Showing posts sorted by relevance for query port royal. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query port royal. Sort by date Show all posts

Saturday, February 28, 2024

Port Royal Damage Serious, Raises Maintenance Concerns

The USS Port Royal (CG 73) grounding is going to be expensive, at least I expect it to be. There are a lot of things that can get damaged when a ship goes aground, and tries to pull itself off the coral reef several days in row. A lot of the damage being reported by Navy Times in this article makes sense, but some of the damage bothers me a bit.
The hatches of the forward and aft vertical launch cells, which hold Port Royal’s arsenal of missiles, were damaged as the ship’s hull rolled and flexed with the waves.

The antennae and other equipment on the ship’s mast endured “severe shock” as the ship rolled on its reef. The shocks also affected the alignment of Port Royal’s Aegis radar arrays and other sensitive gear, costing the ship the use of its Aegis sensors as well as its ballistic-missile defense capability.
The VLS damage has me wondering if we are seeing an unfortunate side effect of VLS as opposed to rail launcher system, and I would appreciate some expert opinions on this. VLS is very economical for space, and allows the Navy to increase the weapon payload of our ships. Will this make opening all the VLS hatches a standard procedure for future groundings? Would we have seen a similar problem with a rail system? Shock and buckling from a ship being flexed isn't unique to being grounding, the effect of many weapon systems hitting a ship would produce the same effect.

The the article goes on to note something I had previously missed.
After the grounding, all surface ships were tasked with completing a series of internal reviews by Feb. 27, in a safety standdown ordered by Naval Surface Force commander Vice Adm. D.C. Curtis. The review was prompted by the cruiser mishap and the loss of a sailor during a boat-lowering operation in the Middle East earlier that week.

The crews of other ships have watched with trepidation to see how much money it would take to repair the Port Royal, said a second retired cruiser captain. The unexpected repair bill could get so high that it could draw money from other ships, forcing them to scale back or postpone scheduled maintenance.

A further complication was a Feb. 2 order — which came three days before the Port Royal grounding — that froze all maintenance spending for surface ships. The Navy had deferred about $450 million in payments, but Navy spokesmen would not say why.
With INSURV information being classified, it sure becomes easier for the Navy to conceal any side effects that come from deferring $450 million in maintenance spending for surface ships. I believe the current CG and DDG forces are the most important ships to the future Navy, particularly now that the Navy intends for them to serve 40 years. The material condition of those ships matters a great deal, and preventing the public from knowing the material condition of our ships with INSURV information insures that we do not get valid information that results from policy changes related to maintenance funding.

The bigger problem is Congress doesn't get good information either. Lets face it, unless they ask for it specifically, they will be unfortunate victims of the 'failed to mention that' syndrome that always trumps full disclosure.

Thursday, March 15, 2024

The FY13 Inactivation Schedule

From NAVADMIN 087/12
2. THE PROJECTED FY13 SHIP INACTIVATION SCHEDULE FOR INACTIVATING U.S. NAVAL VESSELS IS PROMULGATED AS FOLLOWS TO FACILITATE FLEET PLANNING EFFORTS TO CONDUCT A DECOMMISSIONING CONTINUOUS MAINTENANCE AVAILABILITY (CMAV) OR INACTIVATION AVAILABILITY (INAC):

SHIP NAME INACTIVATION POST DECOM STATUS
USS CROMMELIN (FFG 37) 31 OCT 2024 SEE NOTE 1
USS UNDERWOOD (FFG 36) 15 FEB 2024 SEE NOTE 1
USS CURTS (FFG 38) 27 FEB 2024 SEE NOTE 1
USS CARR (FFG 52) 15 MAR 2024 SEE NOTE 1
USS ENTERPRISE (CVN 65) 15 MAR 2024 SEE NOTE 2
USS KLAKRING (FFG 42) 22 MAR 2024 SEE NOTE 1
USS REUBEN JAMES (FFG 57) 30 AUG 2024 SEE NOTE 1
USS COWPENS (CG 63) 31 MAR 2024 SEE NOTE 3
USS ANZIO (CG 68) 31 MAR 2024 SEE NOTE 3
USS VICKSBURG (CG 69) 31 MAR 2024 SEE NOTE 3
USS PORT ROYAL (CG 73) 31 MAR 2024 SEE NOTE 3

NOTE 1: VESSEL IS DESIGNATED FOR FOREIGN MILITARY SALE (FMS). PER REF A, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF NON-TRANSFERRABLE TECHNOLOGY IDENTIFIED BY NAVSEA AND NAVY IPO UNDER SEPCOR, NO ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT REMOVALS ARE AUTHORIZED ON THE FRIGATES EXCEPT AS SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED BY OPNAV N8F IN RESPONSE TO A RECORD MESSAGE REQUEST THAT INCLUDES JUSTIFICATION FOR REMOVAL AND INCLUDES COORDINATION VIA THE APPROPRIATE SYSTEMS COMMAND. TYCOMS ARE REQUIRED TO ENSURE STRICT ADHERENCE TO THIS DIRECTION. PER REFS A AND B, IT IS NAVY POLICY THAT SHIPS DESIGNATED FOR FMS TRANSFER SHALL NOT BE STRIPPED. STRIPPING OF SHIPS PROVIDES DIMINISHED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY TO MARITIME PARTNERS AND CORRODES OUR EFFORTS TO BUILD MARITIME PARTNER CAPACITY. SEE PARAGRAPH 3 FOR ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT REMOVAL GUIDANCE.

NOTE 2: DATE INACTIVATION BEGINS IN A NAVAL SHIPYARD AND THE UNIT IS NO LONGER AVAILABLE FOR OPERATIONAL TASKING. FINAL DECOMMISSIONING DATE SHALL BE REPORTED TO THE CNO AND NVR CUSTODIAN IAW REFS B AND C.

