.1 billion of cost growth on a base of $741.8 billion - 7.7% average cost growth.

In light of these facts, I do not think it is possile to conclude that the DoD acquisition process alone is broken. It is crystal clear that programs must be started on a solid foundation of knowledge with realistic cost estimates and requirements. I would suggest it is equally clear that many factors outside the DoD acquisition process are significant contributors to the poor performance of a number of acquisition programs, specifically the annual budgeting and funding process and the requirements process. The DoD budget is generally over-programmed, seeking to buy more programs than DoD can afford and thus underfunding all programs and preventing efficient execution.

I completely agree that there is significant room for improvement. We have implemented a wave of changes seeking to make these improvements - budgeting to independent cost estimates, questioning requirements, implementing configuration steering boards, issuing acquisition decision memorandums which fix requirements and guided contract strategies, conducting enhanced oversight, establishing program management agreements, requiring competitive prototyping, completing independent program reviews, and planning material development decisions at program initiation. Over time, these policies have the potential to improve the acquisition team's performance on defense development and procurement programs. The defense acquisition team cannot successfully control or reduce costs if requirements regularly change, budgets annually churn, independent cost estimates are ignored, quantities are constantly varied, military Service technical certification standards are excessively applied, and programs are formulated on viewgraphs in program budget reviews.

No cost growth is acceptable as any cost growth comes at the expense of the opportunity to buy additional capability for the warfighter or to lower costs for the taxpayer. However i think it is necessary to look more carefully at the highly publicized $296 billion number which has been used to condemn the defense acquisition process. This detailed review makes clear that it is unfair to characterize only the current defense acquisition process as broken based solely on the misleading and out-of-date $296 billion number cited by GAO.

I agree with everything John Young is saying, but I would like to see an independent analysis of whether what has been happening in the DoD acquisition process matches up with what is being said by John Young.

It is a very interesting counter view, and tells a smarter story than the one sensationalized by the media following the GAO report. I think ultimately, John Young's points will prevail both in the White House and in Congress regarding his assessment of defense acquisition (indeed this is a topic in virtually every defense hearing in Congress lately), and the political leaders will shift focus of oversight towards execution and realistic cost estimates leveraging independent analysis for comparisons, and not try to change to process simply for the sake of change.

While there is room for improvement, John Young is right. Requirements planning and initial estimates is where the DoD gets it wrong the most. Get those two right, and the DoD will find programs more often closer to initial budget estimates, except where Congress makes changes (which is never reflected in GAO reports, and Congressional budget process changes that increase costs are always blamed on the DoD).

Congress Taking Aim At Military Personnel Budget?

The Congressional Budget Office has issued a report laying out some alternatives to reign in the defense budget. One of their proposals is to bring back the pay gap:

Personnel expenses, he said, are a prime example. After adjusting for inflation, the average cost of an active-duty service member is 45 percent higher today than in 1998, he said. And, he added, that doesn’t even include health care costs, which have grown by an average of 7 percent annually. In the defense budget, health care costs are funded out of operation and maintenance accounts, not personnel accounts.

The Congressional Budget Office prepared some budget alternatives for Congress to deal with defense budget shortfalls. One of its options calls for capping military and federal civilian pay raises through 2015. For several years, raises approved by Congress have been 0.5 percentage point more than the average annual increase in private-sector wages. The CBO proposal would cap raises at 0.5 percentage point less than average private-sector raises, but would increase some special pays and bonuses to make up for the reduced pay.

Yikes!

DDG 1000 Program Way Ahead

John Young has been sending out several memos lately, but it was a memo dated January 26th, 2009 titled "DDG 1000 Program Way Ahead" that set the Navy community on fire today. Geoff Fein of Defense Daily (subscription only) includes several details of the memo in his article, while Chris Cavas's article in Defense News is a fountain of youth of information that really expands the memo in a dozen directions. It will take a few posts on the blog to cover the various angles Chris Cavas packed into that article. If you read Chris Cavas's article please keep to the pace of the blog and don't get ahead of the discussion, details matter and I have more than he offered in that article, and that article is loaded with good information. We'll get to it, but first lets stick to the memo.

The 6 page John Young memo is rich in content so this will not be a short analysis. I apologize to novice Navy observers whom this analysis is not intended, but hopefully I keep it simple enough you can follow what is going on. It is also important to note this memo is marked "Pre-decisional" indicating things are subject to change. I think the memo will be reflected in FY10, because quite frankly while this is an advisory memo to the Navy, it is also marching orders with an implied threat that not following the advice will lead to more work for the Navy in FY10, and FY10 planning is already cut short on time with the top-down defense review being performed by the new administration.

According to the John Young memo, in FY10 the Navy will build 1 DDG-51 followed by 2 DDG-51s in FY11, all three expected to be DDG-51 Flight IIA models. These account for the only three DDG-51s Congress has currently authorized, and these 3 new ships will be included in the Selective Acquisition Reports for 2008 resulting in a new plan to build 65 DDG-51s total.

