Expanding A2/AD: Is it Time to Start Worrying about the Eastern Mediterranean?

Note from Jon Solomon: My Systems Planning and Analysis colleague Jonathan Altman has long been interested in the Mahanian aspects of Russia’s foreign policy initiatives in the Eastern Mediterranean. Overshadowed by the ongoing Russian ground intervention in Ukraine or the headline-grabbing bomber sorties into the North Atlantic and Arctic, Russia’s cultivation of “places” and potential bases for its forces in that region over the past few years simply has not received much public attention from the security studies community. This needs to change, as the Mediterranean not only remains central to U.S. and European defense strategies, but is also a vital market as well as thoroughfare for Western economies. Jonathan has generously taken the time to outline his thoughts below on this overlooked topic.

Much has been written about the challenges posed by the Chinese adoption of what the U.S. military calls “A2/AD” (anti access area denial) in the Western Pacific. Accordingly, the Pacific remains a key focus area for both the U.S. Navy and Air Force, with the Navy promising to put 60% of its forces in that theater as part of the so-called “Pacific pivot.” Yet as focus remains on PACOM, the rest of the world is not standing still. This is exemplified in the Eastern Mediterranean, as the Russians have already begun laying the seeds to create an A2/AD zone in the region against the U.S. and its allies. If fully realized, an A2/AD envelope could put Western access to the Suez Canal, the Black Sea and the resource-rich Eastern Mediterranean at the mercy of Vladimir Putin.

There are three interrelated elements that make the development of an A2/AD zone in the Eastern Mediterranean possible for the Russians. The first of these is the prospect of a credible military presence, which in this case would most likely be provided by forward deployments from the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Armed with three (six by 2016) new enhanced Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines, 11,000 marines and a surface flotilla of 42 ships[1] as of last year, the Russian Black Sea Fleet is probably the most capable maritime force in the region. By contrast, the U.S. Sixth Fleet has a single command ship and four DDGs that will be permanently assigned to it from 2015 onward (though those DDGs are based on the other end of the Mediterranean in Spain), with only occasional rotational presence from ships passing through its area of regard on the way to or back from the Middle East. Though the U.S. does have allies in the region with credible maritime combat power, the Russians are working to drive wedges into these relationships; which not coincidentally is the second pillar of regional Russian strategy.

The Russian effort to decouple longstanding allies such as Turkey, Greece, and Egypt from political and military alignment with the U.S. is helped by policy choices the U.S. has made, as well as favorable circumstances the Russians can exploit. In the case of Greece, the formation of a coalition government by far-left and right wing parties that are deeply resentful of the European Union (and its American allies), committed to breaking out of the fiscal austerity “straitjacket” imposed as terms for European Union loans, and ideologically aligned with Russian “Eurasianist” geopolitical theory has opened new opportunities for extending Russian influence. The Russians have waded into this fray, supporting the Greek government politically and entertaining the possibility of assisting Greece with its debt issues. Greco-Russian relations have unsurprisingly warmed considerably. In the case of Turkey, Russia has taken advantage of a decade-long trend by the Erdogan government away from democracy toward authoritarianism. As the West has criticized Erdogan for imprisoning journalists, fabricating charges against political opponents, and repressing civil dissent, the Russians have remained supportive to the point that Erdogan is now praising Putin directly. The other Russian charm offensive in the region has been focused on Egypt. Faced with a virulent insurgency in the Sinai, and a U.S. Administration that until recently was withholding military aid as punishment for the suspension of democracy, Egypt's repressive military junta has instead turned towards the Russians for military equipment procurement for the first time since the mid-Cold War. The sum total of these actions is to cultivate Russian goodwill with three countries that control chokepoint access to and freedom of maneuver within the Eastern Mediterranean, not to mention use of the Eastern Mediterranean to access the Black and Red Seas. Neutrality by these countries in the event of a Russian-American crisis or conflict could be devastating to U.S. strategy.

With access for their credible maritime combat power vastly improved, the final aspect of Russian regional strategy is to secure and expand basing agreements. Limited by geography, the Russians have no port on the Mediterranean; anything they want to put in the region would likely come via the Black Sea (though assets could be deployed from there other fleets as well assuming they could pass through Gibraltar or Suez). Even though Turkey may be friendly with Russia now, basing agreements hedge against a risk of change in the political winds that could bottle the Black Sea Fleet up. Additionally, as Admiral Greenert states again and again, forward basing allows a Navy to keep more assets in theater, multiplying the impact of a smaller force. Russia's only base outside of the former Soviet Union is in Tartus, Syria, which of course is in the Eastern Mediterranean. Recently the Cypriots, long prone to Russian sympathies, agreed to an expansion of Russian port calls and even potentially an air base, giving the Russians an additional strategic location to use in the region. Current deployment of land based Russian-supplied Yakhont anti-ship cruise missiles in Syria provides an additional boon to the area denial aspect of their approach, which could be augmented by further sales or deployments of Russian forces equipped with ASCMs to friendly countries.

