A Blog, Relaunched

My home blog has completed overhaul and is back in the water, ready for sea. I'll still be posting hereabouts regularly, though. Stop by and have a look around.

USS Port Royal Hard Aground - Updated

From the Honolulu Advertiser:

The USS Port Royal, a Pearl Harbor-based guided missile cruiser, remained aground today approximately a half-mile south of the airport's Reef Runway.

The Navy said the ship ran aground about 9 p.m. last night.

The Navy said the ship is stuck in sand and there are no oil or fuel leaks.

Navy tugs tried early in the morning to nudge the 9,600-ton warship away from the spot it hit but were unsuccessful.

The Navy says divers from Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit One from Pearl Harbor and the salvage ship USS Salvor will try to tow the warship.

Normally I wouldn't bother posting about a grounding here, but PORT ROYAL is one of just three BMD cruisers in the fleet and she looks to be well in the shoal water on Runway Reef and parallel to the beach, to boot. The Advertiser's picture is here.

Judging by the pictures, I'd say she's 500-1,000 tons aground. Not good.

There's a lot of good Sailors on that ship, so be judicious with your discussion. I'm going to refrain from further speculation and comments other than to remind myself, there, but for the grace of God, go I.

Update: Galrahn here, Yankee Sailor updates with an estimate in the comments of around 5000 tons aground. This is going to be a difficult salvage job if the wave action is still driving the ship the sand. Since everything regarding the actions of the ship itself is absent any good information, I'd prefer to keep the comments focused on the salvage operation to lift the ship.

All informed comments and questions welcome.

Congress Taking Aim At Military Personnel Budget?

The Congressional Budget Office has issued a report laying out some alternatives to reign in the defense budget. One of their proposals is to bring back the pay gap:

Personnel expenses, he said, are a prime example. After adjusting for inflation, the average cost of an active-duty service member is 45 percent higher today than in 1998, he said. And, he added, that doesn’t even include health care costs, which have grown by an average of 7 percent annually. In the defense budget, health care costs are funded out of operation and maintenance accounts, not personnel accounts.

The Congressional Budget Office prepared some budget alternatives for Congress to deal with defense budget shortfalls. One of its options calls for capping military and federal civilian pay raises through 2015. For several years, raises approved by Congress have been 0.5 percentage point more than the average annual increase in private-sector wages. The CBO proposal would cap raises at 0.5 percentage point less than average private-sector raises, but would increase some special pays and bonuses to make up for the reduced pay.

Yikes!

The Trouble With Work's Rating Systems

Galrahn has been beating his rating system drum for quite some time, but I have concerns about Mr. Work's system. The fundamental problem with this modern rating system is time. We're here today, Samuel Pepys is not, and technology has dramatically altered the calculus of evaluating naval power.

The first problem in adapting Pepys' rating system to the modern era is Pepys' system was developed in a world where there was just one warfare area, surface warfare, and there was only one major threat, surface platforms. It was a pretty simple exercise then to compare the relative power of competing navies or forces by counting up the guns. Today, most ships must be capable of perfoming in multiple warfare areas, and threats can be in the air or under the surface. For instance, today a surface action group of three or four "battleships" could be destroyed by an "unrated flotilla" composed of submarines and aircraft. Would this have been possible in the era Pepys? I think not.

The second problem in adapting Pepys' model is the relative capability of systems. For example, examine Britain's problem during the War of 1812 when dealing with America's first frigates. The United States, concerned about the relative strength against Britain's legendary force of frigates, built a force of ships using materials and construction techniques that reduced the value of a typical British broadside. After several embarrassing losses, the Admiralty had to order its captains not to take on the American ships in a duel.

And the leveraging potential of technology today is much greater than in the past. Today, innovative technologies in weapons systems can instantaneously improve or reduce the relative value of a surface platform, regardless of how many missiles she carries. If your missile can't reliably shoot down their missile, it doesn't matter how many you have in your launcher.

