Weekend Movie Night

I thought this panel was very interesting. I enjoyed watching this very much. The story of the French frigate off Libya is one I had heard, and one I was thinking about earlier this week when I was reading how Syrians are using the iPhone to do all kinds of very interesting things that someone will eventually reveal once Assad takes a hike. Enjoy!

What is the relationship between terrorist groups and illicit networks, including proliferators? How do they use illicit networks to move money, goods, weapons, and people? This panel explored existing gaps in institutional responses to the growing nexus between these organizations.

David Asher, Former Director, The National Security Council's North Korea Activities Group
Brian Dodd, Director DEA Operations Center on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime
Andrew Weber, Assistant Secretary of Defense, WMD
David Kilcullen, CEO of Caerus Associates

Moderated by:  Chris Isham, Vice President and Washington DC Bureau Chief, CBS News

US MARSEC Capability Development Programs in West Africa: Current Status and Future Prospects

US Navy Photo

The following contribution is from N.R. Jenzen-Jones &  LT Chad R. Hutchins, USN.

West Africa[1] today is plagued by a variety of serious maritime security (MARSEC) concerns. Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, trafficking of persons, arms, and drugs, oil bunkering, illegal migration, and piracy have contributed to a maritime environment characterized by crime and corruption. The costs of these illegal activities are significant; the cost of illegal fishing alone is over $1 billion US Dollars annually, and an estimated 600,000 people are trafficked illegally each year[2]. Pirate attacks targeting oil product vessels in West Africa are occurring with increasing regularity, and are becoming increasingly violent[3].

Like much of the rest of Africa, the nations of West Africa have traditionally held a land-centric view of security. National navies, as well as other maritime entities such as coast guards and fisheries patrols, have never been in the vanguard of training or financial investment. Despite this, recent years have seen a renewed focus on maritime security in West Africa, driven by concerns of piracy, threats to oil production, and international programs of assistance. Many nations and organizations have strategic interests in building strong MARSEC partnerships with West African nations, most in the hopes of protecting or establishing maritime enterprise relationships. The United States Department of Defense (DoD) Strategic Doctrine for 2012, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, discusses the importance of partnerships around the world, including those in Africa. This document sets forth a goal to “become the security partner of choice” in nations of interest, and advocates an “innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approach”, with an emphasis on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities[4].

West Africa holds particular strategic significance for the United States, and European partner nations, and not only for its vast reserves of energy resources. The region is also an advantageous safe haven for terrorist and transnational criminal groups, a transhipment point for drugs being trafficked to Europe and further, and its ports are key components of the global maritime transportation network.

Capacity building is the most effective approach to building a sustainable, self-reliant maritime security environment in West Africa, whilst keeping to the small-footprint approach outlined by the DoD. These partnerships and training efforts allow regional nations to directly counter MARSEC threats within their domains, leveraging the vast experience in maritime operations provided by partner nations. They encourage a two-way exchange of ideas and skills, and allow participants from U.S. and European nations to get a glimpse at the problems plaguing the region first hand.

Africa Partnership Station (APS) is a U.S. Navy (USN) initiative designed to facilitate events that foster cooperation between African nations, the U.S., and European partner nations with the goal
of developing maritime safety and security capabilities on the African continent. The partners of APS work together through both sea and land based engagements, focusing on a broad range of MARSEC-related operations, joint exercises, and professional training programs. These endeavors focus on four main pillars of capability: Maritime Domain Awareness, Maritime Professionals, Maritime Infrastructure, and Maritime Enforcement[5].  A highly unique and advantageous aspect of APS is that it requires no permanent land base, as the ships participating act as the ‘base’ for engagements and training. This allows the USN to follow the small-footprint approach outlined in the Sustaining Global Leadership document, and leaves assets available for re-tasking if high-priority situations arise in the region.

The African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP) is a US Africa Command (AFRICOM) program that focuses on assisting partner nations within Africa with a view to building stronger maritime security through cooperative real-world law enforcement operations[6]. Partner nations work directly with the U.S. Coast Guard and/or U.S. Navy whilst conducting operations to counter common security threats such as IUU fishing, trafficking of weapons, people, or narcotics, and so on. This decreases the reliance of West African nations on foreign assistance to counter common MARSEC threats in the region, as well as enhancing operating cohesion, and fostering trust and confidence between partnering nations.