According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, the presence of Yakhont ASCMs in Syria alone has been enough to create a surface naval A2/AD zone in the northeastern corner of the Mediterranean. Furthermore, rolling the three Russian thrusts together, it becomes clear how an expanded Eastern Mediterranean A2/AD envelope could be enacted in the very near future. As Mahan famously wrote, the land features of a region can play a large role in determining maritime influence and access. For example, consider the military implications of a Russian deployment of advanced long-range SAMs alongside its existing Yakhonts in Syria, or perhaps a deployment of those SAMs in notional locations in Cyprus. Much has been written about the capabilities of Russian “triple digit” SAMs (in service S-300s and S-400s and the developmental S-500). S-500s will have up to a 600 km anti-air range according to some Russian sources - enough to blanket the region from Crete east assuming they are based in Cyprus (the same sources cite S-400 range at 400km and newer S-300 variants at a more modest 200km). The Russians may also seek to adapt these systems to enable integration aboard surface ships beyond the existing S-300F integration in Russian cruisers; further increasing deployment flexibility. A Russian deployment of Kilo-class submarines to the region would insert a further threat into the undersea domain at a time when more advanced but already overtasked U.S. nuclear submarines continue to decline in force structure. The degree to which U.S. and allied surface and air access in the Eastern Mediterranean would be imperiled by any single one of these potentialities, and especially by combinations of them, should be clear.

Fortunately there are options available to mitigate the risks of such an outcome. Beyond political, economic and diplomatic solutions, of which there are a great many possibilities, there are three broad Navy-focused options that could be pursued. The first of these, and the least desirable, would be transferring forces from other theaters to increase our capability in the Eastern Mediterranean. The issues in the Eastern Mediterranean are fundamentally a symptom of a U.S. Navy that is undersized for the global tasks assigned it and a NATO maritime force that no longer provides sufficient deterrent effect. To redeploy existing U.S. forces to the Mediterranean would simply exacerbate these symptoms in another part of the world. The second option, which is from a navalist's perspective the most desirable but simultaneously the most politically challenging, is to grow the size of the U.S. Navy. During the Cold War, carrier and amphibious group deployments to the Eastern Mediterranean were routine and kept the Soviet fleet in check. By contrast, the Navy’s current supply of day to day deterrence through credible combat power and presence is far outstripped by demand the world over.

Acknowledging this issue, and taking the fiscal policy conflict between Congress and the Administration into account, reinvigorating NATO Standing Maritime Groups may be the quickest and most feasible way to push back on the Russian A2/AD threat. Currently NATO operates two Standing Maritime Groups, though between them both only seven ships are combatants (and three of those were recently augmented above normal force structure). Given that no allied submarines and only a handful of helicopters exist within both combined groups, this force is highly vulnerable to Russian submarine attack or coercion. This could be addressed by augmenting the standing group assigned to the Mediterranean with allied undersea forces. Furthermore, with the allocation of dedicated land-based air power and additional surface combatants, NATO maritime forces’ credibility in the region would be greatly increased. To be maximally effective, this Standing Group should field electronic warfare capabilities and be trained to employ counter-surveillance techniques that can together defeat the over-the-horizon targeting systems supporting the Syria-based Yakhonts. Additionally, Standing Groups have the deterrent benefit of tying nations together as an attack on the group would affect at least a half-dozen different countries. To add further effect, NATO leadership should work to ensure Greek and Turkish participation (though perhaps not concurrently for historical reasons) in the Mediterranean Standing Group and cycle it through the Eastern Mediterranean regularly.

Whatever course of action the U.S. and NATO ultimately pursue, it is important for policymakers and strategists alike to recognize the gross implications of a Russian A2/AD envelope in the Eastern Mediterranean. Such an envelope would present grave challenges to U.S. influence in the region, and would imperil the free flow of commerce that is essential to U.S. (and global) prosperity.

Jonathan Altman is a Program Analyst with Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc. who holds a Master’s Degree in International Security from the Korbel School at the University of Denver. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis Inc., and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.