The third problem is in the relative flexibility of systems. Taking the vertical launch system as an example, you can put a whole bunch of different things in a VLS cell, and not all of them are "battle force missiles". Every cell you fill with a Tomahawk, Enhanced Sea Sparrow or SM-3 will effectively reduce the rating of the ship under the proposed system. And I find it hard to imagine a real-world scenario where a VLS ship would deploy exclusively with "battle force missiles".

While Mr. Work's rating system may have some utility in comparing surface ships, its utility in measuring the relative strength of forces or navies is limited, at best. Don't get me wrong, I agree completely with Galrahn's assessment that our current and proposed mix of ships stands way to close to the "high" end on the high-low spectrum. I just think Work's rating system is an inadequate tool to make the measurement.

Normandy Vet Blogs!

An 86-year-old vet of the D-Day landings goes a 'bloggin. Here's a sample:

Last week was the 63rd anniversary of the D Day Landings, in France. I find it sad, that we have learned so little, about the great sacrifices of the young and eager men and women, in the war to end all wars. Sacrificing is not always, to die for a cause, or being mortally wounded and dying of those wounds many months later when they have dropped off the radar. This is certainly much more than anyone expects of them. We hope they will return victorious and minimize their hardships so the next generation of gladiators will go blindly, into a full of adventure frolic, without fear and with the sense of immortality, oozing from every pore, into the cauldron. That is, until the day, one of their illusions is shattered by the sight of one unidentifiable corpse. That is when the adventure turns to reality. "My God ...Someone can get killed here"

A man jumps off a bridge in Oshkosh and the media gives his story
three columns , two pictures and 8 minutes of air time.

Eight servicemen are killed by a roadside bomb and a comment is made
two days later or not at all. Their body count is simply added to the monthly total.

We are so happy to read about our servicemen returning. We seem to keep forgetting how many are not.

No, he's not a Sailor, but as a member of a Port Company he's got a more than casual relationship with ships. Pay him a visit, introduce yourself, read, and learn a few things.

Navy, Take Note

The White House has a blog. At least a blog of sorts. I have a feeling it will be missing a few key elements that make up what most of us recognize as a blog, like comments. Time will tell, though.

Navy Expands Engagement With Discovery Channel

Following the success of the series Carrier, the Navy has announced a whole list of new projects with the Discovery Channel. The details are in the NAVADMIN:

RMKS/ 1. THE NAVY HAS APPROVED SUPPORT TO THE DISCOVERY NETWORK (INCLUDING DISCOVERY CHANNEL, MILITARY CHANNEL AND SCIENCE CHANNEL) TO
CREATE A SERIES OF PRODUCTIONS FOCUSING ON TODAY'S NAVY.
2. THE PROJECT INCLUDES:
A. A 3-PART DOCUMENTARY (3 HOURS TOTAL) FOCUSING ON VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE MARITIME STRATEGY IN ACTION. THE SERIES IS EXPECTED TO AIR IN THE LABOR DAY 2009 TIMEFRAME.
B. A 30-MINUTE PRODUCTION TO REPLACE THE CURRENT "AT SEA" FILM PLAYING AT THE NAVY MEMORIAL IN WASHINGTON. THIS NEW FILM WILL ALSO BE DISTRIBUTED TO MARITIME MUSEUMS AND CENTERS ACROSS THE COUNTRY.
C. 12 3-5 MINUTE VIDEOS FOCUSING ON THE NAVY'S PRIMARY COMMUNICATION PRIORITY, THE MARITIME STRATEGY, AND THE SECONDARY COMMUNICATION PRIORITY AS APPROVED BY THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS ON A MONTHLY BASIS. THE VIDEOS WILL BE POSTED TO WWW.CHINFO.NAVY.MIL FOR NAVY LEADERS AND SPEAKERS TO USE IN KICKING OFF PRESENTATIONS.
D. 12 ADVERTISING VIGNETTES FOR COMMANDER, NAVY RECRUITING COMMAND RECRUITING EFFORTS.
E. DISCOVERY WILL PRODUCE AN EPISODE OF THEIR TECHNOLOGY BASED SHOW CALLED "PROTOTYPE THIS", THAT WILL FOCUS ON THE LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP.
F. DISCOVERY WILL PRODUCE AN EPISODE OF THEIR ENGINEERING BASED SHOW CALLED "BUILD IT BIGGER", THAT WILL FOCUS ON VIRGINIA-CLASS SUBMARINES.
G. DISCOVERY WILL ALSO BE PRODUCING OTHER SHOWS BASED ON ONGOING EVENTS. ONE SUCH SHOW WHICH HAS BEEN APPROVED IS THE NAVY'S ROLE IN COUNTERING PIRACY.
3. THE INTENT OF THIS PROJECT IS TO PROVIDE THE AMERICAN PUBLIC WITH A COMPREHENSIVE VIEW OF OUR NAVY THROUGH INTERESTING AND COMPELLING TELEVISION. THIS CAN ONLY BE ACCOMPLISHED BY PROVIDING DISCOVERY WITH ACCESS TO OPERATIONS IN THE WEEKS AND MONTHS AHEAD.