Private Security Companies (PSCs) also play a role in capacity building operations in Africa. One such company, Triton International Ltd., has conducted extensive training of the Somaliland Coast Guard, developing their capabilities to respond to a variety of threats in their area of responsibility[7]. Similarly, PSCs are participating in training local navies and coast guards in West Africa, and are even augmenting local coast guard and fisheries patrols in some cases. PSCs can play an important role in building maritime security capacity in West Africa, lessening the burden on the world’s navies, and allowing programs such as APS and AMLEP to target areas of specific interest or concern.

All of the above initiatives, as well as a handful of others falling outside the scope of this article[8], are innovative approaches to engaging with African nations in efforts to develop stronger local maritime presence, self-reliance, and response capabilities. However for these partnerships to be effective, especially in Africa, there exists a need for carefully structured milestones, robust oversight and accountability, and end state definitions that outline success. More can be done in order to prove that investment in African nations can provide a truly sustainable, self-reliant, and effective maritime presence. There is a common need for nations, commercial interests, private security companies (PSCs), and non-profit organizations to build cooperative partnerships with the nations of West Africa in order to develop MARSEC capacity in the region. US involvement should follow an interagency (‘whole of government’) approach, synergising the efforts of the DoD and the various services (particularly the USN and USCG), Department of State, Drug Enforcement Administration, and other USG stakeholders. Such interagency programs have enjoyed regional success in areas such as Colombia[9], and would be ideally suited to tackling the multifaceted challenges presented by the West African situation.

The numerous challenges of building a sustainable partnership and self-reliant West African maritime capability are widely recognized and understood. Most West African nations have a widely-acknowledged problem with corruption and nepotism, and the efficiency of military and civil command structures are often in question. Additionally, there is the challenge presented by integrating the efforts of the wide range of stakeholders seeking to promote enhanced MARSEC in West Africa. Nonetheless, much of the groundwork for achieving these goals is already in place, and it would require a comparatively modest investment to begin making a real impact. The lacking pieces of the puzzle are a unified strategic plan, and a designated body to coordinate various agencies’ and nations’ efforts.  

The U.S. State Department has already established a Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, an ad-hoc discussion group of international representatives that could provide a blueprint for the sort of collaborative body that could be established in order to implement maritime security development programs Africa-wide. The USN’s Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) has also implemented a monthly series of meetings focusing on piracy off the Horn of Africa. The Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) meetings provide an opportunity for stakeholders from worldwide militaries, law enforcement agencies, and industry to coordinate counter-piracy efforts in the region. Such collaborative initiatives should be combined with the US interagency approach, in order to maximize the effective participation of all stakeholders in the region. We recommend a tiered approach to integrating these efforts:

The tactical level: Develop a cooperative training and engagement program consisting of navy, coast guard, and private security experts from around the world to continue building upon previous and current training in maritime operations, education, administration, and other relevant areas. 

The operational level: Develop a cooperative assistance program aimed at upgrading and maintaining maritime infrastructure in critical West African ports. Establish an interagency body tasked with coordinating maritime capacity building operations throughout the region, and recommending the best distribution of surplus US and European materiel gifted to nations in the region.

The strategic level:   Engage with individual West African nations, as well as ECOWAS and the African Union, through high-level exchanges across the interagency. Establish an interagency framework to organize MARSEC development at the strategic level, directly supporting U.S. and partner nations’ foreign policy goals. These engagements should focus on laying out a framework to work towards a sustainable end-state; the development of an effective, self-reliant maritime capability in West Africa.

If the U.S.’s strategic plan is to consider the benefits of West African partnerships seriously, then creating an international group that mirrors many aspects of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia to fill the role as the ‘Contact Group for Maritime Security in Africa’ would be an admirable first step. Such a body should be responsible for the tiered approach outlined above, coordinating both interagency and international participation in programs to strengthen the MARSEC capabilities of nations throughout Africa, tailoring exercises, training, and operations to suit US and partner nations’ foreign policy goals, and reducing confusion and overlap between programs from different countries and agencies.




