AQAP's Continuing Seapower Strategy

A civil war in Syria, nuke deals with Iran, and a Chinese air defense zone have dominated the attention of national security watchers and policy makers.  Even so, al Qaeda's network continues to quietly operate and plot terror in its multiple safe havens dotted across Africa  and the Middle East.


Balhaf Terminal exports up to 12.5 billion cubic meters of gas per year. 

A few years ago, I wrote about how al Qaeda has deliberately employed sea power as part of its strategy against the West.  In short, this unwritten strategy contains three elements: 1) facilitating the movement of men, money, and munitions in support of AQ's operations; 2) earning revenue to sustain operations via taxation of ports; 3) disrupting SLOCs and oil infrastructure in order to raise the cost of energy and hurt the global economy.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and its predecessors in Yemen have operationalized this strategy more than any other affiliate, with sea-borne attacks on USS COLE and MV LIMBERG, maritime facilitation to supply Somalia's al Shabaab, and a couple of amphibious-like operations along Yemen's southern coast.

Last week, AQAP again went to sea in support of the third line of operations when they attempted an attack against the Balhalf liquefied natural gas terminal, apparently foiled by Yemen's small navy.  Completed in 2010, the $4.5 billion Balhaf Liquified Natural Gas terminal exports gas from the Marib field to the coast via 320km of pipeline. The terminal and its surrounding pipelines have been the focus of a number of attacks the past few years, but this is perhaps the first water-borne attempt.

These activities may seem like small potatoes in the greater naval spectrum - and they are to a certain extent.  But taken with other irregular maritime threats proliferating globally, they represent vacuums in sea power that when filled with non-state actors have greater implications for modern navies. Is protecting oil infrastructure and defeating pirates a job for a handful of multi-billion dollar warships, or flotillas of more numerous, more affordable small combatants?  Might distributed maritime operations using both manned and unmanned vessels be a better force construct against irregular threats than CSGs and ARGs?  What is the best way for Marine Corps, joint SOF, and Navy teams to get after these rogue maritime elements in a discrete footprint, politically palatable manner?  How can naval aviation detect, track, and engage threats that blend in with local fishing and commercial traffic? When does it make sense for the US to unilaterally and quickly deal with these threats versus enabling our partners or deferring to our allies?

The views in this post are those of the author alone, presented in his personal capacity.

AQAP’s Fight From the Sea

This week’s most excellent news from the Arabian Peninsula was that long time fugitive COLE bombing planner Fahd al-Quso was exploded. But a little noticed related story was Al Qaeda’s retaliatory attack in the vicinity of Zinjibar, which killed 30+ Yemeni troops. What is most interesting about this attack is that a portion of AQAP’s fighters reportedly infiltrated via fishing boats, demonstrating a very nascent amphibious warfare capability. The importance of Zinjibar and Yemen’s Southern coast to AQ's strategy has been discussed by this author before.

In the terrorists’ own words: “Attention is drawn to the fact that for the first time the Mujahideen attacked the puppets both by land and sea. This fact testifies to the rapidly growing potential of the armed forces of AQAP.” Since the attack on COLE, Islamic militants in Yemen have occasionally promoted their “fleet” and threatened friendly shipping. So why haven’t we seen more evidence of their maritime capability? One, as special operations folks like to say, "don't confuse enthusiasm with capability."  Al Qaeda's appreciation and desire for naval power is real, but building a viable maritime capability much beyond smuggling networks and an occasional lucky attack is  challenging.  Second, since COLE, allied navies and commercial shipping have increased their awareness and hardened themselves against these sorts of attacks (we also have unchecked piracy to thank for that). Finally, these plots have likely been quietly disrupted by various counter-terrorism actions.  Nevertheless, much like AQAP’s ongoing laser-like focus on attacking Western aviation was inspired by successful 911 aviation attacks, aspirations for a useful maritime capability bolstered by the success against COLE are unlikely to wane, so ongoing attention is warranted.

And in a tangentially-connected story, four Somalis were arrested on Yemen’s Socotra Island learning how to scuba dive. Were they these guys just enjoying a sabbatical from buccaneering or do they represent another example of the al Shabaab fighters who have increasingly adjusted their sights toward jihad in Yemen as their own prospects falter in Somalia?  As AQAP still controls territory in Southern Yemen, it has become the new magnet and safe haven for foreign fighters.  Until we get serious about destroying these safe havens faster than they can regenerate, the movement will persist and the war against al Qaeda will not be won.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

The STRATCOM Opportunity of Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame

No matter where I go or who I talk to in the US Navy, the one thing folks give me a hard time about is that it is suggested I often spend too much time focusing on piracy in Somalia and not enough time discussing Al Shabaab. That is fair, I guess, although I was the guy who suggested we buy the services of pirates to fight Al Shabaab, after all at least we know the motivation of pirates is money...

But on a more serious note, US officials have been talking up the threat posed by Al Shabaab and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula over the last few months. It turns out, they had a very credible intelligence source of information regarding the threat of those two organizations. A few details from Luis Martinez of ABC News.

After secretly holding and interrogating a Somali man captured off the coast of Africa for two months, the United States indicted him, claiming he was a liaison between terrorist groups.

The Somali man, Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame, believed to be in his mid-20s, is a top leader in the al Qaeda-linked al Shabaab terrorist group in Somalia who has been acting as a go-between with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the U.S. Justice Department alleged in an indictment Tuesday.

Many thoughts, not very well collected, come to mind as I observe this event.

First, Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame was captured at sea on April 19, 2024 and taken to USS Boxer (LHD 4) where he was interrogated and held before being transferred to New York. To capture the man while at sea obviously suggests an impressive intelligence operation took place behind the scenes, and while it shouldn't need to be said - the reason the US did capture him on what was almost certainly a short notice window to respond to intelligence is because the US Navy is globally deployed and always present. It is probably a bit of luck that some pirate event didn't have our ships out of position to respond to this intelligence, a detail that needs to be stated because it is important to note piracy is a distraction for maritime forces, not a maritime mission the US Navy is currently, actively dealing with directly.