This is a good thing.

For those of you that have followed my blog for a while, you know that I believe the Navy suffers from an "out of sight, out of mind" problem, in that we've had forces continuously deployed around the globe for the last half century, but the activities of those forces haven't gotten much attention in the media except during major operations and conflicts. The more we can do as a service to inform the public on what the security and stability threats are in the world and what their investment in their Navy buys, the more support we'll get in the long run.

A Brief PSA

For those of you that do business with USAA:

USAA is investigating a new e-mail phishing scam that attempts to collect users' sensitive information.

Members have received a recent e-mail claiming to be from USAA that says your secure mailbox has 1 new message. In an elaborate scheme using 3 web pages, the e-mail directs members first to a counterfeit website to log on. Logging on produces an apparent error message stating "Your Account is Locked" and directs members to click on a link "Please Unlock your Account." Clicking on that link produces the third web page that asks for sensitive information.

Technology As A Disabler In Warfare

Col. H. R. McMaster argues an interesting position that should provide food for thought as the Navy relentlessly pursues the "gee whiz" factor in its acquisitions strategy: that technology has been an impediment to effective strategic planning for the last half century.

As did McNamara’s whiz kids, advocates of the Revolution in Military Affairs applied business analogies to war and borrowed heavily from the disciplines of economics and systems analysis. Both Graduated Pressure and Rapid Decisive Operations promised efficiency in war; planners could determine precisely the amount of force necessary to achieve desired “effects.” Graduated Pressure would apply just enough force to effect the adversary’s “calculation of interests.” According to the terms of Rapid Decisive Operations, U.S. forces, based on a “comprehensive system-of-systems understanding of the enemy and the environment,” would attack nodes in the enemy system with a carefully calculated amount of force to generate “cumulative and cascading effects.”

But the U.S. experience in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq demonstrated that it was impossible to calibrate precisely the amount of force necessary to prosecute a war. The human and psychological dimensions of war, along with the friction and uncertainty generated when opposing forces meet, invariably frustrates even the most elaborate and well-considered attempts to predict the effects of discrete military actions. Enemy countermeasures such as dispersion, concealment, deception, and intermingling with the civilian population limit the reach of surveillance and precision strike capabilities. Other factors, such as cultural, tribal, and political identities enhance complexity and influence the course of events. Emphasis in planning and directing operations, therefore, ought to be on effectiveness rather than efficiency. The requirement to adapt quickly to unforeseen conditions means that commanders will need additional forces and resources that can be committed with little notice. For efficiency in all forms of warfare, including counterinsurgency, means barely winning. And in war, barely winning can be an ugly proposition.