Sources
[1] Generally accepted to be the 15 nations comprising ECOWAS, plus Mauritania.
[2]http://www.ejfoundation.org/page275.html
[3]http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-04-24/global-pirate-attacks-becoming-more-violent/3967950
[4]http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf
[5]http://www.naveur-navaf.navy.mil/about%20us.html
[6]www.africom.mil/fetchBinary.asp?pdfID=20100503145240
[7]http://pmso.net/PMSOSpecial%20Report_AnIndustryApproachToMaritimeSecurityInWestAfrica.html
[8]Including but not limited to the US DoD’s Gulf of Guinea Guard Initiative, Maritime Liaison Officer (MARLO) programs, the Maritime Security Centre (Horn of Africa), and programs administered by the EU’s CSDP.
[9]http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/run-through-the-jungle-colombia%E2%80%99s-jungla-commandos

Short Bios
Nic Jenzen-Jones is a security and defence industry consultant, writer, and analyst. He is the co-editor of Security Scholar and can be found on Twitter (@RogueAdventurer).
Chad Hutchins a Lieutenant in the United States Navy, currently attending the Naval Postgraduate School. He has previously served aboard ships participating in capability development operations in Africa. The opinions and views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy, or any other agency.

East Africa Updates

A variety of interesting, though sometimes confusing news has emerged regarding Somalia in the past few weeks. What follows is an attempt to provide ID readers some insight into these developments and amplify Galrahn’s recent post.

Kenyan Offensive into Jubaland:
Kenya’s offensive into Southern Somalia under the guise of UN Article 51 (right to self-defense) began as retaliation for al Shabaab kidnappings in Kenyan refugee camps and coastal areas (more below on those). The Kenyan air force is dropping bombs, and ground troops have captured key coastal terrain and intend to push all the way to Kismaayo. Note, contrary to some reporting, the US is not supporting this offensive. There is no shortage of of interest and discussion on Somalia in US and European governments these days, but frankly, that interest hasn't translated into a desire for action, at least on the part of policy makers.

Unencumbered by bureaucratic paralysis, al Shabaab has already retaliated in Kenya with a series of minor grenade attacks in Nairobi. A future escalation of these attacks to include some of AS’s tactics regularly used in Mogadishu, such as suicide bombers, is certainly possible. However, if the Kenyans do take Kismaayo, this will be a huge blow to one of al Shabaab’s fundraising and facilitation hubs as a major revenue source disappears. Holding the terrain is a different matter, and probably best left to one of Kenya's proxies.

The political and diplomatic responses to Kenya’s incursions have been a little bit less straight-forward. On one hand are the TFG’s contradictory positions. On the other are those of pro-TFG militias Ras Kamboni and ASWJ, who have voiced their support to the effort. These pronouncements should not be surprising as they stand to gain significantly from a capture of Kismayo and the financial windfall it would bring either group. At least one US diplomat has publically discussed the potential of future support to the operation. Western countries should seriously consider immediate assistance to Kenya - logistics, intelligence sharing, ISR, and fires support, if needed. One idea is to provide airlift or sealift for a contingent of AMISOM and TFG troops (even a token presence) to Kismaayo to extend the reach of their governance into Southern Somalia and provide a means for Kenya to gradually withdraw. The longer Kenyan troops are in Southern Somalia, the staler their welcome will become, so anything Western countries can do to speed their victory and withdrawal will increase stability there and alleviate the millions of Somalis still suffering from the al Shabaab-exacerbated famine there.

Kidnappings: A series of high profile kidnappings/murders of European (and now an American) aid workers and vacationers in East Africa has occurred in the past months. At this point, these kidnappings appear to be a fundraising mechanism for various malign actors in Southern Somalia. Westerners have been valuable hostage targets for Islamic terror groups (see AQIM, AQI, AQAP, especially) the past decade. What we are seeing in East Africa seems (from my perspective) to be a mutually beneficial relationship evolving between various criminal/clan, al Shabaab, and pirate groups to capture and ransom Westerners in Somalia and Kenya. Al Shabaab has probably lost funding in the form of taxation as TFG/AMISOM have captured and held territory. Pirates are also likely seeing their revenue streams dry up as their attack success rate drops (primarily attributable to embarked armed security detachments, rather than the coalition naval presence). Larger shipping companies, which have better insurance and resources for paying ransoms, have shifted some of those resources to armed security. This leaves smaller, poorer shipping lines - and the handful of flag states who are still myopically failing to protect their crews - as vulnerable targets. Note, Somali piracy is non-traditional in that it is really kidnapping for ransom at sea, rather than cargo seizure. (The expanding piracy in West Africa is focused on profiting from captured cargoes, not crews.)