Starting in FY12, the Navy will begin buying a brand new surface combatant in a program being called "Future Surface Combatant" (FSC). The John Young memo covered by both news articles above is specific to how to treat this new Future Surface Combatant in the FY10 budget, and describes some clever maneuvering that is about a hell of a lot more than costs (which are confusing) although costs will certainly be what the media thinks is important. In the end, cost is actually the most expected and least interesting part of John Young's memo in my opinion.

DDG-1000

The DDG-1000 is facing a Nunn-McCurdy threshold as a result of being truncated at three ships. Essentially, while the program remains the only surface combatant in the Navy shipbuilding budget on cost and schedule, potentially a model program for costing and design maturity (an amazing quark of the moment not widely known), reducing the number of DDG-1000 hulls purchased from 7 ships to 3 ships means all the R&D costs now have to be equally divided among only 3 ships. All numbers below are in millions.

This adjusts the approved Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) from $3,154.790 to $5,963.567 per ship and the Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC) from $2,323.470 to 2,941.167 per ship. Essentially, PAUC is the average cost of a DDG-1000 when adding in R&D, while APUC is the average unit cost which goes up due to fewer hulls and loss of cost savings by building more ships. The PAUC increase results in the DDG-1000 costing 89.03% more, while the APUC increase results in the DDG-1000 costing 26.58% more. All of these cost increases are a direct result of truncating the program at three ships, even though the actual cost of the two DDG-1000 paid for (and one partially paid for) hasn't actually changed. By truncating the ship number from 7 to 3 and being unable to spread out those R&D costs or generate cost savings with more ships, the DDG-1000 has a Nunn-McCurdy breach with both APUC and PAUC, which is triggered when a program goes 15% over cost.

In order to avoid a Nunn-McCurdy breach threshold for DDG-1000, John Young is advising the Navy to put the new FSC program in with the DDG-1000 program. You can see the results by clicking the image of Table 2 of the memo above. As you can see, by adding the 6 FSCs with the 3 DDG-1000s, the PAUC of the 9 ships reduces from the $5,963.567 per unit to $3,403.756 per unit while the APUC changes from $2,941.167 per unit to $2,396.286 per unit (all figures in millions). While this still represents a cost increase for the DDG-1000 program, the PAUC increase is only 7.89% and the APUC increase is only 3.13%. The net effect of the FSC being a placeholder in the DDG-1000 budget prevents a Nunn-McCurdy breach for DDG-1000, and allows the Navy to move forward without all of the Congressional problems for the Navy and the new administration a Nunn-McCurdy breach comes with. The memo requires the Navy to provide revisions to the DDG-1000 acquisition strategy to describe the procurement strategy for the FY09 DDG-1000 that was only partially paid for.

New DDG-51 Flight IIAs

The Navy told Congress on in the July 31 House Armed Services Committee hearing that instead of building 7 DDG-1000s, the Navy planned to truncate the DDG-1000 line at 2 or 3 ships, and begin building DDG-51 Flight IIA baselines instead. Congress authorized only 3 more DDG-51s beginning in FY10 pending further review of the change, and ended up partially paying for a third DDG-1000 in FY2009.

The memo comes with strings attached regarding the three new DDG-51 ships. First, the Navy must update the DDG 51 acquisition strategy and submit it to USD(AT&L) for approval to describe the procurement strategy for the FY10 and FY11 DDG 51 ships. Second, a Program Decision Memorandum III directs the Navy with OSD office of Programs, Analysis and Evaluation and AT&L to assess the cost, schedule, and feasibility of outfitting the three FY10 and FY11 DDGs with required power generation and cooling capacity to support backfit of air and missile defense radar (AMDR) enhanced BMD capability. That study must be complete by March 1st, 2009.

The AMDR backfit study is a major element of this memo. The study will require the Navy to give an exact figure how much the real costs of a new DDG-51 Flight IIA with BMD will be, a figure no one has ever been able to accurately produce to date, and because this study must be completed by March 1st, 2009, it means the figure will be known before the Navy goes up to Capitol Hill, and btw Congress will know the exact cost too.

I believe that cost for AMDR backfit is going to surprise a hell of a lot of people. While I could be wrong, I believe John Young has decided to expose a hidden Navy cost secret regarding new DDG-51s and AEGIS BMD. Anyone who wants to comment on this issue needs to be very careful, because when I read "required power generation and cooling capacity" it reads to me like there is some classified information that needs not be leaked out in this blogs comments. We all know radar systems for BMD draw a hell of lot of power, and we also know that BMD on the Flight IIAs doesn't exist today. We will just leave it at that.

Future Surface Combatant

On July 31, the Navy told the House Armed Services Committee that the Navy intended to replace the 4 remaining DDG-1000s with 8 DDG-51 Flight IIA copies, no upgrades except the addition of BMD. I noted that signaled a retreat from the littorals, and the plans leaked in this memo confirm the retreat has a new shipbuilding strategy. The John Young memo represents the first public press regarding a new surface combatant program the Navy has been working on, suggesting that sometime since July the Navy decided against 8 new DDG-51 Flight IIA copies (with BMD) and instead decided to begin studies of a new warship perhaps based on an evolved DDG-51 design or the DDG-1000 hull form. The John Young memo outlines several requirements for the Future Surface Combatant.

