The Internet as we know it has only been around for a generation. Pretty much everyone in the industrialized world takes the Web for granted by now, as it has become a ubiquitous component of business, government, and our social lives. Yet, most of us probably don't give much thought to the 77 undersea fiber optic cables spanning nearly a million kilometers that carry 99% of the world's communications and data. Fortunately, one website has done the service of providing not only an amazing visualization of this vital, yet vulnerable infrastructure, but tied its importance to naval history and military operations. Even the Air Force's UAV operations rely on undersea cables to reduce the latency inherent in satellite networks. Built Visible's Messages in the Deep page serves as a reminder that our daily lives remain inextricably linked to the oceans. (for even more details, see Submarine Cable Map). This overlooked aspect of seapower facilitates global commerce today much as surface shipping has done for centuries.
Showing posts with label sea power. Show all posts
Showing posts with label sea power. Show all posts
Monday, July 21, 2024
Saturday, April 19, 2024
Military Sealift Command: Flexible. Forward. Seapower.
| Cesar Chavez (T-AKE 14) conducts a replenishment-at-sea with Royal Australian frigate HMAS Toowomba (FFG 156). (U.S. Navy photo by Master Capt. Rollin J. Bellfi/Released) |
To get a better idea of the variety and importance of this force, allow me to highlight three ongoing missions, in three different theaters, using three completely different platforms. In the far reaches of the southern Indian Ocean, a handful of international ships continue a wide-ranging search for any trace of missing Malaysia Air flight 370. Keeping these ships moving and fed is USNS Cesar Chavez (T-AKE 14). This sort of underway replenishment combat logistics mission is MSC's bread and butter, with dozens of similar operations occurring around the globe every day and night.
In the Mediterranean, another MSC ship is deployed for a unique and historical mission - to dispose of Syria’s chemical weapons. MV Cape Ray, part of the Transportation Department Maritime Administration’s Ready Reserve Force, departed Portsmouth in late January. The ship has spent most of its deployment pier-side in Rota while Syria stalls in fulfilling its UN-mandated obligations to aggregate the stockpiles at Latakia for transport and neutralization at sea. Whether or not the ship will ever get to execute its intended mission remains to be seen. Nevertheless, the fact that this operation was able to spin up so quickly and embark the U.S. Army’s chemical neutralization equipment demonstrates the agility of our heavy sealift ships.
Along the volatile west coast of Africa, USNS Spearhead (JHSV 1) and her joint training teams are deployed for Africa
Partnership Station (APS), conducting maritime security capacity building,
and exercises. The ship has even embarked African coast guards and navies for real-world fisheries enforcement operations.
Although APS deployments have been happening for several years, this marks
the first trial of the concept using the new Joint High Speed Vessel. Eventually 10 JSHVs will become part of MSC’s sealift fleet, conducting a wide range of logistics and combat support missions. From everything I’m hearing, they are
already being fought over by the geographic combatant commanders.
At this point, I should brag on my fellow citizen Sailors. Two of the missions I've mentioned couldn't happen without the dedication of Navy Reservists on extended active duty. While the ships themselves are operated by the MSC's civil mariners, reservists make up a significant portion of the mission teams aboard Cape Ray and Spearhead, to include some key leadership positions. Reservists are also part of USS Ponce's mission in the Arabian Gulf. Naval operations are often come-as-you-are affairs, and there are no better folks at rapidly and seamlessly partnering with the MSC for operational pick-up games than our reserve Sailors.
When considering long term budgets and acquisition plans, our capital combat ships are extremely important. But the flexibility and strategic reach of our military sealift force is what makes us a global naval power. The above ships represent just a small part of the MSC's inventory. Other vessels are prepositioned around the world to support major contingency operations. Still others support salvage, submarine rescue, or special operations missions. Time after time, MSC has demonstrated the ability to get equipment to the fight and sustain our warfighters.
Any opinions expressed in the preceding post are those of the author alone and not representative of the U.S. Navy or any other organization.
Saturday, August 25, 2024
The Army Gets Seapower...
...or, at least one reserve Lieutenant Colonel in Missouri does. Although I've spent nearly half of my career working in the joint and interagency environment, I am unabashedly parochial when it comes to the importance of spending on the Navy in comparison to the other services. Fortunately, Wayne Bowen doesn't share my parochialism towards his service. He's written a remarkably concise and powerful piece outlining the value of a strong navy and the perils of a large standing army that deserves wider dissemination. BZ Army...
The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.
The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.
Wednesday, February 8, 2024
System D at Sea
At its core, Seapower involves the defense of economies - large and small. But not all markets work the way we might assume. Journalist Robert Neuwirth describes the $10 trillion globalized black market economy as System D. The concept is worth examining from a maritime perspective, if not for its size and rate of growth alone. The first point to understand is that there is a thin gray line between the informal System D economy and criminal activities. System D maritime businesses include local fishing, oil bunkering (especially in West Africa), and unregistered vessels moving goods and people to undeveloped ports. System D also includes some forms of smuggling at sea, but not obvious maritime crime such as illicit trafficking in narcotics, weapons, or piracy. Perhaps the way one defines System D depends on the scale of the activity. For example, illegal fishing is a 23.5 billion dollar global industry. Clearly, not all of this economic activity is “lost” especially to the persons profiting from it and fishermen selling their catches in local markets.
For an interesting example of System D in action, watch the “River kids” risking their lives trying to make a living in Amazonia. The first two minutes will give you the idea, but the entire story is worth watching.
Budding entrepreneurs or pirates in the making?
Why is it important for naval professionals to understand System D? First World Sailors might view these activities as unusual, but the fact is, paying customs fees, registering motor vessels, licensed and regulated fishing, and other rule of law issues we take for granted are anomalies for most of the world's population.
Modern navies operate around System D whether or not they realize it. MCAST Sailors or Coast Guardsmen working to develop nascent navies must understand that in many cases their counterparts are underpaid by their governments and feed their families by their activities in the shadow economy. They may even use government owned (and even US tax-payer funded…) naval vessels to support their System D businesses. In addition to patrolling coasts and rivers, small craft may be used to catch fish, smuggle goods, or provide private security. Moreover, practically every US Sailor making a port call abroad has participated in System D buying goods from street vendors; some of whom sell licit locally-produced merchandise, while others hawk pirated or counterfeit knock-offs.
In his book, Stealth of Nations: The Global Rise of the Informal Economy
, Neuwirth argues that instead of attempting the impossible - to close down these informal economies - that the developed world should co-opt them. Rather than judging the débrouillards making their livings by First World standards, we should realize that the informal economy on the world's waterways is vibrant, necessary, and not going away any time soon.
The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.
For an interesting example of System D in action, watch the “River kids” risking their lives trying to make a living in Amazonia. The first two minutes will give you the idea, but the entire story is worth watching.
Budding entrepreneurs or pirates in the making?
Why is it important for naval professionals to understand System D? First World Sailors might view these activities as unusual, but the fact is, paying customs fees, registering motor vessels, licensed and regulated fishing, and other rule of law issues we take for granted are anomalies for most of the world's population.
Modern navies operate around System D whether or not they realize it. MCAST Sailors or Coast Guardsmen working to develop nascent navies must understand that in many cases their counterparts are underpaid by their governments and feed their families by their activities in the shadow economy. They may even use government owned (and even US tax-payer funded…) naval vessels to support their System D businesses. In addition to patrolling coasts and rivers, small craft may be used to catch fish, smuggle goods, or provide private security. Moreover, practically every US Sailor making a port call abroad has participated in System D buying goods from street vendors; some of whom sell licit locally-produced merchandise, while others hawk pirated or counterfeit knock-offs.
In his book, Stealth of Nations: The Global Rise of the Informal Economy
, Neuwirth argues that instead of attempting the impossible - to close down these informal economies - that the developed world should co-opt them. Rather than judging the débrouillards making their livings by First World standards, we should realize that the informal economy on the world's waterways is vibrant, necessary, and not going away any time soon.The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.
Friday, November 25, 2024
PERSTEMPO - The Hollow Force's Canary in the Coal Mine
Along with other reporting and data, recent Personnel Tempo, or PERSTEMPO trends illuminate cracks in the Navy’s readiness. As previously noted in this blog, Bataan, Mesa Verde and Whidbey Island are on their way to setting records with 10.5 month deployments. For those not familiar with Navy deployment patterns who might try to view these data in the context of recent 12-15 month Army deployments, I’ll try to add a bit of context on why anecdotal evidence and other statistics are a harbinger for future problems.
Partly as a result of the post-Vietnam “hollow force” of the late 1970s, the Navy began tracking PERSTEMPO in 1985 and has kept detailed data on these trends ever since. Past Center for Naval Analysis PERSTEMPO studies demonstrated that six month deployment lengths and 2:1 turn around ratios (or dwell, as its now called in joint parlance) are optimal for balancing forward deployed presence, allowing ships enough time to receive depot-level maintenance, and sustaining retention and morale for Sailors who are generally assigned to 3-5 year periods of sea duty. Prior to 2007, deployments longer than six months required CNO approval. As with other standards in DOD, when they can’t be met regularly, they are often redefined. The attached graphic shows these trends up to 2004. One thing not illustrated in this slide is how ship numbers have declined in relation to PERSTEMPO increases. In 1991, during Desert Storm, the shipcount was 529 ships. In 2004 at the end of the graphic, it was 292. Today, it's only 284.
I haven’t seen recent data on PERSTEMPO “busts” or CNO waivers, but we know that the new PERSTEMPO instruction extended the deployment length limit to seven months and shrunk dwell to 1.0:1 between deployments. And more than a few ships seem to be tripping those limits. Another interesting data point is the number of ships deployed at any given time. After running approximately 30% of the force deployed on any given day for decades, today 36% of the force is deployed away from home station, a figure previously seen only during wartime surge periods such as Desert Storm, immediately prior to Iraqi Freedom, etc. A detailed analysis of recent PERSTEMPO trends might make for an interesting NPS Thesis…
In the late 1990s, the realization occurred to the Navy that PERSTEMPO data demonstrates how frequently platforms and units are deployed, but doesn’t account for the amount of time individual Sailors are away from home. In response to Congressional concerns, an attempt to capture this data, and possibly even compensate Sailors for excessive time away, resulted in the creation of a system called “ITEMPO.” However after 9/11, this system was simply ignored as unworkable, because the limits set were frequently broken with war time requirements such as individual augmentee deployments. Therefore, it’s difficult to measure the actual strain of time away from home on each Sailor over the course of a career.
It should be noted that unlike the Army, the Navy (and Marine Corps) was heavily deployed prior to 2001 - albeit with more ships and aircraft - and will continue extended deployments for operational forces following the Afghan withdrawals scheduled for 2014. This pattern is the nature of what makes naval forces responsive and ready - continuous forward presence.
However now, the Combatant Commanders’ global demands for deployed naval forces are higher than current the ship count can sustain. Sooner or later, something will give, resulting in either a (more) precipitous decline in readiness due to maintenance problems, retention, or a combination of both. History demonstrates that what likely won’t give are these presence requirements, or the Navy’s obligation and inclination to fill them. So we seem to be left with two choices: a pending readiness disaster; or to simply build more ships. A force of less than 300 ships does not bode well for maintaining the US Navy’s status the world’s premier sea power. The exact force composition, high-low mix, etc. has been and should continue to be debated, but the fact that we can’t sustain maritime primacy without more ships and submarines should be clear to all by now.
The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.
Monday, November 14, 2024
The New York Times Takes Note...
Interest in maritime affairs goes mainstream:
The article isn't interesting so much for its content as for its existence; most of the readers of this blog will be familiar with the basic arguments and disputes. However, it's one a relatively few serious peaces in a major mainstream newspaper to tackle maritime affairs. That it comes from the NYT White House correspondent suggests that there may be some policy discussions afoot that someone in the administration wants to shed light on. Indeed, this might represent an initial effort to pushback against some of the Army arguments that Leon Panetta has seemed receptive to.
Like a lot of others, I'm interested to see whether we'll be entering a new era of inter-service conflict. Phil Ewing has a good piece on the public disputes between the Navy and the Air Force in the late 1940s. The services have, in contrast to their British counterparts, managed to avoid serious public confrontation since the 1960s, instead confining conflict to elite levels. It seems, however, that some of the players are at least considering stretching or redefining the rules.
The Obama administration first waded into the treacherous waters of the South China Sea last year when Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton declared, at a tense meeting of Asian countries in Hanoi, that the United States would join Vietnam, the Philippines and other countries in resisting Beijing’s efforts to dominate the sea. China, predictably, was enraged by what it viewed as American meddling.