Developed countries’ inaction towards addressing shore-based pirate facilitators has left these networks intact and apparently some of them have moved onto new and potentially more profitable business. Until these actors are targeted - lethally, since there is no law enforcement reach into Somalia and mildly worded diplomatic press statements aren’t helping much - expect these kidnappings to continue, if not multiply.

Other Recent Related News:
- Al Shabaab in America Al Shabaab’s global facilitation network stretches throughout Africa, into Europe, Australia, and yes, even the United States. The tens of thousands of Somalis in America -- the vast majority of whom are law-abiding citizens -- create a challenge for law enforcement agencies who must sort out the small percentage (still probably hundreds) of bad apples in the diaspora.

- Finally, for the benefit of the random DOS person reading this blog, if I haven't already raised your hackles enough thus far - this - is a colossally dumb idea. Other agencies are still cleaning up the mess made from the last time do-good diplomats opened the floodgates to un-vetted refugees from “countries of concern.”

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

On Reinventing Our Security Architecture

Apparently I spend a lot of time thinking about how we could recreate the institutional architecture of our military and security services as if there were no obstacles to doing so...

While counterterrorism was certainly understood as important during the 1980s, it did not dominate defense considerations. After the attacks of Sept. 11, SOF again assumed a prominent role in counterterrorist operations. However, counterterrorism itself now became the primary "problem" of U.S. security policy. So while special forces played key roles in the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, particularly the former, counterterrorism was redefined in more conventional terms. Fighting terrorists no longer involved small teams raiding terrorist hideouts, but rather large military operations geared toward regime change.

We can't know how the debate over the response to Sept. 11 would have played out had the U.S. armed forces been designed differently at the time. Nevertheless, the inclination to understand major security problems in traditional terms may be a consequence of the enduring structure of America's Cold War-era security institutions. In other words, as counterterrorism became the major mission of the U.S. national security apparatus, the traditional services came to interpret this mission in conventional terms. A different structure, one that privileged the skills and capabilities of SOF, might have come to different conclusions about the appropriate response to the attacks of Sept. 11.

Countering Piracy Ashore - A Step in the Right Direction‏

Late last year, I argued that in order to truly impact Somali pirates, we needed to spend less energy on the pirates themselves and target their key network nodes and facilitators ashore. In January, VADM Fox similary advocated focus on the pirates' networks. Yesterday, the FBI announced that they are doing just that.

The arrest of Mohammad Shibin is a significant breakthrough in the United States’ battle against Somali pirates,” said U.S. Attorney MacBride. “Today marks the first time that the U.S. government has captured and charged an alleged pirate in a leadership role—a hostage negotiator who operated in Somalia. We hope that this indictment will strike at the heart of the piracy business and send a strong message to all pirates that they are not beyond the reach of the FBI, whether they board the ships or remain on-shore in Somalia.

Rolling up a single facilitator is clearly a positive step, but we shouldn't expect major disruptive effects anytime soon unless faciltiators are neutralized faster than they can reconstitute. That said, additional efforts to dismantle the pirates’ logistical and financial network ashore will prove significantly more effective (both operationally, and cost-wise) than CMF's futile interdiction operations in the Indian Ocean.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Maritime Weapons Interdictions

As “UNIFIED PROTECTOR” kicks off, it’s worthwhile to look at some recent interdictions of sea-born smuggled weapons. The Emiratis displayed excellent intelligence fusion and interagency cooperation in last week's seizure of thousands of weapons headed for the Houthis. The last thing Yemen needs is more small arms fueling one of the three or four (depending on how you count) ongoing insurgencies there.

Here is an interesting video on Israel’s interception of weapons probably bound for Hamas. As alluded to in the video, six C-704s represent a serious sea denial capability that fortunately was disrupted before reaching the hands of terrorists.

Judging by the destinations, Iran was probably responsible for both of these shipments... And to complete the trifecta, earlier this month, the Malaysians seized possible nuclear-related cargo sailing from China to Iran.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Optimizing APS

GAO has produced a new report on various interagency issues in AFRICOM including a focus on the Africa Partnership Stations. One item of interest is the table on page 54 listing the ships used over the 14 iterations of APS, which include US CRUDES and Amphibs, USCG cutters, and allied ships. Given the enduring nature of this mission, and others like it around the world, one wonders when the Navy will procure a vessel optimized to engage nascent navies. Certainly DDGs are overkill. If the primary goal is a platform that can hold the various training teams and interagency reps, then a JHSV will probably fit the bill. But if it's to give partners a realistically attainable platform to emulate for operations and training, then the USCG cutters, or better yet, a new green water vessel (something between a PC and FFG/LCS) would be appropriate. Maybe the right answer is a mix of the two.