Second, Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame was captured at sea. The sea is playing an important but rarely discussed role in Al-Qaeda's lines of communications. Around The Horn of Africa there is a lot of attention given to piracy as the major problem at sea, but piracy is a symptom of the bigger regional lack-of stability problem and by no definition is piracy a threat to the national interests of the United States. Task Force 151, the international task force against piracy, is symbolic of US military activities lately - it is a halfhearted military solution that can never solve the political problem that sources the piracy in the first place. I do not know why it is the policy of the United States to sail the fleet in circles off the Horn of Africa pretending to protect commerce from piracy threats, but at some point effective and efficient use of the fleet needs to focus on forwarding legitimate security solutions. In this instance, that claim can be made.

Third, I intend to leave the legalities of taking Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame to civilian court to the experts, and highly recommend the good folks at the Lawfare Blog. They have made available a copy of the full indictment of Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame at this link (PDF), and have already gone into the coverage of this very important development. Does it matter? Yes, how we deal with terrorists is a legal issue that rises to the level of a Presidential election issue. Will this trial get as much coverage as Casey Anthony? It would be a tragedy regarding the judgment and quality of American journalism that balances ratings in favor of national importance if it didn't, which also means it probably won't get anywhere near as much attention as Casey Anthony on the US cable news networks.

Fourth, the politics of this are also very important. George Bush left office with no way to deal with detained terrorists except to release them to the custody of other nations. Some people say the Guantanamo Bay solution works just fine, but it really doesn't. The bottom line on the Guantanamo Bay solution is that it has always been a temporary solution with no replacement, and both the Executive and Congress has been unable to come up with a better replacement for almost a decade now.

But more important than the detainment politics to me is the war narrative politics. For a couple of years now the US Army has cited only "hundreds" or less Al Qaeda operating in Afghanistan and Iraq, but Al Shabaab alone is well over 5,000, with access to tens of thousands more disenfranchised folks in Somalia alone. No one really knows how big Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is, but best verifiable numbers range over 500, and they have access to many thousands of disenfranchised folks in Yemen. While it is unlikely the Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame case will bring it up, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is on the rise and becoming the next big problem with thousands in their ranks.

The point is, Afghanistan gets all the attention but that isn't where Al Qaeda is. I've put together a little map to put my thoughts in context, and included a few pointers to where one might notice a few dumpster fires.

One Hot Mess

There are more Al Qaeda at the end of those arrows on this map than all other places not shown on this map combined, and you do not see major parts of Pakistan or Afghanistan on that map. The Obama administration knows this, hell everyone knows this, but the question is what is anyone going to do about it and what should the United States be doing about it?

The Obama administration is going to send Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame to civilian court, which means evidence will be presented publicly and a narrative will emerge from that evidence.

We are about to find out if the United States has any STRATCOM at all in the State Department, because this court case is without question the single most important STRATCOM moment of the next decade in the fight against terrorism - not just on the prosecution legal side but also on the operational side.

So lets all generically think about what is happening here. News reports are claiming Somalia is not only a failed state, but Somalia is a dead state with as many as 54,000 people fleeing the war stricken drought zone in June alone. Pirates are now organized enough to use the Yemen controlled island of Socotra as a fuel depot. News headlines tomorrow will discuss a pirate hijacking inside the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor, about 30 miles from Aden if my sources are correct. But none of this news items about Somalia actually matters, because none of these developments represent a threat to the national interest of the United States.

Those are other peoples problems and should be left for other people to deal with. It might be hard to swallow, but when one starts counting problems in Somalia, piracy looks more and more like the least of the problems folks are facing, at least it is unless piracy is part of the income model for Al Shabaab. No government has officially made that claim yet though.

The threat comes from Al Shabaab, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) - all of whom are capable and have desires to strike at US interests both globally and domestically. Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame represents the link between Al Shabaab and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which makes him potentially the most important Al Qaeda member captured outside Pakistan or Afghanistan since 9/11. If similar links between these organizations and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) exist, we are in serious trouble... and those links probably exist.

Think about the map. Right now Libya is a dumpster fire with no local functioning security system, which means it represents a tremendous opportunity for organizations linked to Al Qaeda to move and operate freely around the current military contest for political control. Libya has all the makings of a prolonged, uncontrolled tribal war similar to Somalia where groups are likely to link up with elements of Al Qaeda like AQAP and AQIM for support towards taking political control once Gaddafi is removed.

Folks also better start paying attention to the news on the western side of Africa, because another front is starting to open up in Africa (see here, here, and here) - and I'm not talking about Independence day in Sudan this Saturday - which is where the UN is focused.

Right now we are fighting wars on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq, with the political objective hopefully to reduce the military presence in both nations over the next few years. Pakistan is going to remain a target in an extended air campaign for years. The only sure thing we know from the announced arrest of Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame is that the United States is about to really spin up air operations in Yemen and Somalia over the next days, weeks, and months.

Libya is a strategic catastrophe, or as it is more commonly being called privately - an Obama Boondoggle - and it will surely look like one that even the best political spin doctors can't hide as European nations begin to withdraw from combat operations next month. Libya is also emerging as the new nexus in North Africa for Al Qaeda, and anyone who says otherwise is ignoring how that fight against Al Qaeda is the fight everyone knows is coming after Gaddafi loses power. The easiest prediction one can make right now is that some form of covert US military operations against AQIM and their efforts in Nigeria are coming - sooner rather than later. Finally, the Obama administration has a "no massacre" policy, so if things get heated after South Sudan declares independence, expect US military activity there too.

Since AFRICOM stood up, the focus has been engaging African nations at their request in what is described as a "supportive role" towards security. That must change in the very near future.