The memo states the Navy will build 1 FSC in FY12, 2 FSCs in FY13, 1 FSC in FY14, and 2 FSCs in FY15 for a total of 6 between FY12-FY15. The expected average cost of the FSC is estimated at $2,148.433 million per unit, only slightly more than the average unit cost of the 3 additional DDG-51s but considerably less than the average of the three DDG-1000s.

According to the memo, the Joint Staff is requested to consider tasking the Navy to provide to the Joint Staff for validation a Capabilities Development Document (CDD) or Capabilities Production Document (CPD), as appropriate, for the Future Surface Combatant. The CDD or CPD should be ready for validation by the Joint Staff not later than September 30,2009.

Additionally, a technical and capabilities-based study comparing the feasibility and multi-mission capabilities of the DDG 51 and the DDG 1000 needs to be conducted to determine the appropriate baseline for the FSC. The study should conclude and a decision should be made prior to any future decision on any new radar system development that might be envisioned for the FSC. The timeline for the radar development places the FSC baseline decision in the mid-FY 2010 timeframe. The FSC CDD or CPD defines the requirements for the FSC for this study. The FSC Baseline Study must be concluded by December 30,2009.

I see the baseline study as a major part of this memo, because it means that by December 30, 2024 the Navy must conduct a study that compares the DDG-1000 and the DDG-51 side by side without bias towards a radar system that would eventually be put on either platform. That means the Navy is being forced to conduct a platform comparison requirements study that did not happen (that anyone is aware of or has been shown) when the Navy decided to truncate the DDG-1000 in favor of the DDG-51, and despite all the "common hull" speak everyone heard at SNA, expect the DDG-51 design used in the comparison to be an evolved Flight III version because it will have to be in order to reasonably be compared to DDG-1000. I will expand on this in a later post.

The memo states the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan should reflect that FSC requires study and should not conclude an outcome. That it needs to be in the 30-year shipbuilding plan is the signal that there are more FSCs in the 30 year plan beyond the 6 discussed in the memo through FY15, another key point that I will expand with details in a later post.

Finally, once the decision on exact capabilities for the FSC ships is determined, then adjustments will be made to funding, quantities, and budget representation, as needed. Any required Nunn-McCurdy actions will be taken at the time the FSC decision is finalized. In other words, all John Young is doing is delaying the Nunn-McCurdy breach by one year to give the Navy all of 2009 to study major surface combatant acquisition, making the FY11 budget (the first real Obama budget) the point where the Navy moves ahead on major surface combatants.

People can read this however they want, I have many more thoughts I'll write down as I dig into many details not contained in this analysis specific to the John Young memo, but I get a sense this is in part John Young signaling the new administration that he is capable of acquisition reform. Regardless of what one might think about the man or the plan, this has reset the Navy to square one in shipbuilding, allowing the new administration a clean slate to work with starting in FY12, the first year the FSC would begin being purchased.

It also immediately resets all of the requirements planning and forces the Navy to go through a justification process before deciding how to spend tens of billions of SCN funds. I give John Young a lot of credit here, he has represented the new administration very well by following through on a campaign promise to grab the reigns of the Navy acquisition system, under the threat of Nunn-McCurdy on DDG-1000 no less, forcing the Navy to go back and meet the requirements planning process for major surface combatant shipbuilding. Its a small step, and it looks like a Washington budget maneuver without all the study requirements and fine print, but with all the fine print it becomes a smart step in the right direction towards fixing out of control shipbuilding requirements which have led to major cost problems.

Something Was Missing From the Conversation

I have discussed a few of the things I enjoyed about the Conversation with the Country in Durham, specifically I thought all three services presented themselves well and kept it at the appropriate level for the audience present. However, walking out of this little adventure in observation I noted something odd that didn't quite work.

Shortly before the symposium began, and when I accepted the reality I had no shot of picking EagleOne out of the crowd, I began scouting the room for where I wanted to sit. The back row of tables were reserved, so I figured I would set up shop at a table in the back near the reserved seats, giving myself an opportunity to introduce myself should I get a chance. There were 30 tables, each table supporting 6-8 seats, in a configuration 6 across and 5 tables back aligned in rows. I picked a table in the fourth row in the back corner away from the entrance. When I sat down there was only one person at the table, a very interesting man who introduced himself as Jack Taylor.

I know, I should of known who Jack was, but I didn't. He immediately gives me his card which reads Director, Military Sealift Fleet Support Command. Quietly excited, I ran a quick Google search on my blackberry as the coffee begins to kick in. At that point we started talking about the MSC.

Jack was great, skeptical as hell of some young guy being advertised as a blogger, I don't think he knew quite what to make of me. When I talked about how the Navy could use an evangelist the other day, allow me to note that the MSC already has one, because when Jack talks about the MSC this quiet part of the Navy that gets very little mention becomes this global logistical operation available on demand.

