How will new Submarine Sensors and Payloads Influence Naval Warfare in the 21st Century?

Today's guest is Owen R. Cote Jr., MIT Security Studies Program

How will new Submarine Sensors and Payloads Influence Naval Warfare in the 21st Century?

Since the beginning of the 20st century, a series of new submarine sensors and payloads have changed naval warfare, sometimes in revolutionary fashion. To a large extent these changes have been cumulative. Changes that first occurred in the First World War are still in place, such as the idea that merchant shipping is inherently vulnerable to attack by torpedo-armed diesel submarines. But increasingly over this period, other new submarine sensors and payloads have not been adopted universally, such as the great strides in passive acoustic sensing that remain a near monopoly of the U.S. Navy, and particularly its submarine force. It is therefore useful to review the history of innovation in submarine sensors and payloads during the 20th century to determine what changes occurred in what navies and where they may still apply. I will discuss four such changes, the last three of which are today largely or completely unique to the U.S. Navy: the torpedo-armed diesel submarine; the quiet, passive acoustic-equipped, nuclear attack submarine; the nuclear ballistic missile submarine; and the conventional land attack cruise missile submarine. After summarizing these four developments I will shift to a discussion of future submarine sensors and payloads and their potential impact.

The development of the torpedo allowed the smallest ships to sink the largest ships, and the marriage of the torpedo with the diesel submarine combined that lethality with a means of operating in distant waters controlled by a superior opponent. This changed naval warfare in WWI by providing the weaker naval power - Germany - with a means of interdicting British commerce even though the German High Seas Fleet had failed utterly to wrest command of the sea from the superior British fleet. In WWII, war came with the German Navy still in the early stages of rearming, causing it to cancel its plans to build a traditional fleet. Instead it focused from the outset on interdicting British commerce using submarines, and arguably came closer to success than in WWI before being decisively defeated in May 1943.

Britain and her allies eventually succeeded in both Battles of the Atlantic by mounting antisubmarine warfare (ASW) efforts that were wildly disproportionate in scale and cost to the submarine threat they were a response to. On the other hand, once the Allied ASW efforts reached maturity, the defeat of German U-Boats in both wars was total.

The U.S. and the Japanese had different experiences with submarines in the Pacific during WWII. Here, there was a more traditional struggle for command of the sea, albeit with fleets using new platforms, including especially the aircraft carrier. But this struggle unfolded in the midst of a very different maritime geography where the respective fleets were separated by the Pacific Ocean rather than concentrated within 500 miles of each other on either side of the North Sea as in WWI. Submarines played a less dominant role than expected in operations against opposing fleets because in blue water diesel submarines were much less effective when used against fast naval combatants than when used in attacks against merchant ships because only in the latter case did the submarine have the speed advantage. In the net, this greatly advantaged the U.S. because only the Japanese were economically dependent on merchant shipping in the way Britain was, while the U.S. remained economically autarkic. Under these circumstances, U.S. submarines shifted to commerce raiding in the western Pacific, while Japanese submarines remained committed to the often fruitless task of finding and attacking American fast carrier task forces in the vast reaches of the central Pacific. Ironically, because of the more constricted seas in which both the Japanese fleet and its merchant marine operated, and cuing provided by Magic, American submarines not only succeeded in completely shutting down Japanese commerce, they also still achieved better results than Japanese submarines in operations against major fleet combatants. Thus, in the Pacific theater, submarines worked decisively to the advantage of the stronger naval power, unlike in the first and second Battles of the Atlantic.

Nuclear power made obsolete the panoply of ultimately successful ASW measures developed in WWII that exploited the diesel submarine’s need to operate mostly on the surface. With nuclear propulsion came the “true” submarine that did not need to surface at all. Nuclear power also provided power densities sufficient to propel submarines at submerged speeds over 30 knots with essentially unlimited endurance, allowing them to run down and attack even the fastest surface combatants. Viewed through the lens of the recently completed world war, the nuclear attack submarine potentially undermined every aspect of American naval power because it would not only threaten the merchant shipping that was central to the U.S.’ emerging postwar alliances, it would also threaten the carrier-based power projection capabilities that had played such a central role in Japan’s defeat. And unlike Germany before either of the two world wars, the Cold War Soviet Navy did not appear distracted by dreams of great ocean-going fleets, embracing a strategy of sea denial rather than control from the outset; but like the U.S. before the two world wars, and unlike Japan and Britain, and in the post war period increasingly the U.S., the USSR was economically autarkic, and thus was not vulnerable to U.S. submarines. All of this could be seen with varying degrees of clarity before USS Nautilus, the first nuclear-powered submarine, went to sea in 1954. Even though the U.S. Navy had pioneered the development of nuclear propulsion, the Soviet Union was shaping up as a peer competitor, and it couldn’t be long before it emulated the U.S. naval nuclear power program, as it did in 1958 with the November. In anticipation of that point, U.S. Navy planners feared that submarines would once again become the weapon of the weaker Navy.

What followed instead were the next two major changes in naval warfare caused by submarines, both of which were deployed by 1960. These were caused by the marriage of nuclear propulsion with passive acoustics on the one hand, and nuclear weapons on the other. The marriage between Fleet Ballistic Missiles and the nuclear submarine made the SSBN into the most survivable nuclear delivery system in the U.S. arsenal and one against which the Soviets had no defense, while the marriage between the nuclear submarine and passive acoustics made the SSN into the dominant platform in the U.S. ASW arsenal.  Furthermore, as is the norm in naval competitions between peers, the Soviets eventually deployed their own SSBNs in 1968 as well, but in a radical departure from the norm, the U.S. maintained a unique and enduring advantage in passive acoustics and the concomitant submarine silencing that resulted almost to the end of the Cold War. (For more on this story and the mutually reinforcing dynamic between geography, passive acoustics and submarine quieting (see Owen R. Cote Jr., The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy’s Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines, Newport Paper #16). Thus, submarine versus submarine conflict came to be envisaged as the norm by the U.S. Navy, rather than a rarity, and the acoustic advantages enjoyed by U.S. SSNs against Soviet submarines, including Soviet SSBNs, augured for a highly favorable exchange rate. Thus, despite all expectations, the submarine remained preeminently a weapon of the stronger Navy in the hands of the U.S. during the Cold War, despite the great efforts by the weaker Navy to make it otherwise, and it was the Soviets who ended up on the wrong side of the cost-exchange ratio in the undersea battle.

The next big change in naval warfare caused by a new submarine weapon was muffled by the end of the Cold War. First deployed in 1986, conventional Tomahawk, or TLAM C, was the first long range, precision, land attack weapon. It gave surface ships and submarines a weapon that could penetrate even the most advanced air defenses without any prior suppression effort and strike any non-hardened, fixed target within a ~1000 mile radius with a very high single shot probability of kill (SSPK). In addition, it uniquely gave U.S. submarines a weapon that could be launched from within the periphery of the most advanced anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) network the world has yet seen - as described in the now declassified NIE 11-15 Soviet Naval Strategy and Programs Through the 1990s in March 1983. (See Newport Paper 19 (PDF), Appendix I, pp. 101-184). Precision eliminated the “many weapons, one kill“ syndrome that had plagued air attacks using unguided weapons for decades, nap-of-the-earth flight profiles defeated even the most modern ground-based air defenses by simply eluding them, and submarine basing allowed deployment on platforms that could ignore even the most robust sea denial efforts. Thus, in the mid 1980s, TLAM C did for fixed targets with conventional weapons what Polaris did for fixed targets with nuclear weapons in 1960 - one shot, one kill, no defense. Certainly Tomahawk has been given its due as a transformational weapon given its extensive use since the end of the Cold War, and it was the unique value of its marriage with the submarine that, after much debate and plenty of opposition from within the Navy, led to the decision to convert four Trident SSBNs into SSGNs. But the relative difficulty of this process is an indication of how future changes in naval warfare might be stalled or eschewed altogether.

Future changes in naval warfare have become part of the current discussion about the rise of the Chinese Navy, and particularly its submarine force. For now, the submarine remains the weapon of the stronger Navy in the Pacific. But there are two ways in which this could change: the U.S. could lose its currently massive advantage in ASW, or the U.S. Navy could fail to exploit new submarine sensors and payloads with the potential of causing a fourth major change in naval warfare. Neither of these outcomes need come to pass, but it is arguably less likely that the former will happen than the latter because military organizations generally have an easier time of sustaining existing doctrine in the face of new challenges than they do creating new doctrines.