While Col. McMaster's conclusion seem reasonable for a land conflict that can devolve into insurgency, the application of his thinking to naval warfare seems more challenging. Perhaps in our planning for potential conflicts with ideologically or religiously motivated regional powers it would do us well to plan for a surge in Sea Tiger-style operations following the destruction of any conventional naval forces.

Just In Case You Were Wondering...

...where the anti-submarine warfare threat is focused, read this carefully:

The Department of the Navy announced Jan. 2 its decision to provide facilities and functions to base five fleet squadrons of the P-8A Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) with a fleet replacement squadron (FRS) at Naval Air Station (NAS) Jacksonville, Fla., four fleet squadrons at NAS Whidbey Island, Wash., and three fleet squadrons at Marine Corps Base Hawaii Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, with periodic squadron detachment operations at NAS North Island.

That's four operational squadrons for Atlantic Fleet and seven for Pacific Fleet. And I wouldn't be at all surprised if one (or more) gets pushed to Guam or Japan eventually.

Russia To Build Its Own "String Of Pearls"?

Eagle1 posted a good overview of Chinese maritime strategy over the weekend, but now we learn Russia may be looking to build its own "string of pearls" to influence global events:

Russia's military leaders approved a plan by the navy on Sunday to station warships permanently in friendly ports across the globe.
...
"The General Staff has given its position on this issue and it fully supports the position of the (Navy's) main committee," deputy chief of staff Colonel-General Anatoly Nogovitsyn told RIA Novosti news agency.
...
In August a Russian diplomat said the navy was to make more use of a Syrian Mediterranean Sea port. Last month a Russian warship cruised off Cuba after visiting South America for the first time since 1991.

Nogovitsyn said Russia was directly negotiating with foreign governments to station warships at bases around the world permanently, although he declined to give exact details.

"Nobody can predict where problems could flare up," he said. "What we need are permanent bases, but these are very costly. They need to be considered very carefully."

RIA Novosti wrote that the Russian navy was already in negotiations to build a permanent Black Sea Port in the Russia-backed breakaway Georgian region of Abkhazia.

First, the U.S. should strongly oppose even temporary Russian bases in Abkhazia so long as our position remains that the region is still part of Georgia. And in general, while these moves may prove to be largely symbolic, particularly if oil prices--a huge source of Russian revenue--remain low, it certainly indicates Russia will increasingly complicate the problem of protecting U.S. interests around the globe.

Why We Don't Hang Pirates

Fabius Maximus has a sound review of the rationale behind how we deal with pirates in these times. In short, the answer is:

1. Modern pirates seldom kill passengers or crew, or commit the other crimes for which their predecessors were infamous (e.g., rape, ransom). See these Wikipedia lists: piracy, somali pirates.

2. Developed nations today have few or no capital crimes. Theft is seldom one, and rarely for first-time offenses.

The more basic problem in dealing with pirates is piracy hasn't been a serious problem in over a century and the law has had no real need to catch up. Now would be a good time, though....

The Navy Discussing Economic Doomsday

The Navy and the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy sponsored a policy discussion yesterday focusing on the national security implications of the financial crisis. The featured speaker was James Rickards, the Senior Managing Director for Market Intelligence at Omnis, an applied research organization. As reported in Politico, the four doomsday scenarios Mr. Rickards is focusing on are:

The Bait Effect

Terrorists, and al Qaeda in particular, are fascinated with the idea of destroying the U.S. economy. Rickards worries that the economic meltdown in the United States could serve as bait of sorts for a terrorist attack, as plotters calculate that a strike now could have a “force multiplier” effect because of the already skittish U.S. stock market.

The China Syndrome

The Chinese own more than $500 billion worth of U.S. Treasury bonds, and billons more in the debt of other U.S. entities such as those held by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. And a general sense of mutually assured financial destruction keeps them from wielding that debt like a weapon: if the Chinese dumped U.S. debt on the global market, their own holdings of U.S. debt would decline in value, the U.S. economy would be damaged, ultimately harming the Chinese economy by reducing American ability to buy more Chinese goods.

