On Drama

For those who have been following the Captain Honors drama, here is the latest by Admiral Harvey.

For those who like to follow other types of drama, like the NGO wars at sea down under that take place this time of year, check out the latest by gCaptain.

These things really have nothing in common, except that it's all video drama.

Six Hundred Kilobytes of War 2.0

The first cyber smart bomb has been delivered, and researchers are still trying to figure out who did it, and even what the target was. Stuxnet may be getting lots of attention in the news over the last week, but what is most interesting about this cyber smart bomb is that the payload expected to finish the job by January 2010 - meaning whatever got hit was hit months ago.

I rarely get the opportunity to discuss cyber security on the blog - contractually I must get approval to blog such discussions. In most cases I simply ignore the topic and let someone else do it better than I anyway, but in the case of Stuxnet we cannot ignore what has happened on ID.

For technical professionals I encourage you to monitor Symantec for updates and revelations regarding Stuxnet. I personally hope that Liam O'Murchu publishes his paper on the worm for public consumption while responsibly withholding certain details. Stuxnet is a game changer for cyber warfare for many reasons, but one reason we must not ignore is that Stuxnet represents the first seriously dangerous piece of malware to be openly disseminated and discussed in the context of a state level cyber smart bomb.

For those who want to be caught up to speed, here is a brief recap.

The Stuxnet worm is a "groundbreaking" piece of malware so devious in its use of unpatched vulnerabilities, so sophisticated in its multipronged approach, that the security researchers who tore it apart believe it may be the work of state-backed professionals.

"It's amazing, really, the resources that went into this worm," said Liam O Murchu, manager of operations with Symantec's security response team.

"I'd call it groundbreaking," said Roel Schouwenberg, a senior antivirus researcher at Kaspersky Lab. In comparison, other notable attacks, like the one dubbed Aurora that hacked Google's network and those of dozens of other major companies, were child's play.

As the New Scientist notes, Stuxnet is unlike anything seen before.

Computer viruses, worms and trojans have until now mainly infected PCs or the servers that keep e-businesses running. They may delete key system files or documents, or perhaps prevent website access, but they do not threaten life and limb.

The Stuxnet worm is different. It is the first piece of malware so far able to break into the types of computer that control machinery at the heart of industry, allowing an attacker to assume control of critical systems like pumps, motors, alarms and valves in an industrial plant.

In the worst case scenarios, safety systems could be switched off at a nuclear power plant; fresh water contaminated with effluent at a sewage treatment plant, or the valves in an oil pipeline opened, contaminating the land or sea.

"Giving an attacker control of industrial systems like a dam, a sewage plant or a power station is extremely unusual and makes this a serious threat with huge real world implications," says Patrick Fitzgerald, senior threat intelligence officer with Symantec. "It has changed everything."

Stuxnet was written with a specific target in mind, but it is still unclear what that target was. As recently as Wednesday night Forbes began to speculate that the target was India's INSAT 4B satellite which apparently went offline due to a system glitch on July 7, 2010. Forbes speculates that the virus could have been written by the Chinese to disable the satellite to force SunDirect to order its servicemen "to redirect customer satellite dishes to point to ASIASAT-5, a Chinese satellite owned and operated by Asia Satellite Telecommunications Co., Ltd (AsiaSat)."

That follows speculation from an article in the Christian Science Monitor (and to some degree the German newspaper FAZ) that the target was the Iranian Bushehr reactor, which leads to the natural suggestion that the Israeli's developed the malware. The bottom line on Stuxnet is we have a serious cyber warfare capability that was unleashed on a target that needs to be examined.

Professional Grade War 2.0

As Symantec notes, there are no less than 4 zero day Microsoft Windows vulnerabilities that Stuxnet is able to seamlessly exploit, although apparently one of the vulnerabilities had been known about since 2009, even though Microsoft failed to provide a patch until a few weeks ago. A zero day vulnerability packaged within malicious malware is a serious problem, but four never heard of, demonstrated, or identified vulnerabilities in a single package? It is unprecidented.

Stuxnet also introduces something that will no doubt have Siemens stockholders a bit nervous - a rootkit for Industrial control. Symantec explains the danger:

Previously, we reported that Stuxnet can steal code and design projects and also hide itself using a classic Windows rootkit, but unfortunately it can also do much more. Stuxnet has the ability to take advantage of the programming software to also upload its own code to the PLC in an industrial control system that is typically monitored by SCADA systems. In addition, Stuxnet then hides these code blocks, so when a programmer using an infected machine tries to view all of the code blocks on a PLC, they will not see the code injected by Stuxnet. Thus, Stuxnet isn’t just a rootkit that hides itself on Windows, but is the first publicly known rootkit that is able to hide injected code located on a PLC.

In particular, Stuxnet hooks the programming software, which means that when someone uses the software to view code blocks on the PLC, the injected blocks are nowhere to be found. This is done by hooking enumeration, read, and write functions so that you can’t accidentally overwrite the hidden blocks as well.

Stuxnet contains 70 encrypted code blocks that appear to replace some “foundation routines” that take care of simple yet very common tasks, such as comparing file times and others that are custom code and data blocks. Before some of these blocks are uploaded to the PLC, they are customized depending on the PLC.

By writing code to the PLC, Stuxnet can potentially control or alter how the system operates. A previous historic example includes a reported case of stolen code that impacted a pipeline. Code was secretly “Trojanized” to function properly and only some time after installation instruct the host system to increase the pipeline's pressure beyond its capacity. This resulted in a three kiloton explosion, about 1/5 the size of the Hiroshima bomb.

For those who are getting lost in the technical jargon, lets ponder a few non-technical observations.

I have a hard time believing a single person could identify the 4 zero day vulnerabilities - which is what suggests this was a team of researchers working collaboratively in developing working exploitations. The skill sets involved in the zero day windows vulnerabilities are completely different than the skill sets involved in developing a rootkit for industrial hardware devices - which means not only is this team highly trained, but is additionally broadly diverse in skill sets. It has been suggested there is a Siemens association that cannot be ignored, and while probably true, as the New York Times reports Stuxnet also "masked their attack with the aid of sensitive intellectual property stolen from two hardware companies, Realtek and JMicron, which are located in the same office park in Taiwan."

It is clear Stuxnet underwent considerable Quality Assurance during testing to develop code that can not only meticulously exploit 4 zero day vulnerabilities in multiple Windows operating systems without being noticed, but also in order to develop a rootkit for industrial hardware - one is going to require a fairly significant testing environment that consists of the kind of industrial hardware you will not easily store in some hackers basement. That means there is a multi-million dollar industrial site somewhere on the planet that was used to develop this code.

When you factor in that Stuxnet executes in a way that nothing crashes, offers no outward signs of infection, and the final payload is specific parameter and code manipulation for specific SPS computer within an expected environment - making Stuxnet a target specific attack - it is hard to look anywhere else except at the government level for such a meticulous and well funded development.