First, the much touted “death of passive acoustics” at the hands of modern, quiet diesel submarines has proven premature. For example, rapidly deployable passive acoustic surveillance systems exploiting the reliable acoustic path (RAP) are under development by the U.S. which will enable the formation of ASW barriers against even the quietist submarines. Second the maritime geography of a U.S.-Chinese naval competition is more favorable to the dominant naval power than any prior great power naval competition, excepting perhaps that which Britain enjoyed during WWI, and it is certainly better from an ASW perspective than was the U.S. position versus the Soviet Union during the Cold War. (For more on this see Owen R. Cote Jr., Assessing the Undersea Balance Between the U.S. and China (PDF), SSP Working Paper, February 2011) Third, and perhaps most important, the U.S. Navy has an organizational legacy of more than 60 years of intensive and highly successful research and development into methods of detecting submarines, whether to support its own ASW efforts, or in the case of the SSBN security program, to “red team” the ASW methods that might be adopted by its opponents. By contrast, any possible future naval competitor in this realm will be starting from a position of near zero capability or experience. I argue that the biggest variable concerning the future impact of submarines on naval warfare concerns the choices made by the U.S. Navy regarding future submarine sensors and payloads.

The next major change in naval warfare caused by U.S. submarines will likely result from the marriage between the submarine on the one hand, and precision, land attack, tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs) and small, long endurance UAVs on the other.

In general, fast weapons and small UAVs would give submarines a capability to find and strike high value, mobile targets ashore. Specifically, in the context of the new Air-Sea Battle strategy, they would enable a submarine-based capability to destroy rather than merely suppress modern, ground-based air defenses, or in the DOD vernacular, DEAD. A submarine-based DEAD capability would close a major capability gap against modern A2/AD networks.

The systems that form these networks often seek to use the sanctuary provided by mobility in the cluttered environment ashore as a base from which to launch missile strikes against fixed targets necessary for power projection like air bases, or more ambitiously against ships at sea. Ever since the failed “SCUD Hunt” of Desert Storm, persistent airborne surveillance has been identified as key to the rapid identification and precise geo-location of mobile targets, as has been a source of precision weapons for attacking those mobile targets in time urgent fashion when they are found. Everything learned during the decade-long war on terror in operations against IEDs and terrorist leaders has amplified that message. This means that persistent airborne surveillance and time urgent weapons will also need to play a central role in defeating the mobile targets that form the heart of an A2/AD network.

But modern, ground-based air defenses are themselves mobile targets, which introduces a chicken-egg problem at the outset of any anti-A2/AD operation.

At the heart of any DEAD capability against a modern air defense system is the need to destroy relatively small numbers of expensive, phased array engagement radars. Without them, SAM batteries lack the ability to track targets with the accuracy needed to guide missiles against them. These radars need only emit intermittently during an engagement and can be quickly moved afterward. Thus, traditional radar-homing weapons like HARM will not work because they require a continuous signal to home on, and traditional single-platform, angle-of-arrival (AOA) ELINT techniques cannot provide accuracy sufficient to target coordinate-seeking weapons. This challenge first presented itself in Kosovo, albeit for different reasons, and in a much more benign air defense environment; and in different form (COMINT rather than ELINT), this challenge is ubiquitous in the battle against so-called “high value targets” in the war on terror. This has led DOD to embrace an ELINT/COMINT technique long used by the intelligence community that involves time difference of arrival (TDOA) signal processing, whereby a network of at least three platforms surrounding the emitter compares the precise time of arrival of the same signal at three widely separated locations. This enables precise and immediate geo-location sufficient to target coordinate seeking weapons.

TDOA lies at the heart of the Air Force’s current approach to DEAD using the F-16 via the R7 upgrade to the HARM Targeting System (HTS). In its COMINT role in the war on terror, programs like DOD’s net-centric collaborative targeting (NCCT) and the NRO’s real-time regional gateway are using networks of ground-based collectors; legacy airborne platforms like RC-135, U-2s, EP-3s, and Guardrail or UAVs; and COMINT satellites to identify and precisely locate cell phone and push-to-talk radio signals in near real time. In the future, both the U.S. Air Force and Navy plan on using F-35s with such a TDOA capability to accomplish the DEAD mission in an A2/AD environment. This has two consequences: first, it assumes that sea and air bases for these aircraft are available, i.e. a medium as opposed to a high threat environment, or a high threat environment in which some parts of the opponent’s A2/AD system have already been destroyed by other assets; and second, it assumes that the DEAD mission can be accomplished by relatively small numbers of non-persistent assets that come and go to and from the battlefield, providing only an intermittent presence.

A submarine-based DEAD capability would instead hold SAM engagement radars at continuous risk of destruction whenever they emit by operating forward within an A2/AD network’s periphery for as long as needed. This, in turn, would enable two major contributions by the submarine to the Air/Sea battle concept DOD is now contemplating as a counter to A2/AD networks. First, a forward, persistent DEAD threat would enable airborne surveillance platforms like those described above to operate safely just inside the maximum range of their sensors (~150 miles) because a close-in DEAD capability could ensure destruction of engagement radars well before the completion of SAM engagements at such long ranges. Second, given the cueing made available in this way, scarce F-22s and F-35s could efficiently attack other types of mobile targets in the A2/AD network without the prior need to deal with mobile air defenses. (For more on submarine-based DEAD see Owen R. Cote Jr., Submarines in the Air Sea Battle (PDF), JHU/APL Submarine Technology Symposium 2010)

There are certainly other innovations in submarine sensors and payloads to imagine, and indeed some may already be under development, but there is a strong logic behind U.S. submarines acquiring a DEAD capability against mobile air defenses. Ever since the submarine first threatened to provide a weaker Navy the ability to overthrow a stronger Navy’s command of the seas, the dominant Navies have been forced to respond vigorously to this threat. During the first half of the 20th century, these responses were often slow in coming, asset intensive and expensive compared to the threat they were countering, and therefore prone to abandonment in peacetime. In the second half of the 20th century, a different dynamic emerged. Peacetime technological and doctrinal innovation combined to make the submarine a tool that favored the dominant naval power during the Cold War, both because the submarine became a dominant part of the ASW solution, and because it acquired the ability to project power ashore against fixed targets without the need to first defeat an opposing A2/AD network. Today, the dominant naval power faces a different A2/AD threat than the one it faced during the Cold War, one in which mobile targets ashore play a dominant role. U.S. submarines can play a role in meeting that threat only with new sensors and payloads that go beyond the legacy of the last one.

Venezuelan Navy Chases Off Nuclear Submarine

President Hugo Chavez told the media yesterday that his military forces detected a nuclear submarine near the island of La Orchila, where the Venezuelan military is currently conducting training.

"It was pursued. It escaped because it's much faster than ours," Chavez said, referring to Venezuela's diesel-powered submarines. He said that judging by its speed and size, "it's a nuclear-powered submarine."

Chavez said his government was unable to say what nation might have sent the sub. "We can't accuse anyone," Chavez said, adding that his government is investigating.

The leftist leader has long had tense relations with the United States, and has recently called the U.S. together with its European allies "the empires."

"Now you know how the empires are used to going around the Caribbean Sea and going everywhere, and they also use their satellites for espionage. It's espionage," Chavez said.

Chavez is correct - it is espionage.

If this story is true, what is noteworthy is that the submarine CO apparently realized the submarine had been detected and was able to get his submarine away and disappear.

There is nothing to analyze from this incident without more information, but any detection of a possible US, UK, or French nuclear submarine that makes its way into the media under any circumstances is noteworthy.

SSNs for Canada - Potentially a Bargain

CBC News is reporting that the Harper Government is at least pondering the idea of cutting their losses with the Victoria class submarines and replacing them with nuclear submarines. The Victoria class submarines have been plagued with problems since being acquired from the UK, and despite being described as the "military bargain of the century" when purchased for $750 million in 1998, they have become anything but.

The submarines are currently all out of service, with HMCS Victoria the soonest to potentially return to service by late next year. The article describes the issues.

One of the subs, HMCS Chicoutimi, has been in active service of the Royal Canadian Navy exactly two days in the 13 years since it was purchased from the Brits.

The Chicoutimi caught fire on its maiden voyage from the U.K. to Canada, killing one sailor and injuring a number of others.

It has been in the repair shop ever since, and isn’t expected back in service for at least another two years and $400 million more in repairs and retrofits.

The article goes on:

The other three would remain out of service until at least 2013. One may not be out of the repair shop until 2016.

By that time, the submarines will have cost taxpayers an estimated $3 billion, almost enough to have bought all new subs in the first place.

