Showing posts with label Vietnam. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Vietnam. Show all posts

Friday, September 30, 2024

Another Hawk in the Party Calls for PLA Military Action in South China Sea

Today we see another Chinese hawk advocating military action, this time against the Philippines and Vietnam. I encourage everyone to read the entire editorial. Be careful to neither casually dismiss nor overstate the importance of this editorial, because this is a sanctioned editorial by the Party's mouthpiece Global Times, but it also only one of many opinions among Chinese Party leadership regarding how to manage the South China Sea tensions over energy resources. The author is identified as the strategic analyst of China Energy Fund Committee.
It’s very amusing to see some of the countries vow to threaten or even confront China with force just because the US announced that it has “returned to Asia.”

The tension of war is escalating second by second but the initiative is not in our hand. China should take part in the exploitation of oil and gas in South China Sea.

For those who infringe upon our sovereignty to steal the oil, we need to warn them politely, and then take action if they don’t respond.

We shouldn’t waste the opportunity to launch some tiny-scale battles that could deter provocateurs from going further.

By the way, I think it’s necessary to figure out who is really afraid of being involved in military activities. There are more than 1,000 oil and gas wells plus four airports and numerous other facilities in the area but none of them is built by China.

Everything will be burned to the ground should a military conflict break out. Who’ll suffer most when Western oil giants withdraw?

But out there could just be an ideal place to punish them. Such punishment should be restricted only to the Philippines and Vietnam, who have been acting extremely aggressive these days.
The impacts of nationalism will only create more tension between the cautious and hawkish elements of the Party moving forward. The other issue is that there are as many reasons to be concerned with the leadership changes next year as there are to be heartened.

It is a time of change in China. A time when outsiders should be both excited for the future of China while remaining cautious of that future as well. Predicting the results of the rapid growth in China with any accuracy is very difficult. Beware of all who aren't very cautious of China's intentions, because even Chinese leaders can't predict the future as they focus on the consolidation of their own power while balancing their intentional nationalism against the tensions that result from greater demands of a rapidly growing society.

It does concern me that we see ranking members of the Party in the Energy sector aligned with the hawks of the PLA, because it fits easily into the discussions and analysis regarding why China would take a more militarily hawkish policy towards other nations, including their regional neighbors.

Tuesday, July 12, 2024

"He's a Procurement Officer"

On models of civil-military interaction:
CJCS Admiral Thomas Moorer: The flow shifts back and forth. And it’s very difficult, almost impossible, to run that from Washington. And so far as the reports to you are concerned, let me tell you right now, that if I am directed to give the reports you will get them precisely when you ask. But I am not running this reporting business. And I am passing the information up to the Secretary of Defense and it’s being run from up there, but it’s—
President Richard Nixon: Right. I am directing you—
Moorer: If you want me to do it, I can do it—
Nixon: I am directing you, and if the Secretary of Defense raises the questions, I am directing you. I have to have them directly, and they must be unsanitized. And also when an order goes, it’s got to go from me. The Secretary of Defense is not Commander in Chief. The Secretary of Defense does not make decisions on these kinds of things—
Moorer: I understand that, Mr. President—
Nixon: He’s a procurement officer. That’s what he is and not another goddamn thing. And from now on this has got to be done this way. So under these circumstances we can go. Now, getting back to this thing, let’s see what kind of an excuse is being developed here.
Hat tip to Carl Prine. My initial thought regarding this snippet is that Nixon is acting entirely appropriately by exercising his authority, but that he's inviting some danger by undermining the authority of the Secretary of Defense. Of course, the relationship between SecDef, President, and CJCS was different before Goldwater-Nichols. Thoughts?

Monday, June 27, 2024

What to Watch For This Week

There are six big issues this week I will be watching closely.

South Korea will be conducting military exercises all week near the city of Paju near the DMZ. While South Korea conducts exercises along the DMZ all the time, I keep thinking we are going to see another North Korean action in the very near future. The reports of the Army struggling with malnutrition is particularly troubling, and on Tuesday the US women's soccer team is going to kick the snot out of the North Korean women's soccer team at the Women's World Cup in Germany. If you get a chance, look for photo's of the two teams side by side before the game. It is going to look like a competition between the women and the girls, and the North Korean soccer team isn't malnourished like the rest of that nation.

Russia will continue testing the Bulava missile on June 28th. One of the really interesting aspects of this launch is that Russia intends to stream the launch live on the Russian Defense Ministries website. That is either a sign of confidence in the missile program after very difficult development pains or political desperation given how much money has been spent. I am less concerned than apparently most of you regarding the conventional military power of Russia, but I am concerned about Russia's nuclear inventory. Nuclear weapons remain Russia's most influential and most leveraged political weapon.