At some point it is time to admit that strategically, the US military efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq to consolidate and contain Al Qaeda to those two states has failed miserably, and the US must adapt. I do not know what that adaptation looks like, but western, northern, and eastern Africa are dumpster fires where Al Qaeda presence is growing - and AFRICOM needs to grow up from its touchy, feely hands off approach and be a real Unified Combatant Command if they are going to productively deal with these emerging problems. The United States is facing Al Qaeda on three sides of a continent we have neglected as policy for decades, and our best friend on the continent - Egypt - is enduring some internal issues that remove the nation as a regional leader we can count on.

Which takes us back to Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame's day in court and the associated STRATCOM. What will the court files reveal about Al Qaeda? What will be the emerging narrative from a terrorist trial in the US at a time where the nation is suffering from war fatigue, and oh by the way, the future is darker than the present. How strong are our alliances and are they sufficient to address emerging challenges?

How can the US and China work together in solving the emerging Al Qaeda problem in Africa? We are engaged with China on this, right? If the answer isn't yes, we have much work to do. How long before Europe bails in dealing with problems on their own southern lawn? How much longer will US war hawks trumpet the cause in Afghanistan with other, much more serious problems emerging in Africa and the Middle East? How long can the US sustain "air campaigns" and claim that activity legitimately forwards a solution, as opposed to doing what air campaigns always do - prolong the problems?

The US Navy is heavily investing in force structure to fight the big war against China in the Pacific while the nation is engaged in 6 campaigns - none currently deployed from the sea - in 6 countries across the Middle East and Africa. The most important nation in Africa besides the United States is China. In other words, the Navy is organizing to fight the one nation that has the most shared interest with us towards an Africa that is connected to the global trade system - something Al Qaeda stands squarely against. Is this approach to national security interests our naval strategy, or our naval strategery?

What does the logistics of distributed regional naval support presence look like when low end counter terrorism problems are to be addressed in the maritime domain by the Littoral Combat Ship?

Tell me what WWIII might look like. Take your hand and rub it on a globe from Nigeria to Pakistan on land, and if we count piracy - go from the Gulf of Guinea up towards the Med, down the Red Sea and all the way over to the west Indian coast topped by the Persian Gulf all the way down to the southeastern coastline of Africa. Is that a sufficient amount of territorial mass to conduct military operations and potentially be big enough to be a world war? By 2012 that is almost certainly going to be the range of land and sea where the US is conducting air strikes and maritime security operations against legitimate Al Qaeda related terrorism threats. This is not a hollow prediction, the US has consistently fought Al Qaeda wherever they go, and right now that enormous swath of territory is the area Al Qaeda is attempting to influence politically. Think about it.

STRATCOM matters in ideological struggles, and right now the expansion of Al Qaeda across Africa represents a weakness in our ideological struggle against the legitimacy of Al Qaeda as a credible alternative to the global trade system. If the global trade system isn't effectively reaching the people of African nations, which in many cases it is not; Al Qaeda represents a legitimate alternative to an offering we can't make to disenfranchised people.

The STRATCOM from the Obama administration offers nothing productive to disenfranchised people in Africa, and unfortunately that is the one lesson everyone stands witness to with the Arab Spring. That also might explain why the Obama administration does not stand up for folks like Mubarak and Gaddafi, hoping the result will offer the US better access to disenfranchised people. Will we have compelling alternatives for the people once dictators are out of power? I don't think anyone really knows, primarily because we are still quite uncertain how it all turns out in Egypt.

Are we fighting the right fights with the right tools? Today the Obama administration claims air campaigns aren't war; they are simply an evolved variation of armed humanitarian intervention. If humanitarian air strikes isn't the STRATCOM for Libya, then what exactly is? What about Somalia? What about Pakistan? Yemen? Sudan? Nigeria? Are we shaping the information environment for political action, or simply shaping the battlefield for the next air campaign?

The United States is a strategic hot mess right now in our fight against Al Qaeda. We are engaged in two land wars and air campaigns in four countries, and we do not have a policy that can be articulated as an acceptable plan for successfully ending any of these military campaigns. Why is defense cuts the most highlighted spending issue by this administration when the Presidents policies continue to call for more and more open ended military activity across Africa and the Middle East? How does any of this end?

Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame is sure to be another political parade of some sort, but is the United States preparing to lead the parade by establishing a narrative that explains the use of global forces or are we simply going to operate as usual pretending 6 different simultaneous military campaigns are no big deal? I believe the event represents a real opportunity for the administration to take control of the counter terrorism narrative to forward a more reasonable realignment of counter terrorism policy.

If the President can't establish a narrative that explains the constantly expanding use of military force globally as his primary political tool in the war against terrorism, then he needs to be replaced for getting the United States involved in (and also failing to lead during) what is by any definition the largest hot battlefield globally the nation has fought on since World War II. It is quite concerning that US political leaders are not being held accountable for that remarkable fact.

Denying the Sea to al Qaeda

By now, those who follow the world of counter-terrorism closely have learned that the FBI has unsealed an indictment against Ahmed Warsame, who according to various news reports, was captured and has been held at sea on a naval vessel for the past couple months. It is no secret or suprise that the sea plays an important role in al Shabaab's continued sustenance. Although certainly it is possible to receive munitions and other logistical support via air or land routes, given that al Shabaab controls hundreds of miles of Somali coastline, the sea is a logical component of their supply chain.

The revelation that al Qaeda is moving key personnel (along with arms and money) at sea is an even better reason for us to ramp up countering maritime facilitation supporting al Shabaab and AQAP. Unfortunately, most of the naval assets that would be required to execute this sort of comprehensive maritime campaign are tied up in attempting to counter Somalia's other seaborne scourge, piracy. Using a phased approach, once piracy is defeated (and this can and should happen sooner, rather than later), coalition naval forces in the Gulf of Aden and Somali Basin should turn their attention towards enforcing UNSCR 733 and 751. European countries that aren't hip on countering terrorism should certainly be game to supporting long un-enforced UN sanctions, right?

