Pivot to the Gates of Tears

The clash between radical Islam and modernity manifesting itself in the littorals of the Indian Ocean is an interesting subject. Recently, one of my friends currently patrolling the Indian Ocean invited my attention to book on this very topic by Camille Pecastaing, a professor at Johns Hopkins SAIS.

The title and cover jacket (a photo of a lone Aegis cruiser) of Jihad in the Arabian Sea are a bit misleading; navalists looking for a detailed account of terrorism on the high seas might be disappointed, with only one chapter really devoted to al Qaeda’s activities on the water along with a quick treatment of Somali piracy. Those interested in understanding the reasons behind AQ's operations at sea can save some time and read a more concise account of that subject here.

That said, I'd strongly recommend the book anyone involved in researching the region or preparing to deploy there. The book provides a wealth of context on the Horn of Africa and Arabian Peninsula’s importance to al Qaeda. Detailed chapters on the violence and chaos endemic in Somalia and Yemen for decades give the reader a greater understanding of the conditions that allowed terrorism to take root there. Knowing the history and geography of areas in which policy makers and strategists are trying to devise solutions seems like common sense, but is often dismissed in favor of combing over the latest intelligence reports for "ground truth."

Rob Farley (and others) have written about the coming “pivot” of US defense focus to the Asia-Pacific. The reality is that a pivot has already occurred, especially in naval focus. As al Qaeda’s core has been decimated in South Central Asia, the network has dispersed to safe havens around the Indian Ocean and Africa where it can parasitically latch onto other insurgencies and unrest. Yet terrorism is just one of the problems driving US national interests in the region.

As Pecastaing writes, “At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the challenges for the countries on the littoral of the Arabian Sea are civil war(s), piracy, radical Islamism, transnational terrorism, and a real risk of environmental and economic failure on both sides of the [Bab el-Mandeb] strait.” Since the demise of Saddam Hussein, attention of the US Navy has shifted from the Arabian Gulf to the Indian Ocean in response to those challenges. While ground forces remain locked in a protracted nation-building effort in Afghanistan, since 2005-ish, the US Navy has dealt with a range of irregular threats from the Mediterranean to Pakistan’s Makran Coast. Quiet, but platform-intensive counter-terrorism operations, coalition piracy efforts over millions of square miles of ocean, large scale humanitarian assistance operations, and support to regime change in Libya are just a few of the missions that have driven demand and PERSTEMPO sky high for Naval and Marine Corps units of all types. Although in the long term, forecasters of a pivot to East Asia are likely correct, in the mid-term, we should expect continued requirements for naval presence in and around the Gates of Tears.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Coast Guard as a Means of National Power

I received many great comments and e-mails, in response to my post a few weeks ago looking for thoughts as to ways the USCG was a national instrument of power and how best to articulate that value to the public.  A standard method at looking at the various elements of national power is to group them in one of four general areas, Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economic.  This is the DIME model (as one commenter pointed out, there is a body of opinion that DIME is an outdated model in that other kinds of power elements may also be found.  I recognize this perspective, but personally prefer DIME, so I will use it here).

The thoughts on "how" were generally similar to my own:

The USCG is able to project US power and influence through when, where and over whom it exercises law enforcement jurisdiction, those with whom it works, trains, exercises, deploys, and when it is able to respond to a contingency, especially when already deployed.

All of this works well within the 2007 Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, which is a great expression of how the efforts of the three sea services should fit together.

Across the USCG's 11 missions, I find six, Drug interdiction, Living marine resources, Defense readiness, Migrant interdiction, Ice operations, and Other law enforcement, that regularly fit within my definition.  My list is somewhat flexible as there are certainly times when the other five missions (Ports, waterways, and coastal security, Aids to navigation, Search and rescue, Marine safety, and Marine environmental protection) can also be flexed.  I am attempting to parse out missions that regularly reflect elements of power, rather than simply may appear on an international stage.  Feel free to fire away in comments.


The USCG's work in these six missions won't always be an exercise of power, but, looking at the elements of DIME, many of the activities undertaken in these missions do fit in at least one of the elements of power.


I will build on some of the specifics in my next several posts.

The views expressed herein are those of the blogger and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Commandant or of the U. S. Coast Guard. Nor should they be construed as official or reflecting the views of the National War College, National Defense University, or the Department of Defense.

Study Material

Several different posts have gone up in topic areas of interest. As I am still working out my posting (and overall) schedule, I am going to link to them by general topic here. Read at your leisure if interested., and comment, please. I will get back to these items as I am able over the next several posts.