There is diplomatic movement in the territorial dispute between China and Vietnam. The Wall Street Journal is reporting that there is a resolution, while the New York Times is reporting that both sides have agreed to sit down and discuss the issue. I tend to think the Wall Street Journal mistook the announcement for talks about the issue as an actual resolution to the territorial dispute, and the New York Times reporting is more accurate. Regardless, the possibility the US could get diplomatically involved is one of the factors driving a diplomatic solution from China. I would suggest Hillary Clinton has once again positively influenced the region with her speech last year regarding US policy of South China Sea territorial disputes in ways that most people do not truly appreciate.

It is unclear what will happen with the "peace" flotilla that sailed to run the Gaza blockade. Egypt is playing a positive role, and other nations have also played positive roles in preventing a confrontation. Much of the international will ignore how running a naval blockade is an act of war, but Israel's naval blockade of Gaza is an act of war, which makes whining about rockets into Israel nothing more than a complaint by Israel that the enemy is fighting back. The big difference here is that the war is between Israel and Gaza, not those of the blockade who make themselves enemy combatants in a war zone intentionally. Israel isn't only within their right to stop the flotilla, but also within their legal rights under international law to sink the ships outright. Yeah that would be the height of political stupidity, but Israel will stop the flotilla at any cost.

The TFG in Somalia is making things harder for everyone on the piracy issue. On May 24 six private security personnel were arrested and $3.6 million intended for paying a pirate ransom was seized by the TFG in the name of anti-piracy efforts. While the six people have been released due to Presidential pardon (read external political pressure), the bottom line is ransom money will now have to be delivered in ways that get around the TFG. This comes as it is reported that London insurance companies now pull in more than $120 million a year from Somali piracy, while the United Nations reports ransoms last year totaled just over $110 million. The areas where piracy insurance is required in the Indian Ocean have expanded, so expect a much higher figure than $120 million for insurance companies this year. Bottom line, governments everywhere are part of the problem because none of them are willing to commit to a real solution, and the shipping industry is caught trying to manage their own interests against an assault of some kind from all sides.

Finally, ex-Varyag goes to sea trials on Friday. No need to discuss this one, I'm pretty sure everyone will be watching and there will be plenty of things said. The aspect of this event I am watching for is what China says about it.

A bonus thought:

People have long asked where Somali pirates are getting all of their good intelligence from. They seem to know where the easy to hit ships will be, by name and all. There is ample evidence that Somali pirates are not working with Iran and they also do not appear to work in coordination with any Al Qaeda affiliated groups. One of the biggest questions that has popped up as a result of several different events over the last several months is how much influence and apparent connectivity ISI Chief Ahmed Shuja Pasha has with Somali pirate leaders. My sense is the relationship between Somali pirates and the ISI is the next big pirate story on the verge of busting into the media.

(Picture at the top caught my attention. Some will get it, some won't. Click for more information.)

Friday, June 24, 2024

Rules of Engagement in the South China Sea

Over the past 2 weeks I have been closely following the activities taking place in the South China Sea. It is worth noting that the tensions between China and the Philippines have advanced far enough that political leadership in the Philippines wants clarification regarding rules of engagement.
Lawmakers on Thursday urged the House of Representatives leadership to summon officials of the Department of National Defense (DND) so that they can brief Congress on the ongoing security situation in the West Philippine Sea.

The House also wants to find out the specific mission orders and rules of engagement issued to BRP Rajah Humabon and other maritime assets which are conducting sovereignty patrols in the disputed Spratly Group of Islands.

Davao City Rep. Karlo Alexei Nograles said the Chamber headed by Speaker Feliciano Belmonte Jr. can ask the DND and representatives of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), particularly the Philippine Navy (PN), to brief the House on the parameters of the country's assertion of its sovereignty over its territories in the West Philippine Sea.

This is very important, Nograles said, because while the Philippines is committed to protecting its sovereignty and its right to defend itself from foreign intrusion, "Congress needs to be apprised on what to expect under different possible scenarios."

"We should know how we are going to respond, especially in a worst case scenario because while it is true that although we have to protect our territories even if we are a small nation with a very ill-equipped Armed Forces, this act of sending BRP Rajah Humabon to conduct sovereignty patrols could be viewed as an act of brinkmanship," he said.

"A single act of hostility from either side could spark a shooting war and we definitely do not want that to happen," he added.
This comes after the topic of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and Philippines was raised earlier this week when Hillary Clinton promised the United States stands with the Philippines, although I do believe there are still some questions as to what exactly that means.

The US is also looking to arm up the Philippines, which is obviously necessary given the near absence of any legitimate naval capability by the Philippines. China responded to Hillary Clinton's remarks unfavorably, as one would expect.