For all its echoes of the 1800s, not to mention the cold war, the showdown in the South China Sea augurs a new type of maritime conflict — one that is playing out from the Mediterranean Sea to the Arctic Ocean, where fuel-hungry economic powers, newly accessible undersea energy riches and even changes in the earth’s climate are conspiring to create a 21st-century contest for the seas.
China is not alone in its maritime ambitions. Turkey has clashed with Cyprus and stoked tensions with Greece and Israel over natural-gas fields that lie under the eastern Mediterranean. Several powers, including Russia, Canada and the United States, are eagerly circling the Arctic, where melting polar ice is opening up new shipping routes and the tantalizing possibility of vast oil and gas deposits beneath.
The article isn't interesting so much for its content as for its existence; most of the readers of this blog will be familiar with the basic arguments and disputes. However, it's one a relatively few serious peaces in a major mainstream newspaper to tackle maritime affairs. That it comes from the NYT White House correspondent suggests that there may be some policy discussions afoot that someone in the administration wants to shed light on. Indeed, this might represent an initial effort to pushback against some of the Army arguments that Leon Panetta has seemed receptive to.
Like a lot of others, I'm interested to see whether we'll be entering a new era of inter-service conflict. Phil Ewing has a good piece on the public disputes between the Navy and the Air Force in the late 1940s. The services have, in contrast to their British counterparts, managed to avoid serious public confrontation since the 1960s, instead confining conflict to elite levels. It seems, however, that some of the players are at least considering stretching or redefining the rules.
I'm an assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, University of Kentucky.
Thursday, November 3, 2024
A Day in the Life of US Seapower
The following is the written testimony of Vice Admiral Bruce W. Clingan, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans and Strategy before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces and Subcommittee on Readiness on A Day Without Seapower and Projection Forces.
The hearing was dull, as expected, but this written statement is very well done, and I quote it in full. I do like it when the Navy tells their story this way - this is the 3500 words a sailor should write every month and post to the Navy blog. This is also the monthly article in Rhumb Lines that I miss the most.
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Chairman Akin, Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member McIntyre, Ranking Member Bordallo and members of the Subcommittee, it is my honor and pleasure to appear with you, representing over 600,000 Navy men and women - active, reserve and civilian. Today, as we have done for over 200 years, our Navy is forward- deployed around the world protecting our nation. Our dedicated Navy men and women operate at sea, on land, in the air, in space and in cyberspace. I appreciate your continued support for our Sailors, our civilians, and their families.
Seapower in the Evolving Security Environment
The value of seapower cannot be fully appreciated outside the context of the evolving security environment, defined by a combination of recognizable trends and consequential uncertainties. The changing distribution of power in an increasingly competitive global environment poses challenges and opportunities for U.S. interests. Nation states with growing economic and political power such as China, India, Russia, Brazil and Turkey are continuing to field advanced military capabilities. Civil unrest is spreading throughout North Africa and the Middle East, fueling disorder and unexpected regime changes; and nations are employing all means of state power to restore order and extend both regional and global influence.
Rapid population growth, increased urbanization and migration into the littoral regions are exacerbating the impacts of multiple concurrent and diverse crises that challenge the capacity of nations to respond and threaten the continuity of global systems. Energy resources, precious minerals, fishing rights and food and water scarcity will continue to be the root of competition and flashpoints of conflict. Natural and man- made disasters, terrorist attacks, cyber warfare, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and employment of advanced military technology by both state and non-state actors is causing disruptions that threaten global stability and increase the possibility of conflicts today and in the future.
These global trends in an uncertain world underpin an increasing demand for seapower. As a maritime nation, the United States is dependent upon the sea for both national security and economic prosperity. To this end, the Navy employs the global reach, persistent presence and operational flexibility inherent in U.S. Navy seapower to accomplish six strategic imperatives.
Strategic Imperatives
Where tensions are high or where we wish to demonstrate to our allies and friends our commitment to security and stability, U.S. naval forces regionally concentrate forward-deployed task forces with the combat power to limit regional conflict, deter major power war, and should deterrence fail, win our Nation’s wars as part of a joint or combined campaign. In the Asia- Pacific region, for example, the U.S. is bound by defense treaties with the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, the Philippines, Japan and Thailand. The U.S. Navy maintains forward capabilities in the Western Pacific to support interagency efforts to limit aggression by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), as well as to respond to other assertive or coercive actions in the region. To this end, frequent interaction to maintain and improve interoperability with the ROK, Japan, Australia and our other allies and partners is critical to effective crisis response operations and limiting the potential for regional conflicts.
The U.S. Navy provides a broad range of offshore options to deter major power war that include a survivable nuclear strike capability and forward deployed conventional combat power capable of achieving and sustaining operational access in contested areas.
As U.S. ground forces reduce their role in active combat missions in Southwest Asia and transfer internal security responsibilities to Iraq’s and Afghanistan’s national forces, these new partners and residual U.S. joint security force assistance teams - akin to those working with numerous other partners throughout the world - will rely increasingly on offshore capabilities and support. Concurrently, the Navy will continue to work with interagency and international partners to disrupt and defeat Al Qaeda, its affiliates and their support structures as our nation continues its war against violent extremist organizations.
Throughout the world, mission-tailored naval forces are distributed in order to contribute to homeland defense-in-depth, foster and sustain cooperative relationships and prevent or mitigate disruptions and crises before they impact the global systems. The Navy’s most significant contribution to homeland security is identifying and neutralizing threats as far away from our shores as possible. When required, the Navy rapidly responds to threats approaching our coastlines and off-shore assets, primarily through maritime interdiction and air/missile defense missions. Closer to home, the Navy works closely with the Coast Guard to support domestic maritime security efforts while increasing Navy-Coast Guard interoperability. The Navy also maintains the capability to support civil authorities in times of emergency and in response to natural and man-made disasters, as well as working with the interagency to defend the nation’s cyberspace infrastructure.
Building and sustaining cooperative relationships to prevent disruptions of the interdependent global networks of trade, finance, information, law, people and governance is at the forefront of Navy international engagement initiatives. The Navy plays a significant role in preventing disruptions that occur if the flow of resources, commodities and components are interrupted; terrorist attacks undermine the rule of law; or natural or man-made disasters prevent economic activities. In fact, cooperative relationships play a critical role across all of the strategic imperatives and will be increasingly critical in the emerging security environment.
The Daily Impact of U.S. Navy Seapower
March 19, 2024 is representative of the daily impact the U.S. Navy has on achieving these strategic imperatives and protecting our national interests.
Win Our Nation’s Wars
On March 19, the Navy was engaged on the ground in Afghanistan and in Iraq with 8,066 Sailors, among them 1,428 mobilized Reservists. Many of these Sailors were applying core Navy competencies such as medical, construction, explosive ordnance disposal, intelligence exploitation/analysis, electronic warfare, base operations, military police, maritime and port security, airlift support, Joint Task Force (ISAF, MNF- I, USF-A)/COCOM staff support and Navy Special Warfare expertise to make significant contributions to the successful accomplishment of our joint operations ashore. Still others were applying their initiative, creativity and adaptability to
perform tasks outside Navy’s core competencies, leading and contributing to Provincial Reconstruction Teams, detainee operations, civil affairs, Embedded Training Teams, customs inspections, counter-Improvised Explosive Device (IED) exploitation and combat support. In total, nearly 13,000 Sailors were employed throughout the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) conducting ground-based combat, combat support and combat service support missions.
On the same day, more than 13,000 additional Sailors were conducting naval missions afloat in CENTCOM’s AOR. Sailors from Maritime Expeditionary Security Squadron 5 were providing security aboard vessels supporting the rotation and sustainment of the joint force operating in Iraq and Afghanistan. Carrier Air Wing 1 embarked in USS ENTERPRISE completed 28 sorties from the Arabian Sea in support of U.S. and coalition ground forces conducting counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations throughout Afghanistan. USS CARL VINSON, having just completed a month at sea conducting similar flight operations, was heading to Jebel Ali for a short maintenance availability in preparation for follow-on tasking to support Operation NEW DAWN in Iraq. Within the week, the USS CARL VINSON/Carrier Air Wing 17 team would fly 13 sorties in support of Operation NEW DAWN, contributing to the Navy’s share of air support for Multi- National Forces-Iraq which averages 30 percent of the fixed-wing sorties and almost 60 percent of the electronic attack sorties flown over Iraq each day.
On March 19, Navy also conducted 54 flight hours of manned Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) mission support for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq that included seven Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft (P-3/EP-3) sorties. Elsewhere throughout the world, six P-3 ISR missions, three EP-3 missions and 230 hours of ISR coverage from 17 forward-deployed unmanned systems (BAMS-D, Fire Scout, Scan Eagle and Shadow) were provided by the Navy, some of it in the continuing fight against violent extremist organizations. On this day in particular, surface combatants and both manned and unmanned ISR were pursuing high-value terrorist targets in both Somalia and Yemen.
Limit Regional Conflict
March 19 marked the beginning of ODYSSEY DAWN, an operation initially mounted to enforce a no-fly zone over Libya to protect its citizens from potential genocide perpetrated by their own government. Subsequently, the mission was expanded to support the internationally recognized transition government and its ground forces as they endeavored to displace the Qaddafi regime. On the first day of ODYSSEY DAWN, the U.S. Navy launched 122 Tomahawk Cruise Missiles from two surface ships and three submarines, including the USS FLORIDA. This strike marked the first time an OHIO-class guided-missile submarine launched TLAMs during hostilities. Navy E/A-18G Growlers ground-based in Iraq were retasked to support ODYSSEY DAWN, and within 44 hours of completing a combat mission over Iraq were engaged against hostile forces in Libya. Other ODYSSEY DAWN highlights in the days after March 19th include the engagement of the Libyan Coast Guard vessel VITTORIA, suspected of laying mines, with a AGM-65 Maverick missile fired from a P-3; and the employment of a MV-22 Osprey from the deck of the USS KEARSARGE in a Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) mission that successfully recovered an Air Force pilot who had ejected over northeastern Libya.
On March 19 in the Asia-Pacific region, both a Carrier Strike Group and an Expeditionary Strike Group were underway, visibly demonstrating to North Korea that belligerent acts like the sinking of South Korea’s corvette CHEONAN, which had occurred almost a year prior, could invite an immediate proportional response to prevent potential ‘anniversary’ aggression from spiraling into a regional conflict.
Deter Major Power War
On March 19, 23 submarines were forward deployed around the world conducting missions vital to national security, including ballistic missile submarines on strategic nuclear deterrent patrols. Moreover, four carrier strike groups, three amphibious ready groups, 23 independently deploying surface combatants and amphibious ships, nine fleet oilers and 15 P-3s from three Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft detachments were forward deployed, prepared to aggregate credible combat power capable of generating decisive effects in response to a crisis.
Contribute to Homeland Defense-in-depth
Among the forward deployed forces that the Navy employs to contribute to homeland defense-in-depth, surface combatants with AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capability are increasingly in demand as the range of ballistic missile systems increase and the systems proliferate. On March 19, USS MONTEREY deployed to begin the enduring presence of Aegis BMD-capable ships in the Mediterranean as part of the Phased Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense in Europe as directed by the President. MONTEREY joined the USS STOUT conducting Operation SHARP SENTRY in the Eastern Mediterranean supporting ballistic missile defense of Israel; and USS FITZGERALD, USS TRUXTON and USS PICKNEY and three alternate ships were providing similar defense of Japan and defense-in-depth for the United States.
Ballistic missiles are not the only proliferating threats that pose a growing challenge to the United States. Numerous state and non-state actors are developing and employing cyber capabilities to exploit intellectual capital and military capabilities, as well as mounting attacks that disrupt or damage networks, data repositories, automated control systems and hardware. To deal with this growing threat, the Navy re-established the U.S. 10th Fleet. Cyberspace has become an important warfighting domain, and 10th Fleet's mission is to integrate cyber capabilities into naval operations to achieve information dominance. On March 19, 10th Fleet and its subordinate commands countered approximately 150 malicious attacks.
Foster and Sustain Cooperative Relationships
The Navy's premier maritime security engagement program employs "Partnership Stations" to strengthen the maritime security capacity of partners by developing maritime professionals, infrastructure, domain awareness and response capabilities. It is designed to be a multi-national security cooperation initiative that involves allies and able partners in planning, training and other aspects of the endeavor, ultimately building national and regional capabilities that can be aggregated to achieve global maritime security. To this end, on March 19 USS CLEVELAND was in the South Pacific conducting a Pacific Partnership Station with numerous Pacific island
nations; Sailors and Marines from High Speed Vessel SWIFT were performing community relations projects in Honduras; USS OAK HILL was conducting Southern Partnership Station to counter transnational organized crime in the Caribbean Sea; USNS COMFORT was participating in CONTINUING PROMISE, providing medical care to the citizens of various South American countries; and USS ROBERT G BRADLEY was in Freetown, Sierra Leone, conducting Africa Partnership Station West maritime security training events.