NOTE 3: VESSEL WILL BE DECOMMISSIONED AND DISPOSED OF BY DISMANTLEMENT. REQUEST USFFC AND CPF COORDINATE REQUIREMENTS FOR UTILIZING VESSELS IN A LOGISTIC SUPPORT STATUS PRIOR TO THEIR DISMANTLEMENT WITH OPNAV N8F VIA N86.

3. AN OPNAV WORKING GROUP WILL BE REVIEWING THE LOGISTICAL NEEDS OF THE NAVY AND THE CAPABILITY NEEDS OF OUR MARITIME PARTNERS. FLEET REPS, PROGRAM OFFICES, AND FMS STAKEHOLDERS WILL BE PROVIDED AN OPPORTUNITY TO JUSTIFY THEIR REQUIREMENTS FOR EQUIPMENT REMOVALS AND EXPLORE OPPORTUNITIES TO MITIGATE IMPACT TO FLEET AND INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS AS PART OF THAT REVIEW. DETAILS OF THE WORKING GROUP FORUM WILL BE PROVIDED VIA SEPCOR.
Noteworthy the Navy is preparing to sell the Frigates, but is not going to sell the Cruisers. When I heard the Navy was going to decommission several Cruisers early, I was sure that meant they would be sold FMS. I guess not.

Basically, those 11 ships represents an entire Carrier Strike Group and more. That is a lot of capability to retire in a single fiscal year. Obviously the Navy has no choice with USS Enterprise (CVN 65), the ship is going to run out of nuclear fuel and at over 50 years old. Also noteworthy, USS Crommelin (FFG 37), USS Underwood (FFG 36), USS Curts (FG 38), USS Carr (FFG 52), and USS Klakring (FFG 42) will all be over 30 years old at retirement. The Oliver Hazard Perry class was built to serve 30 years, and that the ships made it truly is a reminder to the sturdy nature of the Perry class frigate. The USS Reuben James (FFG 57) will only be about 28.5 years old at retirement, and I am unsure why the ship is being retired before 30 years.

For me the Navy appears to have got their money's worth with the Enterprise and Perry frigates being retired next year. As for the cruisers, not so much...
  • USS Cowpens (CG 63) will be 24 years old at retirement. She is currently homeported in Yokosuka, Japan and should still have at least 11 good years in her. The ship was in a Selected Restricted Availability (SRA) maintenance period last month, and fields the AN/SPY-1B radar capable of being upgraded to the latest AEGIS ballistic missile defense baselines with the Cruiser modernization program.
  • USS Anzio (CG 68) will be around 22.4 years old at retirement. She is currently homeported in Norfolk, Virginia and should still have at least 13 good years in her. Also fielding the AN/SPY-1B radar, the ship was expected to be upgraded to a ballistic missile defense cruiser with the cruiser modernization program.
  • USS Vicksburg (CG 69) will be around 21.6 years old at retirement. She is currently homeported in Mayport, Florida and should still have at least 14 good years in her. USS Vicksburg (CG 69) departed with the USS Enterprise Strike Group this week on what is scheduled to be her last deployment. Also fielding the AN/SPY-1B radar, the ship was expected to be upgraded to a ballistic missile defense cruiser with the cruiser modernization program.
  • USS Port Royal (CG 73) will be around 20.3 years old at retirement. She is currently homeported in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii and should still have at least 15 good years in her. USS Port Royal (CG 73) ran aground in February 2009 and a great deal of money was spent repairing the ship over 7 months from the damage of that incident, and an additional $14 million was spent at the end of 2010 repairing cracks found in the ships hull. It is unclear if the ship is still suffering from serious problems related to that grounding incident, or simply a product of poor maintenance by the Navy. USS Port Royal (CG 73) is one of a handful of existing US Navy AEGIS Cruisers with Ballistic Missile Defense capability.
In my opinion, unless there are serious undisclosed material condition problems on these ships, this is a Bullshit Popsicle. The over 500 VLS cell missile capacity of these 4 warships exceed the combined missile capacity of the Royal Navy, the French Navy, the Italian Navy, the Spanish Navy, the Dutch Navy, the German Navy, the Turkish Navy, or the Danish Navy. These four ships are about equal in total missile capacity to the existing surface combatant force of the Royal Navy today.

These ships have a decade of life in them and were on the verge of modernization towards becoming four of the most powerful surface combatants in the history of naval warfare - all four for less than half a billion dollars. When the reality is the Navy couldn't spend 6x that much money to build even one of these ships new today, and all of these ships can serve at least a decade, the retirement of these ships at a time the Navy has scarce money for new ships, and is already short on capable warships, makes no sense at all to me.

I privately hope these ships are legitimate pieces of rusted crap behind the scenes, because if they aren't, the Navy is retiring good ships way too early. It would be a tragic waste of taxpayer investment if Congress allowed the Navy to throw taxpayer investment away so casually.

Tuesday, March 27, 2024

The Politics of Fleet Constitution

I went back and reviewed the Navy Readiness Posture hearing in the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness back on March 22, 2012. The hearing was held 2 days after I wrote this blog post.

The panel included Vice Admiral William Burke, Vice Admiral Kevin McCoy, and Vice Admiral David Architzel. I have a few thoughts.

It should be noted that nobody, not Congress and not the Navy, wants to keep USS Port Royal (CG 73). Considering that the current CNO classified INSURV reports several years ago, the condition of the USS Port Royal (CG 73) has been previously concealed to Congress and the American taxpayer.

All discussions apparently focus on the remaining three FY13 cruisers and to some extent, the three FY14 cruisers also set for early retirement.