But the real problem is that by the time the whole fleet is in active service for the first time in 2016, the submarines will already be almost 30 years old with only perhaps 10 years of life left in them.

High-ranking sources tell CBC News the government is actively considering cutting its losses on the dud subs, and mothballing some if not all of them.

Defence Minister Peter MacKay is hinting they might be replaced with nuclear submarines that could patrol under the Arctic ice, something the existing diesel-electric subs cannot do.

I'm not sure how the costs break out over a single budget year, but based on the article it sounds like Canada has already spent $1 billion and will spend $2 billion more by 2016, which suggests costs that average around $500 million over the next 4 years. That's a lot of money just to get 10 years out of four SSKs.

If we do the math, basically the Harper government is faced with the very real problem. The repair costs will earn Canada 4 Victoria class SSKs that are already old for an investment cost of at least $75 million annually per submarine, and at the same time India is leasing the significantly more capable and new Russian SSN K-152 Nurpa for $900 million over 10 years - $90 million annually.

Something tells me Rep. Joe Courtney (Conn) could come up with a few ideas here - just saying. What would it cost to refuel and refit a Los Angeles class submarine for a second time to add 15 or so more years to the submarine? In 2005 the cost was slightly over $200 million, so even if we estimate the total refit per submarine to be around $350 million (serious modernization), Canada would only be spending $1.4 billion for four SSNs with a service life of 15 years vs $2 billion for four SSKs with a service life of 10 years. Another big advantage for Canada would be they could use the rest of the money to put their sailors through existing US Navy submarine training schools and use existing US contractor services for upkeep, both of which would allow Canada to save a bunch of money.

The cost difference for the hardware would be $25 million per sub per year for SSNs vs $75 million per sub per year for SSKs. While it is true the operational, maintenance, and personnel costs will be higher for SSNs than it would be for SSKs, there are likely enough cost savings to be gained through existing US infrastructure that it's hard to believe the SSNs would be so much more expensive as to make it a bad deal.

I'm just floating this idea, but really trying to highlight that leasing Los Angeles class SSNs would likely be cost neutral (or perhaps even cost saving) for the Harper government given the big problems Canada is facing with the Victoria class.

I don't know if the US Navy even has four 688s that they would be willing to sell to Canada (although in a time of short term budget cuts impacting the Navy, now is the time to talk about this type of thing). I also don't know if the US and Canada can work out a realistic agreement that would give Canada the ability to utilize US Navy infrastructure for training and other services related to 688s. I do know that going down the road of supporting foreign SSNs would be good for either/both Electric Boat and Newport News, because when one looks at the trends they are having in Australia with their submarine industry - a deal with SSNs with Canada now would go a long way towards getting process and framework for this type of high end military deals in place so when our next very close ally comes along - we have a system and experience in place to support such agreements.

Future of Submarine Force Discussed

New details emerge in this Chris Cavas article at Navy Times. The article is full of new information, but this section provides excellent fodder for discussion.

The idea would be to insert a new hull section with large missile tubes into the existing Virginia-class design. The exact number of missile tubes has yet to be agreed on, although most studies indicate four tubes would be optimal. The new section would be about 94 feet long and add about 25 percent to the length of the submarines, which today stretch 377 feet from bow to stern.

Two of the tubes, known as Virginia Payload Tubes (VPT), are being installed in the bows of Block III Virginia-class submarines, beginning with the North Dakota (SSN 784), now under construction. The bow VPTs are able to each carry six Tomahawk cruise missiles and replace 12 single-tube missile launchers of the original design. But although the VPTs are able to carry a larger variety of payloads, including vehicles and other gear, the bow location prevents dry access when the sub is submerged.

The new hull section, known as the Virginia Payload Module (VPM), would feature four in-line, 87-inch diameter missile tubes able to carry a range of features, from Tomahawk cruise missiles -- seven apiece, for a total of 28 -- to other payloads that could be floated out. The VPM tubes are configured with access hatches and connectors to enable their use by special operating forces.

The concept continues to be studied and refined by the submarine force and its submarine builders, General Dynamics Electric Boat and Huntington Ingalls Industries Newport News. One recent idea, for example, would feature a horizontal tube running through a vertical tube, providing access in the side of the ship to allow swimmer delivery and unmanned vehicles, weapons and special operations forces to swim out.

Questions regarding this proposal might include:

When extending the ship by 25%, should be estimate the cost increase to be 25% as well? If so, that would increase the cost of these advanced attack submarines to somewhere around $3.0 billion. When we have spent a decade reducing the costs of attack submarines, isn't requirement creep that leads to 25% expansion of nuclear submarines be a step in the wrong direction?

What about ice configuration? The Virginia class submarines are brilliant everywhere except in the Arctic. Would this include adding better ice capabilities to the future US attack submarine force?

How does this influence the life cycle of a Virginia class submarine? When expanding the length and displacement of a Virginia class leveraging existing propulsion, what are the impacts to existing Virginia class capabilities like speed and total life cycle endurance?

How many extra sailors will be required for the extra equipment? What are the total life cycle cost increases?

We are already building a new class of submarine for the SSBN(X) replacement? What is the cost difference when using the SSBN(X) hull as a SSGN(X) replacement and continue building Virginia class SSNs of current configuration rather than expanding all SSNs? Will there be a legitimate evaluation of tradeoffs of converting the entire SSN force into a limited SSN/SSGN hybrid vs running distinct SSNs and SSGNs?

Is this a red flag for requirement creep? This approach would create very large and very costly submarines - about 5x the size and 5x the cost of the SSKs that are being mass produced globally. It begs the question whether nuclear powered underwater motherships in this hybrid SSN/SSGN configuration have replaced traditional submarines. Has underwater warfare fundamentally changed in a way that drives towards the wide array of requirements we find in a SSN/SSGN hybrid? Are there no alternatives other than these very high quality and extremely expensive submarines? The global growth in SSKs combined and the heavy investment in UUVs suggests a less costly, more capable middle ground could exist before 2034. Food for thought.

The ASW Challenge: South Korean Edition

This is a remarkable article for several reasons. Read it all, although I'll focus on this quote.

South Korean patrol boats and corvettes are able to detect a mere 30 percent of submarines at a time when North Korea is increasing the frequency of submarine infiltration drills.

According to data the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Intelligence Agency submitted to Democratic Party lawmaker Shin Hak-yong of the National Assembly's Defense Committee, North Korean submarine infiltration drills in the West Sea increased to 28 between January and August 2010, from a mere two in the same period in 2008 and only five in 2009.

In the same period this year, North Korea raised the number of infiltration drills to 50.

Infiltration exercises using semi-submersible craft also rose from 14 in the first eight months last year to 22 this year. The number of submarine exercises in the East Sea soared from 25 in the January-August period last year to 39 this year.

The most important aspect of this article from my point of view is the remarkable detail of intelligence provided in the article. These are very specific statistics regarding North Korean submarine activity, which suggests that while detection at sea might be a serious problem for South Korea - detection of activity is not.

One of the keys to this article is the reminder that traditional methods of anti-submarine warfare from surface vessels are getting less and less effective against submarines of all types, but particular in noisy littorals.

I think South Korea faces a major challenge with North Korea's mini-submarine force. Until this year, it has been unclear how many of these DRPK mini-submarines still worked given the funding shortages for the military, but it would appear that somehow the force has been given some maintenance money.

The corvettes fielded by the South Korean Navy all use hull mounted sonars, which provide limited range for effective ASW against very small midget submarines that aren't snorkeling, and in the case of the Cheonan, wasn't useful at all. One of the problems South Korea faces is the lack of capability to deliver a quantity of ASW sensors to an area rapidly without placing major naval vessels in harms way from the submarines. The Inchon class frigates will help some, but it is still very much unclear if the new frigate class will significantly change the balance.

With the proliferation of submarines globally, a revolution in ASW for surface forces is very much needed right now. While the sensors aspect of the ASW module for the LCS is very smart - leveraging sensors that already exist rather than attempting to reinvent the wheel - the delivery mechanism in the form of the unmanned vehicles is still very much uncertain at this time.

If during this decade, 2011 - 2020, the US Navy is unable to significantly evolve ASW for surface forces, I believe the entire force structure of the US Navy will change dramatically as large quantities of high quality and expensive aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and big deck amphibious vessels become indefensible as investments for seapower in the face of the growth and much improved capabilities of the global submarine force.

Inspiration Is Enough

Hidden in this article about the submarine industrial base is some interesting comments by Loren Thompson.