In other engagement efforts on March 19th, Virginia Class submarine USS NEW HAMPSHIRE and the Seawolf Class submarine USS CONNECTICUT commenced Ice Exercise 2011 in the Arctic Ocean with other U.S., Canadian and United Kingdom units. Seabees from several Naval Mobile Construction Battalions were building schools in Djibouti and drilling water wells in Ethiopia, as part of our humanitarian civil assistance efforts in Africa to help our partners prevent the establishment of violent extremist safehavens.
Prevent or Contain Local Disruptions
On March 19, the REAGAN Carrier Strike Group responded to one of largest humanitarian disasters in recent memory as the earthquake and tsunami in Japan affected our strongest ally in the Pacific region. Navy was on-hand immediately to provide critical humanitarian assistance in the face of widespread devastation from the opening hours of the tragedy. REAGAN was transiting the Western Pacific en route to conduct combat air operations over Afghanistan and quickly altered course. Within hours they were headed to Japan where they used much of the same training practiced for Afghanistan to deliver humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. At the same time, the ESSEX Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), normally stationed in Okinawa with USS HARPERS FERRY, USS GERMANTOWN and with the embarked 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), continued their transit to the Sea of Japan near Honshu, to be in position to launch Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HADR) missions over land. Military Sealift Command's dry cargo/ammunition ship USNS MATTHEW PERRY conducted replenishment-at-sea operations with the USS ESSEX ARG, sustaining their support of what eventually became known as Operation TOMODACHI. Additionally, USS TORTUGA, with two embarked heavy-lift MH-53 helicopters, on-loaded approximately 300 Japanese Ground Self Defense Force personnel and 90 vehicles in Tomokomai, Hokkaido to transport them to the disaster area. USNS SAFEGUARD, along with Mobile Dive and Salvage Unit 1, Companies 1 and 2, arrived in Yokosuka, Japan, to begin on-loading HADR supplies for transport to devastated regions throughout the country. Fleet Logistics Support Squadron 62 transported 10,375 pounds of radiological control equipment and 18 members of Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard’s Radiological Control Team to Atsugi, Japan, to assist with HADR and nuclear monitoring efforts.
On March 19, USS HALYBURTON, USS BULKELEY, USS LAKE CHAMPLAIN, USNS ARCTIC and USNS ALAN SHEPARD conducted counter- piracy operations in the vicinity of the Horn of Africa to prevent the disruption of the free flow of resources and trade through the Gulf of Aden. HALYBURTON responded to a bridge-to- bridge call from a pirated vessel, M/V IRENE, requesting immediate medical assistance for a suspected pirate. HALYBURTON agreed to provide medical assistance and requested that the pirates release their hostages, to which the suspected pirates agreed. Though the injured pirate succumbed to his injuries, the pirates released 13 hostages to HALYBURTON where they received food and medical attention and were ultimately repatriated.
On March 19, USS DOYLE was at sea conducting counter- illicit trafficking operations with its embarked U.S. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment. Three E-2C Hawkeye aircraft and crews from Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron 77 (VAW-77) flew three missions for a total of 13 flight hours in support of counter-illicit trafficking operations in the U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility. Meanwhile, the Reserve crew of Fleet Logistics Support Squadron 53 delivered 20 personnel and 10,000 pounds of maintenance support equipment for VAW-77 from Naval Air Station New Orleans to El Salvador, allowing VAW-77 to continue uninterrupted anti-drug/stability operations.
A Day Without Navy Seapower
In total, 152 of the Navy's 288 Battle Force Ships were underway or forward-deployed on March 19, along with a similar percentage of our other capabilities - training for or engaged in missions focused on accomplishing our strategic imperatives and advancing our national interests. Without the seapower the Navy uniquely provides our nation, not one of the activities undertaken on the 19th of March would have been accomplished; nor would a similar number and range of activities be accomplished every day of every year.
Impact of Budget Control Act
Even with all the activity taking place on March 19, the Navy was still not able to meet the global demand for naval forces requested by the Geographic Combatant Commanders. Throughout fiscal year 2011, the Navy was only able to source an average of 59 percent of the Combatant Commander’s requirements.
Without question, the Fleet is operating now at an unsustainable level. To best meet the Combatant Commanders' need for deployed Navy forces since September 11, 2024 and to respond to emergent requirements, we have increased the frequency and average length of unit deployments. This has resulted in reduced training time; reduced maintenance availabilities; a narrowing of pre-deployment training for certain units to mission-specific tasks; and an accelerated aging of our ships and aircraft. As our ground forces draw down from combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, every indication is that demand for naval forces' presence, deterrence and engagement activities will increase.
The impact of the cuts directed by the Budget Control Act is still being determined, and so a detailed discussion of how those cuts might affect the Force and the allocation of Navy resources to the Combatant Commanders would be premature. Clearly, each of the Services stands to be affected by the budget decisions made in the weeks and months ahead--and Navy, with its capital-intensive shipbuilding and aircraft procurement and maintenance accounts, could potentially be the Service most adversely affected. The Navy has postured itself over the past decade to meet its requirements in the most efficient manner possible, but not without assuming some manageable risk in the process. Careful consideration will be given to decisions meant to keep the fleet at a high state of readiness while investing in future capabilities and building the ships, submarines and aircraft that will patrol the seas in an increasingly lethal environment during the coming decades. We anticipate that a Navy top-line decrease as a result of the Budget Control Act will reduce the capability, capacity and proficiency required by the fleet to accomplish our global missions; reduce the operational availability of those forces that we retain; and increase the risk to mission success and our naval forces to the maximum acceptable limit.
Should additional cuts beyond those expected from the Budget Control Act be imposed on the Navy, we anticipate confronting stark choices with further reductions in our ability to perform our most vital missions. While we would continue to make informed decisions with regard to prioritizing those missions and managing the associated risks, the impacts of potential Navy budgets resulting from sequestration will drastically affect the readiness of all of our Sailors and platforms as well as their ability to successfully perform their vital missions as part of the Joint Force tasked with guaranteeing national security.
The Navy will manage the risks of reduced resources by continuing to put our core war-fighting responsibilities first - ensuring we are ready to fight and win today, while building the ability to win tomorrow as resources allow. Operating forward, we will continue to provide offshore options to deter, influence and win in an era of uncertainty and harness the teamwork, talent and imagination of our diverse force to employ resources responsibly in order to be ready to fight.
Enduring Value of Navy Seapower
In an ever-changing and uncertain global environment, one fact remains clear. The United States is, and always will be, a maritime nation. Vast quantities of global goods--over 70 percent of the total of all trade value are moved by sea, mandating a dedicated and vigilant force to safeguard maritime routes and promote economic prosperity and security. When one considers that almost 90 percent of the earth's population lives within 500 miles of the sea, it becomes clear how much humanity still relies on the freedom of the oceans as a medium for trade and sustenance. Our maritime forces not only contribute to national and global economic health, but also provide Combatant Commanders with flexible and rapid response options that include sustained high-intensity operations without the need for a sizeable footprint ashore or permission from any other nation. The Navy’s global presence in defense of free access to the global commons by all nations is vital to our national security and prosperity. The Navy’s preeminent role in this regard is unique among the Armed Forces and cannot be replaced.
Once again, I thank you for this opportunity to address the Subcommittee and I appreciate your support for those who sail in harm’s way.
The hearing was dull, as expected, but this written statement is very well done, and I quote it in full. I do like it when the Navy tells their story this way - this is the 3500 words a sailor should write every month and post to the Navy blog. This is also the monthly article in Rhumb Lines that I miss the most.
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Chairman Akin, Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member McIntyre, Ranking Member Bordallo and members of the Subcommittee, it is my honor and pleasure to appear with you, representing over 600,000 Navy men and women - active, reserve and civilian. Today, as we have done for over 200 years, our Navy is forward- deployed around the world protecting our nation. Our dedicated Navy men and women operate at sea, on land, in the air, in space and in cyberspace. I appreciate your continued support for our Sailors, our civilians, and their families.
Seapower in the Evolving Security Environment
The value of seapower cannot be fully appreciated outside the context of the evolving security environment, defined by a combination of recognizable trends and consequential uncertainties. The changing distribution of power in an increasingly competitive global environment poses challenges and opportunities for U.S. interests. Nation states with growing economic and political power such as China, India, Russia, Brazil and Turkey are continuing to field advanced military capabilities. Civil unrest is spreading throughout North Africa and the Middle East, fueling disorder and unexpected regime changes; and nations are employing all means of state power to restore order and extend both regional and global influence.
Rapid population growth, increased urbanization and migration into the littoral regions are exacerbating the impacts of multiple concurrent and diverse crises that challenge the capacity of nations to respond and threaten the continuity of global systems. Energy resources, precious minerals, fishing rights and food and water scarcity will continue to be the root of competition and flashpoints of conflict. Natural and man- made disasters, terrorist attacks, cyber warfare, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and employment of advanced military technology by both state and non-state actors is causing disruptions that threaten global stability and increase the possibility of conflicts today and in the future.
These global trends in an uncertain world underpin an increasing demand for seapower. As a maritime nation, the United States is dependent upon the sea for both national security and economic prosperity. To this end, the Navy employs the global reach, persistent presence and operational flexibility inherent in U.S. Navy seapower to accomplish six strategic imperatives.
Strategic Imperatives
Where tensions are high or where we wish to demonstrate to our allies and friends our commitment to security and stability, U.S. naval forces regionally concentrate forward-deployed task forces with the combat power to limit regional conflict, deter major power war, and should deterrence fail, win our Nation’s wars as part of a joint or combined campaign. In the Asia- Pacific region, for example, the U.S. is bound by defense treaties with the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, the Philippines, Japan and Thailand. The U.S. Navy maintains forward capabilities in the Western Pacific to support interagency efforts to limit aggression by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), as well as to respond to other assertive or coercive actions in the region. To this end, frequent interaction to maintain and improve interoperability with the ROK, Japan, Australia and our other allies and partners is critical to effective crisis response operations and limiting the potential for regional conflicts.
The U.S. Navy provides a broad range of offshore options to deter major power war that include a survivable nuclear strike capability and forward deployed conventional combat power capable of achieving and sustaining operational access in contested areas.
As U.S. ground forces reduce their role in active combat missions in Southwest Asia and transfer internal security responsibilities to Iraq’s and Afghanistan’s national forces, these new partners and residual U.S. joint security force assistance teams - akin to those working with numerous other partners throughout the world - will rely increasingly on offshore capabilities and support. Concurrently, the Navy will continue to work with interagency and international partners to disrupt and defeat Al Qaeda, its affiliates and their support structures as our nation continues its war against violent extremist organizations.
Throughout the world, mission-tailored naval forces are distributed in order to contribute to homeland defense-in-depth, foster and sustain cooperative relationships and prevent or mitigate disruptions and crises before they impact the global systems. The Navy’s most significant contribution to homeland security is identifying and neutralizing threats as far away from our shores as possible. When required, the Navy rapidly responds to threats approaching our coastlines and off-shore assets, primarily through maritime interdiction and air/missile defense missions. Closer to home, the Navy works closely with the Coast Guard to support domestic maritime security efforts while increasing Navy-Coast Guard interoperability. The Navy also maintains the capability to support civil authorities in times of emergency and in response to natural and man-made disasters, as well as working with the interagency to defend the nation’s cyberspace infrastructure.
Building and sustaining cooperative relationships to prevent disruptions of the interdependent global networks of trade, finance, information, law, people and governance is at the forefront of Navy international engagement initiatives. The Navy plays a significant role in preventing disruptions that occur if the flow of resources, commodities and components are interrupted; terrorist attacks undermine the rule of law; or natural or man-made disasters prevent economic activities. In fact, cooperative relationships play a critical role across all of the strategic imperatives and will be increasingly critical in the emerging security environment.
The Daily Impact of U.S. Navy Seapower
March 19, 2024 is representative of the daily impact the U.S. Navy has on achieving these strategic imperatives and protecting our national interests.