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

A Bad Week for al Qaeda

Several key AQ personalities met their fates last week. Ilyas Kashmiri, a senior operations officer was destroyed in the FATA. One of the best open sources for counter-terrorism information, The Long War Journal, reports Abu Ali al Harithi, a leader in AQ in the Arabian Peninsula, was killed in Yemen. And Harun Fazul, who has been on FBI’s most wanted list for his role in the 1998 East African embassy bombings, apparently pissed off the wrong folks at a check point in Mogadishu. Life by the gun, die by the gun.

How or who killed these scumbags doesn’t matter. What is important is that constant pressure is maintained on all aspects of the network following the death of UBL. Keeping their operational planners and talking heads in survival mode is the best way to prevent further major attacks on America and our allies.

Despite these positive developments, al Qaeda maintains safe havens in North and East Africa, Yemen, and to a lesser extent in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, while pockets of true believers reside untouched in a few other places, and yes, even on US soil. It’s unfortunate that we’ve wasted nearly a decade on a variety of ineffective measures, most of which have done little to weaken al Qaeda. During this time we’ve learned that tap-dancing with corrupt leaders and pumping billions of US taxpayer dollars in foreign aid (much of which makes its way into their offshore bank accounts) while they ignore the very conditions that allow terrorist safe havens to persist in their countries doesn’t work. We now know that our own legal system is mostly too paralyzed by indecision to bring captured terrorists to justice so it’s just easier to kill them on the battlefield, wherever that may be. We understand that there are less costly (in lives, money, and prestige) and better ways to eliminate groups of terrorists than massively expensive wholesale conventional military occupations. Despite numerous efforts, we realize that attempts at public diplomacy, strategic communication, and de-radicalization are futile against an enemy whose core beliefs are not negotiable nor compatible with a free society. And we’ve discovered that inane flying policies and TSA feeling up our children makes for great security theater but only entices the terrorists to become more creative in disrupting our economy and liberty. One hopes that what we have learned is that the best way to defeat al Qaeda and its adherents is to rapidly attrite leadership and key facilitators to the point of collapsing the network to irrelevancy and discouraging those who might want to emulate them. Keep on pressing.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Thud

This is the transcript of the President's speech yesterday about the Middle East and North Africa.

I thought the speech was too long and poorly crammed two different issues into one speech, and the speech never really found a way to link the different issues effectively.

The Arab Spring is a unique event, and the White House needs to be smarter and understand that it is a big enough event that it doesn't need to tie into Israel and Palestine. Had these two issues been treated separately, the President would have resonated with more people on each issue. Instead I believe the message intended got lost.

The President tried to spread it around too much, and my sense by the reactions I have read by those in the Middle East and North Africa, this speech hit with a resounding thud of 'ho-hum' to many target audiences while leaving the President exposed politically on Israel.

I find some of the Israel related political criticism by the Presidents political opponents very legitimate, and I believe that criticism could have been avoided. It is hard to be Presidential in credibility when the President issues hollow warnings of possible UN sanctions to government leaders in Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria regarding the killing and imprisonment of their own civilians when the only real substantial action advised to Middle Eastern nations by the President was his instruction to Israel to concede land for peace.

Threatening governments with possible UN sanctions that may not even be attainable politically is hardly the stuff of a bully pulpit by the President of the United States in the defense of people seeking freedom and liberty from tyrannical regimes, and yet that was the substance of the speech to the Middle Eastern government leaders dealing with the Arab Spring by killing or rounding up their own people. I was underwhelmed.

There were so many mixed messages in the President's speech that it is difficult to believe the message communicated was the same message delivered. What exactly is the message to the Middle East when on one hand the President asks Arabs to quit blaming Israel for their problems, and on the other hand the President tells Israel the path towards peace with a neighbor that rejects the existence of Israel as a starting point is land concessions of major population centers?

Everyone knows Israel must make concessions for peace, but if the policy of the United States in addressing the issue doesn't begin with the concession by Palestine for 2-state, peaceful mutual existence with Israel as a starting point - then any US policy related to Palestine and Israel is going nowhere.

While I think the part of the speech that focused on Egypt and Tunisia was very well done, I'm not sure the rest of the speech did much to forward American foreign policy objectives in the Middle East or North Africa, nor did much to build American credibility with the various folks engaged in the Arab Spring movements throughout the Middle East. I wouldn't call the speech a strike out, but with that speech the President never made it to first base.

Maritime Weapons Interdictions

As “UNIFIED PROTECTOR” kicks off, it’s worthwhile to look at some recent interdictions of sea-born smuggled weapons. The Emiratis displayed excellent intelligence fusion and interagency cooperation in last week's seizure of thousands of weapons headed for the Houthis. The last thing Yemen needs is more small arms fueling one of the three or four (depending on how you count) ongoing insurgencies there.

Here is an interesting video on Israel’s interception of weapons probably bound for Hamas. As alluded to in the video, six C-704s represent a serious sea denial capability that fortunately was disrupted before reaching the hands of terrorists.

Judging by the destinations, Iran was probably responsible for both of these shipments... And to complete the trifecta, earlier this month, the Malaysians seized possible nuclear-related cargo sailing from China to Iran.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Countering Al Shabaab at Sea

Most discussion in the naval blogosphere related to Somalia is centered on piracy. But the real threat to US and western interest there is al Shabaab (AS). Recent offensives by AMISOM and pro-government ASWJ militias have done little to break the stalemate in Southern Somalia between TFG and AS. While a weak TFG government receives military support from AMISOM (primarily made up of forces from Uganda and Burundi), AS enjoys a consistent supply of munitions, fighters, and funding from various sources, much of it via the sea.

To provide some perspective on the scope of the problem, understand that Somalia’s coastline stretches more than 3,300 km, which is roughly equivalent to the combined shores of California and Florida. Disrupting support to AS at sea is not a trivial matter and any calls for an all out blockade cannot be taken seriously. That said, given the sufficient attention and effort, there are opportunities to address the problem. These efforts include selectively building partner capacity, discrete unilateral/multilateral at sea and in port interdictions of illicit maritime shipments, and supporting intelligence efforts.