---

[1] Though not all of these ships can be assumed to be self-deployable. Counting only principal combatants and amphibious ships, the Black Sea Fleet has 14 self-deployable ships; though it should be assumed that any deployment of these ships would be accompanied by some number of smaller combatants (missile boats or patrol craft), of which the Black Sea Fleet has 19.

On Syria and Turkey

The Arab League is starting to look west as they struggle to influence Assad in Syria, which means the world appears to be moving in the direction of escalation. I do not see military intervention in Syria in the short term, but do not dismiss it as a long term possibility.

One aspect of the Arab uprisings of 2011 that has caught my attention is the genuine interest by nations in the Arab world to attempt to take some responsibility for political problems within that region by leveraging the frameworks of established international institutions like the Arab League, United Nations, and in the case of Libya - NATO. I don't want to overstate that as an important event, even if it is important; because it is a relatively new development for a region that last century largely conducted foreign policy with leaders standing at a podium shouting threats and waving a gun.

Even a nuanced political change is change.

While I'll agree we are observing very weak data points, collective political action by regional partners through established institutions like the Arab League (and even African Union in Somalia to some extent) does suggest that international institutions are showing signs of gaining some strength in addressing some types of international political problems, even if the process is still incredibly ugly to watch and the success of action through those institutions is still yet to be determined.

The latest news regarding the Syrian uprising is that the Arab League is reaching out the UK and France for some guidance and leadership on ways to move forward effectively. What caught my attention was a Reuters report that some folks associated with Syrian politics believe that a Turkish military intervention would be received well in Syria. Part of me thinks this comes from the Middle Eastern School of Dick Chaney Diplomacy or perhaps even a Middle Eastern version of Sun Tzu that looks to others to do the dirty work, but I don't have the expertise and understanding regarding the internal politics of Syria to know if this is legitimate or not. Either way, it is worth consideration... here is the Reuters report:

A leader of Syria's outlawed Muslim Brotherhood said on Thursday the Syrian people would accept military intervention by Turkey, rather than Western countries, to protect them from President Bashar al-Assad's security forces.

Mohammad Riad Shaqfa, who lives in exile in Saudi Arabia, told a news conference in Istanbul the international community should isolate Assad's government to encourage people in their struggle to end more than four decades of Assad family rule.

Hundreds of people have been killed this month, one of the bloodiest periods in the revolt that began in March. The United Nations says more than 3,500 people have died in the unrest.

If Assad's government refused to halt its repression, Shaqfa said Turkish intervention would be acceptable.

I understand a lot of folks get immediately skeptical when they read "Muslim Brotherhood," but it is a fact of life that the Muslim Brotherhood is a political entity in the Middle East and North Africa that will have to be dealt with by the US directly on a diplomatic and political level for years to come - and all indications are that will be especially true for Egypt. While there are obviously differences, the Muslim Brotherhood of 2011 reminds me of the Ba'ath Party rise in the 60s. I have a feeling the US will take a similar political approach with the Muslim Brotherhood as we did with the Ba'ath Party - we don't like them, we don't trust them, and we'll find a way to work with them anyway.

Commentators and opinionators in the US seem to believe the US has full control over whether military action takes place against Syria. This New York Times Op-Ed, for example, contemplates military action against Syria and encourages the US to avoid military intervention. It is an interesting Op-Ed, but it reads like a political narrative from the first decade of the 21st century, not a narrative compatible with the adjustments guiding use of military power in the second decade of the 21st century. When discussing Syria and military intervention, there is only one key player who will decide when military intervention is necessary in Syria, and it isn't the United States, UK, or France - military action related to Syria begins and ends in Ankara.

For all the talk that trouble might break out between Turkey and Israel or Turkey and Greece or Turkey and Cyprus; for example, how flotilla's from Turkey might create an international political incident with Israel or how energy competition between Turkey and Cyprus could spark a conflict; all that heat has led to exactly zero smoke. Today, Turkey remains a strong ally of the US and one of our most important partners in the region. The news the US intends to set up BMD capabilities in Turkey suggests the political relationship between the US and Turkey is still being looked at in the context of long term commitments, not in the context of short term adjustments.

Because the relationship between the US and Turkey is and will remain strong long term, one question we should be asking is what happens when Turkey reaches a red line with Syria and Assad? It is still very possible that Turkey will approach NATO and say - this emerging Syrian civil war issue is a legitimate threat and we want NATO to help us intervene. Events in Syria could easily unfold in ways very similar to how events unfolded in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and if you recall, Bosnia and Herzegovina evolved from a UN political intervention into a NATO military intervention. With the Arab League and Turkey, it isn't impossible to see a similar scenario unfold regarding Syria.