Win Our Nation’s Wars
On March 19, the Navy was engaged on the ground in Afghanistan and in Iraq with 8,066 Sailors, among them 1,428 mobilized Reservists. Many of these Sailors were applying core Navy competencies such as medical, construction, explosive ordnance disposal, intelligence exploitation/analysis, electronic warfare, base operations, military police, maritime and port security, airlift support, Joint Task Force (ISAF, MNF- I, USF-A)/COCOM staff support and Navy Special Warfare expertise to make significant contributions to the successful accomplishment of our joint operations ashore. Still others were applying their initiative, creativity and adaptability to
perform tasks outside Navy’s core competencies, leading and contributing to Provincial Reconstruction Teams, detainee operations, civil affairs, Embedded Training Teams, customs inspections, counter-Improvised Explosive Device (IED) exploitation and combat support. In total, nearly 13,000 Sailors were employed throughout the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) conducting ground-based combat, combat support and combat service support missions.
On the same day, more than 13,000 additional Sailors were conducting naval missions afloat in CENTCOM’s AOR. Sailors from Maritime Expeditionary Security Squadron 5 were providing security aboard vessels supporting the rotation and sustainment of the joint force operating in Iraq and Afghanistan. Carrier Air Wing 1 embarked in USS ENTERPRISE completed 28 sorties from the Arabian Sea in support of U.S. and coalition ground forces conducting counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations throughout Afghanistan. USS CARL VINSON, having just completed a month at sea conducting similar flight operations, was heading to Jebel Ali for a short maintenance availability in preparation for follow-on tasking to support Operation NEW DAWN in Iraq. Within the week, the USS CARL VINSON/Carrier Air Wing 17 team would fly 13 sorties in support of Operation NEW DAWN, contributing to the Navy’s share of air support for Multi- National Forces-Iraq which averages 30 percent of the fixed-wing sorties and almost 60 percent of the electronic attack sorties flown over Iraq each day.
On March 19, Navy also conducted 54 flight hours of manned Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) mission support for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq that included seven Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft (P-3/EP-3) sorties. Elsewhere throughout the world, six P-3 ISR missions, three EP-3 missions and 230 hours of ISR coverage from 17 forward-deployed unmanned systems (BAMS-D, Fire Scout, Scan Eagle and Shadow) were provided by the Navy, some of it in the continuing fight against violent extremist organizations. On this day in particular, surface combatants and both manned and unmanned ISR were pursuing high-value terrorist targets in both Somalia and Yemen.
Limit Regional Conflict
March 19 marked the beginning of ODYSSEY DAWN, an operation initially mounted to enforce a no-fly zone over Libya to protect its citizens from potential genocide perpetrated by their own government. Subsequently, the mission was expanded to support the internationally recognized transition government and its ground forces as they endeavored to displace the Qaddafi regime. On the first day of ODYSSEY DAWN, the U.S. Navy launched 122 Tomahawk Cruise Missiles from two surface ships and three submarines, including the USS FLORIDA. This strike marked the first time an OHIO-class guided-missile submarine launched TLAMs during hostilities. Navy E/A-18G Growlers ground-based in Iraq were retasked to support ODYSSEY DAWN, and within 44 hours of completing a combat mission over Iraq were engaged against hostile forces in Libya. Other ODYSSEY DAWN highlights in the days after March 19th include the engagement of the Libyan Coast Guard vessel VITTORIA, suspected of laying mines, with a AGM-65 Maverick missile fired from a P-3; and the employment of a MV-22 Osprey from the deck of the USS KEARSARGE in a Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) mission that successfully recovered an Air Force pilot who had ejected over northeastern Libya.
On March 19 in the Asia-Pacific region, both a Carrier Strike Group and an Expeditionary Strike Group were underway, visibly demonstrating to North Korea that belligerent acts like the sinking of South Korea’s corvette CHEONAN, which had occurred almost a year prior, could invite an immediate proportional response to prevent potential ‘anniversary’ aggression from spiraling into a regional conflict.
Deter Major Power War
On March 19, 23 submarines were forward deployed around the world conducting missions vital to national security, including ballistic missile submarines on strategic nuclear deterrent patrols. Moreover, four carrier strike groups, three amphibious ready groups, 23 independently deploying surface combatants and amphibious ships, nine fleet oilers and 15 P-3s from three Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft detachments were forward deployed, prepared to aggregate credible combat power capable of generating decisive effects in response to a crisis.
Contribute to Homeland Defense-in-depth
Among the forward deployed forces that the Navy employs to contribute to homeland defense-in-depth, surface combatants with AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capability are increasingly in demand as the range of ballistic missile systems increase and the systems proliferate. On March 19, USS MONTEREY deployed to begin the enduring presence of Aegis BMD-capable ships in the Mediterranean as part of the Phased Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense in Europe as directed by the President. MONTEREY joined the USS STOUT conducting Operation SHARP SENTRY in the Eastern Mediterranean supporting ballistic missile defense of Israel; and USS FITZGERALD, USS TRUXTON and USS PICKNEY and three alternate ships were providing similar defense of Japan and defense-in-depth for the United States.
Ballistic missiles are not the only proliferating threats that pose a growing challenge to the United States. Numerous state and non-state actors are developing and employing cyber capabilities to exploit intellectual capital and military capabilities, as well as mounting attacks that disrupt or damage networks, data repositories, automated control systems and hardware. To deal with this growing threat, the Navy re-established the U.S. 10th Fleet. Cyberspace has become an important warfighting domain, and 10th Fleet's mission is to integrate cyber capabilities into naval operations to achieve information dominance. On March 19, 10th Fleet and its subordinate commands countered approximately 150 malicious attacks.
Foster and Sustain Cooperative Relationships
The Navy's premier maritime security engagement program employs "Partnership Stations" to strengthen the maritime security capacity of partners by developing maritime professionals, infrastructure, domain awareness and response capabilities. It is designed to be a multi-national security cooperation initiative that involves allies and able partners in planning, training and other aspects of the endeavor, ultimately building national and regional capabilities that can be aggregated to achieve global maritime security. To this end, on March 19 USS CLEVELAND was in the South Pacific conducting a Pacific Partnership Station with numerous Pacific island
nations; Sailors and Marines from High Speed Vessel SWIFT were performing community relations projects in Honduras; USS OAK HILL was conducting Southern Partnership Station to counter transnational organized crime in the Caribbean Sea; USNS COMFORT was participating in CONTINUING PROMISE, providing medical care to the citizens of various South American countries; and USS ROBERT G BRADLEY was in Freetown, Sierra Leone, conducting Africa Partnership Station West maritime security training events.
In other engagement efforts on March 19th, Virginia Class submarine USS NEW HAMPSHIRE and the Seawolf Class submarine USS CONNECTICUT commenced Ice Exercise 2011 in the Arctic Ocean with other U.S., Canadian and United Kingdom units. Seabees from several Naval Mobile Construction Battalions were building schools in Djibouti and drilling water wells in Ethiopia, as part of our humanitarian civil assistance efforts in Africa to help our partners prevent the establishment of violent extremist safehavens.
Prevent or Contain Local Disruptions
On March 19, the REAGAN Carrier Strike Group responded to one of largest humanitarian disasters in recent memory as the earthquake and tsunami in Japan affected our strongest ally in the Pacific region. Navy was on-hand immediately to provide critical humanitarian assistance in the face of widespread devastation from the opening hours of the tragedy. REAGAN was transiting the Western Pacific en route to conduct combat air operations over Afghanistan and quickly altered course. Within hours they were headed to Japan where they used much of the same training practiced for Afghanistan to deliver humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. At the same time, the ESSEX Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), normally stationed in Okinawa with USS HARPERS FERRY, USS GERMANTOWN and with the embarked 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), continued their transit to the Sea of Japan near Honshu, to be in position to launch Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HADR) missions over land. Military Sealift Command's dry cargo/ammunition ship USNS MATTHEW PERRY conducted replenishment-at-sea operations with the USS ESSEX ARG, sustaining their support of what eventually became known as Operation TOMODACHI. Additionally, USS TORTUGA, with two embarked heavy-lift MH-53 helicopters, on-loaded approximately 300 Japanese Ground Self Defense Force personnel and 90 vehicles in Tomokomai, Hokkaido to transport them to the disaster area. USNS SAFEGUARD, along with Mobile Dive and Salvage Unit 1, Companies 1 and 2, arrived in Yokosuka, Japan, to begin on-loading HADR supplies for transport to devastated regions throughout the country. Fleet Logistics Support Squadron 62 transported 10,375 pounds of radiological control equipment and 18 members of Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard’s Radiological Control Team to Atsugi, Japan, to assist with HADR and nuclear monitoring efforts.
On March 19, USS HALYBURTON, USS BULKELEY, USS LAKE CHAMPLAIN, USNS ARCTIC and USNS ALAN SHEPARD conducted counter- piracy operations in the vicinity of the Horn of Africa to prevent the disruption of the free flow of resources and trade through the Gulf of Aden. HALYBURTON responded to a bridge-to- bridge call from a pirated vessel, M/V IRENE, requesting immediate medical assistance for a suspected pirate. HALYBURTON agreed to provide medical assistance and requested that the pirates release their hostages, to which the suspected pirates agreed. Though the injured pirate succumbed to his injuries, the pirates released 13 hostages to HALYBURTON where they received food and medical attention and were ultimately repatriated.
On March 19, USS DOYLE was at sea conducting counter- illicit trafficking operations with its embarked U.S. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment. Three E-2C Hawkeye aircraft and crews from Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron 77 (VAW-77) flew three missions for a total of 13 flight hours in support of counter-illicit trafficking operations in the U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility. Meanwhile, the Reserve crew of Fleet Logistics Support Squadron 53 delivered 20 personnel and 10,000 pounds of maintenance support equipment for VAW-77 from Naval Air Station New Orleans to El Salvador, allowing VAW-77 to continue uninterrupted anti-drug/stability operations.
A Day Without Navy Seapower
In total, 152 of the Navy's 288 Battle Force Ships were underway or forward-deployed on March 19, along with a similar percentage of our other capabilities - training for or engaged in missions focused on accomplishing our strategic imperatives and advancing our national interests. Without the seapower the Navy uniquely provides our nation, not one of the activities undertaken on the 19th of March would have been accomplished; nor would a similar number and range of activities be accomplished every day of every year.
Impact of Budget Control Act
Even with all the activity taking place on March 19, the Navy was still not able to meet the global demand for naval forces requested by the Geographic Combatant Commanders. Throughout fiscal year 2011, the Navy was only able to source an average of 59 percent of the Combatant Commander’s requirements.
Without question, the Fleet is operating now at an unsustainable level. To best meet the Combatant Commanders' need for deployed Navy forces since September 11, 2024 and to respond to emergent requirements, we have increased the frequency and average length of unit deployments. This has resulted in reduced training time; reduced maintenance availabilities; a narrowing of pre-deployment training for certain units to mission-specific tasks; and an accelerated aging of our ships and aircraft. As our ground forces draw down from combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, every indication is that demand for naval forces' presence, deterrence and engagement activities will increase.
The impact of the cuts directed by the Budget Control Act is still being determined, and so a detailed discussion of how those cuts might affect the Force and the allocation of Navy resources to the Combatant Commanders would be premature. Clearly, each of the Services stands to be affected by the budget decisions made in the weeks and months ahead--and Navy, with its capital-intensive shipbuilding and aircraft procurement and maintenance accounts, could potentially be the Service most adversely affected. The Navy has postured itself over the past decade to meet its requirements in the most efficient manner possible, but not without assuming some manageable risk in the process. Careful consideration will be given to decisions meant to keep the fleet at a high state of readiness while investing in future capabilities and building the ships, submarines and aircraft that will patrol the seas in an increasingly lethal environment during the coming decades. We anticipate that a Navy top-line decrease as a result of the Budget Control Act will reduce the capability, capacity and proficiency required by the fleet to accomplish our global missions; reduce the operational availability of those forces that we retain; and increase the risk to mission success and our naval forces to the maximum acceptable limit.
Should additional cuts beyond those expected from the Budget Control Act be imposed on the Navy, we anticipate confronting stark choices with further reductions in our ability to perform our most vital missions. While we would continue to make informed decisions with regard to prioritizing those missions and managing the associated risks, the impacts of potential Navy budgets resulting from sequestration will drastically affect the readiness of all of our Sailors and platforms as well as their ability to successfully perform their vital missions as part of the Joint Force tasked with guaranteeing national security.
The Navy will manage the risks of reduced resources by continuing to put our core war-fighting responsibilities first - ensuring we are ready to fight and win today, while building the ability to win tomorrow as resources allow. Operating forward, we will continue to provide offshore options to deter, influence and win in an era of uncertainty and harness the teamwork, talent and imagination of our diverse force to employ resources responsibly in order to be ready to fight.