Several factors have figured into this process, building on the high-profile missile attacks in wars from Afghanistan to Libya, plus the longtime role of the Trident ballistic-missile subs as “the backbone of the U.S. nuclear deterrent,” Thompson said.

For one, the stealthy Virginia-class attack subs — a far more cost-effective successor to the Seawolf — “can collect intelligence where other intelligence systems wouldn’t work,” Thompson said. “Whether it’s tracking Chinese submarines or intercepting electronic transmissions in Libya or putting people ashore to fight terrorists, there’s a huge role for submarines that cannot be fully understood by people who don’t have top security clearances.”

For the future, “as surface ships become more vulnerable to attacks by China and other countries, submarines are becoming the preferred way of controlling sea lanes and attacking targets ashore.”

I continue to read opinions that the US Navy needs to be thinking about conventionally powered submarines. I do not agree. What the US Navy needs to get right is unmanned underwater vehicles including the MIW and ASW modules for the LCS, because unmanned vehicles should one day help take on these roles of submarines - indeed will significantly enhance the ability of submarines in the future to carry out these critical roles.

If the US Navy can get unmanned underwater systems right, and specifically the energy and communications aspects of unmanned underwater systems right - the Navy can reduce the total number of submarines and still be much, much more capable than an enemy force with 3-4 times as many submarines.

It is a lousy answer, but Loren Thompson is right when he says "there’s a huge role for submarines that cannot be fully understood by people who don’t have top security clearances." However, the Navy can do a lot more to explain the value of submarines without having to dive into a full explanation, because the Navy really only needs to discuss just enough to inspire imaginations.

Talking Underwater Warfare

Did you catch A Navy's Vital Silent Service by James Holmes in the Diplomat? It was an article discussing the recently released white paper titled Undersea Warfighting (PDF) and it's companion document Design for Undersea Warfare (PDF).

Vice Admiral John M. Richardson, Commander of the US Submarine Forces, responded to Holmes in the Diplomat yesterday with Submarines and a Battle of Minds.

Something is happening here and they now have my attention. Did anyone else notice how many active and retired US Navy officers wrote about submarines in the June issue of Proceedings? Now we are seeing Vice Admiral John Richardson not only blogging on his own, but writing all over the place actively engaged in discussions about submarines.

The silent service is no longer as silent as they have traditionally been, which some might suggest is simply because the Navy is starting to build 2 Virginia class submarines a year and a new SSBN(X) replacement design is underway. I don't think that is the reason for the sudden public engagement by VADM Richardson though, because unlike a lot of expensive programs in the DoD - the submarine community doesn't have to prove their usefulness at either the strategic or tactical level of national security to anyone - civilian leaders already understand this very well.

Whatever the motivation, this is a new development worth observing.

The Silent Service Finds a Voice

"Let us dare to read, think, speak and write." — John Adams - 1765

And for COMSUBFOR - Blog.

The first post is discussion "Design For Undersea Warfare," and according to Bubblehead, the reviews so far are good. Things might get interesting if the Silent Service learns how to talk about themselves in public. At minimum I have to give VADM Richardson credit - he's going to give it a shot.

Sinking Aircraft Carriers

How would you sink the Shi Lang? The question led to quite a few comments. My answer to this question is simple - we will sink an aircraft carrier the same way we have always sank aircraft carriers.

The United States Navy has a history of sinking aircraft carriers. The following history guides suggests how the United States Navy would attack and sink aircraft carriers.

Japanese Aircraft Carriers sunk in WWII:

• Akagi - Scuttled on 5th June 1942 after taking heavy damage from US bombers at Midway.
• Kaga - Sunk on 4th June 1942 after taking heavy damage from US bombers at Midway.
• Ryujo - Sunk at the battle of the east Solomon Seas by aircraft from the USS Saratoga and USS Enterprise on the 24th of August 1942.
• Soryu - Sunk on 4th June 1942 at Midway after US bombs caused fires which reached her fuel tanks.
• Hiryu - Scuttled on 5th June 1942 after taking heavy damage from US bombs at Midway.
• Shokaku - Survived Coral Sea and Santa Cruz battles but was torpedoed and sunk on 19th June 1944 by the sub USS Cavalla.
• Zuikaku - Sunk on 25th October 1944 by US bombers in the Leyte Gulf operations.
• Hiyo - Sunk on 20th June 1944 by torpedo from US aircraft in Philippine Sea.
• Chitose - Sunk on 25th October 1944 in Leyte Gulf actions.
• Chiyoda - Sunk on 25th October 1944 in Leyte Gulf actions.
• Unryu - Sunk on 19th December 1944 by the sub USS Redfish.
• Amagi - Sunk on 24th July 1945 by US bombers.
• Taiho - Sunk on 16th June 1944 after a torpedo from the sub USS Albacore.
• Shinano - Sunk on 29th November 1944 by the sub USS Archerfish.
• Taiyo - Sunk on 18th August 1944 by torpedoes from the sub USS Rasher.
• Unyo - Sunk on 16th September 1944 by torpedoes from the sub USS Barb.
• Chuyo - Sunk on 4th December 1943 by torpedoes from the sub USS Sailfish.

In WWII, 10 aircraft carriers were sunk by aircraft while 7 aircraft carriers were sunk by submarine. In other words, the most things have changed with technology, the less things are different in naval warfare. Navies still strike from long range through the air, and still strike at short range from underwater.

And just like in WWII, the surface fleet protects the high value assets from air and sub threats, conducts littoral operations near the shore in support of operations on land, and commits to combat with other ships when required.

So has anything changed? It is very much unclear. There has been tremendous investment towards the capability of ships to defend the fleet, but no one is sure how effective this capability would be in war. The defensive capability of the surface fleet actually reflects history in WWII. As Wayne Hughes highlights in his great book Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, towards the end of WWII the number of guns combined with more effective radar on surface ships became a remarkably lethal and effective combination against attacking aircraft, including Kamikaze attacks.

That raises the question regarding the extent to which fleet defenses must be rolled back to defeat an aircraft carrier. This question does not have an answer derived from combat, so we really do not know whether quantity or quality will be the decisive factor in defending an aircraft carrier. What we do know, however, is that for offense - quantity is generally preferred.

Pentagon Gives a Mixed Review on Virginia Class

"Because Navy security rules prohibit Virginia conducting exercises with foreign diesel-electric submarines (SSKs), the Navy finished IOT&E without testing the Virginia class submarine against this primary threat of record. The Navy began investigating alternative testing strategies against the SSK threat of record."

No, that isn't my opinion, that is from the 2010 DOTE Annual Report (PDF) discussing Virginia class submarines. Below is the assessment section, I highlighted in bold what I thought was very interesting.

Assessment

DOT&E’s classified BLRIP report on Virginia’s performance concluded the following:

• Virginia is an effective, suitable, and survivable replacement for the Los Angeles submarine, with improvements in acoustic and electromagnetic covertness.
• Virginia’s operational effectiveness is dependent on the mission conducted. Virginia is effective for conducting Strike Operations, minefield avoidance operations, Battle Group Support, and Anti-Surface Ship Warfare attack (in most scenarios).
• Virginia is effective for conducting ASW against some submarines, but is not effective in some environments or against most quiet threats of record. It is not clear that any passive sonar system using existing or planned technology could be effective in all environments or against quiet threats.
• Virginia is effective for conducting some limited ISR missions depending on the intelligence collection requirements; however, additional testing is required.
• Virginia was not fully evaluated for the Naval Special Warfare mission, but has the potential to use the installed Lock-Out Trunk for Special Operations Force operations once the Navy certifies Virginia for diver oxygen recompression and storage of Special Warfare equipment and ordinance. Further testing is required to evaluate Virginia’s capability with a Dry-Deck Shelter.
• Virginia is operationally suitable. However, the reliability of several key engineering plant components, NPES equipment, Government Furnished Equipment, and the Photonics Mast need improvement.
• Operational and Live Fire testing demonstrated that the Virginia class submarine is survivable in most expected threat environments. Details of the survivability assessment are classified and contained in the BLRIP report.

The Navy has achieved some testing efficiencies by combining operational testing of several programs into consolidated test events.
With the completion of IOT&E, assessment of the Virginia class has shifted to the following areas:

• Modernization of the Virginia class submarine’s NPES. These changes to the class require testing to assess the effects of the combat system upgrades on ASW, ASUW, STW, Mine Avoidance, and Information Assurance capabilities.
• Verification of the correction of deficiencies discovered in IOT&E. The Navy expects to correct and retest many of the deficient areas in the upcoming modernization FOT&E period. Other efforts to retest deficient performance are under discussion and the Navy is tracking each issue identified by the Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force (COTF) and DOT&E from their respective IOT&E reports.
• Operational testing not completed during IOT&E. Virginia’s IOT&E did not include testing of ASW capabilities in the Arctic environment (planned for 2QFY11), susceptibility to Low-Frequency Active sonar systems (completed in 4QFY10), special operations forces deployment from a Dry-Deck Shelter (planned for FY13), and ASW capabilities against diesel-electric submarines (unknown completion date).