As both France and the UK get more involved behind the scenes in helping the Syrian opposition movement, and as Turkey becomes more frustrated with the current Syrian government, a lot is yet to happen. While first steps in Syria do not appear to be military in nature, the militarization of policy can unfold over time, and events can unfold in predictable and unpredictable ways that can expedite the militarization of policy. One possible scenario that could emerge from the political fog is a limited Turkish led NATO military mission to deal with Syria, and that potential scenario alone suggests the US cannot rule out supporting military activities related to unfolding events in Syria. Calling for US military restraint is wise, but recognizing the potential for legitimate US support for military intervention in Syria is also wise.

I do not necessarily see Syria unfolding towards military intervention, but I also do not believe we have seen the last domino fall as it relates to the political uprisings that began earlier this year in the Middle East and North Africa. I also do not believe we have seen the last military intervention as a result of the ongoing unrest in the region.

The uprisings in Syria are starting to get more attention politically, and that uprising isn't going away anytime soon. Sanctions and other international pressures will only increase the stakes for the Assad government, which suggests to me the situation is approaching a policy change moment for the United States who in the words of some will assert power through the "lead" from behind model. Whether it's lead from behind or lead as part of a front, US leadership on the issue appears to be inevitable - but the US will "lead" only after Turkey asks us to.

The Eastern Mediterranean Sea is Starting to Get Crowded

As regional powers attempt to rise, other regional powers will react. This is particularly true in this era of globalization. Turkey is now riding a learning curve. Here is how the latest is unfolding.

Turkey warned Thursday it will declare a border on the continental shelf if the island of Cyprus proceeds with offshore oil and gas drilling activities.

The Foreign Ministry's announcement came a day after Cyprus President Dimitris Christofias announced that U.S. firm Noble Energy will soon begin exploratory drilling to confirm deposits beneath the sea bed off Cyprus' southern coast despite Turkey's attempts to prevent such a move.

The undersea boundary has been among the most contentious issues in Greek-Turkish relations, with each country trying to mark out where on the continental shelf it can exploit seabed oil and mineral deposits in the Aegean Sea.

A move by Turkey to declare such a border would aggravate relations with Greece and Cyprus, which is divided into an EU-member Greek south and a breakaway Turkish north.

Turkey does not recognize Cyprus as a sovereign country and strongly objects to the Greek Cypriot search for mineral deposits inside the island's exclusive economic zone. It insists that Cyprus has no right to go ahead with the search before a settlement to reunify the divided island can be reached.

In a globalized world things are more complicated than small disputes between neighbors, particularly when one adds resource rights into the picture. Enter another regional power, one that has a history of pushing back when being pushed around.

Russia has sent two nuclear-powered submarines to patrol Eastern Mediterranean waters around Cyprus and enforce the island's right to explore for undersea oil and gas in its territorial seas, according to information from Defencenet.gr, citing a Russian FM spokesman.

Alexander Lukashevich said that Russia supports Cyprus and guarantees its security if it is threatened: "Under the UN Convention on International Law, among 162 other signatory states, including Cyprus, each state has sovereign rights in its EEZ for exploring, exploiting and protecting both live and non-living natural resources, including water, the seabed and subsoil," said Lukashevich in comments made on August 19th and reported by Defencenet.gr (in Greek).

So far there has been no reaction from the foreign ministry on reports that Russian submarines will be sent to protect Cyprus from any potential military threat from Turkey. A telephone call to the foreign ministry for comment has not yet been returned. A telephone call to the press attache at the Russian Embassy in Nicosia has also not yet been returned.

The submarines are due in early September and are being interpreted as a clear warning to Turkey to stay away from Noble Energy's drilling sites in Block 12. Noble is set to start exploring for undersea gas at the beginning of October along with Israeli energy company DELEK, which has reached an agreement with Noble Energy to share in its licensing deal with Cyprus, reported Globes.co.il.

It is a noteworthy coincidence that on the same day, Russia signs the contract to build three new Krivak IV class frigates for the Black Sea Fleet.

Diplomacy Can Be Ugly

The friction between Turkey and Israel is a diplomatic problem being expressed in the media as a naval confrontation. This article by Reuters is a great example how the problem is being exaggerated.

Raising the stakes in Turkey's row with Israel over its refusal to apologize for the killings, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan told Al Jazeera television that Turkey had taken steps to stop Israel from unilaterally exploiting natural resources in the Mediterranean.