China has recently completed 2 naval exercises in the South China Sea - one large exercise involving forces of the South Sea Fleet and a smaller naval exercise with Vietnam. Tensions between China and Vietnam are just as strained as they are between China and the Philippines due to similar incursions in the South China Sea. Vietnam has a stronger military and coastal security force than the Philippines does though, so the dynamic between those nations is very different.

As schedules would have it, it is time for our annual naval exercise with Vietnam while CARAT moves to the Philippines. The presence of the US Navy in the region is likely to add more political rhetoric to the tensions. The US is always forward deployed in the Pacific though, so there really isn't anything new here to note. For those who are curious, the Essex and George Washington will be at sea more over the next few months, but again that isn't new either - the calendar just changed to summer meaning it is time for the summer patrols.

It is hard to imagine an all out shooting war breaking out in the context of all this tension, indeed there is no public evidence anyone involved wants to see that happen based on political comments. With that said, there is also no evidence anyone is ready to back down, and we are at the stage where rules of engagement for the possibility of a military engagement is being discussed at the highest levels of government. That suggests to me some kind of incident may be looming large over the horizon.

As I have watched this unfold, my guess is this is intentionally leading to an incident. As unlikely as it may sound to some, the United States is in a terrible political position with these events and our credibility in the Pacific may be heading for a serious challenge. China is dead serious about these territories. As I have been watching all of this unfold, I am starting to think China may be looking to test the strength of our mutual defense treaty with the Philippines by inciting a major, but isolated incident. China knows a one time incident will not be responded to in any meaningful way by the United States, and also knows they can leverage our inaction in support of the Philippines as part of their political influence throughout the rest of the region.

If you are looking for a quick review of events unfolding in the South China Sea, I recommend this recap by Sen. James Inhofe (R-Okla.) over at The Hill. The map above can be used to reference where most of these activities are taking place relative to the Philippines. As you can see, these islands are nowhere near China, all of them 400-500+ miles away from China while being within the Philippines EEZ.

Monday, June 6, 2024

Tensions Rise in the South China Sea

From the International Institute for Security Studies (Shangri-La Dialogue) as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Shangri-La Hotel, Singapore, Saturday, June 04, 2011. Full transcript here, but this section caught my attention.
Maritime security remains an issue of particular importance for the region, with questions about territorial claims and the appropriate use of the maritime domain presenting on-going challenges to regional stability and prosperity. The U.S. position on maritime security remains clear: we have a national interest in freedom of navigation; in unimpeded economic development and commerce; and in respect for international law. We also believe that customary international law, as reflected in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, provides clear guidance on the appropriate use of the maritime domain, and rights of access to it. By working together in appropriate regional and multilateral fora, and adhering to principles that we believe are of benefit to all in the region, we can ensure that all share equal and open access to international waterways.

Experience consistently shows that pursuing our common interests together increases our common security. As I have stated before, providing for security and upholding the principles I mentioned earlier is not the task of any one nation alone, but the shared responsibility of all nations. This is the one reason we have placed a premium on building the partner capacity of friends in the region and enhancing the role of multilateral cooperation and organizations in Asia-Pacific security affairs.

Even so, we recognize that the American defense engagement - from our forward deployed forces to exercises with regional partners - will continue to play an indispensable role in the stability of the region. Although much of the press in both the United States and the region has been focused in recent years on our efforts to modernize our basing arrangements with traditional allies in Northeast Asia - and our commitment to those efforts is absolute - we’ve taken a number of steps towards establishing a defense posture across the Asia Pacific that is more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. A posture that maintains our presence in Northeast Asia while enhancing our presence in Southeast Asia and into the Indian Ocean.

For example, this past November, the U.S. and Australia established a force posture working group tasked with expanding opportunities for our two militaries to train and operate together - to include alliance arrangements that would allow for more combined defense activities and shared use of facilities.

Together, we are evaluating a range of options, including:
  • Increasing our combined naval presence and capabilities to respond more readily to humanitarian disasters;
  • Improving Indian Ocean facilities - a region of growing international importance; and
  • Expanding training exercises for amphibious and land operations, activities that could involve other partners in the region.
In Singapore, we are strengthening our bi-lateral defense relationship within the context of the Strategic Framework Agreement and pursuing more operational engagement - most notably, by deploying U.S. Littoral Combat Ships to Singapore. We are examining other ways to increase opportunities for our two militaries to train and operate together, to include:
  • Prepositioning supplies to improve disaster response;
  • Improving command and control capabilities; and
  • Expanding training opportunities to help prepare our forces for the challenges both militaries face operating in the Pacific.
Although we will continue to maintain and enhance our traditional presence in the Asia-Pacific region through efforts such as these, we believe that U.S. presence, and the associated impact and influences should not solely be measured in terms of conventional metrics, or “boots on the ground.” In the coming years, the U.S. military is going to be increasing its port calls, naval engagements, and multilateral training efforts with multiple countries throughout the region. These types of activities not only broaden and deepen our relationships with friends and allies, they help build partner capacity to address regional challenges.