As we were talking, Jack kept going back to the service relationship between the MSC and the Navy, the civilian character of the mariners in the MSC, and the always active aspect of the MSC that gets lost in the way the Navy presents itself. The MSC is that 'other' service that is always there, indeed several times throughout the day the Navy emphasized the soft power approach with the hospital ships, and General Conway mentioned the Sea Basing operation off Liberia, but throughout the day no one ever explained the difference between the Navy and the MSC.

I thought it was an opportunity missed. As Eagleone noted, the encouraging aspect of the questions and comments from those in attendance was the reoccurring question from a business leader participant asking "What can we do to help?" The Navy's answer for that very exciting question... was absolutely terrible. Let me explain...

RADM Fred Rosa described the Coast Guard perfectly, he discussed the Coast Guard as a military service that bridges the Department of Defense with the Department of Homeland Security. Everyone in the room understands that, it was simple and comprehensive at the same time. The Navy should use the MSC in the same way by leveraging the MSC as a way to bridge the maritime services with the civilian population. For example, how many stories does Captain Bob have after a deployment to the South Pacific. Captain Bob is a maritime mariner, a civilian, and I can tell you I've enjoyed all of his stories over the last few months. Captain Bob is one of many Captains with stories from a civilian perspective that can relate to, get this, civilians!

Before the Q&A session that ended the day, what if Captain Bob took the stage for a few minutes to discuss the MSC, and told this story.

I’m going to stray from this precept of mine to share with you a comment from my last post. This came from "Nenginin" in Chuuk who posted:

"We the people of Chuuk would have to agree with you when you said your visit to Chuuk was "amazing," but in a different perspective of course. Even after your departure today, we are still amazed when we think back to what you and everyone on the PP08 team did for the people of Chuuk. All of you must have heard so many 'thank yous’ and 'kinisou chapur', but I do not think we can ever thank you ENOUGH. We are truly blessed to have been visited by angels on their big white angel boat :) The sight of the beautiful Mercy in the Chuuk Lagoon will forever live in our hearts."

Wow! "...visited by angels on their big white angel boat." Not bad!!! And just a little humbling…to say the least.

That is a soft power story worth telling. How many NGOs and private sector organizations were involved in the USNS Mercy (T-AH 19) deployment? Did the Navy fill up the Mercy or did the Mercy have any space to spare? What about the Kearsarge or Peleliu when they deployed? How much spare capacity does the Navy have that the private sector can contribute in these soft power deployments? Unless the answer is none, the Navy missed an opportunity.

Other ways the private sector can get involved includes what Eagleone suggested.

I wish the answers had been a little stronger instead of just "Write your Congressman," -- there should have been something like join the Navy League (the services should invite the local Navy League, Marine Corps League and the Coastie equivalent and introduce them), tell people to invite their Congressman to speak on maritime matters (that will keep such matters on his/her mind) and having the ability of interested people to sign up to get training to take home to their Rotary Club luncheons...

To be fair, the services did have the ROTC from the local universities there, and they were able to meet General Conway, so there was some of this. It was also a good opportunity to highlight some of the care programs for wounded Marines, you know, since we are a nation at war. If you don't know of a good private organization to recommend, allow me to recommend a great one. Then, after the Navy has given out as many options as possible, the 'write your Congressman' option can be given as the final fallback position for citizen action.

I thought that was a missed opportunity, but it doesn't need to be. The Military Sealift Command, specifically because of its civilian culture, is a perfect vehicle to transition the conversation from the service to the civilians towards the purpose of encouraging private citizen action. Maybe next time.

The Other Arsenal Ship Dream Has Died

The Taxpayers for Common Sense website has a spreadsheet available for download here that lists all the earmarks included in the FY09 Defense Spending Bills, both House and Senate.

We love these types of lists, because we like to know which defense project is the "baby" of which politician. As veterans readers of this blog know, there is one specific earmark we always check to see whether it is listed, and sure enough, line 242 in the spreadsheet notes the floating earmark shall return to sea for only $10,000,000 more taxpayer dollars following the FY08 $21 million repair bill after rough seas ripped a hole in the hull using the ships own anchor.

If one considers the return to action by Duncan Hunter's Navy the good news, we must also pass on the bad news. The once hyped 'affordable cruise missile' did not get its earmark this year, and has finally, officially died. We sympathize with those whose dreams of a 950 ton arsenal ship with hundreds of "affordable cruise missiles" has come crashing down, but apparently someone thought it was wise not to build a ship where the weapon payload would cost just as much (if not more) as the ship itself.

Is there a future for Duncan Hunter's Navy? Depends. Would something 'like' Sea Fighter (FSF 1) be a good replacement for the Cyclone class PCs? It is nearly three times the displacement, so maybe not.

Because if we are being honest, if there is one shipbuilding program we would get excited about, it isn't the SC-21 nightmare, it would be a Cyclone replacement program. At least that ship has a clear mission purpose, and plenty of places in need of that purpose.