Rep. Forbes and the Navy both cited different estimates for the modernization and maintenance of the cruisers scheduled for decommissioning in the March 22 hearing, but in the hearing Admiral Burke does a great job of highlighting how the numbers are actually the same - from different point of views. Rep. Forbes cites an estimate of $592 million in FY 13 and $859 million in FY 14 to modernize the cruisers, while the Navy claims the estimate of savings for early retirement of the cruisers is over $4 billion. It looks like they are both right, and both sides are making interesting arguments.

Vice Admiral Burke and Vice Admiral McCoy's arguments are very smart. Basically what they are saying is that it will cost about $4.1 billion to modernize, maintain, and operate the cruisers through the FYDP (next 5 budget years), and the Navy number includes manpower, training, and equipment costs like the helicopters while the numbers used by Rep Forbes estimates only part of the bill for keeping the cruisers. The concern the Navy has is that just because Congress finds money for modernization and keeping the cruiser hulls, the Navy won't get the additional funding for maintenance and operations of the cruisers in the out years and thus down the road the Navy won't have the extra funding to properly maintain the ships that Congress spent just enough money to save and modernize. That partial support of the early retirement cruisers would force the Navy to maintain the cruisers at the expense of other ships in the out years, which the Navy does not want to do.

The hearing was very interesting to me to listen to the second time because this time I noted that from the opening testimony - the discussion was focused on the cruisers, which I think has been the plan from the beginning. Lets take a step back and observe objectively what is happening.

A few years ago the Obama administration drew up a new strategy for National Ballistic Missile Defense that centered on the Navy's AEGIS BMD capability. A lot of noise was made of this major change, but in terms of shipbuilding, maintenance, and modernization of naval forces capable of fielding ballistic missile defense - no plan has changed since that announcement and no additional funding for ships from the administration ever went to the Navy to take on that rather important strategic role. I think that is important, because it highlights the strategy the Navy has come up with to find more money from Congress during the tight FY13 budget season.

The Navy has put 7 cruisers up for early retirement. Keep in mind that all 7 cruisers put up for early retirement in FY13 and FY14 are capable of being modernized for ballistic missile defense (Port Royal already has BMD capability, but Port Royal is apparently a lemon). I think that is pretty remarkable, because the US Navy actually has 7 cruisers not capable of being upgraded to BMD - the baseline 3 Ticonderoga class cruisers CG 52-58 which do not have the proper radar for AEGIS BMD. In other words, despite being given a new national strategic mission in ballistic missile defense, the US Navy has put up 7 surface combatants capable of performing the BMD mission up for early retirement when in fact the Navy has 7 surface combatants not capable of performing that BMD mission. Why would the Navy do this?

It is fairly obvious to this observer that the Navy put these cruisers on the chopping block precisely because they expected Congress to swoop in and save the 6 cruisers the Navy wants to save, and allow the Navy to dump the amphibious ships and no one will care. Cruisers are shiny toys that represent power projection, and these specific cruisers have a significant future ahead of them if the money was to be found and made available for the US Navy to keep them. To big Navy, amphibious ships are dull and boring, and all they do is all the hard, unsexy stuff.

I believe it is fairly obvious Congress is doing exactly what the Navy and the Obama administration wants them to do - saving the 6 cruisers and allowing the Navy to retire USS Port Royal (CG 73), and in fact the House Republicans are saving the cruisers in exactly the way the Navy and Obama administration (by that I mean SECNAV and CNO) wants them to do it - by making it an issue the House Republicans feel ownership of and thus are able to find funding for when budgets everywhere are tight. The Obama administration is basically using Rep. Forbes and Rep. McKeon to find money and pay for the administrations ballistic missile defense policy that is otherwise neglected and unfunded by the administration. It is part of a political game, and the Republicans seem perfectly willing to be played like a political fiddle in this political game.

Meanwhile big Navy is getting exactly what they want out the game. When it came time to make budget adjustments to the FY13 FYDP, to pay for more surface combatants the Navy is moving amphibious ships to the right, and by putting up the cruisers for early decommissioning the Navy insures Congress will save them, and discard the amphibious ships (which are listed, and nobody is talking about). Whether the issue is new shipbuilding or early retirements, big Navy has framed the argument perfectly in a way that Congress focuses on saving the surface combatants while the amphibious force suffers. Meanwhile, it is the amphibious ships that are making record length deployments being further worn out, while the replacements for the ships being worn out faster are being pushed further and further to the right in the shipbuilding plan.

Apparently Congress doesn't think the short dwell time of amphibious ship sailors is a big deal, so why should the CNO care? Congress is trying to draw a line in the sand on the early retirement of the cruisers, which is exactly what the Navy and the Obama administration wants Congress to do. In my opinion, Congress needs to think for themselves and not get sucked into the political game they are being manhandled in. If the House Republicans were playing this smart politically, they would target the LSDs for saving and save USS Cowpens (CG-63) - which is the cruiser in the best condition of those listed, and let the Obama administration hang themselves with their political shenanigans. If Congress doesn't save the cruisers, it is the Obama administration that has to answer questions why they are now neglecting their own ballistic missile defense strategy. Nobody cares of course, except Congress - which is why it is a solid plan by the Obama administration.

Make no mistake, the Obama administration not only expects the House Republicans to save the cruisers, they are in full support of it - because Congress saving the cruisers is actually the Obama administrations plan. By the time the voting comes around, I fully expect broad bi-partisan support to save the cruisers, but I do not believe there would be bi-partisan support to save the amphibious ships. Why? Because that isn't the administrations plan.

The administration doesn't care how the cruisers are saved when there is no money to pay for them, because if they did they wouldn't have given that problem to the House Republicans to figure out.

I find it all fascinating. I also truly believe that if the Congress doesn't save the cruisers set for early retirement in the FY13 budget, those three cruisers set for early retirement in FY14 will suddenly find the money to survive early retirement. The Navy is only gambling as many as six cruisers because it is a safe bet that some of them will be saved. I still wonder to myself what the number of cruisers is the Navy expects to get back from Congress - in a worse case scenario - and if that number can be achieved while saving the amphibious ships.