There are many players involved - or who should be involved - in dealing with this issue while AMISOM does the heavy lifting against AS ashore. A few decades ago, Somalia had one of the largest and most professional Navies on the continent. Today three different nascent navies struggle to deal with the scourge of piracy, and protect Somalia’s fisheries while al Shabaab operates under the radar: Somaliland’s Coast Guard, Puntland’s Coast Guard (established 2000), and the TFG Navy (reestablished 2009). All three of these organizations are under-funded, under-equipped, and under-motivated. Current training efforts are conducted by contractors funded by various countries such as Norway.

On the US side, complex C2 arrangements handicap any sort of coherent strategy or action against AS maritime facilitation. At the headquarters level, since the Unified Command Plan was redrawn in 2008, AFRICOM has owned the land of Somalia and territorial waters out to 12 nautical miles. CENTCOM runs most operations outside of territorial waters and owns the majority of naval forces. At the operational level, NAVCENT’s counter-piracy operations in the Somali Basin and Gulf of Aden are run by the rotating leadership of CTF-151, involve numerous EU, NATO and non-aligned countries; all operating on their own caveats, and none focused on disrupting al Shabaab. NAVAF’s limited forces occasionally working off East Africa are primarily devoted to theater security cooperation. On the special operations side, SOCAFRICA inherited a security force assistance program from SOCCENT to assist the Kenyans in developing a maritime security and law enforcement capacity. The situation on land is equally complicated, with CJTF HOA owning various bits of the problem. Additionally, the USCG runs training in Djibouti and another capacity building mission in Yemen, separated from Somalia by a major maritime rat line crossing the Gulf of Aden.

The tensions and boundaries between the Geographic Combatant Commanders/interagency, tactical/operational levels, policy/authorities, and special operations/general purpose forces hamstring our efforts in Somalia’s waters, while the enemy operates freely in the fastness our bureaucratic seams provide.

The UK has been involved in a number of capacity building efforts in East Africa, including on the maritime side. Of course Somalia’s coastal neighbors -- Djibouti, Kenya, and Tanzania further to the South have their own maritime issues and capacity limitations. Other international partners, such as the United Arab Emirates, the largest export partner of Somalia (mostly charcoal and livestock) should be involved in any discussions to counter AS facilitation. This trade, while vital to Somalia’s fragile economy, is taxed as it passes through the enemy-controlled port of Kismaayo, providing AS a major source of funding.

It’s easy to see there are many Indians running around this problem, but no Chiefs. The root to a solution in my opinion lies in leadership. Who will step up to take that role?

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

*Somaliland CG photo courtesy of Brendan Bannon.

When Bad Policy Gets Worse

I have never been more excited to attend an event like I am for attending the United States Naval Institute History conference this year. While the contractors have been working on my home office I had a chance to read RADM Joseph F. Callo, USNR (Ret.) book John Paul Jones - which is remarkably well written and applicable for the US Navy today. Actually, I'll be talking about many of the folks who will be at that conference over the next several blog posts - but in this blog post let me just say that I hope when Stephen Carmel of Maersk Line gives his luncheon keynote address he speaks to this rather incredible issue nobody seems to be talking about.

The Suez Canal Authority’s decision one month ago to no longer allow commercial vessels with onboard firearms to transit the strategic waterway is causing severe complications for some ship owners and operators trying to protect crews, cargo and assets from Somali pirates.

Maersk Line Ltd. learned about the new policy by surprise when one of its ships was prevented from entering the Suez Canal until it surrendered its supply of weapons to Egyptian authorities, Stephen Carmel, the company’s senior vice president of maritime services, said during an interview...

This article by American Shipper's Eric Kulisch is almost certainly going to end up in a CRS report very soon, because the article goes on and on with incredible moments of hand to forehead frustration - read the whole damn thing!

Are the ships chartered to bring home US Army equipment from Iraq - with tanks, vehicles, etc... having their security personnel disarmed when passing the Suez canal? YES.

"The real ridiculous part of this is we’re on some ships that have military hardware and we have to take our little M-4s and 9 mms off," Rothrauff said, referring to the rifles and pistols stored on board the cargo vessels.

I'm not even going to touch the firearms export rules, because the article suggests the State Department has a good understanding of the problem - and I know there is at least 1 CRS report about it because that is where I first learned of the firearms export issue a few months ago.

But still...jeeez.

The real problem here is that the US government forced a policy of self protection on the maritime shipping industry outside of any international regulatory framework. The complex nature of global maritime trade can make unilateral policies of any individual country even more dangerous than the problems they are meant to correct due to secondary and tertiary network effects. On one hand the Navy and Congress is telling the industry to put armed security on ships, and on the other hand nations - including the United States - are legitimately enforcing firearms export laws preventing ships from bringing guns into ports.

Neither Congress nor the US Navy are providing an alternative that represents a well thought out security solution to ships moving in and out of the pirate areas. Both the Navy and Congress have instead been pushing bureaucratic paper shuffling alternatives intended to inefficiently circumnavigate the complex system that has ultimately only further increased the cost of trade above and beyond the original costs of hiring the security in the first place.

And in the places where a ship is most vulnerable - like a Persian Gulf port or the Suez canal - the weapons are being removed by the local state - who has a legitimate right just like our own Coast Guard does to remove firearms from ships approaching ports. The solution to this problem is not easy, and by no means do I think the US government should put security on every ship - but can we at least protect the billions in Army equipment returning from Iraq with something a bit tougher than a hired gun whom another nation can disarm at will, or do we have to be like Canada and take action only after there is a problem.

The American Shipper article is fantastic, and discusses many points not covered in this analysis.

I will say this though... the timing is very interesting because the Egyptians began the enforcement just prior to the beginning of Ramadan. There is a lot of internet chatter about Al Qaeda affiliated groups in Yemen doing a lot of research and talking about efforts towards sinking a US flagged ship. The action by the Egyptians could suggest Egypt is very aware of this threat and is taking necessary steps to prevent such an attack from taking place at their strategically and economically important choke point. I imagine to an extremist organization looking to make a big splash in the maritime domain, a US flagged ship with unarmed security team on a ship carrying the equipment of an US Army combat brigade returning from Iraq, sitting off the Med side of the Suez canal waiting for Egyptians to return firearms - looks like a much easier target than a US Navy warship on pirate patrol.