They’d have to be crazy to try it. But Rickards points out that governments don’t always do the rational thing. And in the meantime, their holdings give the Chinese incredible power over American decision making.

The Existential Crash

A pessimist by nature, Rickards believes that many economic forecasters are wrong, and the recession will get far worse than predicted.

He sees an epic disaster scenario in which the U.S. gross domestic product declines by a staggering 35 percent over the next six to seven years. Crippling deflation could take hold. Unemployment, he says, could approach 15 percent.

That’s a calamitous rate, but it would not be an all-time high: unemployment hit 25 percent during the Great Depression.
...
In this scenario, the possibilities for global unrest increase dramatically as a staggering United States retreats from foreign aid and global diplomacy and the list of dangerous failed states grows sharply.

The Alternate-Dollar Nightmare

“The Number One vulnerability is the dollar itself,” Rickards concluded. “We’re printing them and shoving them out the door, and the Fed is basically out of bullets. So why hasn’t the dollar collapsed? The short answer is, global investors don’t have any other choice.” That is, there simply aren’t enough Euro- or Yen-backed securities for investors to shift their money out of dollars and into some other currency.

But what if some kind of global coalition - say a trillion-dollar sovereign wealth fund allied with several countries around the world - banded together to create a gold-backed alternative to the dollar?

Why do I mention this in a forum on naval strategy and policy? Mr. Rickards explains:

“The national security community needs to be conversant with this,” Rickards said. “In defense, intelligence, and national security, you earn your money by preparing for things that may be remote, but pose an existential threat if they come to pass.”

Indeed. So, what are the ramifications for the Navy? On one hand, immediate examples seem to be decreased operating and maintenance funds, long-term impact on acquisitions and perhaps even a surge in seaborne instability, like piracy and smuggling. On the other hand, with a global economic crunch potential peer competitors like China and Russia would also be slowed. The possibilities seem endless, so what say you?

Counter-Piracy: The Drug War On Steroids

I wrote something off-handed the other day over at USNI's new blog that appears to fit more and more: "The piracy problem in the Horn of Africa looks more and more like the drug smuggling problem on the American coasts every day. The application of maritime forces can change the way pirates operate and influence to pace of pirates’ operations, but as long as there’s money to be made and the risk of death or arrest is acceptable, the pirates will be there".

This just helps confirm my suspicions:

Ahmed Dahir Suleyman is cagey as he talks about the global network that funds and supports piracy off the coast of Somalia.

"We have negotiators, translators and agents in many areas ... let me say across the world," said Suleyman, a pirate in the harbor town of Eyl, where scores of hijacked ships are docked.

"These people help us during exchanges of ransom and finding out the exact person to negotiate with," he told The Associated Press. Before cutting off the cell phone call, Suleyman snapped: "It is not possible to ask anymore about our secrets."

The dramatic spike in piracy in African waters this year is backed by an international network mostly of Somali expatriates from the Horn of Africa to as far as North America, who offer funds, equipment and information in exchange for a cut of the ransoms, according to researchers, officials and members of the racket. With help from the network, Somali pirates have brought in at least $30 million in ransom so far this year.

"The Somali diaspora all around the world now have taken to this business enterprise," said Michael Weinstein, a Somalia expert at Purdue University in Indiana. He likened the racket to "syndicates where you buy shares, so to speak, and you get a cut of the ransom."

Weinstein said his interviews with ransom negotiators and Somalis indicate the piracy phenomenon has reached Canada, which is home to 200,000 Somalis.

John S. Burnett, a London-based author working on a book about hijackings off the Somali coast, said there is no doubt Somali pirates are part of "transnational crime syndicates." He said information from sources, including people involved in ransom negotiations and payouts, indicates the money goes as far as Canada and capitals in Europe.

"Places like Eyl are getting only a portion of the millions in ransom being siphoned off," he said. "The Somali diaspora is huge."