Virginia’s mission performance is significantly dependent on supporting acquisition programs that make up the Virginia combat and weapons systems. The performance requirements or demonstrated performance of some NPES components do not support meeting Virginia’s requirements. The A-RCI Sonar AN/BQQ-10, the TB-29 series towed array, the AN/ BLQ-10 Electronics Support Measures and the Mk 48 Advanced Capability torpedo are examples of systems with known performance limitations or reliability problems that affected Virginia’s performance during IOT&E.

Underwater warfare means network warfare in the 21st century. A lot to think about here.

Meanwhile, Somewhere Else in the Mediterranean Sea...

I really like this picture from two weeks ago.


MEDITERRANEAN SEA (March 4, 2024) The guided missile submarine USS Florida (SSGN 728) pulls into the Bay of Naples. Florida is on a scheduled deployment supporting maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts in the U.S. 6th Fleet area of responsibility. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Daniel Viramontes/Released)

Pakistan to Buy Chinese AIP Submarines

Pakistan is looking to expand their submarine force, and has found an interesting partner to build the submarines for them.

Islamabad is planning to buy six submarines outright with options of joint development of conventional submarines with China, The Express Tribune reported.

The newspaper did not mention the class of submarines being sought by Pakistan saying merely that Islamabad wanted advanced under-sea vessels with air independent propulsion (AIP) system, which would give them capabilities to stay submerged longer and operate noiselessly.

The Defence Ministry has asked the federal Cabinet to approve the purchase of Chinese submarines to counter “emerging threats” faced by Pakistan, the paper said.

Pakistan has a total of five active diesel electric submarines plus three midget submarines. While the three submarines are of German SSK class, Islamabad had recently inducted two French Agosta class ones.

Doesn't this act as a confirmation that the Yuan class submarine is AIP? I can't imagine Pakistan would order AIP submarines from China if China wasn't already fielding AIP submarines.

China has quickly become the primary supplier of advanced high end military equipment to Pakistan. First advanced fighter aircraft, then frigates, and now submarines.

The other big issue here is that we have yet another country expanding their submarine force. It is only a matter of time, and I'm thinking near term, because the Middle Eastern nations start buying submarines too. The US really needs to get into the conventional submarine construction business, which is a conversation Congress is not having.

The Silent Service Gets Underway

I have mentioned before how much I really do like Rhumb Lines by CHINFO. This was Rhumb Lines on December 6th, the monthly "Executing the Maritime Strategy" edition.

Executing the Maritime Strategy

"365 days a year, 24/7, Navy Installations Command provides the right shore services to support the fleet, fighter and family. More than 50% of the Navy's fleet and 16% of Navy personnel are either deployed or on an IA, and the holiday season can add to that stress. Whether supporting the deployed Sailor worldwide or families at home, Navy Installations Command is always ready to do what's needed.”

- Vice Adm. Michael C. Vitale, Commander, Navy Installations Command

Around the world, the Navy is executing the core capabilities of the Maritime Strategy - some examples from throughout the fleet in the month of November were:

Forward Presence

• The Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group (CSG) flew 1,571 sorties for 4,001.5 hours of flight time supporting Operations Enduring Freedom and New Dawn; the Harry S. Truman CSG completed 480 combat sorties and 2863.3 flight hours in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.
• USS Ponce (LPD 15) and Marines from the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (26 MEU) participated in exercise Edged Mallet with Kenyan military forces in Manda Bay, Kenya. Edged Mallet '10 is a two-week, bilateral military exercise designed to refine operational skills while enhancing collaboration and strengthening military-to-military relationships.

Deterrence

• USS George Washington (CVN 73), with embarked Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 5, along with guided-missile ships USS Cowpens (CG 63), USS Lassen (DDG 82), USS Stethem (DDG 63), and USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62), participated in a combined military exercise with the Republic of Korea (ROK).
• Ballistic-missile submarine USS Henry M. Jackson (SSBN 730) completed its 75th Trident deterrent patrol, becoming the first Ohio-class SSBN to accomplish the milestone.

Maritime Security

• USS Momsen (DDG 92) conducted bilateral maritime domain awareness training with the Maldivian coast guard. The Government of the Maldives invited the U.S. Navy to work with the Maldivian coast guard to improve maritime domain awareness capabilities within the island nation’s exclusive economic zone.

Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Response

• USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) provided assistance to Carnival cruise ship C/V Splendor, which went dead-in- the-water after it suffered propulsion failure in the Pacific Ocean about 150 nautical miles south of San Diego. Reagan facilitated the delivery of more than 4,500 pounds of food and goods.
• USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7), along with Seabees attached to Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 7, concluded Continuing Promise 2010 (CP10). CP10 provided humanitarian and civic assistance, including veterinary, medical, dental and civil engineering support to eight partner nations.

Building Maritime Partnerships

• Military Sealift Command High Speed Vessel (HSV) 2 Swift conducted Southern Partnership Station 2011 (SPS 11) in Haiti and Chile. SPS 11 is an annual deployment in the U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility designed to engage the U.S military sea services with partner nations’ defense forces, police departments and coast guards.

At the bottom of Rhumb Lines this was offered as of December 1:

Ships, Submarines & Aircraft
Total deployable ships/subs 288
Ships underway 148 (51%)
Attack subs underway 25(46%)
Ships deployed 108 (38%)
Subs deployed 20 (37%)
Expeditionary forces on mission 85 (45%)
Total operational aircraft 3,700+

One of the blogs very clever readers put together an interesting chart with a trend worth following:

Date ......ships underway .....attack subs underway
Nov30 .............. 45% ................ 46%
Dec01 .............. 51% ................ 46%
Dec02 .............. 52% ................ 46%
Dec03 .............. 53% ................ 46%
Dec06 .............. 55% ................ 63%
Dec07 .............. 55% ................ 63%

According to the Status of the Navy website that 63% is made up of 34 subs. 34 / x = 0.63. x ~= 54. The previous attack subs underway was 46%. 54 * 0.46 ~= 25.

34 - 25 = 9.

So nine subs got under way over the weekend, 2 of those on official deployment. Actually the number is 10 over the period of the last week, because USS Jacksonville (SSN 699) just returned from deployment last week and USS Charlotte (SSN 766) deployed the next day. Worth remembering, ~60% of the submarines in US Navy inventory are in the Pacific.

I'm sure this activity is completely unrelated to recent events on the Korean Peninsula. Or not.

Submarines, More Submarines

This is a very interesting link on the decision process in India for the next 6 AIP submarines they intend to buy. The Amur submarines at the bottom of the page caught my attention.

In November 2010 it was reported that Russia's Rosoboronexport will offer Amur-1650, its 4th generation diesel powered submarine against the Indian tender.

Amur-1650 Capabilities
Developed by Rubin Central Design Bureau for Marine Engineering, Amur-1650 has acoustic field rate that is many times lower than that of Project 877/636 diesel subs.

Armed with 6 torpedo tubes, the Amur-1650 can go to a depth of 300 meters. It is manned by a crew of 35 hand has an endurance of 45 days.

I believe the "acoustic field rate" being discussed here is being discused in the noise level of the Amur class submarine. According to Yang Xiushui, who might be the Chinese version of Norman Polmar, Project 877/636 (Kilo class) diesel subs noise is 105 decibels.

For comparison, ocean background noise is 90 decibels, and according to Yang Xiushui in the same article linked above, in his opinion the quietest submarine in the world is the Seawolf class with a reported noise level of 95 decibels.

I am not sure I believe the Amur-1650 is significantly quieter than the Kilo class, indeed perhaps only 2-3 decibels quieter at most. When it comes to submarine sounds, there are a number of ways that submarines can be made quieter, but as part of that discussion size does matter. These folks who talk about sound underwater and focus on propulsion really don't know what they are talking about - there are far more significant factors than type of propulsion plant a submarine has that determines the decibel level of a submarine.

In the case of the Kilo, its larger size allows for more technology and design characteristics that make the class remarkably quiet. The Amur-1650 is smaller than a Kilo, and while I believe it is probably quieter, I don't think the difference would be much - and one would have to factor the smaller payload capacity and shorter range the Amur has compared to the Kilo in this decision.