If Congress wants to draw a line in the sand on early retirements, I hope they draw that line around the amphibious ships. The Navy will find a way to fund their major surface combatant force - and the FY13 budget itself is proof they always do. Come hell or high water, before a single cut is made to surface combatants in either shipbuilding or early retirement, observe that first the amphibious ships will be thrown overboard by big Navy until and only if/when Congress says otherwise.

Monday, February 9, 2024

Port Royal Pulled Free

USS Port Royal (CG 73) has been pulled off the sand. Nice bit of reporting at Navy Times by Phillip Ewing, giving us some of the information I know people here are interested in.
He said the Navy knows the ship’s rubber sonar dome was damaged in the grounding, but he didn’t know how badly, nor how many other problems the grounding may have caused. A lighter barge brought alongside over the weekend was also slammed by waves against the Port Royal’s side, although it wasn’t clear whether that damage was serious.

To lighten the ship enough to pull it off the rocks, engineers emptied the cruiser’s tanks of seawater pumped in to compensate for the fuel oil burned by its engines. The ship also jettisoned its anchors and anchor chains, and offloaded more than 100 crew members, Gureck said. Then the Military Sealift Command salvage ship Salvor, the powerful tug Dove — which is used to tow the Sea-Based X-Band radar — and seven other Navy and civilian tugs worked at high tide for 40 minutes early Monday to pull the Port Royal off the rocks.
The article goes on to mention Rear Adm. Dixon Smith apparently went on the ship on Friday, after the grounding, to take charge of the salvage operations.

The ship had to remove 600 tons of stuff to be pulled free, and will be put into dry dock next week after a damage assessment.

Good job to those who pulled the ship loose. Most importantly, no injuries.

Sunday, November 4, 2024

5th Fleet Focus: The Final Puzzle Piece

First it was announced the big stick, specifically the rather large Truman Carrier Strike Group, deploys on Monday. Then it was pointed out those 'extra elements,' specifically a strike group focused around anti-submarine warfare and mine warfare, would be deploying to the Persian Gulf in early 08. Finally, we have the rest of the puzzle also deploying tomorrow, bringing with it those two specific pieces of defense it is only smart to have.

More than 5,500 Marines and sailors are making final preparations this weekend for a Monday departure and deployment to the Western Pacific and Persian Gulf, Navy officials said.

The amphibious assault ship Tarawa will lead two other San Diego-based amphibs, the dock landing ship Germantown and the amphibious transport dock Cleveland for the scheduled six-month deployment to the U.S. 7th Fleet and 5th Fleet regions.

En route, the Tarawa Expeditionary Strike Group will link up with three ships: the frigate Ingraham, based in Everett, Wash., and the cruiser Port Royal and destroyer Hopper, both based in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.


No, the US isn't sending Marines into Iran, although I believe the 11th MEU is scheduled to do a few weeks training in Kuwait (this is not new). Rather, I'm talking about the USS Port Royal (CG 73) and the USS Hopper (DDG 70).

You have to have two, not one, in case you didn't know. I'm talking about AEGIS Ballistic missile defense, and how it works. In this case, the USS Hopper (DDG 70) acts as the early warning Long Range Tracking ship while the USS Port Royal (CG 73) would act as an interceptor.

I would consider it highly unlikely that the USS Port Royal (CG 73) would deploy with SM-3s though. First, the Navy simply doesn't have enough SM-3s to spare. Second, that information would probably leak. Finally, there are plenty of Patriot missiles in theater that can act as interceptor, removing the need for SM-3s.

Noteworthy none the less, the Navy is sending 2 AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense ships to the Gulf with the Tarawa ESG. In case you are wondering, the Navy has deployed 1 AEGIS destroyer with BMD LRS&T capability in the last 3 Pacific strike groups, specifically the Nimitz CSG, Stennis CSG, and Bonhomme Richard ESG.

So what is different? This is the first time the Navy is sending one of its BMD cruisers to the Gulf. If you ask the Navy, I'm sure they will quote what the British said about the minesweeper deployment, this is a scheduled deployment, and has nothing to do with Iran...

Saturday, February 9, 2024

HMS Illustrious Returns To Port, Again...

HMS Illustrious has returned to port, again, because of another piece of faulty equipment. This is the second time the HMS Illustrious has returned to port since its departure on Jan 21.

A Royal Navy vessel on its way to a diplomatic tour in the Indian Ocean has been unable to leave port for a second time due to mechanical failures.

HMS Illustrious is in Portland, Dorset, after a system that stops oil being discharged from the ship became faulty.

The ship first left Portsmouth on 21 January to carry out exercises in the Channel before its four-month tour.

The BBC goes on to report the port visit to Portland was scheduled, supposedly.

A Royal Navy spokeswoman said the visit to Portland was planned despite the latest mechanical problems preventing the vessel returning to sea.

I have a big problem with this, because if it is true it says worse things than if it is false, so I'm hoping this Royal Navy spokesman is simply telling a lie. By believing the HMS Illustrious was scheduled to make a port visit in Portland, then what the Royal Navy is actually telling us is that they aren't just too cheap to fly spare refrigerator parts out to the Middle East should that system break, but they are actually too cheap to fly parts out to Portland!

When you take a snap shot of the world today, you can throw conventional wisdom about Navies out the window. Who would have ever thought that the Russian Navy can deploy an aircraft carrier task force without having to return to port with problems, but the Royal Navy cannot. I love how the British people blame the wars, as if a war that involves what amounts to around a single full division of British land power explains why their military is in rapid decline of capability. If a nation with a major world economy can't conduct war with only a single division without breaking core capabilities of its entire military, then that nation can't blame the war for its problems.

Monday, March 9, 2024

More on Port Royal Damage

AP report on Port Royal damage.