While we don't advocate for Duncan Hunter's Navy (clearly), we don't dismiss it either. In particular, if this thing ever gets in the hands of someone creative at SOUTHCOM, you never know...

The Global Military Condition

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has released its annual yearbook for 2008, a collection of statistics and studies of global military activity. The Yearbook summery, which gives all the relevant statistics worth a look can be downloaded here. While there is plenty of information, the highlight we noted in particular is for military expenditures. First the global expenditures:

World military expenditure is estimated to have been $1339 billion in 2007—a real-terms increase of 6 per cent over 2006 and of 45 per cent since 1998. This corresponded to 2.5 per cent of world gross domestic product (GDP) and $202 for each person in the world.

The subregion with the highest increase in military expenditure over the 10-year period 1998-2007 was Eastern Europe, at 162 per cent. It was also the region with the highest increase in 2007, at 15 per cent. Russia, with a 13 per cent increase in 2007, accounted for 86 per cent of this regional increase.

And the focus on the United States:

The USA’s military spending accounted for 45 per cent of the world total in 2007, followed by the UK, China, France and Japan, with 4-5 per cent each. Since 2001 US military expenditure has increased by 59 per cent in real terms, principally because of massive spending on military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also because of increases in the ‘base’ defence budget. By 2007, US spending was higher than at any time since World War II. However, because of the growth of the US economy and of total US Government spending, the economic and financial burden of military spending (i.e. its share of GDP and of total US Government outlays) is lower now than during previous peak spending years in the post-World War II period.

Some perspective. The GDP of the United States is 4.25x that of China, 5x that of the UK, and 5.5x more than France. Comparing the GDP of the US and China, the difference is around 10 trillion dollars annually.

Click the image to view the top 15 listed in order according to annual military expenditures.

The Stone Age Approach to Networking

The "Conversation with the Country" continues, in Portland. I really want to attend one of these instead of always getting footnotes. This is a very Mahan approach to strategy, which unfortunately I can't seem to find in the download section of the Maritime Strategy section on the Navy's website.

Linking the past with the future, Dr. Karl F. Walling, professor in the department of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College, began the discussion of future strategic possibilities by presenting a "Backward Look at Forward-Thinking Strategies." Walling discussed historical approaches to maritime decision-making and highlighted fundamental issues faced by the country's forefathers.

"We look to history to see the present and future more clearly and find that it is normal and proper to have these conversations, as these are the same conversations previously had by former leaders," he said. "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower" emphasizes core capabilities from previous strategies - forward presence, deterrence, sea control and power projection - in addition to two maritime strengths that have been newly elevated to core capabilities - maritime security and humanitarian assistance/disaster response.

That sounds fantastic, context for strategy, bravo! Where can I download that podcast, or youtube, or how about a PDF? Can someone explain why the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard are actively rejecting the internet as a communication tool? Given the number of Congressional staffers reading blogs daily, that's just dumb.

Too bad the context for strategy is limited to only the several dozen in a certain city. Most active duty officers I know haven't seen this presentation as part of the Maritime Strategy that they are being asked to execute.

Implementation of this strategy will require that the sea services demonstrate flexibility, adaptability and unity of effort in evolving to meet the enduring and emerging challenges and opportunities ahead. At the end of the conversation, Marine Corps Brig. Gen. Robert D. Papak, director, Joint Capabilities Assessment and Integration Directorate, challenged the audience to continue the conversation about maritime strategy with others.

Marinelink is clearly doing an editorial bit here, we guess to sell the story, not exactly a good day for journalism. Adaptable and flexible requirements? I totally agree, but where is it? Deepwater, DDG-1000, LCS, Increase Manning for the Marines, Sea Basing; all of this existed before the strategy and still exists afterwards, so where is the change?

Are we honestly supposed to believe that "Conversations with the Country" is the best approach all three services could come up with in communicating the maritime strategy? In the 21st century, this is the joint services best foot forward for networking ideas with the public? Is there an Admiral or General who would kindly claim that out loud in front of Congress? I think it would be hard for that Admiral or General to keep their job if they actually claimed to Congress these in person conversations are the best approach to reaching the American people, because the media would crucify that person for advocating a strategy for the 21st century while executing a communication strategy that utilizes the best practices of the era prior to the telegraph.

Apparently the joint services find incredible value selling the new maritime strategy to "Rotary International" and the "Portland World Affairs Council" (not a joke, read the story!). I'm not really sure what this story says to most veterans, who like the rest of us use http, but it was a 26 year navy veteran from my lodge who emailed me this story (that's smtp for those in the Navy over the age of 50), and his opinion was not family friendly. Am I being sarcastic and condescending? Hell yes, and it is a direct reflection of the opinions in my inbox.

A Strategy That Fails To Convince

Effective transformation requires that organizations address four specific considerations: the geostrategic setting (the context for transformation), the ends (the purpose of the organization), the ways (the methods that the organization uses to achieve those ends), and the means (the resources used to accomplish the ways). This approach of “context, ends, ways, means” provides a holistic, coherent approach to transforming an organization; without it, an organization does not truly transform.