Personally, I think India should go for the French DCNS Scorpene MESMA submarines, because there are savings in the support costs when operating 12 of one type of submarine vs six versions of 2 different types of submarines. The way the Indian Navy buys small batches of different types of ships makes logistics and maintenance look really ugly for the Indian Navy.

The US Navy's Submarine Numbers Challenge

Aviation Weekly's Michael Fabey is reporting on the shortage of Virginia class submarine numbers in the 30 ship plan submitted last year with the FY 2011 budget.

The Navy’s so-called 30-year shipbuilding plan, as updated for Fiscal 2009 and earlier years, showed the SSN force recovering to 48 boats by the early 2030s, the CRS pointed out. But the latest update indicated that benchmark may not be made after all. “The Navy’s new Fiscal 2011 30-year (fiscal years 2011-2040) plan shows the SSN remaining below 48 boats through 2040. The change is due to a reduction in planned SSN procurements,” CRS reported. “The Fiscal 2009 plan included procurement of 53 SSNs over 30 years, while the Fiscal 2011 plan includes procurement of 44 SSNs over 30 years.”

The reduction in SSN procurements in the Fiscal 2011 plan, the CRS reported, may be due in large part to the planned procurement of 12 next-generation SSBNs (nuclear-powered strategic ballistic-missile submarines) in Fiscal 2019-2033. “The Fiscal 2009 plan did not account for the cost of these 12 SSBNs, while the Fiscal 2011 does, apparently causing reductions in planned procurement rates for SSNs and other types of ships during that period,” the CRS reported.

You can find a copy of the CRS report here. The topic is discussed in detail beginning on page 6. The report shows a graph where the number of attack submarines bottoms out to 40 in 2029, after which the number does not reach the QDR requirement of 48 by 2040. The CRS report discusses several options that could increase the number by as many as 4 to a low mark of 44, but none of these options prevent the number of submarines from dropping below the QDR number of 48.

It is an interesting problem, but ultimately it comes down to availability of money - and there is no money available. If numbers really matter, then the only real option is to look into one option not listed in the CRS report - building smaller, reduced range conventional submarines. Absent a forward basing strategy (and we do plan on forward basing submarines in Guam, for example), I am not sure building conventional submarines is a good idea for the US.

On the other hand, if US submarine activities around Africa, South America, and Europe can be conducted effectively by conventional submarines, then perhaps now is the right time for the US Navy to build conventional submarines and base them all in the Atlantic fleet, allowing the US Navy to meet the SSN requirement for the Pacific. Now would also be a good time to make the change, as the design costs could be shared with allies like Australia who is working on building a large, conventional fleet submarine - not to mention what could be gained by working with Japan who is expanding their fleet of conventional submarines.

The one point that must be understood is that conventional submarines are not as capable as nuclear submarines. Despite the popular commentary on the internet otherwise, it really isn't even a close debate. The only way I see conventional submarines as a legitimate option is if it could be done as some sort of stimulus (with money that doesn't actually appear to exist) in addition to the existing nuclear submarine plan that falls short. Short of building a dozen conventional submarines with extra money obtained somehow, I do not see conventional submarines in the future of the US Navy even while I acknowledge there are enormous benefits to the US Navy building and operating conventional submarines.

I ultimately think the US Navy wants to reduce the requirement and use unmanned vehicles as a way to meet forward operating requirements. Given how slow unmanned technology underwater is developing, that may not be an option. Ultimately, short of a new conventional submarine program forced upon the Navy by Congress (which is not a bad idea either because it could be used as a much needed energy technology development initiative) - there may not be a solution coming from the Navy to meet the 48 attack submarine requirement as outlined by the QDR.

Maybe the DoD Didn't Whiff as Much as Suggested?

A week ago I suggested that new photos give the impression that the DoD may have whiffed when it came to the discussion of Yuan class submarine production in China in DoDs most recently released Report on PLA military developments (PDF).

The most recent photos however suggest maybe the DoD was more accurate than I gave them credit for.

It is very hard to figure out what is going on, because there are a lot of people calling the submarine in the front of these photos a Type 039B (Yuan class). With all due respect, that is not a Yuan class - that is clearly something completely different and new. If you look behind the submarine in the front of these pictures (click to see larger versions), you will note there is a second submarine in the picture behind it - and that is what appears to be a new Yuan class submarine. The presence of the second submarine suggests the DoD report on PLA Navy submarine activity is accurate - and Yuan class submarine expansion is continuing.

What does this mean? It means that while China is indeed expanding the number of Yuan class submarines in service, China has also already put to sea the next generation of SSK - which raises questions regarding what the rate of construction for SSKs might be in China right now.

If the DoDs latest PLA Navy report claims 4 fielded Yuan class submarines, and the DoD report was written regarding last years developments - then what we see in the background of these pictures is probably the 5th Yuan class submarine. For purposes of review, here are pictures that compared the first three, and here was the 4th. Keep in mind the 4th Yuan was photographed in September of 2008, which would be why it was counted in the 2010 PLA Navy report (which reviews the year 2009).

The DoDs China report claims that as many as 4 Yuan class are already in service (as of the end of 2009). As the first Yuan class entered service in 2006, the rate appears to be 1 per year, and we also know based on visual evidence that each of the 4 is slightly different than the other. With a Yuan now popping up in October 2010, and the 4th Yuan photographed in September 2008, one question might be whether or not a 5th Yuan was produced last year but no photograph was taken. Wuhan has proven in the past to be capable of producing at least 3 SSKs per year, and would appear they recently built at least 2 SSKs at one time.

We do not know what the rate of construction is at Wuhan, and I believe rate of construction of the various Chinese shipyards is a key piece of information missing from DoD reports. Seeing two SSKs, and recognizing they represent two different classes altogether, suggests that the rate of construction of 2 per year is the current rate. If that is the case, and Wuhan is producing 1 Yuan a year - then perhaps China has built 5 Yuan class and started a new class with this Russian looking Kilo sail - Lada hull looking submarine in these pictures.

In the end we know a little and don't know a lot - and the US Navy seems keen on not revealing much regarding what they know. I find this problematic to be honest, because by not spilling the goods on Chinese shipyard activity the US Navy doesn't hold China's lack of transparency in check. Without classified clearance, withholding information on PLA Navy shipyard activity seems to make it very difficult to have a public debate regarding the level of threat China poses at a time when everyone knows China is currently undertaking a major military buildup.

I tend to think the lack of transparency from China, compounded by the lack of transparency by the United States regarding the PLA Navy buildup, undercuts all public arguments regarding the threat China poses. That may be the intentional policy at work, but that policy is pretty hypocritical at a time when Congress is having the US Navy put more carriers and submarines in the Pacific when specifically citing the reason for the Pacific fleet increase to be the rise of China.

So what have we learned? That in the next PLA report for Congress the DoD can safely claim 5 Yuan class submarines and 1 new SSK class of submarines that appears to be heavily influenced by Russian SSK designs. Either way, one thing we can also note is that each new class of Chinese SSKs appears to be getting bigger and more modern - and with those characteristics the one thing we can imply is that they are being built with greater range.

As of right now, based on the best public information, the PLA Navy has 12 Kilo class submarines, 13 Song class submarines, 5 Yuan class submarines, and one of whatever this new class is - for a total of 31 new SSKs acquired since 1995 (15 years). That does not count the 9 unimpressive Ming class (Type 035s) acquired over the same period, although by counting the Ming class it should be noted the rate of construction for SSKs in China is actually 28 SSKs built in China over the last 15 years - a figure that doesn't count the 12 SSKs acquired from Russia.

What troubles me the most though is the growth rate of a Naval force capable of adding 40 new conventional submarines to a fleet over a 15 year period. It seems to me that rapidly expanding the number of submarines is one way to rapidly expand the experience pool of submariners of a nation.

Did the DoD Whiff on PLA Navy Submarines?

I went back and reviewed the annual report to Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China for 2010 (PDF) and it looks like the DoD whiffed on PLA Navy submarine developments - and whiffed badly. If the point of the document is to inform the public and Congress on Chinese military developments, it seems to me a few important points were left undisclosed.

On page 3 the report states:

China has 13 SONG-class (Type 039) diesel-electric attack submarines (SS) in its inventory. The SONG-class SS is designed to carry the YJ-82 ASCM. The follow-on to the SONG is the YUAN-class SS, as many as four of which are already in service. China may plan to construct 15 additional hulls for this class. The YUAN class SS are armed similarly to the SONG class SS, but also include a possible air independent propulsion system. The SONG SS, YUAN SS, and SHANG SSN will be capable of launching the new CH-SS-NX-13 ASCM, once the missile completes development and testing.