Piracy

Courtesy of GCaptain.com, the International Sailing Federation (ISAF) has some strong advice (Here):

"Do not sail in the western Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea, Somali Basin and Gulf of Aden. ISAF robustly endorses this position. It considers that sailing in these waters is highly irresponsible"

Arctic Policy

EagleSpeak discusses the USCG Commandant's recent testimony on Capitol Hill regarding USCG Arctic preparedness. A quote,:

"Our current Arctic capabilities are very limited. We have only one operational ice breaker. We do not have any coastal or shoreside infrastructure."

Then there is this port visit press release from the two days later, where the only mention of the state of the USCG icebreaker fleet is:

"The nation’s largest ice breaker, Coast Guard Cutter Healy"

From Dark Roasted Blend, some photos of the Russian Icebreaker fleet in action

Cutter Fleet

Chuck Hill over at CGBlog.org, discusses an item that I have followed closely, the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) program.

CGBlog also discusses how strategic communication (or lack thereof) can impact the future cutter fleet. This well-written piece also ponders how could USN and USCG fleet construction efforts be better coordinated (this overall discussion is also relevant to Arctic policy)

Maritime Interdiction

Chuck Hill also discusses how the Israeli Navy applied lessons learned in a high profile interdiction effort.

Please take a look at these links. We'll discuss these and other topics in the near future.


The views expressed herein are those of the blogger and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Commandant or of the U. S. Coast Guard.

Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Maritime Implications

Stewart Patrick at CFR does a pretty good job here of an overall assessment of the new White House Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime (TOC). Below are some possibly contrarian viewpoints on the maritime aspects of this strategy.

First, and most obvious, threat prioritization is important. This problem is complex, global, and will never be defeated totally. Therefore, the nation's sea services must prioritize deployments in a resource-constrained environment. This means less naval support to the long running, but largely ineffective counter-narcotics efforts in our own hemisphere, and more emphasis on dismantling smuggling routes that facilitate terrorist groups. A shift in CN patrols from the Eastern Pacific to the Eastern Atlantic would be a good start. But aren't these drugs from Latin America killing our children, creating violence on the border, etc? Of course, but four decades of interdicting the transit zone hasn't changed those dynamics, especially when most of those drugs enter the US across the land border anyway. Meanwhile, networks of illicit traffickers on the other side of the world -- mostly motivated by money, but indifferent to whom they support -- move people, drugs, weapons, bulk cash, etc. at the behest of extremist groups who whose motives are ideologically driven towards the wholesale destruction of our way of life, not to mention our energy supplies. These are the maritime facilitators who warrant more of our limited Navy/Marine/USCG resources.

Second, although we tend to put more time and money into figuring out how to defeat high end enemy naval capabilities, disrupting these shadow networks at sea is just as challenging (if not more so) than denying it to another navy. Denying SLOCS to illicit transnational actors is a complex three dimensional problem, requiring coordination between air, surface, and subsurface and ground forces, with the cooperation of other agencies and commerical organizations. Identifying a singular fishing vessel smuggling foreign fighters over hundreds of miles of coast or the proper container containing weapons on a 10,000 TEU ship, then arraying the proper assets for an interdiction is not a trivial matter. However, once fixed, boarding or sinking an illicit trafficker at sea is fairly straight forward.

In addition to resource allocation, the problem set requires unique arrangements of command and control, improved legislation, and shifts in rules of engagement and use of military force policy. Along these lines, the preemptive use of deadly force must be considered as a viable option against the most dangerous at sea facilitation targets, in the same way we lethally interdict enemy supply lines on the battle field and used to interdict them on the high seas. Boarding an illicit shipment has advantages in many cases: the ability to gain prosecutorial evidence, exploit intelligence, etc.; but in others, the first choice should be disrupting the threat violently and encouraging illicit mariners to find another line of business. The viability of lethal versus legal approaches to terrorism has been debated ad nauseum and now should be (re)introduced to the maritime realm.

Another reality is that in order to execute this strategy, we will need to learn to work with non-state maritime surrogates to counter illicit maritime facilitation, especially when traditional nation state partners are complicit in these activities. This engagement requires interagency cooperation and a serious relook at arcane legislation and regulations against DOD involvement in local capacity building. To wit, an example from the TOC Strategy:

“The recent re-appointment of U.S. Treasury-designated drug kingpin Jose Americo Bubo Na Tchuto as Naval Chief of Staff is likely to further entrench drug cartels in the permissive operating conditions prevailing in Guinea-Bissau. In the Gulf of Guinea, maritime criminals operate in areas of weak governance, kidnapping oil workers, stealing oil from pipelines, and causing environmental damage that harms the citizenry. The United States will work with African governments, European partners, and multilateral institutions to counter this threat to development, democratic processes, and the rule of law in the region.”

Those conventionally-oriented recommendations are fine, but in most cases, networks of local surrogates can provide the best intelligence, and a wider variety of options for disrupting illicit networks.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.