Speculating the WhoDoneIt

Of all the analysis I have seen, this one makes the most sense to me - and for those who want to know more, this link is a fantastic read that could form the basis for the Stuxnet movie one day:

But there is another theory that fits the available date much better: stuxnet may have been targeted at the centrifuges at the uranium enrichment plant in Natanz. The chain of published indications supporting the theory starts with stuxnet itself. According to people working on the stuxnet-analysis, it was meant to stop spreading in January 2009. Given the multi-stage nature of stuxnet, the attacker must have assumed that it has reached its target by then, ready to strike.

On July 17, 2024 WikiLeaks posted a cryptic notice:

Two weeks ago, a source associated with Iran’s nuclear program confidentially told WikiLeaks of a serious, recent, nuclear accident at Natanz. Natanz is the primary location of Iran’s nuclear enrichment program. WikiLeaks had reason to believe the source was credible however contact with this source was lost. WikiLeaks would not normally mention such an incident without additional confirmation, however according to Iranian media and the BBC, today the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, Gholam Reza Aghazadeh, has resigned under mysterious circumstances. According to these reports, the resignation was tendered around 20 days ago.

A cross-check with the official Iran Students News Agency archives confirmed the resignation of the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization.

According to official IAEA data, the number of actually operating centrifuges in Natanz shrank around the time of the accident Wikileaks wrote about was reduced substantially.

On 07. July 2009 the Israeli news-site ynet-news.com posted a lengthy piece on possibly cyberwar against the Iran nuclear program. Intriguingly, even contaminated USB-Sticks were mentioned. In retrospect, the piece sounds like an indirect announcement of a covert victory to allies and enemies.

That there are serious anti-proliferation efforts by all available means undertaken by western intelligence is not in doubt. .

There is further indication in the way stuxnet is actually working on the SPS-level. The current state of analysis seems to support the assumption, that the attack was meant to work synchronized and spread over many identical nodes. In a nuclear power plant, there are not many identical SPS-nodes, as there is a wide variety of subsystems of different kind. Compared to this, an enrichment centrifuge plant consists of thousands of identical units, arranged in serial patterns called cascades. Each of them is by necessity the same, as enrichment centrifuges are massively scaled by numbers. stuxnet would have infected each and every one, then triggering subtle of massive failures, depending on the choice of the attacker. To get an impression how the Natanz facility looks from the inside, Iranian President Ahamadinendjad has visited the place in April 2008.

So in summary, my guess is that stuxnet has been targeted at Natanz and that it achieved success in reducing the operational enrichment capability successfully.

Best theory I have seen so far, although one hopes there is some identification within stuxnet that will eventually reveal the target for sure. Given the malware is a 600kb package that is masterfully put together, there are probably clues within that will send researchers on multiple wild goose chases the wrong direction. I can't imagine that the malware was masterfully put together only to forget to leave plenty of misdirections within the code to insure the original authors are never identified.

Ramifications for the US Navy

Stuxnet is six hundred kilobytes of War 2.0 engineered to a weapons grade level of capability with no observable side effects and a massively destructive payload intended for a specific target. It is also a publicly available powerful piece of code that will be reverse engineered by the cyber community of the world - the ramifications of which can only be speculated.

Navy warships and aircraft depend on the type of industrial machinery at the heart of the Stuxnet payload - thus Stuxnet represents exactly the kind of cyber capabilities that could potentially be developed to target and disable naval vessels at sea during wartime. The US Navy has begun developing open architecture standards to steamline technologies in all aspects of technical specifications, and it is at these points in the standard architecture system that must be protected as the points of attack by malware like Stuxnet.

Special consideration must be integrated into the security of terminals that monitor the hardware of ships systems, particularly as the fleet becomes more reliant on specific engineered systems like the GE LM2500 turbines, or any of the various engineering and information systems that run ships. While AEGIS no doubt already has security considerations built-in, smart cyber payloads against naval vessels will most likely target engineering and power systems to exploit multiple points of failure within the infrastructure of a warship where security is harder to centralize rather than directly attacking the highly secured and protected computer systems. If French naval aircraft can be grounded by the "Conflicker" virus, then what happens when the enemy develops malware that specifically targets the temperature gauges of the Joint Strike Fighter? Things can go bad real fast if the engine is overheating in mid-flight and the pilot doesn't know it during a war sortie.

Welcome to the future of warfare, where simply planting doubt in the reliability of a system due to a cyberwarfare based malware payload infection is enough to achieve a mission kill against an enemy system.

Securing American Maritime Boundaries

When I started my blog Information Dissemination in 2007, I made the conscious decision to use a pseudonym from my days as an iRCop - Galrahn. The intention behind using a nickname was to focus the readers attention on the content of what was being written, rather than who was doing the writing. The maritime services - and indeed topics like maritime strategy and maritime security - are topics where the details are important to insiders but can sometimes be boring to average Americans. The citizens of our country no longer feel the same connection to the ocean as it relates to our livelihood as Americans once did in the early years of our country. I can be a long-winded writer though, and my tactic was to suck people into my message with just enough information to be insightful, educational, and hopefully interesting and entertaining. Like all bloggers - my success rates may vary.

My inspiration behind using a nickname was my favorite founding father and fellow New Yorker Alexander Hamilton, who along with James Madison and John Jay published the Federalist Papers from fall of 1787 until the spring of 1788. On September 17, 1787, the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia had approved a new constitution and sent it to the Continental Congress, which ten days later sent it to the states for ratification. It was a difficult period for America in those first years after the Revolutionary War - the country was broke and heavily in debt; and Congress under the Articles of Confederation had no power to raise funds. Our founding fathers believed the federal system under the Articles of Confederation was fatally flawed, and the country would not survive without a stronger federal system.

It was Alexander Hamilton's idea to publish a series of essays urging ratification of the new Constitution, and he threw himself into the work producing 51 individual essays in four months. James Madison added 29 and John Jay wrote 5. All were published under the pseudonym "Publius." The Federalist papers, as they are known today, were printed in four New York newspapers between October 1787 and May 1788.

In his book Six Frigates: The Epic History of the Founding of the U.S. Navy, Ian W. Toll describes how the Federalist papers revealed the importance of maritime security in the minds of our founding fathers.

Hamilton's Federalist essays made a ringing case for "active commerce, an extensive navigation, and a flourishing marine." (No. 11) It was America's destiny to trade by sea, and "the little arts of the little politicians" could never "control or vary the irresistible and unchangeable course of nature." The major Europeans powers were determined to suppress the growth of American trade -- to "clip the wings by which we might soar to a dangerous greatness." If America was serious about asserting her maritime rights and protecting her hard-won independence, "we must endeavor, as soon as possible, to have a navy." (No. 24) Madison pointed to the vulnerability of the nation's long, unfortified coastline. Those living near the sea, north and south, should be "deeply interested in this provision for naval protection." (No. 41) Without a navy to defend them, they were vulnerable to the "predatory spirit of licentious adventurers," and would sooner or later be "compelled to ransom themselves from the terrors of a conflagration, by yielding to the exactions of daring and sudden invaders."