I'm willing to believe there are 4 Yuan class submarines, but what appears to be completely inaccurate is that China may plan to construct 15 additional hulls of the Yuan class. The problem is the picture of the submarine Feng posted on Sunday (see picture above) is not a Yuan class (regardless what Chinese bloggers call it), and is also not a Song class nor a Kilo class.

We are looking at something new and distinct, and the more I studied this picture the more it looks to me like it might be a PLA Navy variant that combines characteristics of the Yuan class with characteristics of the brand new Russian Lada class SSK. That picture probably has the cyber cops in Russia going over the computer systems at the Russian Rubin Design Bureau with a fine tooth comb, because it looks fairly clear to me like the Центральное конструкторское бюро "Рубин" took a Swiss cheese approach to security and failed to prevent China from stealing some submarine designs.

When I raised this point with someone who knows a hell of a lot more about submarines than I do, I was pleased to learn that Janes seems to think there are some similarities as well.

While not much larger than the 3,000- to 4,000-ton Type 041 Yuan class, the new boat appears to incorporate Russian design influences, including a stouter hull with a reduced aft taper similar to the Project 667 Lada/Amur class, plus an elongated sail and hull-mounted retractable hydroplanes similar to the Project 636 Kilo class. However, in contrast to the sail of the Kilo, the new Chinese SSK incorporates hydrodynamic elements such as an intricately-faired leading edge with concave and convex curves.

Here is all we actually know - the evolution of Chinese shipbuilding in producing technologies is taking place on a curve that continues to exceed the expectations and projections made by the DoD in their public documents like the annual report to Congress on the Chinese military. When China continues to outpace expectations and projections, it raises serious questions about whether the United States will be timely should China - with their 65 operational shipyards - decide to expand their naval production at a higher rate.

I think as we see China continue to incorporate the latest modern Russian technology, it is within that context we note that Russia is looking towards the west for help with their military. Our strategist can now legitimately start pondering the question - at what point does Beijing become a greater national security concern to Moscow than Washington, DC? We should also seek the answers to another question - are we accurately projecting the PLA Navy technological evolution, and if not, what are our options in addressing their technological gains that appear to be outpacing our estimates and expectations?

Securing American Maritime Boundaries

When I started my blog Information Dissemination in 2007, I made the conscious decision to use a pseudonym from my days as an iRCop - Galrahn. The intention behind using a nickname was to focus the readers attention on the content of what was being written, rather than who was doing the writing. The maritime services - and indeed topics like maritime strategy and maritime security - are topics where the details are important to insiders but can sometimes be boring to average Americans. The citizens of our country no longer feel the same connection to the ocean as it relates to our livelihood as Americans once did in the early years of our country. I can be a long-winded writer though, and my tactic was to suck people into my message with just enough information to be insightful, educational, and hopefully interesting and entertaining. Like all bloggers - my success rates may vary.

My inspiration behind using a nickname was my favorite founding father and fellow New Yorker Alexander Hamilton, who along with James Madison and John Jay published the Federalist Papers from fall of 1787 until the spring of 1788. On September 17, 1787, the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia had approved a new constitution and sent it to the Continental Congress, which ten days later sent it to the states for ratification. It was a difficult period for America in those first years after the Revolutionary War - the country was broke and heavily in debt; and Congress under the Articles of Confederation had no power to raise funds. Our founding fathers believed the federal system under the Articles of Confederation was fatally flawed, and the country would not survive without a stronger federal system.

It was Alexander Hamilton's idea to publish a series of essays urging ratification of the new Constitution, and he threw himself into the work producing 51 individual essays in four months. James Madison added 29 and John Jay wrote 5. All were published under the pseudonym "Publius." The Federalist papers, as they are known today, were printed in four New York newspapers between October 1787 and May 1788.

In his book Six Frigates: The Epic History of the Founding of the U.S. Navy, Ian W. Toll describes how the Federalist papers revealed the importance of maritime security in the minds of our founding fathers.

Hamilton's Federalist essays made a ringing case for "active commerce, an extensive navigation, and a flourishing marine." (No. 11) It was America's destiny to trade by sea, and "the little arts of the little politicians" could never "control or vary the irresistible and unchangeable course of nature." The major Europeans powers were determined to suppress the growth of American trade -- to "clip the wings by which we might soar to a dangerous greatness." If America was serious about asserting her maritime rights and protecting her hard-won independence, "we must endeavor, as soon as possible, to have a navy." (No. 24) Madison pointed to the vulnerability of the nation's long, unfortified coastline. Those living near the sea, north and south, should be "deeply interested in this provision for naval protection." (No. 41) Without a navy to defend them, they were vulnerable to the "predatory spirit of licentious adventurers," and would sooner or later be "compelled to ransom themselves from the terrors of a conflagration, by yielding to the exactions of daring and sudden invaders."

Today these words are even more applicable, indeed with 90% of the worlds trade taking place by sea today - there remains an inherent bond between freedom and access to the sea and the United States of America. Today is the first day of Homeland Security 2020: The Future of Defending the Homeland conference at the Heritage Foundation. The panels for the day will include:

1000-1100: Defending Domestic Waters: U.S. Maritime Security Policies

Mr. Michael Barrett, President of Diligent Innovations and former Director of Strategy, Homeland Security Council, White House

Mr. Adam Salerno, Senior Manager, U.S. Chamber of Commerce

1100-1200: Programs, platforms, and People: Public Sector Capabilities for 2020

VADM Terry Cross, USCG (Ret), Vice President for Homeland Security Programs, EADS-NA, and former USCG Vice Commandant

Dr. Steve Bucci, Associate Partner and Cyber Security Lead, Global Leadership Initiative at IBM Global; former DASD for Homeland Defense and Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

America's Maritime Challenge

The CIA World Factbook lists the land boundaries of the United States as 12,034 kilometers (7,477 miles), and the coastline as 19,924 km (12,380 miles). The CIA World Factbook breaks down the land boundaries further to include 8,893km (5,526 miles) for Canada (including 2,477 km or 1,539 miles with Alaska), and 3,141km (1,951 miles) for Mexico.

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration lists the US coastline as 12,383 miles. Most organizations who use geography figures of the US coast line cite the numbers provided by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration instead of the CIA Factbook, but maybe the CIA knows something about those 3 miles that the rest of us don't know?

The Learning Network has a breakdown of coastline length by state using the 12,383 mile coastline figures of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The 12,383 miles of United States coast line includes 2,069 miles of Atlantic coastline, 1,631 miles of Gulf coastline, 7,623 miles of Pacific coastline, and 1,060 miles of Arctic coastline along Alaska's northern border.

Following 9/11 the US government gave priority to port security as the maritime defense layer in most need of security. While Congress has passed legislation to protect America’s ports, it’s important to evaluate the effectiveness of the legislation passed, as well as that of intelligence measures taken since 9/11. 90% of the worlds trade is transported by sea, and an attack on a major port would have serious economic impacts to America. In every maritime security conference I have been to, port security is usually the first and foremost topic.

But in the conference at the Heritage Foundation today I hope to learn more about three other topics that I believe requires the constant attention of our national political leaders if they are to truly address the dynamic change of the maritime security environment around our nations maritime borders.

The Coast Guard

The United States Coast Guard is a national treasure, but it is also taking on water at a phenomenal rate. The material condition of the Coast Guard has long passed the tipping point, and the funding necessary to provide the manpower and training for the US Coast Guard to address the emerging roles and missions of the 21st century has not been provided. It is a real credit to the men and women of the US Coast Guard that they are able to do what they do, because every single day they are - in my opinion - carrying more responsibility with less money provided than any agency in the Federal government today.

The budget and size of the Coast Guard is out-of-sync with the responsibilities being tasked. According to a recent tally by Rep. James Oberstar, D-Minn., in the past 35 years Congress has handed the agency at least 27 new responsibilities. Prior to the BP oil spill in the Gulf, the Obama administration planned to cut Coast Guard personnel by 773, decommission five large cutters, retire four HU-25 Falcon medium-range surveillance aircraft, retire five HH-65 Dolphin search-and-rescue helicopters, and dissolve five 90-person marine safety and security teams next year. Following the BP oil spill, Congress has added minor increases to personnel end-strength for offshore oil monitoring, canceled the elimination of around 1,100 billets, and decreased the number of ships and aircraft scheduled for decommissioning. These adjustments are token changes and fall well short of what is necessary to strengthen the Coast Guard.

