Three Bits

1. My book manuscript is finished (for better or worse), so I soon hope to be using the space that Galrahn has graciously granted for something more than self-promotion. In particular, I plan to return to the idea of writing a series on seapower in fiction. However, also expect some more book reviews, mostly associated with recent work on the airpower manuscript.

 2. Until then, self-promotion #1: I jabber about airpower and Syria with Heather Hurlburt of the National Security Network, in Episode III of Foreign Entanglements: If you're interested, you can also "Like" Foreign Entanglements on Facebook.

 3. Self-promotion #2: In this week's WPR column, I think about how a 1947-style restructuring of the national security bureaucracy might go down:

Most of the time, when confronted with the clear shortcomings of the system in place, we choose to muddle through. Since 1947, the United States has undertaken a series of minor revisions to the national security bureaucracy. The most significant change came with the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, which affirmed the value of jointness and attempted to remedy the problems of inter-service conflict created by the National Security Act. After Sept. 11, the United States tweaked its intelligence bureaucracy by creating the position of Director of National Intelligence and the Department of Homeland Security, although these latter reforms represented more an effort to create cover for the intelligence failures associated with Sept. 11 than a genuine reform. On rare occasions, however, we have the opportunity to revisit national values and to redesign the institutions that constrain our policy choices. These contingent moments come when the accumulated weight of years of muddling, combined with geopolitical and technological changes, leave us with institutions fundamentally out of sync with the strategic environment the nation faces. There is reason to believe that the United States now faces such a moment. The strategic, political and technological challenges facing the Obama administration -- and potentially a successor Romney administration -- differ so dramatically from the environment that faced Harry Truman and Acheson at the time of the “creation” that they now risk pulling the national security bureaucracy out of shape.

Libya BH

Spencer Ackerman and I talk about Libya:

Atomic Obsession

I had the opportunity earlier this week to diavlog with John Mueller, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, on his new book, Atomic Obsession. Mueller's argument is that the importance of nuclear weapons has been substantially overstated in several ways; popular culture has exaggerated the effect of individual nuclear weapons, historians and political scientists have exaggerated the importance of nuclear weapons to Cold War stability, and policymakers have wildly overhyped the threat of a terrorist group employing nuclear weapons. The book is readable and quite good, and although I would quibble with elements of the historical argument I think the skepticism about a nuclear terrorist attack is dead on. As Mueller argues, the "1% doctrine" is a somewhat sensible way of thinking about the necessity of preparedness for high lost, low probability events, but at some point the events are of such low probability that it's a waste of time to build policy around them. In this section, we discuss the role that arms control efforts might play in eventual nuclear abolition; Mueller is skeptical.

Robert Farley vs Michael Goldfarb on BMD

For your viewing entertainment: The BMD debate.

Pay attention big Navy, Michael is pushing talking points on AEGIS BMD. If you want the core mission, then tell the American people why you should have it.

Shaping the issues and addressing the argument early: what the Navy does worst.

A Chat With Robert Farley

Earlier this month Robert Farley invited me to participate in a bloggerhead.tv session with him regarding naval topics. I said sure, because I will try anything once. It is only now after watching the video that I realize that despite using the internet as communication tool for more than half my lifetime, this is actually the first time I've either heard my own voice or seen my own face recorded on video.

We had a lot of fun though, and I really appreciate Sang Ngo of bloggingheads.tv for showing me their excellent technology and enabling Rob and I to have a discussion. Below is a small segment of our discussion, this particular section relating to China.

I have no intention to make excuses for my inability to be as good as the folks you see on TV, all I'll suggest is preparation is important and it is harder than it looks. I went in thinking it was like giving a PPT brief and thought it looked easy. Lesson learned. It was an excellent learning experience though, and I hope to do it again in the future... particularly now that I understand what it is I'm getting myself into.

The full video, which is over an hour btw, can be found here and covers a range of topics from Obama to piracy to my impression of the Navy blogosphere in the context of VADM Harvey's comments on the USNI Blog. There are specific sections broken down as well, so you don't have to watch the whole thing. Keep in mind the conversation isn't really intended for this audience, rather a broader audience as these videos tend to end up on the New York Times website (so I'm told). I had trouble finding that technical friendly spot between a broader audience and this audience, something I need to work on. Like the poster says, now I can prove without a doubt why nobody listens to me.

Please feel free to be brutally honest in the comments, I really would appreciate the feedback regarding not only the technology, but my performance that demonstrates my remarkable need to practice using the English language. I'm a big boy and can handle criticism, and indeed I assure you no one is as harsh a critic of me as I am.

It was a lot of fun regardless. Big thanks to Rob and Sang for making it happen.