Sheik Qasim Ibrahim Nur, director of security at Somalia's Interior and National Security Ministry, said evidence points to Somali expatriates in Kenya and the United Arab Emirates, but declined to give further details. He said there is "no doubt" the pirates have links outside Somalia.

The French Have It Right On Piracy

The commander of French naval forces in the Horn of Africa understands where the piracy problem must be solved:

Piracy in the Gulf of Aden will only be defeated by a strong government in Somalia, the commander of the French naval operation in the Indian Ocean said on Sunday.

"We will not end this phenomenon unless we have a Somali government that has the means to act on its territory to fight piracy," Vice-Admiral Gerard Valin said on the sidelines of a regional security conference organized by Bahrain and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).
...
Valin also hailed the European Union naval mission in the Gulf of Aden as a major step in battling the surge in attacks and hijackings by ransom-hunting Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden, a crucial trade route used by 12 percent of the world's maritime trade and 30 percent of its oil.

"It is really a leap forward, since this is the first time that a coalition has been formed with the mission of fighting piracy," he told AFP.

The EU mission Atalante, a coalition that groups eight EU countries, began operations off the coast of Somalia on December 8 to try to stem the growing piracy, including the hijacking of a Saudi supertanker last month.

America seems to understand, too, but the proposed solution is a little perplexing:

The Bush administration will mount a last-ditch push this week to muster international backing for a relatively small U.N. peacekeeping mission in Somalia, in an effort to help stem piracy and prevent the resurgence of Islamist militants in the lawless East African nation, according to State Department officials.
...
The United States has already begun informal negotiations on a resolution that would authorize the transformation of the existing African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) -- which includes 3,400 Burundian and Ugandan peacekeepers -- into a somewhat larger U.N. mission. The peacekeepers would be restricted to Mogadishu and other parts of southern Somalia, according to U.S. officials.

U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon concluded last month that even a larger and better-equipped U.N. peacekeeping force of 22,000 blue helmets would not be capable of stabilizing Somalia and that a much more powerful multinational force was needed.

But a spokeswoman from the U.S. mission to the United Nations, Nicole Deaner, rejected Ban's proposal Friday, saying it is not a "viable option" since no country is prepared to lead or finance such a mission. "AMISOM is an effective peacekeeping force and will provide a good starting place in developing and deploying a future U.N. mission," she said.

Perplexing, that is, until you read on to the end of the story:

The Bush administration has received support from China and key African countries, including South Africa, which have pressed the United Nations to mount a large new peacekeeping mission in Somalia. "All the experts who know Somalia say the chance of everything falling apart is great," said South Africa's U.N. ambassador, Dumisani Shadrack Kumalo. "Unless something is done immediately, the radical Islamic groups will be running Mogadishu again tomorrow with very harsh Islamic principles that they want to impose."

So, what this looks like is a piece in the War on Terror pie portrayed as the kernel of a piracy solution. Perhaps that's true, but just how long does the administration believe it will take?

Quick Math For Anti-Piracy Operations [Update 3]

Observing the first phase of Operation Atalanta, I've run through some of the numbers to get a feel for the economic price taxpayers in the EU will be incurring to stem the tide of piracy in the Horn of Africa. Here's what I came up with:

Each group of ships involved will spend approximately 120 days on station and another 15 days transiting to and from the region. With 10 frigates, three smaller combatants, one support ship and a small staff involved, I estimate there are about 1750 sailors in the force. Picking an average cost rate of $40k per year in pay and another $10 per day in food, the personnel costs run approximately $28.4 million for each phase, or $85.1 million for the entire year-long operation.

Then, looking at fuel costs, a group this size will run through around 1,400 barrels of fuel per day while transiting and perhaps 800 barrels per day on station, which at $125 per barrel yields a cost of $14.6 million per phase and $43.9 million for the entire operation.

So, not even considering maintenance, ordnance, flight operations, logistics and port and canal costs, the starting point to estimate the cost of the whole operation should be around $129 million. Other costs associated with a heightened operational tempo could increase the cost by another $20 million or more.