Also worthwhile is the discussion of challenges involving various flavors of money in support of partner capacity building efforts, which include spending details from Nashville's APS deployment. The problems inherent with complex and inefficient funding and authorities for security force assistance have been reported consistently by multiple COCOMs for several years, yet OSD, Congress, and other relevant agencies have done next to nothing to address this critical shortfall to security cooperation.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.

Navigating the Interagency Morass

Today in some defense circles, one's mastery of jointness isn't enough for success. The currently en vogue "whole-of-government" approach requires senior military officers to maneuver (or plod) their way through the IA environment. Former SECDEF Rumsfeld once remarked that the interagency process can "suck the life out of you." For those sea service folks lucky enough to find themselves working in an interagency environment, the GAO provides some insight.

"This testimony highlights opportunities to strengthen interagency collaboration by focusing on four key areas: (1) developing overarching strategies, (2) creating collaborative organizations, (3) developing a well-trained work force, and (4) improving information sharing. It is based on GAO's body of work on interagency collaboration."

Having a bit of experience in this lane myself, I offer the following IA Truths:

1. The degree of success usually realized in IA coordination is directly proportionate to the distance from the Beltway.
2. Consensus building is overrated. Successful interagency coordination requires a lead, follow, or get the hell out of the way approach.
3. Personalities trump bureaucracies and formal chains of command. If your initiative isn't progressing due to a certain personality, go around, over, or through them.
4. When an agency rep asks "why is DoD doing that?" it really means -- stay off our turf because you are embarrassing my agency, even though we aren't competent or willing to do what we were chartered/authorized/funded to do.
5. Never forget that DoD is always the 800 pound gorilla in the room. Always.


Feel free to add your own.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.

Piracy Is Only Partially a Shore-based Problem

Herb Carmen, the Navy's Thinker in Residence at the Center for a New American Security and someone whose work I am coming to enjoy, has written a blog post that Tom Ricks has picked up on his Foreign Policy blog here.

All is well thus far for the unsuspecting reader--except that I was led to Ricks' post by a post by Carmen on Facebook in which he links to Ricks' post. Carmen appends the link with the following comment: "Gotta look ashore to stop piracy at sea."

I've heard this line of thinking before, and Martin Murphy (another friend, though not on Facebook) is growing prosperous as its leading proponent. That said, when I hear it, I cringe, not because it isn't partially true--because it is. But it has become one of those DC area "truths" that has become so firmly fixed in the lexicon of the piracy discussion that it is not often critiqued for completeness. More insidious though, is the fact that I have on more than one occasion--in person and on television--witnessed uniform wearing flag officers of the world's most powerful Navy hew to this line, generally in response to a question about "what is the Navy going to do about this?" Not wishing to get drawn into the argument/discussion of piracy as force structure driver, the flag officer tends to try and diminish the impact that Naval forces actually have on the problem, pointing rather to their organization, funding and logistics ashore.

I have used the line (which I alone seem to find funny) that calling piracy a shore-based problem is a little like the DC Chief of Police describing an open-air drug market as a "foreign policy problem". At some level of abstraction, the Chief of Police is correct--as are Carmen, and Murphy, and the unnamed flag officers. But at the level of action and consequences, that drug market is a local police issue, and piracy is an issue for sea-based forces. Will all the action take place at sea? No. Will capturing and killing pirates at sea have an impact? Absolutely. Empty chairs at pirate dinner tables (a.k.a the removal of incentives) whether through incarceration or expiration will serve as a message to others looking to join in the fun. Will forces from the sea likely be a large part of whatever action occurs ashore? Yes. Are such activities likely to be planned largely by representatives of the maritime forces? Yes.

Piracy has become the issue that "jumped the shark", taking us from a paradigm in which Jointness worship has been replaced by Interagency worship, the evidence of which can be seen in Naval Officers of various ranks not seeing the importance of OWNING a mission that is some ways is at the heart of the birth of all navies. The "piracy is a land-based" problem is tailor-made for the "Interagency", giving all sorts of opportunities for "root cause" discussions, diplomacy and development, and international cooperation. None of this is bad, mind you. None of it. What is bad is that the Navy seems content to join the orchestra, when it should be conducting it.

Bryan McGrath