The U.S. Pacific Fleet on Friday said propeller blades, the sonar dome and underwater hull were among the damaged parts of the guided-missile cruiser USS Port Royal.

It says the ship sustained between $25 million to $40 million in damages when the warship ran aground on a coral reef for three days.

Navy officials dispute a report Monday by The Navy Times that a Navy preliminary assessment cited the ship's damaged ballistic missile defense capabilities.

Previous discussion regarding the Navy Times article here. If you recall, the Navy Times article was important because it noted a shortage of maintenance funding. It would have been nice if officials would have addressed that issue.

Expensive.

Friday, February 6, 2024

USS Port Royal Hard Aground - Updated

From the Honolulu Advertiser:
The USS Port Royal, a Pearl Harbor-based guided missile cruiser, remained aground today approximately a half-mile south of the airport's Reef Runway.

The Navy said the ship ran aground about 9 p.m. last night.

The Navy said the ship is stuck in sand and there are no oil or fuel leaks.

Navy tugs tried early in the morning to nudge the 9,600-ton warship away from the spot it hit but were unsuccessful.

The Navy says divers from Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit One from Pearl Harbor and the salvage ship USS Salvor will try to tow the warship.
Normally I wouldn't bother posting about a grounding here, but PORT ROYAL is one of just three BMD cruisers in the fleet and she looks to be well in the shoal water on Runway Reef and parallel to the beach, to boot. The Advertiser's picture is here.

Judging by the pictures, I'd say she's 500-1,000 tons aground. Not good.

There's a lot of good Sailors on that ship, so be judicious with your discussion. I'm going to refrain from further speculation and comments other than to remind myself, there, but for the grace of God, go I.

Update: Galrahn here, Yankee Sailor updates with an estimate in the comments of around 5000 tons aground. This is going to be a difficult salvage job if the wave action is still driving the ship the sand. Since everything regarding the actions of the ship itself is absent any good information, I'd prefer to keep the comments focused on the salvage operation to lift the ship.

All informed comments and questions welcome.

Sunday, September 27, 2024

Book Review: Flotilla

I recently finished Donald Shomette's Flotilla: The Patuxent Naval Campaign in the War of 1812. The United States initiated the War of 1812 in response to the activity of the Royal Navy, including the impressment of US sailors and the restriction of US freedom of trade. Territorial aggrandizement was also a goal; although opinions differ on how serious the US was about the annexation of Canada, the elimination of British influence along the frontier was understood as necessary to further US settlement and expansion. In spite of US growth since the Revolution, Great Britain remained militarily dominant by any metric. It was hoped, however, that the British would be too distracted by the war against Napoleon to devote their full attention to North America. Unfortunately for the Americans, the Royal Navy had largely eliminated the French Navy as a major threat, and was able to devote serious attention to the United States from the beginning of the war. The US coastline was virtually unprotected, leaving American vulnerable to trade blockade and to raids. The Royal Navy decided to concentrate its activity in the Chesapeake Bay area, home of the new US capitol and of the major port of Baltimore.

In response to the overwhelming dominance of the Royal Navy, Revolutionary War veteran Joshua Barney proposed to the Secretary of War a new set of tactics. In order to carry out their raiding operations, large, deep draft Royal Navy vessels had to accept some vulnerability, and had to employ launches in order to deliver and recover troops. Barney reasoned that a flotilla of shallow draft barges could sufficiently harass Royal Navy raiding parties to make the operations too costly and dangerous to carry out. Barney received approval from Washington to build a flotilla and recruit a corps of sailors necessary to carry out this effort; for his pains, he was made Commodore of the flotilla. The organization was distinct from the USN, and was viewed with some hostility by military professionals. Nevertheless, it represented the only chance to break the hold of the Royal Navy over the Chesapeake, a hold that was becoming increasingly intolerable as escaped slaves began to flock to the British flag.

Barney was able to put together his flotilla, but he was unable to stop Royal Navy depredation. The British took the flotilla seriously, and treated it as the major threat in the Chesapeake. They responded by bottling the flotilla up and blockading it on the Patuxent River. This utilized some Royal Navy resources, and the Americans were able to score some minor victories, but no major British vessels were lost, and British raiding activity continued. Local militia had no interest in fighting the British, and typically fled at the first shot. Because of the large number of pro-British slaves (male slaves of age were trained to fight, while the rest were freed and sent either to Canada or British Caribbean possessions), the Royal Marines typically had excellent intelligence as to American capabilities and dispositions.

The Chesapeake campaign resulted in an almost complete victory for the Royal Navy. Atlhough the British were unable to secure and burn the city of Baltimore, they managed to burn and loot much of the rest of the region, including the city of Washington. The British looted an enormous quantity of tobacco, ground regional commerce to a halt, and freed a substantial number of American slaves. Barney's flotilla was scuttled to prevent capture, although his men served heroically at the Battle of Bladensburg and at Fort McHenry. British victory depended not only on vast material superiority, but also on exceptional skill on sea and on land. American militia and regular Army were simply inadequate to the task of fighting the battle-hardened British on anything approaching equal circumstances. It didn't help that the very best American forces were deployed to the Canadian border. Moreover, the outcome of the Chesapeake campaign should have been essentially foreseeable to American policymakers. While Americans lacked the capacity to challenge the Royal Navy in anything but single-ship battles, it was obvious that the British would use their superiority at sea to devastate American coastal areas. The presence of the French and Spanish navies had limited the damage during the Revolution, but neither were a factor in the War of 1812. I think it can be plausibly argued that the War of 1812 represents the biggest "mistake war" in American history; regardless of whether sufficient cassus belli existed, the United States was simply not up to the task of launching and winning a war against Great Britain.

