A few interesting stories have run this week detailing the current and planned state of unmanned aviation in the Navy.
First, Halyburton
completed her deployment which saw extensive combat operational testing of Firescout around the Horn of Africa and Libya: “MQ-8B operators pushed the unmanned helicopter to its operational limits, setting records for maximum altitude, range, and endurance. More than one thousand deployment flight hours were recorded, with 438 hours flown by Fire Scout.” (note, I take this to mean that the embarked SH-60s flew 562 plus hours, with the MQs making up less than half the total). Hopefully, the next FS deployment (and the other ongoing Afghanistan based det discussed in the story below) will help the Navy work maintenance and logistics kinks out of this system to increase readiness rates.
Here’s a
very good overview of current UAV efforts including naval programs.
Finally, from the NY Times, an
update on the super-expensive Global Hawk. In my opinion, the naval component of this program chases a mediocre capability with a lot of good money. Why does the navy need a land-based long range system that essentially mimics the USAF’s capabilities (other than a couple of sensors)? Without full motion video, the Global Hawk lacks the ability to support dynamic targeting at sea. Other sensors still lag in development. Instead, the Navy should rapidly acquire the Avenger (pictured above), based on the proven Predator series.
The Avenger’s ceiling and endurance is roughly equal to G-hawk; its' payload is greater, cost is significantly less; it’s smaller - and I’d guess stealthier, and moreover it will be armed (unlike GH), bringing the ability to find, fix, and finish with the same aircraft. Furthermore, a very robust C2 and dissemination architecture is already in place for MQ-1/MQ-9s. The best part about the Avenger system for the Navy is that it is being modified for deployment at sea. The closest the G-Hawk will ever get to a flight deck is 60,000 feet. Basing UAVs ashore (especially the armed variety) outside of active combat zones requires the USG to walk a diplomatic tightrope. In some cases, these machinations must happen for every single flight. The best way around this issue is to base these strike and ISR aircraft
on US sovereign territory out at sea.
In the current austere fiscal environment, I’d love to understand why the Navy acquisition community thinks that buying 68 Global Hawks at $160 million or so per plane brings the combatant commanders a worthwhile ISR and strike capability while appropriately stewarding the US taxpayers' dollars. The Sea Avenger will compete with other platforms for the
UCLASS program, but if several airframes could be purchased and deployed more rapidly (knowing General Atomics, they probably could) for combat testing, then that option should be considered, while saving the Navy $10 billion or so by cancelling G-Hawk.
The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.