The context provides the purpose for undergoing transformation. It could be the geostrategic setting or perhaps an emerging technology or method that demands dramatic, innovative change. For the United States, the context of the geostrategic setting changed dramatically in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent downfall of the Soviet Union. Today we still grapple with the impact of those changes—and the world keeps changing while we contemplate the end of the Cold War. Regardless of whether one believes that the world is shaped according to the “core” and the “gap,” as does Barnett, or by a “clash of civilizations,” as does Samuel Huntington, or the myriad other ways of depicting the world, we do not have a bipolar world on the edge of a superpower confrontation—at least not today. Since the world has changed dramatically, the military must do so as well or become irrelevant.

Organizations generally don’t have the luxury of setting the strategic context, but they do have a choice in their reaction to contextual change. Once the context is determined, three approaches—one of which is transformation—address the changing needs of large, complex organizations (similar to changes in the business world). The approaches, which deal with the ends (purpose or product), ways (methods), or means (technology and resources), include transforming the organization’s purpose (focusing on ends), reengineering its methods (focusing on ways), or downsizing or “rightsizing” its technology and resources (focusing on means).

Military Transformation: Ends, Ways, and Means, Dr. Jack D. Kem, Colonel, USA, Retired

In the time of Rumsfeld, the use of the word transformation was often substituted for the word strategy, as they were seen interchangeable by those who believed in transformation. The new Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower failed to mention the word transformation, even once, highlighting a way ahead that substitutes strategy for transformation, as it should be. However, in evaluation of the Navy's maritime strategy we observe it is incomplete, as it only truly forms part of a strategy. The Maritime Strategists within the Navy attempt to reject this criticism, which we continue to find strange as I have recently observed they admit as much themselves.

From the release of the Maritime Strategy we observed an overwhelming rejection of it. First it was the blogosphere led by CDR Salamander, he did what needed to be done, used the proverbial scissors that cut away the fat and left only the substance. CDR called it 6-6-3, and the name stuck. The Navy then took their strategy on the road, a "Conversation With the Country" they call it, and to describe the reception to date as lukewarm is to be polite.

On this road show the 3 services introduce the strategy, explain it, and find few believers among the audience. In introduction of these conversations the presenter begins by highlighting the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower is but only 1/3 of the total strategy, with the classified NSP and CONOP (NOC) forming a trilogy that makes up the whole of the Maritime Strategy. This follows a predictable pattern the Navy should have been prepared for.

When the Maritime Strategy was introduced to the internet masses, it was quickly labeled an incomplete strategy, and naturally the Navy didn't like it. This process was repeated with Congress who called it a "really slick brochure". The Navy has since introduced their document as only 1/3 of the strategy in its conversations in person which has also been received less than favorably, after which we observe the Navy defending themselves because no one believes in their work as a strategy. Among the few impressed by the strategy is Kaplan, who calls it a “strategy of elegant decline". Ouch.

We believe it is time to look at the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower for what it is, an incomplete strategy that consists of a "Strategy of the Ends" (purpose or product), a "Strategy of the Ways" (methods), with a "set of priorities" as guidance for executing the strategy. We believe this is accurate, because as everyone, particularly Congress, has observed the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower is absent a "Strategy of the Means", a strategy that outlines a fleet; and that is one of several problems that reduces the value of the document as a strategy.

Building upon the outline of the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower we observe the "Strategy of the Ends" to include six purposes; Limit regional conflict with forward deployed, decisive maritime power; Deter major power war; Win our Nation's wars; Contribute to homeland defense in depth; Foster and sustain cooperative relationships with more international partners; and Prevent or contain local disruptions before they impact the global system as explained. We observe these ends to be excellent within the context of strategy, but alone they do not constitute a strategy.

We then observe the "Strategy of the Ways" to be six methods; Forward Presence; Deterrence; Sea Control; Power Projection; Maritime Security; and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response as explained. Again, we observe these to be excellent methods to be applied in the pursuit of a comprehensive strategy, but alone they do not constitute a strategy.

Finally we observe the three guiding priorities to be Improve Integration and Interoperability, Enhance Awareness, and Prepare our People as explained. We support the Navy in identifying the priorities that will help execute the maritime strategy, but it is important to point out, alone, or in combination with the ends and means above, this does not constitute a strategy.

Within this context we observe the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower to be an incomplete strategy, one that leaves a reader looking for a Strategy of the Means. The people, like Congress, want to discuss that aspect of a maritime strategy, and most importantly, they want that aspect of the new maritime strategy to match the ends and ways as laid out as 6-6-3.

Does the 313-Ship Plan do that? Are there any defenders of the 313-ship plan who believe it aligns itself with the strategy produced? If the Navy polled an audience that question at one of these "Conversations with the Country", what percentage of the audience would believe the 313-ship plan aligns itself with the strategy? I'd bet money the percentage would be very low, because the community of this blog is a good sample of those who would make up that audience and supporters for the 313-ship plan are few indeed.