As of the first part of October this year, pirates have collected an estimated $30 million in ransoms in 2008.

[Update] Looks like costs may be increasing by a factor of two:

The European Union is urging nations from outside the bloc to join the EU’s anti-piracy naval force off Somalia, the fleet’s commander said.

“We are in talks with countries that want to contribute that have the potential to double the size of the force,” Admiral Philip Jones said today at a news conference in Brussels.

[Update 2] Reader Antonio comments: Also in your comparison to the $30M in ransom they've collected, you also need to look at the increased costs of insurance for ships transiting the region, as well as the economic impact of some vessels taking other, slower routes. I'm sure there are a host of other second and third order effects making the $129M+ expenditure seem more reasonable than just accounting for $30M in ransom.

My response: There are certainly costs associated with increased insurance and delayed shipments, but the only estimate I've seen of costs to the shipping industry is in the $16 billion range. That was sourced to an industry group and seems enormously inflated to me.

With approximately 20,000 ships transiting the Gulf of Aden every year, that would mean an increased cost of $800k per ship. Considering the hijacking rate is less than one in 300 and traffic through the region hasn't dropped off significantly, I find it hard to believe a shipper would pay an extra $800k in insurance per ship to avoid a 0.3% chance of having to pay a couple of million dollars in ransom.

If the annualized payout rate is $36 million in ransoms distributed over 20,000 ships insured, one would expect insurance to go up by about $1,800 per ship plus costs to the insurance companies processing claims. So what other costs are shippers incurring that must total around $798k per ship to raise the total cost to shipping into the $16 billion range?

I suspect someone did some quick math of their own to influence policy makers by assuming every ship transiting the Gulf of Aden diverted in one way or another and every shipping company paid the increased insurance rates. If my assumption is true, the "garbage in, garbage out" principle applies.

I need to see the numbers and assumptions to thoroughly evaluate the claim.

[Update 3] After doing a little research, the $16b claim seems to be sourced to Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister Tony Tan, quoted in a 2004 Foreign Affairs article by Gal Luft and Anne Korin, titled "Terrorism Goes to Sea".

Stefan Eklöf, a research fellow, Centre for East and Southeast Asian Studies, Lund University, Sweden, also calls this estimate into question in his book, Pirates in Paradise, and concludes a more reasonable estimate of the cost of piracy is $70m to $200m (p. 100).

The Times reports the average insurance rate for ships transiting the Gulf of Aden is $9,000, which is a more reasonable figure.

Sink The Carriers!

So says Naval Postgraduate School professor John Arquilla:

Over the next few decades the Pentagon is planning to spend more than $50 billion on its Gerald R. Ford class of aircraft carriers. The first of these 100,000-ton ships is due for completion in 2015, with others following as vessels in the existing 12-carrier fleet are retired. Since aircraft carriers are near helpless without a protective ring of about ten destroyers, frigates and cruisers, the military wants to invest in newer versions of these, too, at a cost of an additional $50 billion.

This plan constitutes a huge waste of taxpayer money and exemplifies the Defense Department's fixation on preserving legacy systems designed for a kind of war that the U.S. is likely never to fight again.

Arquilla's three big arguments are the supercarriers are too vulnerable, do too little for today's conflicts and America will never again see a conflict where they have utility. And I must say, I agree with him on two out of three points. Today's supercarriers are too vulnerable and aren't flexible enough, but whether we will ever need one again depends entirely on what China and Russia do over the next decade or two.

So, I say, line some out in the budget and draw down the inventory of supercarriers to around five from the current requirement of twelve. Then replace the other seven with smaller, more flexible platforms that trade some capability as offshore strike platforms for some expeditionary capability.

Thoughts?

Report: Iran Deploys Troops And Missiles To Eritrea

A report from The Cutting Edge caught my eye yesterday that has me wondering just what's going on between Iran and Eritrea.