The FY 2011 budget for the Coast Guard is $10.1 billion (PDF) - 4% less than the FY 2010 budget. The Acquisition & Construction budget in FY 2011 for the entire Coast Guard is $1.536 billion - about 70% the shipbuilding cost of a single US Navy destroyer. The material condition of the US Coast Guard is not good by any standard. The US Coast Guard operates 250 cutters 65' or more, and the average age of those cutters is 41 years old.

“No amount of maintenance can outpace the ravages of age,” retired Coast Guard Commandant Thad Allen said in a recent speech. “The condition of our fleet continues to deteriorate, putting our crews at risk and jeopardizing our ability to do the job.” Of the 12 major cutters assigned to Haiti relief operations, 10 of the cutters (87%) suffered mission-altering breakdowns. In the immediate hours following the explosion on DEEPWATER HORIZON, no less than 3 Coast Guard aircraft were unable to respond due to maintenance problems. In February of 2010, Mackenzie Eaglen of the Heritage Foundation made an applicable analogy:

The mismatched demands of the nation and the President’s budget cuts for the Coast Guard are unacceptable. One can only imagine the outcome—and outrage—if 83 percent of the fleet assigned to the Battle of Midway had to return to Pearl Harbor for emergency repairs. The Coast Guard should not be held to lower standards.

The DEEPWATER HORIZON explosion is only one symptom of a larger problem related to the Coast Guard being able to meet the responsibilities they have been tasked by our national leaders, and the Gulf oil spill is only a taste of the real economic disaster that awaits any nation with insufficient capabilities in maritime security and protection.

Technology Evolutions

In November of 2006, a Coast Guard cutter operating 100 miles off Costa Rica observed a strange blur in the water. Upon investigation, spotters on the cutter observed what appeared to be several snorkels poking up out of the water. It turned out to be a self-propelled, semisubmersible built in the jungles of Colombia carrying 3 tons of cocaine. Nicknamed "Bigfoot" the simisubmersible is now on display at Truman Annex, Naval Air Station Key West in Florida.

In 2009 officials estimated that 70 such simisubmersibles are now being constructed every year, and it is estimated only 14% are interdicted as they transfer narcotics from source to destination. In 2009 simisubmersibles were believed to carry 30% of Columbia's total cocaine exports. The cost to build a drug smuggling simisubmersible is around $500,000, and simisubmersibles are only used for a single trip. However, it is a remarkably affordable way to smuggle drugs into the United States.

The street value for 1 kilogram of cocaine in the United States can be averaged at $20,000. These simisubmersibles can transport between 3 and 7 tons of cocaine, and one short ton contains about 907 kilograms. That puts the street value of one simisubmersible full of 3 tons of cocaine at just over $54 million. At $54 million the transport costs using simisubmersibles with a 3 ton payload from South America to the United States is below 1% of the total street value.

In the 21st century, the rate of technological change drug cartels and other non-state actors have demonstrated is remarkable. In just the last 10 years, the drug trade has gone from go-fast speed boats to simisubmersibles to - as recently discovered in July 2010 in Ecuador - full midget submarine technology. Leveraging tides that ebb and flow through the rivers and tributaries in South America, simisubmersibles and submarines are being constructed well away from the coast in swamp areas sometimes as much as a hundred miles inland.

At roughly 30m long, the drug smuggling midget submarine found in Ecuador is roughly the same size as the midget submarine suspected of sinking the South Korean warship Cheonan, albeit far less sophisticated than its North Korean counterpart. Leveraging off the shelf technologies like the Hummingbird depth finder and GPS technologies, Jay Bergman, Andean regional director for the DEA, told CNN the submarine costs about $4 million to build. As a fully submersible submarine capable of carrying 10 tons of cocaine and reusable unlike its simisubmersible counterparts, one can see how the full submarine approach would be more cost effective - thus more likely to be used - by drug cartels in the future.

Now that midget submarines have transitioned from a theoretical capability used off the US coast to an actual capability to be used off the US coast, how does this influence the resource and training plans of the US Coast Guard? If the drug cartels are already using submarine technologies, what happens when organizations with more nefarious plans than smuggling narcotics develop these capabilities to use off the shores of the United States? The United States is not only unprepared for these types of challenges, there is little evidence that Congress is taking the rapid technological evolution of maritime threats seriously. Asking tough questions about US Coast Guard sonar technologies and training highlights the significance of the challenge the US faces today - much less the near future.

America's Arctic Problem

In September of 2008 the MV Camilla Desgagnés, owned by Desgagnés Transarctik Inc., transported cargo from Montreal to the hamlets of Cambridge Bay, Kugluktuk, Gjoa Haven and Taloyoak through the Northwest Passage. The transit marked the first time supplies were delivered to communities in western Nunavut from an Eastern port.

In 2009 two German ships, the Beluga Fraternity and the Beluga Foresight left the Russian port of Vladivostok with cargo picked up in South Korea bound for Holland. The traditional route for the ships would have been through the western Pacific towards the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean over to the Suez Canal, and out through the Strait of Gibraltar up to Holland for a total of roughly 11,000 nautical miles (12,658 miles). Using the Northeast Passage over Russia, the ships cut ~4,000 nautical miles from that trip and saved roughly $300,000 - of which $100,000 was in fuel savings alone. With permission from Russia to make the trip, the nuclear powered icebreaker 50 Years Since Victory escorted the two freighters through the Northeast Passage.

Last week the Barents Observer reported that the 100,000 ton tanker “Baltica” left Murmansk loaded with gas condensate for China escorted by 3 nuclear powered icebreakers. This is the first time a high-tonnage tanker will take the Northern Sea Route from Europe to Asia. The Northeast Passage will cut ~5,000 miles from usual route taken around Africa, as a 100,000 ton tankers are too large for the Suez canal.

As the Northwest and Northeast Passages open up new sea trade opportunities, it is important to note that regardless of which route is taken, both routes will increase the number of ships transiting in US waters - as both routes require ships to pass through the Bering Strait. Alaska has 1,060 miles of Arctic Ocean coastline of which any vessel utilizing the Northwest Passage will transit through. What the United States does not have today is any operational heavy icebreakers to escort and insure safety of navigation in those icy waters.

The Coast Guard has two heavy polar icebreakers — Polar Star (WAGB-10) and Polar Sea (WAGB-11). The Polar Star is not operational and has been in what is called "caretaker status" since July 1, 2006. Congress has provided funding to repair Polar Star and return it to service for 7 to 10 years, and the Coast Guard expects Polar Star reactivation to be completed by 2013.

On June 25, 2010, the Coast Guard announced that Polar Sea had suffered an unexpected engine problem and consequently will likely be unavailable for operation until at least January 2011. That leaves the United States currently without any operational heavy polar icebreakers.

The Coast Guard also operates a third polar icebreaker — Healy — which entered service in 2000. Compared to Polar Star and Polar Sea, the medium polar icebreaker Healy has less icebreaking capability but more capability for supporting scientific research - and is primarily used supporting scientific research in the Arctic.

With 1,060 miles of Alaskan Arctic coastline, and by international law the United States claims out to 200 miles of that coastline to be part of the American economic exclusion zone; how can our nation afford to have ZERO operational heavy icebreakers today? If I had a penny for every time I have heard a news anchor or politician say "Global Warming" on Television, our nation could buy 10 heavy icebreakers - and yet in 2010 we have none.

The Arctic policy of the United States has no political leadership at all, because there isn't a single US politician who would take responsibility for a policy we have no capabilities today to enforce policy with. There is significant global economic potential should either the Northwest or Northeast Passages become a viable sea trade route between Europe and Asia, which means the shipping industry will be exploring these trade routes over the next few years. While politicians in America will openly discuss scientific theory related to global warming, there is a tangible economic and maritime boundary issue for the United States taking place in plain sight today related to climate changes impact to global maritime commerce trade patterns that could result in US territory - the Bering Strait - becoming a crowded sea trade choke point in the very near future. The US economic exclusion zone off the Alaskan coastline is a marine resource, a potential energy resource, and a possible economic trade resource that the United States must be prepared to protect.

The condition of the United States Coast Guard, the technology evolutions by non-state actors and criminals in the 21st century, and the missing-in-action US Arctic Policy represent three homeland security concerns along our nations maritime borders that are evolving at a pace greater than our nations political leaders in Washington are adapting. I look forward to the Heritage Foundation Homeland Security 2020 event today in hopes that these issues are discussed thoughtfully and inform our national leaders on how the United States can best address these and other emerging challenges off our nations shorelines.