Enduring Value of Navy Seapower
In an ever-changing and uncertain global environment, one fact remains clear. The United States is, and always will be, a maritime nation. Vast quantities of global goods--over 70 percent of the total of all trade value are moved by sea, mandating a dedicated and vigilant force to safeguard maritime routes and promote economic prosperity and security. When one considers that almost 90 percent of the earth's population lives within 500 miles of the sea, it becomes clear how much humanity still relies on the freedom of the oceans as a medium for trade and sustenance. Our maritime forces not only contribute to national and global economic health, but also provide Combatant Commanders with flexible and rapid response options that include sustained high-intensity operations without the need for a sizeable footprint ashore or permission from any other nation. The Navy’s global presence in defense of free access to the global commons by all nations is vital to our national security and prosperity. The Navy’s preeminent role in this regard is unique among the Armed Forces and cannot be replaced.
Once again, I thank you for this opportunity to address the Subcommittee and I appreciate your support for those who sail in harm’s way.
Sunday, September 25, 2024
Coast Guard as a Means of National Power
I received many great comments and e-mails, in response to my post a few weeks ago looking for thoughts as to ways the USCG was a national instrument of power and how best to articulate that value to the public. A standard method at looking at the various elements of national power is to group them in one of four general areas, Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economic. This is the DIME model (as one commenter pointed out, there is a body of opinion that DIME is an outdated model in that other kinds of power elements may also be found. I recognize this perspective, but personally prefer DIME, so I will use it here).
The thoughts on "how" were generally similar to my own:
The USCG is able to project US power and influence through when, where and over whom it exercises law enforcement jurisdiction, those with whom it works, trains, exercises, deploys, and when it is able to respond to a contingency, especially when already deployed.
All of this works well within the 2007 Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, which is a great expression of how the efforts of the three sea services should fit together.
Across the USCG's 11 missions, I find six, Drug interdiction, Living marine resources, Defense readiness, Migrant interdiction, Ice operations, and Other law enforcement, that regularly fit within my definition. My list is somewhat flexible as there are certainly times when the other five missions (Ports, waterways, and coastal security, Aids to navigation, Search and rescue, Marine safety, and Marine environmental protection) can also be flexed. I am attempting to parse out missions that regularly reflect elements of power, rather than simply may appear on an international stage. Feel free to fire away in comments.
The USCG's work in these six missions won't always be an exercise of power, but, looking at the elements of DIME, many of the activities undertaken in these missions do fit in at least one of the elements of power.
I will build on some of the specifics in my next several posts.
The views expressed herein are those of the blogger and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Commandant or of the U. S. Coast Guard. Nor should they be construed as official or reflecting the views of the National War College, National Defense University, or the Department of Defense.
The thoughts on "how" were generally similar to my own:
The USCG is able to project US power and influence through when, where and over whom it exercises law enforcement jurisdiction, those with whom it works, trains, exercises, deploys, and when it is able to respond to a contingency, especially when already deployed.
All of this works well within the 2007 Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, which is a great expression of how the efforts of the three sea services should fit together.
Across the USCG's 11 missions, I find six, Drug interdiction, Living marine resources, Defense readiness, Migrant interdiction, Ice operations, and Other law enforcement, that regularly fit within my definition. My list is somewhat flexible as there are certainly times when the other five missions (Ports, waterways, and coastal security, Aids to navigation, Search and rescue, Marine safety, and Marine environmental protection) can also be flexed. I am attempting to parse out missions that regularly reflect elements of power, rather than simply may appear on an international stage. Feel free to fire away in comments.
The USCG's work in these six missions won't always be an exercise of power, but, looking at the elements of DIME, many of the activities undertaken in these missions do fit in at least one of the elements of power.
I will build on some of the specifics in my next several posts.
The views expressed herein are those of the blogger and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Commandant or of the U. S. Coast Guard. Nor should they be construed as official or reflecting the views of the National War College, National Defense University, or the Department of Defense.
Friday, September 2, 2024
Why Do We Still Need a Huge Army? - Round II
I’ve received significant feedback on this post , ranging from private emails calling these ideas “brilliant” to a blatant dismissal of any arguments that recommend cutting the army by a single soldier. More importantly, regardless of one's opinion on my arguments, the discourse on this topic has been energized. Since my post, a few timely articles were written discussing this debate. Looks like the Army itself is talking about eliminating 10 out of 45 active BCTs, which is just short of the 25% SWAG I recommended (no, I didn’t have inside information on this).
Was I too parochial? Guilty as charged, except that I’m also defending the Marine Corps, Air Force, and multi-service SOF community over the Army conventional force. However, I’m not sure how one can take a position on force reductions without being parochial, unless one thinks that across the board cuts make any sort of strategic sense (I don’t). I was also accused of coming to the right conclusion for the wrong reasons. Fair point, but I didn’t intend to capture all of the reasons that the army should be reduced before the other services in a single post. Those arguments have been made extensively at every draw-down, most recently during the early 1990s, post-Cold War/ODS era.
For someone much more eloquent than this author on the value of of sea power to America's security, I recommend reading Bryan McGrath. But I will make a few points here to round out the case for a large decrease in the size of the active component army, while leaving the other services relatively unscathed by future budget cuts:
-The Navy/Marine Corps (and SOF) are nimble and able to respond quickly to global military contingencies. Despite repeated efforts at trying to correct this, the army is too bulky and inflexible to provide a global on call response force when it counts. Furthermore, neither the US people nor international community will show any appetite for a large US military combat footprint anywhere for at least the next couple of decades. As one of the commenters noted, it's best to "start small and stay small." To paraphrase another responder, having a large army provides us a convenient excuse to use a large army. Going in big is not always the best strategic COA, especially when other political or military options are available.
-Post Afghanistan, the Army will withdraw to garrison and do little to counter ongoing irregular threats, while the other services (and SOCOM) remain forward engaged. It’s not in the US Army's culture or capacity to do otherwise. For those who might disagree, what is the Army’s strategy to counter non-state actors short of a full scale ground invasion with follow-on extended COIN operations?
-Yes, SOF-Airpower, the air-sea battle, and other future warfighting concepts are still in nascent stages of development (some more than others). However, we've seen enough benefits from these ideas in combat the past decade or so to make a decision on investing more in air, maritime, and SOF capabilities, even at the expense of traditional ground combat force structure.
- Finally, the Navy has already taken significant hits to manpower and readiness the past few years, while continuing to support the war efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and against al Qaeda in a variety of ways. One way these personnel shortfalls manifest themselves is through the boots-on-the-ground individual augmentees the Navy provides to make up for a supposed lack of army capacity in certain areas. In some cases, this augmentation has been thoughtful and logical. In others, it’s just plain stupid. Additionally, the Navy continues to pull Sailors from what are already “optimally manned” ships to deploy in support of the Army. The most egregious IA example I've heard of is deploying highly trained, highly compensated nuclear qualified submarine junior officers to Afghanistan to run army postal units. First, the Navy must take a hard scrub on these IAs. Second, the Army Chief might want to consider doing what the Marine Corps Commandant did a few years back; scour the Pentagon and all other DC staffs (not to mention those homesteading comfortably in Europe and Asia) to find the embarrassing number of Army field grade officers and senior NCOs -- regardless of rank or specialty-- who have never deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan and put them on the next rotator to Bagram Air Base with a postal scale in their ruck.
Defense reductions should be made strategically, not on the basis of some sense of fairness. Why should the other services take further cuts when the Army pulls back to garrison post-Afghanistan? Why shouldn’t the conventional army take the lion’s share of any defense cuts?
The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.
Was I too parochial? Guilty as charged, except that I’m also defending the Marine Corps, Air Force, and multi-service SOF community over the Army conventional force. However, I’m not sure how one can take a position on force reductions without being parochial, unless one thinks that across the board cuts make any sort of strategic sense (I don’t). I was also accused of coming to the right conclusion for the wrong reasons. Fair point, but I didn’t intend to capture all of the reasons that the army should be reduced before the other services in a single post. Those arguments have been made extensively at every draw-down, most recently during the early 1990s, post-Cold War/ODS era.
For someone much more eloquent than this author on the value of of sea power to America's security, I recommend reading Bryan McGrath. But I will make a few points here to round out the case for a large decrease in the size of the active component army, while leaving the other services relatively unscathed by future budget cuts:
-The Navy/Marine Corps (and SOF) are nimble and able to respond quickly to global military contingencies. Despite repeated efforts at trying to correct this, the army is too bulky and inflexible to provide a global on call response force when it counts. Furthermore, neither the US people nor international community will show any appetite for a large US military combat footprint anywhere for at least the next couple of decades. As one of the commenters noted, it's best to "start small and stay small." To paraphrase another responder, having a large army provides us a convenient excuse to use a large army. Going in big is not always the best strategic COA, especially when other political or military options are available.
-Post Afghanistan, the Army will withdraw to garrison and do little to counter ongoing irregular threats, while the other services (and SOCOM) remain forward engaged. It’s not in the US Army's culture or capacity to do otherwise. For those who might disagree, what is the Army’s strategy to counter non-state actors short of a full scale ground invasion with follow-on extended COIN operations?
-Yes, SOF-Airpower, the air-sea battle, and other future warfighting concepts are still in nascent stages of development (some more than others). However, we've seen enough benefits from these ideas in combat the past decade or so to make a decision on investing more in air, maritime, and SOF capabilities, even at the expense of traditional ground combat force structure.
- Finally, the Navy has already taken significant hits to manpower and readiness the past few years, while continuing to support the war efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and against al Qaeda in a variety of ways. One way these personnel shortfalls manifest themselves is through the boots-on-the-ground individual augmentees the Navy provides to make up for a supposed lack of army capacity in certain areas. In some cases, this augmentation has been thoughtful and logical. In others, it’s just plain stupid. Additionally, the Navy continues to pull Sailors from what are already “optimally manned” ships to deploy in support of the Army. The most egregious IA example I've heard of is deploying highly trained, highly compensated nuclear qualified submarine junior officers to Afghanistan to run army postal units. First, the Navy must take a hard scrub on these IAs. Second, the Army Chief might want to consider doing what the Marine Corps Commandant did a few years back; scour the Pentagon and all other DC staffs (not to mention those homesteading comfortably in Europe and Asia) to find the embarrassing number of Army field grade officers and senior NCOs -- regardless of rank or specialty-- who have never deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan and put them on the next rotator to Bagram Air Base with a postal scale in their ruck.
Defense reductions should be made strategically, not on the basis of some sense of fairness. Why should the other services take further cuts when the Army pulls back to garrison post-Afghanistan? Why shouldn’t the conventional army take the lion’s share of any defense cuts?
The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.
Sunday, August 28, 2024
Libya Lessons: Supremacy of the SOF-Airpower Team… Or, why do We Still Need a Huge Army?
A number of interesting learning points have arisen from the Libyan conflict. Foremost among them for me is the need to massively downsize the United States Army. More about that heresy in a minute… Galrahn and Robert Farley have discussed the merits and shortcomings of airpower in relation to the US/NATO/various third-party countries' campaign against the Gadhafi regime. They both make some interesting points. However, what the Libya campaign best demonstrates, or more appropriately, reiterates, is the utility of the special ops-airpower team. And by airpower, I’m referring to service-agnostic airpower in all its’ forms, although biased towards the flexibility sea-based aircraft provide.
This lesson was best demonstrated in 2001 in Afghanistan, when relatively small numbers of US Special Forces combined with guerilla fighters and precisely applied airpower over-ran the Taliban. A similar unconventional warfare campaign was executed in Northern Iraq in 2003 when conventional US Army forces were prohibited from gaining access there via Turkey. Instead, Army Special Forces working in conjunction with Kurdish Pesh Merga fighters deftly defeated Saddam’s ground forces, including mechanized armor formations.
No US military boots deployed on the ground during Libya, but other nations’ SOF are reported to have participated, including those of the Gulf States, which by the way, have worked and trained extensively with US SOF the past several years. The rag-tag TNC rebels, supported by (primarily) US ISR, multi-national strike sorties, and foreign SOF - which came to the party somewhat late - were able to defeat a rather heavily armed force. Needless to say, had US SOF been involved, the game would have been over for Gadhafi many months ago.
So what is the role of the Navy in this construct? First, SOF’s capabilities are amplified when they are inserted, supported, and sustained from the sea (see Sep. 2005 Proceedings for elaboration), and Navy-SOF interoperability is as critical now as ever. Second, and more importantly, is that the United States has designed and nearly perfected a capability to defeat large conventional armies without employing our own conventional ground forces has huge budgetary implications that can be seen as favorable to the Navy (and Air Force).
Look at the range of expected combat missions over the next few decades:
-Overthrowing a dictatorial regime? Use SOF married to an indigenous force of irregulars supported by naval forces and air power.