Today these words are even more applicable, indeed with 90% of the worlds trade taking place by sea today - there remains an inherent bond between freedom and access to the sea and the United States of America. Today is the first day of Homeland Security 2020: The Future of Defending the Homeland conference at the Heritage Foundation. The panels for the day will include:

1000-1100: Defending Domestic Waters: U.S. Maritime Security Policies

Mr. Michael Barrett, President of Diligent Innovations and former Director of Strategy, Homeland Security Council, White House

Mr. Adam Salerno, Senior Manager, U.S. Chamber of Commerce

1100-1200: Programs, platforms, and People: Public Sector Capabilities for 2020

VADM Terry Cross, USCG (Ret), Vice President for Homeland Security Programs, EADS-NA, and former USCG Vice Commandant

Dr. Steve Bucci, Associate Partner and Cyber Security Lead, Global Leadership Initiative at IBM Global; former DASD for Homeland Defense and Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

America's Maritime Challenge

The CIA World Factbook lists the land boundaries of the United States as 12,034 kilometers (7,477 miles), and the coastline as 19,924 km (12,380 miles). The CIA World Factbook breaks down the land boundaries further to include 8,893km (5,526 miles) for Canada (including 2,477 km or 1,539 miles with Alaska), and 3,141km (1,951 miles) for Mexico.

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration lists the US coastline as 12,383 miles. Most organizations who use geography figures of the US coast line cite the numbers provided by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration instead of the CIA Factbook, but maybe the CIA knows something about those 3 miles that the rest of us don't know?

The Learning Network has a breakdown of coastline length by state using the 12,383 mile coastline figures of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The 12,383 miles of United States coast line includes 2,069 miles of Atlantic coastline, 1,631 miles of Gulf coastline, 7,623 miles of Pacific coastline, and 1,060 miles of Arctic coastline along Alaska's northern border.

Following 9/11 the US government gave priority to port security as the maritime defense layer in most need of security. While Congress has passed legislation to protect America’s ports, it’s important to evaluate the effectiveness of the legislation passed, as well as that of intelligence measures taken since 9/11. 90% of the worlds trade is transported by sea, and an attack on a major port would have serious economic impacts to America. In every maritime security conference I have been to, port security is usually the first and foremost topic.

But in the conference at the Heritage Foundation today I hope to learn more about three other topics that I believe requires the constant attention of our national political leaders if they are to truly address the dynamic change of the maritime security environment around our nations maritime borders.

The Coast Guard

The United States Coast Guard is a national treasure, but it is also taking on water at a phenomenal rate. The material condition of the Coast Guard has long passed the tipping point, and the funding necessary to provide the manpower and training for the US Coast Guard to address the emerging roles and missions of the 21st century has not been provided. It is a real credit to the men and women of the US Coast Guard that they are able to do what they do, because every single day they are - in my opinion - carrying more responsibility with less money provided than any agency in the Federal government today.

The budget and size of the Coast Guard is out-of-sync with the responsibilities being tasked. According to a recent tally by Rep. James Oberstar, D-Minn., in the past 35 years Congress has handed the agency at least 27 new responsibilities. Prior to the BP oil spill in the Gulf, the Obama administration planned to cut Coast Guard personnel by 773, decommission five large cutters, retire four HU-25 Falcon medium-range surveillance aircraft, retire five HH-65 Dolphin search-and-rescue helicopters, and dissolve five 90-person marine safety and security teams next year. Following the BP oil spill, Congress has added minor increases to personnel end-strength for offshore oil monitoring, canceled the elimination of around 1,100 billets, and decreased the number of ships and aircraft scheduled for decommissioning. These adjustments are token changes and fall well short of what is necessary to strengthen the Coast Guard.

The FY 2011 budget for the Coast Guard is $10.1 billion (PDF) - 4% less than the FY 2010 budget. The Acquisition & Construction budget in FY 2011 for the entire Coast Guard is $1.536 billion - about 70% the shipbuilding cost of a single US Navy destroyer. The material condition of the US Coast Guard is not good by any standard. The US Coast Guard operates 250 cutters 65' or more, and the average age of those cutters is 41 years old.

“No amount of maintenance can outpace the ravages of age,” retired Coast Guard Commandant Thad Allen said in a recent speech. “The condition of our fleet continues to deteriorate, putting our crews at risk and jeopardizing our ability to do the job.” Of the 12 major cutters assigned to Haiti relief operations, 10 of the cutters (87%) suffered mission-altering breakdowns. In the immediate hours following the explosion on DEEPWATER HORIZON, no less than 3 Coast Guard aircraft were unable to respond due to maintenance problems. In February of 2010, Mackenzie Eaglen of the Heritage Foundation made an applicable analogy:

The mismatched demands of the nation and the President’s budget cuts for the Coast Guard are unacceptable. One can only imagine the outcome—and outrage—if 83 percent of the fleet assigned to the Battle of Midway had to return to Pearl Harbor for emergency repairs. The Coast Guard should not be held to lower standards.

The DEEPWATER HORIZON explosion is only one symptom of a larger problem related to the Coast Guard being able to meet the responsibilities they have been tasked by our national leaders, and the Gulf oil spill is only a taste of the real economic disaster that awaits any nation with insufficient capabilities in maritime security and protection.

Technology Evolutions

In November of 2006, a Coast Guard cutter operating 100 miles off Costa Rica observed a strange blur in the water. Upon investigation, spotters on the cutter observed what appeared to be several snorkels poking up out of the water. It turned out to be a self-propelled, semisubmersible built in the jungles of Colombia carrying 3 tons of cocaine. Nicknamed "Bigfoot" the simisubmersible is now on display at Truman Annex, Naval Air Station Key West in Florida.

In 2009 officials estimated that 70 such simisubmersibles are now being constructed every year, and it is estimated only 14% are interdicted as they transfer narcotics from source to destination. In 2009 simisubmersibles were believed to carry 30% of Columbia's total cocaine exports. The cost to build a drug smuggling simisubmersible is around $500,000, and simisubmersibles are only used for a single trip. However, it is a remarkably affordable way to smuggle drugs into the United States.

The street value for 1 kilogram of cocaine in the United States can be averaged at $20,000. These simisubmersibles can transport between 3 and 7 tons of cocaine, and one short ton contains about 907 kilograms. That puts the street value of one simisubmersible full of 3 tons of cocaine at just over $54 million. At $54 million the transport costs using simisubmersibles with a 3 ton payload from South America to the United States is below 1% of the total street value.

In the 21st century, the rate of technological change drug cartels and other non-state actors have demonstrated is remarkable. In just the last 10 years, the drug trade has gone from go-fast speed boats to simisubmersibles to - as recently discovered in July 2010 in Ecuador - full midget submarine technology. Leveraging tides that ebb and flow through the rivers and tributaries in South America, simisubmersibles and submarines are being constructed well away from the coast in swamp areas sometimes as much as a hundred miles inland.