"Turkish warships, in the first place, are authorized to protect our ships that carry humanitarian aid to Gaza," Erdogan said in the interview, broadcast by Al Jazeera with an Arabic translation.

"From now on, we will not let these ships to be attacked by Israel, as what happened with the Freedom Flotilla," Erdogan said.

The resources at sea being discussed in the article are actually claimed territorially by Greece, Lebanon, Turkey, and Israel. There is no impending drilling about to create a confrontation, that is still well off into the future and the diplomatic process has plenty of time to work itself out. The resources issue is also a side show to what this is really about - Turkey flexing some regional muscle over Israel for political points towards being seen as a regional leader in the Muslim world.

If you read the Reuters article in full, you will note that Turkey is mentioned as a member of NATO no less than three times - indeed it sticks out as something the article author is trying to emphasize for impact to the reader. What isn't said in the article is that according to international law, if Turkey runs the Israeli naval blockade of Gaza, Turkey would be committing an act of war against Israel and would forfeit the privileges for mutual defense in the NATO charter. A NATO nation can't conduct an act of war against another nation then invoke the mutual defense clause of the NATO charter for assistance.

While the naval blockade may or may not be an act of war against Gaza under any legal definition (because Gaza isn't recognized as a state), a naval blockade is in itself an act of war by legal definition. Turkey simply doesn't have much legal ground to stand on should Turkey provoke a military conflict, and it is difficult to see a scenario where anyone in NATO comes to the military aid of Turkey if they intentionally provoke Israel like Erdogan describes.

But the bigger point is that Israel doesn't want to fight Turkey, and despite the public rhetoric, it is hard to believe Turkey would risk a major military incident with Israel over the Palestinians or has any desire to engage in a military contest with Israel.

Measuring military power of various nations isn't really my style, but let me be clear - the Israeli Air Force is elite. Any nation in the world that fights the Israeli Air Force is going to take enormous punishment for it in a war, and by 'any nation' I am absolutely including the United States. Erdogan might be stupid enough to think otherwise, but no one in the Turkish military is that stupid.

What I am watching for in this political clash is whether this turns into a real escort operation for the Turkish Navy. If it does, the next question becomes whether Turkey will send more than one warship. If Turkey sends more than one warship, the situation has the potential to get ugly. If Turkey only sends one warship, it is unlikely anything happens and if something does happen, it will be against the flotilla ship and Erdogan will get embarrassed. I can't imagine Turkey would send more than one warship in support of Erdogan's political agenda though - the political gains simply aren't there for Turkey to push Israel into any kind of military conflict.

The problem Erdogan faces is that it is hard to imagine any Turkish Navy Captain would be foolish enough to take a warship into the territorial waters of Gaza, which under the Interim Agreement is considered Israeli controlled waters. Once inside those territorial waters, Israel would be within their legal rights to sink the Turkish Navy vessel. That won't happen.

Once the flotilla vessel enters those territorial waters though, Israel will seize the ship. Because Israel will have a huge show of force present, the Turkish Navy would be forced to watch from outside territorial waters. The result of any confrontation will be plenty of very loud international political outrage against Israel, but because the flotilla ship will never reach Gaza, Erdogan would find himself drowning under the political pressure of starting an incident with Israel he couldn't win, and at the same time he would find himself without any international support except in words only.

If Turkey sends more than one ship... well, everything I have said is nonsense. That would be a situation ripe with miscalculation and I am never surprised anymore by anything Israel does. My sense is that with the recent agreement with the US to install the X-Band BMD radar in Turkey - Washington intends to give Turkey plenty of political space in their dealings with Israel - right up to but not beyond the point where confrontation turns into conflict.

Unfortunately, that is also usually the point where miscalculations tend to occur. We'll see. This emerging possible naval confrontation has the right stuff to generate a lot of noise in the media, but when it is over I suspect very little will actually happen.

MV Full City: The Rest of the Story

Last week I discussed the international cooperation involved in the MV Full City piracy incident. Navy News has the rest of the story.

Guided-missile cruiser USS Bunker Hill (CG 52) boarded a suspected pirate vessel in cooperation with international forces while responding to a distress call May 5.

The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Organization received a distress call from the Panamanian-flagged merchant vessel Full City and passed the information to U.S. 5th Fleet.

An Indian maritime patrol aircraft was able to locate the vessel, and
broadcast that warships were on the way. The crew had locked themselves in
a secure space from which they could control the ship, known as a 'citadel.'