Taken together, all of these developments demonstrate the commitment of the United States to sustaining a robust military presence in Asia - one that underwrites stability by supporting and reassuring allies while deterring, and if necessary defeating, potential adversaries.
There are few details regarding the deploying of Littoral Combat Ships to Singapore. Does that mean forward basing of ships, or just basing of modules? It is still unclear.

The region is certainly getting a lot of attention lately though. Folks may not be following it, but tensions are rising in the South China Sea. A few weeks ago it was reported that China has set up military garrisons and outposts on six islands within Philippine-claimed territory in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. This morning news from the Philippines is that the US Navy is sending the USS Chung-Hoon (DDG 93) to the region amid the escalating tensions.

There are also details out this week of recent events that involved the Chinese Navy shooting at Vietnamese and Philippine fisherman. Both articles are very detailed accounts of the actions, and are expected to be included in diplomatic protests filed with the UN this week by both nations.

Tuesday, November 9, 2024

Vietnam Gives China the Bird

Vietnam is giving the Chinese the middle finger.
Nyugen Tan Dung, the Vietnamese prime minister, said Cam Ranh Bay, 180 miles north west of Ho Chi Minh city, would stand ready to service ships and submarines "from all countries".

Russia is to help rebuild the port as part of an £1.3 billion defence deal signed earlier this year.

The move is one of a series of interlocking regional arrangements that are being put in place to counter China's growing might.

In October, Vietnam signed an agreement giving Indian naval ships base facilities at its ports. India, in turn, agreed to help Hanoi expand its naval logistics capabilities, and to train its army in jungle warfare.

Russia is selling Vietnam a raft of state of the art military hardware, including six submarines and 20 Sukhoi 30 fighters.

The port was used as a naval base for the French forces in Indochina, by the Japanese navy in 1942, by the US Navy during the Vietnam war, and by the Russians during the Cold War.

Beijing and Hanoi have been locked in an increasingly bitter dispute over the oil and gas rich South China Sea.
Observers in the west make a big deal of every little step the United States takes that is contrary to the narrative of China's manifest destiny to be the regional hegemony in the South China Sea. The biggest challenge to China's rise isn't the United States though - it is the activities of everyone else in the region.

The US is playing the part they always play - the reason for all of China's problems. Thanks almost entirely to the actions of the Chinese and the reaction of the other nations within China's sphere of influence, the reality no longer fits that narrative. When I observe the steady stream of events that have set back Chinese ambition during their rise this year, I think the US has become better positioned as not the challenge for China's assent; rather the solution.

We will see how it unfolds, but as I see things - almost every unilateral policy action taken by China this year has backfired except when China works as part of a larger coalition (anti-piracy being one of the few examples). Everyone in the DoD, and many in politics, are so ready to dismiss the CS-21 cooperative approach to security as nothing more than a noble document promoting an ivory tower methodology, and yet the results of an institutionalized approach (ADM Roughead, ADM Keating, and ADM Willard's impact) towards cooperation has changed the expectations and perceptions of power in the Pacific region.

That is not a trivial change. Vietnam could have taken a limited partnership approach with Cam Ranh Bay, but took the broadest cooperative approach instead. Give serious thought to how this move changes the South China Sea geopolitics particularly if a number of nations with an interest in the South China Sea, but not directly in the region (Japan, South Korea, Russia, US, Australia) take Vietnam up on their offer and negotiate agreements.

Wednesday, August 11, 2024

Culture Influences Partnerships

This picture comes from an album on the US Pacific Command's Facebook page.

Sometimes a picture is worth a 1000 words. This exchange is important, because it represents a cultural issue the US Navy will have as it builds a relationship with Vietnam. It also represents one potential reason why a US aircraft carrier could not be welcome to visit Vietnam.

There is a gift exchange culture in Vietnam that would make life very difficult for the relatively poor country when 5000 sailors come ashore. Gift giving is important to Vietnamese because of the significance of interpersonal relationships in Vietnamese culture, and the symbolism it has within the context of special occasions (like a US Navy destroyer partnership exchange and port call).

This picture represents one of things on my mind when I wrote the last paragraph in this article yesterday. I am not suggesting we make force structure decisions based on these issues, but I think everyone would agree that cultural issues are important when developing our partnership strategies. The USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) has a crew of around 270. I wonder how the US Navy handled the gift exchange culture with so many sailors.

I know it is a small thing, but small things matter a lot with soft power.