We suggest few believe that the 313-ship plan for the future constitution of the fleet aligns with the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. We believe the defenders of the 313-ship plan do it solely for the sake of preventing further shipbuilding inflation. We believe the desire by the Navy to bring stability to the shipbuilding industry is driving the process for retaining annual shipbuilding orders under the 313-ship plan, and yet it is the lack of orders for more ships within the 313-ship plan that is reducing the shipbuilding capacity of the nation. We also note the annual shipbuilding plan changes in Congress anyway, so the Navy desire for stability appears to be a false hope.

Many who want to connect with the strategy saw the focused, directed, stated 1986 Maritime Strategy as the American way, because it stated and confronted the challenges facing our nation. Many have asked how the Navy can so clearly define the ends (purpose) and ways (method) if they can't even clearly and specifically define the challenges (name thy evil). In that way, it is often noted that the lack of clear definition for challenges gives the Navy flexibility to shape the “means” any way they see fit. As long as the Navy can define the threats and challenges in secret or on demand, the Navy can define the means in public any way they want without defending their position based on strategy.

In this way, it is easy for the Navy to say the 313-ship plan meets the challenges of the Maritime Strategy. It is why we will soon have the DDG-1000 ready for action to meet the challenges of the 21st century, you know, the challenges that aren't identified in the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.

As a stockholder in the Navy, I believe it is time the Navy starts talking about the “Strategy of the Means” that aligns itself with the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower in a way stockholders, also known as taxpayers, can believe in. In a few weeks the Navy will to sit down in front of Congress and talk about the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, and we do not expect that process to go well for the Navy.

Congress has expectations of the Navy, they desire a “Strategy of the Means” to define the requirements of the Navy shaped in strategy that guides Congress in the process to fund new ships. Because the “Strategy of the Means” is absent in the Maritime Strategy, the ends and ways as represented by 6-6-3 will mean little to Congress, and has meant little to date. There is a division of labor here, and the Navy is going to have to step up if it wants to sell its strategy. Until the Navy produces a “Strategy of the Means,” Congress will not be interested in the ends and ways outlined in the Navy's maritime strategy, which allows Congress to do its own thing with shipbuilding money again, as should be expected when there us no public intellectual basis they are beholden to by the stockholders (voters).

Over the coming days and weeks we intend to explore the Maritime Strategy further, and utilize Julian Corbett’s chapter on the Theory of the Means in terms of fleet constitution to reinforce why a “Strategy of the Means” needs to be produced to tackle the challenges of the 21st century. We outright reject that strategies for fleets need to be classified, it argues in the face of over 200 years of open government. One would imagine with all the DoD emphasis of "Sea Enterprise" and application of business practices, the Navy would have learned about business communication strategies for stockholders. The stockholders need to believe they are getting a return on investment if the business is it to retain the investment. The Navy's stockholders are taxpayers, also known as voters, and as things stand today, taxpayers do not have the information necessary to advocate for further investment in a time of competing interests for national defense investments.

Some might say I'm being harsh; the crew thinks so. I plead guilty, however I am also aware of some very well written intellectual contributions soon to be released in the open source which raises excellent questions of the new Maritime Strategy, so this discussion isn't going away, in fact it will soon get much louder, and much smarter.

Bush Subsidizes Iran Nuke Program, Congress Subsidizes Nuke Submarines

Back in November we pointed out that the US appears to have lost control of its nuclear policy in relation to Russia. We highlighted that the United States will spend $448M in the FY08 budget on dismantling Russian nuclear weapons, which is a good cause, but by paying for the dismantling it is allowing Russia to spend 10 billion Rubbles, or roughly $411M on new Borei Class ballistic missile nuclear submarines this year.

In other words, while we pay to clean up the nuclear mess left over from the last cold war, we are removing that responsibility from the Russian government, who in turn is building a new round of nuclear weapons. We recommended it was time to take a closer look at the "Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program," which we agree has been very effective in the past, but appears to have run its coarse.

Now we are getting word the Dept of Energy is subsidizing two Russian nuclear institutes involved in the Iranian nuclear program. From the International Herald Tribune:

The U.S. Energy Department is subsidizing two Russian nuclear institutes that are building key parts of a reactor in Iran that the United States spent years trying to stop, according to a House committee.

The institutes, both in Nizhny Novgorod, gave U.S. officials sales presentations describing their capabilities, and listing the Bushehr reactor, which Russia has agreed to fuel, as one of their projects. One institute is providing control systems, including control room equipment, and the other is providing hundreds of pumps and ventilation fans.

The Energy Department is subsidizing the institutes under the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, a program set up after the collapse of the Soviet Union to prevent newly impoverished scientists and their institutions from selling their expertise to states that might be developing nuclear weapons. The United States supplements the salaries of scientists, and pays overhead at those institutes, among others.

These reactions are justified, but intellectually bankrupt for reasons to be explained.