At roughly 30m long, the drug smuggling midget submarine found in Ecuador is roughly the same size as the midget submarine suspected of sinking the South Korean warship Cheonan, albeit far less sophisticated than its North Korean counterpart. Leveraging off the shelf technologies like the Hummingbird depth finder and GPS technologies, Jay Bergman, Andean regional director for the DEA, told CNN the submarine costs about $4 million to build. As a fully submersible submarine capable of carrying 10 tons of cocaine and reusable unlike its simisubmersible counterparts, one can see how the full submarine approach would be more cost effective - thus more likely to be used - by drug cartels in the future.

Now that midget submarines have transitioned from a theoretical capability used off the US coast to an actual capability to be used off the US coast, how does this influence the resource and training plans of the US Coast Guard? If the drug cartels are already using submarine technologies, what happens when organizations with more nefarious plans than smuggling narcotics develop these capabilities to use off the shores of the United States? The United States is not only unprepared for these types of challenges, there is little evidence that Congress is taking the rapid technological evolution of maritime threats seriously. Asking tough questions about US Coast Guard sonar technologies and training highlights the significance of the challenge the US faces today - much less the near future.

America's Arctic Problem

In September of 2008 the MV Camilla Desgagnés, owned by Desgagnés Transarctik Inc., transported cargo from Montreal to the hamlets of Cambridge Bay, Kugluktuk, Gjoa Haven and Taloyoak through the Northwest Passage. The transit marked the first time supplies were delivered to communities in western Nunavut from an Eastern port.

In 2009 two German ships, the Beluga Fraternity and the Beluga Foresight left the Russian port of Vladivostok with cargo picked up in South Korea bound for Holland. The traditional route for the ships would have been through the western Pacific towards the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean over to the Suez Canal, and out through the Strait of Gibraltar up to Holland for a total of roughly 11,000 nautical miles (12,658 miles). Using the Northeast Passage over Russia, the ships cut ~4,000 nautical miles from that trip and saved roughly $300,000 - of which $100,000 was in fuel savings alone. With permission from Russia to make the trip, the nuclear powered icebreaker 50 Years Since Victory escorted the two freighters through the Northeast Passage.

Last week the Barents Observer reported that the 100,000 ton tanker “Baltica” left Murmansk loaded with gas condensate for China escorted by 3 nuclear powered icebreakers. This is the first time a high-tonnage tanker will take the Northern Sea Route from Europe to Asia. The Northeast Passage will cut ~5,000 miles from usual route taken around Africa, as a 100,000 ton tankers are too large for the Suez canal.

As the Northwest and Northeast Passages open up new sea trade opportunities, it is important to note that regardless of which route is taken, both routes will increase the number of ships transiting in US waters - as both routes require ships to pass through the Bering Strait. Alaska has 1,060 miles of Arctic Ocean coastline of which any vessel utilizing the Northwest Passage will transit through. What the United States does not have today is any operational heavy icebreakers to escort and insure safety of navigation in those icy waters.

The Coast Guard has two heavy polar icebreakers — Polar Star (WAGB-10) and Polar Sea (WAGB-11). The Polar Star is not operational and has been in what is called "caretaker status" since July 1, 2006. Congress has provided funding to repair Polar Star and return it to service for 7 to 10 years, and the Coast Guard expects Polar Star reactivation to be completed by 2013.

On June 25, 2010, the Coast Guard announced that Polar Sea had suffered an unexpected engine problem and consequently will likely be unavailable for operation until at least January 2011. That leaves the United States currently without any operational heavy polar icebreakers.

The Coast Guard also operates a third polar icebreaker — Healy — which entered service in 2000. Compared to Polar Star and Polar Sea, the medium polar icebreaker Healy has less icebreaking capability but more capability for supporting scientific research - and is primarily used supporting scientific research in the Arctic.

With 1,060 miles of Alaskan Arctic coastline, and by international law the United States claims out to 200 miles of that coastline to be part of the American economic exclusion zone; how can our nation afford to have ZERO operational heavy icebreakers today? If I had a penny for every time I have heard a news anchor or politician say "Global Warming" on Television, our nation could buy 10 heavy icebreakers - and yet in 2010 we have none.

The Arctic policy of the United States has no political leadership at all, because there isn't a single US politician who would take responsibility for a policy we have no capabilities today to enforce policy with. There is significant global economic potential should either the Northwest or Northeast Passages become a viable sea trade route between Europe and Asia, which means the shipping industry will be exploring these trade routes over the next few years. While politicians in America will openly discuss scientific theory related to global warming, there is a tangible economic and maritime boundary issue for the United States taking place in plain sight today related to climate changes impact to global maritime commerce trade patterns that could result in US territory - the Bering Strait - becoming a crowded sea trade choke point in the very near future. The US economic exclusion zone off the Alaskan coastline is a marine resource, a potential energy resource, and a possible economic trade resource that the United States must be prepared to protect.

The condition of the United States Coast Guard, the technology evolutions by non-state actors and criminals in the 21st century, and the missing-in-action US Arctic Policy represent three homeland security concerns along our nations maritime borders that are evolving at a pace greater than our nations political leaders in Washington are adapting. I look forward to the Heritage Foundation Homeland Security 2020 event today in hopes that these issues are discussed thoughtfully and inform our national leaders on how the United States can best address these and other emerging challenges off our nations shorelines.

Gulf Supertanker Was Terror Target

According to this New York Times article, it would appear Al Qaeda affiliated groups have attempted their first sea-based terror attacks on a super tank since the call for terror strikes at sea was made late last year.

Investigators in the United Arab Emirates said Friday that a terrorist attack caused the mysterious damage a Japanese oil tanker suffered last week as it passed through the Strait of Hormuz, raising fears of future attacks in the narrow channel that serves as a passageway for shipping crude oil from the Middle East to the rest of the world.

The damage to the tanker — which an Emirati official said was caused by “homemade explosives” aboard a dinghy — was not considered serious, and there was little immediate impact on oil markets on Friday.

But the news instantly fanned worries about shipping security. If confirmed, the attack would be the first of its kind in the volatile strait, which has long been a focal point for tensions with Iran, just across the water from the Arabian Peninsula.

What I find interesting is the decision of the attackers to target a super tanker with the seaborne IED model similar to the USS Cole incident. In the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s no super tankers were lost to attacks by direct attacks from major weapon systems (including large mines and air launched anti-ship missiles), so a dingy attack with homemade bombs is not likely to create the spectacular impact these terror groups are looking for.