Bunker Hill and aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) were the closest naval vessels to the Full City and set course to intercept. The Turkish ship Giresun, part of NATO's counter piracy operation Ocean Shield, also responded.

While Giresun boarded Full City, Bunker Hill approached a dhow in the area believed to be the 'mothership' for the pirate attack. An SH 60 Sea Hawk helicopter from Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron Light 49, deployed with Bunker Hill, fired warning shots to stop the dhow and instructed the suspected pirates to move to the bow of the vessel. In the early evening, a visit board, search and seizure team from Bunker Hill boarded the suspected pirate dhow.

The team found and destroyed paraphernalia on the dhow, including weapons, excessive fuel and other equipment commonly used in the commission of acts of piracy. They also sank a small skiff towed by the dhow; these skiffs are often used for actual attacks and boardings by pirates.

It wasn't said so we must assume... the pirates were released. I wonder where the real owners of the dhow are, because odds are good they are dead, and the US Navy just let the pirates go in a stolen dhow.

US policy towards piracy needs to concentrate on making two things happen:

• All equipment, including vessels, must be confiscated.
• Pirates must encounter some form of punishment.

The US Navy can do more, but how much more is determined by political leaders who are currently doing as little as possible to give naval forces the ability to better address the problem. When the next major tragedy occurs resulting in the loss of human life or catastrophic environmental damage, it is only valid to lay all the blame at the feet of politicians who ignore the problem and offer no policy guidance towards working solutions.

The Rescue of MV Full City

Yesterday there were a lot of unofficial reports and rumors surrounding the hijacking of the MV Full City, a Panama flagged, Chinese owned ship with a crew of 24 Chinese nationals. Reports were sketchy though, suggesting several ships including 2 Chinese warships were bearing down on the ship.

The only detail known was that the crew had successfully barricaded themselves inside the citadel - setting up a potential confrontation between naval forces and pirates. The race was on, and India got there first.

New Delhi/Mumbai, May 6 Prompt action by the Indian Navy staved off a pirate attack on a Chinese cargo vessel far out in the Arabian Sea, forcing the brigands to flee and earning kudos from the authorities in Beijing, a senior naval official said Friday.

An Indian Navy TU-142 maritime reconnaissance aircraft made several low sorties over the MV Full City, 450 nautical miles (850 km) off Karwar in Karnataka, warning the pirates to immediately leave the vessel or face the wrath of Indian Navy and Coast Guard ships that were fast closing in.

The warnings worked and the pirates scampered into the skiff from which they had boarded the vessel and sailed toward a nearby mothership, which immediately set off toward Somalia at full speed, the official said, requesting anonymity due to service rules.

The aircraft stayed on station for four hours till the Indian combat vessels arrived on the scene in an operation that was closely coordinated with a NATO Task Force, a Chinese Task Force and the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre at Beijing, highlighting the international cooperation in the anti-piracy efforts in the Indian Ocean, the official said.

But the Chinese skip that part of the story, and tell only the rest of the story.

The 24 Chinese sailors on board a Panama-flagged bulk cargo ship, hijacked by pirates yesterday at the Arabian Sea, have been rescued, as Turkey and U.S. navy ships in the nearby rushed to them and chased away the pirates, Xinhua News Agency reported.

About seven suspected Somali pirates have left the ship, "Full City", and the 24 Chinese workers are found safe, locking themselves in the safety vessel of the ship, the report said. Guarded by U.S. Navy ships, a group of Turkey Navy commandos boarded the pirated ship.

The pirates attacked "Full City" at midday on Thursday local time, and seized it about 450 nautical miles off the coast of Mumbai in India.

The China Sea Rescue Center earlier reported two Chinese navy ships patrolling in the Gulf of Aden were alerted of the hijacking and rushed to its rescue yesterday. The center also sent liaisons to nearby patrolling ships for help.

Obviously China is intentionally not giving India any credit, at least on the domestic consumption side, but has no problem giving Turkey and the US credit. The Indian aircraft was probably the only way the pirates new that naval forces were bearing down on their location, and almost certainly was the single largest contributor to the pirates fleeing the ship before naval forces arrived.

Despite the absence of a public acknowledgment regarding Indian efforts, India learned of the hijacking somehow, so there is a lot of evidence of excellent communication and coordination at the government level on pirate activities. There was coordination between China, India, Turkey, and the United States against a pirated vessel 450 nautical miles off the coast of Mumbai in India. These small victories are adding up.

It doesn't matter how the various national media outlets tell the story, the job by the crew to protect themselves in the citadel and the cooperation by so many different nations in response to the hijacking of a ship is the story I see.