Hopefully folks outside the State Department are aware of the Egyptian policy change, and aren't stupid enough to trust in security through the obscurity of the issue.

Latest Mujahideen Threat Looks to Sea

While I am yet to see a transcript of the speech, there is audio available here containing the latest threat by Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) entitled "A Response to Crusader Aggression." The BBC has a news article up.

A Yemen-based offshoot of al-Qaeda has called on Muslims in the region to wage holy war against the US and its allies.

A purported audio statement by Said al-Shihri, deputy leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, warned "American and Crusader interests are everywhere".

"Attack them and eliminate as many enemies as you can," Mr Shihri urged...

He said the group aimed to gain control of the strategically important strait of Bab al-Mandab, which connects the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea.

Then militants could "close the door and tighten the noose on the Jews, because through [the strait], America brings support to them by the Red Sea", he said.

Evan Kohlmann of Flashpoint Intelligence translated a few lines on Twitter today:

AQAP to al-Shabaab: "You have offered to send forces to support us... May Allah bless you, but let us cooperate each in his own trench."

AQAP to al-Shabaab: "We both are on the banks of the Mandab Strait... and let us complement each other in our warfare against our enemies."

The Washington Post goes into more detail regarding the specific threat.

Shehri called on Somalia's Islamist al Shabaab insurgents to help block a narrow strait at the mouth of the Red Sea that separates Yemen from the Horn of Africa.

"At such a time the Bab (al Mandab) will be closed and that will tighten the noose on the Jews (Israel), because through it America supports them by the Red Sea," Shehri said.

Targeting a strategic choke point at sea specifically would suggest the strategic sophistication of Al-Qa'ida is improving, although the number of attacks that could be carried out effectively to close the Mandab Strait are very limited - in fact so limited one can only name two types of attacks that could be useful, and only one with any sustainability.

Mines.

Given the IED has become the weapon of choice for Al-Qa'ida in every theater they have fought the west, that would be the most likely capability AQAP would seek to utilize in that area. Sea mines however are very difficult to acquire, not exactly available on the black market, and require a much higher level of capability to develop and deploy than IEDs.

The other form of attack would be suicide boats, but the use of a suicide boat against a US flagged vessel might be difficult to pull off with ships actively watching for pirates in that region. One thing is clear, non-lethal force is not going to stop a suicide boat bomber, so if any US flagged ship is counting on non-lethal capabilities to prevent an attack by Al-Qa'ida with small boats in the region - not being armed to deal with an a suicide boat would seem very foolish.

This is a very serious problem that has huge ramifications on the entire region. How can one tell the difference between a pirate or a suicide boat? Shipping companies can bet their bottom line that Al-Qa'ida recognizes this confusion and is planning on exploiting it.

Piracy has been allowed to fester for over two years at growth rates each year of over 90% from the previous year, and is now in a position to add enormous tactical confusion. If you thought the problem was hard when ships were just being hijacked, wait until ships are being hijacked and attacked by suicide boats in the same seas, with nothing distinguishing one type of attack from the other until it is too late. Don't think they can sink a ship? That would be a foolish assumption, Al-Qa'ida has proven very resourceful in adding lethality to IEDs.

The question is whether the west waits and allows Al Qaeda to strike first before changing the rules of engagement dealing with small boat threats in the region. It is not an easy decision for the Obama administration, because the target could be a 50,000 ton chemical tanker that could potentially create an enormous environmental disaster in a region already struggling from drought on land and reliant on the sea for food.

However, to be more realistic, when one goes down the road of studying the level of sophistication Al-Qa'ida has demonstrated in major attacks, one can't stop at simple threats. That 50,000 ton chemical tanker may not be the real target, rather could be hijacked by Al-Qa'ida and become the weapon against something much more important... like the Yanbu' terminal in Saudi Arabia.

Our failure to study history will soon catch up with us. Piracy was treated as more than a crime for thousands of years for very valid reasons, and yet we have treated it as nothing more than a crime preventing the international community from dealing with a few dudes in speed boats with AK-47s. Recognizing our inability to deal with simple problems at the policy level, once again Al-Qa'ida looks to exploit our political blind spot - specifically our 'enlighted' western non-lethal policy towards piracy. The consequences are unlikely to be very pretty.

Hopefully point defenses will be effective, because every other type of defense against small boat threats in that region under current policy has been largely ineffective to date.

Yemen's $50,000+ Anti-Piracy Escorts

There is big money in anti-piracy security, and the Yemen Coast Guard apparently has found a way into the pockets of the shipping industry.

But at least one merchant ship a day, including some of the largest ship owners, are discreetly paying Yemen for military protection, said Nick Davis, chief executive of British-based Gulf of Aden Group Transits, which has an exclusive contract with the country's navy.

Under the payment-for-protection deal, up to 10 warships are placed at the company's disposal, with armed soldiers deployed to board private ships as escorts, with land-based military "right behind us if we need them", Mr Davis said.

"It's the only dedicated, military-supported full escort protection available in the Gulf of Aden at the moment. There's nothing better. We'd all like it to be free but that's not possible," he said.

The article goes on to note a warship escort is available for $55,000 - which believe it or not, is a competitive price for anti-piracy security. There have been 4 attacks on ships paying for the service, and all 4 attacks were repelled.

This isn't new news; I seem to recall we discussed this on the blog in the past. Maybe in the old comments (anyone remember)? $30 million over the last 18 months is significant money and begs the questions - where does the money go? Apparently the Yemen government didn't know about the scheme, so the report says.

When folks say Yemen is a corrupt mess, they aren't kidding.

The irony is we need the Coast Guard of Yemen to be able to assume the major security roles of the region, as indigenous security at sea is the exit strategy for the international coalition dealing with piracy.