That's the thing about small boat attacks that distinguishes the success of piracy compared to the direct attack model - the effectiveness of a direct attack lies in quantity more so than quality, where as piracy can be seen as a quality style attack because it puts the pirates in complete control of the ship. When you have neither quality or quantity, success in a direct attack is unlikely. In the case of the USS Cole incident, the quality was there for both surprise and enormous luck with nearly precision targeting (the physical location the bomb created a hole in on the ship itself). That second part about precision targeting is essentially the story of the USS Cole bombing - and the part of the story rarely discussed.

I see this as the first of many sea based terror incidents in the region to come. Al Qaeda's first attack on the World Trade Center didn't work out as planned either - indeed one defining characteristic about Al Qaeda is how the organization has a history of making tactical adjustments from failure towards eventually achieving success. Expect the same learning process at sea, and expect the next Al Qaeda attack at sea to involve a boarding operation more similar to piracy instead of the direct attack method more similar to methods of the past. These are not folks who traditionally make the same mistake twice, or use failing tactics repeatedly when the opportunity to adapt exists.

Picture of the Day

From the funny folks at CNAS.

More Thoughts on the Gaza Flotilla

This is a really good post at Danger Room discussing the information war of the Gaza flotilla incident. If you haven't read the STRATFOR analysis, it is truly brilliant and worth your time.

The STRATFOR analysis raises a serious question with me. If we have advanced so far as a people, and the internet has opened up information flows to the level that we celebrate how informed we are as a people, then why is it that so many smart people are able to so easily fall for what are clearly populist political infowar efforts intended to shape perception despite the facts - which are still in short supply.

For example, there were three members of the IDF commando team hospitalized. One of the soldiers was injured when thrown overboard, but I find it interesting the other two were hospitalized with gunshot wounds.

But facts really don't matter when faced with overwhelming populist agendas playing to a predetermined bias - a bias that swings both ways. A good example of how it swings both ways is the recent comments by Charles Krauthammer quoted by The Corner.

The fundamental deception here is the use of the word "humanitarian." . . . Humanitarians don't wield iron clubs, and [they] would have killed the Israelis had the Israelis not drawn their pistols in self-defense.

But there‘s a larger issue here. What exactly is the humanitarian crisis that the flotilla was actually addressing? There is none. There’s no one starving in Gaza. The Gazans have been supplied with food and social services, education, by the U.N., by UNWRA, for 60 years, in part with American tax money.

Second, when there are humanitarian needs, the Israelis allow — every day — food and medicine overland into Gaza. The reason that it did not want to allow this flotilla is because, as the spokesman for the flotilla said herself, this was not about humanitarian relief. It was about breaking the blockade.

And the reason the Israelis have a blockade is because they only want to allow humanitarian supplies and not weaponry. Look, the proof of that is the fact that if you look at a map of Gaza, you'll see that Israelis only control three sides of this rectangle. There’s a fourth side on the Egyptian side. So it is an Egyptian-Israeli blockade.

The Egyptians have the same problem with Gaza. People accuse Israeli of the blockade [saying it’s because] because they're racist, they’re anti-Muslim, anti-Arab. The Egyptians are Muslim and Arab and they’ve gone to war three times on behalf of the Palestinians. So why do they have exactly the same blockade? Because Gaza is run by Hamas, a terror entity that wants to import weaponry and resume the war against Israel.

The man who made the announcement that we saw earlier, explaining the commando raid is the defense minister of Israel. He‘s not a right-winger. He‘s not Likud. He’s Ehud Barak, who’s the leader of Labor, the party of Yitzhak Rabin, Golda Meir, the party of the left, and the man who ten years ago this summer offered the Palestinians a peace agreement that would have [provided] a Palestinian state, division of Jerusalem, and an end of the conflict.

The Palestinians said no. And Gaza two years ago declared war on Israel. That's why you have a blockade. . . .

If these people had wanted humanitarian aid, Israel offered to take the ships into Haifa, peacefully, unload all the stuff inside and to allow all the humanitarian aid immediately into Gaza, all the food and medicine. And it was refused because it was meant to be a provocation and to create an incident.

Charles Krauthammer fails when he attempts to forward the Israeli official government view of the maritime blockade. No question part of the intent is to prevent weapon smuggling - and that is certainly a legitimate purpose of a maritime blockade (indeed the UNSC has a similar maritime blockade established against North Korea in regards to arms sales).

What isn't mentioned is how the maritime blockade is also intended to be part of the economic war on Gaza. Is that a legitimate military tactic? Yep, but don't ask me to sympathize with Israel when on one hand they intentionally deny economic opportunity to a huge population then complain with the other hand that the enemy is actively fielding plenty of unemployed young men in a war against them. Israeli policy perpetuates the violence, so Israel doesn't get any sympathy from me when complaining they are constantly under attack. The war goes both ways.

But Krauthammer nails the rest of his argument, and it is a point dismissed in the populist political rhetoric shaping the perception of the Gaza flotilla event. When IDF soldiers are being treated for gunshot wounds, clearly this was not a 'peace' movement. The blockade isn't just an "Israeli" thing either; Egypt has also been a partner in the blockade until this incident. One of the more interesting results so far is the Egyptian reaction to drop the blockade. In theory, the second flotilla could approach from the Egyptian maritime zone and avoid the Israeli blockade - except that running the maritime blockade has already been announced as the intent of the second flotilla - thus Israel again already has the right to interdict the second flotilla in international waters.

How the second flotilla is dealt with will tell us a lot about the policy at work in Israel. Obviously I believe Israel is going to stop the flotilla - it will not be allowed to run the maritime blockade. The only question to be asked is whether Israel treats this as a serious military operation - like it did the first time, or if Israel changes tactics to treat it as part of the global infowar campaign Hamas is trying to make it.

One final thought. My impression is that this does represent a strategic blunder by Israel, but there is a cynical alternative that does merit mentioning. It has been suggested that further isolation of Israel by the United States would give greater flexibility to Israel for undertaking unilateral military action by Israel against Iran. That isolation would need to be more than just the NPT discussions that force Israel to disclose their nuclear arsenal, and more than just a diplomatic disagreement regarding the use of UN sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program. This event would seem to be in line with creating additional political separation between Israel and the US needed for Israel to act unilaterally. Time will tell, but a brute force response to the second flotilla could easily give President Obama the flexibility he needs to create additional political separation from Israel on the US end.

I'm not really a subscriber of this point of view, but I do agree further political separation between Israel and the US right now would give Israel more flexibility to unilaterally attack Iran, and as the Danger Room article notes - Israel went into this flotilla operation understanding the infowar unfolding. Israel never plays expecting to lose something for nothing, suggesting something bigger may be at work here.

Israeli Actions Are Stupid, But Legal

nGW and information warfare go hand in hand, and that is exactly what we are seeing unfold with the situation regarding the sea based protesters and Israel this morning as the discussion moves away from law and into the realm of politics. The political fallout will prove interesting, only because we are likely to learn a lot about President Obama.

The news has already gone viral, and many pundits have weighed in - many of whom have formulated their response without the facts of what happened. It is not surprising to me that much of the early press reporting has suffered from inaccuracies - early reporting of activities at sea often gets it wrong - and this incident is no different.