-Want to defeat a large conventional army? SOF and ISR will target enemy ground formations for destruction by air power and naval fires.
-Need to counter an irregular threat? Apply SOF, naval, and air power. Rinse. Repeat.
-Steady state shaping operations? SOF excels at these, and the navy's forward deployed forces are always positioned to respond to emerging crises.
What’s missing from the above scenarios? The conventional army. In other words, there is little role for a large standing army in supporting the national security of the United States once we have pulled out of our manpower-intensive counterinsurgency fights. What does an armored force give us against an opposing armored force when air dominance allows us to slice and dice enemy armored divisions? (And if we didn’t have air supremacy, we wouldn’t commit large numbers of conventional ground troops to be slaughtered by an opposing air force anyway). How often do we use artillery to suppress threats in a collateral damage adverse world now that we have on call ISR over-watch and precision guided munitions? And why on earth would we deploy a large conventional infantry force for constabulary duty in another protracted ground war given the lessons (relearned) in Iraq and Afghanistan?
What about Iraq, you say? The routing of Saddam's army took over 100,000 US troops and GEN Shinseki said we should have used several hundred thousand more. Yes, but with a little more patience, a few battalions of US Special Forces supported from the air could have deposed Saddam's regime through an unconventional warfare campaign. This sort of effort probably wouldn't have destroyed Iraq's infrastructure and army to the point of bringing the complete disarray to the country that our "shock and awe" campaign required. But that sort of operation wouldn't have been appreciated by the conventional army generals running the war, would it?
Naturally, there are drawbacks to instituting major cuts to the army's force structure. Primary among these are the secondary effects on USASOC, which recruits the majority of its special operators from the conventional army. But unlike platform-intensive air and naval forces, or mature and highly trained special operations forces, conventional army formations can be reconstituted rather rapidly. And admittedly, there are times when a US ground force is necessary to conduct a larger unilateral raid or punitive expedition ashore than SOF alone could execute. Fortunately though, there is a magnificently self-sufficient, expeditionary, and flexible group of warriors known as US Marines, who are well-equipped and forward deployed to handle these sorts of operations; again, supported by naval and air power.
I realize the above concepts are controversial, but I also know that the US became a secure and strong nation and will remain powerful because of sea power, not land power. And a globally deployed Navy/Marine Corps team, combined with a robust range of airpower and special operators is the force we need to defeat just about any conceivable future threat. So why shouldn't the Army take a disproportionate share of the impending DOD budget cuts?
UPDATE: To save readers from going through 80+ postings and provide some clarity: what do I mean by "massive" cuts to USA force structure? How about at least 25% of active duty force structure? Honestly, I won't venture to put out an exact number, but I do know that 5% cuts applied to all services across the board is a disservice to national security. Designing a future force for "most likely" scenarios, as well as black swans doesn't mandate that we do things the way we always (or at least recently) have done them. And while 25% may not seem like a large number, when you put it in dollars and manpower, it's pretty "massive."
The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.
This lesson was best demonstrated in 2001 in Afghanistan, when relatively small numbers of US Special Forces combined with guerilla fighters and precisely applied airpower over-ran the Taliban. A similar unconventional warfare campaign was executed in Northern Iraq in 2003 when conventional US Army forces were prohibited from gaining access there via Turkey. Instead, Army Special Forces working in conjunction with Kurdish Pesh Merga fighters deftly defeated Saddam’s ground forces, including mechanized armor formations.
No US military boots deployed on the ground during Libya, but other nations’ SOF are reported to have participated, including those of the Gulf States, which by the way, have worked and trained extensively with US SOF the past several years. The rag-tag TNC rebels, supported by (primarily) US ISR, multi-national strike sorties, and foreign SOF - which came to the party somewhat late - were able to defeat a rather heavily armed force. Needless to say, had US SOF been involved, the game would have been over for Gadhafi many months ago.
So what is the role of the Navy in this construct? First, SOF’s capabilities are amplified when they are inserted, supported, and sustained from the sea (see Sep. 2005 Proceedings for elaboration), and Navy-SOF interoperability is as critical now as ever. Second, and more importantly, is that the United States has designed and nearly perfected a capability to defeat large conventional armies without employing our own conventional ground forces has huge budgetary implications that can be seen as favorable to the Navy (and Air Force).
Look at the range of expected combat missions over the next few decades:
-Overthrowing a dictatorial regime? Use SOF married to an indigenous force of irregulars supported by naval forces and air power.
-Want to defeat a large conventional army? SOF and ISR will target enemy ground formations for destruction by air power and naval fires.
-Need to counter an irregular threat? Apply SOF, naval, and air power. Rinse. Repeat.
-Steady state shaping operations? SOF excels at these, and the navy's forward deployed forces are always positioned to respond to emerging crises.
What’s missing from the above scenarios? The conventional army. In other words, there is little role for a large standing army in supporting the national security of the United States once we have pulled out of our manpower-intensive counterinsurgency fights. What does an armored force give us against an opposing armored force when air dominance allows us to slice and dice enemy armored divisions? (And if we didn’t have air supremacy, we wouldn’t commit large numbers of conventional ground troops to be slaughtered by an opposing air force anyway). How often do we use artillery to suppress threats in a collateral damage adverse world now that we have on call ISR over-watch and precision guided munitions? And why on earth would we deploy a large conventional infantry force for constabulary duty in another protracted ground war given the lessons (relearned) in Iraq and Afghanistan?
What about Iraq, you say? The routing of Saddam's army took over 100,000 US troops and GEN Shinseki said we should have used several hundred thousand more. Yes, but with a little more patience, a few battalions of US Special Forces supported from the air could have deposed Saddam's regime through an unconventional warfare campaign. This sort of effort probably wouldn't have destroyed Iraq's infrastructure and army to the point of bringing the complete disarray to the country that our "shock and awe" campaign required. But that sort of operation wouldn't have been appreciated by the conventional army generals running the war, would it?
Naturally, there are drawbacks to instituting major cuts to the army's force structure. Primary among these are the secondary effects on USASOC, which recruits the majority of its special operators from the conventional army. But unlike platform-intensive air and naval forces, or mature and highly trained special operations forces, conventional army formations can be reconstituted rather rapidly. And admittedly, there are times when a US ground force is necessary to conduct a larger unilateral raid or punitive expedition ashore than SOF alone could execute. Fortunately though, there is a magnificently self-sufficient, expeditionary, and flexible group of warriors known as US Marines, who are well-equipped and forward deployed to handle these sorts of operations; again, supported by naval and air power.
I realize the above concepts are controversial, but I also know that the US became a secure and strong nation and will remain powerful because of sea power, not land power. And a globally deployed Navy/Marine Corps team, combined with a robust range of airpower and special operators is the force we need to defeat just about any conceivable future threat. So why shouldn't the Army take a disproportionate share of the impending DOD budget cuts?
UPDATE: To save readers from going through 80+ postings and provide some clarity: what do I mean by "massive" cuts to USA force structure? How about at least 25% of active duty force structure? Honestly, I won't venture to put out an exact number, but I do know that 5% cuts applied to all services across the board is a disservice to national security. Designing a future force for "most likely" scenarios, as well as black swans doesn't mandate that we do things the way we always (or at least recently) have done them. And while 25% may not seem like a large number, when you put it in dollars and manpower, it's pretty "massive."
The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.
Wednesday, August 24, 2024
Seapower and Irregular Warfare
John Sandoz published an article in Small Wars Journal that nicely summarizes why the US Navy should institutionalize an irregular warfare focus.
As Sandoz notes, “While irregular challenges often begin with underlying causes, they can quickly manifest themselves as pernicious irregular threats. The Navy‘s role in confronting irregular challenges includes conducting a variety of preventive security activities, stability operations that respond to crises and operations that deter and defeat irregular threats.”
First off, it is good to see more naval-oriented authors writing for SWJ. SWJ is a ground-centric (read Army, mostly) forum whose readers don’t always appreciate the role and value seapower contributes to “small wars” and in addressing irregular threats. Yet these seaborne threats are pervasive and increasing globally, ranging from insurgents, terrorists, and pirates, to transnational criminal organizations and other illicit traffickers.
Other naval authors who have emphasized similar points at SWJ include LCDR BJ Armstrong and this guy. Outside the NSW community, IW proponents in the navy often seem like salmon swimming upstream, fighting against the current of calls for more investments in BMD, carrier aviation, and other big ticket programs. Nevertheless, there is value in this line of thinking.
If US seapower advocates put all our eggs in the “we’ve got to be ready to fight China at sea someday" basket, we shouldn’t be too surprised when our budgets get cut by those who discount that threat or think that it is too far in the future worry about. But if we can successfully articulate how naval forces are relevant to confronting today’s non-state challenges to our national interests, then we have a better chance at supporting the naval force structure that serves this country in protecting our nation against the full spectrum of irregular and conventional threats. Moreover, when fighting for slices of the shrinking budget pie, I have yet to see any cogent arguments for the contribution a large conventional army will make towards confronting irregular challenges once they withdraw from the active combat zones. If anyone would like to cite them, I’m all ears.
The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.
As Sandoz notes, “While irregular challenges often begin with underlying causes, they can quickly manifest themselves as pernicious irregular threats. The Navy‘s role in confronting irregular challenges includes conducting a variety of preventive security activities, stability operations that respond to crises and operations that deter and defeat irregular threats.”
First off, it is good to see more naval-oriented authors writing for SWJ. SWJ is a ground-centric (read Army, mostly) forum whose readers don’t always appreciate the role and value seapower contributes to “small wars” and in addressing irregular threats. Yet these seaborne threats are pervasive and increasing globally, ranging from insurgents, terrorists, and pirates, to transnational criminal organizations and other illicit traffickers.
Other naval authors who have emphasized similar points at SWJ include LCDR BJ Armstrong and this guy. Outside the NSW community, IW proponents in the navy often seem like salmon swimming upstream, fighting against the current of calls for more investments in BMD, carrier aviation, and other big ticket programs. Nevertheless, there is value in this line of thinking.
If US seapower advocates put all our eggs in the “we’ve got to be ready to fight China at sea someday" basket, we shouldn’t be too surprised when our budgets get cut by those who discount that threat or think that it is too far in the future worry about. But if we can successfully articulate how naval forces are relevant to confronting today’s non-state challenges to our national interests, then we have a better chance at supporting the naval force structure that serves this country in protecting our nation against the full spectrum of irregular and conventional threats. Moreover, when fighting for slices of the shrinking budget pie, I have yet to see any cogent arguments for the contribution a large conventional army will make towards confronting irregular challenges once they withdraw from the active combat zones. If anyone would like to cite them, I’m all ears.
The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.
Friday, June 17, 2024
Selling Seapower to Africa - PT II
Part I here. Why should developing nations in Africa (and US security force assistance efforts to those countries) be more focused on building maritime capacity rather than land power? As articulated by Geoffrey Till
, seapower is the sum of all of a nation's civil and military maritime activities: "…there is more to seapower than grey painted ships with numbers on the
side... Seapower also includes the non-military aspects of sea use (merchant
shipping, fishing, marine insurance, shipbuilding and repair and so on) since
these contribute to naval power and since they can also influence the behaviour
of other people in their own right."
, seapower is the sum of all of a nation's civil and military maritime activities: "…there is more to seapower than grey painted ships with numbers on theside... Seapower also includes the non-military aspects of sea use (merchant
shipping, fishing, marine insurance, shipbuilding and repair and so on) since
these contribute to naval power and since they can also influence the behaviour
of other people in their own right."
Certainly sea-borne trade is vital to just about any economy. Interestingly though, one of the most important factors in Africa’s recent and future economic growth is found under the sea. Mobile telephony and broadband Internet access are enabling some African countries to move directly from pastoral economies into the information age. Low cost connectivity facilitates many basic services for the developing world which the West has taken for granted for decades: a more transparent media, a platform for community organization and political activism, better access to health care and education, mobile banking and money exchange systems, and enhanced security for civilians in conflict zones. NDU’s Africa Center for Strategic Studies has produced an excellent study on this transformation. Even in Somalia, with all of its strife and problems, mobile telephony is one of the main (legitimate) drivers of economic growth.
Given the importance of broadband connectivity to the future of Africa; it stands to reason that the national security strategies of those countries should not ignore this economic lifeline. Undersea broadband cables are generally pretty robust and redundant, but there have been several recent notable outages around the world. And because groups like MEND and al Qaeda have become wise to the value of low cost, high impact attacks on maritime oil infrastructure, it stands to reason that they might expand into information infrastructure too. Along Africa's long coastlines, these cables could be disrupted intentionally by maritime guerrillas or more likely, just run over by wayward fishing trawlers. Monitoring and protection of their information infrastructure is yet another reason for African countries to spend a larger portion of their meager defense budgets on building competent coastal navies.