"What policy logic justifies DOE funding Russian institutes which are providing nuclear technology to Iran?" the letter asked, referring to the acronym for the Department of Energy. "How does this advance our nonproliferation goals?"

...

In a statement, Dingell, a Democrat of Michigan, said "only this administration would complain about proliferation in Iran, as part of President Bush's axis of evil, and then finance it with American taxpayer dollars." Stupak called it "schizophrenic foreign policy."

These guys are absolutely right, this needs to stop yesterday, but while they are at it Congress needs to look at the whole issue. Congress is doing just as bad (if not far worse) with Russia in regards to the "Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program" because they are basically removing the responsibility of nuclear weapons from a country already with nuclear weapons. yes, the same country that spent 40+ years in a nuclear weapon showdown against us. Congress can make a fuss about the Presidents $1.5M all day, but it it sounds pretty damn hollow to me when they are spending $448M in FY08 on WMD disposal in Russia at the same time Russia is spending about the same amount this year to build new SSBNs.

Clever bashing of Bush may win a political popularity contest, but it is infinitely absent any wisdom considering Congress is indirectly subsidizing a new ballistic missile submarine fleet for Russia.

Dog and Pony Shows

I guess I'm not political enough, I hadn't even heard of the whole Rush Limbaugh episode until today, and even then it took about 5 minutes to realize it was a dog and pony show. I guess I don't watch enough TV, but the media would have to omit major sections of this story to sound credible in support of the Democrat efforts. The guy was convicted of being phony, what else is there to say? I'm not a Rush fan, but anyone dense enough to buy what is being said about him on this issue is a drone.

But why the distraction?

Because the Senate passed the 2008 Defense Bill by a vote of 92-3 very quietly late on Monday, and only 17 news articles were listed in Google as of 24 hours later. Make enough noise, cause enough distraction, and nobody will notice I guess. Either the left in the US is truly stupid, or the Democrats think they are and can treat them like they are stupid without consequence. Regardless, the only thing all this noise does is improve the credibility of Limbaugh and validate claims the Left still aren't serious players in any aspect of the Iraq discussion, and have to resort to circus over substance.

The final tally: $648 billion. I'll cover details once it becomes law, which is after committee and a presidential signature. If things stay as they are, this could end up the best defense budget for the Navy to date in the Bush administration, in my opinion anyway... more later.

Naval Programs: June 2007 Selected Acquisition Report

SAR Program Acquisition Cost Summary
(Dollars As Of Date: June 30, 2024 in Millions)
Weapon System	Base Year	Current Cost Estimates
NAVY :		Base Year $	Then Year $	Quantity
ADS	05	575.6	528.8
AGM-88E (AARGM)	03	1,415.50	1,691.30	1,919
AIM-9X	97	2,644.90	3,388.00	10,142
CEC	02	4,149.90	4,448.70	271
CH-53K (HLR)	06	15,075.30		156
COBRA JUDY	03	1,360.60	1,520.50	1
CVN 21	00	25,260.60	35,028.70	3
CVN 68	95	5,286.70	6,240.20	1
DDG 1000 (DD(X))	05	30,566.40	36,022.10	10
DDG 51	87	46,495.90	62,752.90	62
E-2D AHE	02	13,366.20	17,487.00	75
EA-18G	04	7,306.20	8,368.00	80
EFV	07	13,188.40	15,972.10	593
ERM	05	1,242.70	1,478.00	15,100
F/A-18E/F	00	43,396.60	46,388.80	494
H-l UPGRADES	96	6,694.50	8,706.50	284
JSOW	90	3,253.10	4,611.90	10,334
LCS (RDT&E)	04	1,791.80	1,938.90	2
LHA REPLACEMENT		163.7	3,280.90	1
LPD 17	96	11,103.40	13,594.00	9
MH-60R	06	10,852.60	11,701.70	254
MH-60S	98	6,538.00	7,909.60	267
MUOS	04	5,385.90	6,372.90	6
NMT	02	1,718.00	2,133.80	333
P-8A (MMA)	04	25,864.60	32,672.60	114
RMS	06	1,298.20	1,411.70	108
SM-6	04	4,660.50	5,957.70	1,200
SSDS MK 2 P3I	04	559.3	674.4	42
SSGN (OHIO CLASS)	02	3,857.30	4,095.20	4
SSN 774 (VA CLASS	95	64,586.70	93,008.20	30
T-45TS	95	6,732.90	6,825.60	225
T-AKE	00	3,856.50	4,628.80	11
TACTICAL TOMAHAWK	99	3,819.00	4,539.40	3,536
TRIDENT I I MSL	83	26,425.40	38,901.90	561
V-22	05	50,610.50	54,636.80	458
VH-71	03	5,252.70	6,144.80	28
VTUAV	06	1,860.00	2,100.60	177

Source: DefenseLink

Statistics can make one a liar, but it is interesting nonetheless.

Combined the Navy and Marine Corps are currently acquiring an estimated $576,053,400 in major programs. Follow the link for information on the other services.