5th Fleet Prepares for War

The US strike in Yemen back in December was reported to be air-launched cruise missiles, likely from a bomber in Diego Garcia. Well, it appears the Navy is being repositioned to support military operations in Yemen.

The US will not put troops on the ground, which again, highlights the utility of naval power to support partners. The interesting part of Yemen operations is that it marks the first time since 1990 that the US is supporting a Middle Eastern nation in military operations by invitation. The last time was Saudi Arabia prior to the first Gulf War.

This distinction is part of the subtle but critical distinctions in the Obama administration policy towards using military power and the Bush administration policies.

An Interview Worth Reading

This interview in Spiegel with Yemeni General Jahja Abdullah is a very informative read on the situation inside Yemen. Some things I think stick out and are worth noting.

The Yemen government refers to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps when discussing "certain circles in Iran." At the end of the Bush administration, the US treated the IRGC and government as one and the same. There has been no major legislation regarding Iran yet in the Obama administration and it remains unclear if Obama treats them the same.

Note the cooperative relationship between Yemen and Saudi Arabia - including at sea. Effective military cooperation between any pair of Middle Eastern countries is rare, and historically only seen when focused on Israel. There are significant Saudi Navy assets dedicated to the Yemen littorals right now - including a many speedboats and a handful of warships. I suspect that Saudi Arabia is developing their RFP for submarines right now, and ISR/EW are high on the list of capabilities desired for their submarines as a direct result of their activities in Yemen.

Note the relationship between Yemen and Somalia as discussed by the General. My problem with this CNAS report on Yemen late last year, besides being written as a backgrounder for the State Department and having minimal value for the DoD, is that it failed to make any connection of substance between the problems in Yemen and the rest of the region. The report fails to mention the connection to Somalia or the Iranian arms link, and while noting the Saudi naval blockade - no reason for the blockade given. This is a big picture problem, not multiple small picture problems. CNAS can and should do better. This report is akin to discussing the problems in Afghanistan without mentioning Pakistan.

Finally and most important, note the government framing the context of the religious high ground. It is the long term solution for both governments and the people to stand up and speak out against the extreme aspects of Islam. Not trivial, and important to be continuously disseminated in the public through media.

Al Qaeda Looks to Sea With Latest Threats

The Osen-Hunter Group is a global, private security company that also puts out daily intelligence assessments, similar to the intelligence services of the popular STRATFOR service. Today's analysis concluded with an assessment worth consideration:

Assessment: Just as a strike against an American ship in the Suez would double the value for AL QAEDA, we would warn that Mombasa is a port of concern, given its proximity to southern Somalia where AL SHABAAB is strongest and where piracy contacts in the Kenyan port authority are ample. Inasmuch as this represents a second reference to ships at sea - unprecedented in a single AL QAEDA statement - we make the following, unequivocal judgment:

We assess a direct, grave threat, by AL QAEDA, against U.S. Navy warships and U.S.-flagged vessels. Moreover, if U.S.-flagged merchantmen are still steaming anywhere in the U.S. FIFTH FLEET Area of Responsibility without armed security, they do so now at a considerably elevated risk.

In this connection, we should also note a reference to the Fort Hood massacre and a call to Muslims “in the Crusader armies” and “agent governments” to replicate the 5 November killings at Fort Hood. We would interpret this as a call on sufficiently radicalized sailors to sabotage warships.

They come to this conclusion based on an observation that I do think is certainly noteworthy. On December 27th, Al Qaeda in Yemen (AQIY) responded to airstrikes in the eastern province of Shabwa conducted by Yemen air force with new threats. The full English transcript (PDF) of the AQIY threat is here, but this part stuck out.

“And lastly, we call upon the proud tribes of Yemen—people of support and victory—and the people of the Arabian Peninsula, to face the crusader campaign and their cooperatives on the peninsula of Muhammad, prayer and peace upon him, and that’s through attacking their military bases, intelligence embassies, and their fleets that exist on the water and land of the Arabian Peninsula; until we stop the continuous massacres on the Muslim countries."

While not unheard of, it is uncommon for any Al Qaeda statement to mention attacking western fleets or attacks on water in general. Plenty of threats discuss planes, bases, and embassies... but rarely targets at sea. That is why the Al Qaeda in Yemen AQIY claim of responsibility for the Christmas airline attack was also interesting. Full English transcript here (PDF), but again, this part stuck out:

“We call upon every Muslim protective of his religion and doctrine to remove the polytheists from the Arabian Peninsula and that’s through killing every crusader working in the embassies or other places, and you ought to declare it a full-scale war against every crusader in the [Arabian] Peninsula of Muhammad, Allah’s prayer and peace upon him, on land, on water, and in the air.”

The Osen-Hunter Group's assessment is in direct response to threats made by Al Qaeda against sea targets twice in one week, because as it turns out, Al Qaeda has never made threats against targets at sea twice in one week, ever.

I'm not going to speculate the conclusions, but let me give the folks in DC something to consider regarding this issue.

If you have followed the fallout from the underwear bomber, the only clear conclusion is that the Department of Homeland Security, and in particular Secretary Janet Napolitano, got caught with their pants down. They had no plan of action in place to respond to the attempted bombing of the airline, and when the event took place on a slow news day like Christmas, it became the only thing to talk about and a major issue to the American people.

So now everyone is talking about the event, and to make things worse, now we have instant experts on everything from underwear bombs to Al Qaeda in Yemen, and in many cases those "experts" couldn't name the Capitol city of Yemen if they had a gun to their head. In politics, actual expertise is completely irrelevant though, and that is the problem. The STRATCOM fallout from the bomber got out of control quickly, and with no coherent response ready to either a successful terrorist attack or even a failed attack, DHS looks like an agency of fools.

So what if Al Qaeda is successful, or even fails, an attack on a commercial or even naval warship in the Gulf of Aden? Who is the lucky person (or people) who will take the plane to New York and be on Fox News, CNN, and MSNBC? How ready is the Navy to defend the bombardment of questions rooted in total ignorance sure to come from the host of any given show? How might such an event influence FY 2011, and would a successful terrorist event against a warship throw a curve ball into the ongoing QDR assessment?