The American strategy in the Chesapeake campaign represents the same kind of asymmetric, small boat strategy that gave the USN fits in the first half of this decade. To be sure, the Americans also employed other asymmetric strategies, most notably a commerce raiding campaign that depended both on USN frigates and on privateers. Nevertheless, as the points of comparison between the Royal Navy of 1814 and the USN of 2009 are obvious, it's not surprising that opponents adopt broadly similar methods. The small boat strategy is not, apparently, dependent upon a particular constellation of technologies. Small boats can always provide some threat to large ships in littoral areas, although I think it could be argued that the development of the torpedo increased small boat lethality. German torpedo boats significantly reduced Allied freedom of action off the French coast in World War II, for example. Indeed, there's nothing new about the idea of blowing up a small boat next to a big ship, although the suicide element is reasonably novel. Of course, small boats can and have also been utilized as part of a larger symmetrical strategy of warfare; the USN PT-Boat campaign of World War II caused the Japanese no end of difficulty.

The experience of Barney's flotilla also brings up some interesting issues regarding the behavior of military organizations. Barney was forced to essentially invent the flotilla, without significant support (and indeed against opposition) from the United States Navy. Barney did his own recruiting, designed his own ships, and procured his own artillery, provisions, and ordnance. To be sure, he didn't do this from his own funds; both the US government and the State of Maryland gave him some support. Also, even a regular naval commander of the Napoleonic Era had to play the role of independent contractor on many occasions, as readers of Patrick 'Brian will be well aware. Nevertheless, the organizational environment that he created is quite distinct from that which exists in any modern military organization. I suspect that it would be nearly impossible to create such an organization today in a modern state; the institutional and legal barriers would be insurmountable. The exception that proves the rule might be Iran's Revolutionary Guard, which has managed to create naval forces independent of the main naval organizations of the Islamic Republic. The Revolutionary Guard, however, enjoys a level of political and organizational independence that is extremely rare in a modern state, and that depends on the peculiar institutions of modern Iran.

Barney's task was undoubtedly made easier by the fact that he could draw upon a population that was familiar with the sea and with boats. This substantially increased the recruiting pool, the interest level (people who depended on the sea were particularly vulnerable to the British), and the skill level of the recruits. I found this interesting in that it supported Mahan's contention that one of the pillars of naval power is a population that is familiar with and interested in maritime life. I have always had some doubt that this is the case in the industrial era; I don't, for example, believe that a serving officer born and raised in Nebraska is any less capable than an officer raised in Maryland or Massachusetts. This is because the tasks of modern naval life are sufficiently distant from the tasks of civilian maritime experience to make any initial differences disappear beneath professional military training. I have no doubt, however, that a population oriented around maritime activities was critical to naval power in the Age of Sail and before. I'm also inclined now to think that the success of irregular naval forces (of which Barney's flotilla is an example) is much more sensitive to the maritime capabilities of a given population than is that of a professional naval organization.

It's odd that the small boat strategy always seems somewhat surprising to established navies, especially given the recurrence of such strategies over the years. One reason might be that navies are organizationally inclined to think about threats that are symmetrical. A Mahanian naval stance requires modern shipbuilding capabilities and a long organizational tail. A commerce raiding or cruiser strategy requires much the same thing, if on a different scale. A small boat strategy, however, can be conducted by organizations utterly unlike a modern Navy. In its relatively ad hoc approach to construction, procurement, and recruitment, Barney's flotillas shares some characteristics with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, the pre-independence Israeli naval forces, the Tamil Tigers, and even Al Qaeda. In combination with the above observation regarding the importance of "people of the sea" to irregular naval forces, there's undoubtedly some interesting work to be done regarding the prospects for Al Qaeda penetration into various maritime-oriented tribal networks in SE Asia. I suspect that there are also some interesting observations to be made regarding population, professionalism, and the effectiveness of small boat strategies.

In any case, Flotilla is valuable both to those interested in naval history, and to those focusing on small boat and irregular warfare strategies. I highly recommend it.

Friday, June 26, 2024

Microbes Against the Giant: The Maritime Strategy of the Jeune École, Part V

The French Battleship Hoche, circa 1886 (Courtesy Wikimedia Commons)