Given the importance of broadband connectivity to the future of Africa; it stands to reason that the national security strategies of those countries should not ignore this economic lifeline. Undersea broadband cables are generally pretty robust and redundant, but there have been several recent notable outages around the world. And because groups like MEND and al Qaeda have become wise to the value of low cost, high impact attacks on maritime oil infrastructure, it stands to reason that they might expand into information infrastructure too. Along Africa's long coastlines, these cables could be disrupted intentionally by maritime guerrillas or more likely, just run over by wayward fishing trawlers. Monitoring and protection of their information infrastructure is yet another reason for African countries to spend a larger portion of their meager defense budgets on building competent coastal navies.
The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.
Wednesday, June 8, 2024
A Day Without Bull***t
I'll confess, I was somewhat less than impressed with "A Day Without Seapower:"
Frankly, I would have been more sympathetic if Eaglen and McGrath had played up the threat of invasion by maritime-oriented aliens. More entertaining, and altogether more realistic.
Eaglen and McGrath's actual recommendations are plausible enough. They call for significant restructuring of the U.S. defense industrial base and the rationalization of long-term U.S. defense planning. These are arguments worth engaging, and I even agree with them on some points. Such arguments do not, however, need to hide behind the dishonest scenario that the authors use to distract and scare the reader into accepting them. Indeed, the authors' recommendations would have almost no effect on the dire scenario that they use to sell them. If the U.S. economy does collapse by 40 percent, U.S. defense spending and U.S. seapower will certainly decline dramatically. Defense sector innovation can't stop that, and long-term plans laid down in Congress today can't keep future politicians from cutting funding because they have no money to spend. Eaglen and McGrath apparently hope that the reader won't notice that their policy recommendations have no relation to the entertaining but absurd scenario that they spin.
Frankly, I would have been more sympathetic if Eaglen and McGrath had played up the threat of invasion by maritime-oriented aliens. More entertaining, and altogether more realistic.
I'm an assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, University of Kentucky.
Monday, May 16, 2024
Heritage Foundation Talking Seapower
Thinking About a Day Without Sea Power: Implications for U.S. Defense Policy Published on May 16, 2024 by Mackenzie Eaglen and Bryan McGrath.
- Modern American sea power is the most flexible, adaptable, useful, and powerful naval force the world has ever known.
- Congress and the Navy need to rebuild their relationship to help the nation build and afford the fleet it needs.
- The oceans are critical to international trade, with $40 billion in oil passing through strategic chokepoints daily and $3.2 trillion in yearly commerce passing through undersea cables.
- More than 95 percent of U.S. international trade is transported by water, with $5.5 billion in goods moving in and out of American ports on a daily basis. The U.S. Navy is essential to guaranteeing the security of this shipping.
- A significant reduction in U.S. naval capacity would harm the American economy financially and reduce employment.
- Failure to invest in the fleet and maintain steady growth in the number of ships in the Navy’s inventory will only embolden U.S. adversaries.
Tuesday, February 22, 2024
Marines Talking Seapower
A couple of retired Marines are discussing the value of Seapower here. You know I love that.
Wednesday, September 22, 2024
The Joint Strategic Vision of Conservatives and Progressives
I've been thinking about the QDR. OK, so I'm the only person who actually thinks about the QDR, but it is useful to look at the QDR to understand where we are and where we are going. In examining the QDR I've also found myself reviewing the recommendations for the DoD produced prior to the QDR by the Heritage Foundation and the Center for American Progress. I focus on these two think tanks because they are highly partisan - which is useful for seeing where the political parties are in terms of looking towards the future.Both think tanks developed a force structure recommendation based on a strategic view of the world. I'm not going to review those strategic views individually - just focus on the force structure recommendations for the DoD QDR produced by both.
The Heritage Foundation
Air Force. The Air Force currently has 2,383 fighter and attack aircraft, including the F-15, F-16, F-22, and A-10. The F-35 Lightening will soon enter service.Center for American Progress
This overall size of the Air Force fighter force structure is about right. The QDR should recommend that the Air Force stay with this number. In particular, it should clearly state that the number should not fall below the current size of the force. The QDR should also point out that this number is adequate only in the context of a commitment to modernize the Air Force's fleet of aging aircraft.
Army. The Army plans to increase its force structure to 76 combat brigade teams across the Army, with 212 modular support brigades. The combat brigade teams will be broken down into 25 heavy brigades, 43 infantry brigades, seven Stryker brigades, and one brigade equivalent of active combat regiments. The airborne units will round out the broader Army force structure.
The upcoming QDR should recommend continuing the Army plan to increase its overall force structure. However, it should state that this projected growth should be a cap. Expanding the Army beyond this level could jeopardize proper funding for other elements of U.S. conventional forces.
Marine Corps. Unique among the services, the Marine Corps force structure is established in law. The Marine Corps has three active Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs) and one in the reserves. Each MEF contains a division-equivalent ground force, an aviation wing, and a logistics group.
The QDR should make it clear that the Defense Department will not seek to change the relevant law. The three-MEF standard is appropriate for the Marines and should permit it to meet its combat responsibilities. As with the other services, this force structure number is dependent on appropriate levels of modernization.
Navy Ships and Aircraft. Shipbuilding was not a priority during the Clinton and Bush Administrations. Annual procurement has fallen to just 5.3 ships per year. A lack of funding and the increasing costs of ships under construction have combined to ensure a low rate of shipbuilding that cannot sustain the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan for a 313-ship fleet. In addition to the strategic ballistic missile submarines, the fleet includes aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, littoral combat ships, amphibious ships, attack submarines, converted Trident submarines, and miscellaneous other ships.
The Navy's future force structure is the minimum size needed to secure U.S. maritime interests, but it lacks the proper internal balance and sufficient funding for the necessary shipbuilding rates. Specifically, it shortchanges aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and attack submarines in favor of littoral combat ships. The U.S. has 11 aircraft carriers, and that number should increase to 13 over the longer term. The number of cruisers and destroyers should increase from a projected 88 to 100, and the number of attack submarines should rise from 48 to at least 60. This should be facilitated, in part, by reducing the projected number of littoral combat ships from 55 to 20.
Further, the QDR should at least consider recommending that the Navy proceed with DDG-1000 procurement instead of extending the construction of DDG-51 Arleigh Burke destroyers by ensuring that the DDG-1000s will have both air and ballistic missile defense capabilities. However, this approach will leave the cruisers with the Navy's primary air and missile defense missions. The QDR should also include a serious discussion of America's shipbuilding industrial base and how to maintain its strategic competitiveness throughout the next two decades.
Ground forces recommendations (Army, Marines)First, we need to recognize a few finer details. The Heritage Foundation always approaches defense issues with two battle cries - "no less" or "a lot more." Seriously, it is a problem. The Heritage Foundation needs to come up with a new national security strategic idea that doesn't always include more money.Naval forces recommendations
- Continue increasing the size of U.S. ground forces without lowering standards. Also, enlarge the recruiting pool by dropping the ban on women serving in ground combat units and repealing the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” law.
- Slow down Future Combat Systems and cut the program’s procurement, research, and design budgets by a third over the next four years.
- Move forward slowly on the Brigade Combat Team model, but carefully review the operations of the Maneuver Enhancement Brigades and determine whether more are needed.
- Maintain funding for the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle at the current level, allowing for development and testing, but delay production in favor of purchasing M-ATV armored vehicles for Afghanistan.
Air forces recommendations (Air Force, Army, Navy, Marines)
- Cancel the Zumwalt-class DDG-1000 destroyer and build two Arleigh Burke-class DDG-51 destroyers a year for the next four years.
- Keep SSN-774 attack submarine production steady at one per year instead of ramping up to two per year in FY 2013.
- Move forward with current plans for the Littoral Combat Ship.
- Deploy the Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) aircraft carrier but delay the construction of the CVN-79 aircraft carrier for five years.
- Cancel the LPD-26 amphibious ship and move forward with the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future).
- End production of the F-22 Raptor immediately at 183 planes.
- Continue development of the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter, but do not start full-scale production until flight tests have been completed. --Buy F-16 Block 60 fighters, two wings of MQ-9 Reaper drones, and 69 F/A-18E/F Super Hornets to make up for the anticipated gap in fighter aircraft.
- Cancel the MV-22 Osprey and substitute cheaper helicopters while continuing production of the CV-22.
- Build more C-17 cargo aircraft.
- Move forward on the KC-X.
- Substitute MQ-1C Warrior drones for Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters.
- Move forward on the new long-range bomber.
The Center for American Progress on the other hand takes a far more strategic approach that selects winners and losers based on strategic view, but they also get caught up in social issue advocacy in a paper intended to be strategic minded. Don't Ask, Don't Tell? Seriously? As a force structure talking point? My real problem with the CAP suggestions is that it doesn't contain any strategic synergy - indeed I don't know what the military CAP advocates for is supposed to do, rather it is simply intended to cost less.
The most important point to highlight here is that both the Heritage Foundation and the Center for American Progress went into the QDR with the recommendation to increase the size of the Army to fight a land war in Asia, even though during the QDR period being discussed a reduction in Army forces in Iraq was quite expected.
Think about that for a second - increasing the Army to fight land future wars in Asia is both conservative and progressive in the 21st century.
Are you kidding me? I'm fiscally conservative and socially liberal, meaning I don't like taxes on principle alone, am agnostic to many issues of politics and religion, and don't perform a Baptist backflipout when my teenage daughters openly homosexual male friends spend the night when she has sleepovers with all the 'girls'... but it also means I don't fall into either category of conservative or progressive. However, if I was either a partisan conservative or a partisan progressive - I'd be more than a little pissed off that my political platform for national security is focused on increasing the size of the Army to fight future land wars in Asia.
When it was announced that 'combat operations' had concluded in Iraq (which is just political nonsesnse), a bunch of folks wrote articles about what was gained and lost in Iraq. Here is my concern on what has been gained and lost. The most influential loss to the United States as a result of the Iraq War was the lingering memory and understanding among the strategic culture in Washington, DC that the United States is a maritime nation. I am also concerned that as a result of the Iraq War, Washington, DC has gained an entrenchment of Army based strategic idea men populated across the think tank community that see every problem as a nail to be solved with the US Army hammer.
The ground war strategic solution mentality started as quickly as the cold war ended - with Panama, then the Gulf War, then the Balkans, then Afghanistan, and finally Iraq a second time - ultimately the United States Army has been engaged in a ground war almost 15 of the last 21 years.
Conservatives and Progressives alike need a new strategic view for America - because the United States is failing every golden rule for sustaining ourselves as a superpower when we are as a nation actively engaging in major military operations on the ground across the globe as a perpetual habit.
We can no longer ignore how every rising power in the world is focused on seapower national security strategies - while the United States remains focused on land war strategic debates (like COIN).
No matter how long we intend to be in Afghanistan, it is past time to realign the strategic direction of the United States towards seapower. If it isn't done now, then when the next crisis comes - no matter what it is - the solution will be to send in the Army because for the last two decades and counting it is the preferred way the defense establishment knows to solve national security problems anymore.
I believe the United States has more options than the US Army hammer, and there is a better way ahead strategically than perpetual land war. Hopefully, sooner than later, someone on Capitol Hill or in the White House will start saying as much and lead the nation back towards seapower.
Monday, June 28, 2024
Thanks for Playing, but...
I like people who take bold and subversive points of view, especially publically. Stepping out of one's comfort zone and area of expertise is admirable, and often, innovative and useful ideas emerge this way. So although I was pleased to see an article from an Army officer on surface ships recently in JFQ, LTC Shrader's piece predicting the end of surface warships leaves me disappointed.
In no particular order, there are a number of problems with his arguments.
- As long as 90% of the world's commerce moves over the surface of the ocean, surface ships will be required to maintain freedom of the seas. Submarines certainly play a part in achieving sea control against a competent enemy, but the vast majority of naval missions don't require the stealth or endurance of a nuclear submarine. To wit, MSO, partner navy engagement, BMD, AAW, mine hunting and sweeping, among many others, require surface ships.
- Without going into details, he over-trivialized the challenges of space-based targeting and long range missile engagements.
"It will be a simple matter to find the exact grid coordinates of any ship anywhere in the world, punch the data into a missile silo, and launch a barrage of missiles to the precise location of the ship or fleet."
But his point about massive salvos of missiles (whether ASCMs or ASBMs) overwhelming surface ship magazines is valid.