Was the Boarding Legal?

Under international law, the consensus of the maritime attorney's I have spoken to is that the boarding operation by Israel was legal. The coast of Gaza has been under maritime blockade by Israel, a blockade that was well known - indeed running the maritime blockade for political purposes was the specific intent of the protesters. It is why the press had been reporting all week that the situation was likely leading towards a confrontation. Is anyone surprised that Israel had an established maritime blockade and enforced that maritime blockade? I'm certainly not, Israel made clear all week that the flotilla would not be allowed to pass.

The maritime blockade is a result of the war between Israel and Hamas. Ones political position on that ongoing war is completely irrelevant to the reality that the maritime blockade was established. Knowledge of the maritime blockade by the protesters is also not in debate, and neither is knowledge the flotilla intended to violate the blockade - they made this clear themselves in the press. Once the flotilla made it clear in the press they intended to run the maritime blockade, according to international law, and even US law, the flotilla was considered to be in breach by attempting to violate the blockade.

It was at that point the IDF had legal authority - under international maritime law governing maritime blockades during wartime - to board the vessels and prevent the vessels from running the blockade. Yes, this action may legally be taken in international waters if those waters are recognized as part of the area under the maritime blockade. It is important to note that the action took place within the zone that was publicly known to be part of the maritime blockade of Gaza, and part of that zone is in international waters.

Whether it was a good decision by Israel to board the vessels is a political question, not a legal question. The outcome of the incident should not surprise anyone part of the maritime security community, indeed it highlights the inherent dangers that exist in political protests by sea. Sea based protests may be civilian political activities, but running a maritime blockade is not a political activity that engages law enforcement, rather it is a political activity against a military force exercising and activity governed by the laws of war - in other words, the protesters attempting to run the blockade could legally be argued to describe an act of war against Israel.

The Maritime NGO

What the hell was Israel thinking? I can't be the only person asking this question today, and yet I imagine there are a number of people in professional Navies around the world who have serious concerns in observing the events as they happened.

Political protests at sea cannot be legitimately compared to any protest on land, particularly when one considers any political protest situation where violent activity is likely. I think the authors on this blog made clear this week that we expected violence, because none of us are naive enough to believe close quarters situations involving Israelis and Palestinians will in any way be peaceful.

There is not a lot of space on ships, even big ships. If you have ever been on a ship, you know hallways are narrow and even something as simple as deckchairs can add to clutter on deck. When maritime security is enforced on any ship, there is an expectation of close quarters interaction with passengers and crew of a ship. One simply cannot get around this.

Putting IDF soldiers and political activists together on the same ship is like putting protesters and riot police in your house - that is literally how close they will be to one another. It isn't like a street protest where police can prepare by giving full city blocks of space for movement and protest activities. During situations on land where protesters may engage law enforcement, the space also allows for time - something one does not get when all activities between protesters and enforcers are in close quarters - like on a ship.

What is the result? Well, once the decision was made by Israel to board the ship the question is how the IDF would board the vessel. Based on video it would appear the protesters had deployed effective techniques to prevent an over-the-side boarding. That led to Israel deciding upon the fast rope approach.

The video of the fast rope activity demonstrates the danger in that tactic. Indeed, the first IDF commando doesn't even make it to the ground before the close quarters situation - like one would find on any ship full of protesters - immediately leads to violence. It seems incredible to me that the IDF didn't see that coming. If we presume the Israeli Navy is competent, we can presume they knew this would happen. That suggests Israel knew the initial boarding would be met with violent resistance, but the political cost of allowing violation of the blockade was higher than the expected political fallout of a violent response.

One thing is clear - every Navy needs to give serious thought to how to address this situation, because fast roping onto the deck of a ship of protesters should always expect to be a forcible entry operation.

It will be interesting to see how the Obama administration reacts. The recently released National Security Strategy of the United States depends a great deal on the use of international institutions and international law as a mechanism for fostering global peace on the maritime domain. Israel can legitimately be accused of having politically tone deaf leadership that is making world class dumbass decisions - an argument I think there is plenty of evidence to support - but the actions taken are within their rights of enforcing a maritime blockade under international law.

The truly scary part is that under international laws governing maritime blockades, Israel could have outright sank the ship instead of board it as an alternative enforcement of the maritime blockade, and Israel still been within their rights under international law. Such an action could have led to war with Turkey, but even if the ship would have been sunk, Turkey would still be on the wrong end of international law in this situation. Turkey will likely find plenty of populist political support in NATO countries over these events, but if they attempt to escalate they may find that support is fleeting among their NATO allies.

No one in NATO is going to support Turkey with anything other than political rhetoric in this situation. Rhetoric is free, but if a financial cost to NATO nations supporting Turkey becomes necessary - international law regarding naval blockades will quickly become the new foundation of NATO countries, and Turkey would quickly find themselves on the wrong end of the shifting political winds. Turkey finds a political victory in the present condition, and needs to do nothing outside of political rhetoric to secure it. The likelihood of taking some meaningful action against Israel by Turkey is very low.

As far as I am concerned, any country that acts as politically stupid as Israel has in this situation deserves every political attack they get. Israel has some seriously tone deaf leadership right now who seems to look at every problem as a nail and every solution requiring a hammer.

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Those wishing to add comment are reminded this is not a political blog. Our focus should be on the tactics of the incident and the legal issues surrounding maritime law. Most Americans probably don't realize everything Israel did was legal under US law, for example. Given the level of political support the protesters are getting from the international community - despite international law - suggests we have plenty to discuss regarding this event that has nothing to do with the Palestinian | Israeli conflict specifically.

Final note. As usual the Small Wars Journal has a timely piece by Claude Berube that goes right to the broader maritime security discussion this situation represents.

Mobility vs Armor In Irregular Warfare

Continuing yesterdays discussion, the lessons in Iraq have proven that many assumptions of conventional wisdom in warfare are inaccurate. The M-1 main battle tank represents better than any platform the ultimate land warfare technology. Clearly a main battle tank is a capable platform in war, but for those who do not follow the tactics in Iraq closely, the main battle tank has proven time and time again to be a vital weapon in counterinsurgency. The M-1 is the poster child for Armor being more desirable than Mobility in dealing with irregular warfare challenges. It is also an example where conventional wisdom is the first thing to be tossed out when approaching irregular warfare challenges.

In the development of new technologies specific to the irregular warfare challenges facing the military services in Iraq, armor has consistently been the most important requirement. While the Iraqi military forces were defeated by the speed, stealth, and mobility of the coalition forces in the warfighting phase in Iraq, it has been hardened, survivable presence that has won the peace. I believe the Navy must closely examine the characteristics of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and learn the lessons of the other services if the Navy is to engage irregular warfare forces successfully in the maritime domain.