For previous installments, see Parts I, II, III, and IV


The Testing of Jeune École Theory

Aube’s 1886 appointment as Minister of the Marine signified the political victory of the Jeune École and its allies over the traditionalists. However, despite the passionate debates of the early 1880s, neither side could point to experiments in the operational fleet that proved or disproved Jeune École theories. Aube aimed to change this.   
In February 1886, Aube dispatched several torpedo boats from Atlantic ports through the Straits of Gibraltar to Toulon in order to test their long-range seaworthiness during rough winter seas. All the boats arrived safely in Toulon, but some of the boat Commanding Officers reported their crews endured severe seasickness and exhaustion at times from being battered by the winter seas. Meal service and sleep were similarly difficult. Hull vibrations caused by the boats’ engines further added to the crews’ woes. Several of the Commanding Officers reported that torpedo boat operations at sea could not be sustained beyond two to three days of rough weather, after which the crews would require recovery periods in port. For his part, Aube interpreted the report’s negatives as “problems to be solved” that did not detract from this proof-of-concept demonstration’s success.[i]
And yet, there was no getting around the number of portcalls the boats had to make during their transit in order to resupply as well as provide their crews some rest. Nor was there any getting around the Commanding Officers’ recommendations regarding the maximum practicable duration of a torpedo boat underway period.[ii] This essentially invalidated the Jeune École oceanic concept of operations for torpedo boats, raised questions about boat squadrons’ ability to rapidly concentrate over long distances for coastal defense in difficult weather, and suggested that even medium sea states rapidly decayed boat crews’ combat readiness.
Experiments involving torpedo boat firing performance were similarly disappointing. As opposed to Charmes’s belief in torpedoes’ near-perfect hit probabilities, test results indicated that well-aimed Whiteheads fired at a range of 400 yards would at best hit a moving target only 33% of the time.[iii] This was a significant performance improvement from the first-generation Whiteheads and more than justified their combat utility. Nevertheless, it fell well short of the performance level the Jeune École expected.
During the summer of 1886, Aube conducted France’s first ever exercise involving its entire Navy. All of France’s torpedo boats transited to the Mediterranean for a series of four battle events against the battleship fleet. The first event tasked the torpedo boats with defending Toulon from bombardment by the battleship line. The second aimed at evaluating torpedo boats’ abilities to disrupt a battleship blockade and thereby support port breakouts by commerce raiders. The third looked at torpedo boats’ abilities to challenge battleships attempting to transit a strait. The final event examined torpedo boats’ abilities to raid battleships anchored at a forward operating base.[iv]
Results were mixed for the Jeune École. The torpedo boats failed to prevent simulated bombardment of Toulon in the first event, in part due to heavy seas. The port breakout exercise was more promising. Although the event umpires judged that the blockade line sunk the light cruiser as it tried to escape, the torpedo boats were assessed to have reached attack range on battleships 126 times. Twenty-one of these approaches were evaluated as excellent firing runs, with eight of these approaches involving torpedo boats penetrating extremely close to battleships before being detected.[v] This validated torpedo boats’ disruptive effects on a close blockade and suggested that given supportive weather conditions, small warships could menace if not deny enemy attempts at controlling the terminal approaches to a port.
The third and fourth exercises faired worse for the Jeune École. In event three the battleships conducted a nighttime straits transit, and although they kept their navigation lights illuminated they were never approached by the torpedo boats.[vi] Aube and his staff tried to explain that the results were not representative of torpedo boats’ potential, as many of the boats were not capable of “autonomous” operations and suffered from faulty compasses to boot. Those that were “autonomous-capable,” Aube claimed, experienced no such problems and as such hinted at what a boat flotilla might achieve if properly outfitted.[vii] 
Event four began with the battleship anchorage location’s disclosure to the torpedo boats. However, poor weather delayed the torpedo boats’ departure from Toulon for two days, and even then only twelve of the larger boats along with two cruisers and a coastal defense ship actually sortied. The seas forced half the torpedo boats to turn back, and one additional boat suffered an engineering casualty just prior to the attack. Those that actually arrived at the target anchorage after the twelve hour transit suffered from crew exhaustion and their squadron commander doubted that they retained any ability to press an effective attack.[viii] While there was some debate between Aube’s staff and the Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet regarding the actual combat readiness and efficacy of the boats once they arrived on scene, it was obvious even to Aube’s staff that the event had not gone well for the boats. Aube’s Chief of Staff was left to argue that “pride and self-respect” would enable a torpedo boat crew to function under such arduous conditions.[ix]
Similar exercises were conducted the next year. In the 1887 events, 32 torpedo boats, 3 light cruisers, and a coastal defense mothership failed to prevent the Mediterranean battleship squadron from transiting the Balearic Passage. What’s more, the battleships were judged to have sunk most of the torpedo boats and their mothership at standoff range. Some torpedo boats failed to transit from their starting points in time to intercept the battleships despite cueing. The Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet observed after these exercises that the boats were only effective when operating in groups or otherwise supported by larger warships. Even then, he noted, torpedo boat concealment until the moment of attack was critical to their success.[x] One suggested tactic was for torpedo boats to hide behind friendly ships of the line during a melee until the gunfire smoke became thick enough for a torpedo boat charge.[xi]
These two years of experiments confirmed that torpedo boats could provide the battlefleet with powerful new tools for port defense and other sea denial missions under specific operational conditions. As one ought to have expected, torpedo boat effectiveness in a given situation depended heavily on visibility conditions, sea conditions, required transit distances and times, coordination with larger warships, coordination with other torpedo boats, and concealment before attack. The experiments confirmed Grivel’s wisdom from a decade earlier that successful Guerre de Course and coastal defense demanded a balanced fleet consisting of both heavy and light warships.
The experiments had the additional effect of restoring credibility to the traditionalists. The embarrassing failure of the bateau-cannon during operational testing also contributed to this, as the gunboat’s small size denied it the necessary stability for accurate firing.[xii] The Admiralty argued that Jeune École doctrine failed to account for seakeeping as demonstrated by the fleet experiments’ documented results. They also noted that new technologies offered barriers against effective torpedo attack.[xiii] Across the English Channel, the Royal Navy worked to prove the traditionalists correct.

The Royal Navy’s Response

The Royal Navy’s delayed transition to steel meant that its naval gun designs of the 1870s barely improved upon earlier capabilities. Most Royal Navy guns of this era were iron muzzle-loaders configured for close-in broadsides; they lacked the accuracy for engagements at longer ranges. Krupp’s all-steel breech-loading gun designs of the 1870s rendered the Royal Navy’s arsenal obsolete, particularly after steel guns were paired with shaped grain propellants offering higher muzzle velocities.[xiv] The Royal Navy’s delay in adopting steel meant that its capital ships’ sides were not heavily armored, leaving them especially vulnerable to the impact-fused Whiteheads.[xv]
Already stung by its vulnerability to the new weapons, Royal Navy fears were amplified by Aube’s provocative new ideas and anti-Anglo rhetoric. Around 1885, the Royal Navy shifted its procurement priorities in response to the Jeune École threat as well as increasing tensions with Russia. In doing so, it benefited greatly from that fact that quick-firing naval gun technologies had matured rapidly since the mid 1870s. By the time the Royal Navy sought its first anti-torpedo boat weapons, light and medium caliber gun systems available on the open market could be readily trained on a maneuvering target and sustain up to fifteen rounds a minute out to 2,000 yards, well beyond the maximum range of a Whitehead. Steel torpedo nets lowered over a warship’s side into the water offered protection while at anchor or transiting at speeds under 7 knots. Electric searchlights could deny approaching boats the cover of night. However, Royal Navy experiments showed that gunsmoke still degraded guncrews’ visibility, anxious guncrews often fired at shadows cast by searchlights, the area illuminated by a single searchlight remained limited, and torpedo nets constrained ship maneuvers as well as denied crucial speed when trying to intercept commerce raiders.[xvi] Although the 1887 introduction of high-energy smokeless powder in the Royal Navy helped address the gunsmoke problem, its ships of the line still needed increased maneuver and engagement space for torpedo defense.[xvii]
HMS Rattlesnake, circa 1886 (Courtesy Wikimedia Commons)