Iranian ships and submarines have deployed an undisclosed number of Iranian troops and weapons at the Eritrean port town of Assab, according to opposition groups, foreign diplomats, and NGOs in the area.

The city of Assab sits at the Horn of Africa in the Arabian Sea. As such, Assab offers a strategic position as the world nervously eyes the precarious routes through which a seaborne oil traverses daily.

Local sources have reported that Iran recently sent soldiers and a large number of long-range and ballistic missiles. The military basing came after Iran signed an accord with Eritrea to revamp the Russian-built refinery used by the Eritrean Oil Company, also known as Assab Oil Company. As the world’s second largest import of gasoline, Iran is sensitive to a Western plan to obstruct its access to refined product as a part of broad sanctions provoked by Teheran’s nuclear activities. Iran needs nearby oil refining ability. Using protection of the Eritrean refinery as a pretext, Iran has set up its military operation there, and has been patrolling with unmanned surveillance drones.

First, I'm immediately skeptical that a submarine was involved, even if parts of the story are true. The Iranians just don't have the skill to pull that off and their subs are so small they wouldn't be a useful platform to transport much of anything.

It's certainly plausible that Iranian military personnel might be in Eritrea in an advisory (read "manipulative") role. It's also plausible that the Iranians may have delivered some form of missiles to Eritrea, either through a "basing rights" agreement or as payment-in-kind for use of Eritrean refining facilities, though what type of missile is in doubt. The Iranians provided coastal defense cruise missiles to Hezbollah, and some say Iranians were the actual operators. It's also possible that the Iranians are selling coastal defense or even short-range ballistic missiles to Eritrea so they can press their territorial disputes.

I see no reason to be alarmed at this point, but it will be interesting to see if the rumors that military hardware and personnel were transferred or deployed to Eritrea prove to be true.

Foreign Policy Climbs Out On A Piratical Limb

Foreign Policy makes an ill-considered call on their blog by placing a prediction regarding piracy as #3 of their "10 Worst Predictions for 2008". First, here's the prediction:

“[In] reality the risks to maritime flows of oil are far smaller than is commonly assumed. First, tankers are much less vulnerable than conventional wisdom holds. Second, limited regional conflicts would be unlikely to seriously upset traffic, and terrorist attacks against shipping would have even less of an economic effect. Third, only a naval power of the United States’ strength could seriously disrupt oil shipments.” —Dennis Blair and Kenneth Lieberthal, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2007

Now here's FP's take:

On Nov. 15, 2008 a group of Somali pirates in inflatable rafts hijacked a Saudi oil tanker carrying 2 million barrels of crude in the Indian Ocean. The daring raid was part of a rash of attacks by Somali pirates, which have primarily occurred in the Gulf of Aden. Pirates operating in the waterway have hijacked more than 50 ships this year, up from only 13 in all of last year, according to the Piracy Reporting Center. The Gulf of Aden, where nearly 4 percent of the world’s oil demand passes every day, was not on the list of strategic “chokepoints” where oil shipments could potentially be disrupted that Blair and Lieberthal included in their essay, “Smooth Sailing: The World’s Shipping Lanes Are Safe.” Hopefully, Blair will show a bit more foresight if, as some expect, he is selected as Barack Obama’s director of national intelligence.

First, it's quite a stretch to characterize the hijacking of one supertanker as a "serious upset" to the maritime flow of oil. Again, thus far the only consequences are those barrels of oil will be delayed to market and delivered at a higher cost.

And second, were the Somali pirates to take any action that posed more than the current nuisance factor, the international response would be (rightly) overwhelming. Indeed, a serious disruption in the flow of shipping through the Gulf of Aden might be the only thing that could get the international community to seriously address the roots of the piracy problem: instability in the Horn of Africa.

The Naval Institute's Catchup Game

The Naval Institue has finally taken a step that is long overdue: they've started a blog. Stop by and visit when you get a chance; they've got a host of familiar faces, including our gracious host, Galrahn.