I believe the Navy must develop a well armored, well armed small craft intended to operate in the littorals, and I do not believe the LCS represents the right platform for this job. The LCS has a role, but it does not have the armor necessary to sustain attacks from irregular challengers. A dhow in the littoral could be a fishing vessel one minute, and a launch pad for rockets the next minute. Against the thin skin of the LCS, a rocket attack is going to do some serious damage, and even though the LCS could probably sustain such a hit and zoom away to safety, thus survive, the ship will not be mission capable if hit in several locations depending upon damage. The necessity to sustain blows that are common in the irregular warfare land campaign represented in both Iraq and Afghanistan highlight the folly of building thin skinned ships to operate in the littorals where those weapons are most likely to be found. There is a reason why Iran mounts anti-tank missiles on their small boats, because they know those weapons will cause serious damage to all but our most hardened combatants.

I believe what is required is something harder to hit, harder to hurt, and with the ability to hit hard back. The vessel I am talking about would range from ~400-600 tons, cost $100 million dollars, be as lethal as possible within 2 miles, armored like a tank, and would have some form of point air defense against missiles and aircraft. While speed is important, endurance and sustainability with armor is far more important, and given the choice between mobility and armor, armor should win every debate.

There are several important metrics, none that have anything to do with speed. The vessel must be able to survive without serious damage a direct hit from the gun of a main battle tank. If cage armor is required to make this possible, then it is required. If it requires three levels of armor, then it needs all three. The vessel must be capable of supporting a full squad of Marines, have the facilities to support 2 corpsman, and when necessary for law enforcement roles the platform must have additional berthing space available for a small detachment of Coast Guard in addition to the Navy and Marine crew. There will be no aviation facility or landing pad, but the platform needs to be capable of replenishment from helicopters. The RHIB is critical to the purpose and intent of the platform, and should be capable of being heavily armed if needed and also support beaching all 12 Marines in one trip. Each platform would join with 3 other platforms, 4 squads total, representing what amounts to a reinforced Marine rifle platoon. Maintaining unit integrity is important.

Why these metrics? The littorals are populated, and well trained manpower has consistently proven to be the most important capability in peacemaking populated spaces. Why do Marines need to be engaged at the squad level? Because the process begins with engaging the local population and building cultural familiarity, and that process begins at the point of engagement at sea with the local population there. Marines cannot operate on the ground in nations around the Horn of Africa today and build local population cultural understanding on the ground, if we were to apply the Horn of Africa as an example, the fishing communities and population at sea around the Horn of Africa represents the starting place for building that cultural understanding. As part of a national strategy in preventing war, we cannot wait to build cultural understanding until after troops are on the ground, it must begin long before, and this is vital in places where our troops are forbidden from access.

While there is plenty of room for developing specific technical metrics for the ships, the $100 million cost cap drives capability. The primary weapon is almost certainly going to be gun.

Building small platforms and operating them in littoral environments, no matter how well protected they are from challenges that might be posed by the most likely threats in that environment, still represents several C2 and logistical challenges. Luckily, both current wars give insight and lessons for dealing with those challenges as well.

If the Navy has ever conducted a wargame where the enemy team has not presented an irregular warfare challenge against logistics and transport vessels operating in the littoral, I would suggest that wargame was unrealistic. Why? Because in Iraq one of the most common uses of IEDs was the targeting of convoys, or put another way, the use of irregular warfare tactics against the logistics train of our land services represented one of the most common direct attacks against US forces during the war. In the littorals, the expectation of attack against logistics ships should be accepted as a guarantee. This expectation alone should immediately suggest several challenges facing naval forces attempting to operate in the littorals, after all, our naval logistics vessels are not only big unarmed platforms, but they are operated by civilian crews.

This is why conventional wisdom must be thrown out with the bathwater when approaching irregular warfare and the challenges facing the Navy in the littorals. Assume for a moment the Navy intends to operate forces in the littorals in the future, and forces in the littoral are facing a persistent, evolving series of irregular warfare tactical challenges. How will the Navy keep ships on station and logistically supplied in the littorals? Do we risk MSC ships bringing logistics to the warfighters in the littorals? Do we pull out the warfighters to deeper water to logistically supply, ignoring the intent of sustained presence? Do we seek some other solution?

In Iraq, convoys used tactics more akin to mobility and stealth in avoiding attack during supply delivery. Changing convoy routes when possible and irregular delivery schedules were among a few of the tactics used to limit attacks by irregular forces. In developing logistics strategies in the littoral to defeat irregular challenges against logistics forces, I think throwing out conventional wisdom approaches is step one, and using an armed platform with a combination of mobility and stealth with enough space to deliver full supply to a four ship squadron is important. Luckily for the Navy, they are currently developing a platform with exactly the right capabilities: the LCS.

People think I'm crazy to suggest the LCS represents a logistics solution instead of a warfighter solution, but that is only one of several solutions the LCS represents in the littoral warfare environment against irregular challenges. As a mothership for unmanned systems, it can afford to deploy and stand off further from the engagement point conducted by the smaller, better armored vessels. That is a terrible peacemaking tactic if the LCS was a stand alone platform for engaging the local population at sea, but brilliant tactically if it is supporting other forces closer to the shore doing that function for the fleet.

As a logistics ship, the LCS can move in quickly for delivery and get out quickly, leveraging the platforms combination of speed and space to effectively support forward operations without committing to the hostile battlefield. But LCS brings more than just unmanned platforms for supporting the scouting for smaller forces in the littoral, and more than just a logistical enabler, the LCS can act as a forward command node for the 4 ship force, a C2 enabling node in the networked littoral battlefield able to give the forward forces aviation support and information support so the smaller forces can do their work. This is critical, because if 4 ship squadrons have a unique C2, support, and logistics node, the regional dispersal can be larger and influence can be achieved over a larger regional area of the maritime domain.

Different ships are built for different roles. The industry, absent the lessons in Iraq, may see the LCS as the 21st century frigate, but those who observe the irregular warfare threat carefully know better. Just because the LCS isn't the 21st century frigate, or even a front line contact/engagement platform, that doesn't mean the platform is flawed. The combination of speed and space is a rare combination that solves many of the challenges our own land forces had difficulty with in delivering logistic supplies to front line forces during the Iraq war when facing an irregular warfare threat like IEDs, or targeted attacks by enemy forces in Afghanistan.

There is one consideration that anyone advocating for smaller vessels in the US Navy must account for. Without an effective, capable logistics, C2, and support strategy for smaller front line vessels; small vessels in the littoral will never come to be in the US Navy until the wartime requirement forces the issue, by which time obviously flawed strategies will have already produced casualties.

Observing The Establishment of Combined Task Force 151

As The Custodian noted on Thursday, the US Navy has established a multinational task force focused solely on counter-piracy operations in and around the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. The name of this new task force is Combined Task Force 151 (CF-151). Despite the previous rhetoric otherwise from 5th Fleet and the political forces in Washington, including Condoleeza Rice at the United Nations, this is the first tangible action taken by the United States Navy to address the piracy problems emanating from Somalia. Previous efforts have consisted solely in information sharing and assistance response to mariners under threat. These are my observations of the political, tactical, and strategic thinking behind this action by the US Navy.

Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) will operate from the USS San Antonio (LPD 17) which will act as a command ship, and initially will be supported by two unnamed warships. It will be interesting to see what kind of helicopters we see flying off the USS San Antonio (LPD 17), we have recently seen AH-1s and UH-1s on the flight deck (click image above and look at it in hi-res), and it will be interesting to see if it becomes Marine airmen who become the sharp end of the spear. I also noted the announcement that the Boxer ESG will deploy Friday, which includes both the USS New Orleans (LPD 18) and the new UH-1Y Huey's. Go back and read my conversation with Expeditionary Strike Group 5 leadership, including the transcript of the whole conversation. The announcement today puts a lot of that conversation in context, making me think they kind of knew this was coming. As a consistent vocal fan of the San Antonio class, this is exactly the scenario that I have so often discussed this ship... as the flexible sea-air-land nGW maritime domain command ship (mothership). It will be interesting to observe whether reality confirms or discredits my theories through this implementation.

One final note on this, the Boxer ESG only has 2 warships and 1 Coast Guard Cutter. If this ESG replaces the Iwo Jima ESG in the 5th Fleet operating theater, the net effect is a reduction of one warship. It is interesting we are setting up a new command to be resourced by ships at a time the Navy appears to be gradually reducing the number of ships in the region. This could be telling us something about the Navy's obligations being reduced as it relates to the Iraq war theater.

Depending upon your point of view, or world view, the reasons regarding why the US Navy is developing CTF-151 may very. The Europeans, in particular the Germans, believe this is a reaction to the German Navy taking over command of Task Force 150 next week. The German Navy has a very specific mandate in the region regarding action against piracy, and German command over Task Force 150 coalition forces that take proactive steps to curb piracy could create political problems, and disrupt what has been a very successful coalition effort dealing with other security issues maritime forces are operating to address in the region.

While it is an interesting theory, that would not explain why the US Navy's commitment to date fighting piracy has been lackluster at best, so it wouldn't explain why the US Navy decided to all of a sudden take a more proactive approach against piracy simply because Germany is taking command of Task Force 150. The fundamental change here has nothing to do with the Germans, the fundamental change is a shift in strategy towards piracy. Without the decision to adjust the Navy's fundamental strategic approach to fighting piracy, the US Navy would be quite content operating in Task Force 150 under German command.

I also think CDR Salamander couldn't be more off the mark with his analysis that this represents the US Navy going it alone in theater. The US Navy has talked tough about piracy and has intentionally NOT done the job of the Europeans in protecting their trade for a long time now. In my opinion, the result of the pirate problem is that pirates have become the solution to developing a multinational approach to solving the difficult challenges in Somalia, and has built the largest collection of warships in the 21st century dedicated to the single purpose of curbing piracy against global trade in a concentrated region. There are 3 Saudi frigates and 3 Chinese ships missing from my last Order of Battle for the 5th Fleet. I'm stunned that the CDR believes as we observe another prerequisite for the framework required in developing a Global Maritime Partnership, he sees it as a sign the US Navy is abandoning the maritime strategy that has so brilliantly shaped these conditions? The patience that has been demonstrated, particularly given the incredibly harsh criticism of the US Navy by so many people on both the CDRs blog and mine, has been extraordinary, and the results in the form of a shared international responsibility against the difficult challenge of piracy has been well worth the wait.

CTF-151 will have a one-star Admiral in command, Rear Adm. Terry McKnight, which I think is exactly the right approach towards building this force for the long haul. After all, I suggested it would be the right approach towards coalition building for a multinational approach to piracy back in December after the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed UNSCR 1846.

My only concern by the pick of Rear Adm. Terry McKnight is that I am surprised the Navy picked an Admiral from the Atlantic Fleet. Expeditionary Strike Group 2, last I heard, was associated with the USS Bataan (LHD 5). I am sure Rear Adm. Terry McKnight is capable, but I was just expecting leadership to come from the Pacific Fleet. Put another way, I expected the Navy to pick someone with experience and familiarity dealing with the PLA Navy.

There is another reason the Navy may be forming CTF-151 besides taking a unilateral approach or because the Germans are taking Command of Task Force 150. This week the PLA Navy entered the action curbing piracy against regional commerce off the coast of Somalia. While the establishment of Combined Task Force 151 might represent the tactical development of an infrastructure to fight the pirate problem originating from Somalia, a problem everyone agrees is on land more than sea; the establishment of Combined Task Force 151 also represents a long term strategy towards the ends of linking the national security strategies of CENTCOM and PACOM looking into the future. Consider for a moment what CTF-151 looks like in the context of an image posted by EagleOne the other day, what I'm calling in the spirit of Thomas Barnett, the Navy's New Map in the first term of the Obama administration.

The tactical purpose of Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) might be to establish "a multinational task force focused solely on counter-piracy operations," but the strategic purpose has larger ends. Combined Task Force 150 represents a mostly Western approach to nGW in the maritime domain in and around the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. The nations that contribute to Task Force 150 are European and North American, but also made up of regional partners including Pakistan. If there is any vision behind Combined Task Force 151, the number one priority of Rear Adm. Terry McKnight is to build an Eastern approach to nGW in the maritime domain in and around the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. Essentially, Rear Adm. Terry McKnight priority from day 1 should be to recruit China, Russia, India, Malaysia, and Saudi Arabia into CTF-151, all of whom have already committed ships with the intent to fight piracy. If or when Japan and South Korea send ships, recruit them as well.

The US Navy has absolutely nothing to gain in creating maritime competitions in fighting piracy, indeed the Maritime Strategy is about creating maritime coalitions in dealing with maritime challenges. With the creation of Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) the US Navy continues to evolve at the pace of the international community towards the development of a cooperative approach to dealing with the problems in Somalia. The strategy here has been absolutely brilliant in my opinion. By not solving the piracy problem for others, a problem that has no economic impact whatsoever to the United States; by encouraging and assisting coalition partners with existing resources; and by remaining patient but engaged in the slowly evolving political process (UNSCR 1846) the United States Navy now finds itself with the internal infrastructure, regional participants, enabled by evolving international political and legal frameworks, and the right tactical resources to address a maritime nGW problem with an international, coalition approach.

For better or worse, the US Navy's Maritime Strategy has put the US Navy exactly in the position the maritime strategy states it is designed to do. It is now up to our national leadership, both political and inside the Navy, to close the deal with the opportunities at hand. In this bloggers opinion, there is some irony the success in developing a coalition approach to deal with Somalia will fall to the new Secretary of State, one Hillary Clinton. She, more than anyone, understands the challenges of military activities in Somalia. The question is whether that is an advantage, or a burden in the process. Time will tell.

cross-posted at the United States Naval Institute Blog