Consider some of the questions. It will be noted that piracy in 2009 peaked in that region, highest level in decades. It will be noted that Al Qaeda is operating not just in Yemen, but Somalia, and Iran will be a constant point of discussion. It will be noted how important oil transport at sea is. The multi-national effort in the Gulf of Aden will be discussed, which will lead to topics such as the Chinese and Russian naval vessels in the region. They may bring up the UN statistics for the human trafficking in the region, stunning numbers of human suffering. Most importantly though, they are going to ask what the Navy is doing there and if the Navy is lucky, they won't ask for some form of tangible results of naval operations...

but what if they do?

What is the STRATCOM when the Navy accurately notes the few number of ships hijacked in the Gulf of Aden since July of 09 when at the same time, more ships are being hijacked just south in the Indian Ocean than ever before, including as far as 1000 nautical miles east of Somalia. When asked how the Navy intends to deal with the piracy problem or Al Qaeda in Somalia or Yemen, what is the answer that doesn't turn millions of politically active Americans into millions of politically frustrated Americans?

How will the Navy explain themselves to the American people following a highly dramatic crisis at sea that unfolds on TV when it doesn't end like the Maersk Alabama? We just spent the entire first year of the Obama administration publicly debating military strategy for Afghanistan on TV and on the internet. Should a few incidents at sea occur in early 2010, the Navy is going to get that conversation with the country on maritime strategy two years later than anticipated, and unless the Navy is ready for that conversation from the very beginning, expect the opinions of "experts" to dominate any Navy STRATCOM and more importantly - watch those "experts" heavily influence the political reaction.

Rare Hijacking in the Gulf of Aden

This is a noteworthy development.

Somali pirates have seized a Yemeni cargo vessel with a crew of 16 and are taking it out toward the Indian Ocean, a Yemeni Defense Ministry website said on Monday.

The vessel, called Al Mahmoud 2, had left Yemen's southern port of Aden on December 18, with 15 sailors and a captain on board -- all Yemenis, the impoverished Arab country's coastguard told the website.

Not sure the ship name is accurate in that report, because according to this information the ship Al Mahmoud 2 is actually in Beirut. Perhaps a different ship of the same name?

Based on reports from other sources (more credible than Reuters), an unnamed ship was hijacked approximately 97 NM southwest of Al Mukalla, Yemen (12 58N 048 33E) at 14:49 Zulu (GMT). Unless my calculations are wrong, that would be 5:49 in the afternoon, just minutes after sunset.

This hijacking would represent the first successful hijacking in the Gulf of Aden since early July, and is the first example where a ship that followed the guidelines set forth by the international community was hijacked in the shipping lane patrolled by multinational naval forces.

CS-21 Goes Mainstream

This is an excellent example of the cooperative nature of CS-21 being leveraged to support allies struggling against al Qaeda.

On orders from President Barack Obama, the U.S. military launched cruise missiles early Thursday against two suspected al-Qaeda sites in Yemen, administration officials told ABC News in a report broadcast on ABC World News with Charles Gibson.

One of the targeted sites was a suspected al Qaeda training camp north of the capitol, Sanaa, and the second target was a location where officials said "an imminent attack against a U.S. asset was being planned."

The Yemen attacks by the U.S. military represent a major escalation of the Obama administration's campaign against al Qaeda.

In his speech about added troops for Afghanistan earlier this month, President Obama made a brief reference to Yemen, saying, "Where al Qaeda and its allies attempt to establish a foothold -- whether in Somalia or Yemen or elsewhere -- they must be confronted by growing pressure and strong partnerships."

Until tonight, American officials had hedged about any U.S. role in the strikes against Yemen and news reports from Yemen attributed the attacks to the Yemen Air Force.

President Obama placed a call after the strikes to "congratulate" the President of Yemen, Ali Abdallah Salih, on his efforts against al Qaeda, according to White House officials.

A Yemeni official at the country's embassy in Washington insisted to ABC News Friday that the Thursday attacks were "planned and executed" by the Yemen government and police.

(emphasis mine)

The emphasis of cooperation in our national strategic documents is beginning to show up on battlefields globally, and one can't help but admire the effectiveness of the style. We just sent cruise missiles into Yemen, because they asked us to work with them - help them.

If this model is effective, it can be exported to other places - like Pakistan.

Middle East Naval Blockade

The next flash point in the Middle East is starting to heat up. When Saudi Arabia gets to the point they are willing to use military power outside of their own country, the situation must be a lot worse than the daily news suggests. See this YouTube video for a pretty good update on the situation in Yemen.

This is the latest significant development.

Saudi Arabia has imposed a naval blockade along the Red Sea coast of northern Yemen in an attempt to cut off supplies to Houthi fighters along its border with Yemen.

The kingdom's warships were ordered on Tuesday to search any ship suspected of carrying weapons or fighters near the Yemeni coast, a government adviser said, as Riyadh vowed to continue its offensive against the rebels until they pull back from the border area.

Despite a warning by Iran to keep out of Yemen's affairs, Prince Khaled bin Sultan, the Saudi deputy defence minister, pledged to keep up the military offensive against the Houthis on Tuesday, as he visited Saudi troops in the kingdom's southwest Jizan province.

This could be the beginning of the active, open use of military force in the political standoff between Saudi Arabia and Iran that has been simmering for years. I also wonder if this will have any effect on the human smuggling that takes place between Somalia and Yemen?

The continued growth of Islamic militant movements in the Horn of Africa region cannot be ignored in the Afghanistan calculations. It does the US and allies no good to throw resources into Afghanistan if the violence that threatens global economic instability is spilling out into one of the busiest economic highways in the world (Gulf of Aden).

How does the active engagement of Saudi military forces in the south influence the calculations of Israel in dealing with Iran? Also, keep an eye on the Saudi Air Force, the best trained of the Saudi military forces. The level of their engagement is a measuring stick for how serious the situation is from the Saudi Arabian perspective.