The pirates got away though, as is not uncommon, meaning another attack is almost certain to take place in the very near future unless someone stops them. Based on recent anti-piracy activities in the area and ongoing disputes between India and Somalia, I have a feeling India is not done yet with this group of pirates.

Priorities

A very interesting nugget in this Reuters article.

Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz said his country was examining its energy ties with Israel, but Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul said delivery of Israeli-made Heron military drones would continue.

In other words, there will be lots of rhetoric by political elites in Israel and Turkey, but it would appear the military's of Israel and Turkey intend to maintain good relations where possible.

The message by Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul suggests the perspective of the Turkish Military = Israeli Drones > Palestinians.

I cannot say I'm surprised.

Israeli Actions Are Stupid, But Legal

nGW and information warfare go hand in hand, and that is exactly what we are seeing unfold with the situation regarding the sea based protesters and Israel this morning as the discussion moves away from law and into the realm of politics. The political fallout will prove interesting, only because we are likely to learn a lot about President Obama.

The news has already gone viral, and many pundits have weighed in - many of whom have formulated their response without the facts of what happened. It is not surprising to me that much of the early press reporting has suffered from inaccuracies - early reporting of activities at sea often gets it wrong - and this incident is no different.

Was the Boarding Legal?

Under international law, the consensus of the maritime attorney's I have spoken to is that the boarding operation by Israel was legal. The coast of Gaza has been under maritime blockade by Israel, a blockade that was well known - indeed running the maritime blockade for political purposes was the specific intent of the protesters. It is why the press had been reporting all week that the situation was likely leading towards a confrontation. Is anyone surprised that Israel had an established maritime blockade and enforced that maritime blockade? I'm certainly not, Israel made clear all week that the flotilla would not be allowed to pass.

The maritime blockade is a result of the war between Israel and Hamas. Ones political position on that ongoing war is completely irrelevant to the reality that the maritime blockade was established. Knowledge of the maritime blockade by the protesters is also not in debate, and neither is knowledge the flotilla intended to violate the blockade - they made this clear themselves in the press. Once the flotilla made it clear in the press they intended to run the maritime blockade, according to international law, and even US law, the flotilla was considered to be in breach by attempting to violate the blockade.

It was at that point the IDF had legal authority - under international maritime law governing maritime blockades during wartime - to board the vessels and prevent the vessels from running the blockade. Yes, this action may legally be taken in international waters if those waters are recognized as part of the area under the maritime blockade. It is important to note that the action took place within the zone that was publicly known to be part of the maritime blockade of Gaza, and part of that zone is in international waters.

Whether it was a good decision by Israel to board the vessels is a political question, not a legal question. The outcome of the incident should not surprise anyone part of the maritime security community, indeed it highlights the inherent dangers that exist in political protests by sea. Sea based protests may be civilian political activities, but running a maritime blockade is not a political activity that engages law enforcement, rather it is a political activity against a military force exercising and activity governed by the laws of war - in other words, the protesters attempting to run the blockade could legally be argued to describe an act of war against Israel.

The Maritime NGO

What the hell was Israel thinking? I can't be the only person asking this question today, and yet I imagine there are a number of people in professional Navies around the world who have serious concerns in observing the events as they happened.

Political protests at sea cannot be legitimately compared to any protest on land, particularly when one considers any political protest situation where violent activity is likely. I think the authors on this blog made clear this week that we expected violence, because none of us are naive enough to believe close quarters situations involving Israelis and Palestinians will in any way be peaceful.

There is not a lot of space on ships, even big ships. If you have ever been on a ship, you know hallways are narrow and even something as simple as deckchairs can add to clutter on deck. When maritime security is enforced on any ship, there is an expectation of close quarters interaction with passengers and crew of a ship. One simply cannot get around this.

Putting IDF soldiers and political activists together on the same ship is like putting protesters and riot police in your house - that is literally how close they will be to one another. It isn't like a street protest where police can prepare by giving full city blocks of space for movement and protest activities. During situations on land where protesters may engage law enforcement, the space also allows for time - something one does not get when all activities between protesters and enforcers are in close quarters - like on a ship.

What is the result? Well, once the decision was made by Israel to board the ship the question is how the IDF would board the vessel. Based on video it would appear the protesters had deployed effective techniques to prevent an over-the-side boarding. That led to Israel deciding upon the fast rope approach.