- Yes, ships are very expensive these days and take many years to design and build. But I wonder what LTC Shrader thinks the price tag would be on the giant submarine capable of carrying an USMC MEU and all its' equipment that he suggests? Developing super-sized cargo, aircraft, and troop carrying submarines would break the bank and shrink the fleet even faster than today's untenable ship-building plan.
I'm confident LTC Shrader's ersatz sea power strategy will not threaten surface warfare for a good long while. Good on ya for playing, though.
The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.
In no particular order, there are a number of problems with his arguments.
- As long as 90% of the world's commerce moves over the surface of the ocean, surface ships will be required to maintain freedom of the seas. Submarines certainly play a part in achieving sea control against a competent enemy, but the vast majority of naval missions don't require the stealth or endurance of a nuclear submarine. To wit, MSO, partner navy engagement, BMD, AAW, mine hunting and sweeping, among many others, require surface ships.
- Without going into details, he over-trivialized the challenges of space-based targeting and long range missile engagements.
"It will be a simple matter to find the exact grid coordinates of any ship anywhere in the world, punch the data into a missile silo, and launch a barrage of missiles to the precise location of the ship or fleet."
But his point about massive salvos of missiles (whether ASCMs or ASBMs) overwhelming surface ship magazines is valid.
- Yes, ships are very expensive these days and take many years to design and build. But I wonder what LTC Shrader thinks the price tag would be on the giant submarine capable of carrying an USMC MEU and all its' equipment that he suggests? Developing super-sized cargo, aircraft, and troop carrying submarines would break the bank and shrink the fleet even faster than today's untenable ship-building plan.
I'm confident LTC Shrader's ersatz sea power strategy will not threaten surface warfare for a good long while. Good on ya for playing, though.
The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.
Thursday, June 10, 2024
Somalia Piracy - Recrafting the Strategic Narrative
What is the current strategic narrative on piracy and do our policy and actions reflect that narrative? On one hand, Navy officials have expressed very clearly that piracy originating from Somalia is a strategic problem requiring a pro-active solution. What follows are a series of statements drawn from USNAVCENT articles.
CTF 151, a multinational task force established by Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) in January 2009 to conduct counter-piracy operations under a mission based mandate to actively deter, disrupt and suppress piracy in order to protect global maritime security and secure freedom of navigation for the benefit of all nations.
CMF, with headquarters in Manama, Bahrain, patrols more than 2.5 million square miles of international waters to conduct both integrated and coordinated operations with a common purpose: to increase the security and prosperity of the region by working together for a better future.
U.S. forces conduct Maritime Security Operations (MSO) to help set the conditions for security in the maritime environment. From security arises stability that results in global economic prosperity. MSO complements the counter-terrorism and security efforts of regional nations and seek to disrupt violent extremists' use of the maritime environment as a venue for attack or to transport personnel, weapons or other material.
So clearly, it appears piracy must be a problem worthy of eliminating (or at least supressing to a locally managed level) by whatever means possible. Contrast the above with the evolving and varying narratives below:
13 Dec 08: “Under the United Nations Security Council resolution passed last week, members of the international community must work together to aggressively pursue and deter piracy...” Land pursuit operations would carry a high risk of harming innocent civilians because of the difficulty of identifying those guilty of piracy, U.S. Fifth Fleet spokeswoman Lieutenant Stephanie Murdock said yesterday.
“This has become a very good business and the first thing we need is better intelligence on who’s behind it,” Gates said. More information is needed on the culprits to minimize any collateral damage from land pursuit, Gates said. “With the level of information that we have now we are not in the position to do that kind of land attack,” he said. With “adequate intelligence” only, land attacks may be carried out, he added.
16 Dec 08: CONDOLEEZZA RICE, Secretary of State of the United States, said that several factors were limiting the effectiveness of the response to piracy and armed robbery. Specifically, because there was no existing mechanism for States to coordinate their actions, the result had been less than the sum of its parts. The United States envisioned a contact group serving as a mechanism to share intelligence, coordinate activities and reach out to partners; it would work quickly on that initiative. Also limiting was the impunity; piracy currently paid, and pirates paid little for their criminality.
She said the United States believed that, with the agreement of the Transitional Federal Government, as authorized by the Council today, pursuing pirates on land would have a significant impact. Maritime operations alone were insufficient for combating piracy.
14 Apr 09: Defense Secretary Robert Gates says he doesn't see any immediate need to bulk up the military response to piracy on the high seas.
14 Apr 09: "There is no purely military solution to it," Mr. Gates said in an address to the Marine Corps War College in Quantico, Va. "There's really no way in my view to control it unless you get something on land that begins to change the equation for these kids."... Among the advocates for more serious initiatives in Somalia has been Vice Adm. William E. Gortney, commander of U.S. naval forces in the Middle East, who on Sunday reiterated his ships could only do so much and "the ultimate solution for piracy is on land."
15 Apr 09: Clinton said there is a need for a more muscular approach to ending the threat posed by pirates, rather than continuing to tolerate it.
In addition to the above, it is frequently articulated that piracy is little more than an annoyance for shipping companies, who don't mind too much as their insurance covers the bottom line.
Still, dozens of countries have increased their efforts and coordination in an attempt to defeat Somalian piracy. The underlying rationale (or hope) is that cooperation will equal results. Yet from 2007 to present, pirates have expanded their reach from a couple of hundred miles off Somalia to well over 1,000, an area encompassing not only the Somali Basin and Gulf of Aden, but the majority of the western Indian Ocean and up into the Red Sea. Depending on what statistics one looks at, the number of successful attacks has decreased somewhat in the last year, but the total amount of revenue secured from ransoms continues to grow. Clearly, the rewards of piracy still greatly outweigh the risks associated with current counter-piracy efforts and the pirates can evolve their tactics faster than we can make decisions, adapt our own TTPs, and coordinate them amongst multiple agencies, two combatant commands, EU, NATO, CMF, and non-aligned maritime forces and their national caveats.
The case for more proactive and assertive operations against piracy must evolve and our actions must match our strategic narrative. Along these lines, here are some additional talking points for consideration:
- By allowing piracy to proliferate and expand, the greatest navy in the world has effectively ceded freedom of the seas to teenagers toting Kalishnikovs and RPGs. If our Navy cannot address this relatively minor situation, then how can we be expected to exercise sea power globally?
- Our failure to defeat piracy has greater strategic implications. Without trying to sound alarmist, it must be noted that piracy provides emerging strategic naval competitors with a perfect excuse to conduct unprecedented out-of-area deployments and improve their naval operations by watching the coalition and learning from their own successes and mistakes.
- Somali pirates negatively affect not only maritime trade, but pose a risk to increased regional instability.
- Similar to the proliferation of suicide bombers and IEDs, other non-state actors will realize the successful business model that Somali pirates have developed and emulate them in around the world.
Many of the above arguments have been made somewhere or another before, but we continue to ignore them.
I offer no solutions here and leave that up to the appropriate policy makers and planners. That said, a more assertive and decisive campaign to defeat piracy will need to be carefully designed rather than just evolved on the fly. This design should consider combinations of US unilateral and multilateral operations, military and non-military actions, kinetic and non-kinetic, both afloat and ashore. Finally, strong leadership is required to eliminate or at least minimize the self-limiting geographic, interagency, legal, and policy boundaries which heretofore have provided the excuse narrative resulting in the failure to decisively address the problem.
The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.
CTF 151, a multinational task force established by Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) in January 2009 to conduct counter-piracy operations under a mission based mandate to actively deter, disrupt and suppress piracy in order to protect global maritime security and secure freedom of navigation for the benefit of all nations.
CMF, with headquarters in Manama, Bahrain, patrols more than 2.5 million square miles of international waters to conduct both integrated and coordinated operations with a common purpose: to increase the security and prosperity of the region by working together for a better future.
U.S. forces conduct Maritime Security Operations (MSO) to help set the conditions for security in the maritime environment. From security arises stability that results in global economic prosperity. MSO complements the counter-terrorism and security efforts of regional nations and seek to disrupt violent extremists' use of the maritime environment as a venue for attack or to transport personnel, weapons or other material.
So clearly, it appears piracy must be a problem worthy of eliminating (or at least supressing to a locally managed level) by whatever means possible. Contrast the above with the evolving and varying narratives below:
13 Dec 08: “Under the United Nations Security Council resolution passed last week, members of the international community must work together to aggressively pursue and deter piracy...” Land pursuit operations would carry a high risk of harming innocent civilians because of the difficulty of identifying those guilty of piracy, U.S. Fifth Fleet spokeswoman Lieutenant Stephanie Murdock said yesterday.
“This has become a very good business and the first thing we need is better intelligence on who’s behind it,” Gates said. More information is needed on the culprits to minimize any collateral damage from land pursuit, Gates said. “With the level of information that we have now we are not in the position to do that kind of land attack,” he said. With “adequate intelligence” only, land attacks may be carried out, he added.
16 Dec 08: CONDOLEEZZA RICE, Secretary of State of the United States, said that several factors were limiting the effectiveness of the response to piracy and armed robbery. Specifically, because there was no existing mechanism for States to coordinate their actions, the result had been less than the sum of its parts. The United States envisioned a contact group serving as a mechanism to share intelligence, coordinate activities and reach out to partners; it would work quickly on that initiative. Also limiting was the impunity; piracy currently paid, and pirates paid little for their criminality.
She said the United States believed that, with the agreement of the Transitional Federal Government, as authorized by the Council today, pursuing pirates on land would have a significant impact. Maritime operations alone were insufficient for combating piracy.
14 Apr 09: Defense Secretary Robert Gates says he doesn't see any immediate need to bulk up the military response to piracy on the high seas.
14 Apr 09: "There is no purely military solution to it," Mr. Gates said in an address to the Marine Corps War College in Quantico, Va. "There's really no way in my view to control it unless you get something on land that begins to change the equation for these kids."... Among the advocates for more serious initiatives in Somalia has been Vice Adm. William E. Gortney, commander of U.S. naval forces in the Middle East, who on Sunday reiterated his ships could only do so much and "the ultimate solution for piracy is on land."
15 Apr 09: Clinton said there is a need for a more muscular approach to ending the threat posed by pirates, rather than continuing to tolerate it.
In addition to the above, it is frequently articulated that piracy is little more than an annoyance for shipping companies, who don't mind too much as their insurance covers the bottom line.
Still, dozens of countries have increased their efforts and coordination in an attempt to defeat Somalian piracy. The underlying rationale (or hope) is that cooperation will equal results. Yet from 2007 to present, pirates have expanded their reach from a couple of hundred miles off Somalia to well over 1,000, an area encompassing not only the Somali Basin and Gulf of Aden, but the majority of the western Indian Ocean and up into the Red Sea. Depending on what statistics one looks at, the number of successful attacks has decreased somewhat in the last year, but the total amount of revenue secured from ransoms continues to grow. Clearly, the rewards of piracy still greatly outweigh the risks associated with current counter-piracy efforts and the pirates can evolve their tactics faster than we can make decisions, adapt our own TTPs, and coordinate them amongst multiple agencies, two combatant commands, EU, NATO, CMF, and non-aligned maritime forces and their national caveats.
The case for more proactive and assertive operations against piracy must evolve and our actions must match our strategic narrative. Along these lines, here are some additional talking points for consideration:
- By allowing piracy to proliferate and expand, the greatest navy in the world has effectively ceded freedom of the seas to teenagers toting Kalishnikovs and RPGs. If our Navy cannot address this relatively minor situation, then how can we be expected to exercise sea power globally?
- Our failure to defeat piracy has greater strategic implications. Without trying to sound alarmist, it must be noted that piracy provides emerging strategic naval competitors with a perfect excuse to conduct unprecedented out-of-area deployments and improve their naval operations by watching the coalition and learning from their own successes and mistakes.
- Somali pirates negatively affect not only maritime trade, but pose a risk to increased regional instability.
- Similar to the proliferation of suicide bombers and IEDs, other non-state actors will realize the successful business model that Somali pirates have developed and emulate them in around the world.
Many of the above arguments have been made somewhere or another before, but we continue to ignore them.
I offer no solutions here and leave that up to the appropriate policy makers and planners. That said, a more assertive and decisive campaign to defeat piracy will need to be carefully designed rather than just evolved on the fly. This design should consider combinations of US unilateral and multilateral operations, military and non-military actions, kinetic and non-kinetic, both afloat and ashore. Finally, strong leadership is required to eliminate or at least minimize the self-limiting geographic, interagency, legal, and policy boundaries which heretofore have provided the excuse narrative resulting in the failure to decisively address the problem.
The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.
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