In 1885, the Royal Navy began constructing “torpedo boat catchers” armed with quick-firing guns to defend blockading squadrons against enemy torpedo boats. These warships provided the Royal Navy with its first defense-in-depth against the torpedo boat threat, allowing the fleet to engage or disrupt enemy boats well outside maximum Whitehead range. The 550 ton Rattlesnake-class torpedo boat catchers featured a breech-loading 5” gun, six 3-pound quick-firing guns, and four torpedo tubes. Unfortunately, their top speed of 19.25 knots barely allowed them to keep pace with their prey. Torpedo boat catchers and torpedo boats also shared similar stability and engine vibration issues.[xviii] Nevertheless, torpedo boat catchers and the fleet’s other new ship self-defense technologies of the 1880s presented new risks to torpedo boats that the Jeune École had not accounted for and could not ignore.

HMS Orlando, circa 1897 (Courtesy Wikimedia Commons)

The Royal Navy achieved greater immediate success countering the Jeune École light cruiser threat. Seven armored cruisers of the 5,600 ton Orlando class were laid down beginning in 1885. Orlandos were designed to carry large amounts of coal for long-range shipping lane defense missions and could steam up to 18 knots.[xix] These were followed by the two hulls of the 9,150 ton Blake class protected cruisers in 1888. Blakes could achieve speeds in excess of 21 knots and also possessed exceptional coal-carrying capacity.[xx] Forty-two additional cruisers were built under the 1889 Naval Defence Act, including nine 7,300 ton Edgar class protected cruisers designed for long-range trade defense and thirty-three 3,500 ton cruisers of various classes optimized for trade defense closer to the British Isles. This tally of new British cruisers dwarfed the handful of commerce raiders received by the French Navy during the same period.[xxi] Furthermore, the Royal Navy cruisers had greater range, better armament, and generally better speed than their French counterparts.

Tomorrow, the conclusion: were the Jeune École visionaries to emulate or ideologues to deride?



The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.
 




[i] See 1. Ropp, 175-176; 2. Røksund, 65-67, 77-79. Of note, Røksund argues that Ropp came to incorrect conclusions regarding the Toulon voyage’s demonstrated results. Røksund notes that the relevant portions of the French Navy’s archives were not accessible when Ropp conducted his research, and as such Ropp never saw the full set of after-action reports from the torpedo boats’ Commanding Officers. Røksund highlights quotes from these reports that suggest the Commanding Officers believed their boats’ difficult habitability conditions in rough seas could be overcome through crew conditioning and the addition of a dedicated navigation officer. However, Røksund later states that many of the Commanding Officers’ reports also recommended that a torpedo boat operation’s duration needed to be capped at only a few days in order to avoid burning up crews. This contradicts the argument that crew conditioning could fully compensate for the habitability challenges. As such, Røksund shows that Ropp’s conclusions about the voyage’s demonstrated results were essentialy correct even though Ropp lacked access to the full reports. Røksund lastly asserts that however positively Aube may have spun the voyage results in public, the Minister’s private conclusions were far more restrained and humbling.
[ii] Røksund, 77-79.
[iii] Ropp, 175.
[iv] Ibid, 176.
[v] Ibid, 176-177.
[vi] Ibid, 177.
[vii] Røksund, 70-71.
[viii] See 1. Ropp, 177; 2. Røksund, 71-72. Of note, Ropp attributes the commander’s assessment summarized in this paragraph to the torpedo squadron’s Commanding Officer while Røksund attributes it to the Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet. Both historians used the same lecture by a French Navy Captain in 1898-1899 as their source. Interested future archival researchers may want to clarify which commander’s assessment was quoted in the lecture, as the data point must be viewed as containing greater bias if it came from the Fleet commander and not the squadron commander. Unless this question is definitively resolved in future research, my assumption is that the assessment came from the squadron commander because Røksund later notes that the Fleet commander argued to Aube’s Chief of Staff that the seas during this exercise were not rough.
[ix] Røksund, 72.
[x] See 1. Ropp, 177-178; 2. Røksund; 72-73, 87. There appears to be some confusion as to when this exercise actually occurred. Røksund describes a fifth event in the 1886 summer exercise whose tactical scenario closely matches the description of the exercise Ropp attributes to 1887. However, Røksund does not provide sourcing for his discussion of the fifth 1886 event whereas Ropp provides sourcing for the 1887 date. Ropp also asserts there were only four events in the 1886 summer exercise. To confound matters further, Røksund later states that the French Navy did not conduct a major fleet exercise in 1887. Though these differences are minor in the scheme of things, and there may very well have been two separate exercises with similar tactical scenarios, future researchers consulting the relevant French Navy archives may want to resolve the discontinuity nonetheless.
[xi] Sondhaus, 145.
[xii] Ropp, 174.
[xiii] Walser, 22.
[xiv] McNeill, 264-265.
[xv] Sondhaus, 143.
[xvi] Ropp, 137-138, 208.
[xvii] Sondhaus, 156-157.
[xviii] Eric W. Osborne. Destroyers: An Illustrated History of Their Impact. (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 2005), 29-31.
[xix] Anthony J. Watts. The Royal Navy: An Illustrated History. (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1994), 59-60.
[xx] Sondhaus,143-144.
[xxi] Ropp, 208.