The video of the fast rope activity demonstrates the danger in that tactic. Indeed, the first IDF commando doesn't even make it to the ground before the close quarters situation - like one would find on any ship full of protesters - immediately leads to violence. It seems incredible to me that the IDF didn't see that coming. If we presume the Israeli Navy is competent, we can presume they knew this would happen. That suggests Israel knew the initial boarding would be met with violent resistance, but the political cost of allowing violation of the blockade was higher than the expected political fallout of a violent response.

One thing is clear - every Navy needs to give serious thought to how to address this situation, because fast roping onto the deck of a ship of protesters should always expect to be a forcible entry operation.

It will be interesting to see how the Obama administration reacts. The recently released National Security Strategy of the United States depends a great deal on the use of international institutions and international law as a mechanism for fostering global peace on the maritime domain. Israel can legitimately be accused of having politically tone deaf leadership that is making world class dumbass decisions - an argument I think there is plenty of evidence to support - but the actions taken are within their rights of enforcing a maritime blockade under international law.

The truly scary part is that under international laws governing maritime blockades, Israel could have outright sank the ship instead of board it as an alternative enforcement of the maritime blockade, and Israel still been within their rights under international law. Such an action could have led to war with Turkey, but even if the ship would have been sunk, Turkey would still be on the wrong end of international law in this situation. Turkey will likely find plenty of populist political support in NATO countries over these events, but if they attempt to escalate they may find that support is fleeting among their NATO allies.

No one in NATO is going to support Turkey with anything other than political rhetoric in this situation. Rhetoric is free, but if a financial cost to NATO nations supporting Turkey becomes necessary - international law regarding naval blockades will quickly become the new foundation of NATO countries, and Turkey would quickly find themselves on the wrong end of the shifting political winds. Turkey finds a political victory in the present condition, and needs to do nothing outside of political rhetoric to secure it. The likelihood of taking some meaningful action against Israel by Turkey is very low.

As far as I am concerned, any country that acts as politically stupid as Israel has in this situation deserves every political attack they get. Israel has some seriously tone deaf leadership right now who seems to look at every problem as a nail and every solution requiring a hammer.

---

Those wishing to add comment are reminded this is not a political blog. Our focus should be on the tactics of the incident and the legal issues surrounding maritime law. Most Americans probably don't realize everything Israel did was legal under US law, for example. Given the level of political support the protesters are getting from the international community - despite international law - suggests we have plenty to discuss regarding this event that has nothing to do with the Palestinian | Israeli conflict specifically.

Final note. As usual the Small Wars Journal has a timely piece by Claude Berube that goes right to the broader maritime security discussion this situation represents.

Rift Between Turkey and Israel Genuine, Serious

To be clear, there's no question that there's been a serious deterioration in defense ties between Turkey and Israel over the last several months. Last week's Defense News article details the drift, and includes explicit argument by Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan to the fact that popular pressure is limiting the extent to which Turkey can cooperate with Israel. The issue, rather, is whether the rupture represents a dispositional shift in Turkish foreign policy (Turkey abandoning the West for the camp of radical Islam), or whether it's simply the result of Turkish dissatisfaction with Israeli military and security policy. I lean rather heavily towards the latter interpretation; whatever the sins of the AKP, Turkey internally operates much more like a Western liberal democracy than any state associated with "radical Islam," and indeed Turkey's internal politics are more in line with liberal democracy (including especially reform of the role delegated to the military in a liberal democratic state) than they ever have before. The error made by Glick and others, in my view, is in the effort to derive domestic regime type from foreign policy; it is possible for Turkey (or France, or Germany) to be simultaneously democratic and queasy about the Gaza operation. Indeed, in Turkey's case I think that achieving any other outcome would be difficult.

Now, in the short run this means that military dominated regimes may be easier for the United States (and certainly Israel) to deal with. In the long run, however, I don't see that this policy has much of a future. You don't need to be a neoconservative to be deeply skeptical about a policy of maintaining authoritarian allies of convenience; such a policy is far more likely, in my view, to lead to events like the Iranian Revolution than is tolerance of parties like the AKP.

What to do with Turkey?

Jerusalem Post contributor Caroline Glick asserts that Turkey has moved into the camp of radical Islam; she's troubled by a lack of Turkish support for Operation Cast Lead. The merits of this argument aside (and I think it's bat**** insane), what would the policy implications of such a shift be? This is to say, if Turkey really did join Tehran's camp (and, given Turkey's massive military and economic superiority over Iran, it would shortly become Ankara's camp), what policy changes ought the United States conduct? I must admit that the question is animated, in large part, by the last chapter of Wayne Hughes' Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat; replace Greece with Israel, and replay?